

**Civic Engagement in Europe:**  
**A Multilevel Study of the Effect of Individual and National**  
**Determinants on Political Participation, Political Consumerism**  
**and Associational Involvement.**

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## List of abbreviations

CATPCA	Categorical Principal Components Analysis
CCSR	Cathy Marsh Center for Survey and Census Research
CID	Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey
DTSS	Data Theory Scaling System Group
EGP	Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero
ESS	European Social Survey
EVS	European Value Survey
FDR	Federal Republic of Germany
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HDI	Human Development Index
IAE	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ISC	Institute of Social Change
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
NSM	New Social Movement
NSMO	New Social Movement Organisations
MCA	Multiple Correspondence Analysis
PCA	Principle Categorical Analysis
PPP	Power Purchasing Parities
PPS	Purchasing Power Standards
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
WVS	World Value Survey

## **List of country abbreviations**

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
DK	Denmark
FI	Finland
FR	France
DE	Germany
GR	Greece
HU	Hungary
IT	Italy
IE	Ireland
LU	Luxembourg
NL	Netherlands
NO	Norway
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
SI	Slovenia
ES	Spain
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

## Abstract

Active and engaged citizens are the backbone of a strong democracy and a vibrant civil society. Yet recent trends of low electoral turnout in Europe and decreasing levels of civic engagement have called into question the legitimacy of governments and the stability of democracy in the long term, particularly in Europe.

Against the background of such developments this research sets out to provide a comparative study of civic engagement and analyse the variations in civic engagement between countries. The study is mainly based on the analysis of the European Social Survey 2002, covering 35,000 individuals from 19 European countries and applies advanced statistical modelling techniques including Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Multi-level modelling.

Although there is a good deal of research examining civic engagement using individual level data or aggregate level data, very few studies have combined both approaches. This study addresses this gap and applies multi-level modelling to examine the relative importance of an individual's socio-demographic characteristics and his/her country in determining levels and types of civic engagement. Thus, it has the advantage of identifying whether civic engagement is significantly affected by country characteristics or the converse, whether a person's characteristics (age, education, social class etc.) are all that is needed in order to account for the variations in civic engagement.

The innovative application of MCA to explore indicators of civic engagement has led to the identification of three dimensions of civic engagement; political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement. Moreover, by projecting all activities on a two-dimensional map it became evident that citizens who tend to carry out 'individual' types of political consumerism such as 'boycotting', boycotting and signing petitions are also more likely to be involved in New Social Movement organisations. These significant results shed new light on activities usually regarded as 'individualistic' type of activities and suggest viewing them in the context of a wider array of collective actions.

Furthermore, in addition to the standard contextual measures such as economic development, welfare regime, income inequality, and levels of democracy, this study introduced two innovative policy measures. To consider the impact of government policies on levels of civic engagement measures of governments' support of the voluntary sector and civic education at school (comparing the education policies of 19 European countries from 1945-2002) were developed.

The results confirmed the importance of both individual level characteristics as well as country level characteristics in explaining civic engagement in Europe. However, differences between countries were reduced to a greater degree when contextual factors were introduced. Particularly the welfare state, showed the greatest effect. This implies that socio-economic conditions and in particular social policy and the degree to which it reproduces egalitarian structures determine to a great extent citizen involvement. In other words the results of this study suggest that the national context matters and that governments can and do shape the nature and levels of civic engagement.

## Declaration

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this PhD to my parents. They have always supported my education.

## **Origin of the data**

This research is based on the European Social Survey (Round1, 2002/2003). The ESS is directed by a Central Co-ordinating Team led by Roger Jowell at the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, London. The project is funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country. The data is supplied by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (<http://ess.nsd.uib.no>).

## **The Author**

Necla Acik-Toprak has studied Islamic Studies, Politics and Sociology at the Free University of Berlin in Germany. She has worked on research projects on ethnic minorities and the labour market at the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) and the Working Lives Research Institute at the London Metropolitan University.

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# Chapter I

## 1. Introduction

Terms such as “civil renewal” and “active citizenship” may conjure up images of do-gooding or sitting in endless local meetings, and I am happy if need be to find a new vocabulary for this agenda. But whatever the terminology, the crucial policy imperatives are clear. We must aim to build strong, empowered and active communities, in which people increasingly do things for themselves and the state acts to facilitate, support and enable citizens to lead self-determined, fulfilled lives. In this way, we will genuinely link the economic and social, the civil and formal political arena, the personal with the public realm. (Blunkett, 2003: 43)

### 1.1 Background

The call for “civil renewal” and what is termed active citizenship in the UK and elsewhere in Europe is based primarily on the assumption that citizens in modern Western societies are increasingly disengaged from public life (Putnam, 2000). Moreover, low levels of electoral participation in the UK and in many other European countries (Norris, 2002) calls into question the legitimacy of democratic institutions, leading to a loss of public trust and support in the political processes and governments. Governments in Europe have therefore sought to re-engage citizens in their community affairs and give them more opportunities to participate in decision-making processes.

The key idea behind government thinking is that individuals must move away from being passive, self-centred consumers to become more active, community-spirited citizens who contribute to the ‘common good’ through engagement. (Jochum *et al.*: 2005: 15).

In recent years the social capital model became viewed by governments as a panacea for a wider range of problems in society. Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003) argue for example that there is a clear link between New Labour social policy and social capital ideas. Moreover, in 2002 the Performance and Innovation Unit (now the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit) attached to the Cabinet Office, produced a discussion paper analysing the literature and evidence on social capital, and its relevance to the development of future government policy (Aldridge *et al.*, 2002). The authors highlight the areas in which the UK government has introduced policies to increase levels of social capital; at the *individual level* by supporting families, volunteering and new approaches in dealing with offenders, at the *community level* by fostering community networks and at the *nation level* through citizenship education and service learning in schools, community service credit schemes etc. Other changes introduced by the Labour government in relation to social capital are

structural changes such as devolution and modernising government to make it more accessible and accountable.<sup>1</sup>

The social capital approach suggests that government performance can be improved if it faces a civic minded and active community, which in turn leads to a more content and democratic society and a transparent and responsive government. In these active communities, people develop norms of reciprocity and learn to trust each other. Through interaction with other members of the society, interest in wider societal issues and in politics increases, while at the same time communication skills, leadership etc. improves and this increases people's tendencies and abilities to articulate political interests and get involved in community affairs (Putnam, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Aldridge *et al.*, 2002). Given the promising cure of social capital, it is not a surprise that within a short period the concept has entered the policy agenda of many governments in Europe and across the Atlantic. Putnam, for example, became the adviser of the Clinton administration and he was also invited to a number of official talks in the UK, which included a visit to Buckingham Palace. At the same time research on social capital expanded and the concept was adapted by disciplines within the political sciences and sociology. The celebration of the social capital model brought studies on political participation and the voluntary sector to the forefront of discussions. Measuring citizen's levels of involvement became a measure for the health of a democratic society.

## **1.2 Definition of civic engagement**

In this context, studies of civic engagement gained a new significance for policy informed social research. It is in such an environment that this PhD topic was developed and funded by the ESRC and the CASE partner Unlock Democracy. Active citizenship and the importance of civic engagement for the quality of democracy and the health of a society become subject to research on social capital. Therefore, civic engagement can not be separated from discussions on social capital, as it is one major way in which to measure it in addition to norms and trust. Civic engagement in this context is often used to refer to citizens' involvement in voluntary organisations as well as to political activities of citizens (Putnam, 2000; Norris 2000; Inglehart, 1997).

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<sup>1</sup> See Labour parties web page; [http://www.labour.org.uk/democracy\\_and\\_citizenship](http://www.labour.org.uk/democracy_and_citizenship)

In the European Social Survey (ESS) the set of questions relating to political activities and involvement in voluntary organisations are asked in different set of questions. Political participation is captured through the following indicators: voted in the last national election, contacted a politician, government or local government official; worked in a political party or action group; worked in another organisation or association; worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker; signed a petition; taken part in a lawful public demonstration; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons; donated money to a political organisation or group; and participated in illegal protest activities.<sup>2</sup> Formal organisational involvement includes involvement (i.e. member, donour, participant, voluntary work) in 12 types of voluntary organisations. These include the following types of organisations: sports club or club for outdoor activities; organisation for cultural or hobby activities; trade union; business, profession, or farmers' organisation; consumer or automobile organisation; organisation for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants; organisation for environmental protection, peace or animal rights; religious or church organisation; political party; organisation for science, education, or teachers and parents; social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies; any other voluntary organisation.<sup>3</sup>

The first set of questions are usually grouped in the literature on social capital and civic engagement as 'political activities', while questions relating to formal organisational activities are grouped as 'social' or 'civic' activities. Yet, as I will demonstrate in chapter II, the conceptionalisation of civic engagement reflects the different models of democracy as well as the definition of what constitutes the private/public domain and therefore the definition of 'political' and 'social' or 'civic' activities. In chapter V, I will demonstrate that this becomes more complicated when attempting to operationalise civic engagement. In the political behaviour literature, the dualism of 'political' and 'social' activities is widely accepted,<sup>4</sup> and this is often reinforced by the way standardised survey questions on civic engagement are phrased, as it can also be seen in the ESS. In this study I focus how civic engagement can be conceptualised and operationalised, rather than rely on previous studies for definitions and measurements. Chapter V focuses on developing the dependent

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2.1 for the exact phrasing of the questions.

<sup>3</sup> For the exact phrasing of these questions please see Appendix 2.2.

<sup>4</sup> In his earlier work in the 1960s for example Dahl (1961) spoke of two types of citizen; those driven by the motivation to influence politics and those who are primarily involved in civic activities. Although, more recent studies recognise that many activities of citizens are driven by a mixture of both impulses, i.e. have social as well as political elements to it, the main distinctions are still along the lines of political activities versus civic activities or involvement in voluntary organisations (Campbell, 2006; Oliver, 2002).

variable - civic engagement - and broadly includes the above indicators as measured by the ESS.

This study does not include indicators of political efficacy and political interests, including cognitive engagement, such as discussing politics, to measure civic engagement, although they are asked by the ESS and might well be included as different aspects of civic engagement in any other analysis. Rather, the focus is on actual behaviour of citizens and why this behaviour changes from country to country. As this study focuses on civic engagement as well as the micro and macro factors that determine civic behaviour, it is not possible to explore all aspects of civic engagement. This would exceed the scope of this study. Moreover, incorporating attitudes and norms into the analysis would have conflated the analysis of civic engagement with an analysis on social capital. Often civic engagement and civic norms have a strong relationship with each other, which makes it difficult to separate their effects. Given the strong correlation of these attitudinal factors (i.e. political efficacy, trust, political interest etc.) with the dependent variable, it is sensible to exclude them from the analysis. Otherwise, there is a danger that civic norms account for the greatest amount of variation in civic engagement and therefore cancel out the effect of government policies and other contextual factors.

Participation takes on a multi-dimensional appearance. This was first examined in an empirical manner in the seminal study, *Participation in America* by Verba and Nie (1972), followed by a similar comparative study of seven countries (Verba *et al.*, 1978). These studies demonstrated that participatory activities had a structure which was common to different societies and cultures. Verba and Nie (1972) discovered that, on the whole, people tend to specialise in one or other mode of participation (if they were not totally inactive). As argued by Parry *et al.* (1992) participants could not be arranged into a single hierarchy.

Thus, for this study, the pooled data of the 19 European countries are used to identify common patterns of civic engagement across Europe. This does not mean that countries do not differ in terms of their profile of civic engagement. On the contrary, as Verba *et al.*'s (1978) study of seven Western countries pointed out, each country has a unique pattern of participation. According to the needs and problems of their citizens and according to their perception of the most effective forms of action for solving these problems, these countries, they argue, encourage various types and combinations of civic engagement. However, for this study the aim is to identify broad common patterns between countries,

which will serve as the dependent variable for further analysis. This also ensures that a wide range of activities are included in the analysis. Some activities might be very characteristic for some countries but not for others. For example, France and the Southern European countries have relatively high levels of demonstrations, while this is relatively low in the Scandinavian countries. Given that one of the aims of this study is to compare levels of civic engagement, it is important to include all civic engagement indicators in the analysis, rather than selecting only a few activities. Just as different citizens tend to engage in different activities, certain activities tend to be more prevalent in some countries than in others.<sup>5</sup>

Chapter II delivers the theoretical basis of this thesis and defines the dependent variable 'civic engagement'. The different concepts of citizenship and its implications for the definition of civic engagement will be discussed. By demonstrating how, over the years, studies have expanded their definition of political activities and moved to a wider array of civic activities, I will argue for a broader definition of civic engagement encompassing political and social activities, individual and collective activities, transcending the traditional public/private domains. This will be followed by chapter III, in which an overview of the main models of participation as well as a summary of the main debates on controversies on civic engagement will be given.

### **1.3 Why measure civic engagement?**

Civic engagement is crucial for a democratic system. While the Libertarian approach to democracy tends to measure the health of democracy by the extent the system allows checks and balances of power, the Republican, Communitarian and Radical Democracy approach tends to measure the strength and health of the democratic system by the degree of citizens' involvement in public life.<sup>6</sup> Most research that measures and compares levels of participation can therefore be grouped into the latter approach of democracy. Most of these studies have focused on individual level participation, exploring the characteristics of participants and non-participants. The results across countries point to similar trends, those with greater economic resources and those who have high levels of formal education are more likely to be involved in voluntary associations and are more able to make their voices heard compared to the poorer sections of the society. As Parry *et al.* (1992) warn in

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<sup>5</sup> See Parry *et al.* (1992) and Verba and Nie (1972) for a discussion of the multidimensional character of civic engagement.

<sup>6</sup> The Libertarian, Republican, Communitarian and Radical Democracy approaches to democracy is discussed in chapter II.

their classical study on *Participation in Britain*, unequal distribution leads to unequal representation. They point out that if the apathetic or the alienated are to be mainly found amongst particular social classes or in specific minority groups, these groups may fail to benefit from the distribution of rewards and benefits in society which could undermine support for the political system as a whole:

(...) political participation has served two contrasting functions. On the one side, it has enabled those classes of people who have been less successful in the economic market place to use political means to counter-balance their fortunes. This has been the fundamental purpose of socialist parties and of the political activities of trade unions. On the other side, those who are already advantaged socially and economically are also able to employ political means to reinforce their advantages. One reason for studying the state of political participation is for the light it can shed on the 'bias' of participation and its likely consequences in a range of situations. (Parry *et al.*, 1992: 7).

This 'bias of participation' as Parry and his colleagues call it, is of concern as it can question the legitimacy of the democratic system. Thus, studies have also paid attention to the socio-demographic characteristics of participants, being aware of the link between unequal participation and unequal representation. For this reason it is not only important to compare levels of civic engagement across countries but also to examine the characteristics of individuals predicting civic engagement, as will be done in this study in chapter VII.

## **1.4 Why cross-country analysis?**

With the decline of more traditional organisations mobilising the working class such as the Trade Unions, social clubs and Churches, the bias in participation has become even greater over the last few decades (Norris, 2000; Hall, 1999). This trend however, is greater in some countries than in others. As previous research has shown, levels of activism vary considerably between countries. Yet these variations are not random and some patterns emerge. For example, as will be shown in the subsequent empirical chapters (chapter V and VI), the Nordic countries have a vibrant civil society, while the postcommunist Eastern European countries have low levels of political engagement and a relatively limited associational life according to many measures. Considering the history of these countries, this is perhaps not surprising. As will be argued in chapter VI, the Nordic countries have a long tradition of state-civil society cooperation and the postcommunist countries emerged only in the last two decades from a centralised state and planned market economy, which had been very hostile towards any activities outside the state.

A cross-country analysis allows us to go beyond individual level explanations and looks at the country context that shapes the different pattern and levels of civic engagement. A cross-country analysis of either a few countries as the classical study of Almond and Verba (1963) on the *Civic Culture* or of a large number of countries, such as Inglehart's (1997) or Norris (2002) analysis of over 40 countries has the advantage that it also allows consideration of the differences between countries. Comparing countries helps to better understand the developments in a country in relation to other countries. Comparing and examining the circumstances of countries that do well in terms of the active participation can also help to inform policy making.

This study compares 19 European countries, which display stark variations in terms of different historical developments, different relationships between the state, civil society and the market, different degrees of privatisation, differences in their social policies etc. Yet, these countries have also similar socio-economic developments. The 19 European countries are among the most affluent, well-educated, industrialised and democratic countries across the globe. Thus, these countries provide a good basis for comparative analysis, as the similarities between them allows a comparison of developed, industrialised and democratic countries as well as an analysis of their different policies and socio-economic structures.

As will be discussed in the literature review chapter III, numerous studies have shown, individual's socio-demographic characteristics are important predictors of civic engagement. However, the stark variations in levels of civic engagement between European countries suggest that the contexts in which these activities are rooted are also important. As Welzel *et al.* (2005) suggest an individual's involvement in the community is only partly a matter of this individual's personal attributes. It is strongly conditioned by the amount of opportunities to which individuals are exposed. These opportunities might be shaped by socio-economic, political and cultural factors. This suggests that the country context needs to be considered when analysing the differences between individuals in terms of civic engagement. This study therefore applies multilevel modelling to take into account that citizens' behaviour is not only effected by individual level characteristics, such as age, gender, socio-economic background etc. but also by the country in which they live. This will be done in the final empirical chapter VII.

The country context will be examined in chapter VI. In this aggregate level chapter specific attention will be given to the differences between countries. Through bivariate and

multivariate analysis the different factors effecting civic engagement will be examined. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the differences between countries and identify the country specific variables that have a significant relationship with civic engagement. The findings of the chapter will be used to carry out multilevel analysis, in which the individual level and country level characteristics are considered in the models, which pays tribute to the fact that the data is hierarchical and individuals are clustered within countries.

As will be discussed in the following two chapters, when summarising the main debates on civic engagement, the most apparent factors affecting the variations between countries in terms of levels of civic engagement, are the experience of democracy as well as economic wealth. This argument goes back to modernisation theory, which predicts that democracy and mass education increases with industrialisation economic prosperity (Welzel *et al.*, 2005). However, despite industrialisation and the adaptation of democracy as a political system, there are still differences between the European countries, which the modernisation theory fails to explain adequately. Other studies, as will be shown in chapter III, have considered a wider range of factors that might account for the variations between countries such as social spending, religion, cleavage in the society, institutional design more convincingly. Equal attention has also been given to cultural factors such as norms and habits in a country that have higher levels of civic engagement - in particular trust towards each other and towards the government and political institutions, political interest, political efficacy etc; this has been seen in studies on social capital in the last decade.

These studies differ methodologically by either focusing predominantly on either structural or cultural explanation. Thus, the debates have been predominantly about whether socio-economic developments lead to a culture that is supportive of democracy or whether the civic culture prevalent in a society leads to democracy and economic success. Or is it that both factors are reinforcing each other and are therefore equally important? Nonetheless, the question of whether the causal mechanisms of economic development lead to democracy and a civic culture or whether a pre-democratic civic culture leads to democracy and economic prosperity may never be answered. Focussing on government policies, however, is a more constructive approach as it is more concrete and is a realm that can be influenced by government policies and citizens. Thus, the question of what can be done to minimise this increasing 'bias in participation' and what governments and the people can do to close this gap in participation remains.

## 1.5 The role of government

The social capital model became very prominent within a decade as it seemed to offer a relatively easy solution to the ‘crisis of democracy’. The ‘Putnamian’ social capital model has been particularly welcomed by governments, as it does place greater responsibility on the individuals rather than on the market or on the state. The role of the government in this process is a facilitator that creates the context in which the citizen does or does not take up initiatives. This becomes evident in a number of government documents in the UK, as exemplified by the speech of the former Home Secretary David Blunkett (2002:5), who was one of the main advocates of the “civil renewal” policies in the New Labour government:

The roles I have outlined for Government – creating a safe and secure environment, investing in communities and working in partnership with people – are all areas where we are making progress. I would like to end by touching on the other side of partnership – the responsibility of individuals. Government has important roles, but individuals must play a role in renewing communities. People must make the effort to work together, to reach out across communities, to make a difference. There has to be a civil spark.

That is why I believe that we must think about building social capital in the wider context of citizenship. The two weave together. Those who volunteer in their communities tend to be more likely to vote. Conversely, those who have a sense of citizenship tend to work with others to improve their communities. A final part of our approach must, therefore be to reinforce citizenship at a national level. That is why, as Secretary of State for Education, I introduced citizenship classes into the school week, including ensuring that young people learnt by doing – going out into their communities and helping others.

The “civil spark”, which David Blunkett talks so passionately about places a great responsibility on individuals, yet the role of government in facilitating individuals’ participation is also recognized.

Social capital and active citizenship might well start with and belong to communities as Begum (2003), a policy researcher on social capital writes, but the government can influence the conditions in which it can flourish. More explicitly Lowndes and Wilson (2001: 641) argue that government is central to the building of social capital. They point out that government’s role in widening opportunities for public participation is manifold and can range from support of the voluntary sector, to targeting groups that are excluded:

(...) social capital may remain a ‘latent’ phenomenon in the absence of responsive and inclusive political institutions. Institutional design plays an important role in determining whether groups of citizens are able to gain access to decision making,

whether decision-makers have a capacity to respond, and whether certain groups are privileged over others in term of influence they exert.

The government, as an important agent of change, has also been identified by Hall's (1999) classical study of social capital in Britain since World War II. Assessing the thesis of a decline of the civic community in Western democracies, Hall also identified (in accordance with Putnam's results for the USA) that British citizens have become less trusting, both towards individuals as well as towards their government. As for civic engagement however, his data did not observe a decline in Britain. He demonstrated that while some traditional forms of membership have declined since the 1950's, other forms of associations, such as environmental and charitable organisations have expanded. Thus, his data for Britain showed that the voluntary sector has remained vibrant. Hall attributes this success to the governments' cultivation of the voluntary sector among other major structural developments such as rising levels of education and changes in the class structure. Other studies on the voluntary sector in Britain and elsewhere have demonstrated that the strength of the voluntary sectors is strongly related to the support of the voluntary sector by the government (Salamon *et al.*, 2003; Maloney *et al.*, 2000).

The aim of this study will therefore be to contribute to these debates by examining government policies and their effects on civic engagement. In particular two new government policies will be examined; governments' support of the voluntary sector and the history of civic education<sup>7</sup> at schools. The examination of these policies is an innovative approach and will be applied for the first time to cross-country analysis.

While schools are identified as important institutions in which individuals learn about democratic values, democratic processes and institutions, later institutional affiliations of adults have also been equally recognized as important (Verba *et al.* 2001). Supporting the voluntary sector and introducing and expanding civic education at school has therefore become one of the policy priorities of many governments across Europe and elsewhere (Eurydice, 2005a). This is largely due to the fact that voluntary organisations are believed to carry out rolls that are difficult for the state to fulfil. They are seen as being better able to reach out to marginalized groups, by providing welfare support, and by connecting members of the society with each other. Voluntary organisations are thought to provide opportunities for individuals to improve their civic skills, and help interest groups to make

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<sup>7</sup> Civic education, citizen education or citizenship education all refers to the implementation of modules into the national curriculum that aims at raising pupils' knowledge about the rights and duties of democratic citizens and encourages them to get engaged in the democratic process ([www.eurydice.org](http://www.eurydice.org)).

political demands. They are seen to provide individuals with the motivation and capacity to take part in the democratic processes (Putnam, 2000). Thus, both educational institutions as well as the voluntary sector are perceived as ‘schools of democracy’ and sites for promoting a ‘civic culture’ crucial for active citizenship. Although there are many ways through which the governments can improve levels of civic engagement<sup>8</sup>, it is not always possible to measure and compare these policies across countries. For this study therefore, only two specific policy variables were developed, which is comparable between 19 countries; governments’ support of the voluntary sector and the early introduction of civic education at school. The operationalisation of these innovative policy variables will be discussed in the methodology chapter IV and the empirical results discussed in chapter VI and VII.

## 1.6 Methodology

This study mainly applies quantitative methods based on the analysis of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a relatively new survey that has been designed to explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its citizens. Great attention has been paid to its sampling strategy and fieldwork. As a consequence it is a fairly reliable data source for cross-country analysis. From the three waves available (2002/2003, 2004, 2006)<sup>9</sup> only the first round has a focus on citizenship. The first wave covers 22 countries with an un-weighted sample size of 42,000, yet for this study only 19 countries are included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Italy (IT), Ireland (IE), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK).<sup>10</sup> The interviews were conducted face-to-face and cover persons aged 15 years or older who are resident within private households.

The ESS round 1 taps a wide range of questions about the respondent’s political and social activities in the last 12 months. Thus, these variables serve as indicators of the dependent variable, which will be explored in chapter V through frequency tables and Multiple

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<sup>8</sup> See Aldridge *et al.* (2002) who give examples from the US and UK government’s policies to increase the stock of social capital in the society.

<sup>9</sup> The 2002/2003 Survey will be referred to hereafter as the 2002 survey as most of the fieldwork was carried out mainly in the year 2002.

<sup>10</sup> The Czech-Republic and Switzerland were excluded as they did not ask the questions on involvement in voluntary organisations as a multiple choice question. Israel was excluded from the analysis due to its internal violent conflict and its status as an occupying force. It differs therefore considerably from the other European countries, which do not experience such violent conflicts and militarization of the society.

Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Chapter IV discusses the methods used for the analysis, and introduces the explanatory variables included in the analysis in the subsequent chapters. The ESS is the primary source of the data, yet country specific data such as democracy scores, unemployment rates etc. have been imported from other sources mainly from the European Commission's statistical webpage, Eurostat. The variables on democracy have been obtained from the Freedom House survey. Finally, the 'civic education' variable has been compiled from a number of secondary sources including a large number of historical and contemporary articles and studies on the educational systems, the national curriculum and educational reforms. Moreover, in order to validate this variable, national experts were consulted about the specific history of civic education in their country.

Most studies on civic engagement look at individual level data and analyse the psychological and socio-demographic characteristics of individuals in explaining civic engagement. Studies that focus on civic engagement as an aggregate phenomenon tend to explore the macro factors influencing civic engagement. Both approaches have their benefits, but only a combination of the two provides the opportunity to specify the impact of various factors in a theoretically meaningful way.

In this study I develop a contextual model of civic engagement emphasising the relevance of distinct government policies and other socio-economic developments in different societies in addition to conventional micro-level factors. A multilevel model is presented here combining both individual and contextual factors to explain cross-national differences in civic engagement.

## **1.7 Research questions and hypotheses**

In line with other studies, civic engagement is regarded here as a latent variable (Parry *et al.*, 1992; Verba *et al.* 1978). This study therefore examines the set of questions relating to political participation and involvement in voluntary organisations as measured by the ESS in 2002. The aim is to explore whether the various indicators of civic engagement reflect one feature of civic engagement or whether they reflect multiple dimensions of civic engagement? In other words, are citizens similar to each other in the way in which they get engaged in public affairs? Or, as observed from other studies, are citizens likely to show preference for certain types of activities and less for others? Thus, the study starts with exploring indicators of the dependent variable civic engagement in the first empirical chapter V. The following hypothesis will be tested in this chapter:

*H1: Civic engagement is multidimensional. This means that citizens are likely to show preference for certain types of activities and less for other types of activities.*

The multidimensionality of civic engagement also suggests that there might be variations between countries in terms of the levels of civic engagement. A further research objective is therefore to compare the levels of civic engagement across Europe, as will be done in the second empirical chapter VI. This aggregate level chapter will compare levels of civic engagement between countries and explore the macro factors that might be related to these variations in levels of civic engagement. Thus, chapter VI will test the following hypothesis:

*H2: There are variations in the nature and levels of civic engagement between countries.*

*H2a: Moreover, these variations are due to the different socio-economic development and other macro characteristics of the countries.*

Despite globalisation and free market economy governments still play an important role in shaping the trajectory of the nation. Based on the discussions above and later in chapter III, this study suggests that governments can play an active role in shaping the levels of civic engagement. The effect of government policies on civic engagement will be examined in chapter VI and the following hypothesis proposed:

*H3: Government policies do affect levels civic engagement, particularly government's support of the voluntary sector and the introduction of civic education at schools.*

*H3a: Thus, there is a positive and significant relationship between government's support of the voluntary sector and citizen's levels of civic engagement.*

*H3b: Those countries, which have a long history of implementing civic education into the national curriculum, experience higher levels of civic engagement than countries which only have a short history of promoting political literacy and active participation at school.*

The study aims at comparing the nature and levels of civic engagement across Europe and at explaining the variations between countries. Due to the cross-country nature of the analysis great attention has been given to macro factors and the role of government in explaining the variation between countries. However, civic engagement describes foremost individual behaviour and a wide range of literature has demonstrated that participation is to

a great extent also driven by the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. The final empirical chapter VII will therefore take into account individual level characteristics as well as country level characteristics in predicting civic engagement. Based on this the following hypotheses are proposed:

*H4: Civic engagement varies in relation to key socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, education etc., as well other individual level characteristics such as size of locality where one lives, TV watching habits etc.*

*H4a: Variations in civic engagement will be reduced once accounted for individual level characteristics as well as for country level characteristics such as economic wealth, democracy, income inequality, welfare regime and government policies.*

In chapter II and III the theoretical background to the research questions and hypotheses will be given and in the three empirical chapters (V, VI and VII) the hypotheses will be tested. In the final concluding chapter VIII I return to the hypotheses and discuss the overall results in relation to them.

## **1.8 Making the difference**

Previous studies have carried out individual level analysis or only aggregate level analysis to explain civic engagement but this study combines both approaches by examining civic engagement through multilevel analysis. This gives a better picture of the phenomena and allows for a discussion and examination of individuals' socio-demographic characteristics predicting civic engagement as well as the effects of country context on the propensity of individuals to become active. The results of the multilevel analysis will show that the country context and individual level characteristics play different roles for the different dimensions of civic engagement. It will demonstrate that the participation gap is observable between individuals as well as between countries, yet not consistently across all dimensions of civic engagement.

A further strength of this study is the in-depth examination of the contextual variables and in particular the creation of two innovative policy variables. The government's expenditure is taken as a proxy for governments' support of the voluntary sector. In the absence of comparable data on the voluntary sector, this measure has been developed and used to test whether the relative amount of the government's financial support of the voluntary sector

can be related to civic engagement. Moreover, the civic education variable has been created based on the evaluation of a wide range of historical material and articles on the education systems, education reforms and civic education in the 19 European countries, covering a period from 1945 to 2002 - when the ESS survey was carried out. To validate this measure, I carried out qualitative research. Experts on civic education in the respective countries were consulted on the history of civic education in their country. This variable measures the year in which civic education was introduced into the national curriculum of secondary schools. Historical approaches to civic education are rare and none of them appear to compare the civic education policies across such a large number of countries.

Finally the application of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to civic engagement indicators makes this study unique. This method allows the various civic engagement indicators to be explored without any prior assumptions of how to group the data. The application of MCA has led to the identification of three dimensions of civic engagement; political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement. Moreover, by projecting all activities on a two-dimensional map it became evident that citizens who tend to carry out individual types of political consumerism such as buycotting<sup>11</sup> and boycotting are also more likely to be involved in New Social Movement organisations. These significant results shed new light on activities usually regarded as ‘individualistic’ types of activism and this suggests they should be viewed as part of a wider array of collective action.

The thesis concludes with chapter VIII, which summarises the main findings and discusses the above mentioned innovations of this thesis in more detail.

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<sup>11</sup> ‘Buycott’ as used here in this study refers to buying products for environmental, ethical, or political reasons.

## Chapter II

### 2. Setting the theoretical framework for active citizenship

This chapter aims to set the theoretical frame of this study and to clarify the definition of civic engagement. Drawing on fairly broad approaches to citizenship and democracy, this chapter demonstrates that research on civic engagement and political participation is embedded in a wider discourse of politics, democracy and citizenship. Taking a much broader theoretical perspective allows a more critical perspective and helps to see the limits and advantages of current research on civic engagement.

In the political literature, citizens are considered as the base of democratic governance. Unlike subjects or allies, citizens are the full members of a political community or a state. Briefly, citizenship is defined by the relationship between the individual and the state, which is based on reciprocal rights and duties (Heywood, 2002). However, different philosophical ideas about how the social world is constructed and how the individual is placed within it, lead to different understandings of the concept of citizenship. While the list of various forms of citizenship is exhaustive, approaches to citizenship can be grouped broadly into four models of democracy:<sup>12</sup> *Liberal*, *Republican*, *Communitarian* and the *Radical Democracy* approach to citizenship. While the first two approaches can be regarded as classical democracy models, the *Communitarian* and *Radical Democracy* approach are more modern. The *Communitarian* perspective has received a lot of exposure since it emerged in the 1980s and has exerted a strong influence on governments such as the current Labour Government and the Clinton Administration (Rose, 1999). The *Radical Democracy* approach emerged as a criticism to neoliberal concepts of democracy and argues for a form of citizenship that is build around difference and dissent at the same time.

#### 2.1 Main approaches to citizenship

There are many overlapping features between the four approaches of citizenship. For example, the individual in Liberalism has some common characteristics with the individual in Communitarianism, while Republicanism and Communitarianism share similar ideas

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<sup>12</sup> For a general overview about the different concepts of citizenship and recent debates see the *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* by Isin and Turner (2002).

about civic virtue and the ‘common good’<sup>13</sup> Radical Democracy is in tune with Republicanism and Communitarianism with regard to their emphasis on active citizenship. Despite their differences, all of these approaches have distinct ideas about the best way of achieving democracy and about the proper role of the citizen within this process.

### 2.1.1 Liberal citizenship

The Liberal approach to citizenship is a market and state centred conception of citizenship that comes from the tradition of rational choice theory. Influenced by the classical Liberal theorist John Locke (1993) from the 16th century and John Stuart Mill (1972) from the 19th century, Liberal citizenship defines the rights of individuals to private property as the base of individual freedom and the protection of property against public and private invasion as the most important function of law and government. Liberal theorists are in favour of minimalist state intervention and regard the civil society as a group of independent citizenry, that are best able to deal with welfare and other social issues. Moreover, civil society is seen as a counterweight to the state, which keeps an eye on its activities and prevents it from increasing its power (Schuck, 2002).

Political involvement is not central to the life of Liberal citizens, as their primary urge is the pursuit of wealth and the indulgence of material pleasures. Moreover, too much political involvement is seen as a threat to liberty and democracy as is too little involvement. The optimal degree of involvement is therefore the involvement of the elite, who have a specialised knowledge of politics. The majority of citizens are expected to express their approval or disapproval of the political system through voting (Schumpeter, 2003). According to this view, citizens are “controllers” rather than “participants” (Parry *et al.*, 1992: 5). Thus, low levels of involvement do not indicate a threat to the legitimacy of democracy, as long as the system maintains its effectiveness. That is to say that it retains a democratically elected government and that the judiciary, legislature and executive organs are independent of each other, and able to check and control each other etc. (Dahl, 1956, 1971; Madison, 2003; Schumpeter, 2003).

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<sup>13</sup> The ‘common good’ in general describes a specific good that is shared and beneficial for all (or most) members of a given community. The concept has different connotations in the different philosophical traditions. See for example Olson (1965) for a utilitarian and Liberal understanding of the ‘common good’ and Etzioni (2004) for a Communitarian perspective and Rousseau, (1968) for a classical Republican notion of the ‘common will’.

### 2.1.2 Republican citizenship

The Liberalist emphasis on individual rights and liberties is criticised by Republican theorists such as Barber (1984) and Dagger (1997, 2002) for not fostering the public virtues that lead people to do their duties as citizens. From the Republican point of view Dagger (2002) argues that citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal dimension. Hence, 'good' citizenship requires commitment to the 'common good' and active participation in public affairs. Above all, it requires 'civic virtue'. Publicity and self-government are the essential elements of Republicanism. People leave their private lives behind closed doors and come together in the public domain as members of a political community to deal with issues of common concern. A 'good' or ideal citizen is marked by his/her engagement in civic affairs as well as by being able to place the interest of the community ahead of personal interest. For the sake of their own freedom, and that of the nation, they are obliged to fulfil the rights and duties of citizenship, as Dagger (2002: 147) describes in the following citation:

As a member of the public, people must be prepared to overcome their personal inclinations and set aside their private interests when necessary, to do what is best for the public as a whole. The public-spirited citizens who act in this way display public or civic virtue.

For Republicans, civic engagement is an integrative experience that instils a more secure sense of personal identity and integrity. It is through engagement that citizens learn to deal with diversity within the community and to respect the opinions of other members. Active citizenship also has an educational function: individuals expand their civic skills through engagement in public affairs and can also use these abilities in other areas of their lives (Tocqueville, 1998).

The Republican idea of citizenship defines the rule of law as a necessary condition for citizens' involvement in public affairs and capacity to govern. The law only ensures the citizen's freedom when it is responsive to the citizenry and when the public itself is secure and stable enough for its laws to be effective. It is important that everybody is subject to the rule of law, and that the laws reflect citizens' active and public-spirited participation in social life. A free, stable and long-lasting government will be ensured by a system of checks and balances supported by active, civic-minded citizens (Rousseau, 1968; Pettit, 1997; Dagger, 1997)

The Republican approach assumes that governments can be controlled by the public and that everybody has more or less the same interest and works towards the realisation of the 'common good' (Rousseau, 1968). However, the feminist Young (1990) has pointed out that this is premised on the idea that society is homogenous. In practice, the emphasis on the 'common good' serves to justify the dominance of a particular -usually white and male- identity.

### 2.1.3 Communitarian citizenship

Communitarianism has emerged in the 1980's and has overlapping features with Republicanism as well as Liberalism. It rejects the collectivism of the former and the individualism of the latter and replaces them with an explicit cultural conception of community. Identity and participation are seen as the real ties that bind members of a community together. For Communitarians, citizenship is about participation in the political community, but it is also about the preservation of identity. While Communitarians give recognition to other minorities and emphasise the importance of the state in giving official recognition to cultural communities, their main concern is the protection of the majority culture in an age of fragmented and multiple identities. In Communitarianism, the 'common will' of Republicanism is replaced by patriotism and by the identification with a political community, which embodies a more culturally-rooted way of life (Delanty, 2002; Giddens, 2000).

The concept of community in Communitarian discourse is the community of the dominant culture which is officially recognised by the state. Since political community in which citizenship exists, rests in a prior cultural community, minorities and incoming groups must adapt to this community in order to participate in its political community. (Delanty, 2002: 165).

In the radical version of Republicanism represented by Rousseau, citizens governed themselves by being actively involved in public life and intermediary organisations are seen as incompatible with a Republican form of government. Rousseau's influence can still be seen in contemporary France, where participation in direct action are higher and involvement in voluntary organisations are lower compared to other Western European countries.<sup>14</sup> Communitarians differ from this perspective in that they see the public domain or civil society as being separate from the state. The value of civil society lies in its ability

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<sup>14</sup> Western European countries are referred here as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This terminology is used throughout the thesis, where references are made to the analysis and the results. It does not refer to the Southern European countries i.e. Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal or the Eastern European countries.

to promote concepts that are important to a healthy democracy, such as trust, commitment and solidarity. This contrasts with the Republican emphasis on civil society as a means of overcoming conflicts.

This version of civil society, that values associational participation for its non-political benefits, was identified in the early 19th century by Tocqueville and rediscovered by Putnam in his theory of 'social capital.' In Putnam's version of Communitarianism, social responsibility primarily falls within the duties of the civil society, rather than that of the state. His study of modern Italy, found that what matters in terms of a sustainable democracy and strong economy, are not institutions but cultural traditions, particularly those that reinforce civil society. For Putnam, a strong civil society will foster an effective system of governance where democracy can flourish (Putnam, 1993).

In Republicanism, the implementation of civic virtues is seen as the primary responsibility of the state and is something that can be achieved through the educational system, through providing opportunities for public involvement, and through programs that are designed to strengthen neighbourhood and public spirit (Dagger, 2002). In contrast to this, Communitarians tend to identify schools and the family as important areas where one can seek to cultivate a sense of active and responsible citizenship (Etzioni, 1995).

The British sociologist Giddens (2000) claims, that the Communitarians have had a direct and visible influence upon New Labour, as well as upon social democratic parties elsewhere. In academic research, the Communitarian influence is perhaps most visible in studies that describe the decline of the civic community, and amongst those emphasising the importance of face-to-face civic interactions. The most systematic account of this work is outlined in Putnam (2000).

#### 2.1.4 Radical democracy citizenship

The Radical Democracy approach was developed in the 1990s. Unlike previous concepts of citizenship, it does not limit the sphere of politics to the state, the market, or the community. Following the Gramscian idea of hegemony, which highlighted that power is inhabited and maintained in everyday relationships, Radical Democrats adopt a broad concept of the political. In doing so, they define all subjects as political and view a broad range of activities as political in nature. Power is thought of as being dispersed throughout the social field and actualised at particular locations. Radical Democracy is committed to equality, participation and an anti-essentialist politics that continually attempts to redefine

itself in order to resist the exclusion of individuals and groups (Rasmussen and Brown, 2003). The central idea of the approach is described by Rasmussen and Brown (2003: 184) in the following quote:

The core of radical democratic citizenship is an attempt to retain the egalitarian impulse in the idea of citizenship as a means of belonging to a political community without depoliticising or excluding other elements of identity relevant to power relations. (...) Radical democracy maintains that citizenship can be a liberatory identity by remaining an open site of struggle.

The Radical Democracy theorists Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define citizenship as a political activity that involves a struggle for hegemony. This conflict is possible at any site and occurs in interactions with the state, the economy, or in the everyday practices of identity formation.<sup>15</sup> By building democracy around difference and dissent, it is possible to highlight and challenge the oppressive power relations that exist in society (Mouffe, 2000).

The Radical Democracy concept emerged as a response and challenge to the existing democratic political theory. In particular, it suggests that traditional approaches have failed to capture the dynamics of social movements and to recognize their activities as a fundamental part of political life. It has a very inclusive and egalitarian approach and proposes a much broader concept of politics than other notions of citizenship. However, the problem with this idea is that it is too abstract and too inattentive to real material power relations.

## **2.2 Defining civic engagement**

### **2.2.1 Politics and the public sphere**

These different approaches not only help us to understand the different stands taken by researchers working on civic engagement, they also affected the way in which the quality of democracy has been measured. Active participation is crucial for democracy according to the Republican, Communitarian and Radical Democracy approaches. In contrast to this, the Liberal approach to citizenship sees active involvement as being reserved for the elite. Citizens are not expected to take part regularly in the political process apart from periodic voting. As a consequence, the so-called 'Realists' or Liberals do not measure the health of a Liberal democracy by the high levels of involvement by the citizenry. Instead, they base

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<sup>15</sup> Since Laclau and Mouffe argued for 'radical democracy', many other theorists and practitioners have adapted and changed the term. See for example, Freire (2004), Hooks (1996) and Giroux (1996), which have all written about education for a radical democracy.

their assessment on the stability of the system and its capacity to permit checks on its leaders (Parry *et al.*, 1992).

Moreover on a theoretical level, the definition of what constitutes 'political' is connected to discourses about power and the public/private dichotomy. The definition of activities that are 'political' and those that are 'civic' is also closely linked to the different concepts of citizenship outlined in the preceding sections.

The Liberal approach to citizenship has quite a narrow understanding of politics, reducing it to the realm of government and limiting the political activities of the citizen to voting and party politics. Heywood (2002: 5-6) summarises this narrow definition of politics as follows:

Politics is what takes place within a polity, a system of social organization centred upon the machinery of government. Politics is therefore practised in cabinet rooms, legislative chambers, government departments and the like, and it is engaged in by a limited and specific group of people, notably politicians, civil servants and lobbyists. This means that most people, most institutions and most social activities can be regarded as being 'outside' politics. Business, schools and other educational institutions, community groups, families and so on are in this sense 'nonpolitical', because they are not engaged in 'running the country'.

Politics in this tradition has a negative image according to Heywood. It reflects the Liberal perception that, because individuals are self-interested, political power is corrupting. It encourages those in power to exploit their position for personal advantage and at the expense of others. Politics and power are confined to the 'public', while the 'private' sphere refers to non-political activities such as business, voluntary activities, sport and family life. It is a realm of choice, personal freedom and individual responsibility. The civil society, which is allocated outside the public, is seen as a matter of private concern and, as such, it is untainted by political corruption (Heywood, 2002).

I argue that the Republican and Communitarian understanding of the 'political' also rests on the public/private dichotomy. However, they allocate many activities and concerns of citizens to the public domain. As a consequence, they have a much broader concept of the 'political'. As opposed to the Liberal/Realist perception, civil society is allocated in the public domain. Although it is independent of the state, it contains a range of institutions that are thought of as 'public' as Heywood (2002: 8) describes in the sense that "they are open institutions, operating in public, to which the public has access." Examples include activities such as business, community groups, clubs and trade unions.

The Radical Democracy approach delivers the most radical version of politics. It breaks completely with the private/public distinction. Rather than confining politics to a particular sphere such as the government, the state or the 'public' realm, this view sees politics at work in all social activities. In this sense, politics can be found within families and amongst small groups of friends, as much as is evident in nations (Heywood, 2002). Although this definition of political activity is very close to forms of social behaviour, it nevertheless allows us to look at everyday activities as political platforms that shape people's identities, their feelings of well-being and norms of reciprocity and trust. The Liberal/Realist approach to democracy places greater emphasis on accountability to the electorate than it does on political involvement. Bearing these differences in mind, it is not surprising that the importance of participation in political debate can vary from period to period as different views on democracy rise and fall in favour (Parry *et al.*, 1992).

For all these approaches civic engagement constitutes the basis of democracy, while the question of how much participation is good or necessary remains contested. The Republican, Communitarian and Radical Democracy approaches view citizens' participation in the political process and in the public sphere as a crucial element of a healthy democratic system. Thus, by measuring and comparing civic engagement across countries this study, in effect, also measures the health of a democracy.

### 2.2.2 Expanding the definitions of politics and the repertoire of activities

Studies on political behaviour have moved from using a narrow concept of the 'political' confined to the public sphere of government and politics (Almond and Verba, 1963; Kaase and Marsh, 1979) to a wider concept of what constitutes the public sphere (Dalton, 2002; Putnam, 2000; Norris, 2002; Pattie *et al.*, 2004). This latter approach moves away from defining political participation as activities that have to be directed at some government policy or activity. Instead, it also allocates activities of the civil society to the public domain and thus incorporates many forms of collective activity into its definition of political participation. For example, Dalton (2002: 45) includes "communal activities" in his measurement of political participation and argues that they are the "essence of grassroots democracy". Dalton's upgrading of 'communal activities' as 'political activities' is based on the argument, that these activities involve group efforts to deal with social or community problems. These can range from specific issues relating to schools or roads, to broader topics such as protecting the local environment. Thus, although these community

actions might not address governments and policy makers directly, they are relevant for the society as it is a collective form of action.

In a recent comprehensive study of political behaviour and civic engagement in Britain, Pattie *et al.* (2004) argued for the inclusion of people's attempts to influence day-to-day practical matters as an important dimension of a citizen's repertoire of actions. Examples of this can include things like trying to change aspects of a child's schooling or complaining about treatment at work. However in comparison to Dalton, they recognise the individualistic characteristics of such "micro politics" as important political daily practices. The authors argue that responding to the decisions taken by professionals (employers, teachers, doctors etc.) and institutions in their locality is an important part of citizens' daily lives and are experienced as 'political' by the individual. Moreover, I argue that individual actions can also be relevant for the society as a whole. Viewed on a larger scale, these small-scale actions might lead service providers and other agencies to alter their policies and practices.

Putnam's concept of social capital values informal sociability such as bowling, meeting up with friends, picnicking etc. because they promote norms of reciprocity and expand the network of individuals that might lead to other political and community involvement. While recognizing the importance of certain types of informal social activity as crucial, Putnam disregards other types of informal and individualized forms of action as irrelevant for social capital. He regards small self-help groups, cyber-activism and even social movements as bearing little relevance for community involvement. As a consequence, his analysis does not include any indicators of these activities.<sup>16</sup> Putnam (2000) refers to small groups as loose, self-help groups that meet regularly and provide support or caring for those who participate. These can include Bible study groups, Alcoholics Anonymous and Weight Watchers meetings, reading circles, gay support groups, Mothers Against Drink Driving networks and support groups for victims of diseases such as AIDS. Although he acknowledges that these groups "certainly provide emotional support and interpersonal ties that are invaluable to the participants" (Putnam 2000: 150) and bring issues to the public realm, which were previously dealt with in private, Putnam does not put these activities on the same scale as picnicking or bowling. Participating in these groups does not lead to regular involvement in traditional forms of political participation such as voting, volunteering or working on community problems. This view rests on a Communitarian

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<sup>16</sup> Putnam (2000) has devoted a whole section in his book *Bowling Alone* to these types of activities. See chapter 9: *Against the Tide: Small Groups, Social Movements and the Net*.

understanding of citizenship and a traditional divide of the public and private realm as discussed above. However, as will be shown below, this perspective is contested

### 2.2.3 Voluntary organisations and passive involvement

Critical research on Putnam's notion of what type of activities are relevant to social capital and what are not has mainly focused on his preference for face-to-face interactions over passive membership in tertiary organisations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International. However, Wollebaek and Selle (2003b) found a positive relationship between social capital and forms of passive organisation membership that are widespread in Scandinavian countries.<sup>17</sup> Further empirical evidence suggests that passive members do not feel alienated or disconnected from the social system (Selle and Stromsnes, 2001). Although passive membership might not lead to any face-to-face interactions between members, they can still instil a sense of shared values or commitment to a cause. Passive membership can seem to function in a similar way to Anderson's (1991) concept of the imagined community (Wollebaek and Selle, 2003a). This approach explains how members of a nation develop a psychological affinity, even though this group is too large to allow face-to-face contact between all its members.

“Passive affiliations may foster a sense of affinity to a cause, which the individual knows is not only important to him/herself, but also to others. If the association is successful, the membership, regardless of activity level, conveys a sense of the value of cooperation for common purposes, of political efficacy and of shared belonging to something important. Clearly, these virtues are all conducive to social capital.” (Wollebaek and Selle, 2003a: 85).

In addition to this, Maloney (1999) argues that “cheque-book participation” enables organisations to publicly represent certain issues their members are concerned about and to campaign on their behalf. Contrary to Putnam's thesis, Maloney's case studies of Friends of the Earth or Amnesty International in Britain demonstrate that members of these organisations are also often active at the local level. He argues that this form of participation is like voting, only that citizens delegate their political will to campaign organisation rather than to a politician. Instead of disregarding such activities as irrelevant to discussions about social capital, Maloney suggests that they should be recognised as

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<sup>17</sup> See also Wollebaek and Selle (2003a), and Wollebaek and Stromsnes (2008), who argue about the positive effects of passive membership to social capital.

forms of participatory activity that are complementary to more traditional forms of political involvement.

A further topic of controversy about the role of voluntary organisations in creating social capital is whether involvement in any type of organisation or involvement in particular types of voluntary organisation such as political types of organisations create the positive spill-over of associational involvement. Putnam does not differentiate between the type of associations, for him it is the density of involvement that enables citizens not only to improve their personal resources and skills but it also helps them to overcome collective action problems and contribute to the solution of wider ranging societal problems that can not be solved by government actions alone (Putnam, 1993, 2000).

Some studies have suggested that that involvement in non-political associations cannot foster the civic skills necessary to promote social capital and strengthen democracy as much as involvement in organisations that contest state authority (Quigley, 1996; Wollenbaek and Selle , 2003; Dekker *et al.*, 1997; Teorell, 2003; Moyser and Parry, 1997). Foley and Edwards (1996) emphasise that non-political associations are unable to play the role of a state counterweight in the way that political associations or social movements can. However other studies have not found evidence to support this contention. Wollenbaek and Selle found that the main difference is between joiners and non joiners, with the former being consistently more trusting and more civically engaged than non-joiners (Wollenbaek and Selle, 2003a). Examining the organisational life in Germany Wessels (1998: 210) argued that it is often difficult to differentiate between political and non-political organisations:

Some of the social and welfare organisations in Germany, for example, are closely related to churches, and all of them play an important role in the political decision making. Leisure organisations are sometimes related to political parties, in particular sports clubs to the Social Democrats (...). The Federal Sports Association (Deutscher Sportsverband) is also an important power in policymaking in this field.

The classification of voluntary organisations is carried out in chapter three, where the relationship between voluntary organisations and political activities are explored. It is sufficient to remark here that based on the contradictory evidence on active and passive involvement for democracy, all types of involvement in any kind of voluntary organisation will be included in the following analysis. Given that the thesis focuses on measuring citizens' engagement patterns, the question is not so much about what patterns and types of

activities have the greatest payoff for the society, but rather what are the different modes of engagement and how and why do they differ between countries.

#### 2.2.4 Shifts in the repertoire of actions

Political scientists are slowly beginning to recognise these changes in the repertoire of political actions. The most common distinction between types of political activism has been between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ forms of political participation. Barnes and Kaase (1979) first introduced this distinction in their study on political action and it has since become a prominent means of classifying different types of political activity. However the distinction is too historically specific: what might have appeared as ‘unconventional’ in the 1970s, such as boycotting or demonstrations, are now relatively mainstream forms of citizen influence in Western Europe (Brady, 1999). Recent approaches argue that with increasing levels of education and mass technology, citizens are more sophisticated and cognitively mobilized, and are now choosing different ways to get politically involved. The ‘new citizens’ are not relying on voting and campaign activities anymore as argued by Norris (2002) and many other scholars (Dalton, 2002; Jordan, 1998; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Welzel *et al.*, 2005). They are active and demanding participants who focus on single-issue activities and prefer to exercise political pressure through less structured forms of engagement such as protest actions, citizens' groups, communal participation. Thus, notwithstanding the danger of citizens' withdrawal from formal political channels for democracy, such changes in citizens' behaviour might also be interpreted as positive, as it is more citizens centred, as argued by Dalton (2002:56):

The new style of citizen politics seeks to place more control over political activity in the hands of the citizenry. These changes in participation make greater demands on the participants. At the same time, these activities can increase public pressure on political parties. Citizens' participation is becoming more closely linked to citizens' influence.

This shift in preferred repertoire of action in industrialized countries can be related to a general shift in values and to the changing socio-political order. Globalization, individualization and an increase in postmaterialist value orientation has evoked not only more “elite-challenging” (Inglehart, 1997) and “critical” (Norris, 2002) political activities, but also more expressive, consumer oriented, individualistic and every-day oriented political behaviour as many authors argue (Gibbins and Reimer, 1995; Micheletti, 2003; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Inglehart's (1997) analysis of the World Value Survey (WVS) between 1981 and 1990 showed that the proportion of people who have carried out

“conventional” forms of participation such as voting, campaigning and party membership has declined, while at the same time “unconventional” political action has risen substantially. Inglehart (1997) connects this mainly to the increase in postmaterialist values. He argues that as the younger, better educated, and more postmaterialist birth cohorts replace the older, less educated ones in the adult population, “elite-challenging” political action increases. This implies, as proposed by Norris (1999, 2000) that citizens are becoming more active in new ways- such as trans-national policy networks and internet activism- and that channels of political participation are evolving rather than declining.<sup>18</sup>

Within the political sciences these new trends are still being viewed from a rather narrow conception of politics, and research on political behaviour is remains dominated by studies that emphasise the collective nature of citizen’s actions and their relationship to the government. To different degrees, this work seems to reflect Liberal, Republican or Communitarian understandings of citizenship and democracy. However, the Radical Democracy approach highlights the variety of ways in which citizens can voice their discontent, i.e. as individuals, or as members of a group, directed at the government or the market or other societal powers. For example, some forms of engagement might be individualistic, such as contacting a politician, signing petitions, boycotting etc. However, they might become powerful mechanism of change if carried out on a larger scale. Other forms of activities might be purely self-expressive, with focus on cultural codes, self-fulfilment and personal identity. As such, they might not have an explicit political aim or effect but, by reinforcing an individual’s identity, they could constitute an important symbol that could translate into collective action for a particular movement (McAdam, 1988). Thus, as Rucht (1990) argues, petitions are not a particularly effective way of convincing the government to change its policy but they do bring activists and potential supporters together. Hence, some of the political activities might make more sense in conjunction with other types of civic orientation or engagement and not as individual activities. This suggests taking a broader perspective and placing the actions of citizens in a wider context.

Questions about how ‘politics’ and ‘the public sphere’ are defined are perhaps less important than those relating to the extension of the democratic system and citizens’ involvement in that process. In line with the Radical Democracy approach, this study

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<sup>18</sup> See for example *The Global Justice Movement* edited by Della Porta, (2007), which describes trans-nationally organised activities including the G8 protests, the *World Social Forums* and the *Make Poverty History* marches.

adopts a very broad understanding of civic engagement, incorporating individual as well as collective activities directed at a multitude of actors or power holders. At present there are only a limited number of questions asked in cross-national surveys which are related to a citizen's repertoire of actions. Consequently, this study will examine rather the standard arrays of civic engagement indicators, encompassing political activities and organisational involvement. These measures are discussed in more detail in chapter five.

## Chapter III

### 3. Explaining civic engagement: a review of the main debates on civic engagement at the micro and macro level

This study examines civic engagement by individual level factors as well as contextual factors. As such, I am interested in the different in attempting to explain both, why individuals participate as well as exploring the national context in which individuals live. Most studies on civic engagement are based on analysis of individual level data within a country (Pattie *et al.*, 2004; Parry *et al.*, 1992; Verba *et al.*, 2001). Such studies usually take a citizen-centred approach and examine the individual's motivations, and his/her socio-economic conditions and resources that are associated with civic engagement.

In cross-national research the attributes of countries are the primary focus, thereby explaining civic engagement beyond individual-level explanations (Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002; Van Deth and Elff, 2004; Mettler and Soss, 2004). Cross-country research usually explains patterns of involvement by focusing on the country context and, therefore, taps into wider discussions of the role of structure and culture on participation at the aggregate level. Both these methodological approaches are combined here through multilevel analysis. In this chapter, the main theoretical debates on participation are reviewed from these two different perspectives. Whilst differing in focus, the theoretical discussions have many overlapping features. In many ways, these similarities reflect the nested or multilevel character of civic engagement - a point that is often emphasised in the literature on civic engagement (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2007; Curtis *et al.*, 2001)

#### 3.1 Resources of participation: socio-economic status, civic voluntarism and cognitive mobilisation models

One of the most prominent and basic explanations of what determines civic engagement is individuals' level of education (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dalton, 2002; Verba *et al.* 1978; Parry *et al.*, 1992). In particular, two models focus on the role of education in facilitating civic engagement: the socio-economic status (SES) model (Verba and Nie, 1972) and the cognitive mobilisation theory (Dalton, 2002). The SES model connects education to the higher socio-economic status of individuals, and argues that individuals are more likely to have the resources - in terms of skills, money and interest - to be involved. High levels of

formal education provide individuals with the knowledge and the conceptual abilities to understand complex political issues, thus enabling them to take part in politics. Verba *et al.* (1972) argue that high levels of education are more common among individuals from higher socio-economic classes a fact that further increases their ability to participate.

From a more global perspective, levels of education have risen in the industrialised nations, whereas formal levels of education are still comparatively low in less developed countries. The American political scientist Dalton (2002) refers to this cognitive ability that favours participation, as the cognitive mobilisation theory. Derived from the modernisation theory<sup>19</sup>, it assumes that with increasing levels of education and information technology, individuals develop a better understanding of the political system, acquire more skills to participate and analyse complex information and are thus better able to articulate their political interests through various channels. He expands this model in more detail in his comparative study on *Public Opinion and Political Behaviour in Western Democracies* in France, Germany, UK and USA (Dalton, 2002). Dalton (2002) argues that the public's political skills and resources have vastly expanded since the 1950's. The growth in the public's overall level of political sophistication has occurred, in particular, through the advancement of technology and media, which has reduced the cost of acquiring information about politics. Moreover, through rising levels of education, the public's ability to process information has increased. This means that citizens now have the political resources and skills to deal with the complexity of politics and to reach their own political decisions. This also implies, as Norris (2000) remarks, that the citizens of the advanced industrial nations have become more demanding and critical of their governments.

The SES model formulated by Verba and Nie (1972) was extended in their subsequent study (Verba *et al.*, 1978) and then developed into the civic voluntarism model (Verba *et al.*, 2001). The civic voluntarism model argues that the capacity and motivation to take part in political activities is not only determined by an individual and his/her family's socio-economic background, but also has roots in the non-political institutions that the individual becomes associated with during the course of their life. These might include the family, schools, as well as other institutional affiliations such as work-based organisations, voluntary non-political organisations or religious institutions. The acquisition of civic

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<sup>19</sup> Modernization theory explains the modern transformations of social life by mainly looking at socio-economic developments on an aggregate level. For a brief overview of the modernisation theory see Inglehart and Welzel (2005).

skills begins early in childhood at home and at school, and it continues in the non-political institutions of adult life like the workplace or voluntary associations and churches. The opportunities to practice civic skills in these institutions are partly determined by the SES, but also by the nature of these institutions, which is not related to SES.

Verba *et al.* (2001) argue that practicing civil skills in work-based organisations (e.g. writing letters, speaking up in a crowd etc.) are determined by an individual's level of formal education, as people who have a higher educational status are more likely to be employed than people with lower levels of formal education. Also, among the employed, those who have higher levels of formal education get more opportunities to practice their civic skills. They are also more likely to be engaged in voluntary organisations than individuals with low levels of education. However, the authors of the civic voluntarism model argue further that once they are involved in voluntary organisations, the opportunities to practice civic skills are not influenced by education (Verba *et al.*, 2001). They argue that churches are the most egalitarian in terms of members joining and in terms of providing equal opportunities for their members to expand their civic skills. Thus despite a disadvantaged start, individuals are more likely to learn and improve their civic skills through involvement in voluntary organisations, in particular in organisations that are open to people from different socio-economic background, than if they are not involved in voluntary organisations at all.

In their classic study *Inequality in America*, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) argue that individuals from a socio-economic background that have fewer resources (i.e. money and skills) to participate, can increase their chances of active involvement by using group resources. This means that by being involved in organisations such as trade unions, working class associations or ethnic associations, low income groups are more likely to articulate their interests through group-based resources and networks than by relying on their comparatively disadvantaged individual resources. On the other hand, higher-status individuals are in an advantaged position as they are able to mobilise their individual-, as well as group-based resources. Thus, although inequality between the lower and higher status groups is not eliminated, utilising group networks and associations can reduce it considerably. These organisations or networks not only increase people's capacity to participate, they also help improve their desire to become active.

In the civic voluntarism model Verba *et al.* (2001) explain the importance of money and time as resources of participation, which are used for different modes of engagement. Time

is needed to work in campaigns, to write letters to a public official and attend a community meeting, while money can be donated to political parties, voluntary groups or for other political causes. The authors claim that donations have become an increasingly important citizen activity, a fact that they argue has profoundly changed American politics. Thus, money as a resource has become an important factor in explaining a substantial part of political engagement. However, while people from higher socio-economic status groups are richer in financial resources and have more skills, time is not correlated to SES. Based on the US data, the authors show that those who have the least skilled jobs have almost exactly the same amount of free time per day as those who have the highest-level jobs. Thus, time seems to be affected by life circumstances (i.e. being employed or unemployed, in part- or full time work, having children or not, or in a couple where both partners are working etc.) rather than by social class.

To sum up, their main argument for the reasons of individuals' participation, or rather their non-participation, is "because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked" (Verba *et al.*, 2001: 15). This refers to resources, political interest and efficacy, and mobilisation respectively. I have discussed the importance of resources by referring to the SES status of individuals as well as other resources important for participation. The mobilisation and network aspect has been taken forward by other approaches in more depth and I will expand on this when introducing the social capital model. However, the motivations for participation refer to "interest in politics or a sense of efficacy or group consciousness" (Verba *et al.*, 2001: 275). This aspect is best explored by going to the roots of this approach - rational choice theory - and introducing the general incentive theory of participation. The latter is also a common model used to explain the motivations that account for individuals' participation.

### **3.2 Motivations for participation: a general incentive model**

The economic approach of explaining participation is based on the idea that individuals are rational actors who seek to maximise returns and minimize costs in any course of action they undertake. In *The Logic of Collective Action*, Olson (1965) argued that political actors join a political party or an interest group because they receive "selective incentives" and because of the nature of selective goods being 'selective' i.e. only enjoyable for those who join. For example trade unions contribute to the "collective goods": that is, their actions can bring about general improvements in wages and work conditions for all workers.

Eventually, the achievements fought for by trade union members and activists are also enjoyed by other workers as well. The workers who benefit from the outcome without sharing the risks of activism in trade unions are considered as “free riders”, and are a common problem in collective action theories. By introducing selective incentives like legal advice and insurance offered to members only, organisations that produce collective goods can motivate potential members to join them. Olson’s theory explains why the majority of people do not participate, as they will eventually benefit from the general societal improvements that are brought about by the dedication and activism of a minority.

However, critics argue that the selective incentive approach is too narrow, focusing only on individual incentives and ignoring collective and normative motivations for participation. While agreeing with Olson that self-interest is a strong element in an individual’s character, they also emphasise the normative and collective motivations explaining participation. In politics in particular, different normative motivations can play a crucial role. These can include the desire to act morally, or according to one’s ideological disposition, religiosity, altruistic impulses, or identification with a particular party, ethnic group etc. (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Brennan and Hamlin, 1990, 2000; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997).

Looking at members of the Labour party in Britain, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) suggested that people join a party for various reasons, among which is a belief that collective action is necessary to bring about change. Individuals may participate because they want to achieve a collective goal and because they have strong feelings of attachment towards that group. For example, a Labour party activist might believe that the only way social injustice can be changed is by ensuring that the Labour Party is successfully elected. Thus, individuals decide to participate because they believe that collective action can solve the problems of the groups they care about. This interpretation might help to explain participation in social movements like national liberation struggles or feminist movements.

A further important incentive for participation relates to the social norms and values of participation in a society. The key characteristic of social norms is that they do not rely on individual calculations about the consequences of political participation. Rather, individuals participate because they are motivated by a desire to conform to the values of others whose approval they seek (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992). Thus, individuals are more likely to be active in a country where positive civic norms and values are prevalent and where participation is the norm. Involvement in voluntary organisations in Nordic

countries can be seen as a good example of this behaviour. Pattie *et al.* (2004: 143) argue that:

If individuals perceive themselves to be surrounded by people who think that rights are important but who ignore their obligations, or who think that somebody else should look after the interests of the wider society other than themselves, this is likely to inhibit their own participation.

The narrow cost-benefit framework of the Olson model assumes that individuals always choose the most profit maximising options for themselves. However, it seems that what actually matters is the individual's perception of those costs and benefits: that is to say that an individual's decision to get active will depend on how likely it is that they think their activism is going to bring about change. This perception is strongly dependent on an individual's sense of personal efficacy, and research has demonstrated the importance of this variable with civic engagement as argued by Pattie *et al.* (2004: 141) further:

In the general incentives model the individual's sense of personal efficacy, their perception that they can make a difference to outcomes, plays an important role. The reasoning behind this is simple: if individuals think that the system works well, but at the same time they believe that their own participation has little or no influence on outcomes, then they have no incentives to get involved. But if they feel that the system can deliver and that they can make a difference to outcomes, then it will be rational for them to participate to try to improve its performance.

The general incentive model not only helps to understand the conditions that might lead individuals to become engaged, it can also be used to explain the differing levels of civic engagement between countries. This approach can also be adopted to explain why democratic governments, which are responsive to the needs of their citizens, are more likely to have more active citizens, whilst citizens are less civic minded and active in countries where the government is faced with problems of accountability and corruption. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the general incentive model goes some way to explaining the difference in levels of engagement between countries. However, this theory has its limitations as it ignores the wider societal structures that can effect participation. As a consequence, the following sections consider a more contextual and structural approach to civic engagement.

### 3.3 The social capital model

So far, the theories introduced here have highlighted the salience of individual characteristics and their motivation for participation. However, research has also looked at the existence of networks that connect people to each other and their positive consequences for social cohesion and democratic governance. From Tocqueville's (1998) observations about 19th century America to the study of civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) and social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000) voluntary organisations have been identified as crucial elements of civic engagement and democracy. In particular, Putnam's definition of social capital demonstrated not only the importance of social networks for democracy, but also argued that these networks create trust and norms of reciprocity which improve the efficiency of government and democracy by overcoming problems of collective action. Putnam's research argues that Northern Italy had a successful democratisation and economic development experience because of a dense network of horizontal associations, whereas Southern Italy lacked the horizontal networks of civic engagement and norms of reciprocity. As a consequence, the latter has come to be characterised by "amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation" (Putnam, 1993: 183-184).

Thus, at the focus of Putnam's social capital theory are voluntary associations, trust and civic norms. Involvement in voluntary associations has (mainly) a positive effect on the norms, attitudes and behaviours of their participants and on social, political and economic institutions of the wider society. Putnam (2000: 19) defines social capital in a nutshell as:

Social capital refers to the connections among individuals- social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.

These networks and the social trust and norms of reciprocity they generate can improve the efficiency of society and democratic governance by facilitating coordinated actions. This in turn works to increase the intensity as well as the quantity of the networks, resulting in a virtuous circle that, in turn, fosters better working democracy. Putnam (1993: 182) summarises this process in the following way:

On the demand side, citizens in civic communities expect better governments and (in part through their own efforts), they get it. They demand more effective public service, and they are prepared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals. Their counterparts in less civic regions more commonly assume the role of alienated and cynical supplicants. On the supply side, the performance of

representative government is facilitated by the social infrastructure of civic communities and by the democratic values of both officials and citizens. Most fundamental to the civic community is the social ability to collaborate for shared interests.

The social capital theory has attracted a wide range of scholars and resulted in a large number of studies examining patterns and levels of social capital both within and across countries and across time. Most studies examine three aspects of social capital: networks, norms and trust. The studies differ in the extent they use all three categories; some restricted themselves only to the use of networks (Lin, 2002; Edwards and Foley, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Coleman, 1988) but the majority include trust and norms in their social capital measure, although some authors argue that social capital should include a composite measure of all the dimensions of social capital, as these concepts are strongly interrelated (Beugelsdijk and Schaik, 2005; Wollebaek and Selle, 2003b; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005)

One of the most commonly cited critiques of social capital theory relates to the problem of establishing conceptually the causal relationship between these different aspects of social capital (Inkeles, 2000). As Newton (1999) states in his introductory chapter in the book on *Social Capital and Democracy in Europe*, this is an obvious chicken-and-egg problem. Thus, it is highly contested whether formal and informal networks instil or create citizen capacity to trust and reciprocate (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993), or whether networks help to create norms of trust and reciprocity (Keele, 2005). As Putnam and others have argued, these dimensions are interrelated and reinforce one other. As a consequence a number of authors have pointed out that it is very difficult to establish a causal relationship (Whiteley, 1999; Inkeles, 2000; Newton, 1999; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Van Deth, 1997). Putnam (1993: 180) is particularly clear on this:

Social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation are mutually reinforcing. Effective collaborative institutions require interpersonal skills and trust, but those skills and that trust are also inculcated and reinforced by organized collaboration. Norms and networks of civic engagement contribute to economic prosperity and are in turn reinforced by that prosperity.

Empirical research has not solved this problem and the relative importance of these different aspects of social capital remains a hotly contested issue. The various indicators used to measure social capital further complicate the issue. Involvement in social networks, either formal involvement in voluntary associations or informal involvement with friends and family, belong to a standard measure of social capital in many studies.

Trust is usually measured by either generalised trust in fellow citizen or trust in institutions and government. Civic norms on the other hand include very different measures; ranging from law abidingness and attitudes towards democracy to social tolerance, subjective well-being, political interest and political discussion.

Notwithstanding the different understandings of how social capital is generated and sustained, most studies have demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between engagement in social networks, levels of social and political trust and civic norms. Brehm and Rahn's (1997) analysis of the US General Social Survey over time from 1972-94 confirmed the social capital model and identified a reciprocal relationship between civic engagement, general life satisfaction and interpersonal trust at the individual level. They also found that those citizens who have more confidence in federal institutions the more likely they are to participate in their communities. On the other hand, Newton (2001) argued that this relationship does not exist on the individual level. However, his analysis of 42 countries in the WVS (1991-1995) confirmed that societies with relatively high levels of social trust (general trust) tend to have also relatively high levels of political confidence (trust in parliament) at the aggregate level. Moreover, using the same data set Welzel *et al.* (2005) also found significant relationships between organisational membership and elite challenging political activities; and measures of generalised trust, confidence in institutions and political discussion. These relationships were found in Western democracies as well as in postcommunist countries. Stolle and Rochon's (1999) study of social capital in the USA, Sweden and Germany found again that participation in voluntary associations is strongly correlated with higher political activity and awareness, as well as with higher levels of generalised trust.

These recent studies confirm Almond and Verba's comparative five-nation study in the 1960s. On the whole, members of associations are more likely to be politically active, more informed about politics, more confident about their ability to affect political life and more supportive of democratic norms. A major question these studies bring up is the causal relationship between these different factors. What contributes to the unequal trends? Why do the citizens of some countries become actively engaged in their societies and enjoy democracy and wealth, whereas others suffer from ineffective government, corruption, economic instability and even authoritarian regimes?

### **3.4 What affects democracy and participation: culture, structure or both?**

Modernisation theory provides the most widespread and obvious explanatory framework, explaining the emergence of democracy with reference to socio-economic development. Lipset (1963) provided one of the earliest accounts: writing in the 1960s he argued that growing wealth, education, urbanisation and industrialisation were the social foundations for democracy and mass participation in the political system. However, Lipset's work could not explain why countries such as Brazil and Taiwan failed to sustain a democratic political structure despite experiencing rapid economic development in the 1960s and 1970s. More recent studies by the political scientist Przeworski (2008) have looked closer at the mechanisms that allow democracy to succeed. This work covers 135 countries and examines almost all democracies that existed at any time between 1950 and 1990. The main results suggest that the survival of democracy as a political system depends primarily on the distribution of wealth, the interests of the economic group, the military situation and the institutional frameworks (Przeworski, 2008; Przeworski *et al.*, 2003). In addition to these factors Przeworski (2008: 134) argues that democracies are more likely to endure when no party controls a large share of legislative seats, when the head of the government changes every so often, and when no political force dominates completely and permanently:

Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of wealth above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the military prowess of these groups is lower. In the extreme, democracy survives at any income level if its distribution is sufficiently egalitarian or if neither group can establish dictatorship.

The idea that the survival of democracy is to a great extent influenced by the economic prosperity of the country has also been confirmed by other studies examining the relationship between levels of social capital and socio-economic development. Beugelsdijk and Schaik (2005) have used various national and international surveys such as the European Value Survey (EVS) and Eurostat to measure the amount of social capital at 54 regional levels in Western European countries. Their results show that there is a positive relationship between levels of social capital and regional economic development. Furthermore, using the WVS and carrying out a cross-country analysis of 29 countries, Knack and Keefer (1997) also confirmed a strong relationship between social capital and high levels of aggregate economic activity. Based on the Eurobarometer Survey 1978-

1998, Van Deth and Elff's (2004) multilevel analysis also identified economic development as the strongest predictor of political interest in Europe. The authors defined political interest as a prerequisite of citizenship engagement. However, the importance of socio-economic structures is not just highlighted by defenders of the modernisation theory and those scientists who tend to take a structural approach. Studies arguing from the cultural perspective also identify the importance of structural conditions for democracy.

Almond and Verba's (1963) classical study on the civic culture, argues that in order for citizens to play a role in the political process they have to have a knowledge of, and interest in, political affairs. They should also have positive civic values, a democratic outlook and a willingness to be involved in voluntary associations of all kinds. These characteristics ensure that they have the ability to intervene in the political system if the need arises, ensuring that they can monitor political elites. In their studies these attributes were common among countries with a long history of democracy and economic wealth of the population such as the USA and the UK. Without denying the importance of these socio-economic structures, they argued that it is also important to look at the attitudes and norms of citizen that sustain a participatory democracy.

Along similar lines, Inglehart (1997) also argued that a supportive cultural system, which legitimates the democratic system and in which the people of that society have internalised a set of norms and rules, needs a stable economic and a democratic political system. As the principal coordinator of the WVS, Inglehart's (1997) work is primarily based on aggregate level analysis of a large number of countries across the globe. Most of his efforts have focused on a critical evaluation of the modernisation theory and this has lead him to develop his famous materialist and postmaterialist thesis.

Arguing that economic, cultural and political changes go together in a coherent form, Inglehart demonstrates how the core trajectories of modernisation such as industrialisation lead to a change in cultural, social and political areas. Yet the relationship between economic development and democracy is not linear and this has lead him to focus on attitudes and beliefs of individuals. Economic development brings cultural changes and changes in the social structure, which leads to democratisation. Thus, against classical defenders of the modernisation theory, Inglehart argues that democracy is not inherent in the modernisation phase, but becomes increasingly likely as societies move towards postmodernisation.

In a nutshell, Inglehart argues that rapid economic development in the last 100 years led to a shift from material concerns such as food, health, physical safety and social order, to postmaterial concerns such as self-expression, quality of living, civil liberties, environmental issues, job satisfaction, political and community participation. The socio-economic development lead to cultural changes that made individual autonomy and democracy possible, as citizens in a democracy are more likely to get active in the public affairs and thus serving as a check on the elites (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Inglehart (1997: 215) describes briefly the shift from modernisation to postmodernisation in the following quote:

With rising levels of economic development, cultural patterns emerge that are increasingly supportive of democracy, making mass publics more likely to want democracy and more skilful at getting it. (...) Although rich societies are much likelier to be democratic than poor ones wealth alone does not automatically bring democracy. But the process of industrialization does have an inherent tendency to produce changes that are conducive to democracy. (...) Those societies that do move on to trajectory of industrial society will eventually face increasingly powerful pressure for democratization. (...) In the long run, democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes or through clever elite-level manoeuvring. Its survival also depends on what ordinary people think and feel.

Inglehart's (1997) measure of culture includes interpersonal trust and trust towards institutions, organisational membership, and subjective well-being. He analyses how these relate to different aspects of democracy and economic development. Whilst controlling for economic wealth, he finds a significant relationship between aggregate levels of well-being, trust, economic development and democracy. This leads him to conclude that culture is conducive to stable democracy; however, yet other researchers have been more cautious about such interpretations.

For example, Norris's (2002: 167) analysis of the WVS also suggests that trust might be more important than civic engagement with respect to democracy. However, he is more careful about nature of the relationship:

This study remains strictly agnostic about the causal direction behind the associations that we have uncovered. The associations may be the product of culture (social trust) driving socio-economic development and democratisations, as social capital theories suggests. Or, alternatively it could be argued that the process of societal modernisation lay behind value change (the spread of more trusting cultures). In prosperous postindustrial nations, where life is pleasant, nonbrutish, and long, people may well become more trusting of the fellow man (and woman). Or the two processes may go hand in hand.

Moving beyond questions about the causal mechanism (which will no doubt be on the agenda for a long time), the more immediate question for policy makers concerns how institutions and governments can shape and increase social capital, as well as sustain and expand democracy.

### **3.5 Bringing the state back in: the role of institutions and policies**

Cultural attitudes are developed in specific historical and country-specific circumstances. As a consequence, they might prove difficult to transfer to another country. Nevertheless, the equal distribution of resources within a society is a very concrete factor that governments can influence and foster through various policies and interventions. Despite the historical roots of civic communities, Putnam argues (1993) that changing formal institutions can change political practice. As he demonstrates convincingly in the case of Italy, socio-economic development is strongly associated with high-performance of public institutions.

Uslaner (2003) argues that trust depends on long-term cultural systems, particularly religious traditions. However, he also identified economic equality as an equally important factor in shaping levels of trust in different societies. “Societies do not become trusting because they are more democratic. They become trusting because they distribute resources more equally.” (Uslaner, 2003: 173). Likewise, although economic success on its own might not be sufficient (as both Inglehart (1997) and Przeworski (2008) agree) redistributing resources so that people become more optimistic and feel a sense of common fate with others is well within the capacity of states (Uslaner, 2003).

The redistribution of a society’s wealth is central to studies on welfare regimes. Analysing the EVS from 1999/2000 for 23 EU countries, Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) found out that individuals living in countries, which have an extended welfare system also have higher national levels of trust in institutions and in other people; as well as higher levels of active as well as passive participation. Based on Swedish evidence, Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) advanced the hypothesis that people's experiences with universal welfare programmes tend to stimulate their trust in institutions, while personal experiences with needs-testing social programmes tend to have the opposite effect.

Yet extensive welfare regimes are seen as having a negative effect on the motivations of citizens to build social capital. Such critiques argue more specifically that social

expenditure and comprehensive social programmes ‘crowd out’ informal caring relations and social networks; as well as familial, communal and occupational systems of self-help and reciprocity. As a consequence, they foster social isolation, anomie and self-centredness. This in turn leads to a general decline of commitment to civil norms, participation in civil society, and trust in fellow citizens and social institutions (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Etzioni, 1995).

On the other hand, proponents of the welfare state have rejected the crowding out hypothesis by arguing that a well-developed welfare state creates the structural and cultural conditions for a thriving and pluralist civil society. In their opinion, comprehensive welfare states use voluntary organisations and invest in them; they offer people the financial resources and the free time to actively develop their social capital (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Salamon and Sokolowski, 2003; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Skocpol, 1996). Moreover, some authors depict the welfare regime of the Scandinavian countries as one of the most important single structures explaining the high levels of associational involvement observed in these countries (Henriksen and Bundesen, 2004; Kuhnle and Selle, 1992b; Rothstein, 1998a).

Rothstein (1998a) traces the roots of the Social-Democratic welfare regime in Sweden to early corporatism at the turn of the century, as well as to the balance of class power and the nature of state/society relations.<sup>20</sup> Rothstein (1998a: 134) argues that the Swedish state incorporated the labour movement into the political system as a way of managing social conflict and preventing the working class from developing revolutionary movements:

This system of ‘early corporatism’ gave the organised working class a channel to the Swedish state and showed the state to be not entirely hostile to working-class demands. Moreover, this system institutionalized corporatism as a natural and workable political system in Sweden, with the capacity to solve conflicts between the parties to the advantage of both sides. Participation in intermediate organisations, in the case of unions, that engaged in a close cooperation with the state authorities proved to nurture participation in public affairs.

Clearly there is a strand of research that puts welfare regime at the centre of discussions on social capital. Given that civic engagement represents one aspect of social capital, these discussions also relate to civic engagement. Welfare regime as an explanatory variable accounting for variation in levels of civic engagement between the European countries will therefore also be considered in this study. Due to the controversial nature of measuring

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<sup>20</sup> For a more in depth discussion see Rueschemeyer *et al.* (1992).

welfare regime, either quantitatively (by measuring government spending on social protection) or qualitatively (e.g. through welfare regimes typologies), a separate discussion on how welfare regime typologies are created is needed here. Moreover, since welfare regime appeared as an important factor in the analysis of this study, it is even more important to give an account of some of the basic arguments about creating welfare regime typologies. The following methodological chapter will discuss this in more detail.

### **3.6 Government and the voluntary sector**

The Swedish example shows that civic society and state does not need to be mutually exclusive and suggests that increased state action can also nurture civil society (Rothstein 1998 (a); Janoski, 1998). Research on the voluntary sector in other European countries (Kuhnle and Selle, 1992a; Kendal and Knapp, 1996; Fyfe, 2005) and across the globe (Salamon, 1999; Salamon and Sokolowski, 2004; Salamon *et al.*, 2003) has shown the interdependence of the voluntary sector and the state. Moreover, a renewal of the civil society is crucial for the deepening and widening of the societies. Giddens (2000) suggests that this requires, amongst other things, a partnership between government and civil society. In fact as Salamon (1999) argues, there has never been a ‘golden age’ in which the voluntary sector has been totally independent of the government.

Examining the development of the voluntary sector in Birmingham in the UK from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, Maloney *et al.* (2000) demonstrate how the public authorities are deeply implicated in the shape of activities or voluntary associations. This involvement ranges from influencing the institutions created to encourage engagement or participation, to shaping the form of grants and services, level agreements, or the nature of capacity-building programmes. Political institutions have a significant role at least in helping to sustain civic vibrancy and probably also in stimulating its growth. This also supports Hall’s (1999) thesis on the vibrant civil sector in the UK. Official data on the sources of government funding for the UK voluntary sector confirms that an increasing proportion of the voluntary sector’s income has been generated through grants and contracts from the public sector, which amounted to 38% in 2001/2 (HM Treasury, 2005). This situation is not particular to the UK. The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Project has carried out the largest and most extensive cross-national study on the non-profit sector. The project covered 38 countries and confirmed that a larger proportion of the voluntary sector income

was being generated from government sources (Salamon and Sokolowski, 2004; Salamon *et al.*, 2003).

Thus, even when we accept the “historical roots of civic communities” (Putnam, 1993) or the “pre-democratic” attitudes of some societies (Inglehart, 1997; Almond and Verba, 1963) there is still a great scope for governments to intervene and increase levels of social capital. This, in turn, is anticipated to increase government efficacy and to make the citizens more active, trustful, responsible and happy people (Putnam 1993, 2000; Halpern, 2005). The voluntary sector plays a crucial role in this process, as has been demonstrated here. However a thriving voluntary sector, particularly in developed industrial democracies, is dependent on government support and cooperation.<sup>21</sup> This thesis will be tested by measuring government support for the voluntary sector, as well as the relationship between this support and levels of civic engagement. However, cooperation between the state and voluntary sector is just one of many possible government policies that can influence and change the dynamics in the society and, as a consequence, levels of civic engagement.

Civic education is another policy area where governments might promote civic engagement. Although this is by far not the only areas in which governments can influence and shape levels of civic engagement.

### **3.7 Civic education**

The classical study on participation by Almond and Verba (1963), Putnam’s (1993) famous study on Italy and the Crick Report (Crick, 1998) prepared by the British political scientist and advisor to the Labour Party, Bernard Crick, all argue that civic education at school can act as a powerful tool to promoted civic norms and attitudes supportive of democracy among citizens. In light of the pressing problems of social cohesion and political alienation experienced in Europe, civic education gained prominence in Europe in the last decade (Kamens, 1988).

Supported by the European Commission, which initiated a discussion on citizenship education at schools in the 1990’s, citizenship education has therefore become a priority of

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<sup>21</sup> Voluntary sectors in non-democratic and authoritarian countries have a different function than in a democratic society. In non-democratic countries, civil society organisations act as a counterweight to the state. Thus under such conditions it is crucial for a progressive civil society to be financially and ideologically independent of the state, so that it is able to criticise and challenge the government (Foley and Edwards, 1996; Korkut, 2005).

educational reform in many European countries. National curriculums, which can be seen as “a normative description of the knowledge required to be a modern adult and citizen” (Kamens, 1988: 114) were revised with specific reference to citizenship education and the role of schools in promoting active and democratic citizenship. Briefly, the aim of these educational reforms was to promote civic engagement and democratic involvement (Crick, 1998).

Parallel to these developments, new studies conducted showed that civic education at school has a positive effect on young people’s civic consciousness and practice (Galston, 2001; Whiteley, 2005; Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta, *et al.*, 1999; Amadeo *et al.*, 2002). The most comprehensive study of civic education at school was been carried out by *International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement* (IAE) led by Torney-Purta. The analysis was based on a comparative study of 90,000 14-year-olds in 28 countries. It found that school-based civic education does make a significance difference to the development of civic knowledge, skills and attitudes. However, the study found that these achievements required a classroom climate that encouraged respectful discussions of civic and political issues and that fostered both civic knowledge and engagement. It also found that an explicit focus on learning about voting and elections increased the likelihood that young people participated in elections when they reached voting age. Finally, participation in student organisations (including student councils) was also found to promote a sense of civic efficacy (Amadeo *et al.*, 2002; Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta *et al.*, 1999).

Studies in the USA have also sought to evaluate various civic education programmes administered by the Centre for Civic Education. They found that the programmes were especially effective at improving the civic knowledge of elementary, middle, and high school students relative to students in a control group. Participants were also found to develop a stronger attachment to democratic attitudes and principles, as well as exhibiting an enhanced sense of political interest and effectiveness (Galston, 2001). In 2002, a study was conducted with Year 7 students in England in order to examine the effects of the new citizenship education classes. It found that citizenship education had a direct impact on pupil’s likelihood of becoming active in voluntary organisations and political activities, whilst controlling for confounding factors such as political interests, parent’s educational background etc. Subsequent research has found that this relationship holds true for in- as well as out of school activities (Whiteley, 2005).

Given the importance of education in predicting civic engagement in many theories of participation, it is surprising that civic education has only recently been identified as a possible policy area to combat civic disengagement. Education is central to the cognitive mobilisation theory introduced earlier as one of the influential models explaining political participation and organisational involvement. For the civic voluntarism and the SES model, education is also an important resource that provides individuals with the necessary skills and knowledge to follow politics and to become involved. Moreover, even for the rational choice model of participation, education enables the individual to make sense of the political system and thus have a better capacity to choose and operate effectively in politics. Education is also relevant for the social capital model, as educated people are more likely to be engaged in voluntary organisations and have higher levels of trust. Whiteley (2005: 15) summarises the importance of education for civic engagement as follows:

(...) education is a resource, which individuals can utilise to enable them to effectively participate. Education provides political knowledge, which helps them to be cognitively mobilised. Education promotes efficacy and in many cases stimulates an interest in voluntary activity and this stimulates further involvement. Education appears to interact with trust, and so may stimulate social ties and interpersonal co-operation within communities, which in turn promotes participation.

Viewed in this way, education is an important tool in promoting overall engagement. Given the tremendous increase in educational opportunities that has occurred in most industrialised societies in recent decades, we would also expect to see a rise in levels of participation. However, today's younger generations, despite their higher levels of formal education relative to the post-war generation, are not more civically oriented (see Putnam, 2000). In fact, research suggests that they have lower levels of civic engagement than older generations, a result that is borne out by the analysis carried out in chapter VII. This apparently paradoxical relationship between higher levels of formal education and an individual's propensity to engage in activism might be due to the fact that education is usually measured by years of education rather than by the content and quality of the teaching. Thus, as Whiteley rightly (2005: 16) argues:

If we want to see a relationship between education and engagement we should look at civic education rather than education in general.

This study therefore proposes to also look at civic education at school as a possible factor accounting for greater engagement in civic life. The methodological section (chapter IV) of

this thesis gives an overview of the different applications of civic education policies. Specific references for each of the 19 countries included in the analysis are given in the Appendix 1.

This review of the literature has shown that individual behaviour is only one side of the coin and that the larger structural conditions also need to be considered in order to understand the current structure of our societies and, in particular, to understand the different levels of civic engagement across countries. A combination of both approaches helps to place an individual's civic behaviour in a national context, as well as to explain differences in civic engagement by countries, by considering individual characteristics and the country's specific socio-demographic composition. The methods chosen in this study will provide a holistic approach, which combines both individual- and country level analyses. This contributes to a more in-depth understanding of the interaction between individual behaviour and the broader structural conditions. In doing so, it provides insights into the determinants of civic engagement at micro- and macro levels.

## **Chapter IV**

### **4. Methodology**

This chapter deals exclusively with the methods and methodology aspect of this thesis. It intends to provide all the technical details relating to the data and methods used in the analysis carried out in the subsequent chapters. There are various ways of conducting a comparative analysis of civic engagement across Europe. The specific methods and methodology adopted here are not exhaustive; they represent one possible route that can be taken to explore the specific research questions stated in the introductory chapter. The CASE studentship facilitating this research was developed and granted by the ESRC and Unlock Democracy CASE partner. At the time, issues of active and democratic citizenship were high on the agenda in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. The ESS had also just released the first wave of an ambitious comparative dataset focusing on democracy and citizenship. The survey offers a unique opportunity to carry out quantitative research on this topic. Within the UK a number of studies were already underway to examine participation at the national level. Examples include the ESRC-funded Democracy and Participation programme, which resulted in the Citizen Audit survey; as well as the very comprehensive and inspiring book *Citizenship in Britain* written by Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley (2004). A comparative study that makes use of the latest survey data on European civic behaviour was, therefore, the most logical step.

#### **4.1 European comparative study**

This study explores civic engagement from a comparative European perspective. The focus on Europe ensures that countries under investigation have a sufficient degree of similarity, which makes comparison meaningful (Landman, 2002). The 19 European countries, on which the analysis is based, are all modern, democratic, relatively affluent states with more or less comprehensive welfare regimes. Focusing on countries with similar socio-economic and political structures has the advantage of minimising factors that have a well known effect on civic engagement, such as less developed, authoritarian and/or non-democratic countries (Norris, 2002). Another advantage of limiting the analysis to the European countries is the availability of comparable data collected by the European Statistical Office, Eurostat.

A comparison between several European countries helps to identify general patterns and trends of citizen involvement that are common to all countries, without focusing

exclusively on a particular type of activism that might be very specific to one or two countries. Such a narrow focus provides a wealth of contextually specific detail but, in doing so it runs the risk that more general similarities are obscured. The identification of broad patterns of involvement across all countries might help us to formulate and identify more general patterns of social and political change. In particular, the shift from hierarchical, traditional types of involvement to forms of activity that are non-hierarchical, loose and network-based.

In addition, a comparative analysis helps to analyse the levels of engagement in relation to each other, thus avoiding the danger of making normative judgements about the levels of engagement in a particular country as being 'passive' or 'active'. For example, citizens in Spain might feel that they participate in the public life sufficiently, and that they are very outspoken when it comes to expressing their discontent with the government. However, when their level of engagement is compared with that of the Western European countries, Spanish citizens, in general, do not appear to be very active. This example is explored in more detail in the next chapter.

Contrasting one country against a set of others can function like a control comparison, where we compare a specific experience to a more general pattern. The disadvantage is that we cannot design these scenarios. Instead, we have to accept what the real world offers us and then group and compare these experiences by factors that go together fairly naturally, or seen particularly insightful. Furthermore, comparing countries with different levels of socio-economic and political development can help us to understand the likely trajectories of countries with similar characteristics. Given that economic development and democratic regimes are positively related with civic engagement (Norris, 2002), it can be anticipated that citizens in Eastern Europe will be more active in future if they experience similar levels of economic development and security as their Western counterparts.

Most importantly, Castles (1998) argues that comparison can also be used to test hypotheses about factors that might influence active citizenship and, in particular, to test country specific characteristics. This can help to eliminate rival explanations and work towards building more general theories on civic engagement.

The most appropriate method of comparing a large number of countries is through cross-country survey data. A representative survey such as the ESS measures the same phenomena across 19 European countries by using harmonised questionnaires. Such

datasets require long-term planning, cross-national cooperation and sustained funding. Given these difficulties cross-national comparative surveys often only have small sample sizes at the country level. As a consequence, it is important to exercise caution when analysing the results of an analysis with 19 countries. However, these 19 countries can also be viewed as case studies. For example, their residuals can be examined in-depth and some insight can be given on why these cases don't fit the general trend. Thus, a sample size of 19 countries represents a happy medium which is just large enough to carry out quantitative analysis and which provides a large numbers of case studies.

## **4.2 European social survey**

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a relatively new survey that has been designed to help explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its citizens. Three rounds of the survey (2002, 2004 and 2006) have been released so far. The first included over 42.000 respondents from 22 countries and the number of countries increased in the subsequent rounds. Besides socio-demographic and household data, the core topics of the ESS are socio-political orientations, subjective well-being, social exclusion, social trust, media and politics. The latter includes political interest, efficacy, trust; electoral- and other forms of political participation, party allegiance and union membership. These core topics are supplemented by rotating issues. The first round is particularly important for this study, due to its focus on citizenship involvement. This includes organizational membership, family- and friendship bonds, as well as citizenship values. Given that this study is particularly interested in organisational involvement, it focuses on analysing the first round. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of people aged 15 and over resident in a private household, regardless of their nationality, citizenship and language.

The ESS survey has a methodological rigour that is unusually strict for comparative surveys. Participating countries must adhere to rigorous guidelines aimed at ensuring comparability in areas such as survey sampling, questionnaire design, event and context measurements; translations, fieldwork, response rates and archiving. Any deviations from these specifications are documented and transparent.<sup>22</sup> The ESS has used a sampling design that allows for the different sampling frames used by the participating countries. Each country relied on its preferred method of random sampling practice. This ranged from

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<sup>22</sup> Full details of the first wave survey are available in the ESS Technical Annex ([www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)). Data can be downloaded by accessing the ESS Data homepage (<http://ess.nsd.uib.no>).

simple random sampling (e.g. Finland) to multi-stage stratified and clustered sampling (e.g. Poland and Spain). The surveys aimed to achieve a 70% response rate. In practice, response was around 70% with some countries having levels as low as 50%. Sample numbers were between 2.995 (Germany) and 1.207 (Italy). Most national surveys were conducted between September 2002 and April 2003.

There are two weights used in the ESS data set. The ‘design weight’, which corrects for over- or under-representing people in certain types of addresses or households and the ‘population weight’, which makes an adjustment to ensure that each country is represented in proportion to its population size. Both weights are used in when calculating frequency tables and to comparing countries with each other. Thus, weights are only applied to reflect the survey design and size of the population in each country.

### **4.3 Quantitative data analysis**

#### **4.3.1 Multiple correspondence analysis**

Civic engagement can be viewed as a latent variable. In the first round of the ESS a wide array of civic activities ranging from formal and informal involvement; cognitive engagement, voting and political activism were asked. These activities represent different modes of engagement, such as political activities and organisational involvement. However, rather than replicating other studies and grouping civic engagement into political activism and organisational involvement, I take an inductive approach and explore empirically how these different types of activities relate to each other and whether – as argued by many political scientists, a clustering of activism can be observed (Dalton, 2002; Verba *et al.*, 2001; Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

Given the categorical and binary nature of the civic engagement indicators, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) will be employed. MCA helps to reveal the structure of complex data that is categorical. The method is mainly an exploratory technique, like Principle Categorical Analysis (PCA) and Factor Analysis.<sup>23</sup> It helps to uncover clustering in the data that might otherwise not be obvious. In its essence MCA transforms a contingency table with many rows and columns into a geographic or geometric

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<sup>23</sup> Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) are based on the assumption that the response variables should be continuous or at least ordered categorically. Variables with binominal responses are therefore violating these assumptions and critiques agree widely that this would not produce a reliable output (Agresti, 1996). Factor analysis and PCA reduce numerous variables to a unitary indicator. However, MCA allows a more inductive approach, by allowing us to explore how the categories of variables relate to each other on a two dimensional map.

representation. It is a very useful tool for analysing the association between two or more categorical variables. It works by representing the categories of the variables as points in a low-dimensional space. In practice a two dimensional space is often used in order to make interpretations easier. The results are interpreted on the basis of the relative positions of the points and their distribution along the dimensions. Categories with a similar distribution are represented as points that are close in space and categories that have very different distributions are positioned far apart (Clausen, 1998; Greenacre and Hastie, 1987; Greenacre and Blasius, 2006; Greenacre, 2006). In brief, MCA is a geometric technique for the analysis of categorical or categorized variables. It represents and models data sets as clouds of points in a multidimensional Euclidean space.

The analysis of civic engagement indicators is based on an examination of variables and their categories (i.e. joint plot of category points), rather than on the analysis of individual clouds. The joint plot displays the categories of variables that have a similar distribution closer together and categories that have different distributions are represented far from each other. Thus, interpretation consists mainly of looking for groups of variables as well as their location on the axis. Like PCA, MCA also calculates ‘object scores’. These are similar to factor scores and can be used to construct a dependent variable (Meulman and Heiser, 2004).<sup>24</sup> To assess how much variance between the variables is accounted for by the different dimensions, the ‘total inertia’ is calculated. This is similar to the total variance explained in PCA. The dimensions are calculated using the Eigenvalues to help identify how many meaningful dimensions there are to the data. In addition to exploring the data and identifying clusters of activities, one of the main reasons for using MCA is to obtain object scores for the identified dimensions of civic engagement and to use these transformed variables as dependent variables within our analysis.

Finally, in addition to the civic engagement variables, a further set of variables such as demographic variables and/or the country variables can be added to the analysis as supplementary variables. This means, that these variables do not affect the MCA solution, but their categories are mapped on to the graphs. The advantage of projecting supplementary variables into the solution is that we can graphically display and describe how the categories of these variables relate to the set of variables describing the axis. For

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<sup>24</sup> Once the different dimensions are identified, individuals are assigned scores for whether they participated or not. The scores are additive i.e. the more activities they have reported the higher they move up the scales. However, due to the nature of participation, with most people reporting no activities, the distribution of civic engagement dimensions are skewed as will be seen in the following chapters. Thus, the richness of the scale can only be used for aggregate level analysis, where we can carry out multiple regression analysis, whereas for the multilevel modelling the dependent variable has to be collapsed into activist and non-activist.

example, age groups can be added as a supplementary variable. Given that younger and older age groups are less politically active, we would expect these categories to appear near to the non-activist, while we would expect middle-aged groups to be on the same part of the axis as the political activist. To sum up, MCA will be employed as a technique to explore the different indicators of civic engagement and to identify different dimensions of civic engagement. The following analysis identifies three dimensions: political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement. These aspects represent the three dependent variables used in the subsequent aggregate-level analysis and multilevel modelling.

MCA in SPSS has been developed by the Data Theory Scaling System Group (DTSS), from the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences at Leiden University. The group has also developed Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) in SPSS. CATPCA, MCA and PCA (Principle Components Analysis) are all used as data reduction techniques. This enables the description of structures or patterns in the data that would be too difficult to grasp in their original richness and complexity. Both CATPCA and MCA are suitable for nominal variables. However, unlike MCA, CATPCA can also be used for ordinal and scaled variables. If all variables are declared to be multiple nominal, as in our case, CATPCA produces an analysis equivalent to a MCA run on the same variables. Thus, considering that all our variables are binominal, MCA is the most appropriate technique for our purpose. As we will see, the strength of MCA is in its graphical outputs. CATPCA and PCA have been carried out as complementary analyses, in order to confirm that the same results identified in MCA, can also be replicated in CATPCA and PCA. Both methods are reported here in order to demonstrate the robustness of the MCA analysis.

#### 4.3.2 Aggregate level analysis

The MCA analysis will identify the dependent variable used in this study. This will be used to compare and contrast levels of civic engagement across Europe in the subsequent chapter. Comparing aggregate levels of civic engagement experienced at a societal level is important for democracy, as it is the accumulation of individual activities in a country that shows the effect it has on democracy (Newton, 2001). As discussed previously, high levels of citizens' participation in political activities and organisational life points to the health of a democratic system (Parry *et al.*, 1992). It is therefore important to compare and contrast levels of civic engagement between countries and to examine the country specific factors that explain these. This allows for a more in-depth discussion on the different socio-

economic and political characteristics of countries, such as their levels of economic wealth, the extent to which political rights and civic liberties are guaranteed, their specific welfare regimes, and the extent to which poverty and income inequality are experienced. All these variables are explored first through bivariate analysis, where the relationship between a single contextual variable and civic engagement are examined separately. This is then followed by multivariate analysis, where several contextual variables are considered together, thus taking into account several contextual variables at the same time. This will help to identify variables that show high collinearity with each other as well as to decide on the most parsimonious models, which will then be carried forward into multilevel analysis.

The ESS is the most suitable dataset for comparative analysis, due to the attention it gives to all aspects of the survey design and implementation. However, there are two problems with this data: the first relates to statistical interference and the second to the small sample size. In a sense, the 19 European countries used in the analysis are not real samples. They are not taken randomly from a larger sample, but they actually represent an almost complete account of the population under investigation. In other words, the relationships identified here are descriptions of the actual associations located in the data rather than estimates of relationships likely to be found in a population from which a sample has been drawn. Therefore, it might not be possible to replicate the results if other countries are included. Consequently, we cannot generalise these results to other countries around the globe. In addition to these problems of statistical interference, the descriptions of the associations between variables produced by such an analysis must be regarded as approximate (Castles, 1998), due to the small sample size and problems of over-fitting<sup>25</sup> (Hair *et al.*, 1998).

Nevertheless, despite the small sample size of 19 countries, the ESS data provides a robust and comparable measure of a wide range of civic engagement and socio-economic measures. In addition to this, the advantage of looking only at European countries is the availability of fairly reliable and comparable macro figures for all the European countries, mostly obtainable from one source, the European Statistical Office, Eurostat. Thus, despite some limitations in the number of countries available for comparison, we can still carry out a robust comparative analysis, which sheds light on cross-country variations in civic engagement.

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<sup>25</sup> Overfitting means that some of the relationships that appear statistically significant are actually just noise. It occurs when the complexity of the statistical model is too great for the amount of data that you have. The model might show an adequate fit in the data set under study, but does not validate, that is, does not provide accurate predictions for observations from a new dataset.

### 4.3.3 Multilevel modelling

Research comparing political participation and organisational involvement across countries, has found evidence of both individual and country-level variations in civic engagement. This indicates that an individual's choice and perception of civic engagement are influenced by the specific socio-economic and the institutional context of a country (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2007; McFarland and Thomas, 2006; Jones *et al.*, 1992; O'Loughlin, 2004). It is necessary to use multilevel modelling to make inferences about an individual's degree of civic engagement whilst also considering the influence of the national context.

The advantage of using multilevel analysis is that it avoids the pitfalls of aggregate level analysis, as well as those associated with individual level analysis. For example, a pooled individual level analysis of 19 countries risks overlooking the importance of country effects because it does not take the clustering within countries into account. As a consequence it could lead to biased estimates. On the other hand, an aggregate level analysis does not take individual level variation into account, as it only measures the aggregate level attributes associated with a particular country. This means that it might be misleading to make inferences about individuals based on the relationships observed at the aggregate level. A multilevel analysis recognizes that the 35,000 cases in our data are from 19 different countries.<sup>26</sup> In other words, it takes into account that an individual's civic behaviour is not only a result of their socio-demographic characteristics but also a result of the context in which they live. , i.e. it is shaped by nation states and their different policies and socio-economic structures. The multilevel model takes into account that individuals in the pooled data have been derived from different sampling strategies by recognising the country level as one level of analysis (level 2) and individuals as another (level 1) that is clustered within the country level. Drawing on this, chapter VII fits a random-effects logistic multilevel models with fixed intercept and random slope models.<sup>27</sup> The aim of using multilevel analysis to look at civic engagement is to examine whether variations between countries are due to differences in individual level factors or to the national context.

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<sup>26</sup> The ESS data is a hierarchical data, with individuals nested within countries. Although the individuals are also nested within regions in the ESS, regions have not be considered here in the analysis, as most of the contextual variables refer only to country level characteristics such as GDP, income inequality, welfare regime, levels of democracy.

<sup>27</sup> See Goldstein (2003) and Rasbash *et al.* (2005) on the strength of multilevel analysis and the different models that can be predicted. All multilevel models produced here have been carried out in MLwiN. The software has developed by the Centre for Multilevel Modelling in Bristol and offers a wider range of support for users.

Despite the advantage of using multilevel analysis, there are some limitations with this approach that need to be acknowledged. Although there are around 35,000 cases at level one (the individual level), there are only 19 level two cases (i.e. the country level). As with aggregate level analysis, this small sample size can lead here to biased estimates of the standard errors. To reduce this, Rasbash *et al.* (2005) suggest using the penalised quasi-likelihood (2nd order PQL) rather than the marginal quasi-likelihood (1st order MQL) estimation technique when carrying out the analysis in MLwiN. However, Rodriguez and Goldman (1997) argue that all the methods of approximate inference result in substantial underestimation of the fixed and random effects when the level two sample size is too small.<sup>28</sup> Thus, as with aggregate level analysis, the small sample size means that the results should be interpreted with caution and rule out generalising these findings to other countries. Nevertheless, the results do help to explain differences between the countries under investigation.

Despite the limitations of having only 19 countries on level-two, multilevel analysis is the most suitable method of exploring civic engagement in multiple countries. As with most methods that are applied to real world data, the results need to be interpreted with caution and it can be useful to look at other sources in order to get a fairly comprehensive picture of what might explain these differences.

In the subsequent sections of this methodological chapter, the independent variables used in the aggregate level and multilevel analysis are introduced. The civic engagement indicators are derived from the ESS and were briefly introduced in the introduction. There are numerous indicators of civic engagement and chapters I and II drew attention to the accompanying discussions its operationalisation. Consequently, the measurement of this dependent variable is developed in chapter V and is not discussed here.

#### **4.4 Country level predictors**

Several country specific variables have been identified in the literature as explaining the differences between countries in terms of political participation and organisational life. The most famous factors that have been discussed are those relating to economic wealth and democracy as a political system. However, there are other important measures, which are related to differences in social policy and other socio-economic indicators such as income inequality, poverty levels, unemployment levels and welfare regime. These are particularly

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<sup>28</sup> See for more issues of robustness in multilevel analysis Hox and Maas (2004).

relevant to the European context. In addition to these factors, this study will examine whether differences in government support for the voluntary sector and the length of civic education at school explain why individuals in some countries are more engaged than in others.

#### 4.4.1 National economic development

*Gross Domestic Product* (GDP) is one of the most commonly used indicators of economic development and wealth in a country.<sup>29</sup> It is defined as the sum of the total value of a country's goods, services minus payments on foreign investments.<sup>30</sup> The idea that national development strengthens democratic institutions and behaviour goes back to modernisation theory. More than four decades ago Lipset (1963) suggested that economic development is the prime factor responsible for promoting democracy. Subsequent studies have all found that economic wealth is an important aspect a democratic system, when the latter is measured in terms of levels of participation in politics and organisational life (Inglehart, 1997; Norris 2002; Przeworski, 2008; Van Deth and Elff, 2004).

#### 4.4.2 Levels of democracy

The degree of stability or continuity in a democracy is an important factor influencing the level of community participation and associational involvement in different societies (Inglehart, 1997; Curtis *et al.*, 2001). As Lipset (1994: 3) remarks, it takes time for a rich fabric of voluntary community organisations to develop, and ideas such as freedom of speech and the right to assembly “do not evolve over night”. Democracy fosters political freedoms, which then increases civic activity. It also leads to a participatory political culture that is amenable to the formation of voluntary organisations. Research suggests that this, in turn, helps foster democratic governance (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993; Paxton, 2002; Newton, 2001).

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<sup>29</sup>Gross domestic product (GDP) levels expressed in *Purchasing Power Standards* (PPS) divided by total population. This indicator is expressed in relation to EU25=100. If the index of a country is higher than 100 then this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. *Power Purchasing Parities* (PPP) are currency conversion rates that convert national currencies to a common currency called PPS, eliminating differences in price levels between countries in the process of conversion and thus allowing meaningful comparison between countries. PPP and related economic indicators are constructed primarily for spatial comparison and not for comparison over time. The figures are obtained from Eurostat, for the year 2002.

<sup>30</sup> The Human Development Index (HDI) is also being used as an alternative measure of wealth of a country. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge and education, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. However, as Qizilbash (2002) and other researchers (Anand and Sen 1993) have argued, the HDI is better at discriminating the performances of developing countries than of more industrialized countries. Thus, for comparison between European countries the GDP is preferred to HDI.

There are a number of ways of measuring democracy or democratic performance, two of which are relevant for this study. The performance of democratic institutions is often measured by the distribution of political rights and civil liberties. A good example of this is the work done by Freedom House since the 70's ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)). However, others have used a democracy indicator that measures years of continuous democracy, arguing that long periods of uninterrupted democracy is required for the formation of societal associations (Wessels, 1998). To incorporate both approaches, democracy is measured from two different aspects, both of which can be derived from the Freedom House measure. The first indicator captures the current state of political and civil liberties, while the second incorporates the accumulated experience of democracy by calculating average scores of political and civil liberties using data from 1972 (the year Freedom House first collected data on worldwide standards of) to the present. The following aggregate level analysis shows that both measures are important and cannot be substituted for one another.<sup>31</sup> These measures take into account the different experiences with democracy in European countries. For example, Portugal, Greece and Spain only overcame authoritarian regimes at the end of the 70s and the Eastern European countries made the transition to democracy and liberal market economics in the 1990s. The aggregate level chapter shows that despite their comparative youth, the democracy score in these countries is as high as some of the Western European countries.

Freedom House provides an annual classification of political rights and civil liberties around the world. The methodology of the survey is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil liberties, and is derived in large measure from the relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The survey does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and social freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Thus, the survey ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental.

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief including a free media, associational and

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<sup>31</sup> Inglehart (1997:164) distinguishes between these two types of democracy measures. He emphasises that “the *levels* of democracy at given points in time” and “the long term stability of democracy” are measuring different aspects of democracy.

organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state (Karatnycky *et al.*, 2003).

This index is highly relevant to civic engagement, in particular its appraisal of political, associational and organizational rights. The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights and 15 civil liberty questions. The highest number of points that can be awarded for political rights is 40. The highest number of points that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60.<sup>32</sup> The variable that measures current levels of democracy has been composed of the total scores given to a country in 2002 for its political rights and civil liberties (0-100). The higher the scores are, the higher the current level of democracy. Overall, in comparison to other countries around the world European countries score very high, with scores ranging from 91-100. However despite high levels of democracy within Europe, there are still some differences in the degree of political rights and civil liberties that are experienced.

The annual Freedom in the World survey was first compiled for the year 1972.<sup>33</sup> The scores for a single year do not assess the history of democracy in a country. For example, Portugal scores as high as the Nordic countries on the Freedom House index and the Eastern European countries score similarly to some Western European countries which have a longer history of democracy. To account for the history of democracy an average measure of scores will be used that is based on data since 1972. This is a measure over time and reflects the history of democracy in the last 3 decades.<sup>34</sup>

The Freedom House scores over the years are represented on a scale from 1-7, with 1 being the most democratic country and 7 the least democratic country.<sup>35</sup> Hence, the average scores for “democratic culture” in European countries (1972-2002) range from 1 to 4, with Western European countries scoring 1 on average and the Eastern European countries scoring 3-4.

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<sup>32</sup>The correlation between political rights and civil liberties is very high. For these reasons the average score for both political rights and civil liberties were calculated and used as a new variable of levels of democracy, which is a very common practice.

<sup>33</sup> However, not all countries in our analysis were included in 1972 survey, some countries were only included a year later in 1973. It is for this reason that the variable history of democracy ranges from 1973-2002 in the subsequent chapters.

<sup>34</sup> Prior to the independence of Slovenia in 1990, the country was part of the Republic of Yugoslavia. Hence, Slovenia's scores are calculated based on the average scores for Yugoslavia from 1973-1990 and average scores for Slovenia from 1991-2002.

<sup>35</sup> Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for political rights and for civil liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free." Since 2006 the scores given for every single question are published.

#### 4.4.3 Social exclusion and poverty

Active citizenship is not only dependent on the political rights, civil liberties and democratic structures of a country. The degree to which citizens can participate in political and public life also depends on their social and economic integration in society. Researchers and politicians generally agree that increasing levels of social inequality, marginalisation and even social exclusion, can threaten equal citizenship (Andersen and Halvorsen, 2002). Crucially, this segment of the population lacks the social and cultural capital that is thought to be necessary to enabling participation.

The New Politics Network argues that social instability and insecurity generate a lack of faith in politics, and “self-exclusion” from politics and political participation (White, 2001; New Politics Network, 2002). Unequal access to political participation, whether self-inflicted or not, leads to “unequal influence” (Lijphart, 1997). Thus, social integration and social cohesion are seen as the fundamentals of active citizenship (Jansen *et al.*, 2006). T.H. Marshall’s (1965) emphasis on the social aspects of citizenship touches exactly on this weakness in the concept of citizenship, and it is a dimension that is most frequently neglected when it comes to discussing democracy and political participation.

The threat that poverty and social exclusion can pose for the legitimacy of democracy has only become an important policy priority of the EU within the last decade. This has led to the development of a set of common indicators to measure social exclusion and poverty. In addition to using indicators such as education, health, household deprivation to measure social exclusion and poverty, the European Commission’s Social Protection Committee in 2002 also recommended measuring and monitoring the at-risk-poverty rate after social transfers, and the distribution of income (the income quintile ratio) and amount of long-term unemployment (EU, 2004; Twena and Aaheim, 2005).

Income inequality and at-risk-of-poverty indicators both measure monetary deprivation. However, social exclusion is a broader concept than just monetary poverty. It is established that poverty is not only about low income, but also about a person’s capabilities and their relationship to society. Although the definition of social exclusion remains widely contested, it has often been used in the literature to describe a situation where an individual or group is unable to participate in the basic political, economic and social functions of society (Byrne, 2006; Twena and Aaheim, 2005).

The experiences of poverty, unemployment and the extent of social stratification are not homogenous across Europe. These phenomena take place within particular economic, social and political structures which, because of this, may have different dynamics within each national culture (Andersen and Halvorsen, 2002). Thus, in addition to social exclusion and poverty (measured by long-term unemployment, income inequality and at-risk-of poverty), the welfare state regime will also be considered. As will be demonstrated later, the welfare state can have an important effect on how social exclusion and poverty is experienced.

#### 4.4.3.1 Long-term unemployment

The long-term unemployment rate measures the average long term unemployed (those who have been unemployed for 12 months and longer) among the economically active population aged 15 and over in 2002.<sup>36</sup> Long-term unemployment as opposed to the unemployment rate is a core parameter of structural unemployment (Andersen and Jensen, 2002). Furthermore, long-term unemployment has a stronger effect on those experiencing it, than those who are short-term unemployed. Therefore, long-term unemployment is preferred here over the short-term measure of unemployment. However, in general those European countries with high levels of short term unemployment also tend to suffer from high levels of long-term unemployment.

The causes of social exclusion and poverty have been linked to unemployment and are widely recognised by the policy makers of the EU (Tsaklogou and Papadopoulos 2001; Mayes, 2002). However, this link is sometimes contested. Indeed, Twena and Aaheim (2005: 2) point out that:

(...) unemployment can lead to poverty, poverty can lead to social exclusion, and social exclusion can make it difficult for people to find work. (...). [However,] people may be unemployed without being poor, they may be poor without being socially excluded, and can be socially excluded without being unemployed.

Although unemployment can lead to social exclusion and poverty, the degree to which this is experienced also depends on other factors, such as overall employment and welfare policies. The UK and USA are typical examples of countries with low levels of

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<sup>36</sup>The ILO classification of unemployed excludes those who are not actively looking for a job and those whose unemployment has been interrupted due to participation in an activation programme. This may be misleading and underestimate the real figure of unemployment (Andersen and Jensen, 2002). Also, the decrease of unemployment levels across Europe since the second part of the 1990s is due to the rise of part-time employment, as has been observed in particular in the Netherlands. This suggests that part-time work is imposed on people who prefer to work full-time (Daguerre, 2002).

unemployment and high levels of income inequality and poverty. In these two liberal economies, low levels of unemployment have partly been secured by pressing down wages and pushing people to work in low-paid or part-time jobs. This has led to the creation of 'the working poor' and further increased income inequality. In contrast to this, Continental European countries tend to have more strongly regulated labour market. The cost of keeping the wages high has resulted in higher levels of unemployment and, in the absence of generous unemployment benefits and a fairer distribution of income, high unemployment levels also lead to poverty and income inequality. Thus, as Grimalda (1999: 270) explains: "The working poor and the long term unemployed are two sides of the same coin". Similarly, Mayes (2002) argues that unemployment and poor quality employment form one of the most important factors of social exclusion.

#### 4.4.3.2 Income inequality

Income inequality is another indicator of poverty and social exclusion that is widely used. It matters for social exclusion, because income is both the basis of social participation through consumption and a reflection of the power of people in their economic roles (Byrne 2006). In particular, the most recent publication of Wilkinson's and Pickett's (2009), *The Spirit Level* has brought the importance of this measure to the forefront of discussions again.<sup>37</sup> It argues that income inequality is at the root of a large number of social problems. Comparing 22 developed countries across the globe, they demonstrate that income inequality is related to a wide range of social problems such as reduced life expectancy, child mortality, drugs, crime, homicide rates, mental illness, obesity and low levels of trust. They argue that it is not just poverty that creates the social problems, but the differentials in income between rich and poor. These alter the basic fabric of society and this, in turn, affects everybody in society. In countries where great material differences are manifest, people empathise less with each other and compete more with over status and prestige. Thus, the effect of income inequality on individuals and their social relationships can be explained with reference to the psychosocial areas of hierarchy and status.

The measure of income inequality used in this study is the S80/S20 ratio, which is generally used to calculate income inequality in Europe. This ratio is the total income received by the top 20% of the country's population with the highest income relative to that received by the bottom 20% of the country's population with the lowest income. Thus, a

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<sup>37</sup>See their webpage [www.equalitytrust.org.uk](http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk) in which the book and its ideas are promoted and discussed.

high ratio indicates greater inequality.<sup>38</sup> The figures for income inequality were obtained from Eurostat. Despite an attempt to harmonise methodologies used to calculate common indicators, Eurostat warns that statistics for new member states are not fully comparable. This is due to inconsistencies in underlying data sources, income reference periods and the timing of surveys, which can be biased by the variability of the seasonal components such as income from the agricultural economy. Furthermore, the collapse of the old communist regimes and the subsequent harsh transition has led to an increase of the informal or 'hidden' economy in some countries (Dennis and Guio, 2003).

Although income inequality in Eastern European countries is similar and even less than some Western European countries, it is misleading to conclude that these countries do not face extreme levels of poverty. Twena and Aaheim (2005) suggest comparing the median income across the EU. This reveals that income levels in the new member states are less than half the EU average. Thus, although financial income inequality is less marked in the former socialist states, for historical reasons it is necessary to consult other indicators as well so as to paint a fair overall picture of poverty and social exclusion.

The figures for at-risk-of-poverty were also obtained from Eurostat. The income inequality and poverty measures are both based on income measures. Problems associated with unreliable income data in Eastern European countries also apply in relation to the poverty measure. Again, low levels of poverty in Eastern Europe have to be interpreted with caution (Dennis and Guido, 2003). Nevertheless, they are the only comparable figures available to measure poverty on the aggregate level and they still give an interesting insight into the different levels of poverty and income inequality experiences in Europe. While income inequality looks at the relative position of the bottom group with regard to that of the top group, the at-risk-of-poverty indicator focuses on the bottom part of the income distribution. Both indicators highlight different aspects of poverty and are widely used indicators of social exclusion (Twena and Aaheim, 2005)

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<sup>38</sup>The *Gini coefficient* is another way of measuring the inequality of distribution of income in a country. It takes account of the full income distribution whereas the S80/S20 ratio only looks at the top and bottom. It is a technical formula which identifies the relationship of the cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of income, to the cumulative share of the total amount received by them. Since the Gini coefficient shows a similar ranking pattern to the *S80/S20 ratio* for the European countries, only the S80/S20 ratio will be used here (Dennis and Guio, 2004).

#### 4.4.3.3 At-risk-of poverty after social transfer

The standard way of measuring poverty is to count individuals living in households where the household income is below 60% of the national equivalised median income. The equivalisation is achieved by correcting for differences in household size and composition. Thus, the focus of this measure is on relative rather than absolute risk of poverty. The fact that having an income below this threshold is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition of being in a state of poverty means that these indicators are consequently referred to as measures of “poverty risk” rather than poverty *per se* (Dennis and Guido, 2004: 2). The at-risk-of poverty measure includes the proportion of people experiencing poverty after social transfers. The inclusion of social financial support reduces the proportion of the population at risk of poverty.

A systematic comparison of the 15 EU states’ 2002 levels of poverty before and after social transfer showed that the extent to which social transfers reduced the risk of social poverty ranged from 5% in Greece to almost 70% in Sweden. Thus, countries vary in terms of their levels of social expenditure as well as in terms of the impact social transfers have on benefits. While in the Southern countries social transfers do not have a strong impact on poverty reduction, the Nordic countries’ social policies have a much stronger poverty-reducing effect (Twena and Aaheim, 2005). Even after considering social transfers, there is still a difference in the levels of poverty experienced. This indicates that expenditure on social transfers alone is insufficient at explaining differences in reducing poverty. For example, in the UK, parents who work get working tax credit and child tax credit, neither of which is captured by the flat rate of social security benefits. There are also other factors that play a role and these are best described by differences in welfare regimes in term of levels of social spending, coverage of state provision and philosophies of state involvement in social provision (Apospori and Millar, 2003).

#### 4.4.4 Typologies of welfare regimes

Studies about the effect of welfare regime on social capital and, in particular organisational life, have suggested that this factor is a strong determinant in explaining the differences in the levels of social capital in advanced industrialised countries (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Henriksen and Bundesen, 2004; Kuhne and Selle, 1992b; Rothstein, 1998a). These studies benefit from the other work that has sought to develop various typologies of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrara, 1996; Leibfried, 1992; Katrougalos, 1996).<sup>39</sup>

In particular, Esping-Andersen's (1990) tri-polar welfare typologies set off a wide range of debates and discussions of social policy differentiation into regime typologies. Although some scholars find such typologies over-simplistic (Baldwin, 1996), and problematic due to the complex features of welfare policymaking (Kasza, 2002), they are nevertheless very popular when welfare state issues are studied and debated, particularly in developed countries. The classification of welfare states performs a significant reduction of complexity. This has become even more important, as Bonoli (1997) argues, since virtually all welfare states are going through a period of crisis and restructuring. Social policies in this context have become central to the political debate in almost all advanced industrial countries. The classification of ideal-types of welfare regimes makes the identification of factors responsible for the development and the shape of a welfare state more practical and is thus a powerful tool for comparative social policy (Bonoli, 1997; Huber and Stephens 2001).

The welfare regime typologies adopted in this analysis are based on the classifications proposed by Esping-Andersen, but expand this to apply to the countries under investigation in this study. This leads to the adaptation of five welfare regime systems: the Liberal system (UK and Ireland), the Corporatist system (German, Austria, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), the Nordic system (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland), the Southern system (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) and the Postcommunist welfare regimes (Poland, Hungary and Slovenia).<sup>40</sup>

Esping-Andersen's thesis can be situated within the comparative welfare state literature of power mobilisation and path dependency, which argues that politics matters (Esping-

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<sup>39</sup> See Abrahamson (1999) for a discussion on how the "business" of welfare typologies in the social policy literature developed.

<sup>40</sup> Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) have also classified these countries in the same manner.

Andersen, 1996; Cook, 2007). Based on the degree of decommodification<sup>41</sup> and the kind of stratification that the welfare regimes produce, Esping-Andersen distinguishes between three models, or 'deal-types' of welfare states. These are the Conservative, Liberal and Social-Democratic. They owe their origins to different historical forces and they follow qualitatively different developmental trajectories. The historical characteristics of states or more precisely, the history of class coalitions play the most decisive role in determining variations between welfare-state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996). Decommodification is defined as the "degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). The level of decommodification provided by a welfare state depends, he argues, on the stringency of eligibility rules, on the level of income replacement and on the range of entitlements, which is developed differently in the welfare states.

Esping-Andersen's tripolar classifications are as follows: the Liberal welfare regimes are characterised by means-tested<sup>42</sup>, modest universal transfers, or modest insurance plans. Those entitled to social assistance are mainly those with no or minimal income, and are usually the working class and the state dependents. This model is typical for USA, Canada and Australia, but includes also the UK and Ireland. The consequence is that this type of welfare regime minimizes the decommodification effects and erects an order of stratification, which is a "blend of relative equality of poverty among state-welfare recipients, market differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two." (Esping-Andersen 2004: 162).

The Conservative-Corporatist type of regime is characterized by a moderate level of decommodification. This form of organisation is typical for Germany, France, Austria and Italy.<sup>43</sup> The direct influence of the state is restricted to the provision of income maintenance benefits that are related to occupational status. The Church plays a strong role in the Corporatist welfare regime, which shows its effect in strong commitment to the preservation of traditional family unit. As a consequence, the participation of married

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<sup>41</sup>Decommodification is defined as the "degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). The level of decommodification provided by a welfare state depends, he argues, on the stringency of eligibility rules, on the level of income replacement and on the range of entitlements, which is developed differently in the welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

<sup>42</sup>Means-testing is a requirement that a recipient or household be at or below a specific level of income before he or it can receive government assistance.

<sup>43</sup>Italy's inclusion into the corporatist typology is controversial, as many other researchers have argued that this country fits best in a cluster with the other Southern European countries (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Leibfried, 2000), which some regard as a subcategory of the corporatist welfare regime (Katrougalos, 1996).

women in the labour market is discouraged, motherhood is emphasized, non-working wives are excluded from social insurance and there are insufficient day care provisions for families with children. Generally, the state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted.

The Scandinavian countries on the other hand represent the most universal and generous form of social policy provision. They are classified as Social-Democratic regime types because social democracy was the dominant force behind these reforms. These forms of organisation are most commonly found in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. In comparison to the other two models, (Esping-Andersen, 2004: 163) argues that it has also the most equalising effect on the society:

Rather than just tolerate a dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, the social democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere.

One of the most important criticisms of Esping-Andersen is that he did not systematically include the Mediterranean countries.<sup>44</sup> According to his thesis, Italy belongs to the family of the corporatist welfare state regimes and Spain, Greece and Portugal are not covered by his typologies. This led other authors to propose a fourth category in addition to the three models suggested by Esping-Andersen. Leibfried (2000) identified the Latin-Rim, which includes Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal as distinct to the Scandinavian countries; the Bismarckian (Germany and Austria) countries and the Anglo-Saxon (UK, USA, New Zealand) countries. Leibfried's categorisations are based on different policy models and their different institutional arrangements in combating poverty. In line with Leibfried (2000), Bonoli (1997) and Ferrera (1996) also argue for a fourth Mediterranean or Southern European prototype of welfare regimes, in addition to Esping-Andersen's three types.

The classifications developed by the different authors do not cover the same nations or use the same criteria for grouping countries. However, despite these diverse political approaches, it appears that even when one uses different indicators to classify welfare states, some countries emerge as standard examples that approximate to certain ideal

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<sup>44</sup> Feminists also criticised Esping-Andersen's neglect of gender. Feminist critics of mainstream welfare state theory have challenged the use of de commodification – the extent to which social rights eliminate dependence on the labour market – as a core dimension along which welfare states have been compared. Comparison of welfare states that reflect the reality of women's lives must highlight the extent to which state policies promote women's opportunities to engage and advance in paid work. Access to paid work for women should constitute an independent dimension in comparing welfare states (Orloff, 1993; Bamba, 2007).

types.<sup>45</sup> Thus according to Arts and Gelissen (2002), the application of a particular type of classification depends on whether these typologies lead to a theoretically more satisfying and empirically more fruitful comparative analysis of welfare state regimes.

Despite applying different criteria for grouping the European countries under welfare regime typologies, Ferrera's (1996) and Bonoli's (1997) countries are in identical clusters. Bonoli combines levels of social expenditure with the way welfare provision is delivered, mainly distinguishing between a high or low social spending of a Bismarckian<sup>46</sup> regime and a low or high level of Beveridgean<sup>47</sup> approach to social policy. On the other hand, Ferrera (1996) concentrates on four dimensions of social security systems: eligibility, the conditions under which benefits are granted, the regulations to finance social protection and finally, the organisational-managerial arrangements to administer various social security schemes. Their clustering of countries corresponds closely with Esping-Andersen's classifications.<sup>48</sup>

The above typologies do not include the Eastern European countries. This is mainly due to the lack of research on the welfare regimes in the postcommunist countries and also to the radical process of transformation that has reshaped the socio-political and economic structures of the postcommunist countries throughout the 1990s. However, as the initial 'shock' of the transformation settled down, the shape of the new capitalist welfare regimes slowly began to take shape and new studies emerged, which drew parallels between the existing welfare regime typologies and the different features of welfare regimes within postcommunist countries. The first and most comprehensive study aimed at developing similar classifications of welfare policies for postcommunist countries was carried out by Cook (2007). In a nutshell, Cook argues that the postcommunist countries have a welfare

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<sup>45</sup> The United States emerge as the typical prototype of a welfare state which can be best described as liberal or Anglo-Saxon. Germany approaches the Bismarckian/corporatist or conservative ideal type and Sweden approximates the social-democratic/Scandinavian or Nordic ideal type (Arts and Gelissen, 2002).

<sup>46</sup> The Bismarckian social policies are based on social insurance; provide earning related benefits for employees; entitlement is conditional upon satisfactory contribution records and financing is mainly based on employer/employees contributions (Bonoli, 1997: 357).

<sup>47</sup> The Beveridgean social policy is characterised by universal provision; entitlement is based on residence and need; benefits are typically flat-rate and are financed through general taxation (Bonoli, 1997: 357).

<sup>48</sup> Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) group the UK and Ireland as the 'British' or 'Anglo-Saxon' welfare regime, which corresponds to Esping-Andersen's (1990) Liberal welfare regime. The 'Nordic' or 'Scandinavian' countries in Bonoli's and Ferrera's models encompass Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. This approximates to Andersen's 'Social-Democratic' model with the exception that Esping-Andersen also added Austria, Belgium, and Netherlands to this category, a decision that has been fiercely criticised by many comparative welfare analysts. Germany was described as the prototype of a 'conservative' model according to Esping-Andersen. Ferrera describes Germany as typical for a 'Bismarckian' model along with France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland. Bonoli refers to the same countries as a 'Continental' model, with the exception that he has not included Austria in his analysis and grouped Switzerland under the 'Southern' model.

regime that is distinct from the West European countries and is characterised by weak democratic structures, a deep and fundamental postcommunist economic crisis in the 1990s, and a strong, statist welfare system inherited from the previous political regime.

All postcommunist countries emerged from a social sector that was fully administered and financed by states, which had eliminated markets and alternative sources of social provision. Moreover, these welfare states were embedded in full-employment economies based in the centralized state planning and resource allocation that formed part of the communist development model (Sengoku, 2004; Deacon, 2000; Sapporo, 2004). During the transition, this inherited welfare state left a legacy that played an important role in the reforms pursued in the social policy area. Besides from the economic and financial pressures to scale back welfare states, the postcommunist governments also faced a population that was highly dependent on the state, combined with a popular attachment to welfare states and still influential social sector elites and welfare bureaucracies with vested interests in the maintenance of the old system of public administration and financing of social welfare. However, the postcommunist governments' differing responses to the pressures and constraints of the transition were, according to Cook (2007), subject to political bargaining. Although democratic rights, constraints, and electoral feedback across the postcommunist countries have been weaker than the Western European countries, these features have nevertheless played an important role in the way welfare policies have been negotiated, and help to explain the different trajectories of social policies among postcommunist countries.

Therefore, Cook (2007) argues that those countries, which had relatively strong pro-welfare parties and labour organisations, were more successful in maintaining relatively strong welfare policies. In Poland and Hungary, (unlike Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) labour unions and social democratic parties formed alliances and participated regularly in governments. Pressure from these groups, and their direct role in political bargaining, affected welfare outcomes. Unions and parties helped to gain compensation for societal groups that were hurt in transitional recessions and this contributed to large expenditure increases in selected social transfer programs, even during the depths of recession. Representative institutions bargained for a moderate change toward privatisation and social insurance markets. They also pressed to sustain public expenditure and responsibility for welfare provision (Cook, 2007).

All Postcommunist welfare states have mixed elements of state, market, and informal provision. But in the end differences in state capacity have produced distinctive welfare outcomes. Poland and Hungary moved towards a more market-conforming, social-liberal model and states with weaker taxing and regulatory capacities (such as Russian and Kazakhstan), moved toward an informalised welfare model characterised by weak coverage, poorly regulated social security markets, and multiple informal controls over access to welfare services (Cook, 2007). In brief, Cook argues that there are three central characteristics of Postcommunist welfare regimes: retrenchment<sup>49</sup>, liberalisation<sup>50</sup>/informalisation<sup>51</sup>, and corruption<sup>52</sup> of the social sectors.

Slovenia is the only country that has not been systematically included in the analysis of the welfare typologies. Although Cook only focused on Poland and Hungary, she has grouped these countries within Central and Eastern Europe, which share similar welfare developments in contrast to Western Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the different paths of welfare regimes within postcommunist countries, if the comparison is between the welfare states of developed industrial democratic countries and those of postcommunist countries then, as Cook demonstrated, the postcommunist countries emerge as a distinct group. Thus, for the purpose of this study Slovenia, Poland and Hungary can be grouped as welfare states that exhibit typical features of a Postcommunist welfare regime (Fenger, 2007).<sup>53</sup>

Overall, the welfare typologies also correspond strongly to a common cultural, historical and geographical feature of the ‘families of nations’ (Castles, 1993, 1998)<sup>54</sup> or to distinct

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<sup>49</sup>Retrenchment is defined here as cutbacks in expenditure –cuts in benefits and entitlements that reduce payments or restrict eligibility but leave in place the basic principles of public financing and state responsibility.

<sup>50</sup>Liberalisation means deep change in the structures of the welfare state, the dismantling of public programmes and administration and their replacement by social insurance markets and privatised social services. During the 1990s the liberal paradigm largely defined the terms of the debate over social policy in postcommunist states.

<sup>51</sup>Cook refers to a feature of the postcommunist welfare state that has no parallel in Western European countries. The category “informalised” (Cook 2007: 10) welfare state captures the mix of weak state and market regulations and informal mechanism that emerged in the control and distribution of welfare resources, which was widespread particularly in Russia and Kazakhstan.

<sup>52</sup>Postcommunist governments suffered from both tax evasion and weak control over the use of revenues that were collected.

<sup>53</sup>Sengoku (2004) gives a good overview of the reforms in social policy comparing Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Deacon (2000) identifies Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, as a distinct group in comparison with the other postcommunist countries. He identifies these groups as strong reformers in general and in particular in the field of social policy.

<sup>54</sup>UK and Ireland are united by a language and a common political tradition consequent upon the historical ties with Great Britain. The Scandinavian countries have been closely linked through the past millennium; they belong to the same denomination and historically had a common legal tradition. The corporatist or Continental European countries have a historical legacy of dynastic links, cultural and, in particular religious

cultural zones (Inglehart, 1997). This is not a contradiction, particularly from Esping-Andersen's point of view. The degree to which a mature, universal and generous welfare policy has developed is to a great extent dependent on the specific circumstances of the socio-economic, and particularly the political, conditions of a country. Thus, the welfare regime typologies indicate that path dependency explains why countries have taken different routes in terms of fighting poverty and social stratification.

#### 4.4.5 Government expenditure

Government expenditure is used here as a proxy for a government's support of the voluntary sector. This variable will test the hypothesis H3a which assumes a link between a government's effort to support the voluntary sector and levels of civic engagement. However, government expenditure is also used as a proxy for the size of the welfare state (Arts and Van Oorschot, 2005). To avoid confusion, the measure used here does not include government expenditure that is related to social protection.

Data on government expenditure by function are compiled according to the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which is laid down in the *ESA 95* categories of the United Nations. The specific aim of COFOG is to classify the purpose of various kinds of government outlays. Government expenditure is broken down into 10 functions: general public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreation/culture and religion, education and social protection.<sup>55</sup>

In the 19 countries the average total government spending by all functions accounted for 44.5% of GDP. As a whole, as well as in the individual states, 'social protection' is the most important function of government expenditure within the 10 functions. The average government spending on 'social protection' alone, was equivalent to 18.2% of GDP in 2002. This dimension of government spending has been used as an indicator of the size of the welfare state (Arts and Van Oorschot, 2005).

The John Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector, which carried out a comparative survey on voluntary organisations in a large number of countries, discovered that in general

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similarities. The Southern European countries are part of the ancient Mediterranean cultural world and have many features in common by virtue of the lateness of their economic, social and political modernisation. Finally as the name indicates, the postcommunist countries all emerged from the Communist bloc and experienced similar socio-economic and political problems during the transition (Castles, 1998).

<sup>55</sup>For a general discussion of trends within Europe of government expenditure see Pulpanova (2006).

voluntary organisations are active in areas such as education, social services, health, development, culture, professional, civic advocacy, environmental and international organisations (Salamon *et al.*, 2003). Moreover, they demonstrated that most of the income of these organisations is generated through fees and public support, rather than through donations. Furthermore, in most of the Western European countries (Ireland, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, France, Austria and the UK) the major source of non-profit revenue is not fees and payments/donations, but public sector grants and contracts. This is in line with other research demonstrating that the governments in Europe are increasingly outsourcing welfare services from the public sector to the third sector (Tarling, 2000; Evers and Laville, 2004).

This reflects the tradition of subsidiarity that is built into European social policy, a tradition that acknowledges the important role of the state in financing social welfare services, but turns extensively to private, non-profit organisations to deliver many of the services. Funding from the public sector generally flows into areas such as health, education and social services, in Western Europe in particular. In the Eastern and Central European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia), as well as in Spain and Finland, the non-profit sector depends more strongly on the private market for the delivery of these services. This is because they are not provided by the third sector in these countries. Fees are the main sources of income from third sector bodies that offer these services (Salamon *et al.*, 2003).

The current character of the non-profit sector in Eastern Europe reflects its communist legacy. Unlike the Western European countries the non-profit sector is not dominated by welfare services but by activities relating to culture and recreation, as well as professional organisations and unions. These types of activities were tolerated and even supported by the Communist regimes. At the same time, in these countries the non-profit sector's involvement is still limited in relation to core welfare areas such as social services, education and health (Salamon *et al.*, 2003)

Thus, within the 10 functions of government's expenditure this study will only include the areas of *housing and community amenities, health, recreation/culture and religion, and education*. Excluded from this category are general public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, and environmental protection, which are primarily areas that covered by the public sector. 'Social protection' is also excluded from this measure, as it refers to social transfers such as benefits and pensions that the state provides directly to

those entitled. Since ‘social protection’ constitutes the biggest single government expenditure, its inclusion might suppress the differences of government spending in other social and cultural areas and could end up functioning as an indicator of the size of the welfare state rather than the support of the government for the voluntary sector.

Government expenditure in housing and community amenities; health, recreation/culture and religion; and education, are all areas in which voluntary organisations are primarily active. Thus, in the absence of comparative data on the income and size of the voluntary sector and its resources, this study assumes that part of the government expenditure in these areas flows into voluntary organisations for various services.

#### 4.4.6 Civic education

The variable relating to citizenship education at school has been created to evaluate the educational reforms from 1945-2002 across 19 countries with reference to civic education. This study made use of secondary sources for composing the civic education variable. A large number of historical and contemporary articles and studies of the educational systems, the national curriculum and educational reforms were analysed.<sup>56</sup> Relying on secondary data by national experts no doubt has the advantage of relying on specialist opinion that is based on an in-depth knowledge about the education system in a particular country. However, these data have the disadvantage of being uneven in their focus and detail. As a consequence, they do not provide a comparable measure of civic education.

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<sup>56</sup> A number of comparative studies have been carried out and a considerable amount of articles have been written about the different approaches of citizenship education in the various European countries. By far the most comprehensive study in this field is “Education-for-Democratic-Citizenship Project” launched by the *European Commission* in 2002. This ‘All-European Study’ evaluated with a national team of researchers the official Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) policies in primary and general (lower and upper) secondary education in 29 European countries. The project analysed a wide range of legislative documents (constitutions, laws and regulations), national programmes for civic education, written contributions on national civic education policies, curricula, textbooks and methodological guides, articles and research studies with reference to ‘responsible citizenship’. To put these reports in context, the European Commission also holds a database about the structure and history of the education systems of all European countries. All of these documents are available on the Eurydice web page ([www.eurydice.org](http://www.eurydice.org)). These country reports on citizenship education were the only comprehensive studies that made systematic reference to the constitution, education laws, the national curriculum and the syllabus of the respective countries, which I relied on heavily.

Another crucial comparative source was the “Civic Education Study” undertaken by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IAE) over a period of eight years and in approximately 30 countries (Torney-Purta 2002; Amadeo *et al.*, 2002). These studies are based on survey conducted at schools and measure and compare the knowledge, skills and behaviour pupils have with respect to responsible and active democratic citizenship. The project however also published a book with contributions from educational experts in 24 countries about the development of civic education programmes at school. The advantage of these articles was that while mainly evaluating the survey results for the particular country also gave a brief introduction of the history of civic education in their country. This proved to be very useful sources for the creation of the civic education variable. Unfortunately only 10 out of the 19 European countries that are covered by this PhD were included in that book project.

The term civic education or citizenship education has a long tradition. It developed from a very rigid and narrow definition of citizenship education, which focused on the moral duties of citizens with respect to their national identity and emphasised political literacy, to a very broad concept of active and democratic citizenship. In contemporary discussions the term generally refers to school education for young people and seeks to ensure that they become active and responsible citizens capable of contributing to the development and well-being of the society in which they live. Citizenship education is normally meant to guide pupils towards political literacy, critical thinking and the development of certain attitudes and values and active participation (Eurydice, 2005a).

Within Europe civic education exists under different names, reflecting the different socio-political and historical circumstances in which the subject has developed. It is sometimes described as political education (Germany and Austria), civic education (France), citizenship education (UK), personal and social development (Portugal), and societal science (Denmark) (Birzea *et al.*, 2004). In addition to the different meanings of citizenship education across Europe, the subject can either be found as a cross-curricular theme that is integrated into courses such as history, geography, social sciences or economics. Sometimes it is also included in the overall aim of the school and is reflected in teaching methods and class atmosphere. In most cases, citizenship education only gained the status of a separate subject in the last few decades, with some countries making it a compulsory course unit. The diverse meanings associated with this concept mean that a narrow definition of civic education cannot be used here; at the same time, it has to be narrowed down in some way, so that a differentiation can be made between those governments who mention civic education in the national curriculum and those who do not.

Another major difficulty arises from the fact that the national curriculum is enacted by the government in some countries, but is independent or exists as a framework of reference in other countries. Comparing civic education across countries is further complicated by the existence of private schools, publicly funded religious schools and public schools because these can differ considerably in the content of the class work and the preferred teaching methods (Ruget, 2006).

All these issues make it very difficult to compile a single variable that measures efforts to introduce civic education at schools. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess how well and widespread civic education has been implemented, or to assess whether the teaching

methods, material, practices and environment were supportive of a democratic learning environment. There is simply not enough historical research to enable a proper exploration of all these aspects, even though they are important and relevant in assessing the effects that the subject of civic education has on pupils' behaviour.

Notwithstanding the different educational systems in the European countries, this study has tried to compile a variable that has a "common denominator", i.e. a factor that is roughly comparable across 19 countries. Thus, it focused only on the educational reforms of central governments, and any attempts that they have made to incorporate civic education into school life. This might be as a subject within broader subjects such as history, geography, social studies, philosophy; or as a cross curricular theme within the secondary curriculum. The countries are ranked by the year citizenship education gained prominence in the national curriculum either as a separate subject or as a cross-curricular theme.

Despite these problems, a comparable measure can yield some light on different levels of active citizenship in Europe by looking at the year in which governments recognized the importance of including civic education into the national curriculum. In the following sections, I have given examples of the different policies in some of the countries included in this analysis. This list is included in the appendix (Appendix 1), with a specific justification explaining the year assigned to each country. The civic education variable created here is a continuous variable ranging from year 0 to 57. Those countries that did not have civic education until 2002 were assigned the value 0 and those that introduced civic education as early as 1945 were assigned the value 57, reflecting a length of 57 years. By creating the measure in this way should be clear that it is an attribute of the country and not an individual level measure. However, this variable will be transformed into a binary variable in the multilevel analysis and will be used as an attribute of individuals. This has been done by differentiating between those in a country who were young enough to have been exposed to civic education and those who had already left school when civic education was introduced at schools.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> For example civic education in Austria was introduced in 1978 at secondary level. That means that all those who were born after 1968 were 10 at the time they went to secondary school which then offered civic education classes to that generation and the subsequent generations. Those born before 1968 would have already left school and therefore would have been too old to have civic education at class. This measure does not take into account that some people did not go to secondary school. Nor does it distinguish between East and West Germany; both are classified as West-Germany for technical reasons, although East-Germany had a communist style education system.

Furthermore, experts in the different countries working on civic education have been contacted via email to validate the information found for each country. My main question to them was to confirm roughly the year civic education was first introduced at secondary schools. I was hoping to be redirected to new resources and be given more information about the historical development of civic education in their countries.<sup>58</sup> However, most of the experts could not give more information than I already had, which confirmed that I had worked very thoroughly through the available documents. However, another reason also is that these researchers did not focus on the historical development of civic education, and had only worked, or were working on, recent developments. For the British case, Prof. David Kerr expressed his support and provided me with quite a few references, yet his material all referred to the developments in the last few decades. The Swedish reply was the only case that led me to change the date I had identified for Sweden. The consultation of national experts may not have changed my measure very much, but it confirmed the validity of my scale based on the available resources. This measure can be improved in the future: for example, one could reanalyse archival material on national curriculum and other policy documents relevant to civic education. However, this cannot be done by one person only, given limited resources and language barriers.

In what follows, a brief overview will be given of the different education reforms and government policies in 19 European countries relating to civic education. More detailed information are being provided in Appendix 1.

The Nordic countries introduced civic education as a cross-curricular topic as early as the 1960's and 1970's into the national curriculum. These developments were parallel to the widening of the social-democratic welfare system and the establishment of a comprehensive school system that offered equal opportunities to every student regardless of their social background (Eurydice, 2004/05 Denmark; Eurydice, 2005b; Hahn, 1999; Eurydice, 2006/07 Sweden; Eurydice, 2004/05 Finland; Eurydice, 2004/05 Norway).

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<sup>58</sup> After a short introduction about the project and the rationale for creating this variable, the experts were asked via Email to answer the following questions or provide further reference:

Q1: When was citizenship education first introduced into the national curriculum in your country? Please go back as far as 1945 and refer to specific educational reforms or national curriculum changes for secondary school?

Q2: What were the aims and objectives of civic education as outlined in the curriculum. Can you provide references?

Q3: Did citizenship education exist as a subject on its own or was it integrated into other subjects?

Q4: Do you have any information about how widely civic education has been implemented across the schools?

Q5: Was there a specific syllabus for civic education, outlining in detail the topics that ought to be covered?

The schools in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg enjoy relative independence from the state and have no national curriculum. Instead, schools and local authorities are free to choose their own curriculum. Government-set attainment targets usually guide them, but they are not bound to them (see [www.eurydice.org](http://www.eurydice.org)). Besides public schools, there are also a wide range of publicly funded religious schools that have different curricula. Nevertheless, while civic education in the Netherlands has been part of the national attainment target since the 1960's (Eurydice, 2004/05 The Netherlands; Hahn, 1999). For Belgium and Luxembourg no reference to civic education could be found for that period. Thus, educational reforms in these two countries refer to recent developments, in which citizenship education became the focus of many educational reforms in Europe in the last 15 years (Eurydice 2004/05 Belgium (Flemish/German). The European Commission, who launched many projects to expand or introduce active democratic citizenship at schools, initiated this project as part of efforts to combat political apathy, promote social cohesion and encourage positive civic values and behaviour (Eurydice, 2005a).

During the totalitarian regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal, civic education existed as a means of implementing nationalist feeling and promoting conformity with the law. Thus, after the transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s, civic education was avoided due to a fear of ideological indoctrination and it was only slowly introduced in the mid 1980's and early 1990's (Eurydice, 2004/05 Greece; Makrinoti and Solomon, 1999; Eurydice, 2004/05 Portugal; Menezes, 2003; Menezes *et al.*, 1999; Eurydice, 2004/05 Italy; Losito, 1999; Losito, 2003; Eurydice, 2004/05 Spain; Eurydice, 2006/07 Spain; Naval *et al.*, 2002/03).

A similar trajectory of civic education can also be observed in the postcommunist countries. Although they had civic education classes, the aim of this subject was to teach Marxist-Leninist ideas, rather than encourage critical thinking and debates (Heandle, 2002). Nevertheless, unlike the Southern European countries, the Eastern European countries quickly worked on integrating civic education into the national curriculum after the transformation to democracy in the 1990s (Simenc, 2003; Eurydice, 2004/05 Slovenia; Strajn, 1999; Eurydice, 2004/05 Hungary; Matrai, 1999;. Eurydice, 2004/05 Poland; Buk-Berge, 2006,).

Germany is a very special case, due to its experience with Nazism. Soon after the Second World War civic education was introduced on a wide scale across all schools as political

rehabilitation and re-socialisation. In comparison to other European countries, teachers received specialised education to teach the subject as early as the 1950s (Haendle *et al.*, 1999; Eurydice, 2004/2005 Germany). Austria, which shares the same language, introduced civic education in 1970, much later than Germany. However it did so very extensively, so that the curriculum for civic education formulated in the 1970s is still practiced today (Austria, 1978; Filzmaier and Klepp, 2006; Eurydice, 2004/05 Austria).

In the UK civic education was widely advocated in many areas and practised in secondary schools in the 1930s (Batho, 1990). The national curriculum for secondary schools in 1943 even refers to these debates, with the government announcing that it is not convinced that the norms of good citizens can be learned through classroom instruction, but rather through the quality of general life at schools. Furthermore, the government argued that history, in particular contemporary history, should be sufficient for ensuring students have basic knowledge about how the political system works (HMSO, 1943). Thus, the government abandoned civic education classes until the 1990s, when it made a sharp u-turn and introduced it in England as a statutory subject in secondary schools in 2002 (Birzea *et al.*, 2004; Kerr, 2002; Crick, 2000).

The French government on the other hand has been preoccupied with the teaching of 'civics' since it declared itself a republic (Dumas and Lee, 1978). Schools were meant to consolidate French identity and have tried to be powerful instruments of integration ever since then. The aim of 'civics' was to assist in the creation of a new nationalist identity that was secular. Thus, despite the long tradition of civics at school, only in the 1970s, parallel to major educational reforms, civic education was thought of not as a moral lesson, but with the aim teaching skills and knowledge for active democratic citizenship (Ruget, 2006; Osler and Starkley, 2001).

## 4.5 Individual level predictors

The aforementioned indicators refer to explanatory predictors at the country level. However, one of the objectives of this study is also to consider individual level attributes. As discussed in chapter III, civic engagement does not vary only between countries but also between individuals with different socio-demographic characteristics (Parry *et al.*, 1992; Putnam, 1995; Dalton, 2002; Curtis *et al.*, 1992; Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Unequal participation spells unequal representation, as the interests of those who remain withdrawn from the affairs of public life are also likely to be ignored or to remain unheard. It is therefore important to identify these gaps and to address these issues as academics as well as policy makers. In this study, a standard array of 10 socio-demographic characteristics is employed that attempts to maintain consistency with other empirical work on this topic. The variables include age, gender, marital status, education, social class, economic activity, ethnicity, domicile and TV habits.

All of these variables are included in the analysis as categorical variables. The effects of these variables on civic engagement will be examined in chapter VII where multilevel analysis will be carried out. As in most cases, the effect of socio-demographic variables on civic engagement is similar, and this study will treat these variables as fixed effects. This means that it does not consider country level differences. For example, the gender difference or the age difference in participation might not be as big in some countries as in others. The coefficients calculated for individual level predictors will be based on the average relationship observed across 19 countries. Thus a random slope model is not the focus of this study, as it would exceed the scope of this PhD.

### 4.5.1 Age in three age groups

Age has turned out to be of central importance in explaining political participation, and it has a curvilinear relationship with political and civic participation. Young and older people are less likely to be active than middle-aged people. This is often attributed either to life-cycle effects (Curtis *et al.*, 1992; Dalton, 2002,) or generational effects (Putnam, 1995), or both (Parry *et al.*, 1992). The life-cycle effect is attributed to variations in social integration. Young people are less socially integrated, more mobile and less interested in politics (Dalton, 2002). In contrast to them, older people tend to withdraw from the active workforce, are more likely to be widowed and can be removed from close family ties. Their circle of friends might also shrink, as they get older (Parry *et al.*, 1992). Middle aged people are therefore most likely to be active. This is due to their stronger social

integration, which gives them more incentive to participate and keeps them motivated in politics. As Dalton (2002: 47) remarks: “People become taxpayers, homeowners, their children enter public school, and they may begin to draw benefits from government programs.”

Proponents of the generational effect argue that there has been a shift of civic values that led to a shift in modes of activities, such as a shift from involvement in electoral and partisan politics towards more direct action and elite challenging activities (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Dalton, 2002). Using the ESS 2004 survey and the Comparative Youth Survey 2006, Quintelier (2007) found that young people tend to be engaged in political activities such as badge-wearing, demonstrations and signing petitions. Older people on the hand other prefer boycotting, contacting politicians and joining political parties.

Taking into account the three major life cycles relevant for civic engagement, age has been re-coded into three age groups 15-29, 30-59 and 65 and over. These age-bands have been chosen to reflect the different adult life stages of young, middle aged and old.

#### 4.5.2 Gender

The activism gap among women and men in Western Europe has narrowed over the last decade, in particular with respect to voting turnout and cause-oriented political activism. Nevertheless, men are still the dominant actors in political parties and voluntary organisations. This is attributed to persistence of traditional gender roles that confine women to the ‘home’ and may therefore integrate them less in a social or professional context (Badescu and Neller, 2007). The most recent and comprehensive study on gender and political participation in Britain argues that women often have fewer resources of time, money and civic skills, combined with lower psychological engagement in politics (Norris *et al.*, 2004). Thus, they are less active than men due to lack of resources, lack of interest, lack of networks (not being mobilised into politics) and because the institutional rules of the game deter them from participating.

#### 4.5.3 Marital status

Being married or cohabiting increases the likelihood of political participation due to the social integration, social controls and positive incentives for political participation that it provides (Armingeon, 2007; Li *et al.*, 2005). In the ESS, the questions about the marital

status of the respondents includes (1) married, (2) separated, (3) divorced, (4) widowed, (5) never married.<sup>59</sup> These categories were collapsed into 0) married and 1) not married (separated, divorced, widowed and never married) with married people being more likely to be socially integrated than non-married people.

#### 4.5.4 Socio-economic status: education, social class and economic activity

The socio-economic status of an individual is a strong predictor of civic engagement. Higher status individuals, especially the better educated, are more likely to have the time, money and access to political information; as well as the knowledge and ability to become civically engaged (Verba *et al.*, 2001; Dalton, 2002). The socio-economic status of individuals is measured by a number of indicators, three of which are used in this study: the respondents' social class, levels of education and economic activity.<sup>60</sup>

##### 4.5.4.1 Education

Due to the differences in the history of educational institutions across Europe, harmonisation of the education levels and qualifications are particularly challenging. To assure comparability and precision, each country used the corresponding national schemas for education, which were then transferred to the UNESCO International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The ISCED was modified for the ESS and is based on six educational levels; (0) not completed primary education, (1) primary or first stage of basic education, (2) lower secondary or secondary stage of basic, (3) upper secondary, (4) post-secondary non-tertiary, (5) first stage of tertiary, (6) second stage of tertiary education. For the purpose of our analysis these categories were collapsed into three groups: 1) basic education or none (category 0/1), 2) secondary education (categories 2/3), 3) tertiary education (categories 4-6).<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> In France a separate category of 'co-habiting' was asked. To ensure comparability, this category was collapsed into those married.

<sup>60</sup> The question related to household income has not been used here due to a large number of missing values; Germany, Ireland and Hungary have not used the household income card, which means that the figures for these three countries were not included in the ESS data.

<sup>61</sup> In the Austrian dataset only five options were given for this variable. There was, for example no extra category for 'primary or first stage of basic education' instead they have a category for 'Pflichtschule' (Compulsory schooling age 6-15). Those who have not completed compulsory school are classified as having no educational qualifications. Similarly, post secondary qualifications included only two instead of three categories. However, since the education variable has been recoded into three broad categories for analysis here, these differences were adjusted.

#### 4.5.4.2 EGP class scheme

A three-way Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero class is used here (EGP). The EGP class scheme is based on the work situation (authority and autonomy at work) as well as the market situation (including income, degree of income security, career prospects and source of income) of the respondents. Additional criteria include distinctions between owners, employers and employees; between firms with more or less than 10 employees; and between manual and non-manual occupations. Seven classes emerge based on these indicators (see table 1).<sup>62</sup>

**Table 1: Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero class scheme**

I	Service class	Higher professionals, administrators, managers etc.
II	Service class	Lower professionals etc.
IIIa	Intermediate class	Routine non-manual employees, some qualifications needed
IIIb	Intermediate class	Routine non-manual employees, no qualifications needed
IVa	Intermediate class	Small proprietors with employees
IVb	Intermediate class	Small proprietors without employees
IVcd	Intermediate class	Self-employed farmers
V	Intermediate class	Supervisors of manual workers, low grade technicians
VI	Working class	Skilled workers
VIIa	Working class	Unskilled workers
VIIb	Working class	Agricultural workers

Source: Leiultsrud *et al.* (2005)

The seven classes are collapsed into three major classes for the purpose of comparison in this study: the service class, the intermediate class and the working class (Leiultsrud *et al.*, 2005). Respondents who have never worked could not be allocated to any of those classes. Consequently, they were grouped into a separate category of ‘no class’.

#### 4.5.4.3 Main economic activity in the last 7 days

While the economic activity variable relates also to social class and education (given that employment is higher among the better educated and those from higher social classes), economic activity is important as it taps into discussions about financial resources and resources for participation, skills and time (Verba *et al.*, 2001). Those who are working are more likely to have the financial means to get involved in voluntary organisations particularly professional and business organisations. As a consequence, they have more

<sup>62</sup> The operationalization of the EGP class scheme here is based on the Spss-program of Harry Ganzeboom, from the University of Utrecht, made available on his web page (<http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/hg/isko88/>).

opportunities to improve their civic skills, although they might lack the time to get involved. On the other hand, types of activities that mainly require money might be less available to those who are not economically active, in particular the unemployed, the retired and those who stay at home. However, these groups are more likely to have the free time to become active. Similarly, students might lack the time and the money to participate, but the university environment could provide them with unique opportunities to participate.

Economic activity asks for respondents activities in the last 7 days and includes the following categories: (1) in paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business), (2) in education, even if on vacation (not paid for by employer), (3) unemployed and actively looking for a job, (5) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job, (6) permanently sick or disabled, (7) retired, (8) in community or military service, (9) doing housework, looking after children or other persons, (10) other. This variable has been re-coded so that it distinguishes between respondents 1) working, 2) unemployed, 3) student, 4) retired, and 5) economically inactive (includes doing housework, looking after children or other persons, permanently sick or disabled and other reasons). Being on community service or on military service has been excluded due to small case numbers and it could not be collapsed into any of the other categories.

#### 4.5.5 Domicile

Besides socio-demographic variables, the size of locality where one lives can also have an effect on people's propensity to become active (Oliver, 2000; Dahl, 1967; Hansen *et al.*, 1987; Van Deth and Martin, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Curtis *et al.*, 1992). Civic participation is higher in rural and small towns as these areas often offer tight networks of social contacts (Torpe, 2003, Putnam, 2000). Where and individual's social contacts are not as dense, they might have less social control and be less likely to be asked to participate. However, bigger localities might offer more opportunities to participate and might, therefore, offer a different kind of social capital than in small places (Van Deth and Martin, 2007).

The ESS measure of domicile is based on the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) measure of locality and is commonly used in social surveys. It includes the following five categories: (1) a big city, (2) the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, (3) a town or a small city, (4) a country village, (5) a farm or home in the countryside. To facilitate comparison across the 19 countries, these five categories were collapsed into three that

distinguish between 1) the metropolis (big city and its outskirts), 2) small town or city and 3) countryside.

#### 4.5.6 Habits of watching TV

The spread of TV as a dominant leisure-activity has been blamed for a decline in civic activities (Putnam, 2000). While exposure to the political content of mass media may reflect an interest in politics and society, watching TV excessively has been seen as an indication of lack of integration in as much as it takes time away from social activities. The variable tapping habits of watching TV during the weekdays has been collapsed into moderate TV exposure (from not watching TV to up to 2.5 hours) and excessive TV consumption (more than 2.5 hours) daily on an average weekday.

#### 4.5.7 Ethnicity

Ethnic minorities are systematically underrepresented in politics and are less likely than the autochthonous population to be active in voluntary organisations and in political activities (Verba *et al.*, 2001; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Anwar, 2001, Berger *et al.*, 2004). To account for the different behaviour of ethnic minorities and autochthonous population, the variable ‘ethnicity’ was created from 5 different questions: whether the respondent considers themselves as belonging to an ethnic group in country (blgetmg=1), whether the respondent has citizenship of the country (ctzcntr=2), whether they were born abroad (brncntr=2), and whether their father (facntr=2) or mother (mocntr=2) was born abroad. This resulted in 15% of the total survey population having an immigration background.<sup>63</sup>

The nine individual level explanatory variables are all categorical variables. They will be analysed in chapter VII in a two-level multilevel logit random intercept model. There are also nine contextual variables included, with welfare regime being the only categorical variable and resulting in 4 dummy variables. The other eight contextual variables are all continuous. Their relationship with the dependent variable is first examined in an aggregate level analysis. Following on from this, the most parsimonious models are carried forward into a multilevel analysis. However, before any regression analysis is carried out, the indicators of civic engagement are discussed in the next chapter. The aim of this next

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<sup>63</sup> There is a single variable asking respondent whether they consider themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority group and only 3.4% of the respondent in the pooled data answered this question positively. This question might not include those who have migrated from another European country but don’t consider themselves as ‘ethnic minorities’ as this can be understood in belonging to a visible group of ethnic community.

chapter is to identify the various dimensions of civic engagement and introduce the dependent variables for further analysis.

## Chapter V

### **5. Three dimensions of civic engagement in Europe: political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement**

This chapter explores the dependent variable civic engagement. As discussed in chapter I and II, this study refers to civic engagement as citizens' actual behaviour and its relevance for democracy. It can, therefore, include social as well as political activities, both of which are important aspects of participatory democracy. Civic engagement is, therefore, a latent variable, which is not measured by a single variable but by a number of questions tapping into various forms of engagement. The aim of this chapter is to explore whether there is a systematic pattern underlying people's choice of civic activities from the set of questions available to us, and whether these modes of activity reflect different aspects of civic engagement. To do this, the numerous indicators of civic engagement are first discussed separately. This will give an overall comparative picture of what types of activities are preferred across Europe and how this differs between countries. In addition, it will also help identify typologies of voluntary organisations. A further aim of this chapter is to identify broad clusters of activities common to all 19 countries. To do this, the pooled data of all European countries will be used. Based on the pooled data for the 19 countries, three broad dimensions of civic engagement will be identified. These dimensions will be used to compare how the countries are ranked in terms of overall rates of involvement, as well as being used as the dependent variable for analysis in the subsequent chapters.

The multi-dimensionality of civic engagement is not contested in the literature and, as Dalton (2002: 33) explains, "a person who performs one act from a particular cluster is likely to perform other acts from the same cluster, but not necessarily activities from another cluster." Thus, citizens are very likely to show preference for one type of activity and not for another. However, in this study, the set of questions tapping political activities and the set of questions tapping involvement in voluntary associations are both regarded as civic engagement indicators and will be explored through Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA).

MCA is applied to categorical data and helps to visualise the associations between various civic engagement indicators on a graphical two-dimensional map (see discussion in chapter IV). This method has two main purposes, serving as a cluster analytical technique as well

as a method of data reduction (Bacher, 1995). The former is important as it explores the relationship of the various civic engagement indicators to each other and identifies groups of activities that cluster. The latter helps to create the dependent variables for this study, through the technique ‘optimal scaling’.<sup>64</sup>

MCA as an explorative and data reduction technique is not very common in the UK, although it is becoming increasingly so. Therefore, in this chapter, references are made to other studies that have come to similar conclusions, despite using different techniques. A good example of this is the Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy (CID) survey.<sup>65</sup> In addition to MCA, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was also carried out to demonstrate the robustness of this technique. PCA does not always give reliable outputs for categorical and binary variables and is therefore not recommended for our data. The advantage of MCA is that it has been particularly developed for the use of categorical data.

However, despite the CID analysis and other studies that use the ESS to identify political consumerism as a separate form of political participation (Norris *et al.*, 2004), these studies did not put much weight on interpreting the significance of this form of participation. Political consumerism is increasingly developing into the most dominant form of political activity, in particular in developed industrialised democracies.<sup>66</sup> The application of MCA will also help to unravel the relationship between political consumerism and certain types of voluntary organisations, an issue that has not been identified in previous studies.

In line with previous research, this chapter will confirm the multi-dimensionality of civic engagement, defined as consisting of associational involvement and political participation. It will also identify a third dimension, namely political consumerism. In particular, the chapter argues that political consumerism is embedded in “New Social Movement Organisations” and can be regarded as a collective form of action.

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<sup>64</sup> The dependent variable is created through MCA in SPSS by producing ‘object scores’ for the different dimensions identified in the MCA analysis. This is done through the particular technique ‘optimal scaling’ which quantifies the binary variables into continuous variables and assigns every individual ‘object scores’ or factor scores, depending on their rate of civic engagement (Meulman *et al.*, 2004; Meulman and Heiser, 2004; Heiser and Meulman, 1995).

<sup>65</sup> The CID survey was carried out in 13 European countries and taps involvement in a number of political activities and voluntary organisations. It has a richer repertoire of civic engagement indicators than the ESS. The survey has been analysed by a number of researchers and is published in the book *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies* edited by Van Deth, Montero and Westholm in 2007. In particular Teorell *et al.*, (2007), Morales and Geurts (2007) and Armingeon’s (2007) contributions are relevant for this chapter as they talk about associational involvement and political participation.

<sup>66</sup> See Stolle *et al.* (2005). They used the Political Action Study in 1974 and the WVS since 1981 to show how political consumerism in comparison to other types of political activities has increased.

## 5.1 Patterns of political activities

The ESS 2002 asks 10 questions related to political participation in the last 12 months as well as a question on voting in the last national election and a separate question on current membership of a political party (See Appendix 2.1). Furthermore, there is a battery of questions that taps into involvement in 12 different types of voluntary associations (see Appendix 2.2). Here the respondents are asked as part of a multiple choice question to indicate in which capacity they have been involved in voluntary organisations in the last 12 months. This could be involvement as a member, a participant, or simply through financial donations money or volunteering. The responses result in 48 different variables of involvement in voluntary organisations. Overall, there are 60 variables that can be used as indicators of civic engagement.

**Table 2: Frequency of political activities by country**

	NO	SE	FI	DK	GB	IE	LU	AT	NL	BE	DE	FR	IT	ES	PT	GR	SI	PL	HU	Average
Vote	81	82	72	89	67	76	51	82	81	79	78	75	85	72	69	84	75	62	79	76
Petition	37	41	24	28	40	28	29	27	22	34	31	35	17	24	7	5	12	7	4	24
Buycott	37	55	42	44	32	25	30	30	26	27	39	28	7	12	7	7	10	10	11	25
Boycott	20	33	27	23	26	14	16	22	10	13	26	27	8	8	3	9	5	4	5	16
Contact	24	17	24	18	18	22	18	19	15	18	13	18	12	12	12	15	12	10	15	16
Community	28	25	31	17	9	14	17	19	23	23	18	18	8	17	6	6	2	6	3	15
Demonstration	9	6	2	8	4	7	21	10	3	9	10	18	11	17	4	5	3	1	4	10
Campaign badge	23	11	16	5	10	9	5	8	4	7	6	12	7	10	7	3	2	3	3	8
Donation	12	7	7	9	8	11	15	11	8	10	9	3	3	5	4	2	7	9	2	8
Party/action group	9	5	4	4	3	5	4	10	3	5	4	5	3	6	4	5	4	3	3	5
Party member	9	8	7	6	3	5	7	14	5	7	4	2	4	3	5	5	5	2	2	5
Illegal protest	1	1	0	1	1	1	4	1	0	2	1	3	2	2	0	2	1	0	1	1
N	2,036	1,999	2,000	1,506	2,052	2,046	1,552	2,257	2,364	1,899	2,919	1,503	1,207	1,729	1,511	2,566	1,519	2,110	1,685	

**Source:** ESS 2002. Cell entries are in percentages. Cases are weighted by Design and Population weight, thus the data may be considered representative for each country. The variables are ranked by the most popular types of activities across 19 countries. Vote (voted in last national or parliamentary election), petition (signed a petition), buycott (deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons), boycott (boycotted certain products), contact (contacted a politician, government or local government official), community (worked in another organisation or association (non party or action group), demonstration (taken part in a lawful public demonstration), campaign badge (worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker), donation (donated money to a political organisation or group), party/action (worked in a political party or action group), party member (currently member of a political party), illegal protest (participated in illegal protest activities).

A first look at table 2 above reveals a huge amount of variation both between and within countries. For all states, voting in a parliamentary election is by far the most common participatory activity. As one might expect, participating in illegal protest activity is the least participatory. Besides the institutional act of voting, the most frequent activities in the countries as a whole are signing petitions and deliberately boycotting products or and buying them for ethical, political or environmental reasons. These activities also display

the greatest variation between countries. The overall average for signing petitions is 24% and, apart from Spain (24%), all the Southern and Eastern European countries are far below this average. Interestingly, the UK and Sweden have the highest percentage of people signing petitions (around 40%). A similar pattern emerges for boycotting and boycotting, which are far below the overall average in Southern and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, one third to half of the population deliberately bought products for political, ethical or environmental reasons in Western Europe. About one third of citizens from Sweden, Finland, Germany and France; and slightly less in Norway, Denmark and Austria, boycott products for certain reasons. These types of ‘consumer activities’ (Micheletti *et al.*, 2003; Armingeon, 2007; Teorell *et al.*, 2007) are also the least time-consuming political activities, which might partly explain their prevalence.

Unlike political consumerism, contacting a politician, government or local official displays the smallest cross-country variation, with an average of 16%. Working in another organisation and association that is not a political party or action group, (named here as ‘community involvement’), shows very low engagement in Southern and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Spain (17%). The UK has similar levels for both activities (9%) and is below the overall average in terms of community involvement. The Nordic countries (17-30%) and The Netherlands (23%) and Belgium (23%) are among the most active in community associations.

Despite the clearly dominant trends of the Nordic countries in almost all types of activities, it is even more striking to see that this is not the case for public demonstrations and illegal protest activities. Both types of ‘dissident’ activities are the highest in Luxembourg, France and Spain. In the case of Spain and France, they also have the lowest percentage of political party membership. Austria, on the other hand, is clearly a nation of political party activists and is closely followed by Norway. On average, around 5% are involved in a political party or action group. The UK has relatively low levels of involvement in political parties (2%) or for employment in a political party or action group (3%). In contrast to this, Greece, Slovenia and Portugal display higher levels of political party and action group activism. Wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker is far below the average in Eastern Europe (around 3%) and relatively high in Norway (23%), Finland (16%) and Sweden (11%). At the same time it is very low in Denmark (5%). It could be argued that wearing a badge or sticker emerges in situations where people are mobilised for a political cause or campaign, and is therefore associated with party membership or participation in public demonstrations. Indeed, apart from Luxembourg, all countries that have average or

above average levels of engagement in these activities, also have above average levels of wearing or displaying a badge/sticker.

Some patterns that emerge here are very clear, such as the consistent low levels of involvement across Eastern Europe and, to a certain extent, across Southern Europe. Apart from demonstrations, the Nordic countries also appear to be especially politically active societies. Britain's relatively low levels of engagement in political parties and political action groups interrupt these general patterns. The country also has low levels of electoral turnout as well as engagement in community associations. In contrast to this trend, the British are among the most active societies in signing petitions, boycotting and boycotting. This suggests that they seem to have a stronger preference for less binding types of activities as opposed to those that require more party loyalty and commitment to a political cause. Lipset (1963) suggests that each country's political history is associated with a culture that is more or less individualist or collectivist. Thus, the high percentage of political consumers and low percentage of party loyalists in the UK and Ireland might, among other factors, be a reflection of the liberal value system within these countries.

France and Spain are also interesting cases, due to their distinct taste for 'dissident' types of political activities. Working for a political organisation and action group is popular but individuals are much more hesitant to join political parties.<sup>67</sup>

Luxembourg is more at odds with the general patterns than any other nation. According to the survey responses, only half of Luxembourgers bothered to cast their vote at the last national election, despite being committed party loyalists. They are also among the most generous Europeans when it comes to donating money to a political organisation or group, and about one third of those surveyed reported that they had signed a petition and made a political statement by buying certain products. Besides from these differences, they were about as likely as other Western Europeans to be engaged in a community group for political reasons. Much like France and Spain, the Luxembourgers reported that they were willing to march down the streets to put across their political point; however, unlike these countries, they were less willing to turn their back on political parties.

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<sup>67</sup> Nam (2007) argues that protesters in democratic countries with a weak legislature find it difficult to deliver their demands to government due to the institutional environment. Therefore, they are more inclined to protest than citizens in countries with a strong legislature. With a strong legislature, people would have better access to the government and thus be less prone to use confrontational forms of activities.

To sum up, it is evident from the frequency table 2 that some societies clearly have a preference for certain types of activities. The reasons beyond these preferences are manifold and cannot be explored here, given that the main focus of this work is to capture the various civic engagement indicators under a few broad dimensions. In doing so, it is hoped that this will help, emphasise the commonalities between different modes of activities rather than their differences. So far, the frequency table has shown that political consumerism shows the greatest cross-country variation and is by far the most popular form of activism. Next, I will turn my attention to associational involvement before including these variables into an MCA analysis and exploring their relationship to one another.

## **5.2 Patterns of associational involvement**

The ESS taps respondents' involvement in 12 types of voluntary associations, and unlike other cross-national surveys like the World Value Survey (WVS), it also asks about the nature of this involvement. Respondents are asked whether they are members of those organisations, whether they donate money to them, whether they participate at their events; and/or whether they volunteer for them. Tapping into the different ways in which respondents are involved in voluntary organisations has become more crucial given the recent debates about the role of passive and active involvement in generating social capital (Putnam, 2002). However, it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the differences between active and passive participation. Other studies have used the richness of such detailed questions for such purposes.<sup>68</sup> As discussed in chapter II, passive and active participation are both seen as important aspects of a citizen's repertoire of actions. In particular, studies have demonstrated that passive involvement can be as crucial for generating social capital as active involvement (Wollebaek and Selle, 2003b). Thus, in this study, all four modes of activities i.e. member, donor, participant and volunteer, are ultimately collapsed into 'involvement' in general. This implies that if people are involved in one organization they are also more likely to carry out one or more of the other types of the activities (Dalton, 2002).

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<sup>68</sup> Morales and Geurts (2007) have given a detailed account of different modes of associational involvement across 13 European countries using the CID survey and social trust. Other researchers such as Dalton (2006) adopted different strategies in order to make use of the detailed account of modes of involvement. Rather than focusing on the different types of associations, Dalton measured in his analysis of the US version of the ESS the *intensity of involvement*, i.e. inactive, passive, active, and super-active, depending on whether the respondent reported to be only a member, participant, volunteer and/or donor.

The next table 3 shows involvement (including participant, donor, member or volunteer) in all 12 types of voluntary organisations by country.

**Table 3: Involvement in 12 types of voluntary organisations by country**

	NO	SE	FI	DK	GB	IE	LU	AT	NL	BE	DE	FR	IT	ES	PT	GR	SI	PL	HU	AVERAGE
Party	9	9	8	7	4	7	7	16	6	9	6	3	5	4	5	4	5	2	2	6
Trade Union	48	56	49	65	17	20	23	23	23	30	15	11	14	7	6	6	21	7	7	24
Professional	15	10	15	15	15	18	13	12	15	13	9	5	12	6	3	6	10	2	5	11
Consumer	34	38	6	18	33	10	46	34	32	11	29	6	7	5	2	1	10	1	3	17
Educational	12	14	11	8	13	11	12	15	14	16	9	11	4	11	3	4	7	4	5	10
Humanitarian	36	33	21	24	14	14	15	23	24	21	21	15	15	11	4	2	14	4	3	17
Environmental	9	14	8	15	17	11	18	30	34	18	15	9	8	5	3	2	2	3	2	12
Religious	19	19	35	28	21	34	6	41	32	12	25	11	11	10	12	2	13	7	9	18
Sports	43	50	38	40	36	44	33	36	56	42	38	32	19	18	12	5	23	6	10	31
Cultural	30	30	26	30	25	26	28	29	25	33	24	28	14	16	6	6	13	5	9	21
Social	26	22	13		21	22	20	25	12	29	18	14	8	11	6	4	9	3	8	15
Other	16	13	13	8	11	10	6	18	15	12	9	10	4	6	10	2	6	4	4	9
N	2,036	1,999	2,000	1,506	2,052	2,046	1,552	2,257	2,364	1,899	2,919	1,503	1,207	1,729	1,511	2,566	1,519	2,110	1,685	

**Source:** ESS 2002. Cell entries are in percentages. Cases are weighted by Design and Population weight, thus the data may be considered representative for each country. Refers to all kinds of involvement i.e. member, donating money, participating and/or doing voluntary work for that organisation.

Party (political party), Professional (business, profession, or farmers' organisation), Consumer (consumer or automobile organisation), Educational (organisation for science, education, or teachers and parents), Humanitarian (organisation for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants), Environmental (organisation for environmental protection, peace or animal rights), Religious (religious or church organisation), Sports (sports club or club for outdoor activities), Cultural (organisation for cultural or hobby activities), Social (social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies), Other (any other voluntary organisation). All activities refer to the last 12 months.

Table 3 shows the patterns of political party involvement across 19 European countries. These patterns are similar to the aforementioned political party and action group activities discussed. Across all types of organisations the East-West divide is very pronounced, with involvement in associations in Western Europe three times higher than in Eastern Europe. The one exception to this pattern is the case of trade unions, where the gap is not so marked. Apart from Slovenia (21%), involvement in Eastern Europe is only half the size (around 7%) of the involvement in Germany (15%), France (11%), Italy (14%) and the UK (17%). Furthermore, Slovenia (21%) seems to have a higher level of labour force organisation than the UK (17%). This shows that trade unions still have an important function in Eastern Europe. Finally, as expected, involvement in trade unions is very high in the traditional Social-Democratic states of the Nordic countries. In Denmark participation is 65%.

Slovenia's involvement in professional, business and farmers' organisations is very close to the average of 11%, and around the same level as Sweden (10%). On the other hand, France has relatively low levels of involvement in these types of organisations (5%) when

compared to the UK (15%) and Ireland (18%). The latter two are among the most active societies when measured on this particular variable. Political consumerism displays the most unequal distribution between countries. Luxembourg has by far the highest involvement, with almost half of its population reporting that they are members of a consumer or automobile organisation. This goes down to around 30% for Norway, Sweden, the UK, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany.<sup>69</sup> Membership in Finland is unusually low for a Nordic country: at 6%, it has a level similar to those observed in France, Spain and Italy. Spain tends to have below average involvement levels for all types of associations. However, science, education, teacher and parent organisations (11%) are exceptions to this, reporting above average levels of involvement. Interestingly, neighbouring countries such as Italy and Portugal are not keen members of such associations (4% and 3% respectively).

Humanitarian or immigrants' organisations have above average rates of participation in the Nordic countries and in Continental Europe, but are hardly represented in Portugal, Greece, Poland and Hungary. The environmental, peace and animal rights associations are relatively underrepresented in Eastern Europe (around 2-3%) but are very popular in the Netherlands (34%) and in Austria (30%). Norway (9%) and Finland (8%) have below average rates of involvement for these categories of associations. This contrasts with their generally above average rates of involvement in all other types of organisations.

Religious and church based organisations determine associational life in Austria (41%), Finland (35%), and Ireland (34%); as well as in the Netherlands (32%) and in Denmark (28%). The Eastern and Southern European countries, as well as France, Luxembourg and Belgium, all have average rates of participation (18%) that are far below average. Greece has the lowest rate of church commitment (2%) despite being a relatively religious country.

Sports and cultural organisations are the most popular types of associations that European citizens are involved with, although a clear West-East and West-South divide is still visible in terms of the percentage of people who are involved. The most eager activists within Eastern and Southern Europe are from Italy, Spain and Slovenia, while Greece and Poland are the least likely societies to go out and engage in sports, hobbies, outdoor activities or to be involved in cultural activities and friendly societies. A large number of respondents

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<sup>69</sup> Involvement in automobile associations has high numbers of involvement, as signing up for a insurance policy entitles them with membership. This is mainly restricted to a few countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Norway. Consumer organisations, often co-ops are popular in Sweden and Denmark (Morales and Geurts, 2007). Thus, it is not possible to exclude automobile members from other forms of consumer participants or automobile members that are also active.

(8%) felt that their involvement had not been captured by these 11 types of organisations, and crossed the category ‘other voluntary organisation’. This number is too big to exclude, although we cannot be sure what kind of associations they were referring to. However, based on the distribution of modes of activities, this variable has been identified as similar to sports and cultural activities in terms of the type of involvement.<sup>70</sup> Overall, citizens from countries with a rich associational spectrum tended to choose this category. This includes Austria (18%) and Norway (16 %). Portugal (10%) which otherwise has below average involvement in all the other organisations also responded to this category in relatively large numbers.

A breakdown of the types of associations by modes of activities across the 19 countries shows that certain organisations emerge clearly as membership-only based organisations, while others are more participation or donation oriented (see Appendix 3).

Across all types of organisations, membership constitutes the most important mode of involvement (with the exception of humanitarian organisations). For a variety of organisations (political parties (5%), trade unions (23%), business, profession and farmers organisations (9%), consumer and automobile organisations (16%) and science, education, teachers and parents organisations (7%)), membership remains the most popular form of involvement, with a relatively low percentage of donors, participants or volunteers. For these organisations, donations are around 1%-2%. With the exception of science, education, teachers and parents organisations; volunteering and participation at those associations also remains low (around 2%). Volunteering for trade unions is about (4%), but in comparison with the percentage of its members (23%) this figure is relatively low.

Organisations for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants; and organisations for environmental protection, peace or animal rights, are all membership and donation dominated organisations. Both types of organisation have relatively high percentages of people who are involved by donating money (12% and 6% respectively). Humanitarian organisations have a higher percentage of people who donate money (12%) than become members (6%), and this pattern is unique across the whole associational landscape. This might be due to large-scale humanitarian appeals and campaigns that

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<sup>70</sup> An MCA solution with the 11 voluntary organisations confirmed the proximity of ‘other voluntary organisations’ with sports, cultural and social organisations. This means that the category ‘other’ were mainly crossed by respondents who tend to be involved in socio-tropic organisations rather than by those who were involved in professional and other types of voluntary organisations.

encourage individuals to donate money to catastrophic events across the globe. These organisations also have low levels of participation and volunteering.

Religious and church-based organisations are the most diverse forms of organisations in terms of their modes of participation. Although most of those involved are members (13%), about half of the members are involved in making a financial contribution (7%) and participating at their events (6%).

Voluntary organisations that are mainly based on active participation include sports clubs, clubs for outdoor activities; organisations for cultural or hobby-oriented activities; social clubs; clubs for the young, the retired/elderly and women; and friendly societies. Although, the number of members is higher than the number of participants, the high percentage of participants indicates that involvement requires being registered as a member in order to take part in its activities.

To conclude, four different patterns emerge: two of them require more passive involvement and two of them require more active or participatory involvement. Involvement in political parties, trade unions, business, professional and farmers organisations and science, education, teachers and parent's organisations, are mainly membership based organisations and, as such, they do not require individuals' active involvement on a large scale. Similarly, humanitarian, ethnic minority, environmental, peace and animal rights organisations are also membership-based. However, the latter group are also distinguished by a high level of donations. Religious, sports, cultural and other associations, require more active participation. Involvement in these organisations seems to lead to more face-to-face interactions, as a large percentage of those who are members of these organisations also participate in their activities and volunteer for them. These are general trends and, despite the diverse history and traditions of associations in the different countries, it is striking that these patterns are fairly equal across Europe. This therefore justifies the use of the pooled data for the 19 countries in order to identify common patterns of involvement.

### 5.3 Typologies of voluntary organisations

So far an attempt has been made to identify patterns of associations by their mode of involvement (passive or active), as well as by their levels of involvement across Europe.<sup>71</sup> This leads to the emergence of the aforementioned fourfold typology of association. Another popular way of grouping the large lists of organisations in order to identify patterns of involvement is to group them as political, semi-political or non-political organisations or in terms of their goals, i.e. whether they produce primarily public or private goals.

The previous section on the scale of participation in voluntary organisations and the nature of involvement in these organisations has led to the emergence of four broad groupings of voluntary organisations. These typologies also correspond to the criteria of whether they produce public or private goods, as well as whether they are political or non-political organisations in nature. Notwithstanding the criteria chosen, they are complementary and result in four different typologies as follows:

**Utilitarian Organisations:** Encompasses mainly nation-wide, large-scale organisations that are relatively professionalised and advocate a particular group interest. These private-good producing associations can range from political organisations, such as trade unions, to semi-political organisations such as teachers and parents associations; as well as non-political automobile and consumer organisations. Although, these associations can also offer opportunities for active involvement through participation and volunteering in local groups and their branches (Clarence *et al.*, 2005), active involvement remains rather low in proportion to the percentage of people being a member.

Trade unions are often treated as a very distinct form of voluntary organisation, due to their strong historical role as mobilising power, and their mainly working class base.<sup>72</sup> However, trade unions are losing their social movement character and becoming increasingly like

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<sup>71</sup> For a very detailed analysis of the associations between voluntary organisations see Rossteutscher and Van Deth (2002). They have applied three different techniques, namely principal component analysis (PCA), cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling to identify common clusters of a wide range of German voluntary organisations. Their results demonstrated that PCA and cluster analysis identified similar groups, whereas the groupings identified by multi-dimensional scaling deviated from the other two methods. They argue that although “substantial and methodological arguments suggest the inappropriateness of factor analytical techniques for detecting associations between associations” their empirical results do not confirm these suspicions (Rossteutscher and Van Deth, 2002: 23-24).

<sup>72</sup> See Hall (1999) and Savage *et al.* (2003) who argue that trade unions had a distinct working class character in Britain. Furthermore, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) demonstrated the way in which trade unions in Western Europe have played a direct role in structuring electoral politics through formal links with party organisations.

private interest groups that are concerned exclusively with their members.<sup>73</sup> This is also reflected in the way in which trade unions have been categorised in the literature. Well-known studies have also grouped trade unions and other professional organisations into one group as either “economic associations”, “occupational organisations”<sup>74</sup> or “utilitarian organisations”<sup>75</sup> (Welzel *et al.*, 2005; Moyser and Parry, 1997; Stolle and Rochon, 1998).

**Social and Recreational Organisations:** Includes sports, cultural, social and other small-scale, regional, grass roots based organisations, which primarily offer benefits to their members and are, as such, primarily private-goods producing organisations. Moyser and Parry (1997) also group these as recreational organisations because they are mainly non-political in character. These associations are traditional associations with a high degree of face-to-face interaction between their members, as opposed to ‘mailing list’ and “cheque-book” groups that are characterised by passive involvement (Dekker and Van den Broek, 2005).

**New Social Movement Organisations (NSMO):** Includes pressure groups that are usually described as New Social Movements. This includes environmental, peace, and animal rights organisations; as well as organisations that work on the behalf of other people with a specific agenda. This can include human aid and human rights organisations, as well as groups that focus on issues related to minorities and immigrants.<sup>76</sup> Welzel *et al.* (2005) have defined these organisations as “socio-tropic organisations” because, in contrast to utilitarian organisations, they are aimed at creating public goods that are beneficial to all community members. Other studies have also treated them as separate categories, emphasising primarily their full- or semi-political character (Dekker *et al.*, 1997).<sup>77</sup>

**Religious and Church Organisations:** This category has been treated separately in the literature due to its unique nature (Welzel *et al.*, 2005; Wollebaek and Selle, 2003b). It is regarded as different from other voluntary organisations owing to its long history,

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<sup>73</sup> For a discussion of the change of trade unions in Europe see Leisink *et al.* (1996).

<sup>74</sup> In Moyser’s and Parry’s (1997) famous study on political participation in Britain, trade unions and professional organisations are both grouped as part of ‘occupational organisations’ as opposed to political organisations which includes only political parties and organisations.

<sup>75</sup> Welzel *et al.* (2005:126) also argued that membership in trade unions and professional organisations are utilitarian organisations because they aim at “partial goods that are group-specific: they chiefly benefit the partisans of the given organisations”.

<sup>76</sup> Rossteutscher and Van Deth (2002) identified these groups as ‘new’ politics. For an in depth discussions on the structure of New Social Movements in Britain see Jordan and Maloney (1997), Byrne (1997), Della Porta and Diani (2006). For a general discussion on social movements with some European case studies see Larana *et al.* (1994).

<sup>77</sup> Wollebaek and Selle (2003b) classified these organisations as semi-political organisations in contrast to political groups such as parties and trade unions and non-political groups such as sports, music, hobby and fraternity groups.

enormous size and extended networks. Mainstream churches also have strong roots in local communities, and their followers come from very diverse social backgrounds (De Hart and Dekker, 2005; Norris, 2002). The frequency table 3 also confirmed that religious and church organisations follow a different pattern due to their relatively high levels of active and passive involvement. In many ways, they can be regarded as a hybrid form. They produce public, as well as private, goods and are characterised by active, as well as passive, involvement. They can also combine political and non-political activities, depending on the context.

So far, based on frequency tables, I have demonstrated that cross-country variations exist for political activities as well as associational involvement. Furthermore, the analysis has shown that certain types of activities and voluntary involvement are more popular in some countries than in others. The next section assesses the relative proximity of these variables to one another, by running them through an MCA analysis. The aim is to explore what specific activities cluster together to form a more coherent form of action. This will help us to reduce the data and identify the different dimensions of civic engagement.

## **5.4 Exploring the multidimensionality of civic engagement through MCA**

This part of the analysis is based on the pooled data of 19 countries and covers a total of 35,863 cases. Not all of the variables have been subject to a dimensional analysis. The question on turnout in the last parliamentary election (vote) has been excluded. Since it is the sole item representing the voting mode of activity, its dimensionality is untestable. Nevertheless it will be included as a supplementary variable in the first MCA graph in order to demonstrate its relationship to other forms of civic activities. Moreover, variables with frequency less than 5% produce unreliable outputs in MCA and have either been combined with another variable or excluded from the analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004).<sup>78</sup>

Involvement with a political party is often treated in the literature as a distinct form of political engagement (Teorell *et al.*, 2007; Dalton, 2002; Moyser and Parry 1997). In the

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<sup>78</sup> The categories 'don't know/no answer/refusal' and the missing categories, i.e. those who did not answer all the questions, had also too few cases to be included as separate categories in the analysis. Small cases cause unreliable outputs and lead to a distortion of the maps, they were therefore recoded into the 'no' categories. An examination of the missing categories and those who ticked 'don't know/no answer/refusal' in MCA showed that they appeared among the non-activists. This reinforces further the decision to collapse these small cases into the corresponding 'no' categories of a particular variable.

ESS there are six variables tapping into partisan behaviour<sup>79</sup>, all of which have relatively small case numbers and thus constitute a problem in MCA if they are included separately. Consequently, these variables were all added together into one variable named ‘political party or action group activism’, and the overall percentage of involvement reached 7.3%.<sup>80</sup>

Unlike the other indicators of political activities, illegal protest activity is a very distinct and marginal form of protest behaviour (Barnes *et al.*, 1979). This variable also only captures a very small proportion (1.3%), thus contributing to distortions in the MCA graphs.<sup>81</sup> It is therefore the only variable that had to be excluded, as there are no sufficient theoretical and empirical arguments to combine it with any other political activity variable.

It could be argued that boycotting and buycotting are very similar forms of action and that the two variables could be combined before running the analysis. However, it is argued here that they are different in nature and that they will therefore not be collapsed into one variable. As demonstrated by other studies, while there is evidence that buycotting tends to be practiced more frequently by higher income groups (Cowe and Williams, 2001), this is not the case with boycotts (Clouder and Harrison, 2005). Furthermore, while boycotting aims at existing products in the market, deliberately buying certain products, such as fair-trade, organic or non-GM products, suggests the existence of alternative products for which consumers have political, ethical, or environmental reasons to buy these products. This presupposes the existence of organisations and campaigning groups that offer alternative products, such as fair-trade products (Harrison, 2005).

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<sup>79</sup> Involvement in a political party in the last 12 months; as a member (3.3%), participated (2%), donated money (1.1%), voluntary work (1.1%), worked in a political party or action group in the last 12 months (4.7%) and currently member of a political party (3.7%). Unfortunately, the ESS does not differentiate between working in a political action group and working for political party. Thus, it does not allow us to observe the difference between actors who are committed to a political party and those who choose to exercise their political voice through non-party channels such as single issue campaigns. Where the data has allowed, these two types of activities have been treated conceptually and empirically as different types of political activities (Teorell *et al.*, 2007).

<sup>80</sup> In addition to this, if all of these variables were included in an MCA solution, together with the other civic engagement indicators, all the questions related to political party involvement appeared as one cluster (graph not produced here).

<sup>81</sup> The variable ‘illegal protest’ appeared in an MCA solution as an outlier. An outlier, according to Clausen (1998) can cause a problem for correspondence analysis because if it deviates to a large degree from the others in the set, this point will often have a dominating effect on the results of the analysis. Illegal protest did not cluster with any other political participation variables and contributed to a further, separate dimension.

Below is a summary of all the variables that will be used in the MCA solutions. The middle column describes the variables. On the right hand column is the weighted frequency of those who reported having carried out that particular activity (in percent). On the left is the name of the variables, as they will appear on the MCA graphs.

**Table 4: Frequency table of final civic engagement indicators included in MCA**

<b>Political activities in the last 12 months</b>		<b>%</b>
Party/action group	Involved in a political party or action group	7.3
Donation	Donated money to a political organisation or group	6.4
Community	Worked in another organisation or association	7.7
Contact	Contacted a politician, government or local government official	9.5
Campaign badge	Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	13.7
Demonstration	Taken part in a lawful public demonstration	14.5
Petition	Signed a petition	25.8
Boycott	Boycotted certain products	17.2
Buycott	Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	23.9
<b>Typologies of associational involvement in the last 12 months: member, donour, participant and/or volunteer</b>		
Religious org.	Religious or Church organisations	16.6
Utilitarian org.	Trade unions, business/profession/farmers, consumer/automobile and, science/education/teachers/parents or	34.6
Social/recreational	Sports, cultural, social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women and other voluntary organisations	20.9
NSMO	Environmental/peace/animal rights, humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities and immigrants organisations	16.6


**Source:** ESS 2002. Cell entries are in percentages. Cases are weighted by design and population weight.

Table 4 shows that despite combining all the variables related to political party involvement and working in a political party or action group, the variable still constitutes one of the less popular activities across Europe. In contrast to this, signing a petition and boycotting are among the most common political activities. With respect to associations, involvement in social and recreational organisations is by far the most popular type of involvement in Europe as a whole, and this is closely followed by utilitarian organisations. Involvement in NSM and religious/ church organisations has around the same level of popularity.

Figure 1 below shows all the indicators of civic engagement variables on a two dimensional map. MCA plots the most frequent categories closer to the centre of axis (also called a centroid) and places the least frequent categories further apart from this point. For example, as voting and being inactive represent the most frequent cases, they are closer to the centroid than involvement in a political party or action group. To aid the graphical representation of the map, the ‘no’ categories have not been labelled, and are situated

around the centroid symmetric to their ‘yes’ counterparts. For a better illustration they have been marked as ‘non-activists’.

**Figure 1: Indicators of civic engagement on an two dimensional MCA map**



**Source:** ESS 2002. N=35863. Cases are weighted by population and design weight. Total inertia for the two dimensional solution is 0.362.

The interpretation of the axis lies in the distribution of the category points and their relative location to one another, as well the side of the axis that the categories occupy.<sup>82</sup> Those points that contribute mainly to the interpretation of the axis are at the far ends of the axis. The horizontal or principal axis (marked as dimension 1) separates those who have reported to be engaged with any types of voluntary organisation or political activity in the last 12 months, from those who have not reported any activities. The vertical axis (marked as dimension 2) distinguishes between those who have reported having undertaken some kind of activity in the last 12 months.

Along the vertical axis, the involvement with a political party and working for a political party or action group (pol. action/party) is at the top of the vertical axis, while religious/church organisations, NSMO and boycotting/boycotting are at the opposite ends of the axis. Thus, the second dimension differentiates mainly between political activities and voluntary organisations; and boycotting and boycotting.

<sup>82</sup> See Greenacre and Hastie (1987) for the interpretation of MCA planes.

Overall this two dimensional map helps the identification of the following patterns:

Voluntary organisations are all located at the same part of the axis, indicating that they are a distinct form of activity from political participation. In particular, people involved in voluntary organisations tend to be different from those being engaged in political parties and working for a political action group. This is in line with our expectations and confirms the approaches adopted by other studies, which treat associational involvement as being distinct from political party involvement.

The set of questions related to political activities are dispersed along dimension two. In particular, boycotting and buycotting are at the bottom part of dimension two, while the other indicators of political activism are located on the upper part of the vertical axis. There seems to be a difference between political activities that require more commitment, time and face-to-face interaction; and activities that appears, at a glance, to be less time consuming.<sup>83</sup> Thus, within political activities two separate clusters emerge: political activism and political consumerism. Moreover, those working in another organisation and association (community) and those who are contacting government officials and politicians, are closer to the middle of the vertical axis. This indicates that these types of activities also tend to be carried out by people involved in voluntary organisations, as well as by people carrying out political activities.<sup>84</sup>

Signing a petition lies almost exactly in the middle along the vertical axis in an ambivalent position between those involved in voluntary organisations and those carrying out political activities. Again, this indicates that this is a type of activity that is employed equally by those who carry out political activities and those who are involved in voluntary organisations and in boycotting and buycotting. Teorell and his colleagues (2007) also identified this ambivalent position in their analysis of the CID survey. In their data, signing a petition loaded highly with demonstrations and illegal protests, as well as with buycotting and boycotting activities. Signing a petition was regarded in Parry and Moyser's (1992: 276) study as one of the activities that involved "a lot of effort" more than a decade ago.

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<sup>83</sup> Stolle *et al.* (2005) argue that acts of political consumerism are less organised, less structured, and more transient than conventional political participation. Their analysis of a pilot study in Canada, Belgium and Sweden among students is in line with my results. Although, those carrying out acts of political consumerism were as much as other activists likely to be active in other forms of political participation and voluntary organisations, they were however, significantly less likely to be engaged in political parties. This is reflected in the map by the opposite occupation of political party/action group involvement and buycott and boycott along the vertical axis.

<sup>84</sup> This relationship was also discovered by the analysis of the CID survey. Teorell *et al.* (2007) discovered that contacting a politician, an organisation, a civil servant, the media, a solicitor or a judicial body all loaded high with the variable working in another organisation.

However, with the spread of the internet, it has become the most frequently employed political activity and, in most cases, it does not require much face-to-face contact. Thus, the ambivalent position of this variable within the MCA analysis might reflect the contradictory nature of this activity. Petitions can be collected online, in which case they spreads quickly and reach a wider audience (hence the close proximity to those who also boycott and buycott)<sup>85</sup>, or they can be collected in a more traditional way, through face-to-face interactions and campaigns. This latter technique is likely to occur in places where activists are interacting with each other, such as at demonstrations or in various political or community action groups.

The most striking relationship however, is the close proximity of boycotting and boycotting activities to New Social Movement Organisations.<sup>86</sup> Viewed from a two dimensional perspective, those who are involved in human rights, environmental, peace or animal rights organisations are also more likely to buy deliberately products for ethical, environmental or political reasons.

Voting in the last national election has been included as a supplementary variable. This means, that it does not affect the MCA solution, but its categories are mapped on the graphs. In accordance with other studies, voting has been treated as a distinct form of political engagement, not least because it is unlike the other types of activities and is compulsory in some European countries. Voting is the most basic and minimal mode of political participation and forms the basis of representative democracy. It has been already extensively researched at national, as well as cross-national, levels (Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2002; Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2007). This study will therefore limit its analysis of voting to this chapter only. It describes the relationship to other types of civic engagement variables as revealed on the MCA maps and it is not analysed in the subsequent chapters.

Figure 1 shows that those who are voting are more closely associated with those involved in voluntary organisations than those carrying out political activities. A separate analysis was run to see the relationship between voting and the other four types of involvement in voluntary organisations. This analysis demonstrated that, in particular, those engaged in

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<sup>85</sup> Studies have shown a positive and significant link between political consumers and the use of the internet (Teorell *et al.*, 2007). The various ways through which political consumers use the internet are demonstrated by Berry and McEachern (2005) and will be discussed briefly, further on in the chapter.

<sup>86</sup> This relationship is even more pronounced when looking at Western European countries only and excluding the Eastern and Southern European countries, which have low levels of political consumers in general. This might be related to high levels of postmaterialist values prevalent more in the Western European countries than in the rest of Europe and will be discussed in detail later in this study.


utilitarian organisations are more likely to vote than those engaged in social and recreational, religious and church and NSM organisations. This might suggest that not all types of associational involvement are equally conducive to voting. People engaged in utilitarian organisations seem to be more cautious about voting and making sure their voices are represented. An explanation for this might be that, as the general incentive model suggests, those involved in utilitarian organisations are also relatively well-integrated into the society and have therefore more incentives to participate. Hence, it can be speculated that in comparison with people engaged in non-utilitarian organisations, such as social, recreational and religious or NSM organisations, these individuals are more likely to vote. Much like those involved in voluntary associations, they are also more likely to vote than carry out political activities such as working for a political party or action group, taking part at demonstrations etc. This type of citizen engagement suggests a libertarian understanding of citizenship: it expects citizens to be active in civil society organisations but, apart from sporadic voting, it leaves the realm of policy and politics to the political elite (Schuck, 2002; Schumpeter, 2003). However, the map only indicates a trend and it does not show the strength of this relationship, nor does it account for any other factors. Hence, further analysis is needed to examine these points more thoroughly.

Apart from the graphs, MCA also gives the measure of “inertia” or the “goodness-of-fit” that is associated with the data. For the two dimensional solution, the total inertia is 0.362. In other words, a two dimensional map explains 36.2% of the variation in the data. A three dimensional solution increases the total inertia to 0.451. Thus, the third dimension explains almost 10% more of the total variance. Corresponding to the inertia, Eigenvalues are produced. For this data only three dimensions with Eigenvalues over one were identified (see Appendix 4, table 18). These dimensions explain 45.1% of the total variance in the data.

As the next graph figure 2 shows, expanding the solution with a further dimension unravels the distinction between political consumerism and associational involvement, which was suppressed on the two dimensional map. In the next figure 2 each dimension is plotted against each other. Only these three maps are of interest to us, as the other three are just the symmetric representation of the same maps. The map plotting dimension one against dimension two and vice versa is only a repetition of our previous chart. Essentially, the map that plots dimension two against dimension three is the map that needs our attention.

This graph has ‘cancelled out’ the non-activists by focusing only on those who are active.<sup>87</sup> It illustrates how the various civic engagement indicators are related to one another.

**Figure 2: Three dimensional map of indicators of civic engagement**



Source ESS 2002. N=35863. Cases are weighted by population and design weight. Total inertia: 0.451.

As seen previously, dimension one differentiates between activists and non-activists. Furthermore, dimension two differentiates between political activists on the upper side of the vertical axis, and voluntary organisations and political consumerism on the lower part of the axis. However, the strong relationship that could be observed between NSMO and boycotting/buycotting disappears on the three dimensional map. This allows for more differentiation between those involved in associations and those involved in boycotting or and buycotting. Signing a petition, which had an ambivalent position on a two-dimensional map, emerges as being in the same cluster as boycotting/ buycotting and can be described as acts of political consumerism.

<sup>87</sup> A separate analysis was run with the same set of variables filtering out those who have not reported any type of civic engagement resulted in a similar graph. This shows, that most of the people are engaged in one or the other type of organisation, it may be very sporadic and passive, but there is not a clear group of ‘activists’ or ‘non-activists’. Similar observations are also made by Dalton (2002) who suggests that citizen tend to engage in certain types of activities and not in others.

With respect to political activities, the graph shows the following three clusters, although they do not all form different dimensions:

A) Taking part in a demonstration and wearing a campaign badge/sticker are located closer to each other, indicating that those taking part in demonstrations are also more likely to wear/display a campaign badge/sticker. On a two-dimensional map, these two activities appeared closer to political party and group activities and were further differentiated with an additional dimension.

B) Contacting a politician or government official, and working in another type of organisation, remain on the same side as political party and political action group activities. They also continue to exhibit closeness to associational involvement.<sup>88</sup>

C) Finally across all maps, involvement in political parties and action groups, and donating to a political party have been clustered together. This indicated that those who are involved in a political party or working for a political action group are also more likely to donate money to a political group than they are to engage in other types of activities.

Despite the different clusters of political activities, they appeared as one dimension, whereas involvement in voluntary organisations and political consumerism appeared as two further dimensions of civic engagement. These results have been validated by running Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) and PCA with SPSS. Comparing the results of the CATPCA and PCA analyses, with those from MCA yields the same results.<sup>89</sup> Across all methods, the Eigenvalues and the percentage of variance explained for all three dimensions are the same. All of the techniques identify three components with Eigenvalues over one and suggest that the total amount of variation explained by these dimensions is 45.1% (see table 18 in Appendix 4).

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<sup>88</sup> This relationship was also found by the analysis of the CID (see Teorell *et al.*, 2007).

<sup>89</sup> The difference between CATPCA and MCA is that CATPCA is preferred if some of the variables are a mix of continuous and categorical, while it is only suitable for categorical variables. Also, the graphs produced in MCA are much better than in CATPCA (Meulman and Heiser, 2004).

## 5.5 Conclusion

The analysis of a wider range of civic engagement indicators has confirmed the multidimensionality of civic engagement. First of all there is a clear distinction between citizens who tend to be involved in political and social activities and those who do not tend to be active in any shape or form. Furthermore, involvement in voluntary organisations appeared as one dimension of civic engagement. This confirms, in accordance with the social capital model, that people who are involved in one type of voluntary organisation are also more likely to be involved in other types of voluntary organisations (Wollebaek and Selle, 2003a). Indeed, previous research has also demonstrated that multiple memberships in various voluntary organisations is quite a widespread phenomena. This is particularly true for Nordic countries, which have a high density of network of associations. Political activities appeared as a separate dimension to associational involvement. Again, this fits well with previous studies and with traditional approaches that treat those two aspects of civic engagement as separate from one another (Campbell, 2006; Almond and Verba, 1963). However contrary to many studies, this analysis also identified political consumerism as a form of activism that is distinct from political participation and associational involvement.

The MCA analysis identified three broad dimensions of civic engagement. These dimensions were identified based on the relative proximity of the various civic engagement indicators to one another. This means that in relation to people who are involved in political activities, those involved in voluntary organisations appear as one cluster. However, if only the voluntary organisations were included in the analysis, then the differences between voluntary organisations would have been more acute or, for example, if we only looked at the political activities, then the differences between partisanship and demonstrations, would have been emphasised more strongly. Since the aim is to identify fairly broad groups of activism common to the 19 European countries, was important to reduce these indicators to as few dimensions as possible.

The analysis showed that citizens in Europe show preference for three distinct types of activities. This suggests that there are three types of active citizens: Type one gets involved in politics and political issues directly, by contacting politicians, attending lawful public demonstrations, being politically active in community organisations, donating money to a political group or even by becoming active in political parties and action groups. On the other hand, type two is predominantly involved in voluntary organisations, either as a

member, participant, volunteer or by donating money. This type of involvement can be purely for social, recreational, professional reasons; or it can be out of religious attachment or as part of New Social Movement Organisations. Type three is a political consumer, who uses the market as the venue for political contest. Whilst they are distinct in their characteristics, these three types of activities overlap. The main distinction lies between people who tend to be active and those who are inclined not to get involved in any shape or form.

Given the extensive research on political participation and associational involvement, I want to focus on the third dimension of civic engagement - political consumerism because it is an area that has enjoyed little attention from scholars of political behaviour. Political consumerism has been under-theorised and academics have often tended to underplay the importance of activism that focuses on markets (Teorell *et al.*, 2007). One reason for this is that these activities are low-cost activities, which can initially seem like isolated forms of activity that share few collective features. However, the few scholars who have examined this phenomenon have argued for a wider perspective and suggest that it is important consider these 'individualised' acts within the context of other forms of engagement.

This brings us to our second significant finding of this analysis. The two dimensional map showed, that those who are engaged in political consumerism, in particular in boycotting and buycotting, are more likely to be engaged in NSMO. This suggests that political consumerism should not be seen as an action on its own, and certainly not in isolation from NSMO and their associated repertoire of actions. Several authors have argued that acts of political consumerism are often committed by those involved in NSMOs (Crossley, 2002; Shah *et al.*, 2007; Harrison *et al.*, 2005; Micheletti, 2003). This analysis provides empirical evidence for such a claim. More crucially, it underlines the collective nature of these activities.

In line with Harrison (2005) and others (Dickinson and Carsky, 2005; Friedman, 1999; Micheletti, 2003) I propose to view political consumerism as acts resulting from collective actions. This presupposes the existence of a wider network of pressure groups and their campaigns mobilising citizens to alter their consumption behaviour based on ethical, political or environmental reasons. Often, pressure groups are seeking to achieve campaigning goals by providing information about corporate malpractice or by supporting the development of alternative products. They are, therefore, shaping the environment in which individual ethical consumers can operate as Harrison (2005: 55) argues:

(...) the growth of ethical purchase behaviour is not just a spontaneous maturing of individual consumer awareness, but it is also a phenomenon deliberately driven by pressure groups seeking to achieve a variety of specific campaign goals in a globalised world. Many groups have discovered that campaigning for change by seeking to manipulate or influence markets can be a quick and effective way by addressing particular social and environmental problems, and are therefore campaigning in this way more frequently. In other words, it is argued that ethical consumer behaviours are in many cases a form of collective action.

Similarly, Welzel *et al.* (2005) emphasise that “elite-challenging” actions (including boycotting and signing petitions) are as important as voluntary organisations in their ability to promote collective action. Both voluntary organisations and elite-challenging activities are valuable proxies for social capital, “reflecting the existence and operation of community nets” (Welzel *et al.*, 2005: 125). Hence, they argue that “elite-challenging” actions indicate the effectiveness of networks producing collective actions. This argument is supported by the analysis here, which shows a clear relationship between political consumers and those involved in NSMOs.

These are fairly new arguments. Most studies, even when they identify political consumerism as a separate form of political activity, are fairly limited in their interpretations of this behaviour. For example, Teorell *et al.* (2007) argue that ‘consumer participation’ differs from political participation in that it is aimed at influencing firms, the mass media and public opinion rather than representative officials. In doing so, they reject the ‘political’ nature of political consumerism. Although political consumers are also aiming to influence the mass media and public opinion, this can be applied to more established types of protest activities such as demonstrations and wearing a badge or displaying a banner. It is questionable how much such political protest activities really do address the authorities, and to what extent that is substantially different from political consumerism. For example, Casquete (2006) examined the character of mass demonstrations in the Basque region of Spain and argued that demonstrations not only aim to influence authorities, but also to form public opinion and forge social bonds and a sense of group identity between the participants. As with other forms of political activity, the political nature of political consumerism, and the political changes it has brought about, might be limiting; however, do bring about change. For example, they can force companies to change their practices and can put pressure on governments to introduce regulations. For example, they can encourage stricter control on child labour (Micheletti and Stolle, 2004).

Moreover, although the CID data pointed to a significant relationship of political consumerism with the “use of internet to influence society” (Teorell *et al.*, 2007: 351), the

authors did not interpret these findings further. The role of the Internet in “empowering” the ethical consumer is well documented (Berry and McEachern, 2005: 84). They argue that the media, campaign groups and informal communication networks are some of the most important sources of background information for the ‘ethical consumer’. New technology not only extended their reach but deliver new dimensions and potential. The Internet also allows “wannabe ethical shoppers” (Berry and McEachern, 2005: 84) to do product and company searches prior to making a purchase, and it also connects them to online discussion forums and campaign groups.

Research on political consumerism is increasing; however discussions about the nature of political consumerism are still happening at the margins of political studies (Bostroem *et al.*, 2005; Harrison *et al.*, 2005).<sup>90</sup> Among scholars working on social capital and civic engagement, Stolle and Hooghe have paid attention to political consumerism and its relevance for social capital. The Swedish political scientist Michelle Micheletti has done pioneering work on political consumerism and has contributed greatly to the understanding of this concept in the political sciences. The three authors have conducted a pilot study in Canada, Sweden and Belgium which investigates student attitudes to political consumerism. The study looks at the type of products targeted by the activists, the intentions behind their choice, and the frequency of their activism. Stolle *et al.*’s (2005: 249) pilot study highlighted the importance of including acts of political consumerism in future research on political and civic engagement, in particular in light of recent discussions about the decline of civic engagement:

An exclusive focus on traditional forms of participation that target the political system per se entails the risk that innovations in the participation repertoire of citizens remain unnoticed; this in turn could lead to a false conclusion that political participation in general is in decline.

The authors demonstrate that acts signing petitions and boycotting have increased relative to the other forms of political activity. This analysis confirms these findings, suggesting that it has become the most frequent form of action in Western Europe. Whilst political consumerism is by no means new, Harrison argues that factors such as globalisation and the Internet have lead to a shift in the way these activities are carried out. Harrison (2005: 63) defines political consumerism as “one of the newest forms of political participation”, adding it to a list of activities that include campaign group or party membership, and financial support for parties or cause groups. Thus, given the controversies about political

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<sup>90</sup> Micheletti (2003) addresses in her pioneering study on political consumerism the difficulties that research on political consumerism has in the political sciences in particular in the United States.

consumerism and the increase of acts of political consumerism in Europe, more research is needed that examines in particular the implications of political consumerism for active citizenship, social capital and democracy.

In the next chapter, the three dimensions of civic engagement identified here will be used as the dependent variable in an aggregate level analysis exploring country level differences and their relationship to levels of political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement.

## Chapter VI

### 6. Civic engagement across countries: exploring contextual factors through aggregate level analysis

Levels of civic engagement show considerable variation from one country to another, with a higher proportion of the population being active in the Scandinavian countries than in the Eastern European countries. This may suggest that country level characteristics seem to play a crucial role in explaining differences in levels of engagement across countries. This chapter will therefore carry out an aggregate level analysis and examine a number of contextual variables and their relationship to all three dimensions of civic engagement. The aggregate level analysis will focus on civic engagement as collective phenomena. Unlike individual level analysis, a comparison between countries allows us to also consider the attributes of countries that are detrimental to or supportive of active citizenship (Newton, 2001; Portes, 1998). The country attributes that will be tested here have been already introduced in chapter IV and included indicators of economic wealth, democracy, the extent of social stratification and differences in welfare regimes. These factors have been associated with civic engagement as discussed in chapters III and IV. In addition, this study also examines the relationship of specific policy variables on civic engagement: government spending in social and cultural areas as a proxy for government support of the voluntary sector; and years since civic education was introduced in the school curriculum as a proxy for government effort to cultivate norms and behaviours of active citizenship.

#### 6.1 Aggregate level scores of civic engagement

In the previous chapter three dimensions of civic engagement were identified: political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement. In order to obtain scores for these three dimensions of civic engagement, all variables forming one cluster had to be entered separately in the MCA program (i.e. for buycotting, boycotting and petitions as one group, New Social Movement Organisations, Religious and Church organisations, utilitarian organisations, social and recreational organisations for associational involvement and political action or group involvement, donating money to a political group, demonstrations, working in a community organisation etc. for political activities) with dimensionality specified as one. This way, single quantifications for the categories

and a component score for each case were obtained (see table 19 in Appendix 5 for original individual level scores).<sup>91</sup>

In contrast to the scores for political activities, which increase as the number of activities increases, the scores for political consumerism and associational involvement go in the opposite direction; they decrease as their number of activities increases. To make comparison between the three different dimensions of civic engagement easier, these scales had to be transformed.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, in the aggregate level, data means scored for political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement were calculated and to ensure comparability across all three dependent variables the variables were standardized (see table 20 in Appendix 5 for the aggregate standardised scores all three dimensions of civic engagement).

The three dependent variables correlate highly with each other at the country level (see table 21 in Appendix 6 for the correlation matrix). Political activism has a correlation coefficient of 0.74 with political consumerism and 0.76 with associational involvement. However, the correlation between political consumerism and associational involvement is stronger (0.84). This relationship could already be observed through the MCA map, which differentiated mainly between activist and non-activist. Yet, within the activist group, there was a stronger overlap of political consumer and those involved in associations, than those involved in political activities. Theoretically, the “Putnamian” (De Hart and Dekker, 1999) social capital model draws a strong connection between these types of activities, arguing that involvement in voluntary organisations makes citizens more likely to become active in political affairs, as opposed to those citizens who have no involvement with voluntary organisations. This is consistent with other empirical studies (Van Deth *et al.*, 1999; Inglehart, 1997).

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<sup>91</sup> For example, the scores for political participation range from -0.54 to 5.22. All those who have not carried out any political activities such as being involved in a political party or action group, donating money to a political group, contacting a government official, wearing a campaign sticker, taking part in a demonstration or working in another organisation, are assigned the score -0.54, while those having carried out all of the political activities are assigned the maximum value of 5.22. Thus, the lowest value of -0.54 does not only include the complete non-activist, but also those who were engaged in voluntary organisations and acts of political consumerism, but not in any acts of political activism.


<sup>92</sup> The first step was to reverse the direction of the scale for political consumerism and associational involvement so that all their dimensions have a scale going in the same direction; low scores for low levels of civic engagement and high scores for high levels of engagement. In order to reverse the scale for political consumerism and associational involvement, the maximum value of these two variables were added as a constant to the respective variables. Furthermore, these variables were multiplied by -1 in order to make the scale positive.

## 6.2 Comparing levels of civic engagement across countries

The figure 3 below provides a visualisation of the aggregated scores for political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement and in table 5 details of these scores are given, with the country closest to the average mean score being in the middle, marked by the grey shade.

The countries in figure 3 appear in descending order by their overall scores of civic engagement.

**Figure 3: Mean aggregate scores of civic engagement by country**



**Source:** ESS 2002. The figure shows average standardised scores of civic engagement broken down by its three dimensions. The countries are ranked by the highest scores they obtained if all three dimensions are added together. France represents the country with the average score in civic engagement. N=19.

The graph (figure 3) shows that citizens in Western Europe are in general more active than citizens from Southern and Eastern Europe. Among the Western countries, the Nordic countries and Austria have the highest levels of civic engagement. Within the 19 European countries, Hungary, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia display the lowest levels of civic engagement. If broken down by the type of activities, the general trend is still observable, as can be seen from table 5 below.

Although the general trend across Europe is that more prosperous countries have higher levels of engagement, this trend is not so clear if broken down by types of engagement. Thus, separating the three dimensions of civic engagement allows us to focus our attention on countries that break this pattern and might shed some light on the reasons for that.

**Table 5: Standardised mean scores for all three dimensions of civic engagement**

Standardised mean scores for political activity		Standardised mean scores for political consumerism		Standardised mean scores for associational involvement	
Norway	4.19	Sweden	3.91	Sweden	3.23
Finland	3.08	UK	3	Netherlands	3.2
Austria	3.02	Germany	2.95	Denmark	3.2
Luxembourg	2.97	Denmark	2.94	Norway	3.1
Belgium	2.73	Finland	2.91	Austria	2.97
Sweden	2.58	Norway	2.86	Finland	2.79
Ireland	2.42	France	2.69	Belgium	2.44
France	2.33	Austria	2.42	UK	2.38
Denmark	2.1	Belgium	2.27	Ireland	2.38
Germany	2.04	Luxembourg	2.16	Germany	2.36
Spain	2.03	Ireland	1.97	Luxembourg	2.3
Netherlands	1.81	Netherlands	1.89	Slovenia	1.53
UK	1.69	Spain	1.28	France	1.51
Italy	1.44	Italy	1.05	Italy	1.32
Greece	0.86	Slovenia	0.89	Spain	1.05
Portugal	0.85	Poland	0.76	Portugal	0.78
Poland	0.72	Greece	0.74	Hungary	0.64
Slovenia	0.65	Hungary	0.72	Poland	0.49
Hungary	0.49	Portugal	0.64	Greece	0.35

**Source:** ESS 2002. The countries are ranked in descending order. The grey shade represents the country closest to the overall average score across all 19 countries.

Across all three dimensions of civic engagement, the population in the Nordic countries have above average levels of engagement, while the citizens in Southern and Eastern European countries have generally below average levels of civic engagement. For the other Western European countries a more complicated picture emerges. The UK and the Netherlands are the least politically active societies within the Western countries, and their levels of political activism are on the same level as Italy and even lower than Spain's, which is traditionally regarded as a politically less active society (Perez-Diaz, 2002). Yet,

despite their relative disengagement in political activities, the UK has, after Sweden, the highest levels of involvement in political consumerism and above average levels of associational involvement. Similarly, the Dutch –similar to the Swedes- are the most involved groups in voluntary organisations, yet the Netherlands has relatively low levels of political consumerism.

With a few exceptions, the Eastern and Southern European countries are at the bottom of activity levels. Spain's level of political activism is relatively high compared to other countries in the region and does not confirm previous studies (Benedicto, 2004). These high scores for political activities might be an exception, as a large numbers of Spaniards were mobilised against the Iraq war during the reference period of the survey in 2001-2002 (Jimenez, 2007). Thus, this figure has to be treated with caution. Slovenia, despite its communist legacy, has a relatively large voluntary sector. This is partly due to its economic prosperity relative to the other postcommunist countries, as well as to its relative independence from the Soviet Union during the communist period. This gave the Slovenians more opportunities to engage in private economic activities as well as travel to Western Europe. As a result, Slovenia experienced a smoother transition to liberal market economy than the other postcommunist countries (Pleskovic and Sachs, 1994). The Netherlands is known for its vibrant voluntary sector, which is similar to that of the Nordic countries (De Hart and Dekker, 1999). However, its relatively low levels of political activities and political consumerism compared to other Nordic countries, is unusual for a democratic, prosperous country with high involvement in the voluntary sector.

Among the Western countries, in terms of levels of associational involvement, France is ranked between Slovenia and Italy. This relative weakness of France's network of associations, compared to other European countries is often noted and attributed to the dual influence of Catholic culture and a centralized state. As Worms (2002) states, the state and the church have competed for control over French civil society for centuries, leaving little room for citizens' initiatives. However, clearly further analysis is required to understand the contextual differences between these countries.

### 6.3 Examining the relationship between the contextual variables and civic engagement through bivariate regression analysis

In this section the macro-level characteristics of countries will be analysed separately through a bivariate regression analysis. This way the relationship between a single contextual variable and civic engagement can be examined and discussed in depth, before taking into account any other contextual variables in the same model. Table 6 below lists all the contextual variables that are going to be used in the analysis here. The countries have been arranged by welfare regime typologies, which as will be demonstrated, show the strongest relationship with civic engagement.

**Table 6: Macro variables used in the analysis**

Country	Welfare regime	History of democracy (1973-2002)	Democracy (2002)	GDP	Long term unem- ployment	Income inequality	Poverty after social transfers	Government expenditure	Civic education
<b>NO</b>	Nordic	1	100	147.9	0.5	3.5	11	15.8	28
<b>SE</b>	Nordic	1.02	99	113.7	1	3.4	9	16.2	56
<b>FI</b>	Nordic	1.52	99	114.7	2.3	3.7	11	13.6	30
<b>DK</b>	Nordic	1	99	121.4	0.9	3	10	17.5	27
<b>UK</b>	Liberal	1.19	97	116.1	1.1	5.4	18	13.8	2
<b>IE</b>	Liberal	1.1	93	132.3	1.3	4.5	21	12.8	5
<b>LU</b>	Continental	1.09	97	220.7	0.7	3.8	12	12.3	13
<b>AT</b>	Continental	1	98	120	1.1	3.5	12	14.5	24
<b>NL</b>	Continental	1	98	125.3	0.7	4	11	11.8	34
<b>BE</b>	Continental	1.1	95	117.3	3.7	4	13	14	4
<b>DE</b>	Continental	1.38	94	108.5	4	3.6	11	12.5	53
<b>FR</b>	Continental	1.47	95	112	3	3.9	13	16.5	26
<b>IT</b>	Southern European	1.43	92	110	5.1	4.8	18	11.9	23
<b>ES</b>	Southern European	2.14	92	95.2	3.7	5.5	19	12.1	12
<b>PT</b>	Southern European	1.83	98	79.5	1.7	6.5	20	16	16
<b>GR</b>	Southern European	2.12	81	77.2	5.3	5.7	20	8.1	17
<b>SI</b>	Postcommunist	4.05	92	74.5	3.5	3.1	11	14.7	6
<b>PL</b>	Postcommunist	3.88	88	46.3	10.9	4.7	16	13.3	4
<b>HU</b>	Postcommunist	3.79	89	59.1	2.5	3.1	11	13.8	9

Figures for GDP, income inequality, long term unemployment and government expenditure are obtained from Eurostat. Levels of democracy and history of democracy are from the Freedom House index ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)) and citizenship education has been compiled specifically for this study based on the analysis of a number of studies and articles.

Table 6 shows that the Western European countries have been experiencing high levels of democracy for at least three decades.<sup>93</sup> These countries are also marked by very high levels of political rights and civil liberties. Moreover, the Western countries are also marked by economic prosperity, and their level of GDP is above the average in Europe.<sup>94</sup> The other

<sup>93</sup> The scores 1-4 represents the average scores of political rights and civil liberties from 1972-2002. 1 represents high levels of rights and liberties, while 4 represents a low level of political and civil liberties. The overall scale ranges from 1-7, with 1 being the most democratic countries and 7 for totalitarian regimes.

<sup>94</sup> Figures over 100 represent the above average GDP of 25 European countries in PPS.

indicators however, show greater variation between countries and cannot be interpreted as straightforwardly as the GDP and history of democracy and current levels of democracy. In what follows, the contextual variables and their relationship to the three dimensions of civic engagement will be discussed in detail. Table 7 below shows the results for the bivariate regression analysis of all macro variables for all three dimensions of civic engagement. The models in the tables all represent separate models. The relationship between these contextual predictor variables and political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement will be discussed further below and illustrated with scatter plots. Building on these bivariate results the second part of this chapter carries out multiple regression analysis and decides on the most parsimonious models to carry forward to the next chapter, where contextual factors are considered at the same time as individual level attributes.

**Table 7: Results of bivariate regression analysis of civic engagement**


	Political Activities			Political Consumerism			Associational Involvement		
	Coefficient (std)	Constant	Adjusted R2	Coefficient (std)	Constant	Adjusted R2	Coefficient (std)	Constant	Adjusted R2
GDPlog	.8(.000)	-8.74	0.612	.64(.004)	-6.56	0.368	.73(.000)	-7.84	0.504
Democracy 2002	.66(.002)	-10.97	0.403	.69(.001)	-11.59	0.448	.80(.000)	-13.79	0.625
Avr. Democracy 1973-2002	-.73(.000)	3.24	0.512	-.7(.001)	3.18	0.454	-.72(.001)	3.22	0.488
Income inequality	-.36(.131)	3.52	0.078	-.46(.049)	3.93	0.163	-.55(.015)	4.32	0.262
Poverty	-.36(.128)	3.27	0.08	-.53(.021)	3.85	0.235	-.58(.009)	4.04	0.298
Long term unemployment	-.52(.023)	2.58	0.227	-.53(.021)	2.59	0.234	-.67(.002)	2.75	0.417
Gov. expenditure	.27(.266)	0.3	0.018	.44(.057)	-.81	0.15	.39(.102)	-.44	0.099
Civic education	.35(.143)	1.54	0.07	.59(.007)	1.22	0.315	.49(.032)	1.35	0.198
Welfare regime (Continental)		2.48	0.648		2.39	0.835		2.46	0.784
Social Democratic	.21(.211)			.32(.011)			.26(.059)		
Liberal	-.14(.380)			.03(.775)			-.03(.831)		
South-European	-.5(.008)			-.62(.000)			-.66(.000)		
Postcommunist	-.7(.001)			-.6(.000)			-.59(.000)		

The figures in the table represent the standardized beta values for all parameters. The values in brackets represent their p values.

### 6.3.1 Economic prosperity

Figure 4 shows that Luxembourg had by far the highest levels of GDP per capita followed by Norway in 2002.<sup>95</sup> Within the Western European countries Germany had the lowest GDP, even lower than Italy. The Southern European countries have in general lower levels of GDP in comparison to Western European countries, although Italy has a slightly higher GDP than Germany. The Eastern European countries have the lowest levels of GDP within Europe, with Slovenia being the most prosperous country within this group, having GDP rates closer to Greece

**Figure 4: Scatter plot of political activism and GDP**



Adjusted R-square 0.612, standardised Beta coefficient: 0.80(.000)

Overall the relationship between GDP and political activism is positive and very strong. GDP explains a large amount of the variance in political participation (61.2%) and the coefficient is significant at the  $p < 0.001$  level. Norway's high rates of GDP are also

<sup>95</sup> To some extent, the very high level of income in Luxembourg can be explained with reference to the country's high number of employees residing in the neighbouring countries. These contribute to GDP without being part of the resident population, which has a very low population of under a million. In the case of Norway, the petroleum sector is of great importance leading to high income level per capital (Statistics Norway, 2002).

reflected in its high levels of political activism. It is politically the most active society within our sample. The same cannot be said about Luxembourg, which despite being the most prosperous country within the 19 European countries has moderate levels of political activism. Similarly, despite their above average rates of GDP, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands have rather low levels of political activism. Thus, although, while more affluent countries are more active than less prosperous countries, economic wealth as measured by GDP does not explain why among the well-off nations, participation varies so extremely.

### 6.3.2 Democracy


Two measures of democracy have been used here, both derived from the Freedom House index. The history of democracy measures the average scores of political rights and civil liberties from 1972-2002, while the democracy scores for 2002 only measure current levels of democracy, without taking into account the history of democratic experience.

The correlation between these two variables is strong (-0.62) but not so high that it creates concerns of multi-collinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF)<sup>96</sup> is also moderate, so that both variables can be used in the same regression analysis, as they are effectively measuring different aspects of democracy (VIF=1.62). The multivariate regression encountered multi-collinearity problems due to the high correlation between GDP and welfare regime. This makes it very difficult to disentangle whether the specific score of the Scandinavian countries is due more to their high GDP or their distinct welfare regime type or their history of democracy.

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<sup>96</sup> Variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the predictor variables in a regression model on the precision of estimation. It expresses the degree to which collinearity among the predictors degrades the precision of an estimate. There is no formal VIF value for determining presence of multi-collinearity. Values of VIF that exceed 10 are often regarded as indicating multi-collinearity, but in weaker models, such as our models, values above 2.5 may be a cause for concern. When VIF is high there is high multi-collinearity and instability of the b and beta coefficients.

**Figure 5: Scatter plot of associational involvement and history of democracy**




Adjusted R-square 0.488, standardised Beta coefficient: -0.72 (0.001)

The figure 5 shows that all of the Western European countries and Italy have in general experienced high levels of political rights and civil liberties since the 1970s, thus they received the rating around 1. The Eastern European countries' high score (between 3 and 4) on the other hand is a reflection of their communist past. Greece, Spain and Portugal also experienced authoritarian regimes in the last three decades (Jones *et al.*, 2008; Magalhaes, 2005; Benedicto, 2004). The relationship between all three dimensions of civic engagement and history of democracy is highly significant in all three models and explains around half of the variance (see table 7).

Similar relationships can be observed for levels of democracy in 2002. The graph below (figure 6) shows that the Nordic countries and most of the Western European countries score relatively high on the Freedom House index.

**Figure 6: Scatter plot of associational involvement and levels of democracy in 2002**



Adjusted R-square 0.625, standardised Beta coefficient: 0.80(.000)

Greece has the lowest scores, followed by Hungary and Poland. Portugal has relatively high scores for a south European country that has experienced the transition to democracy only in the mid 1970s. The reason for Portugal's high scores in the year 2002 is among other things, its implementation of the most liberal immigration legislation in the EU in August 2001. This legislation enables workers, who entered the country illegally or on a tourist visa, to legalise their status and obtain either permanent residency or citizenship. A shortage of labourers contributed to the legislation (Karatnycky *et al.*, 2003).

Greece on the other hand has the lowest score in levels of democracy for several reasons according to the Freedom House report for the year 2002. Despite the fact that Greece ratified the Convention for Protection of National Minorities in 1997, it recognizes neither the presence of national minorities nor minority languages in 2002. Greece is the only country in the EU that was imprisoning conscientious objectors to military service. Furthermore, similar to Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, the Roma minority have been experiencing discrimination and harassment in Greece (Karatnycky *et al.*, 2003).

The Eastern European countries score low on political rights and civil liberties mainly due to issues of corruption, restrictions on free media, and discrimination against some ethnic minority groups. Again the Nordic countries are those countries in which political rights and civil liberties are best implemented and guaranteed. The relationship between levels of democracy and political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement is positive and highly significant, in particular for associational involvement, where it explains 62.5% of the variance on its own (see table 7).

### 6.3.3 Welfare regimes

The 19 European countries in the sample have been classified broadly under five welfare regime typologies (see chapter IV). The Continental welfare regime has been chosen as the base category, as the majority of countries fall within this typology. The bivariate regression analysis of welfare regime and the three dependent variables of civic engagement show the importance of this variable in explaining the total variance in political activities (64.8%), political consumerism (83.5%) and associational involvement (78.4%). No other variable explains a variance over 65% on its own. Although, both measures of democracy and GDP are also relatively strong predictors of all three dimensions of civic engagement, they do not explain as much variance as the welfare regime.

The effect of welfare regime on civic engagement is the strongest for political consumerism (83.5% of the variance is explained in this bivariate model, see table 7). As opposed to the Continental welfare regime, people living in Social-Democratic welfare regimes are significantly more likely to be engaged in acts of political consumerism, whereas there are no statistical differences between Continental and Liberal welfare regimes in terms of engagement in political consumerism. Being from a South-European and a Postcommunist welfare regime on the other hand as opposed to the Continental welfare regime, has a significantly negative impact on participation in this field.

For associational involvement and political activities, there is not a statistically significant relationship between the Continental welfare regime and the Social-Democratic and Liberal welfare regime. However, as with political consumerism, South-European and Postcommunist welfare regimes have a significantly negative effect on participation in comparison to Continental welfare regime. The striking difference between Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regimes might be explained by their experiences of

democracy and economic wealth. Indeed, if controlled for history of democracy or GDP, the dummy variables for Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regimes show extremely high VIF values.<sup>97</sup> Both welfare regimes also have less experience with democracy as well as low levels of GDP in comparison to the other three welfare regimes of Western Europe. Further comparison of the welfare regimes with other contextual variables shows that the Liberal welfare regimes of the UK and Ireland are also marked by high levels of poverty and income inequality.

#### 6.3.4 Long term-unemployment rates

In the early and mid 1990s mass unemployment in Europe was almost universal and it started to decrease only in the second half of the 1990s (Andersen and Halvorsen, 2002). The decline for Poland however was still very slow. Until 2002 it still had by far the highest rates of long-term unemployment with over 10.9%, followed by Italy and Greece with around 5%. Within the Southern European countries, Portugal has very low long-term unemployment rates of 1.7%, closer to the Scandinavian countries.

In comparison to other European countries, Portugal experienced a labour shortage in construction, tourism and agriculture at the beginning of the Millennium and this led to the introduction of more relaxed immigration laws in order to attract labour from abroad, in particular from eastern Europe (Karatnycky *et al.*, 2003). Hungary's and Slovenia's levels of long-term unemployment are similar to Spain's, Germany's, France's and Belgium's at around 3-4%.<sup>98</sup> Within Europe, the Netherlands has been cited often for its success of bringing down unemployment rates (Andersen and Jensen, 2002).

The Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland also have relatively low long-term unemployment rates (see figure 7 below). Despite low levels of long-term unemployment, problems of social exclusion and social stratification are high in the Liberal welfare regimes of the UK and Ireland, as opposed to the Social-Democratic and Continental welfare regimes. Low levels of unemployment in conjunction with high levels of poverty


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<sup>97</sup> When testing for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), the VIF value for welfare regime, in particular the East European welfare regime, Postcommunist welfare regime and history of democracy is extremely high at around 30, well above the rule of thumb threshold of 10 or 2.5 for weak models. Furthermore, although the VIF value for GDP and Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regimes are much lower at around 3.88 and 3.55, this value is still high for our model, which has a small sample size. The inclusion of welfare regime and history of democracy or welfare regime and GDP or GDP and history of democracy in the same model leads to multi-collinearity and leads to biased b estimation. In such models none of the coefficients appear significant anymore, which is clearly a sign of multi-collinearity.

<sup>98</sup> For a brief overview of Slovenia's relatively low levels of unemployment, which can be ascribed to the specifics of transition and employment policies, see Ignjatovic *et al.* (2002).

indicate an employment policy that increases labour market participation by creating more part-time jobs as well as by pushing people to work in low-paid jobs. This, although resulting in low levels of unemployment, also leads to the creation of the “working poor” (Grimalda, 1999: 270). Hence long-term unemployment rates and their impact on civic engagement have to be assessed together with other indicators of social exclusion.

**Figure 7: Scatter plot of political activism and long term unemployment rates**



Adjusted R-square 0.227, standardised Beta coefficient: -0.52(.023)

The relationship between long-term unemployment and all three dimensions of civic engagement is negative and significant. The higher the levels of unemployment, the lower the levels of civic engagement. This relationship is stronger for associational involvement than for political activities and political consumerism. High levels of unemployment also indicate that the country is experiencing an economic crisis. This might particularly affect the voluntary sector as they rely on the contribution of citizens as well as on income generated from governments and the market, which are likely to go down in times of economic recession. Hence the strong negative relationship of associational involvement with levels of long-term unemployment could be observed here. The slightly weaker but also negative relationship of unemployment with political activism however, could indicate that in times of structural crisis some citizens might have more motive and opportunity to

take part in political activities, such as protesting the closure of their production site and against being laid off.


### 6.3.5 Income inequality and at risk of poverty

At-risk-of-poverty and income inequality are both measures that are extracted from the same source, which measures household income in Europe. Both measures, in addition to long-term unemployment, are generally used as indicators of poverty or social exclusion. However, while the correlation of long-term unemployment with income inequality and at-risk-of-poverty is weak (around 0.3), the correlation between the variables derived from the total household income is very strong (0.89). Similar to income inequality, those countries which are marked by big earning inequalities in their society e.g. the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Poland, also have high levels of poverty. However, while the UK, Ireland and Portugal, for different reasons, have maintained low levels of long-term unemployment, Poland, Greece and Italy have suffered higher rates of long-term unemployment. For these countries all three indicators tell the same story; they all indicate problems of high social exclusion within Europe.

The effect of at-risk-of poverty on all three dimensions of civic engagement is very similar to that of income inequality on political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement (see table 7). Since both variables are measuring the same phenomena, at-risk-of poverty will be excluded from further analysis, in order to avoid problems of multi-collinearity.

There is considerable diversity within the 19 European countries in the degree of income inequality (see table 6 and figure 8). The ratio for the 19 countries as a whole is 4.2 but this varies from 3 up to 6.5. The Nordic countries and Hungary and Slovenia have the lowest levels of income inequality while in particular Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Poland, the UK and Ireland experience a large gap between the top 20% and the bottom 20% of income. In other words the fifth of the population with the highest earnings in the UK for example earn 5.4 times more than the income received by the fifth of the population with the lowest income. In Denmark on the other hand, the richest 20% of the population only earn 3 times more than the poorest 20% of the population.

**Figure 8: Scatter plot of associational involvement and income inequality**



Adjusted R-square 0.262, standardised Beta coefficient: -0.55(.015)

The scatter plot in figure 6 shows a negative relationship between income inequality and associational involvement. Thus, in a cross-country comparison, the smaller the income inequality in a country, the more likely people are to participate in public life. The effect of income inequality on political participation is negative but not significant, whereas it is significant for political consumerism in the 0.05 level and for associational involvement in the 0.01 level.

Although income inequality in Eastern European countries is similar and even less marked than some Western European countries, the sources of inequality are substantially different from those of the developed market economies (Mikhalev, 2003). The postcommunist countries experienced a radical transition from pre-reform egalitarian distributional structures to levels of inequality prevailing in Western Europe. In comparison to the former Soviet Union countries the Central European (CE) countries in transition did not experience polarisation to an extreme extent, which led to the relative maintenance of low income inequality in central Europe. This was mainly due to the relatively strong economic

progress made and the quick and successful reforms of the central European countries within a relatively short period (Mikhalev, 2003; Simai, 2006; Kaasa, 2003).

The CE countries have made real progress in the formation of the middle class of small entrepreneurs. A substantial part of professionals and intellectuals, especially the younger ones have found their successful way into market economy. Also, the CE countries had a smaller militarization and industrial sector and a more developed social sector [in comparison to the countries of the former Soviet Union]. These countries experienced a modest recession and a rather quick recovery. In Poland the wage economy experienced a decline while the social transfer system had significant distortions in comparison to the Czech Republic. Consequently, Poland has much higher levels of earnings and income inequality as well as the incidence of poverty. (Mikhalev, 2003: 11)

Besides historical explanations for the low income inequality rates in central Europe, Eurostat also questions the reliability of the income measures obtained from Eastern Europe. Comparing the median income across the EU reveals that income levels in the new member states are less than half the EU average (Twena and Aaheim, 2005). Thus, although financial income inequality is less marked in the former communist states, these figures are not reliable and other indicators need to be considered at the same time to make sound judgements about the extent of social stratification in these countries.

For political consumerism and associational involvement, income inequality and poverty show a strong negative relationship. Countries that suffer from high levels of poverty or income inequality are significantly less likely to be engaged in voluntary associations or in acts of political consumerism. For political participation however, this relationship is not significant albeit negative. This demonstrates that social stratification in a society has a negative effect on civic engagement. These results confirm Wilkinson and Pickett's (2009) argument that the income gap between the top richest 20% and the bottom poorest 20% of the population has an adverse effect on a society in general. This increases, as they argue, the probabilities of a number of problems in the society, thus affecting everybody's quality of life, not just those who suffer from poverty. Extreme inequalities in earnings might lead to loss of trust in a society, where people empathise less with each other and compete more with each other over status and prestige as argued by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). Thus, income inequality can not only be seen as an indicator of the social distance between different social groups but it might also reflect the degree to which there is a spirit in the community of a common interest.

### 6.3.6 Government expenditure

Hypothesis H3a of this study, states that government spending on the voluntary sector has a positive effect on levels of civic engagement (see chapter I). In other words it is anticipated that the voluntary sector needs the financial support of government, as well as other legal support, to thrive and be efficient. This in turn will also have an effect on levels of political activism, as voluntary organisations help citizens to be motivated, and provides them with the skills and knowledge to voice their demands to the governments in their role as intermediate organisations.

As discussed in chapter IV, governments' support of the voluntary sector is measured by government spending on housing and community amenities, health, recreation/culture and religion, and education. The average government spending in Europe in these areas is 13.8% of GDP. Denmark has the highest government spending in Europe in 2002 with 17.5% of its GDP, followed by France, Sweden, Portugal and Norway at around 16% (see table 6). Greece on the other hand has the lowest government spending, with just half of what Portugal spends. Sweden's and Norway's high levels of spending can be explained by their traditional inclusive policy towards the voluntary sector. Denmark's particularly high spending might be due to the Danish government's policies to increase grants to voluntary organisations, especially in the 1990s. Those grants were mainly given to cultural and recreational associations, in particular to athletic and sports associations with no strings attached (Torpe, 2003). Like in the other Nordic countries, public financial support is vital for many organisations and Torpe (2003) suggests that this is an important reason for the great density of associations in Scandinavian countries and in particular, Denmark. Portugal's high spending might be explained by the EU structural funds, which are regarded as one of the engines of growth in Portugal during the 1990s.

The effects of government expenditure on all three dimensions of civic engagement are positive, indicating that the higher the government spending on housing and community amenities, health, recreation/culture and religion, and education the higher the levels of participation or *vice versa*. This relationship is weak and only significant at the 10% level for political consumerism and associational involvement (see table 7). Government expenditure correlates strongly (0.68) with the levels of political rights and civil liberties in 2002, confirming that high levels of democracy are positively related to high levels of government spending in social, cultural and religious areas. This demonstrates that more democratic countries are more responsive to the demands of their citizens and therefore

spend more money in these social areas that directly benefit the citizens. It also, however, indicates problems of endogeneity, as levels of democracy, civic engagement and government spending can all be viewed as indicators of the same underlying phenomenon i.e. they can all be used as measures of the stability of democracy.


The relatively weak effect of government spending in the models might be due to problems of measurement. Government spending in social and cultural areas on its own might not be enough to measure government support of the voluntary sector. The government expenditure measure showed that the Eastern European countries have spending levels as high as some Western European countries and yet their level of involvement is low. This spending has to be viewed in each context. In a country where the civil society sector is emerging, this value might be far too low. Furthermore, Portugal also has spending rates similar to the Nordic countries. This again is due to specific short-term targeted government programs. It does not reflect a long term policy. A measure that spans back a considerable time might have been much better in measuring government support of the voluntary sector, which is more likely to be effected by long-term policies and developments. The Netherlands low level of government support might be misleading as well. The figure does not reveal that the pillarization in the Netherlands is one of the main reasons for the active associational life in the Netherlands. The pillarization in the Netherlands divided until 1960's, the society along three main pillars; the Protestant, Catholic and Social-democratic. These pillars all had their own social institutions financed by the government and anchored in the constitution. Thus this means that they all had their own newspapers, broadcasting organisations, political parties, trade unions, schools, hospitals, building societies, universities, scouting organisations and sports clubs etc. which is often cited as the reason for the vibrant nature of the voluntary sector in the Netherlands (Hupe, 2006).

### 6.3.7 Civic education

The variable civic education represents the years since the governments introduced civic education into the national curriculum. In the previous chapters, especially in the methodological chapter I talked about its measurement and in the literature review about the definition of civic education and its relevance to civic engagement. Thus, here I will briefly describe only the main differences between countries in terms of the time span since they introduced civic education at schools.

Sweden and Germany seem to have acted as pioneers in this field and introduced civic education right after the end of World War II.<sup>99</sup> Most of the other Western countries, apart from the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg and Belgium, introduced civic education throughout the 70s. For the Southern European countries the introduction of civic education occurred after the end of their authoritarian regimes and transition to democracy became a heated subject. Fears about ideological indoctrination delayed its introduction until the mid 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. By the time the Berlin wall had fallen and the Eastern European countries became pluralist democracies, the importance of the education system in bringing up democratic citizens was widely recognised within the European Union. By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the Millennium, civic education arose as an important topic across Europe. Initiated by the European Commission all European countries by then had either reformed their existing civic education policies or anchored them for the first time in the national curriculum, even making them compulsory subjects as was the case in the UK (Kerr et al., 2002).

**Figure 9: Scatter plot of political consumerism and civic education**



Adjusted R-square 0.315, standardised Beta coefficient: 0.59(.007)

<sup>99</sup> For a detailed discussion about the introduction of civic education in the national curriculum and references please see Appendix 1.

The scatter plot (figure 9) shows that the relationship between the length of civic education at school and political consumerism is positive; i.e. the longer a country had civic education at school the more likely they are to be active in acts of political consumerism or *vice versa*. This relationship is significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level and explains on its own 31.5% of the variance in political consumerism. The effects of civic education on political activities and associational involvement however are not so marked as for political consumerism. Despite a positive relationship, the *t* value shows that this relationship is not significant for either of the two dimensions of civic engagement. This might be due to problems of endogeneity. The Southern- (excluding Italy) and Eastern-European countries could not have civic education classes that were teaching the norms and behaviours of active and democratic citizenship, as they were not democracies until fairly recently. Also, the voluntary sector in these countries developed quite late due to the restrictions on the right to be organised and the right of free speech among communist regimes and the authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece (Perez-Diaz, 2002).

Another reason for the weak relationship observed here might be due to the way civic education has been measured. As stated in the methodology chapter, it is a very crude measure and does not include the quality and scope of implementation. Also, despite the UK, Luxembourg and Belgium having ignored civic education in the national curriculum, values, skills and knowledge of active citizenship have been taught in other subjects. It would be misleading to assume that they did not cover these issues of active and democratic citizenship. However, unfortunately, these policies were not so explicit and therefore, civic education was not included in the school syllabus until after the Millennium.

## 6.4 Multivariate analysis

So far all of the contextual variables were considered separately. The most important predictors of all dimensions of civic engagement are welfare regime, history of democracy, GDP and current levels of democracy. These four variables explained in separate models a large amount of variation in the data (see table 7). The effect of these variables on civic engagement and social capital has also been shown by other studies (Norris, 2002; Inglehart, 1997; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Income inequality and levels of long-term unemployment also showed a negative effect across all dimensions of civic engagement, whereas civic education and government expenditure showed only a limited effect on political consumerism and associational involvement.

Yet these variables were not controlled for by any other macro factors. Thus, some of these relationships identified between the different contextual variables and civic engagement for example might be spurious. This means the significant relationship might well disappear once other underlying variables are taken into account, such as levels of democracy for example. Hence some uncontrolled, direct effects that turned out to be statistically significant in the bivariate analysis may be spurious (Van Deth and Elff, 2004). Moreover, the explanatory power of the single contextual predictors so far was rather limited. A combination of predictors might enhance the explanatory power for the models while sorting out spurious effect.

Due to multi-collinearity of welfare regime, GDP and history of democracy,<sup>100</sup> these three contextual variables will not be used in the same model. These variables all reflect the socio-economic development of the 19 European countries from a different perspective, yet the ranking of the countries are very similar. For example the Scandinavian countries, united in their Social-Democratic welfare regimes, have also been having exceptionally high levels of political rights and civil liberties since 1972, and relatively high levels of GDP, while the Eastern and Southern European countries are marked by opposite developments. These three variables also explain the highest variation in civic engagement between the countries. For these reasons, these variables will be included in the following multiple regression analysis as control variables, while examining the relationship between the other contextual variables such as unemployment rates, income inequality, levels of

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<sup>100</sup> Levels of democracy in 2002 did not lead to problems of multi-collinearity with any other predictor variables such as welfare regime, history of democracy or GDP. It can therefore be included in all of the alternative models run here.

democracy in 2002, government expenditure and civic education and civic engagement for all three dimensions.

The next table 8 shows three separate models predicting political activism. First is the *Welfare Model I*,<sup>101</sup> including only the welfare regime and its four dummy variables. The second model is the *Economic Development Model I*, including only GDP and the last model is the *Democracy and Equality Model I* including the predictor variables income inequality and history of democracy.

**Table 8: Multivariate regression models predicting political activism**

	Political Activities		
	Welfare Model I	Economic Development I	Democracy/Equality Model I
Constant	2.49	-8.74	4.76
Welfare regime (Continental base)			
Social Democratic	.21(.211)	-	-
Liberal	-.14(.380)	-	-
South European	-.50(.008)	-	-
Postcommunist	-.67(.001)	-	-
GDP(log)	-	.8(000)	-
History of democracy 1973-2002	-	-	-.73(.000)
Democracy 2002	-	-	-
Income inequality	-	-	-.36(.024)
<b>Adjusted R-square</b>	<b>0.648</b>	<b>0.612</b>	<b>0.627</b>

The coefficients are standardised Beta coefficients. The figures in the brackets are the p values.

Three models have been reported here, which all explain around 60-65% of the variance in political activism. Welfare regime explains the largest variation (64.8%) (*Welfare Model I*). There is no statistically significant difference between the Continental and the Social-Democratic welfare regimes, or the Continental and the Liberal welfare regimes. For the Western countries having different welfare regimes does not make a significant difference in terms of political participation. However, in comparison to the Continental welfare regimes, the Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regimes are significantly less likely to participate in political activities. Controlling for the differences in welfare regimes, long-term unemployment, income inequality and levels of democracy there is no

<sup>101</sup> Model I refers to models predicting political activities, models II and III refer to models predicting associational involvement and political consumerism respectively in this chapter.

longer any significant explanatory power in predicting political activities. Most of the variations in these variables have been explained by differences in welfare regime.

The *Economic Development Model I* is the next strongest model predicting political activism. As with the welfare model, once this proxy for the socio-economic development is accounted for none of the other previously significant predictor variables remained significant in this multivariate model. The final model, the *Democracy and Equality Model I*, includes history of democracy and income inequality. This means that despite the differences in the length of experiences with democracy, income inequality is still a significant predictor of political activism, leading to low levels of political participation in countries with high levels of income inequality.

For associational involvement three models are reported in the table below: *Welfare Model II*, *Economic Development and Equality Model II*, including GDP, levels of democracy in 2002 and income inequality (see table 9). The final model is the *Democracy and Equality Model II*, encompassing history of democracy, levels of democracy in 2002 and income inequality.

**Table 9: Multivariate regression models predicting associational involvement**

	Associational Involvement		
	Welfare Model II	Eco. Develop./Equality Model II	Democracy/Equality Model II
Constant	2.46	-10.84	-2.19
Welfare regime (Continental base)			
Social Democratic	.26(.059)	-	-
Liberal	-.03(.831)	-	-
South European	-.66(.000)	-	-
Postcommunist	-.59(.000)	-	-
GDP(log)	-	.36(.026)	-
History of democracy 1973-2002	-	-	-.50(.001)
Democracy 2002	-	.48(.006)	.35(.013)
Income inequality	-	-.31(.018)	-.44(.000)
<b>Adjusted R-square</b>	<b>0.784</b>	<b>0.778</b>	<b>0.859</b>

The coefficients are standardised Beta coefficients. The figures in the brackets are the p values.

The *Welfare Model II* includes the welfare regime and accounts for a large amount of the variance in associational involvement (78.4%). As with political participation, people in countries which have a Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regime are significantly less likely to be involved in voluntary associations than countries which have

a Continental welfare regime. The Nordic countries<sup>102</sup> with their Social-Democratic welfare regimes however, are slightly more likely than the Continental welfare regimes to be involved in voluntary organisations, this relationship is only significant at the 10% level and becomes non-significant if levels of democracy are accounted for (model not reported here). Being from a Liberal welfare state, as opposed to being from a Continental welfare regime, on the other hand makes no statistically significant difference on associational involvement. The second model for associational involvement is the *Economic Development and Equality Model II*. This model shows that once GDP is taken into account, among the previously identified significant predictor variables (i.e. income inequality/poverty, levels of democracy, unemployment and civic education), only levels of democracy and income inequality still retain their significant relationship with associational involvement. This model explains 77.8% of the variance. Similarly, in the final and most parsimonious model, the *Democracy and Equality Model II*, again among the other predictor variables only income inequality and levels of democracy in 2002 remain significant once controlled for the history of democracy.

The results for political consumerism are more complex and five models are reported here. They include the *Welfare Model III*, the *Democracy and Equality Model III* and the *Economic Development and Civic Education Model III*.

**Table 10: Multiple regression models predicting political consumerism**

	Political Consumerism		
	Welfare Model III	Democracy/Equality Model III	Eco. Develop./Civic Edu. Model III
Constant	2.39	5.12	-2.48
Welfare regime (Continental base)			
Social Democratic	.32(.011)	-	-
Liberal	.03(.775)	-	-
South European	-.61(.000)	-	-
Postcommunist	-.6(.000)	-	-
GDP(log)	-		.51(.008)
History of democracy 1973-2002	-	-.70(.000)	-
Democracy 2002	-	-	-
Income inequality	-	-.46(.004)	-
Civic education	-	-	.45(.015)
<b>Adjusted R-square</b>	<b>0.835</b>	<b>0.656</b>	<b>0.54</b>

The coefficients are standardised Beta coefficients. Values in bracket are the p values.

<sup>102</sup> The Nordic countries here include Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark.

As with the previous two dimensions of civic engagement, welfare regime is a strong predictor of political consumerism. This *Welfare Model III* accounts on its own for 83.5% of the variation in political consumerism. Once controlled for welfare regime, neither levels of democracy, nor income inequality, long-term unemployment, civic education or government expenditure appear as significant anymore, as most of the variation in these predictor variables is explained by the differences in welfare regimes. In contrast to the welfare models predicting political activities and associational involvement the Social-Democratic welfare regimes have significantly higher levels of political consumerism than the Continental welfare regimes (see table 10 above).

The second model, the *Democracy and Equality Model III*, shows, that once taking into account the history of democracy and income inequality, neither levels of democracy, civic education, or unemployment levels are significant predictors of political consumerism. The final model is the only model in which the policy variable civic education remains significant despite controlling for levels of GDP. However, this is the weakest model of all three predicting political consumerism, accounting only for 54% of the variance.

## 6.5 Conclusion

Across the models presented here; welfare regime, economic prosperity and history of democracy, all emerged as important factors in explaining the differences in political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement between the 19 European countries. Due to strong multi-collinearity however, all three variables could not be used in the same models. This means for example that the relationship between welfare regime and civic engagement could not be analysed by controlling for the history of democracy or levels of economic wealth, as these factors are strongly interrelated. Therefore, several alternative models have been presented here, including either welfare regime, history of democracy or GDP. The strong correlation between these variables means that they are all an indicator of the same socio-economic structure, albeit from a different perspective. Each of these variables explains a great amount of variation between the European countries in civic engagement. In addition to that, after taking into account these socio-economic differences in a country, the explanatory power of the other contextual variables have either been reduced or completely vanished.

Levels of unemployment across all models, for example, have been totally accounted for by these control variables. The result for the other contextual variables however was mixed. Levels of democracy for example, showed a strong positive relationship with associational involvement. Despite taking into account either GDP, history of democracy or welfare regime, the extent of political rights and civil liberties still played an important role in explaining associational involvement between countries. This demonstrates that the extent of citizens' involvement in civil society organisations is strongly dependent on the political climate in a country and the degree to which political rights and civil liberties are guaranteed. The importance of levels of democracy for a vibrant associational life has also been demonstrated by other comparative studies (Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2000). However, it is worth mentioning that this strong relationship observed here might also be due to the measurement of this variable. Levels of democracy are measured by the *Freedom House*, which assesses among other things the rights of citizens to set up associations and the limitations upon them to get involved in voluntary associations. Consequently, it measures indirectly the vibrant nature of the civil society in a country. Hence, further research could use alternative measures of the levels of democracy other than that developed by the Freedom House to draw more confident conclusions from this analysis.

Income inequality also accounts still for a significant part of the variance in all three dimensions of civic engagement, despite taking into account the socio-economic differences between the countries. The negative relationship discovered here confirms previous studies (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Social inequality threatens social cohesion and leads to unequal representation not only in the economic field but also in the political and social arena. Income inequality is also strongly related to welfare regime, as the base of the welfare regime can be seen in the degree to which it can successfully redistribute the wealth of a society.

Models with welfare regime as an explanatory variable emerged as the most parsimonious models in this chapter and these models will therefore be carried forward in the next chapter, where these contextual factors will again be analysed by taking into account the different composition of individuals in the 19 countries. Across all dimensions of civic engagement, countries with a Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regime system were significantly less likely to be active than countries with a Continental welfare regime. The difference between the Continental and the Liberal welfare regime however, was not marked across all models. This might be due to the low number of cases in the

Liberal welfare regime, including only Ireland and the UK.<sup>103</sup> The difference between Social-Democratic welfare regime and Continental welfare regime was significant for associational involvement and political consumerism. This difference could not be observed for political participation, where the levels of political involvement in the Nordic countries did not differ greatly from that of the Continental Western-European countries. Across all dependent variables, welfare regime showed the strongest relationship with political consumerism.

As Esping-Andersen (1990) has argued, the roots of the development of particular welfare regimes goes as far back as the 19th century and can be explained by the way the conflicts between the different classes and interest groups in a country has been negotiated and solved. Thus, rather than viewing welfare regime as a static set of policies providing social security, these policies were negotiated and developed in particular historical circumstances. As a result, despite the convergence of social policies through common EU regulations, there are still marked differences between the European countries in terms of the way they weave their social protection net. The comparatively generous welfare regime in the Nordic countries is based on a relatively inclusive and egalitarian society that allows for fairly high levels of taxation, which benefits everybody in the society, regardless of their socio-economic status. By contrast in the Liberal welfare regime social protection is mean-tested and only a section of the society benefit from it, usually those with low income or no income at all. As a consequence policies that seek higher taxes to fund more generous social policies do not find a general consensus among the majority of the population. Liberal welfare regimes put more emphasis on individual rights and liberties than on collective identities, whereas in the Nordic countries, the collective interest or common good is placed into the forefront, which is particularly reflected in their welfare regimes. These factors might have an effect on the extent citizens are inclined to get engaged in community organisations and to seek the solution for a wider range of societal problems, in co-operation with each other.

Moreover, weak welfare regulations, as experienced in particular in Eastern-Europe but also in Southern Europe, leave the economically poor sections of the society to drift into poverty, while the economically active and prosperous sections of the society experience high living standards. For example poverty and income inequality are high in the Liberal and the South-European welfare regimes, yet the Eastern-European countries also have

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<sup>103</sup> Further research could expand the number of cases in the Liberal welfare regime, by including the United States, Austria and New Zealand for example, in order to draw more confident conclusions.

great problems of poverty. These wide income disparities can lead to grievance among the economically disadvantaged population, as also explained by deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970; Pattie et. al., 2003). Yet, unlike the assumption of deprivation theory, the data showed that high levels of social inequality in a country do not lead to political outbursts, but to a withdrawal from political and social life. Besides, the deeper these inequalities are the more difficult upward mobility can be, as the poorer sections of the society lack the cultural, social and financial capital to move up (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). This can also lead to a blaming of the poor for being responsible for the poverty they experience, as Korkut (2009) shows in the case of the political and economic elite in Hungary. He argues that the elite in Hungary are less reluctant to push for better welfare programmes, as they are detached from the poorer section of the society and blame them for their poverty.

The relationship between a weak welfare state, low economic success, greater income inequality, low implementation of political rights and civil liberties and low levels of civic engagement indicates that government performance plays an important role in determining levels of civic engagement. This accords with the general incentive approach of participation as discussed in chapter III. Applied to differences between countries it can be proposed that strong and effective governments can be an incentive for citizens to become engaged in civic affairs, as they feel that their participation does make a difference. This is more likely to happen in countries that have a transparent government more responsive to the needs of the citizens. The poor performances of the government on the other hand might reduce these incentives and thus decrease the likelihood of citizens' involvement.

The policy variables introduced in this study i.e. government expenditure and civic education did not show any significant relationship with political activities. In the bivariate analysis, civic education had a positive and significant relationship with associational involvement. This effect however disappeared once control variables were introduced. For political consumerism civic education was significant in a bivariate analysis and in the multivariate analysis it only remained significant for the *Economic Development and Civic Education Model III*. However, this was a weak model and in the other two models (*Welfare Model III* and the *Democracy and Equality Model III*) the variations in civic education were accounted for by either welfare regime or history of democracy and income inequality.

Civic education has been introduced longer in the Nordic countries, and fairly recently in the Eastern and Southern European countries. Yet, within the Western European countries

there were stark differences, with Germany, Austria and Netherlands having a long history of civic education at school, while the UK, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg only introduced the subject within the last decade. Thus the variable civic education measures to a certain extent levels of democracy, as the non-democratic countries could not have by definition civic education at school that taught them the skills and knowledge of democratic active citizenship. This explains why civic education did not remain significant after taking into account most of the major socio-economic variables. Nevertheless, as the results for the bivariate analysis demonstrated, those countries which had a long history of civic education classes at school are also more likely to have citizens who display higher levels of political consumerism as well as associational involvement. Overall however, the civic education variable, as measured here, does not bring about the anticipated results of a positive and significant relationship for all dimensions of civic engagement. An alternative way of measuring the effect of civic education classes on participation could be for example, a longitudinal study of pupils who had civic education classes at school and those pupils who were not exposed to it. Moreover, such a study could also look at the different nature of civic education classes pupils are exposed to and their preferred types of civic activities later in life, as has been done in the case of Canada (Millner and Lewis, 2008).

Government expenditure failed to show any significant relationship in the bivariate analysis and was therefore not included in the multivariate analysis. As suggested earlier, this might be due to measurement problems of identifying comparative figures that reflected government support of the voluntary sector. The indicator chosen here seems to be an inadequate measure of the support of the voluntary sector, as even in a bivariate analysis this variable correlated very weakly with any of the three dimensions of civic engagement. In future research this variable can be expanded by identifying other factors that might be a better measure of the role of the government in cultivating the voluntary sector. These factors could be, such as for tax regulations that encourage donations to charities and associations, and frees them from income tax. Government support of the voluntary sector could also be measured by the extent voluntary organisations are regarded as partners and supported by giving them access to public spaces and offering them venues that they can occupy, by consulting and including voluntary organisations into decision-making processes and by closely working with voluntary organisations. All these factors can boost the voluntary sector. Yet, these measures are very difficult to explore through comparative aggregate data. Carrying out case studies of either a country or a city or of a section of the voluntary sector might prove more promising in terms of identifying the

particular nature of the voluntary organisation in a certain location and how it developed and changed over time etc. Thus, given the difficulties of finding appropriate comparative aggregate data of the support of the voluntary sector by the government, the hypotheses suggested here at the beginning of this thesis, might be better explored through qualitative case studies.

The results presented here are in line with previous research that identified the strong relationship between economic wealth and social equality and democracy and the degree of citizens' involvement in public life. These results emphasise the importance of all these factors for civic engagement and in particular the importance of a strong welfare regime and an egalitarian society. The more people feel disillusioned with their society due to perceived disadvantage, the less reason and motivation they have to invest in that society. Thus, in a country that is marked by high levels of deprivation and lack of social cohesion people would lack the resources as well as the aspiration and motivation to 'give something back to the society' or 'work together for a better community'.

## Chapter VII

### 7. Individuals and the country context: a multilevel analysis of civic engagement

In the previous chapter the comparison of levels of civic engagement across 19 European countries has shown that considerable differences exist between countries with clear trends of high levels of civic engagement in Western Europe, in particular in the Nordic countries and low levels of engagement in the Southern and Eastern European countries. Other studies however, have also demonstrated the importance of socio-demographic variables on civic engagement (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton, 2002; Pattie *et al.*, 2004). Thus, the differences observed between countries might also be due to the different composition of individuals in the respective countries. Aggregate level analysis and individual level analysis have their own advantages, the former paying attention the country context and the latter on the characteristics of individuals in explaining civic engagement. However, both approaches have their limitations. Making assumptions about individuals based on aggregate level analysis can lead to an ecological fallacy, where there can be an assumption that what happens on one level also happens on another level. This does not allow for the fact that people in similar circumstances may vary within each area. Similarly, if differences between individuals are analysed without taking into account that individuals behave differently in different countries, then the results could be biased.<sup>104</sup>

A multilevel analysis is therefore the most appropriate technique for handling this micro-macro relationship. It takes into account that an individual's civic engagement is not only as a result of their socio-demographic characteristics but also a result of the environment in which they live. Furthermore, an individual's civic engagement is also likely to be shaped by the different policies and socio-economic structures of the nation states as have been suggested elsewhere (Norris, 2000; Inglehart, 1997; Fieldhouse, *et al.*, 2007; McFarland and Thomas, 2006; Jones *et al.*, 1992; O'Loughlin, 2004).

This final empirical chapter therefore sets out to examine the relative importance of a participant's socio-demographic characteristics of his/her country in determining levels

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<sup>104</sup> See Inglehart and Welzel (2002) for the linkage between individual level and aggregate level relationships and the problems associated with cross-level fallacy.

and types of civic engagement. The multilevel modelling approach has the advantage that it allows us to see if civic engagement is significantly affected by country of residence or the converse, whether a person's characteristics (age, education etc.) are all that we need to know in order to account for the variations in civic engagement.

## **7.1 Preparing the dependent variables and introducing the models**

In the previous chapter VI involving aggregate level analysis, the dependent variables were measured on a continuous scale as mean aggregated scores. The aggregate scores for the 19 countries had a normal distribution. For individual level data however, these scores did not follow a normal distribution. A histogram of political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement revealed that all the non-activists were assigned the same values, whereas the other values were assigned to individuals depending on how many different types of activity they had reported.<sup>105</sup> As a result the scales were extremely skewed, in particular for political activism and political consumerism, which have around 60%-65% of non-activists (see next table 11).

One of the crucial assumptions of multiple regression is that the dependent variable has to have a normal distribution or close to a normal distribution (Hair *et al.*, 1998). These assumptions are violated in this instance. The scales cannot be used as a continuous variable and the best appropriate technique is to collapse the dependent variables into binary outcomes and to carry out a multilevel logistic regression analysis, rather than a multilevel linear regression analysis. The dependent variables are transformed into binary variables. For example all those who have carried out at least one type of political activity are recoded as 1 and those who have not indicated any kind of political activity are recoded into 0.<sup>106</sup>

Table 11 on the next page shows the distribution of the binary variables for political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement across the 19 countries.

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<sup>105</sup> See histograms in the Appendix 7, figures A.7.1, A.7.2, and A.7.3. The distribution of the scores does not follow a normal distribution.

<sup>106</sup> In order to use the richness of the scale, a separate analysis was carried out with the activists only excluding all those who reported no involvement. This allowed the use of the dependent variable as a continuous variable and the application of multiple multilevel linear regression analysis. However, the results did not differ much from the logistic regression models. Roughly the same factors that explained activism as opposed to non-activism also explained intensive activism.

**Table 11: Individual level frequency table of activism versus non-activism for all three dependent variables**

	Political Activities		Political Consumerism		Associational Involvement	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	12,978	35.60%	14,516	39.81%	24,677	67.68%
No	23,482	64.40%	21,944	60.19%	11,783	32.20%
Total	36,460	100%	36,460	100%	36,460	100%

Source: ESS 2002. Design and population weights applied.

Political activities and political consumerism have the highest percentage of non-activity with 64.4% reporting no involvement in any political activities and 60.9% reporting no engagement in political consumerism. For associational involvement, which covered a much wider range of involvement -from professional to sports organisations and from passive membership to active involvement- a much higher proportion of respondents reported involvement in voluntary organisations, while 32.2% of the weighted sample did not report any type of involvement in voluntary organisations, neither as member, donor, participant or volunteer.

The observed response in the case of political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement is binary. To model a relationship between a binary outcome variable and a group of predictor variables a logistic or logit transformation is used. The logit link has the form:<sup>107</sup>

$$\text{Logit}(P) = \text{Log}[P/(1-P)] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1$$

$$P = \text{prob}(y=1)$$

This is a single-level logit model with a single explanatory variable  $x_1$ . The probability that an individual is civically engaged ( $y=1$ ) is denoted by  $P$ . The parameter  $\beta_0$  gives the *log* odds of an individual being civically engaged and  $\beta_1$  is the estimated coefficient for the predicted value of the explanatory variable  $x_1$ . The value of  $\beta_1$  shows how these log odds differ if  $x_1=1$ . The advantage of using the logit link is that this changes the scale of the proportion to plus and minus infinity rather than restricting it to 0 -1. However, it makes

<sup>107</sup> All equations presented here have been adopted from the Users Guide to MLwiN, published by the Centre for Multilevel Modelling at the University of Bristol (Rasbash *et al.*, 2005) and the CCSR Course Books on Logistic Regression (Tranmer and Elliot, 2008) and Multilevel Modelling (Tranmer, 2008).

interpretation more difficult. It is therefore common practice to use the anti-log function to transform the value back to the probability scale and express the relationship either as odds ratio or as probabilities (Rasbash *et al.*, 2005; Tranmer and Elliot, 2008).

This single level logit model shown above does not take into account the nested structure of the data, i.e. it is not a multilevel model. To model a relationship where individuals are clustered within countries, the model above can be extended to a two-level random intercept model, in which individuals  $i$  are level 1 and countries  $j$  are level 2.

$$\text{Logit}(P_{ij}) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k(i)j}$$

$$\text{Where } \beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

$P_{ij}$  is the predicted probability for an individual  $i$  in country  $j$ . A two-level random intercept model consists of two terms; a fixed component  $\beta_0$ , the intercept (in our case the overall rate of civic engagement), and a country-specific component, the random effect  $u_{0j}$  (the country residual). The intercept  $\beta_{0j}$  represents the mean log odds of civic engagement in country  $j$ . The model also includes a number of explanatory variables ( $\beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k(i)j}$ ), which can either be an individual level and/or country level explanatory variable.

The model can also be written in terms of odds, by taking the exponential:

$$P_{ij}/(1-P_{ij}) = \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k(i)j} + u_{0j})$$

It can also be expressed in terms of probabilities of an event occurring, in this case the probability of an individual within a country becoming active:

$$P_{ij} = \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k(i)j} + u_{0j}) / (1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2j} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k(i)j} + u_{0j})).$$

## 7.2 The variance component model

It is common with multilevel models to start the analysis with a simple variance component model as follows<sup>108</sup>:

$$\text{Logit}(P_{ij}) = \beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

The the variance component model does not have any explanatory variables and models the average log odds of an event occurring and how the average country rates of civic engagement differs from the overall mean of civic engagement across all countries. The intercept of political activism for example in this model is -.651. To calculate the probabilities of political activism for individuals within a country  $j$  the following equation is used:

$$(P_{ij}) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + u_{0j})}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + u_{0j})} = \frac{\exp[(-0.651) + \text{country level residual}]}{1 + \exp[(-0.651) + \text{country level residual}]}$$

The following table 12 shows the results for the null model for all three dependent variables.

**Table 12: Variance component model predicting civic engagement**

	Political Activism	Political Consumerism	Associational Involvement
	Variance Component Model	Variance Component Model	Variance Component Model
Individual Level Intercept	-0.651(.120)	-0.544(.201)	0.920(.271)
Country Level Variance	0.270(.088)	0.765(.249)	1.392(.451)
Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC)	0.0758	0.1887	0.2973

Source: ESS 2002. Number of cases on the individual level are 36460, number of cases on the country level are 19. The values in brackets are the standard errors of the estimates.

The fixed parameter for political activities refers to the intercept value (-0.651) and reflects the log-odds of carrying out political activism. The intercept,  $\beta_0$  in the *Variance Component Model*, gives an average estimated rate of an individual being politically active for all 19 countries. Thus when the intercept is transformed from its logit value (-.651), it represents a probability of 0.343 or a 34.3% chance that an individual is a political activist. The log-odds of political consumerism are -0.547 and of associational involvement is 0.920. Thus on average the respondents in our sample have a 37% chance of being

<sup>108</sup> All models were estimated using the specialised multilevel modelling software MLwiN (Rasbash *et al.*, 2005).

engaged in acts of political consumerism, and a much higher chance (72%) of being involved in associations.<sup>109</sup>

The chances of individuals' civic engagement in countries differ from the overall mean depending on their country residual. Whether their probability of civic engagement differs at the 5% level from the overall mean across the 19 countries can be seen by plotting the country residuals and their confidence intervals for each of the dependent variable. Examining the residuals and their confidence intervals for political activism for example shows that the levels of political activism in the Eastern-European countries, Portugal, Greece and Italy are significantly different from the average levels of activism at the 5% level. The Nordic countries, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg on the other hand are predicted to have above average levels of political activism. Their confidence interval does not cross the mean of political activism.<sup>110</sup>

The variation between countries may be an artefact created by different country compositions of different types of individuals. In Greece and Hungary for example there are relatively high percentages of people who have low levels of formal education. In Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia, only one fifth of the population are members of the service class, while their proportion of working class is between 30-50%, the highest among the 19 countries. Poland and Luxembourg have a disproportionately high percentage of young people, with one third of the population being under 30 years old.<sup>111</sup> Thus, the low rates of civic engagement for the Eastern and Southern European countries could be due to the specific characteristics of the population in those countries. Their low level of civic engagement might be due to the socio-demographic characteristics of people who are less likely to be active and are disproportionately over represented in Eastern and Southern European countries. As known from other studies, age and education are generally negatively related to civic engagement (Dalton, 2002; Putnam, 2000). Hence, it might be that differences between countries are reduced or even are explained fully if the different socio-demographic composition of the population is being taking into account.

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<sup>109</sup> These figures are very close to the observed percentage of political activism (35.6%), political consumerism (39.81%) and associational involvement (67.8%). The slight differences in the percentages are due to the null model being predicted values of activism, which did not use any weights.

<sup>110</sup> The residuals for the null models are not reported here. However, they will be discussed further down in the chapter for the final models.

<sup>111</sup> These figures are based on the ESS 2002, tables are not reported here.

The variance in the intercept for political activism at the country level is 0.270 and its standard errors are 0.088. The significance of this estimate can be calculated by dividing the estimate by its standard errors. If the ratio is in excess of plus or minus 1.96, the estimate is judged significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. For the *Variance Component Model* the ratio is 3.07, thus the level 2 variance is highly significant. Similarly, the variance for political consumerism is 0.671(0.022) and associational involvement is 1.392(0.451), which are also both significant (see table 12 above). This confirms that there *are* national differences in terms of civic engagement and that it is worth considering also the characteristics of countries in explaining the variation in civic engagement between countries. In brief, this coefficient indicates that multilevel modelling can be applied to this data.

Moreover, in order to understand at which level the greatest variation in civic engagement lies, i.e. whether differences in civic engagement are the greatest on the individual level or at the country level, the variance can be partitioned. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) for a logistic two-level multilevel model is calculated by the following formula:  $\sigma^2_{u0}/(\sigma^2_{u0} + 3.29)$ .<sup>112</sup> In such a two-level variance components model, the VPC can also be referred to as the intraclass correlation and is equal to the *percentage of variation that is found at the country level*. In table 12 the VPC for all three models shows that approximately 8% of the variance in political activities (VPC= 0.0758, i.e. 7.6%) is attributed to the country level, whereas a much higher percentage of variance in political consumerism (VPC=0.1887, i.e. approx. 19%) and in associational involvement (VPC=0.2973, about 30%) is attributed to the country level. In other words there are greater variations between countries for associational involvement than for political activities. This suggests that political activities might be driven more by individual behaviour, whereas involvement in associations might be more dependent on the country context. A rich net of voluntary organisations takes a long time to develop and is more sensitive to structural constraints than political activities, whereas political activities might depend stronger on individual behaviour and be less restricted by structural constraints such as limited funding, lack of expertise to run voluntary organisations etc.

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<sup>112</sup> The value 3.29 stands for the level 1 variance in the case of a binary or other discrete models, as there is no single VPC measure for a logistic regression models since the level 1 variance depends on the values of the explanatory variables in the model. Thus in a logistic regression model the underlying continuous variable comes from a logistic distribution with a variance of  $\pi^2/3 = 3.29$ , which is substituted for the level 1 variance. See Snijders and Bosker (1999) for further details of how the VCP is computed for binary and other discrete response models.

### 7.3 The socio-demographic models: individual level predictors of civic engagement

To account for the differences in socio-demographic characteristics across countries the variance component model is expanded by including individual level characteristics. The *Socio-Demographic Models* are calculated by following the two level random intercept logit model. They differs from the *Variance Component Models* by including individual level predictors and treating them as fixed effects:

$$\text{Logit } (P_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_k x_{kij} + u_{0j}$$

$$\text{Logit } (P_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{female}} + \beta_{\text{age15-29}} + \beta_{\text{age60+}} + \beta_{\text{not married}} + \beta_{\text{no education/primary}} + \beta_{\text{post-secondary education}} + \beta_{\text{service class}} + \beta_{\text{working class}} + \beta_{\text{never worked}} + \beta_{\text{unemployed}} + \beta_{\text{student}} + \beta_{\text{inactive}} + \beta_{\text{retired}} + \beta_{\text{ethnic minority}} + \beta_{\text{countryside}} + \beta_{\text{small town}} + \beta_{\text{excessive TV watching}} + \text{country residual}_j$$

The *Socio-Demographic Model* allows the average level of civic engagement to be different in each country, while the individual level effects are treated as fixed. This assumes that across all countries the effects of socio-demographic factors on civic engagement is the same for all individuals. Although there might be differences between individuals in the propensity to be civically engaged in the different countries (i.e. a random slope and random intercept model), research across countries identified similar socio-demographic factors as determinants of political activism and associational involvement (Dalton, 2002; Curtis *et al.*, 2001; Barnes and Kaase, 1979). This suggests that there is not a strong case for allowing the individual level factors to vary within countries. Moreover, a random slope and random intercept model would further complicate the models, and it would exceed the aim of this study. The focus of this analysis however, is to consider country specific contexts, while at the same time accounting for individual level characteristics, thus the socio-demographic variables are treated as fixed effects.

The individual level predictors used in this analysis are all categorical variables. They include 9 variables that generated 17 dummy variables:

Gender:	<b>male</b> /female.
Age groups:	young (15-29), <b>middle-aged (30-59)</b> , elderly (60 and over).
Marital status:	<b>married</b> (and cohabiting), not married (single, divorced, widowed).
Levels of education:	no or primary education only, <b>secondary education</b> , post-secondary education.
Social class:	service class, <b>intermediate class</b> , working class, no class (never worked).
Main economic activity:	<b>employed</b> , unemployed, in full-time education, retired, economically inactive (i.e. looking after household, caring for children and others, disabled or with limiting long term illness and being inactive for other reasons).
Ethnicity:	<b>autochthonous (white)</b> <sup>113</sup> , ethnic minority.
Domicile:	<b>metropolis and its suburbs</b> , town or small city, countryside.
TV consumption:	<b>moderate</b> (less than 2.5 hours on an average weekday), excessive (more than 2.5 hours weekdays).

The base categories are marked in bold. They were chosen in such a way that the intercept  $\beta_0$  represents the log-odds of a ‘stereotypical individual’ to be civically engaged. The ‘stereotypical individual’ is somebody in the reference category, i.e. a middle-aged, married male, with secondary education, from an intermediate class, currently employed, living in a big city or its suburbs, belonging to the autochthonous population and watching TV moderately.

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<sup>113</sup> For simplification a member of an autochthonous population will be called hereafter ‘white’, although a Swede living in Britain in other contexts might also be considered as white. However, in our sample the Swedes are regarded as ethnic-minorities as they are not members of the indigenous population and have an immigration background (either they emigrated or their parents). See the methodology chapter IV for how this variable has been composed.

The following table 13 shows the results for all three dependent variables for the Socio-Demographic Model, with individual level predictors only.

**Table 13: Socio-demographic models: two level random intercept logit model predicting civic engagement**

	Political Activism		Political Consumerism		Associational Involvement	
	Socio-Demographic Model		Socio-Demographic Model		Socio-Demographic Model	
	Coefficient	Odds	Coefficient	Odds	Coefficient	Odds
Level one intercept	-0.418(.109)	0.82	-0.292(.192)	1.1	1.410(.266)	5.5
Fixed effects: Individual factors						
Gender (Male)						
Female	-0.369(.025)***	0.69	0.159(.027)***	1.17	-0.373(.03)***	0.69
Age (30-59)						
15-29	-0.151(.038)***	0.86	-0.146(.039)***	0.87	-0.256(.044)***	0.78
60+	-0.086(.042)*	0.92	-0.351(.044)	0.71	-0.048(.047)	0.95
Marital status (Married)						
Not-married	-0.083(.027)*	0.92	-0.016(.028)	0.98	-0.14(.032)***	0.87
Education (Secondary Education)						
Primary or no education	-0.354(.039)***	0.71	-0.581(.042)***	0.56	-0.420(.04)***	0.66
Post secondary	0.354(.031)***	1.42	0.456(.032)***	1.58	0.508(.041)***	1.65
Social Class (Working class)						
Service class	0.274(.032)***	1.32	0.353(.033)***	1.42	0.453(.042)***	1.57
Working class	-0.386(.033)***	0.68	-0.388(.034)***	0.68	-0.296(.035)***	0.75
Never worked	-0.420(.05)***	0.66	-0.682(.054)***	0.51	-0.379(.052)***	0.67
Economic Status (Employed)						
Unemployed	-0.102(.066)	0.9	-0.074(.067)	0.93	-0.612(.069)***	0.54
Full-time education	0.496(.054)***	1.64	0.684(.057)***	1.98	0.452(.066)***	1.57
Inactive	0.137(.033)***	1.15	0.171(.034)***	1.19	-0.136(.04)***	0.88
Retired	0.052(.048)	1.05	-0.146(.051)***	0.87	-0.401(.054)***	0.67
Ethnicity (Autochthons)						
Minority	-0.087(.034)**	0.92	-0.156(.036)***	0.86	-0.249(.04)***	0.78
Domicil (Big city/suburbs)						
Countryside	0.160(.03)***	1.18	-0.255(.031)***	0.78	0.181(.035)***	1.2
Small town	0.051(.031)	1.05	-0.097(.032)**	0.91	0.117(.036)***	1.12
TV consumption (Moderate)						
Excessive	-0.209(.027)***	0.81	-0.296(.028)***	0.74	-0.282(.03)***	0.76
Country Level Variance	0.200(.066)		0.671(.219)		1.309(.423)	
Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC)	0.0573		0.1694		0.2846	

Source: ESS 2002. The Number of cases at the individual level are 36460, the number of cases at the country level are 19. Significance level: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001. The values in brackets are the standard errors of the estimates.

The estimates for all three dimensions of civic engagement in table 13 show that education and social class have the strongest relationship with engagement. Controlling for all the other factors, people who have no formal education at all or who only completed primary school are significantly less likely than those who have completed secondary school to be engaged in all three types of activism. The odds of being politically active for those who have studied beyond the years of compulsory education are 1.42 times higher than the odds of those who have only completed secondary school. The odds increase to 1.6 for political

consumerism and 1.7 for associational involvement. Similarly, the odds of members of the service classes to be politically active are 1.3 times higher than the odds for members of the intermediate class. This relationship is even more pronounced for associational involvement where the odd ratios are 1.6 and for political consumerism of 1.4. Those who have never worked, and those who are categorised as working class on the other hand are significantly less likely to be active in political activities, associational involvement or political consumerism than those being from the intermediate class.

These results support the socio-economic status (SES) model of participation (Verba and Nie, 1972), which explains why higher status individuals, i.e. those from higher socio-economic status, are more likely to be civically engaged. The results also support the civic voluntarism model, which stresses the importance of resources that individuals have at their disposal, including the time, money, and the opportunities they have to participate in politics and in voluntary organisations (Verba *et al.*, 2001). Individuals from higher SES, especially those with more formal education, are more likely to have the time, money and access to political information, and the knowledge and ability to become politically involved (Verba *et al.*, 2001; Dalton, 2002). The variable measuring economic activity is also related to the socio-economic status of individuals as can be seen from the table 13. People from higher social classes and with higher educational levels are less likely to suffer from unemployment than those who have lower levels of education and who are from lower social classes (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba *et al.*, 2001; Parry *et al.*, 1992).

Similar to the differences in relation to education and social class, those who are unemployed, who are economically inactive and those who have retired are significantly less likely to be engaged in voluntary associations than those who are employed. These groups have fewer resources at their disposal than employed people, although they might have more time on their hands to get active. However, with regards to associational involvement, such participation requires not only time but also money and skills to participate. Thus, although full-time employment may reduce the time available to get active (Parry *et al.*, 1992), it also provides more opportunities and incentives for involvement in association. Joining professional associations, for example, is most likely to arise for professional reasons, and is less likely for those who are not employed. Furthermore, I anticipate that joining other types of organisations would also be related to having the financial means available to be able to afford the membership contribution and other costs that are required to participate. It seems therefore plausible that those who are

not in paid employment are less likely to be able to afford these costs and thus become engaged.

For political activism the relationship is somehow different, which might be related to the low-cost of participation involved with certain types of political activism. Controlling for everything else in the model, there are no statistically significant differences in the log odds of being politically active between those who are unemployed or retired as opposed to those who are in paid employment. Even more, the economically inactive are more likely to be active in political activities than those who are employed. These groups might have fewer financial resources than those with paid jobs but on the other hand might be more likely to have the time to be politically active. Furthermore, in comparison with involvement in associations, in particular being a member and making donations, certain acts of political participation, such as contacting, wearing badges or campaign stickers and taking part at demonstrations might not require many resources. These types of activities might appeal more to those who are less well off, because they permit the addressing of specific individual issues and require little in terms of financial resources (Verba *et al.*, 2001)

Moreover, the unemployed are as likely as those who are in paid employment to carry out acts of political consumerism. Although, usually ethical and environmental products –such fair trade and organic products etc. - are usually more expensive than ‘normal’ products this result might appear rather surprising. However, boycotting is only one aspect of political consumerism and I anticipate that signing petitions and boycotting does not require much in terms of resources or time commitment.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, unlike associational involvement, but similar to political activism, the economically inactive people are more likely than those who are in paid employment to carry out acts of political consumerism. Again, this might be related to the low-cost participation requirements of these activities, while they lack the financial means, incentives and motivations to be involved in associations (Norris *et al.*, 2004).

Retired people are less likely to be engaged in acts of political consumerism than those in paid employment. This again might be a reflection of the generational effect, as retired people also tend to be aged 60 and over and are more prone to be active in traditional forms of activity than in new types of consumer activism (Stromsnes, 2005; Quintelier,

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<sup>114</sup> Stromsnes (2005) analysis of political consumerism in Norway found surprisingly, that personal income had no statistical significant relationship with political consumerism.

2007; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Dalton, 2002). Overall, the results for economic activity and civic engagement tend to support the civic voluntarism model, which stresses the importance of resources at the individuals' disposal that determines their chances of involvement. However, the results also suggest that economic activity has a slightly different relationship with political participation and political consumerism than the relationship between social class, and levels of education across all three dimensions of civic engagement. The differences might be due to the different nature of involvement, which in turn requires different resources being available for participation.

Besides socio-economic status, age has been identified as a crucial factor in predicting civic engagement. The analysis carried out here confirms the general pattern of middle-aged people to be more active than the younger and elderly generation. A plausible explanation for this might be the life-cycle effect. Younger people are less socially integrated, more mobile and less interested in politics (Dalton, 2002), while elderly people retire, thus withdrawing from the active workforce, may be widowed and away from close family ties and their circle of friends might shrink as they get older (Parry *et al.*, 1992). However, there are some noteworthy differences for the different dimensions of civic engagement, which suggest that the generational effect might also be important (Putnam, 2000; Curtis *et al.*, 1992; Dalton, 2002). The results presented here shows that the odds of elderly people being involved in associations are 0.92 in comparison with the odds of middle-aged people and this relationship is not significant. Thus, elderly people are as likely as middle-aged people to be active in voluntary organisations holding the other factors constant. Furthermore, comparing the odds of younger people being engaged with the odds of elderly people being engaged for all three dimensions of civic engagement, a clear generational effect can be identified and the relationship is significant. Taking young people as the reference category the odds of elderly people being engaged decreases significantly for political consumerism and increases for associational involvement. For political participation however, there is no statistically significant difference between the younger and older generation. In other words, although the propensity of activism is high for middle-aged people, and low for young and older people, there is a difference between elderly people's and young people's repertoire of actions. The young generation is more likely to adopt acts of political consumerism and less likely to be active in associations than the elderly generation and visa versa. Thus, more traditional forms of engagement appeal more to the older generation (Putnam, 2000), while the individual, network based

and global connection that characterises political consumerism (Berry and McEachern, 2005) seems to appeal more to the younger generation.

Civic engagement shows gendered patterns in the analysis of the ESS and is in line with other studies (Badescu and Neller, 2007; Norris *et al.*, 2004). For political activism and associational involvement women are seem to be less likely to be engaged than men. The dominance of men in political activities and associational involvement might still be due to prevalent gender roles that confine women to the 'home' and may therefore integrate them less in a social or professional context (Badescu and Neller, 2007). This leaves them having fewer resources of time, money and civic skills to participate as well as a lower (psychological) engagement with politics as suggested by Norris *et al.* (2004). However, for political consumerism, women are 1.2 times more likely to be active than men. Ironically, the same gender roles that deter women from participating as much as men in voluntary organisations<sup>115</sup> and traditional political activities might explain their involvement in political consumerism. Micheletti (2003) and Stromsnes (2005) argue that this might be due to women's role as primary shoppers in their families, which makes them by default more likely to be ethical shoppers. A further reason might be, as Stromsnes (2005) suggests that women are more attracted by decentralised and non-hierarchical forms of participation and that the everyday nature of political consumption can make it easier for women to participate.

Being married as opposed to being divorced, single or widowed, does have a positive relationship with regard to political activism and associational involvement. However, for political consumerism the difference between being married and not married is not statistically significant. Being single decreases the propensity of associational involvement and political activism by a factor of 0.9 in comparison to being married, which is not large but nevertheless statistically significant. An explanation for this difference might be the degree of social integration that comes with being married and having a family life. Married people may have more opportunities to build and keep up social networks as compared to single people. Having children for example makes it more likely that parents would get involved in activities such as sport and play group activities with their children, makes them more likely to get active around the education of their children such as parent-teacher associations or simply by volunteering at their children's school events etc. Thus

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<sup>115</sup> Although research on the voluntary sector in Norway showed that many voluntary organisations were dominated by women (Wollebaek and Selle, 1999), our results across Europe indicated that men are more likely than women to be involved in voluntary organisations.

being married and having a family life might give rise to more opportunities, resources and incentives for civic engagement (Armingeon, 2007; Li *et al.*, 2005; Scheepers *et al.*, 2002).

Students are more likely than those employed to be active across all dimensions of civic engagement. They are twice more likely to be engaged in acts of political consumerism and 1.6 times more likely to be politically active and involved in associations than those employed, controlling for all the other factors. The relatively high level of civic engagement among students can be attributed to the politicising environment the campus provides. One line of argument focuses on the change of values associated with studying, in particular for students of the social sciences and humanities. As students enter the liberal and enlightened environment of the university they are more exposed to liberal and critical thinking, which in turn makes them more prone to civic engagement (Rootes, 1980). A more recent approach suggested by Crossley (2008) however, argues that universities serve as a politicising environment due to the dense networks they provide. Universities bring large numbers of previously unconnected but similarly motivated people together. It thus provides a favourable setting for recruitment and mobilisation through various political and non-political networks.

Ethnic minorities or people who are not from the autochthonous population are less likely to be active across all models in comparison to the autochthonous population. However, their relative odds of associational involvement (0.78) and political consumerism (0.86) are lower than their odds for political participation (0.92), in comparison to the odds of an individual from the autochthonous population. This means that for ethnic minorities the chances of participating in political activities are higher than the chances of taking part in voluntary organisations. Or to put in other words they might have more incentives to participate in political activities than in associational involvement. The general underrepresentation of ethnic minorities might have different reasons specific to the migration history, citizenship rights and integration policies of the host-country. Overall these results are in line with previous studies, which confirmed an underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in politics (Verba *et al.* 2001; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Anwar, 2001; Berger *et al.*, 2004). Cross-comparative research on the involvement of ethnic minorities in politics and associations are still rare. However, research on the social capital and participation of ethnic minorities in Europe, conducted at the Institute of Social Change (University of Manchester), suggests that the reasons for non-engagement among ethnic minorities differ from country to country, being dependent on the host-country's integration policies and citizenship rights. Moreover, different ethnic minorities

tend to be engaged in different types of activities (Purdam *et al.* 2002; Morales and Giugni, forthcoming), indicating that non-engagement might not be observed if compared by certain types of activities.

Another clear trend for all dimensions of civic engagement is the habit of watching television. Consuming TV excessively (i.e. more than 2.5 hours on average in a weekday) as compared to those who do not watch TV more than 2.5 hours in a weekday decreases the propensity of activism by a factor of around 0.8. The spread of TV as a dominant leisure-activity has been linked to a decline in civic activities (Putnam, 2000). While exposure to the political content of mass media may reflect an interest in politics and society (Norris, 1996) and thus might result in increased participation or *vice versa*, watching TV excessively has been seen as an indication of a lack of integration in as much as it takes time away from social activities (Putnam, 2000). McBride's (1998) analysis of popular television entertainment programmes and crime-dramas in the United States however, suggests that rather than watching television per se the answer for the relationship between television and civic engagement needs to be explored by looking at the content of broadcasting and the messages they convey. He argues that the characters and stories portrayed by such programmes tend to focus on the individual and thus weakens group attachment and social and political commitment. On a similar line Besley's (2006) analysis of the 2002 European Social Survey of 10 Western European countries suggests indeed that there is a link between the values individuals hold and the amount of non-news programmes they watch. Hence, rather than time displacement, "cognitive displacement" (Besley, 2006: 58) could be the driving force behind declining social capital in Western countries.

The size of the area where one lives (i.e. domicile) also seems to make a difference in terms of activism. Holding all the other variables constant, people living in the countryside are more likely to be politically active and involved in associations than people living in big cities and its suburbs. These results confirm Putnam's (2000) findings that civic participation is higher in rural areas and small towns and lower in major cities. This is explained by the tight network of social contacts in smaller localities which might encourage participation. Social capital in smaller localities is more of a 'bonding' nature (Van Deth and Martin, 2007) and being resident in a smaller locality might incur a greater need to cooperate and seek the assistance of public officials, than in large urban areas. Furthermore, in small localities it might be relatively easier to contact public officials (Booth and Seligson, 2008).

However, for political consumerism the pattern is the opposite. Those who live in the countryside or in small towns are less likely to be active than those living in big cities. Big localities offer a wider range of social networks. The social capital in larger cities might be more of a ‘bridging’ nature and social networks in these urban areas might be more concerned about broader issues than in smaller communities (Van Deth and Martin, 2007). As indicated by the results of political consumerism and the size of locality, political consumerism is higher in urban areas, as the supply of ethical and environmental friendly products might be better in the cities than in smaller localities where this might be restricted (Stromsnes, 2005). Moreover, different acts of political consumerism is planned and organised by campaign groups and voluntary organisations (Micheletti, 2003). Political consumerism is more likely to be influenced by different (global) consumer associations, which are more likely to be concentrated in urban areas (Stromsnes, 2005). Thus, the chances of citizens being recruited into such networks are higher in big cities which increase the opportunities to shop ethically than in smaller communities.

Adding the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals to the model has decreased the proportion of total residual level 2 variance ( $\sigma^2_{u0}$ ), i.e. the variance between countries to some extent. Accounting for the socio-demographic composition of individuals within countries has decreased the differences between countries for political activism from 0.270 in the *Variance Component Model* to 0.200 (0.066) in the *Socio-Demographic Model*. For political consumerism the between country variance was reduced from 0.765 to 0.671 (0.219) and for associational involvement the between country variance was reduced from 1.329 to 1.309 (0.423). Despite an improvement in the *Socio-Demographic Models* relative to the *Variance Component Models* with no predictors, the variance components and its standard errors across all models suggest that there are still significant variations between countries. Hence, *Socio-Demographic Models* can now be further extended by considering explanatory variables at the country level and including them into the models.

## 7.4 Variations of individual behaviour by welfare regime

Among the possible contextual factors discussed in the previous chapter, welfare regime appeared as the strongest predictor of all three dimensions of civic engagement. Although, economic wealth, history and current levels of democracy, and income inequality appeared also as strong predictors of civic engagement, the welfare regime models across all dependent variables were the most parsimonious models. The final models presented here predict the probability of political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement by taking into consideration the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and the welfare regime of the countries where the individuals live. In addition to that in the model predicting associational involvement levels of democracy are also included.

$$\text{Logit}(P_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_k x_{kij} + u_{0j}$$

Logit ( $P_{ij}$  of political activism/ political consumerism/ associational involvement) =

$$\begin{aligned} &\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{female}} + \beta_{\text{age15-29}} + \beta_{\text{age60+}} + \beta_{\text{not married}} + \beta_{\text{no education/primary}} + \beta_{\text{post-secondary education}} + \beta_{\text{service class}} \\ &+ \beta_{\text{working class}} + \beta_{\text{never worked}} + \beta_{\text{unemployed}} + \beta_{\text{student}} + \beta_{\text{inactive}} + \beta_{\text{retired}} + \beta_{\text{ethnic minority}} + \beta_{\text{countryside}} + \\ &\beta_{\text{small town}} + \beta_{\text{excessive TV watching}} + \beta_{\text{Social-Democratic}} + \beta_{\text{Liberal}} + \beta_{\text{Southern-European}} + \beta_{\text{Postcommunist}} (+ \beta_{\text{levels of democracy}})^{116} + \text{country residual}_j \end{aligned}$$

All three final models reported here are two level random intercept or variance components model. This allows the overall probability of carrying out political activities, political consumerism or associational involvement to vary across countries, while the individual level characteristics were treated as fixed effects. As with the *Socio-Demographic Models* the intercept  $\beta_0$  represents the log-odds of a ‘stereotypical’ individual from a Continental welfare regime to be active. These log odds change depending on the type of welfare regime the individual lives in. Thus the ‘stereotypical’ individual is somebody in the reference category, i.e. middle-aged, married male, with secondary education, from an intermediate class, currently employed, living in a big city or its suburbs, belonging to the autochthonous population, watching TV moderately and being from a Continental welfare regime.

<sup>116</sup> Levels of democracy is only included in the model predicting associational involvement, as this appeared significant in the aggregate level analysis despite controlling for welfare regime.

**Table 14: Two level logistic random intercept models predicting civic engagement**

	<b>Political Activism</b>		<b>Political Consumerism</b>		<b>Associational Involvement</b>	
	<b>Welfare Model (A)</b>		<b>Welfare Model (B)</b>		<b>Welfare/Democracy Model (C)</b>	
LEVEL ONE: FIXED EFFECT	Coefficient	Odds	Coefficient	Odds	Coefficient	Odds
Level one intercept	-0.194(.095)	0.82	0.082(.138)	1.1	1.706(.191)	5.5
Fixed effects: Individual factors						
Gender (Male)						
Female	-0.37(.025)***	0.69	0.158(.027)***	1.17	-0.372(.03)***	0.69
Age (30-59)						
15-29	-0.149(.038)***	0.86	-0.145(.039)***	0.87	-0.254(.044)***	0.78
60+	-0.088(.042)*	0.92	-0.35(.044)	0.71	-0.047(.047)	0.95
Marital status (Married)						
Not-married	-0.084(.027)*	0.92	-0.017(.028)	0.98	-0.14(.032)***	0.87
Education (Secondary Education)						
Primary or no education	-0.348(.038)***	0.71	-0.577(.042)***	0.56	-0.416(.04)***	0.66
Post secondary	0.352(.031)***	1.42	0.454(.032)***	1.58	0.501(.041)***	1.65
Social Class (Working class)						
Service class	0.274(.032)***	1.32	0.353(.033)***	1.42	0.453(.042)***	1.57
Working class	-0.386(.033)***	0.68	-0.387(.034)***	0.68	-0.295(.035)***	0.75
Never worked	-0.416(.05)***	0.66	-0.678(.054)***	0.51	-0.374(.052)***	0.67
Economic Status (Employed)						
Unemployed	-0.101(.066)	0.9	-0.073(.067)	0.93	-0.609(.069)***	0.54
Full-time education	0.495(.054)***	1.64	0.683(.057)***	1.98	0.45(.066)***	1.57
Inactive	0.137(.033)***	1.15	0.17(.034)***	1.19	-0.134(.04)***	0.88
Retired	0.053(.048)	1.05	-0.145(.051)***	0.87	-0.401(.054)***	0.67
Ethnicity (Autochthons)						
Minority	-0.086(.034)**	0.92	-0.154(.036)***	0.86	-0.247(.04)***	0.78
Domicil (Big city/suburbs)						
Countryside	0.162(.03)***	1.18	-0.254(.031)***	0.78	0.181(.035)***	1.2
Small town	0.05(.031)	1.05	-0.095(.032)**	0.91	0.117(.036)***	1.12
TV consumption (Moderate)						
Excessive	-0.21(.027)***	0.81	-0.296(.028)***	0.74	-0.28(.03)***	0.76
LEVEL TWO: RANDOM EFFECT						
Welfare (Continental)						
Liberal	-0.171(.175)	0.84	0.04(.264)	1	0.015(.355)	1
Social-Democratic	0.231(.138)	1.25	0.509(.209)*	1.66	0.768(.298)**	2.2
South-European	-0.528(.14)***	0.59	-1.178(.211)***	0.31	-1.26(.328)***	0.28
Postcommunist Eastern Europe	-0.93(.154)***	0.4	-1.515(.231)***	0.22	-1.286(.369)***	0.28
Levels of Democracy in 2002 (centered)					0.069(.032)*	
Country Level Variance	0.043(.015)		0.102(.035)		0.183(.061)	
Variance Partion Coefficient (VPC)	0.013		0.030		0.052	

Source: ESS 2002. Number of cases on the individual level are 36.460, number of cases on the country level are 19. Significance level: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001. The values in brackets are the standard errors of the estimates.

These final models (table 14) also include age, etc. as individual level predictors. The estimates of the effects of the individual level predictors differ not substantially from the estimates obtained from the *Socio-Demographic Models* and will therefore not be discussed again here (table 13) . Instead, I will move on to explain the level two results.

Across all three dimensions of civic engagement, holding the socio-demographic factors constant, being from a Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regime as opposed to the Continental welfare regime has a significantly negative relationship with political

participation, political consumerism and associational involvement. On the other hand there is no statistically significant relationship between a Liberal welfare regime as opposed to a Continental welfare regime across all types of civic engagement. Moreover, although the odds of an individual being active in a Social-Democratic welfare regime are higher by 1.25 in relation to the odds of an individual from the Continental welfare regime this relationship is not significant. However, the differences between Social-Democratic and Continental welfare regime is very marked and statistically significant for political consumerism and associational involvement. The odds of an individual being engaged in these types of activities are almost 2 times the odds of an individual from a corporatist welfare regime. Although, if compared to the Continental welfare regime, being from a Liberal welfare regime does not make much difference, the likelihood of activism decreases significantly if living in Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regimes. For associational involvement, despite controlling for welfare regime, levels of democracy in 2002 also remained significant in explaining the variance between countries.

## **7.5 Comparing the reduction in variance between countries**

Compared to the *Variance Component Models* with no explanatory variables the inclusion of individual level variables and contextual variables explained a large proportion of the variance in political activism (84%), political consumerism (87%) and associational involvement (87%). Compared to the *Socio-Demographic Models* the inclusion of the contextual variables decreased the between country variance for political activism from 0.200 to 0.043 (0.015), for political consumerism from 0.671 to 0.102 (0.035) and for associational involvement from 1.309 to 0.183 (0.061). However, although the variance between countries has been reduced considerably there still remains unexplained variance in the three dependent variables as can be seen by the size of the standard errors (see table 15).

**Table 15: Comparing the reduction in variance between countries**

<b>Political Activities</b>	<b>Fixed constant</b>	<b>Random intercept</b>	<b>Explained variance</b>
Variance Component Model (A)	-0.651(0.120)	0.27(.088)	
Socio-demographic Model (A)	-0.418(0.109)	0.2(.066)	25.93%
Multilevel Welfare Model (A)	-0.194(0.095)	0.043(0.015)	84.07%
<b>Political Consumerism</b>			
Variance Component Model (B)	-0.544(0.201)	0.765(0.249)	
Socio-demographic Model (B)	-0.292(0.192)	0.671(0.219)	12.29%
Multilevel Welfare Model (B)	0.082(0.138)	0.102(0.034)	86.67%
<b>Associational Involvement</b>			
Variance Component Model ( C )	0.920(0.271)	1.392(.451)	
Socio-demographic Model ( C )	1.419(0.266)	1.309(.423)	5.96%
Multilevel Welfare/Democracy Model ( C )	1.706(0.191)	0.183(0.061)	86.85%

Moreover, although most of the variance in civic engagement was explained by the inclusion of contextual variables (around 85% for all three dimensions of civic engagement), individual level variables reduced about ¼ of the variance in political activism, whereas this happened to a lesser extent in associational involvement or political consumerism. For example taking into account individual level characteristics reduced the variance between countries by 26% for political activism, 12% for political consumerism and even less 6% of associational involvement. For political consumerism and particularly associational involvement the country context seems to be more crucial in explaining the variations between countries.

To put it differently, the differences between countries in levels of engagement is reduced more if country specific factors are included in the model. Socio-demographic characteristics on the other hand did not explain very much variation between countries. This does not mean that individual level factors are less important country level characteristics in predicting the propensity of civic engagement. Indeed, will be demonstrate further in the chapter, despite stark variations in levels of civic engagement between countries, an individual's propensity of becoming civically engaged depends to a great extent on their socio-economic status and other individual level characteristics. Yet, in reducing the variance between countries, individual level characteristics were not as powerful as country variables. This is mainly related to the similar socio-demographic composition of individuals across countries, which cancels out the effect of such variables as they are more or less present in all the countries. In addition, previous studies have identified a similar relationship between socio-demographic variables and civic engagement across countries (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Thus, individual level predictors

can therefore by default not explain as much variance between countries as country level predictors. Yet, the comparison of how much variance has been explained by the different models pointed to an interesting difference between political activities and associational involvement. This comparison suggested that political activism depends more on individual level characteristics, whereas associational involvement is more dependent upon the country context.

## **7.6 Discussing alternative contextual models**

In the aggregate level analysis when multiple regression was carried out, several other alternative models were developed, besides the welfare models. In this chapter VI the *Economic Development Model I* for political participation, or the *Democracy and Equality Model II and III* for political consumerism and associational involvement were still significant even after controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. However, these models did not reduce the variance between countries as much as the *Welfare Model I and III* for political activism and political consumerism and the *Welfare and Democracy Model II* for associational involvement (see table 22, 23 and 24 in Appendix 8 for alternative models).

As discussed in the aggregate level analysis civic education and government expenditure showed a very limited significant relationship with political consumerism and associational involvement. This relationship disappeared in most cases when introducing control variables. Even when civic education or government expenditure was introduced as a contextual variable, after allowing for variations between individuals, the inclusion of these two policy variables did not reduce the variance between countries as much as the other contextual variables. For example, controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and the history of democracy, government expenditure was significantly positively related at the 5% level to political consumerism and its coefficient was 0.110(0.055). However, the between country variance was only reduced to 0.251, whereas the *Multilevel Welfare Model (B)* for political consumerism reduced the between country variance to 0.102. As the significant effects of government expenditure on political consumerism disappeared once controlled for welfare regime, this model was not reported here.

### 7.6.1 Civic education

In the aggregate level analysis the relationship between civic education and civic engagement has already been discussed. In the multilevel analysis civic education was included in the models as a contextual variable and the relationship across all three dependent variables appeared as non-significant. Therefore, a number of attempts were made to modify the civic education variable to an attribute of individuals by transforming it into a binary variable and interacting this with age groups.

A binary civic education variable took into account that not everybody was subject to civic education, but only those who were young enough to have been exposed to civic education at school. For example all respondents that were likely to have had civic education at school due to their age were coded as 1, and all the others as 0. Age 10 was taken as the cut-off point, at which the respondent was likely to be exposed to civic education at secondary level, i.e. if the respondent was aged 10 and younger or not yet born when civic education was introduced at secondary school, it was assumed that they were exposed to civic education at school. All those older than 10 would have been too old to be at secondary school and therefore not exposed to civic education, as this would have been introduced after they had left school. For example Sweden and Germany, which had introduced civic education just after the Second World War, had a large number of people who theoretically should have had civic education classes, whereas for those countries who only introduced it after the 1990s such as Britain, Ireland etc. almost no individuals were exposed to civic education, as they were too old to be at school and too young to be included in the survey. This means that the binary variable civic education (i.e. exposed/not exposed to civic education at school) if broken down by country had a quite uneven variance. In countries where civic education was introduced quite recently, middle aged and elderly age cohorts fell all within the “not exposed to civic education” category, whereas the younger age group all fell within the “exposed to civic education” category. In some countries, such as Belgium, Ireland, UK, and Poland which have introduced civic education at school fairly, almost no one fell within the ‘yes’ category, whereas in Sweden in Germany almost everybody who went to school after the Second World War fell within the ‘yes’ category, i.e. they are expected to have been exposed to civic education.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> A breakdown of age into four age categories did not bring any improvements and the results did not make sense, indicating that there are problems with this variable.

As some countries had a long history of civic education and others a very short one, the transformation of the civic education variable as a contextual variable into a binary variable as an attribute of individuals, did not contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between civic education and civic engagement. The results of the models including the binary civic education variable proved to be robust, as the coefficients were sensitive to fluctuations in the model. This suggested that due to the extreme concentration of cases in either the 'yes' or 'no' category, the variable was not a reliable measure. Furthermore, the coefficients could not be interpreted in a meaningful manner, further supporting the case, that the transformation of this variable into a property of individuals did not constitute an improved model, neither did it contribute to the understanding of the relationship between civic education and civic engagement. It was therefore decided to use the civic education variable as a property of countries.

### 7.6.2 Democracy and equality models

Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and history of democracy, income inequality was significantly negatively related to political consumerism at the 0.001 level and its coefficient was -0.350(0.105). However, again this model only reduced the between country variance to 0.192, whereas the *Multilevel Welfare Model (B)* of political consumerism reduced the between country variance to 0.102.

For political activities, after taking into account the individual level factors, the *Multilevel Economic Development Model (A)* (includes GDP) was the second strongest model (total residual variance  $\sigma^2_{u0}=0.046$ ) and the *Multilevel Democracy/Equality Model* was the third strongest model ( $\sigma^2_{u0}=0.064$ ). Again, the *Multilevel Welfare Model* has explained the greatest variation ( $\sigma^2_{u0}=0.043$ ) between countries. Thus the models including welfare regime were chosen as the final models to be presented here (see table 14 in this chapter, and table 22 in Appendix 8).

For associational involvement in the aggregate level analysis the most parsimonious model was the *Democracy and Equality Model II*, which explained 85.9% of the variance. The second strongest model was the *Welfare and Democracy Model II*, with a slightly less variance of 82% (see table 9 in chapter VI). However in multilevel modelling the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model(C)*, explained slightly more variance between countries (0.183) than the *Multilevel Democracy and Equality Model (C)* (0.189). The difference might not be much in terms of reducing the variance between countries, however, in the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model (C)* only three countries are

predicted to have higher or lower levels of associational involvement than expected (France, Slovenia, the Netherlands), while in the *Multilevel Democracy and Equality Model (C)* many more countries are predicted to have levels below (Austria, France, Hungary, Italy) or above the overall intercept (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Slovenia). This means that the later model does not predict associational involvement as well as the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model (C)* (see table 14 in this chapter and table 24 in Appendix 8).<sup>118</sup>

## **7.7 Comparing the propensity of activism between a disadvantaged and a privileged individual**

In order to present the differences in civic engagement by socio-demographic characteristics and how being from different welfare regimes changes their probabilities of civic engagement, I will compare two different prototypes of individuals. For the sake of comparison I will choose a prototype of individual that is disadvantaged in the labour market in many aspects and is therefore more likely to be socially excluded and less likely to be civically engaged. Such a prototype of individual will be named as a ‘disadvantaged individual’ and it will differ from the ‘stereotypical individual’ (which is the base categories of the variables in the analysis) by adding the dummies female, unemployed, young, working class to the equation. To show how the probabilities of civic engagement increases if the individual is in a socio-economic advantaged position, a prototype of a ‘privileged individual’ will be created by adding the dummies service class, further education and living in the countryside to the equation. Thus, a disadvantaged person here represents a young, white, unemployed, married woman from the working class, with secondary schooling, with moderate TV habits and living in a big city. A privileged person on the other hand stands for a white, married middle-aged working male, from the service class, with post-secondary educational qualification and moderate TV consumption habits living in the countryside.

The table 16 below shows the probabilities of political activism, political consumerism and associational involvement for a prototype of a disadvantaged and a privileged person. These probabilities have been separately calculated for each country. However, in order to make the table more readable, countries with similar levels of activism have been grouped together. This corresponds mainly with welfare regime. Since the differences between the

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<sup>118</sup> In fact if the probabilities of involvement in associations are calculated there is almost no difference in the probabilities of activism predicted by both models for any given individual. So, both models are equally strong in predicting the probabilities of individuals being involved in voluntary organisations.

Liberal welfare regimes and the Continental welfare regime was not great, these countries were collapsed into one group. The graphs (figure 10) below show these probabilities by the four groups of countries, rather than breaking it down by individual countries and are presented here in order to visualise how the chances of a privileged person increases in comparison with a disadvantaged individual and how these differ for the Nordic countries, the Liberal and Continental welfare regimes, the Southern and Eastern European countries.

**Table 16: Predicted probabilities of a disadvantaged and privileged individual to be active**


	Political Activism		Political Consumerism		Associational Involvement	
	Disadvantaged	Privileged	Disadvantaged	Privileged	Disadvantaged	Privileged
Finland	0.29	0.77	0.5	0.73	0.7	0.97
Luxembourg	0.28	0.77	0.48	0.72	0.67	0.97
Norway	0.28	0.77	0.46	0.7	0.72	0.97
Belgium	0.23	0.72	0.4	0.65	0.61	0.96
Sweden	0.22	0.71	0.67	0.85	0.84	0.99
Ireland	0.21	0.69	0.35	0.58	0.55	0.95
France	0.2	0.68	0.45	0.69	0.33	0.87
Denmark	0.19	0.67	0.5	0.73	0.84	0.99
Austria	0.18	0.66	0.34	0.58	0.53	0.94
Germany	0.18	0.65	0.5	0.73	0.54	0.94
Spain	0.16	0.63	0.27	0.5	0.25	0.83
Netherlands	0.16	0.61	0.3	0.54	0.73	0.98
Great Britain	0.15	0.6	0.5	0.72	0.57	0.95
Italy	0.13	0.56	0.2	0.4	0.29	0.86
Greece	0.12	0.54	0.14	0.3	0.12	0.66
Portugal	0.11	0.51	0.13	0.28	0.2	0.78
Hungary	0.09	0.45	0.11	0.25	0.14	0.7
Poland	0.09	0.47	0.13	0.28	0.11	0.65
Slovenia	0.09	0.46	0.17	0.35	0.4	0.9
<b>Averages across group of countries</b>						
Nordic	0.25	0.73	0.53	0.75	0.78	0.98
Continental/liberal	0.20	0.67	0.42	0.65	0.57	0.95
Southern Europe	0.13	0.56	0.19	0.37	0.22	0.78
Eastern Europe	0.09	0.46	0.14	0.29	0.22	0.75
Overall Average	0.18	0.63	0.35	0.56	0.48	0.89

Probabilities are based on the *Multilevel Welfare Model* (A) predicting political activism, the *Multilevel Welfare Model* (B) predicting political consumerism and the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model* (C) predicting associational involvement (see table 14).

The probability of a disadvantaged individual to be politically active is low across all countries, at 18% and increases on average to 63% for a privileged individual (see table 16). This figure increases if the individual is from the Scandinavian and Continental European countries to around 20% and decreases for members of the Southern and Eastern European countries to around 10%. In other words around 2 out of 10 disadvantaged people in Western Europe are predicted to be politically active, while in the Southern and Eastern European countries only one in 10 disadvantaged people are politically active. The average levels of political activism for a privileged individual in Eastern and Southern

Europe increases considerably to around 50%. Similarly the chances of political activism increases to around 70% if the individual is privileged and is from Western Europe.

**Figure 10: Predicted probabilities of a disadvantaged and privileged individuals' propensity of political activism**




Source: ESS 2002. Probabilities are based on the *Multilevel Welfare Model (A)* predicting political activism (see table 14).

The graph (figure 10) demonstrated not only the differences between countries clustered by their welfare regimes, but shows also the gap in activism between different social groups. Despite differences between welfare regimes, which predicts significantly lower rates of activism for the South and East European countries, an individuals' propensity of political activism increases considerably if the individual has an advantaged position in the society, due to their education, social class, age, gender and the size of locality. For example, a privileged person from Slovenia is more likely than a disadvantaged individual from Finland to be politically active as well as involved in voluntary organisations. This means that despite differences in welfare regime, individual's status triumphs country characteristics.

For political consumerism on the other hand the difference between countries is much greater (see figure 11 below).

**Figure 11: Predicted probabilities of disadvantaged and privileged individuals' propensity of political consumerism**




Source: ESS 2002. Probabilities are based on the *Multilevel Welfare Model (B)* predicting political consumerism (see table 14).

The predicted probability of political consumerism for a privileged individual from the Southern European and Eastern European countries is much lower than the predicted probabilities of a disadvantaged individual from the Nordic countries. Only three out of every 10 privileged individuals from Eastern Europe is predicted to carry out acts of political consumerism, while every fifth disadvantaged person out of ten is predicted to have carried out acts of political consumerism and it increases to 75% on average for a privileged individual from the Nordic countries. If compared by single countries, the differences between Sweden which has the highest probability of activism for a disadvantaged individual (67%), and Hungary, which has the lowest probability (11%), then the difference is more than six fold. However, the difference is reduced if a comparison is made between privileged individuals; the chance of a privileged individual from Sweden being a political consumer is 85% and in Hungary 25%. Although its difference is still great, it is less if compared to disadvantaged individuals.

Unlike political activism and associational involvement the gap in the probability of political consumerism does not change considerably. This suggests that unequal participation is least marked for political consumerism. This is related to the positive effect of being female and the moderate effect of being young and unemployed on political consumerism. This indicates that political consumerism seems to appeal stronger to disadvantaged people than does political activism or associational involvement. As

discussed in the previous chapters, the great variation between Western, Southern and Eastern European countries might be related to postmaterialist values being more present in the Western Europe and materialist values more present in Eastern and Southern Europe (Inglehart, 1997; Gibbins and Reimer, 1995).

**Figure 12: Predicted probabilities of a disadvantaged and privileged individuals' propensity of associational involvement**



Source: ESS 2002. Probabilities are based on the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy 2002 Model (C)* predicting associational involvement (see table 14).

As figure 12 displays levels of associational involvement in general are higher than levels of political consumerism (figure 11) and political activism (figure 10). However, the differences between countries are very marked here, as well as the different levels of activism for the two different prototypes of individuals. The Nordic countries have the highest levels of associational involvement. This is visible in particular for a disadvantaged person, where on average approximately 8 out of 10 disadvantaged people have been involved in some ways in voluntary organisations, be it as a member, by donating money, participating at an event organised by a voluntary organisation or by simply doing voluntary work for an organisation. The differences of activism between a disadvantaged and a privileged individual are not very large for the Nordic countries, which suggests that being from a disadvantaged socio-demographic group does not reduce the chances of activism in voluntary organisations. These figures confirm the vibrant nature of civil society organisations in the Nordic countries. It also demonstrates, as Esping-Andersen (1990) argues, that the Social-Democratic welfare regime is most successful in reducing the dependence of the citizens on the market and allows them despite lower incomes, to participate more fully at the social level. The graphs however also show that country context makes a difference for the poor but not so much for the rich.

The relatively low levels of involvement among disadvantaged people in the Southern and Eastern European countries might indicate great problems of voluntary organisations to reach out to deprived groups. While only every 2 out of 10 disadvantaged citizen in these countries are predicted to be active, around 7 out of 10 privileged people from the same countries are involved in voluntary associations. This triples the chances of involvement in voluntary associations in Eastern and Southern European countries if the individual is from a privileged background.

The differences between disadvantaged and privileged individuals from the Continental and Liberal welfare regimes with respect to associational involvement are also striking. Despite a relatively large voluntary sector in those countries, only 57% of disadvantaged people on average are predicted to be active, while this increases on average to 95% for privileged individuals.<sup>119</sup> In other words, a disadvantaged individual, compared to a privileged individual, is about 40% less likely to be involved in voluntary organisations if they are from a Liberal and Continental welfare regime and the gap increases to about 70% if this individual is from Southern or Eastern Europe. In the Nordic countries on the other hand this gap is less, at about 20%. Thus, the Nordic countries are not only the most egalitarian in terms of income distribution but also the most egalitarian in terms of the representation of different socio-demographic groups in civic engagement.

## **7.8 Discussing the country residuals**

Examining the country residuals for the final models of political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement is a good way of assessing which countries are not well described by the model and allows for discussion as to why this could be the case. This allows viewing countries that do not fit the general pattern in more detail. These residuals represent the country departure from the overall average, i.e. the overall intercept, predicted by the fixed parameter  $\beta_0$ . This means that countries, whose confidence intervals do not cross the overall intercept (here in the caterpillar plots marked as 0), differ significantly from the overall average at the 5% level. In other words, these countries might be an interesting case study to look at in more detail in order to understand why they differ from countries with similar characteristics.


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<sup>119</sup> Among these countries the Netherlands and Luxembourg have higher and France has lower levels of associational involvement and the possible reason for this will be discussed further below, when the country residuals are examined.

### 7.1.1 Political activism

The caterpillar plot for political activism of the *Multilevel Welfare Model (A)* shows that the confidence intervals of only four countries do not overlap zero (see figure 13 below). Levels of political activism in Luxembourg and Spain are higher than predicted by this model, and in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands levels of political activism are lower than predicted by the model. This means their level of activism differs significantly from the average level of political activism across the 19 countries.

**Figure 13: Country residuals and their confidence intervals: Multilevel Welfare Model (A) predicting political activism**



The country residuals from left to right are: DK, NL, UK, PT, DE, SE, AT, GR, HU, FR, IT, SI, PL, BE, NO, IE, FI, ES, LU. Confidence intervals set at 1.96 i.e. 95%.

The *Multilevel Welfare Model (A)* for political participation predicts that Denmark, and Netherlands have below average levels of political activities than expected given their individual level characteristics and their welfare regime. One explanation for these relatively low levels of political activism might be due to the roles associations play as intermediating organisations between the citizens and the state. As discussed in chapter V and VI, levels of associational involvement in Denmark and the Netherlands are relatively high. Thus, it can be argued that given the ample opportunities citizens have to influence the government through engagement in voluntary organisations, they might have fewer incentives to express their discontent through direct political actions such as taking part at demonstrations, contacting government officials, or wearing and displaying campaign badge or stickers. Indeed if we look at the frequency table of political activities (chapter V,

table 2), such activities are relatively low in Denmark and the Netherlands relative to the other Western European countries.

Spain and Luxembourg on the other hand are predicted to have above average levels of political activism than expected, given their socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and their welfare regime. Relative to other Southern European countries, Spain's level of political activism was high, as already noted in chapter V. Spain's involvement was high particularly with demonstrations, wearing and displaying campaign badges, political party and action group activism and working in a community organisation for political reasons. One reason for this might be due to the extensive anti-war mobilisations amongst Spanish citizens in the reference period of the survey (Jimenez, 2007). However, an alternative explanation could be that in countries where the voluntary sector is not large and effective as a mediating organisation, citizens are more inclined to use direct action to make demands and express their discontent with government policies. However, as seen in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, the reverse can also be the case.

For a country with a Continental welfare regime, Luxembourg also has high levels of political activism and the residual confirms their significant deviation from the mean level of political activism. Within our sample the respondents from Luxembourg have the highest percentage of demonstration (21%) and donations to a political party or organisation (15%), which might not come as a surprise if we consider that it is by far the wealthiest country in Europe. Luxembourg's high level of demonstrations on the other hand might be due to the small size of the country.<sup>120</sup> This means that demonstrations are easier to organise in a small geographical area, where citizens, major national political institutions and even some European institutions are concentrated in the capital. Thus, in such a small country, a demonstration will be more visible and thus might be an effective tool for making demands, which in turn will give citizen's more incentive to participate in politics.

### 7.8.2 Political consumerism


The caterpillar plot shows that levels of political consumerism in seven countries differ significantly from the average at the 5% level. The *Multilevel Welfare Model (B)* for

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<sup>120</sup>Luxembourg's population size is estimated to be just half a million. Most people live in the southwest, where the capital city of Luxembourg is located and two-thirds of the population are urban. The country is about 2,586 square kilometres in size, and measures 82 km long and 57 km wide. ([www.nationsencyclopedia.com](http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com))

political consumerism shows that the Netherlands, Portugal and Austria have lower levels of political consumerism than predicted by the model and that Luxembourg, Germany, Spain and Sweden have higher levels of political consumerism than predicted by the *Multilevel Welfare Model (B)*. This means that given socio-demographic characteristics and given the nature of their welfare states, the levels of political consumerism in the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal differs significantly from the average levels of political consumerism at the 5% levels. For a Continental welfare regime these countries have lower levels of political consumerism. On the other side, given all the explanatory factors in the model, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden and Spain are predicted to have higher levels of political consumerism.

**Figure 14: Country residuals and their confidence intervals: Multilevel Welfare Model (B) predicting political consumerism**



The country residuals from left to right are: NL, PT, IE, AT, NO, GR, HU, FI, DK, PL, BE, IT, FR, SI, LU, UK, DE, ES, SE. Confidence intervals set at 1.96 i.e. 95%.

Acts of political consumerism have to be viewed within the context of other types of voluntary organisation. Citizens might be more likely to carry out political consumerism if there are a wide range of voluntary organisations that focus on consumer behaviour. Most related organisations are consumer organisations, however humanitarian and environmental organisations also mobilise consumers and campaign for various issues such as fair trade products, anti-sweatshop campaigns and environmentally friendly products (Micheletti, 2003). Thus, high levels of political consumerism could be explained partly by the predominance of these organisations and the opportunities they provide for acts of

political consumerism. Luxemburg and Sweden for example have the highest percentage of people who are involved in consumer organisations with 46% and 38% respectively. Yet, Austria and the Netherlands, which have lower levels of political consumerism than predicted by the model also have relatively high percentages of people involved in consumer organisations (34% and 32% respectively) and in humanitarian (15% and 24%) and environmental (30% and 34%) organisations. Moreover, Germany's level of engagement in consumer and environmental and humanitarian organisations lies somewhere in the middle of the levels of these countries, it is neither low, nor exceptionally high (see table 17 in Appendix 3).

Thus, while high levels of political consumerism might be explained in Sweden and Luxembourg by the dominance of organisations that tend to promote political consumer behaviour, it does not explain why despite the high representation of the same types of organisation in Austria and the Netherlands, acts of political consumerism are relatively low. Spain's level of political consumerism is also above average. Relative to the other Southern European countries, Spain has the highest percentage of people who signed a petition (24%) and bought products for ethical, environmental or political reasons (12%). Yet, they have lower percentages of people involved in consumer organisations (6%) than Italy (12%) or Slovenia (10%). Similar trends are observed with their levels of involvement in environmental and humanitarian organisations (see table 17 in Appendix 3).


The examination of the caterpillar plots has shed some light on unusual patterns of political consumerism. Yet, as research into political consumerism is still in its early stages, some differences between countries in terms of political consumerism have yet not been examined.

### 7.8.3 Associational involvement

For associational involvement the model is much better in predicting the differences between countries. France, taking into account the socio-demographic characteristics of its population, its levels of democracy in 2002 and its welfare regime, has still lower levels of associational involvement than expected. The reasons for this are specific to France and as Worms (2002) has described is related to the historical conflict between the French

centralised and secular state and the Catholic Church, which until the 1960's did not promote voluntary organisations outside of the realm of the Catholic Church or the state.

**Figure 15: Country residuals and their confidence intervals: Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model (C) predicting associational involvement**



The country residuals from left to right are: FR, PT, PL, FI, NO, HU, AT, UK, DE, GR, IE, ES, BE, LU, IT, DK, SE, NL, SI. Confidence intervals set at 95%.

The Netherlands and Slovenia on the other hand have above average levels of associational involvement, given the socio-demographic characteristics of their population and the type of welfare regime they have as well as their levels of democracy in 2002. Again, it seems that a historical explanation is the best possible answer to their relatively high levels of associational involvement. Slovenia, despite being part of the Soviet block, enjoyed more independence and thus had a stronger developed civil society than Hungary and Poland (Miheljak, 2006). The Netherlands' high level of associational involvement on the other hand is related to the pillarization, which favoured and supported the establishment of separate voluntary organisations for the main pillars (Catholics, Protestants and Social-Democrats) in the society.

## 7.9 Conclusion

The multilevel modelling results accord well with conventional analysis of political participation and involvement in associations. In line with other studies, this study has found clear evidence of class cleavage, expressed in education and social class. The clear evidence of education and social class across all dimensions of civic engagement confirmed the importance of the socio-economic status in determining civic engagement. However, for economic activity the relationship was not so clear. Those who are economically inactive are more likely to be active in politics and political consumerism and less likely to be active in voluntary organisations than those who are employed. Similarly, the unemployed and retired people are as likely as the employed people to be active in politics, while the relationship with voluntary organisations is different. These accords well with the civic voluntarism model, which suggests that besides the socio-economic status of the individual, resources such as time and money does also determine the extent of an individuals' propensity of activism. While time can be as important as money for involvement in voluntary organisations, those who might have more time on their hands, such as the unemployed, and the economically inactive are more likely to lack the means to take part in such organisations. For political participation on the other hand, which might require in general more time than money, the unemployed and the retired are as likely as the employed to be politically active and the economically inactive are even more likely to be politically active than those in employment. Thus, resources available to individuals could be one explanation for the differences of the effects of economic activity on civic engagement, as the civic voluntarism model suggests. The importance of education and class as an important predictor of civic engagement can also be explained by the cognitive mobilisation theory and the general incentive theory. As discussed in the literature review chapter III, those who have the skills and knowledge to follow politics are also in the position to better use voluntary organisations and political involvement for their own advantage. This in turn gives them more incentive to be active citizens and be well connected through involvement in voluntary organisations.

Moreover, as discussed in this chapter, the multilevel results also point to a gender difference, with women being less likely than men to be involved in political activities and associations but more likely to be political consumers. Although there are some speculations as to why women prefer acts of political consumerism, most of the studies explore women's underrepresentation in politics in general. Further study could explore the motivations of women to become political consumers.

Similar to other studies (Parry *et al.*, 1992; Curtis *et al.*, 1992; Dalton, 2002; Putnam, 2000), the differences in the propensity of civic engagement across age groups suggest a generational as well as a lifecycle effect. However, without panel data it is not possible to establish and prove empirically whether these age differences are a reflection of the different generations and their civic behaviour or whether this is due to the phenomena that individuals tend to adopt different civic behaviour at different life stages? For example the elderly are as likely as middle-aged people to be involved in voluntary organisations, while newer forms of activities such as political consumerism do not seem to appeal very much to them. Also, levels of civic engagement increases as people become integrated more into the society, i.e. middle-aged people are the most active groups, and it decreases again as social integration lessens, as people retire, and as their family and friendship circle shrinks etc. as suggested by Parry *et al.* (1992). Living in a big city, a small town or in the countryside also determines the chances of an individual's level of activism. While small localities, where face to face interactions and social control are more intense, involvement in associations and political activities are greater, however, in big cities there might be more opportunities for individuals to carry out acts of political consumerism.

The role of television has also been debated in various studies. The consistently negative relationship between extensive TV consumption across all three dimensions of civic engagement, suggest that the reasons for this might not only be "time displacement" but also "cognitive displacement" (Besley, 2006: 58). Further studies could explore this by examining the types of programmes watched by those who consume extensive hours of TV and the messages that are conveyed about civic life and society. Finally, the negative effect of ethnicity on civic engagement indicates that inequalities in participation do not only have a class dimension but also a race and ethnicity dimension.

The differences in welfare regime and levels of democracy accounted for most of the variation between countries. Alternative models were also discussed, however as they did not explain as much variation as the *Multilevel Welfare Models (A and B)* or the *Multilevel Welfare and Democracy Model (C)*. In the later model the caterpillar plot of the country residuals showed that Slovenia and the Netherlands have relatively high levels of associational involvement that were not fully explained by these factors, neither could France's low levels of associational involvement be explained fully by the model (see figure 15). The examination of the caterpillar plots is a convenient way of identifying countries that do not fit the general pattern and these countries might be further explored in case studies. For this study it might be suggested that a plausible explanation for these

outliers might be the particular historical development of the voluntary sector and its relationship with the state in these countries. Yet, further research could be conducted to examine such countries as case studies.

The contextual variables civic education and government policies which were specifically developed for this analysis did not show any significant relationship with civic engagement. Both variables had already been discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter attempts were made to include the civic education variable as a property of individuals into the analysis. However, this did not yield any significant results, suggesting that the civic education variable has not been a good measure for government's efforts to educate civic minded and active citizens at an early age. Yet, this does not mean that there is not a relationship between having civic education at school and civic engagement. It shows that it is very difficult to operationalise a civic education variable as has been attempted here, comparing the education policies with regard to civic education across 19 countries over a period of 60 years.

Given the similar composition of individuals across the 19 countries, the between country variance was reduced stronger by the inclusion of contextual variables. Interestingly however, individual level characteristics led to a bigger reduction of variance between countries in the *Socio-demographic Model (A)* predicting political activism than for the *Socio-demographic Model (C)* predicting associational involvement. This means that individual level characteristics determine stronger political activism, than it does determine associational involvement. Country context seems to be more important in explaining associational involvement than it does for political activism. The reasons could be that voluntary organisations are more dependent on structural constraints than political activities. For example it might be far easier to mobilise the masses for a political event than develop a vibrant voluntary sector, which is more long lasting and requires many more resources such as expertise, funding, venue, consistency etc.

The same pattern could be observed when comparing the probabilities of a prototype of a privileged and a disadvantaged individual (see figure 10, 11, 12 and table 16). Across all countries the privileged are very likely to be politically active as well as involved in associations. Although, country context still matters, as the Western European countries have higher rates of civic engagement, the differences between privileged individuals across the countries are relatively small if compared to the differences in engagement between disadvantaged individuals. This indicates that the country context matters more

for a disadvantaged person, than for a privileged person. A privileged person from an Eastern and Southern European country seems to be able to make his voice heard, despite socio-economic disadvantages. A disadvantaged person on the other hand is more strongly dependent on the country context to stimulate her involvement in politics and voluntary organisations.

For political consumerism the difference in levels of political consumerism between countries was greater, than the difference between privileged and advantaged individuals within a country. This points to two possible explanations. First, the everyday nature of political consumerism and the low-cost participation seems to appeal to sections of the population that are usually known to be less active, such as women, the economically inactive and the unemployed. Even young people are more likely to be active in these types of political consumerism, if compared to the elderly generation, while they are underrepresented in political activities and associational life in general. Therefore, the gap in the probability of political consumerism between a disadvantaged person and a privileged person is not as high as it is for associational involvement and particularly as it is for political activism. Secondly, the great variation between countries, suggests that like associational involvement, political consumerism is more strongly dependent on the country context. As noted in chapter V, political consumerism is more widespread in countries with postmaterialist value orientation and is therefore more common in Western Europe than in Southern and Eastern Europe. Other explanations such as cultural factors however might also be plausible and more research is needed to explore the reasons behind these differences.

## Chapter VIII

### 8. Conclusions

At the beginning of this thesis the research question and the hypotheses tested here were introduced. In chapter II and III the theoretical background to the research questions was given and in the three empirical chapters (V, VI and VII) the hypothesis were tested. At the end of each chapter the results were discussed. In this final concluding chapter I return to the hypotheses and discuss the overall results in relation to them.

#### 8.1 What's new about civic engagement: understanding political consumerism

The first empirical chapter, chapter V, explored the multidimensionality of civic engagement as formulated in hypothesis H1: Civic engagement is multidimensional. This means that citizens are likely to show preference for certain types of activities and less for other types of activities.

Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), a data explorative technique more common in France than in the UK, and often associated with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, has been applied innovatively to explore the various indicators of civic engagement. With the help of MCA three dimensions of civic engagement were identified: political activities, associational involvement and political consumerism. The former two categories proved similar to the classical distinction between political activities and civically oriented activities. Dahl (1961) famously distinguished, for example, between two ideal types of activist; the *homo politicus* and the *homo civicus*, who are driven by either the motivation to influence politics or by the motivation to fulfil civic duties. More recently political scientists recognise that many activities are driven by a mixture of both impulses, yet the main distinctions are still along the lines of political activities versus civic activities or involvement in voluntary organisations (Campbell, 2006; Oliver, 2002). This is also generally supported by survey data which ask about these types of involvement with two separate sets of questions. This study, however, also identified a third dimension of civic engagement in addition to the classical dualism of 'political' and 'civic' citizen. Political consumerism, i.e. those who sign petitions, boycott or buycott products for ethical, political or environmental reasons, emerged as a further prototype of activist. Amongst those engaged in political and civic activities the three different clusters that emerged

overlapped to some extent, but seemed also to represent three broad trends of active citizenship in Europe.

In its present manifestation political consumerism can be described as a fairly new phenomenon. Although some of the activities included can be traced a long way back such as, for example, to protests and campaigning by women in the UK around the slave trade and the boycott of sugar in the later 18<sup>th</sup> Century, political consumerism represents a new trend in the way citizens engage both politically as well as civically. Political consumerism in Western Europe in comparison with other forms of political activism has increased over the last 20 years (Micheletti *et al.*, 2005; Friedman, 1999). This increase is explained by the general shift in value orientation (from materialist to postmaterialist), individualisation and globalisation, and the rapid spread of the internet (Inglehart, 1997; Micheletti, 2003; Harrison, 2005; Berry and McEachern, 2005). Furthermore, Stolle *et al.* (2005) argue that political consumerism also integrates political and civic activities, by politicising consumer behaviour and encouraging responsible citizenship. Acts of political consumerism are oriented towards the market, are less organised, less structured, and more transient than conventional political participation. It might be that due to its low-cost participative nature and its integration into every-day life-style activity, political consumerism appeals stronger to women than to men as argued by Micheletti (2004). Moreover, such engagement is also common among young people, the unemployed and people who are economically inactive as the results in chapter VII demonstrated. In other words, it can be argued that acts of political consumerism reduce the participation gap between different social groups observed in traditional political and civic activities, which is an important reason why political consumerism deserves more attention than it currently gets in studies on political behaviour.

A further important result of the MCA analysis was the relationship identified between those involved in acts of political consumerism and those involved in New Social Movement organisations. This finding pointed to the collective nature of political consumerism. As argued in chapter V, political consumerism should be viewed as a part of a wider network of organisations and campaigns advocating wider global issues such as human rights, and environmental problems (Harrison, 2005; Micheletti, 2003). These activities reflect the existence and operation of community networks and are, according to Welzel *et al.* (2005), therefore as important as voluntary organisations in their capacity to produce collective action. This has generally been ignored by the political behaviour literature, which focuses on the decline of traditional participation mechanisms. Such a

view is at least partly influenced by *Communitarian* insights on the importance of a vibrant community, as argued by Stolle and Hooghe (2004), and tends to underplay the importance of new phenomena such as political consumerism. Moreover Stolle and Hooghe (2004) argue that focusing on traditional political activities and on face-to-face involvement in voluntary organisations may lead to a false impression that citizens are withdrawing from public life. On the contrary, this study suggests that political consumerism might essentially be a substitute for conventional forms of political participation that are less efficient and less suitable for the global nature of political problems. Yet further research is needed to establish whether political consumerism leads to the development of collective identity and political efficacy and in which ways political consumerism fosters democracy. This would shed more light on the changing nature of citizen involvement in the context of globalisation, consumerism and individualisation. The results here though do demonstrate the importance of political consumerism as a distinct prototype of civic engagement along with political activism and involvement in voluntary organisations. Particularly, with its connections with the New Social Movement organisations indicating the complex nature of these activities, political consumerism should not be analysed individually but as part of a wider network of the activist and their repertoire of action.

## **8.2 Back to the hypotheses**

Hypothesis H2 proposed that there are variations in levels of civic engagement between European countries and hypothesis H2a proposed that these variations are due to the different levels of socio-economic development and other macro characteristics of the countries. This was tested in chapter VI and VII. The comparison of aggregate scores for the three dimensions of civic engagement confirmed that countries vary in terms of their levels of civic engagement. In general the following pattern could be observed: The Western European countries tend to have higher levels of civic engagement than the Southern and Eastern European countries. Within the Western European countries the Nordic countries dominated and had high levels of civic engagement. However, despite this general pattern, there are some variations between the countries. France, for example, has for a Western European country with a long tradition of democracy relatively low levels of involvement in voluntary organisations, whereas Slovenia, for a country with a communist legacy has relatively high levels of associational involvement. These differences were discussed in detail in chapter VII when the residuals of the multilevel models were examined.

Chapter VI explored macro variables measuring GDP, history of democracy 1973-2002, levels of democracy in 2002, income inequality, poverty level, unemployment rates, government expenditure, civic education and welfare regime in a bivariate aggregate level analysis and then in a multivariate aggregate level analysis. Due to multi-collinearity different models had to be developed for welfare regime, GDP and history of democracy. These variables correlated highly with each other as they indicate the socio-economic development of the countries. These socio-economic indicators proved to be significantly related to all three dimensions of civic engagement. In addition levels of democracy and income inequality also appeared as significant despite taking into account the socio-economic development of the countries.

In this aggregate level chapter, the following hypotheses related to specific government policies were also tested and the results discussed:

H3: Government policies do affect levels civic engagement, particularly government's support of the voluntary sector and the introduction of civic education at schools.

H3a: Thus, there is a positive and significant relationship between government's support of the voluntary sector and citizen's levels of civic engagement.

H3b: Those countries, which have a long history of implementing civic education into the national curriculum, experience higher levels of civic engagement than countries which only have a short history of promoting political literacy and active participation at school.

Civic education showed a significant relationship in a bivariate analysis with political consumerism and associational involvement, confirming that the earlier governments had introduced civic education at school, the higher the levels of political consumerism and associational involvement in that country. This significant relationship however disappeared in most cases once any of the socio-economic development indicators had been controlled for. These results point to problems of endogeneity as well as measurement problems. The civic education variable can also be seen as a reflection of the history of democracy and welfare regime of the European countries. As civic education was defined here as the teaching of the skills, knowledge and behaviour of active democratic citizenship, by definition only those countries which had a democratic system could have had civic education at school that taught active democratic citizenship. Attempts in chapter VII to transform the variable into a property of individuals did not warrant any expected or

interpretable results and were therefore excluded from the final models. However, this does not mean that there is no difference between countries which have been proactive in educating younger people to be active democratic citizens and those countries which have only recently started with such efforts. The results in this analysis merely demonstrate the difficulties of measuring such efforts across 19 European countries and point to the problem of operationalising such a variable. Thus, alternative measurements and/or longitudinal data are needed in order to measure the effect of civic education at school on the propensity of individuals to become active in later adult life across countries. Hypothesis H3a has only been partly confirmed as the significant relationship could only be observed in a bivariate analysis with political consumerism and associational involvement. Moreover, in multivariate analysis civic education remained significant even after accounting for GDP (*Economic Development and Civic Education Model III*). Yet, this model was weak in comparison with other models that considered welfare regime and democracy.

Government expenditure did not show a significant relationship at the 5% level with any of the dimensions of civic engagement. The reason for this weak relationship might also be due to the measurement of the variable. Government expenditure in social and cultural areas seems to be a too broad measure and not capture governments' support of the voluntary sector. Thus, other indicators of government support of the voluntary sector have to be developed before any conclusions on the relationship between government support and levels of civic engagement can be drawn from such an analysis. In other words hypothesis H3b could not be confirmed.

Hypothesis H4 proposes that civic engagement varies in relation to key socio-demographic variables. This has been tested in the *Socio-Demographic Models* predicting political activity, political consumerism and associational involvement in chapter VII. The results accord in general with previous study identifying the importance of formal education, social class, age, and ethnicity in predicting civic engagement. Moreover, other individual level characteristics were also significant, such as gender, economic activity, size of locality etc. although their relationship did not indicate the same direction for all dimensions of civic engagement as has been discussed in the previous chapter.

Hypothesis H4a proposed that variations between countries are due to individual level characteristics as well as due to country level characteristics. This was confirmed in the

two level logit random intercept models predicting, political activities, political consumerism and associational involvement.

### 8.3 Equality and civic engagement

Overall the aggregate level analysis and the multilevel analysis carried out here allowed an exploration and discussion of cross-country variation in civic engagement by focusing on the conditions of countries that favour or hinder civic engagement. While some critics might argue that cross-national analysis leads to a broad level of aggregation and that the results therefore tell us “a little about a lot” (Campbell, 2006: 77), the analysis showed in fact that this ‘little’ actually means a lot. One of the main findings that emerged in this analysis is the importance of welfare regime and income inequality on civic engagement. This shifts the discussion on how levels of civic engagement can be improved to structural determinants rather than individual or community level determinants. These results are in tune with the recently published study by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). Comparing 22 developed countries across the globe they demonstrate that income inequality is related to a wide range of social problems i.e. reduced life expectancy, child mortality, drugs, crime, homicide rates, mental illness, obesity and low levels of trust. They argue that it is not just poverty that creates the social problems, but the differentials in income between rich and poor, which affects everybody in society, as it changes the whole fabric of the society.

The results in the aggregate level analysis showed that the higher the level of income inequality in a country, the lower the rate of political consumerism and associational involvement. This is demonstrated by the *Democracy and Equality Model I, II and III* in chapter VI predicting political participation, associational involvement and political consumerism respectively (see tables 8, 9 and 10 in chapter VI). Moreover, in the *Economic Development and Equality Model II* predicting association involvement (table 9) income inequality was highly significant despite controlling for the history of democracy and levels of democracy in 2002. This relationship was also observed in the multilevel analysis despite allowing for individual level characteristics and other contextual factors (see in chapter VII on the discussion of alternative contextual models).

Income inequality does not only show simply the disparity between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% of society, but it can also be interpreted as an indicator of social stratification and social cohesion (Twena and Aaheim, 2005). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) attempted to explain the reasons for the negative relationship between income inequality and the dysfunction of society mainly by the psycho-social effects in areas of

hierarchy and status. In line with Tocqueville (1998) they suggest that the reason for the strong community life is what Tocqueville (1998: 201) called “the equality of conditions” which takes a longer time to establish and manifest itself in the society. Thus, the authors argue that in countries where great material differences are manifest, people empathise less with each other and compete more with each other over status and prestige (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).

Great social distances between different groups of people in a society can prevent crucial civic norms such as feelings of empathy, reciprocity and co-operation in a society. These norms can therefore be seen as a glue of the society. Great income disparities mean that this glue is not effective in creating a society that can agree in general on certain principles that are in the interest of the majority of the population. The lack of a common interest and the lack of belief that everybody deserves the same chances and opportunities mean that the differences between social groups may become so great they prevent the development and implementation of policies that aim for equality of conditions.

It is argued here that material inequalities also manifest themselves in the overall society by weakening social cohesion and by preventing the development of a common interest. If the wealth of a society is not redistributed, then disadvantaged groups will find it difficult to be fully integrated into the society, not just economically but also socially and politically. The greater the gap between the most privileged and the most disadvantaged citizens, the more complicated and difficult it can be to visualise a solution and reduce these differences. As, Korkut (2009) argued in the case of the Hungarian elite, who tend to blame the poor for their own misery and were therefore reluctant to push for more generous welfare reforms. Thus the greater the social distance between the richest and poorest section of the society the greater it is, as Wilkinson and Pickett (2009: 62) point out, to imagine an “us” rather than a “them”.

## **8.4 Welfare regime and civic engagement**

The most parsimonious models were models including welfare regime. As the results in chapter VII demonstrated, across all three dimensions of civic engagement, holding the socio-demographic factors constant, being from a Southern European and Postcommunist welfare regime as opposed to the Continental welfare regime has a significantly negative relationship with political participation, political consumerism and associational involvement. Moreover, being from a Social-Democratic welfare regime as opposed to Continental welfare regime increases significantly the chances of political consumerism

and associational involvement. Although, this relationship diminishes slightly for associational involvement once the difference in levels of democracy is accounted for, the results still point to the special character of the Nordic-countries which experience high levels of associational involvement and political consumerism. The differences between a Liberal welfare regime and a Continental welfare regime across all dimensions of civic engagement however were not significant. Given the importance of welfare regime in explaining the differences between countries in civic engagement, it is important to summarize what the main features of the five welfare regime typologies are and why they might effect civic engagement.

The clustering of countries by welfare regime typologies is based on the type of coverage i.e. whether social policy is universal or means-tested and the extent of coverage, i.e. whether social assistance is effective in reducing poverty and social stratification. The Social-Democratic welfare regimes have been the most successful regimes in setting up a wide, generous and well functioning safety net that has the most equalising effect in the society. Their universal welfare policy in combination with high welfare spending means that their social policies are most effective in reducing social inequalities and poverty within Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Historically, the Nordic countries have been marked by less strong class cleavages than the other Western European countries. This led to cooperation between intermediate organisations, mainly social movements' organisations, and respective governments as early as the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This long-history of cooperation between the third sector and government deepened and played an important role in the development of the Social-Democratic welfare regime, which in turn reinforced the relationship between civil society organisations and government (Kuhne and Selle, 1992b; Henriksen and Bundesen, 2004; Rothstein, 1998a, 1998b).

The development of the Continental and the Southern European welfare regimes on the other hand is more strongly marked by cleavages between different societal forces such as the state and the church, the farmers and the industrial workers and the ruling classes. In these welfare regimes the Catholic Church maintained its strong position of providing welfare services and has thus played an important role in the formation of the Continental welfare regime. Secondly, the high fragmentation of society led to policies that favoured one group over another. For example, civil servants are more privileged in terms of employment rights and social protection than manual workers and manual workers are better covered than those who have never worked or who have experienced unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, rather than providing universal and generous welfare

provision for all, in the Continental and equally in the Southern European welfare regimes, the bulk of social protection remained linked to occupational status. It mainly favoured those already in employment and due to the strong influence of the Catholic Church, it reinforced traditional family roles, by making benefits dependent on the male bread winner's income and by deliberately under- developing crèche facilities for young children (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Nevertheless, despite the different historical development of the welfare regime and differences in social protection and entitlement, the welfare states of the Western countries have relatively well developed welfare regimes that have good working social security nets in place (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 2005). It is for this reason, that the differences between the Liberal and Continental welfare regimes are not significant across all three dimensions of civic engagement as the two level logistic random intercept models predicting civic engagement show (table 14).

In contrast to the welfare regime of Western Europe, the Southern European countries developed their welfare systems much later. The reason for this was their later development from agricultural to industrial production, their late transition to democracy as well as the role of the family and the Church in Southern-Europe (Ferrera, 2005). Their occupational based social protection puts the male breadwinner at the centre of social policy, while women are pushed back into the home to become carers of the family, the elderly and sick, and children (Esping-Andersen 2004). The social policy in these countries is highly fragmented, the benefits low (except for old age pensions), and many poor households are ineligible for social assistance because they fail to fulfil the narrow eligibility of welfare programmes (Ferrera, 2005). Moreover, as in the case of Postcommunist Europe, even where policies exist, a proper administrative infrastructure has not been put in place in order to deal efficiently with the complicated eligibility rules, and to provide effective social services. Despite financial support from the EU and the development of anti-poverty programs in Southern-Europe, these countries still experience the highest levels of poverty in Europe, including the Eastern-European countries and the United Kingdom (Matsaganis *et al.*, 2003).

The Postcommunist welfare regime is a mix of means-tested and universal social policies. They emerged from a communist welfare system, in which the state provided social assistance and full-time employment for everybody. The transition to democracy and the introduction of the market economy, led to the dismantling of public programmes and

administration and their part replacement by privatised social insurance programmes. This was accompanied by a huge retrenchment of the social sector, which was not only visible in benefit cuts but also in reduced eligibility. In the process of transition, weak state and market regulations led to the emergence of large scale corruption and tax evasion, worsened by the inadequate social services and administration required to implement and control social programmes (Cook, 2007).

Similar to Southern Europe, poor administration in the Eastern European countries, as well as low levels of social protection meant that families often had to pool their resources together as well as rely on income from the informal sector, in order to support each other and those members who are more likely to slip through the safety net such as the unemployed, the student, and the sick. The strong reliance on family networks rather than on state support is also reflected in the low levels of trust towards the government in Southern European and Eastern-European countries and high levels of informal social capital i.e. strong social ties with friends and families (Badescu and Uslaner, 2003; Torcal and Montero, 1999, Jones *et al.*, 2008; Magalhaes, 2005).

It is argued here that as a result of the weak role of the state in providing adequate social protection throughout the lifetime of its citizens, family ties are strengthened while the relationship with the government becomes underdeveloped and limited. The lack of a well functioning social security net reinforces the individual's orientation towards the family and weakens the ties with the state and its institutions. This might explain their low levels of engagement in the public sphere. If families have played an important role in helping individuals through 'tough times' then it is families that are the primary institutions to which loyalties are paid. Thus rather than using intermediate channels to make demands to the governments, citizens from Southern Europe and Eastern Europe rely more heavily on family support and are thus less likely to be engaged in voluntary organisations and political activities than their Western counterparts.<sup>121</sup>

## **8.5 Democracy and civic engagement**

The results presented in this thesis also suggest that the degree of stability or continuity of democracy is an important factor predicting civic engagement. This demonstrates, in line with other studies, that it takes time for a rich fabric of voluntary community organisations to develop (Inglehart, 1997; Curtis, Baer and Grab, 2001). Lipset (1994:3) notes that such

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<sup>121</sup> Curtis *et al.*, (2001) have come to similar conclusions in their cross-national study of civic engagement. See also Reher (1998) about the strength of family ties in Europe.

ideas as freedom of speech and the right to assembly ‘do not evolve over night’. This relates particularly to the postcommunist countries, that despite liberalisation and democratisation since the 1990s, the Eastern European countries still suffer from a lack of “financially independent and socially and politically conscious people to fulfil the task of building and running NGOs.” (Miszlivetz and Jensen, 1998: 86). Moreover, particularly in Hungary, the new political elite developed a strong, anti-civil society understanding of democracy, and viewed grassroots mobilisation as unnecessary. As a result the restoration of authoritarian patterns of behaviour between citizens and their institutions is a powerful tendency in Hungary, having a detrimental effect on active citizenship (Miszlivetz and Jensen, 1998). The two measures of democracy used in this analysis reflect these developments by not only measuring the legal aspects of political rights and civil liberties but also the extent to which there are restrictions to the implementation of these rights. Thus, these two measures are also indicators of the political and democratic culture of the country.

## **8.6 What matters more individual characteristics or country context?**

The study demonstrated that citizens’ propensity to become civically active does not only depend on their socio-demographic characteristics but also on the characteristics of the country in which they live. However, the effects were different for each dimension of civic engagement. Individual level characteristics reduced the variation between countries more for political activities than for political consumerism and associational involvement (table 15). For associational involvement on the other hand the effect of country context was greater. The same pattern could be observed in the graphs that compared the probability of political activism, associational involvement and political consumerism for a privileged person and disadvantaged person (table 10 and figures 10, 11 and 12). The gap between a disadvantaged and a privileged person was greatest for political activism. For associational involvement on the other hand the gap in the propensity of activism between a disadvantaged and privileged person was not as great as the difference between countries. For political consumerism the difference was also more marked between countries, particularly between the Western European countries on the one hand and the Southern and Eastern European countries on the other hand. This suggests that political activism is strongly driven by individual level factors, while political consumerism and associational involvement is more driven by the country context. The reason for this might be that associational involvement reflects more the structures and opportunities prevalent in a country that enable citizens to become involved in them. Similarly, political consumerism

is also dependent on the opportunities to be able to buy fair trade products, for example, which might not be available in every country to the same extent. It has also been associated with postmaterialist values and access to the internet, both more common in Western European countries. For political activism on the other hand structural conditions do not seem to be as important as they are for the dimensions of civic engagement.

The graphs (figures 10, 11 and 12) also showed that the difference between countries is not so great for privileged individuals as for disadvantaged individuals. Privileged individuals from Eastern and Southern European countries seem to be able to make their voice heard, despite the socio-economic disadvantages of those countries. Disadvantaged individuals on the other hand seem to be more dependent on the country context.

The results clearly emphasise the country context in accounting for the variation in civic engagement between countries. Thus, the findings presented here further enhance the case that similar people living under different socio-economic systems tend to display different levels of civic engagement. Most of the studies on civic engagement focus on the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. Given, the significant gap in civic engagement between individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds, this is very much justifiable. Truly, these findings call for concerted research efforts to find out how the difference in civic engagement across class, age, gender, ethnicity etc. can be overcome.

The analysis here has also clearly shown that socio-economically disadvantaged individuals have a higher propensity to be civically engaged if they live in an environment that has had policies in place to ensure that all citizens are fully integrated into the social and economic life. Furthermore, as the significance of the democracy 2002 variable has shown, in addition to the welfare regime, the degree to which civil and political rights are guaranteed is also important. An effective and transparent government is more likely to provide more incentives for citizens' participation in public affairs. This in turn puts more pressure on governments to improve their performance. A weak welfare regime that fails in providing adequate security against poverty, or a government that is corrupt, on the other hand is more likely to alienate citizens from the political process. Such governments are more likely to fear citizen's involvement and therefore more keen to minimise involvement as it can be a threat to their power. In such cases citizens might feel that their intervention in politics does not make a difference and thus might have fewer incentives to participate. Thus, clearly government can and do shape levels of civic engagement.

## **Appendix**

### **Appendix 1: Classifying citizenship education policies across Europe**

Across Europe the post-war countries education policies were marked by a period of rapid change; West and East equally. The school system was reformed with the aim of bringing more equality. In many countries reforms of the national curriculum appeared alongside the extension of compulsory education and the introduction of more egalitarian and inclusive comprehensive schools, particularly in the Nordic countries. In West Europe new teaching methods were developed, for example, French educators adopted “active methods” that encouraged student activity, analytical thinking and small group projects. This moved away from an authoritarian and teacher focused style towards a more open class environment that focused more on the pupils (Dumas and Lee, 1978). During this reform social studies were also developed to include issues related to the modern life of citizens. I will now describe how these reforms varied across Europe.

#### **Norway**

The 1959 Elementary Education Act extended compulsory education to nine years. The act aspired to: “one school for all children up to the age of 16/17, which can be a democratic community in miniature” (Sirevag 1966: 4). However it did not prescribe any curricular or time allotment plans as this was left to the Council of Experiments in Schools they issued yearly reports, curriculum guides and courses of study (Sausjord, 1967). The Council of Experiments in Schools made experimental activity an integral part of the running of schools. The result was that reforms and new ideas could be put into practice more easily and efficiently as they no longer had to be approved by Parliament. The purpose of this Norwegian law was to give school systems an organisational framework in keeping with the requirements of a modern society; while creating the conditions necessary for productive inner growth. In 1964 the “give a days work” or “Operation Day” initiative was introduced, this is regarded at present as Norway’s biggest solidarity programme for young people. Furthermore, Norway is one of the few countries to have a compulsory curriculum for pupils’ (Eurydice 2004/2005: Norway).

There was no single subject for citizenship education at schools in Norway up to the 1990s. It was rather an integral part of school life and permeates all subjects as citizenship and democracy related issues form parts of various subject curricula. The core curriculum

focuses on giving individual pupils not only subject-based knowledge but also broadly based competence in order to encourage them to become critical and active participants in society as well as caring and responsible citizens (Eurydice 2004/2005: Norway). The concept of citizenship education in Norway can therefore be traced back to the 1959 Elementary Education Act.

## **Sweden**

Parallel to the developments of the social-democratic welfare system in the Nordic countries, the Swedish school system was reformed and compulsory schools introduced. The introduction of comprehensive schooling for 9 years was finalised in Sweden through the 1962 law on the *grundskolan*. The subject 'social studies' developed a syllabus relevant to citizenship education that included: community civics; collective behaviour; the State; the Church; democracy; meaning and problems; social movements; political economy and Scandinavian and international co-operations (Husen, 1965). The goals and content of 'civics education' is summarised by Wallin (1971): "It is said that civics education should give orientation about present society both nationally and internationally and stimulate pupils' own contribution to society and create engagement in common problems. [...] this formulation gives room for training of skills in critical thinking." (Wallin, 1971: 40). He continues with quotes from the syllabus: "The pupils should learn civics by active work directed to facts, conditions and problems in society and different ways to cope with urgent questions in the society" (Wallin 1971: 40).

Overall the curriculum and the school systems in Sweden were reformed towards a more egalitarian and democratic system. "In the 1960s pupil influence was introduced into the Education Act and pupils were encouraged to participate in pupil councils to develop their sense of democracy". (Eurydice, 2006/2007(b): 29) The concept of democratic citizenship at school can therefore be traced back to the 1962 law on the *grundskolan*.

## **Finland**

Finland also experienced profound reforms in its education system in the 1960-70s. The Basic School Act of 1972 introduced nine years of compulsory comprehensive schooling and reforms were made to the curriculum, which included now 'moral and citizenship studies' (Whittaker, 1983: 35). Due to its cross-curricular nature, civics was dispersed over the syllabus of several subjects, mainly history and social studies. It is therefore regarded as a task of the whole school system, along with the development of a student's

personality. “The comprehensive school’s curricular is founded on general education, which covers not only cognitive aspects but also ethics, aesthetical sensitivity, observations and social skills. [...] As far as growing up as a member of a democratic society is concerned, the most significant elements are social skills and the perception of the student as an active organizer of his or her own knowledge structure and conception of the world.” (Ahonen and Virta, 1999: 232). Thus the concept of citizenship education in Finland can be traced back to the Basic School Act of 1972.

## **Denmark**

The 1975 *Folkeskole* (Consolidation) Act incorporates a strong democratic tradition at all levels of the educational system. According to paragraph 1 (3) of the Act, teaching and daily life at the school must be built on intellectual freedom, equality and democracy. Schools shall prepare pupils for participation, joint responsibility, rights and duties in a society, based on freedom and democracy. “The Folkeskole shall prepare pupils for taking an active interest in their environment and for participation in decision making in a democratic society, and for sharing responsibility for the solution of common problems. Thus, teaching and the entire daily life in school must be based on intellectual liberty and democracy.” (Bjerg, 1991: 136).

The Act also introduced Pupil’s Councils and set aside a weekly lesson in the timetable to deal with socio-educational problems e.g. the planning of field trips, school camps, parent-teacher meeting, arrangement of the class room, school rules, student council work, conflicts between pupils (Eurydice 2005b). Thus freedom and democracy are overarching terms and are not concentrated in one particular subject (Eurydice 2004/2005: Denmark). Danish schools, like the other Nordic schools, are characterised by many opportunities for democratic discussions and decision-making and this can be traced back to the 1975 act on the Folkeskole (Hahn, 1999, Bjerg 1991).

## **Austria**

The implementation of civic education in Austria’s school is laid down in the “Politische Bildung” (civic education) decree of 1978. The decree emphasise the importance of the connection between individual development and the development of a society as a whole and defines the role of civic education in contributing “proactively towards shaping society and translating democracy into practice” (Austria, 1978). Since 1978 civic education in Austria has been integrated into the compulsory subjects of history and social sciences and

gained the status of a separate subject in 2002 (Eurydice 2004/05\_Austria). In comparison to the new civic education programme, Filzmair and Klepp (2006) remark that civic education was very content-led and knowledge based. The subject concentrated on a country's history and geography, the structure and system of government and its constitutions and gave little opportunities for student's interactions. Nevertheless, the decree of 1978 introduced civic education as a learning principle into the national curriculum.

## **Germany**

Germany is a federal republic, with means that the federal states have autonomy in cultural affairs. In addition to that Germany was divided from 1945-1990 into GDR and FRG. The GDR was part of the Soviet block and had adapted a socialist educational system, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. There is no uniform concept of civic education, but rather objectives of civic education taught under different names and in different subject areas depending on the Leander i.e. 'Gegenwartskunde', 'Gemeinschaftskunde', 'Sozialkunde', 'Gesellschaftskunde', 'Politische Weltkunde'. Haendle (2002) traces the existence of civic education in Western Germany as early as 1949. Referring only to civic education in the Federal Republic of Germany, Haendle, Oesterreich and Trommer (1999) argue that the subject has not been not narrowly confined to instructions about government and politics but found expression in the political dimension of a range of subjects taught in the school. Furthermore, they continue that civic education is also a central objective in interdisciplinary and practice oriented projects, particularly in project days, project weeks and after school events in the school. Civic education has been regarded as a guiding principle that can be taught in integrated courses such as history, geography, religion, languages and economy.

The relative early establishment of civic education in Germany is related to the historical legacy of the National Socialist area from 1933-45. In order to build up a democratic culture and to ensure support for the young democratic institutions by the population after the experience of a totalitarian state, the school authorities in Germany were given the task of preparing people for citizenship with support of the Allies in 1945. Civic education, therefore, became a tool of political rehabilitation and re-socialisation.

In comparison to many other European countries teachers in civic education received specialised education to teach the subject. Since the end of 1950's civic education has been introduced at teacher colleges and universities. In addition a wide ranging scholarly

discussion surrounding the subject civic education is carried out in professional journals, such as *Kursiv Gegenwartskunde* and *Politische Bildung*. There are also professional associations, such as the *Association for Civic Education* (DVPB, est. 1975) and the *Association of the Political Sciences* (DVPW, est. 1951) which makes a wide range of material available to the public, including schools and hold congresses. Since 1952 the DVPW have been publishing teaching material for civic education and numerous other information documents to promote awareness of democracy and participation in politics (Haendle, Oesterreich and Trommer (1999) and Eurydice 2004/2005 Germany).

## **The Netherlands**

The Dutch education system is organised around the principle of freedom of education, which means that the communities have the freedom to found schools, freedom to organise schools and freedom to determine the religion or other convictions on which school is based. Anchored in the Constitution, public and private schools are funded on an equal basis. As a result besides public schools, there are large number religious schools. Although there are standards imposed by the Ministry of Education, the content of education provided by schools varies because of the freedom given to the school authorities to determine the teaching in their schools on the basis of their own views (Dekker, 1999).

The introduction of citizenship education in the Netherlands appeared in a context of discussions on the overall role of the education system in the 1960s. Personal and collective emancipation was at the centre stage of these discussions. Society was expected to create the conditions for everyone's personal emancipation. Personal and collective emancipation were linked, and the further democratization of society and the reduction of inequality were seen as necessary conditions (Veugelers, 2007).

Dekker (1999) reports that in 1969 citizenship education became integrated into the "society" (*maatschappijleer*) lesson taught, in secondary schools. The overall goal of this subject was social and political education and the aim was to prepare the youth for their role as "good" citizens. Although, the article does not specify how common this subject was across the different schools, other articles on the Dutch educational system, suggest an active participatory culture as the characteristics of Dutch schools (Hahn 1999, Eurydice 2004/05).

## **Ireland**

Since the foundation of the Irish state citizenship education has been a contentious issue. The Catholic Church in Ireland did not favour the creation of a separate single school subject on citizenship as it believed that moral education and personal development were best taught through religious education. “The Church argued that, because of its close link to Religion, civic issues should be incorporated within the Religious Education programme—an argument accepted by the government of the day and reflective of the very close relationship that existed between Church and State at this time”. (Kerr, McCarthy and Smith, 2002: 182). In 1966 the first Civics syllabus was introduced into the lower post-primary curriculum in Ireland. In practice the subject was taught with a predominantly national connotation. Its primary aim was “to inculcate values such as civic responsibility, moral virtue, patriotism and law abidingness.” (Harris, 2005: 48). After a critical start, Civics was by the end of the 1970s a dying subject. In 1997 Civics, Social and Political Education (CSPE) was introduced, which replaced Civics. Its aim was is to prepare students for active participatory citizenship through the comprehensive exploration of the civic, social and political dimensions of their lives” (CSPE Syllabus) (Harris 2005). In summary despite the problems in implementing the subject at school, it found nevertheless its way into the national curriculum.

## **France**

French education is one of the most centralised systems in Europe. Changes in school organisation, curriculum, student guidance and placement, teacher and administrator placement are prescribed by the Ministry of Education in Paris (Dumas and Lee, 1978). The French government has been preoccupied with the teaching of ‘civic’ values since it has declared itself a republic. Schools were meant to consolidate French identity and have since then tried to be powerful instruments of integration. The idea was to form a new citizen based on a secular French national identity. ‘Civic education’ thus existed in the curriculum as moral education “instruction civique et morale” since the 19th century (Ruget, 2006). However, civic education “education civique” as defined by this study has only been introduced with the 1976 (Osler and Starkley 2001). The Haby reform introduced a new culture of education, which put an emphasis on student’s activity, analytical thinking, small group discussion and projects. Civic education was allocated an hour per week in the national curriculum and the subject covered areas such as government, politics, and obligations of citizens. Despite the development of a syllabus for

civic education, it was not introduced as a separate subject, but was meant to be taught within the subjects of history and geography and as an overall culture of school as Dumas and Lee (1978: 404) explain:

Historical and geographical knowledge and the ability to criticise and analyse are typically seen as among the more basic implications of culture générale. In fact, the goal of promoting civic responsibility, perhaps the most persistently critical social studies goal in most other western societies, appears to be inseparable from and subordinate to the general culture goal. In discussions of goals, French social educators do not set apart citizenship education as a major objective for history and geography. (...) The one hour weekly separate civic instruction (...) deals with government, politics, and obligations of citizens (...).

Dumas and Lee's analysis has been written in the aftermath of the reforms and are thus very positive. Scholars writing on the current civic education debates and reforms on the other side are taking a comparative perspective, which highlights mainly the deficiency of these policies and their implementation. Ruget (2006) for example refers briefly to civic education since the Haby reform and remarks that the teaching of this subject was very much text-book based and discussions and debates over contemporary issues were neglected mainly due to the lack of adequate teacher training in this field (Ruget 2006: 23).

Since 1999 a brand new 'civic, juridical and social education' is being thought again to French high schools. The new program exhorts renewed teaching, more practice and participation, based on argumentative debates. Community service activities remain rare in France and only since 1997 have schools been encouraged to develop 'citizens' initiatives'. Their objective is to familiarise students with democratic life (visit to the parliament, meeting with local elected officers), or engagement in public action (humanitarian projects). They can also take the form of activities to improve life at school (Ruget 2006). These recent reforms to civic education in France are also very common in other European countries. However, the focus here is on civic education programmes that were introduced after 1945 and before this second wave of civic education reforms of the 1990s. Hence, the civic education can be traced back in France to the Haby reform in 1976.

## **Italy**

Unlike the other Southern European countries Italy left behind its totalitarian regime with the end of the Second World War in 1945. However, when compared to Western European countries, the political and economic life in Italy was affected by many problems such as deeply rooted organized crime and corruption, the gap between citizens and public administration and the chronic disparity between north and south. These developments

hindered educational reforms that were common in the other Western democratic countries in the 60s and 70s (Brinkmann and Hoerner, 2007).

In Italy topics related to civic education were incorporated into moral education from 1958. However, as it is the case in France, moral education falls outside of the definition of civic education of this study. It was only with the reforms of the lower secondary schools in 1979, that civic education was introduced in the national curriculum as “civic education and history” (Losito 2003 and Eurydice 2004/05\_Italy). Analysing the civic education policies in Italy, Losito lists a number of discrepancies between general aims of the school system, curricular content and teaching methodologies (Losito, 1999). Nevertheless, Italy has had a civic education programme since 1976, despite the discrepancies, which can not be taken into consideration here.

## **Portugal**

In Southern Europe the history of democracy is a relatively recent one. Only during the 70's did Portugal, Spain and Greece experience the restoration of democracy after living under dictatorial regimes (Menezes, 2003). During the five decades of dictatorship in Portugal the education system served as a mean to reinstall the authority of the state. Themes such as God, fatherland and authority were at the centre of the school curricular and for these reasons, even after a democratic constitution was established in 1976, there was great concern about the ideological indoctrination of this subject. As a result, no space was devoted to it in the school curricula. However, with the entrance of Portugal into the European Community, together with the emergence of a period of political stability, the 1986 Education Act was approved. This act extended compulsory education to nine years and clearly stated the promotion of active and critical citizens as a goal of education. Civic education was included in the syllabus of Personal and Social Education (PSE) along themes such as sex, family education, health education, environment education (Menezes, 2003 and Menezes et al., 1999). Thus, the introduction of civic education as defined by this study in Portugal goes back to 1986.

## **Spain**

Under the dictatorship of Franco in Spain from 1939-1975 the education system underwent some changes in order to adjust to the challenges of the modern world. Yet, education under his rule was still “Catholic and patriotic” and become a means of imposing ideology (Eurydice, 2006/2007a: 12). After Franco's death in 1975 democracy was re-established

and a large number of educational reforms were undertaken. However, similar to Portugal, due to the experience with the past, civic education was a sensitive issue and gained only slow acceptance by the educational reformer. First moves towards including civic education into the curriculum were made through the 1985 Organic Act on the Right to Education (LODE), which specifies the aims of the educational policies and makes some reference to the “democratic principals of coexistent and preparation for active participation”. (Eurydice 2004/2005 Spain: 3). However, only the subsequent reforms in 1990 (General Law for the Regulation of the Spanish Educational System (LOGSE 1990)) were specific laws passed to implement civic education into the national curriculum (Naval and Iriarte 2003). Thus, the introduction of civic education at schools in Spain can be dated back to 1990 only.

## **Greece**

The post-war period in Greece was marked by a bitter civic war between government forces and communist-led resistance. The conflict reached its peak during the totalitarian regime of the military junta from 1967-74. This oppressive political culture was also reflected in the national curriculum. Although the subject civic education existed in Greece since the 1950s under names as ‘national education’, ‘knowing fatherland’ and as ‘education for citizen’, it was a source of ideological indoctrination and stand in stark contrast to a democratic understanding of citizenship education discussed here as argued by Makrinoti and Solomon (1999: 293):

There was an over-emphasis on the strengthening of national morale and national identity, at the core of which lay a combination of ethnocentric and Christian-orthodox discourse. (...) The course took in the character of political indoctrination, an orientation reinforced by the character of pedagogic practices adopted. The course was textbook and teacher oriented while the students were expected to adopt a passive role as learners. Military like behaviour and attire were imposed both in the school and the community.

Only after the military junta in Greece was dissolved in 1974 a new constitution was written that reflected the drive for democracy in all sectors of Greek society. Many articles in the constitutions are referring to right of citizens to participate in the socio-economic and political life of the country. The education reforms of 1985 (Law 1566/85) defines social and political education as one of the three major aims of primary and secondary education (Eurydice 2004/2005 Greece). Thus civic education at school in Greece can therefore be traced back to 1985.

## England

The UK does not have a national curriculum, as education policies are decided at a regional level (Wales, Scotland, England and Northern Ireland). Local authorities are responsible for formulating curricular policies and objectives that meet national policies and objectives, command local assent, and can be applied by each school to its own circumstance. It is the individual schools that shape the curriculum for each pupil. Neither the government nor the local authorities can specify in detail what the schools should teach. This is for the schools themselves to determine. This approach in the regulation of education policies makes it very difficult to pinpoint one reform or a very particular year to the implementation of civic education at secondary schools in the UK.

The teaching of civics and citizenship in English schools goes back to the Victorian period and Batho (1990: 94) notes particularly the 1930s as a decade when teaching of citizenship was “widely advocated in many areas and practiced in secondary schools”. However, with the publication of the 1943 Norwood Report on the curriculum and examination of the secondary school, the government showed that it was not in tune with the advocates of civic education subjects:

Looking to wider issues, some would point to the needs of a modern democracy and would urge that democracy can work only if its members have enough political and social sense to make it work; they would enlist the aid of history teaching in schools as a main instrument in the education of democracy, and would extend the range of school history and geography to cover 'civics' and 'world politics' and economics. (HMSO, 1943).

The report makes clear that they don't have inventions to provide civics a separate subject, and argue that it is best served as a theme that is being integrated in the syllabus history. “We have naturally had under careful consideration the question of the teaching of civics. Such teaching has had its successes and its failures. We would not ourselves approach the preparation of a child for life as a citizen in a democracy through direct instruction in the duties of the good citizen, and for two main reasons: first, because we think that good citizenship finds its sanction in something at the same time more fundamental and more pervasive than classroom instruction, that the qualities which make a good citizen are taught by or caught from the quality of the general life of the school; secondly, because the instruction, which can be of value only if those qualities are presupposed, springs most naturally and effectively from the study of ordinary school subjects, particularly history, provided that those subjects are treated, when appropriate, in such a way as to be of

relevance and significance to the present day. It is to this last proviso that we would call attention, for it is here that reform in our opinion is most needed.” (HMSO, 1943)

The interest given to citizenship studies as a separate subject faded away in the post war era but it continued in the 1960s as a cross curricular theme in subjects such as history and social studies. The 1962 Handbook for History Teacher devoted a chapter to “The teaching of civics”. (Batho 1990). As David Kerr (1999: 205) explains:

There has never been strong support for a discrete subject entitled civics or citizenship. Instead, what passes as citizenship education has been characterized by an emphasis on indirect transmission through school values, ethos and participation in school rituals than by direct delivery through subject teaching. Indeed, transmission has been weighted toward student exposure to good role models and sound habits rather than to direction through specified subject content. The intention has been to mould character and behaviour rather than to develop civic awareness.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an emphasis from within education on the personal and social development of students. This led to changes in approach to traditional subjects, such as the development of ‘new history’ courses. It also saw the growth of a range of school courses incorporating political education in the widest sense of the term. These courses attempted to have more relevance for students in terms of their experiences and needs in modern society. They included personal and social education (PSE), social studies, peace studies, war studies, civics, law-related education, global education, human rights education, environmental education, women’s studies, Black studies and European studies courses. The majority of these studies were centred upon the core concept of social justice and respect for human rights (Kerr 1999).

“Indeed, the history of education for citizenship in England is a curious mixture; noble intentions that were turned into general pronouncements, which, in turn, became minimal guidance for schools. The avoidance of any overt official document direction to schools concerning political socialization and citizenship education can almost be seen as a national trait. [...] it has usually been located in the implicit or hidden curriculum rather than in the explicit or formal curriculum.” (Kerr 1999: 204).

## **Postcommunist countries**

Poland’s, Slovenia’s, Hungary’s and East Germany’s education system was heavily influenced by the Soviet regime. Their education system from the post-war era to the fall of the Soviet block was based on a unified educational system in order to guarantee

equality, in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Despite the strong idea of equality and solidarity, the socialist education system was also very hierarchical and knowledge based, promoting obedience rather than critical thinking, as Heandle (2002) describes for East Germany:

“The objective of political education at school in this society was the socially committed comrade or more generally: the all-round educated socialist personality. Objectives were centrally determined and hierarchically imparted; political viewpoints were stipulated [...] Not freedom, as in plural democracy was regarded as the central principle, but support for socialist principles and the existing state. Hierarchical forms of interaction and organisation were instruments of these central principles.” (SOWI online, no page)

Articles written by national researches as part of the European Commission study and the IEA's (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, study on civic engagement in the former communist countries all argued that civic education has only be introduced in those countries after the transformation in the 1990s. Despite the existence of a subject on citizenship, they all agree that the civic education programmes of the communist era were based on “the aim of indoctrinating them into being builders of communism” (Buk-Berge 2006: 534). Only the civic education policies after the transformation had the aim of educating citizens living under/for democracy.

## Poland

The transformation from communism to democracy led to fundamental changes in the education system and to the subject ‘civics’. The civic education programme in Poland was developed by Polish teachers with the assistance of American educators. The aim of the programme was to prepare young people for active citizenship in a civil society and in a constitutional state. Civil society according to Buk-Berge (2006: 539) was defined in this programme as a society with high level of activity among citizens in different voluntary organisations.

Civil society is also described in term of reciprocal relations between citizens that are seen as essential different from the relationship between the citizen and the state.

In 1991 at the request of the Polish Ministry for National Education, the project Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created. The EDCP established in 1994 the Centre for Citizenship Education (CCE) as a non-Governmental, non-profit

organisation. “The programme for citizenship education formed in Poland after the fall of communism can be regarded as unconventional since it includes education for life in civic society, life in communities, and democracy.” (Buk-Berge 2006, 540). Attempts to develop civic education at school thus started in 1991 with the establishment of the EDCP project. The 1998 reform of the education system in Poland, introduced the concept of citizenship education at all levels of Polish schools.<sup>122</sup> For pupils in Educational Stage II (ages 11 to 13) the subject History and Society included the topics of Citizenship Education and Education for Society as a cross-curricular pathway. For pupils in the Educational Stage III (ages 14-16), civics as a subject was introduced as documented in Eurydice (2004/05, Poland: 3):

(...) in the core curriculum contents for the different stages of education, reference is made, for example, to the development of civic attitudes and civic awareness, responsible participation in social and public life, respect for the state, and the capacities needed for active involvement in social and public life. The core curriculum includes content concerning the development of political literacy and active participation, as well as a sense of civic responsibility and critical thinking.

Hence, citizenship education in Poland has been introduced since 1998.

## Hungary

Civic education in Hungary during the communist area existed before 1978 as a cross-curricular topic. With educational reforms in 1978, the civic education became a special field of education with its own subject frameworks. However, as Matrai (1999:344) remarks, “civics remained a normative subject that helped maintain the ideological underpinnings of social education.” With the democratic transition of the 1990s in Hungary, the structure of the education system changed. Private schools, maintained by Churches and foundations emerged which developed their own curriculum and textbooks. The National Core Curriculum developed by the government did not bind schools but served as a guideline only. This means that many schools could decide about their own syllabus and choose textbooks from the market.

Nevertheless, the Education Act of 1993, which includes the National Core Curriculum, defines citizenship education as a comprehensive educational development objective with a cross-curricular dimension. It has been reserved a place within the broader subject area of “Human Being and Society” as mentioned in Eurydice (2004/05, Hungary: 4):

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<sup>122</sup>For an evaluation of the effects of civic education programme in Poland see Kazimierz *et al.* (1998).

Humankind is the focus of this subject area (...) in which pupils are encouraged to form their own opinions, participate actively in public life at school and develop democratic attitudes and behaviour.

Thus, since 1993 a programme for civic education at school in Hungary has existed.

## **Slovenia**

Amongst the former socialist countries Slovenia is very distinctive and is economically the most successive post-communist country. Historically, Slovenia enjoyed a milder version of Soviet influence and experienced greater political and economic liberties than other communist countries such as Rumania and Bulgaria. “Already in the period when Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia there was a socialist brand of market economy and a degree of participation in public affairs in the framework of a comprehensive self-management system. Free travel and relatively free flow of information from abroad contribute to a more realistic public awareness of notions like democracy, consumer society and capitalism.” (Strajn, 1999: 547).

Nevertheless Slovenia still experienced almost five decades of communist regime. The transition from a one-party system to a parliamentary democracy at the end of the eighties has lead also to profound changes in the educational system and the national curriculum. Subjects related to citizenship education such as “Foundations of Socialist Morality” and “Socio-Moral Education” that had been taught in schools since 1958 were abolished (Simenc, 2003). The White Paper on Education in Slovenia (1996) sets the systematic, normative and legislative frameworks for the entire educational system. These reforms introduced ‘civic education and ethics’ as a compulsory subject to the pupils in years 7-8 and ‘civic culture’ as an optional subject to pupils in year 9 of their compulsory education (Eurydice 2004/05: Slovenia).<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Similar to Poland and Hungary, the Church in Slovenia emerged as an influential partner in debates about the re-structuring of the educational system. However, unlike these countries, attempts of the Catholic Church to influence the curriculum and introduce religious education at schools were met with resistance (Simenc, 2003). The relationships between the Church, the educational system and civic education emerged as an interesting point throughout this comparison. The Church seemed to have an influence on the introduction of the subject in a number of other countries.

## **Appendix 2: ESS civic engagement indicators**

### **2.1 Political activities**

Exact wording of the questions on political activities in the ESS 2002:

“There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?  
(Answers: Yes, No, (Don’t know))

B15: Contacted a politician, government or local government official

B16: Worked in a political party or action group

B17: Worked in another organisation or association

B18: Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker

B19: Signed a petition

B20: Taken part in a lawful public demonstration

B21: Boycotted certain products

B22: Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons

B23: Donated money to a political organisation or group

B24: Participated in illegal protest activities

#### **Question on attachment to a political party:**

B26: Are you a member of a political party (Yes, No)

Footnote about member: Official membership or registration with a party is meant.

#### **Voting:**

B13: Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? (Yes, No, Not eligible to vote, (Don’t know))

## **2.2 Involvement in voluntary organisations**

E1-12 a: For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please use this card (card 43) to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which. (Card 43: None, Member, Participated, Donated Money, Voluntary Work)

- E1 ... Firstly, a sports club or club for outdoor activities?
- E2 ... an organisation for cultural or hobby activities?
- E3 ... a trade union?
- E4 ... a business, profession, or farmers' organisation?
- E5 ... a consumer or automobile organisation?
- E6 ... an organisation for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants?
- E7 ... an organisation for environmental protection, peace or animal rights?
- E8 ... a religious or church organisation?
- E9 ... a political party?
- E10 ... an organisation for science, education, or teachers and parents?
- E11 ...a social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies?
- E12 ...any other voluntary organisation such as the ones I've just mentioned?

## Appendix 3: Frequency of associational involvement by country

**Table 17: Involvement in 12 types of associations by types of involvement and by country**

	NO	SE	FI	DK	GB	IE	LU	AT	NL	BE	DE	FR	IT	ES	PT	GR	SI	PL	HU	Average
Political Party M	9	8	6	6	3	4	6	11	5	6	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	2	2	5
Political Party D	1	2	0	2	2	3	1	3	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	1
Political Party V	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1
Political Party P	3	4	2	3	1	2	1	5	2	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2
Trade Union M	47	56	46	65	16	19	22	22	22	28	14	9	9	6	5	15	19	6	6	23
Trade Union D	3	0	0	3	3	5	1	3	2	2	1	3	0	2	2	2	9	2	0	2
Trade Union V	4	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	1
Trade Union P	9	7	4	11	3	4	3	3	2	5	3	3	5	2	1	2	3	2	3	4
Professional M	14	9	12	14	13	16	11	10	13	9	9	4	9	5	3	6	8	1	3	9
Professional D	1	1	0	1	3	4	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	3	3	1	0	1
Professional V	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	1
Professional P	5	4	3	6	5	6	3	3	5	5	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	1	3	3
Consumer M	34	37	5	18	32	9	46	33	32	9	28	4	6	4	2	0	9	0	3	16
Consumer D	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	4	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	1
Consumer V	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Consumer P	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	3	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
Educational M	9	11	5	7	7	8	11	10	10	8	6	8	2	8	1	4	5	2	3	7
Educational D	1	2	1	1	4	2	2	3	3	2	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	2
Educational V	4	3	1	1	4	2	2	2	4	3	3	3	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2
Educational P	5	6	5	4	7	4	3	5	5	8	5	5	1	4	2	2	2	1	3	4
Humanitarian M	17	14	4	11	4	5	9	8	8	7	6	6	5	4	2	1	5	1	1	6
Humanitarian D	25	27	13	18	12	9	7	15	20	13	16	8	7	6	4	4	10	3	1	12
Humanitarian V	4	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Humanitarian P	3	4	3	3	3	3	2	5	1	4	3	4	2	4	1	1	2	1	1	3
Environmental M	5	7	2	12	6	4	14	13	20	8	6	5	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	12
Environmental D	5	9	4	6	12	7	6	17	22	9	10	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	6
Environmental V	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Environmental P	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	6	2	5	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
Religious M	13	15	25	27	14	25	5	32	26	7	19	5	5	6	6	1	8	3	6	13
Religious D	10	8	2	7	14	16	1	13	18	3	10	5	2	3	6	0	6	4	3	7
Religious V	6	4	2	2	6	5	1	3	7	3	5	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	3
Religious P	7	7	7	8	12	11	2	9	10	5	9	5	4	4	8	1	2	2	5	6
Sports M	26	39	22	36	27	34	26	26	46	33	32	21	8	12	8	4	16	4	5	22
Sports D	10	12	2	8	7	11	4	7	8	6	6	6	1	3	3	1	8	2	1	6
Sports V	18	17	4	13	6	6	5	3	13	8	11	7	1	1	1	1	8	1	2	7
Sports P	20	23	12	24	23	18	13	13	25	23	21	20	10	10	6	3	10	2	6	15
Cultural M	22	25	13	26	16	18	21	18	19	22	17	18	7	11	4	6	8	3	5	15
Cultural D	6	5	1	5	6	5	4	5	4	4	6	6	0	3	1	2	4	1	1	4
Cultural V	12	10	2	7	5	3	5	3	6	7	7	6	1	2	1	5	5	1	3	5
Cultural P	16	16	10	18	16	11	10	13	11	19	14	18	6	8	3	3	5	3	6	11
Social M	22	19	9	18	16	16	17	19	10	20	13	10	5	7	5	3	0	2	5	11
Social D	5	3	1	3	4	5	2	3	2	5	2	2	0	2	2	2	5	1	1	3
Social V	9	6	1	4	4	5	3	3	4	8	5	4	1	1	0	1	4	0	1	3
Social P	13	11	4	9	11	8	5	6	5	16	10	7	2	5	2	2	5	2	5	7
Other M	13	11	7	7	5	6	5	11	12	8	7	7	2	3	5	2	5	3	2	6
Other D	5	3	2	2	5	2	1	5	4	2	2	3	1	2	6	1	0	1	1	3
Other V	4	4	2	2	4	2	0	3	4	3	2	3	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
Other P	4	5	3	3	4	3	1	5	4	4	4	5	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	3

N 2,036 1,999 2,000 1,506 2,052 2,046 1,552 2,257 2,364 1,899 2,919 1,503 1,207 1,729 1,511 2,566 1,519 2,110 1,685

Source: ESS 2002. Cell entries are in percentage. Cases are weighted by Design and Population weight.

M (member), D (donating money), V (volunteering) and P (participating). Professional (business, profession, or farmers' organisation), Consumer (consumer or automobile organisation), Educational (organisation for science, education, or teachers and parents), Humanitarian (organisation for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants), Environmental (organisation for environmental protection, peace or animal rights), Religious (religious or church organisation), Sports (sports club or club for outdoor activities), Cultural (organisation for cultural or hobby activities), Social (social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies), Other (any other voluntary organisation). All activities refer to the last 12 months.

## Appendix 4: Comparing MCA, CATPCA and PCA

**Table 18: Component loading and statistics of MCA, CATPCA and PCA**

	MCA*				CATPCA**				PCA***				****PCA rotated			
	1	2	3	Total	1	2	3	Total	1	2	3	Total	1	2	3	Total
Party/action group	0.223	0.231	0.08		0.472	0.481	-0.282		0.472	0.481	0.28		0.711	-0.076	0.144	
Donation	0.195	0.124	0.031		0.441	0.352	-0.174		0.441	0.352	0.169		0.573	0.028	0.132	
Community	0.332	0.016	0.04		0.576	0.128	-0.201		0.576	0.128	0.203		0.494	0.149	0.352	
Contact	0.227	0.057	0.033		0.476	0.238	-0.183		0.476	0.238	0.183		0.511	0.072	0.224	
Campaign badge	0.261	0.173	0.029		0.511	0.416	0.171		0.511	0.416	-0.17		0.603	0.303	-0.085	
Demonstration	0.231	0.131	0.096		0.48	0.362	0.309		0.48	0.362	-0.307		0.518	0.404	-0.157	
Petition	0.368	0.001	0.11		0.607	-0.028	0.331		0.607	-0.028	-0.33		0.296	0.614	0.118	
Boycott	0.31	0.091	0.224		0.557	-0.302	0.474		0.557	-0.302	-0.476		0.029	0.776	0.157	
Buycott	0.342	0.143	0.119		0.585	-0.379	0.346		0.585	-0.379	-0.349		0.012	0.721	0.297	
Religious org.	0.084	0.121	0.244		0.289	-0.348	-0.494		0.289	-0.348	0.492		0.006	-0.093	0.662	
Utilitarian org.	0.243	0.081	0.051		0.493	-0.285	-0.227		0.493	-0.285	0.228		0.133	0.206	0.562	
Social/recreational org.	0.256	0.066	0.064		0.506	-0.256	-0.254		0.506	-0.256	0.257		0.167	0.183	0.571	
NSMO	0.293	0.108	0.04		0.542	-0.329	-0.199		0.542	-0.329	0.199		0.124	0.27	0.594	
Eigenvalues	3.365	1.343	1.162	5.869	3.365	1.343	1.162	5.869	3.365	1.343	1.162	5.869	2.121	1.945	1.803	5.869
Inertia	0.259	0.103	0.089	0.451												
Percentage of variance accounted for					25.9	10.3	8.9	45.1	25.9	10.3	8.9	45.1	16.3	15.0	13.9	45.1

Source ESS 2002. N=35863. Design and population weights applied. \*MCA discrimination measure, \*\*CATPCA component loadings, \*\*\*PCA unrotated component loadings, \*\*\*\*PCA varimax rotated component loadings.

In order to prove the validity of the dimensions identified in MCA and the total variance accounted for, the same analysis with the same variables were run in SPSS through Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) and PCA. The outputs are in table 18, which shows the discrimination measure produced in MCA. Next, the same procedure was run in CATPCA. Apart from producing the same graphs and centroid coordinates (equivalent to discrimination measure in MCA) CATPCA also produces a component matrix, which is the second row in the table. However, unfortunately CATPCA does not give the option to rotate the axis, which aids in the interpretation of the components. The final row in table A 4.1 shows the same set of variables run in PCA with an orthogonal varimax rotation. The component loadings in PCA were identical to the component loading of CATPCA and have therefore not been added to the table.

The discrimination measure produced in MCA (see table 18 ) only shows the coordinates of the variables and indicates which variables contribute stronger to the definition of the axis. For example in dimension two most of the political activity variables as well as buycott, religious organisations and NSMO have high loadings and indeed the graphs (figure 1 in Chapter V) along dimension two shows that these variables occupy the opposite ends of the axis along dimension two. On dimension three (table 18, MCA column) buycott and religious organisations are loaded high. However, the graph (figure 2 in chapter V) is much clearer and shows a clear distinction between political consumerism and associational involvement.

## Appendix 5: Civic engagement scores from MCA

**Table 19: Original individual level scores obtained from MCA for all three dimension of civic engagement**

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Political activism	36460	0.040881	1.018564	-0.5407719	5.220038
Political consumerism	36460	0.014487	0.979231	-2.460342	0.688698
Associational involvement	36460	-0.118278	1.030831	-2.507121	1.000742

**Table 20: Aggregate standardised scores all three dimensions of civic engagement.**

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Political activism	19	2	1	0.4906826	4.190369
Political consumerism	19	2	1	0.6366541	3.908844
Associational involvement	19	2	1	0.3473693	3.226974

Source: ESS 2002. To ensure comparability across all three dependent variables the variables were standardized with a mean of two and standard deviation of one. A mean of two instead of the commonly used mean of zero ensures a positive scale above 0 and is thus better for presentational purposes.

## Appendix 6: Correlation matrix

**Table 21: Correlation matrix of all outcome and predictor variables on the aggregate level**

	Political activities	Assoc. involvement	Political consumer.	GDP (log)	History democ.	Demo-cracy	unemploy ment	Income inequality	Poverty	Gov. Expend.	Civic edu.
Political activities	1										
Associational Involvement	0.76	1									
Political consumerism	0.74	0.84	1								
GDP (log)	0.8	0.73	0.64	1							
History of democracy 1973-2002	-0.73	-0.72	-0.7	-0.84	1						
Current level of democracy (2002)	0.66	0.8	0.7	0.63	-0.62	1					
Long term unemployment	-0.52	-0.67	-0.53	-0.71	0.62	-0.7	1				
Income inequality	-0.36	-0.55	-0.46	-0.23	0	-0.33	0.27	1			
Poverty rates	-0.36	-0.58	-0.53	-0.22	0.06	-0.48	0.3	0.89	1		
Government expenditure	0.27	0.39	0.44	0.09	-0.12	0.68	-0.36	-0.4	-0.46	1	
Civic education	0.35	0.49	0.6	0.28	-0.44	0.39	-0.26	-0.35	-0.53	0.18	1

Source: ESS 2002. N=19.

## Appendix 7: Histograms

Figure 16: Histogram of political activism






Figure 17: Histogram of political consumerism



**Figure 18: Histogram of associational involvement**



Source: ESS 2002.

## Appendix 8: Alternative multilevel models

**Table 22: Alternative models: Two levels logistic random intercept model predicting political activism**

	ML Eco. Development Model (A)	ML Democracy/Equality Model (A)
Intercept	-0.419	-0.409
LEVEL ONE (not reported here)		
LEVEL TWO: RANDOM EFFECT		
GDP (log)(centred)	1.133(0.168)	
History of democracy (1973-2002)		0.344(0.060)
Income inequality		-0.143(0.062)
Country Level Variance	0.056(0.168)	0.064(0.022)

**Table 23: Alternative models: Two levels logistic random intercept model predicting political consumerism**

	ML Democracy/Equality Model (B)	ML Democracy Model (B)
Intercept	-0.276	-0.304
LEVEL ONE (not reported here)		
LEVEL TWO: RANDOM EFFECT		
GDP (log)		1.286(0.441)
Levels of Democracy in 2002		0.061(0.032)
History of democracy (1973-2002)	0.606(0.102)	
Income inequality	-0.350(0.105)	
Country Level Variance	0.192(0.063)	0.244(0.081)

**Table 24: Alternative models: Two levels logistic random intercept model predicting associational involvement**

	ML Democracy/Equality Model ( C )	ML Eco. Development Model ( C )
Intercept	1.409	1.388
LEVEL ONE (not reported here)		
LEVEL TWO: RANDOM EFFECT		
GDP (log)(centred)		1.399(0.420)
Levels of Democracy in 2002 (centred)	0.091(0.030)	0.108(0.031)
History of democracy (1973-2002)	0.533(0.133)	
Income inequality (centred)	-0.488(0.114)	-0.349(0.119)
Country Level Variance	0.189(0.063)	0.221(0.073)

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