## Participatory inequality and the welfare state preferences of the politically active: A study of four European countries

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### Abstract

Across Europe, the welfare state is a focus of social and political contention. Participating in the democratic process offers a means for the public to voice their preferences. However, not everyone participates in politics. Research shows that there are significant participatory inequalities as those with greater socioeconomic resources are more likely to participate in politics. In light of these participatory inequalities, this thesis examines the representativeness of the welfare state preferences of the politically active. The main hypothesis posits that, if less advantaged socioeconomic groups are less likely to participate in politicpate in politics, the welfare state preferences of the politically active are unlikely to be representative.

The thesis brings together the comparative study of participatory inequality and social differences in welfare state preferences to examine data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2008-09 for Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Latent Class Analysis examines how preferences about the welfare state vary within Europe. By grouping individuals, the analysis shows that within societies there are different views about what should be the responsibilities of government. Using the latent classes, and considering a range of political actions, multivariate regression models show how social inequality determines conflict over the welfare state and transforms into political inequality. The association between preferences and political activity is examined to establish the representativeness of participant preferences. Finally, models combining welfare state preferences, political activity and social position address how social inequality shapes the link between political activity and welfare state preferences.

Based on survey data for four European countries, the thesis finds that the politically active are not always representative in their preferences; however, the preference bias of participation varies in direction across countries and forms of political participation. Participatory inequalities do lead to the underrepresentation of support for the welfare state among the politically active but not in all cases. Examining the social stratification of preferences and participation, the thesis suggests that cross-national variations in the representativeness of participants may result from how preferences and participation are socially stratified. For instance, significant participatory inequalities can occur in contexts where there is less contention over the welfare state. Conversely, contention over the welfare state can coincide with egalitarian patterns of political activity. A concluding proposition is that the factors inhibiting the political participation of the socio-economically disadvantaged may also cultivate weaker levels of support for the welfare state.

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# Abbreviations

CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
DE	Germany
EGP	Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class schema
ES	Spain
ESeC	European Socio-economic Classification
ESS	European Social Survey
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
LCA	Latent Class Analysis
SES	Socio-Economic Status
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

#### **1** Introduction

Contemporary scholarship on the welfare state emphasises the challenges facing the European social model. Providing social welfare became a primary function of European states in the decades following the Second World War. Financed through taxation and social insurance, governments developed programmes to meet social needs such as those arising from accidents, old age and unemployment. The resulting welfare states have frequently been a source of political contention with political debates about the role of government intensifying in response to social and economic change such as globalisation, de-industrialisation and population ageing (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 1996). Facing questions about their viability and desirability, the contemporary politics of the welfare state have been described as taking place in an 'era of austerity' as governments perceive pressure to reform and contain the costs of social provision (Pierson 1996; 2001a).

This thesis approaches the politics of the welfare state by examining the political preferences and behaviour of European publics. As taxpayers and beneficiaries, providing welfare is a government function directly relevant in the lives of European citizens. In these democracies, citizens can voice their preferences and attempt to induce governments to be responsive through political action such as voting or taking to the streets in protest. Governments, in turn, have incentives to address the interests and preferences of the public. Indeed, the resilience of the welfare state in the era of austerity partly reflects politicians' fear of the electoral consequences of cutting popular welfare programmes (Pierson 1994; Brooks and Manza 2007). Yet, not everyone participates in politics. Even in national elections, the cornerstones of these democratic systems, many do not cast a vote and only a minority of citizens participate in other types of political action.

Such non-participation raises important questions about who participates in politics and significantly scholars refer to there being 'participatory inequalities' as those with greater socio-economic resources more likely to participate in politics

(Verba et al. 1978; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1995; Pattie et al. 2004; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). The under-representation of certain socioeconomic groups in the political process is likely to affect the politics of the welfare state. One plausible impact of participatory inequalities is that the politically active will be unrepresentative in their preferences about the welfare state. The uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of the welfare state make it likely that the preferences of socioeconomic groups are likely to vary, possibly conflict. If some socioeconomic groups are under-represented among the politically active, then their preferences are also likely to be under-represented.

Any systematic under-representation of the preferences of the more disadvantaged could help distort the political process in favour of the more advantaged. However, as this introductory chapter will discuss, existing scholarship offers limited insight into this potential bias of participation. Participatory inequalities and social contention over the welfare state are largely separate areas of study with the few studies examining connections between preferences and participation offering inconclusive evidence. Thus, whilst we know that those who participate in politics are often unrepresentative in their social characteristics, we know less about how they might be unrepresentative in their preferences.

The aim of this thesis is to examine how participatory inequalities impact on the welfare state preferences of the politically active. To further this aim, the thesis brings together the study of political participation and attitudes towards the welfare state. This provides a framework in which to examine the relationship between welfare state preferences and political participation alongside the underlying patterns of social stratification. The empirical content of the thesis consists of the analysis of survey data for four very different European countries: Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. As will be discussed further in this chapter, the comparative approach offers an opportunity to explore how participatory inequalities and social contention over the welfare state interact in different ways across countries. By addressing these patterns, the thesis contributes to our

understanding of participatory and political inequalities and contention over the welfare state within European democracies.

# **1.1** Contention over the welfare state and unequal political influence

Ideas about social conflict, especially conflict between social classes, are pervasive within narratives of the welfare state. In academic scholarship, a central theme concerns the transforming of social conflict into political conflict with the formation of left-wing political parties and trade unions shaping the development of social policy (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). There are important debates about whether social class is losing relevance within European democracies. However, social position remains important for our understanding of interests and preferences in relation to welfare state. In addition to social class, the distribution and redistribution of resources could cause contention between young and old, men and women and those within and outside of the labour market.

A key theoretical move within welfare state scholarship is to understand that social contention not only shapes the welfare state but that the welfare state shapes the nature of social contention. For instance, there is the classic proposition that the development of the welfare state served to moderate class conflict. There are also more nuanced theoretical arguments about how welfare state arrangements might shape the nature and extent of social contention, for example, how means-testing and targeting could sharpen social divisions by developing notions of 'them' and 'us' (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein 1998a). Thus, welfare state scholarship is presenting a complex relationship between the welfare state and public preferences; socio-political conflict can influence welfare arrangements and, in turn, welfare state arrangements influence the nature of socio-political conflict. In scholarship on the welfare state, these important propositions, which the next chapter will consider further, are generally underlying theoretical assumptions rather than the subject of empirical research.<sup>1</sup> Thus, for empirical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Examples of this argument can be found in welfare state and political economy scholarship (Korpi 1980; Rueda 2007, p.4) and in the growing research into attitudes towards the welfare state (Svallfors 1997).

insight into preferences about the welfare state and political behaviour, we must draw on alternative areas of scholarship.

#### Public attitudes towards the welfare state

Data from social surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS) has supported extensive research on the political participation and preferences of citizens. Empirical research into public attitudes and values has often been data-driven. For instance, a criticism of many comparative studies is that they focus on compiling 'league tables' of national differences that are devoid of historical and institutional context (Svallfors 2007, p.264). However, welfare state scholarship has played an important role in stimulating and framing the growth of studies examining attitudes towards the welfare state (for example, predictions about the erosion of public support for the welfare state dominated research in the 1980s (Coughlin 1980; Taylor-Gooby 1984; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). Subsequently, Esping-Andersen's (1990) theory of welfare regimes was instrumental in the evolution of comparative studies (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Svallfors 2003; Arts and Gelissen 2001).

A core finding from this attitudinal research is that there is widespread support for the welfare state within European societies. However, underlying the general popularity there is social contention about the role of government in meeting social needs. Not unexpectedly, research shows that more advantaged social and economic groups tend to hold less favourable attitudes towards extensive welfare provision, with social class remaining a key determinant of preferences (Coughlin 1980; Svallfors 1997; Mau and Veghte 2007; Svallfors 2007; Andreß and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2002). As this field of research has grown, scholars have identified greater differentiation in public opinion. For example, contention over the welfare state is greater in some countries than others and centres predominantly around provision benefitting less advantaged socioeconomic groups (Svallfors 2003; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Edlund 2007).

This now vibrant field of research is refining and testing theories about what drives attitudes towards the welfare state, considering, for example, how selfinterest interacts with social values and the impact of social and political context.

However, an important topic this research has not yet considered is the means through which citizens can voice their preferences. Studies often suggest implicitly that preferences act as inputs into the political system, for example, by referring interchangeably to the 'public' and 'voters'.<sup>2</sup> However, as a field of research it does not consider how 'the voicing' of different preferences about the welfare state could be affected by patterns of political participation.

#### Political participation and the unequal influence of citizens

The effects of non-participation and participatory inequalities on the democratic political process have long concerned scholars of political participation. The magnitude of research into citizen political activity reflects how the participation of citizens in the political process is a defining feature of democracy. Yet, the functions and significance of citizen political participation are opaque. For instance, the participation of citizens in the political process is important for establishing the legitimacy of a democratic system, but how much participation is required remains subject to question. The vision of democracy commonly underlying the empirical study of political participation is 'a responsive model of democracy', which emphasises government responsiveness to the interests and preferences of citizens (Teorell 2006). In turn, scholars focus on political participation as the means by which citizens attempt to influence the political process. From this perspective, non-participation and participatory inequalities are concerning because they imply that influence over the political process is unequal among citizens.<sup>3</sup>

In representative democracies, it is fundamental that citizens select their representatives. As a result, elections and voting have been a primary focus of empirical analysis. However, scholars of political participation have progressively broadened their interpretations of the scope of citizen influence (Van Deth 2001;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Larsen, for example, writes "The focus of our study is the possible existence of an internal logic between the three clusters of institutions and the attitudes of the electorate" (2006, p.10)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The 'responsive model of democracy' underlines the discussions on this thesis, which primarily focuses on the idea that participatory inequalities bias the input of preferences. However, alternative perspectives on the functions of citizen participation contained within democratic theory raise different concerns about non-participation. For example, participatory models of democracy value the self-development effects of participating in decision making processes and therefore non-participants have a reduced capacity to develop their faculties. Both (Teorell 2006) and (Mansbridge 1997)offer interesting discussions of how different normative perspectives offer alternative ways to evaluate empirical patterns of participation.

Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007). Definitions of political participation have referred to actions that aim to influence the selection of governmental personnel and "the actions they take" (Verba and Nie 1972, p.2) and, more broadly, "some political outcome" or "the authoritative allocation of values for society" (Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007, p.336).<sup>4</sup> Broader interpretations of citizen influence embrace a wider range of political actions. Elections encourage politicians to be responsive to voter preferences; however, citizens can convey their needs and preferences in other ways such as contacting political elites or joining a demonstration. Political action can also occur both within and outside the frameworks of representation. Representative officials may not be the target; the aim could be to pressure non-governmental organisations, attract media attention or influence public opinion (Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007, p.341). However, by placing issues on the political agenda, shaping public debate and forcing political action may influence policy decisions (Morales 2009, p.3).

Definitions of political participation broadened partly in response to changes in political behaviour. In particular, protest movements in the late 1960s prompted research into what was then labelled 'non-conventional' political action, which included social movements, petitions and demonstrations (Barnes and Kaase 1979). As these forms of activity have become increasingly common, scholars discuss the widening repertoire of citizen political action. The democratic implications of this increase in the political action repertoire is a matter of debate (Dalton 2000). Emerging action types conceivably enrich democracy by extending the voice of citizens in the political process. However, only a minority of people are involved in politics beyond voting; therefore, there is much concern about a widening bias in the voice of citizens. Declining engagement in the more institutional forms of political action represents a further concern (Klingemann and Fuchs 1998; Jennings and Van Deth 1990). This change in citizen behaviour is captured in relation to declining membership of political parties (Van Biezen et al. 2012) and studies also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For discussion of how the concept of political participation has changed over time, see (Van Deth 2001; Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007)

indicate a downward trend in electoral turnout (Blais et al. 2004; Gray and Caul 2000).

Underlying concern about unequal influence over the political process is an assumption that political elites are responsive to citizens' political demands. Preference aggregation and policymaking are inherently complex, making it difficult to test such assumptions and the need for further research is well-documented (Teorell 2006, p.793; Verba et al. 1995, p.30). Nevertheless, there are studies suggesting that governments are responsive to the preferences of politically active citizens. For example, Hill and Leighley (1992) demonstrate a relationship between the level of turnout among the poor and levels of social expenditure across states in the US. There is also evidence that elected politicians are more responsive to the preference of wealthy citizens (Bartles 2008), which, in turn, suggests the electorate are not anonymous. Thus, whilst not a complete picture, such insights reinforce concern that non-participation and participatory inequalities result in citizens having unequal influence over the political process.

#### Why unequal influence a problematic for democracy?

Unequal influence resulting from non-participation is not necessarily problematic for democracy. For instance, as a voluntary activity it can be questioned whether democracy is impaired if the voices of those opting not to participate are unheard. Arguably, those who have chosen to be active deserve a greater voice in the political process, especially as they are likely to be more informed and engaged with the issues under consideration. Furthermore, from an elitist democratic perspective, the integrity of democratic decision-making is preserved if the uninterested and uniformed refrain from participating (Schumpeter 1979).

The main counter arguments stress how non-participation, participatory inequalities and unequal influence run counter to the core democratic principle of political equality. To show how the principle of political equality can be undermined, we can use two distinct forms of argument. First, we can propose that whilst there may be an equality of political rights, as encapsulated by the principal of one-person one-vote, the realisation of those political rights depends upon inequalities outside of the political domain. A second argument rests on a broader

interpretation of political equality. If political equality is interpreted as meaning citizens should be considered equally within the political process, the unequal influence that stems from non-participation inherently runs counter to political equality (Verba 2004). Additionally, this argument applies at the group level since the systematic inequalities in political participation mean that some socioeconomic groups will be considered less. Combining these arguments, an ensuing concern is that a vicious circle entraps the disadvantaged. The equality of political rights provides disadvantaged citizens with a means in which to use the political system to limit social and economic inequalities (Verba and Nie 1972). However, political participation can also be used by more advantaged citizens to strengthen their position (Parry et al. 1992). Hence, if social and economic inequalities limit the capacity of the disadvantaged to realise their political rights, the voice of more advantaged citizens conceivably reinforces, or increases, social and economic inequalities (Verba et al. 1995; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba 2004).

#### **1.2** The preferences of the politically active

As Parry et al. summarise, "one reason for studying political participation is for the light it can shed on the 'bias' of participation and its likely consequences in a range of situations" (1992, p.7). An important dimension concerning the bias of participation is the representation of political preferences. In particular, discussions of participatory inequalities often raise concerns about how well represented are the preferences of less politically active socioeconomic groups. Bias in the representation of political preferences is significant because it could distort the decision-making process. For instance, in a study of political associations, Morales warned that "who it is that intervenes in the decision-making process might have a substantial impact on the decisions that are finally made, because participants and non-participants do not share the same preferences" (Morales 2009, p.70).

Whilst political preferences are an important element of concerns about the bias of participation, scholars have studied the political preferences of participants less than their social characteristics. With some notable exceptions such as Verba et al's (1995) comprehensive analysis of participatory distortion in the US, studies

focusing on inequalities in participation have tended not to include empirical analyses of participant political preferences. There are studies from various other perspectives that do address differences in political preferences between participants and non-participants. For instance, there has been lively debate over differences in the candidate choices of voters and non-voters in the US (Sides et al. 2008; Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Most relevant to the welfare state, are studies of how participants and non-participants differ in relation to their policy attitudes (Welch and Studlar 1983; Studlar and Welch 1986; Bennett and Resnick 1990; Leighley and Nagler 2014; Gant and Lyons 1993).<sup>5</sup>

#### Policy attitudes of participants and non-participants

Studies of the policy attitudes of participants and non-participants have examined preferences across a broad range of policy issues, with, for example, attitudes towards social policy considered alongside the environment and civil liberties. Perhaps reflecting the wide focus, these studies typically present few hypotheses about the nature of, and reasons for, differences in the preferences of participants and non-participants. The results, however, have led to a widely accepted view that participants and non-participants have similar political preferences. Most notably, Wolfinger and Rosenstone in their study of electoral participation in the US, proposed that in relation to political preferences "voters are virtually a carbon copy of the citizen population" (1980, p.109). Welch and Studlar similarly suggest from analysis of the UK that "activists are remarkable for their unremarkability" (Welch and Studlar 1983, p.618). A number of others report that there are either no or only marginal attitudinal difference between participants and non-participants (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Studlar and Welch 1986; Verba et al. 1995).

We can interpret the finding that participants and non-participants have similar preferences in various ways. On the one hand, it conceivably lessens concerns about unequal influence and bias in participation; indeed, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argued that, because the preferences of voters and non-voters are similar, it does not matter who votes. However, on the other hand, concerns

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A further group of studies examine differences between participants and non-participants in relation to political ideology and social values (Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009).

about bias in the political process are not entirely contingent on manifest differences in the preferences of participants and non-participations. For example, if we consider that non-participants might have different preferences if they did participate, there is a rationale for questioning whether participants can really represent the preferences of non-participants (Liphart 1997). A further important argument is made by Verba et al (1995), who emphasise how the underrepresentation of other politically relevant characteristics such as income is still likely to bias the political process. Verba et al's (1995) argument is relevant to issues around the welfare state; especially as they identify being a beneficiary of government welfare programmes as a politically relevant characteristic that is under-represented among participants. The argument does not necessarily imply that preferences are unimportant; conceivably, the political consequences depend upon whether the bias of participation relates solely to socioeconomic characteristics, preferences or a combination of both. Of particular significance to the themes of this thesis is that by emphasising the significant social biases of participation, Verba et al's (1995) argument illuminates the puzzling nature of the finding that participants have similar preferences to non-participants.

Considering that there are well-documented participatory inequalities, it is puzzling that the political preferences of participants and non-participants do not diverge, at least in relation to issues that affect socioeconomic groups differently such as the welfare state. It is possible that inequalities in participation might not be sufficient to cause any distinct preferences to be markedly under- or overrepresented. For example, if socioeconomically disadvantaged groups vote in only slightly lower numbers, the social bias of participation might not affect the representativeness of voter preferences discernibly, especially since voters outnumber non-voters. Similarly, socioeconomic groups may not have sufficiently different political preferences. For example, theories about 'working class anger' suggest that rather than favouring an expansive welfare state, less advantaged groups may resent paying taxes and supporting those unwilling to work (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). A further important argument rests on the proposition that those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged do not necessarily express their

policy preferences through the types of survey question that underlie the scholarly research (Berinsky 2002). Thus, we may not be fully measuring the differences in the preferences of participants and non-participants.

The underlying processes that could shed light on the puzzling conclusion have not been directly addressed in the existing research. The social bias of participation is still largely considered separately to the preferences of participant and the social stratification of preferences. However, these underlying processes are relevant to our understanding of how democracy works and the politics of the welfare state. For instance, it is important to know whether lower rates of political activity among disadvantaged groups leads to certain preferences about the welfare state being under-represented in the political process. Equally, if participatory inequalities do not result in the under-representation of preferences about socially contentious issues such as those relating to the welfare state, it is relevant to consider why.

A further factor to consider is that the current evidence is also partly conflicting. Specifically, some studies report that non-participants are more approving of social policy than participants (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Gant and Lyons 1993; Leighley and Nagler 2014). Some scholars consider these attitudinal differences to be small and therefore unlikely to have drastic political implications (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Verba et al. 1995, p.167). However, drawing on this evidence, Leighley and Nagler (2014) have presented a strong argument against the consesus view that the preferences of paricipants and non-participants are the same. In their argument, they directly challenge Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) using evidence showing that in presidential elections between 1972 and 2008 non-voters were more in favour than voters of welfare and income redistribution (Leighley and Nagler 2014, chap.6).

#### The limited scope of previous research

A further need for further research into the relationship between preferences and non-participants is that the scope of previous studies has been limited in two important respects. First, studies have largely focused on policy differences

between voters and non-voters.<sup>6</sup> Considering the significant role of elections, the focus on voters and non-voters is understandable. However, it is relevant to consider how preferences are represented across the repertoire of political participation; especially, since other types of political action have become increasingly prevalent and enable citizens to convey their preferences more precisely. Significantly, the bias of participation in terms of preferences could vary across forms of political action. For example, protesting can be an important tool for the disadvantaged to channel their demands; however, because sustaining extra-representational forms of political action requires significant inputs of political resources, an important concern about the growth of these activities is their potential to increase participatory inequality (Verba et al. 1995; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; Pattie et al. 2004). Thus, preference bias in participation may not only differ across forms of participation but is potentially greater beyond voting.

A second important limitation to the scope of the existing research is that studies are primarily of single countries, predominantly of the US. In addition to the risk of generalising findings across contexts, this focus is problematic as there are reasons to expect variations across countries. In particular, research shows that patterns of social contention over the welfare state vary across countries, with differences across socio-economic groups such as social classes being more pronounced in some societies (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Svallfors 2006b; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Svallfors 2007). Where preferences about the welfare state vary considerably across socioeconomic groups, participatory inequalities become more likely to affect the representation of preferences. Equally, preferences of different socioeconomic groups are more likely to be represented in contexts where participatory inequalities are limited. It is, therefore, significant that participatory inequalities have been shown to vary across countries (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1978; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; Morales 2009). Thus, these different patterns of social stratification could feasibly result in the representativeness of the politically active varying across countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> There are exceptions with some studies considering policy attitudes across different forms of participation (Welch and Studlar 1983; Verba et al. 1995)

#### **1.3 Research design and outline of the thesis**

The thesis examines the relationships between preferences about the welfare state, political participation and socioeconomic position. The aim is to examine how representative the politically active are in terms of their preferences about the welfare state. The main hypothesis is that the politically active will under-represent support for the welfare state because 1) social inequalities transform into participatory inequalities and 2) the preferences of the more advantaged differ from the less advantaged. It is proposed that the 'preference' bias of participation may vary across types of political action and is most likely to emerge in relation to forms of political action that are subject to greater participatory inequalities. There may also be cross-national differences because the social stratification of preferences and participation vary across countries. Logically, a preference bias in participation is most likely to occur in contexts where strong social divisions in preferences coincide with low and unequal rates of political participation. Additionally, social groups participate more equally, or where there is less contention over welfare, a preferences bias is less likely; hence, a similar outcome could result from different underlying social stratification patters.

Figure 1-1 illustrates the core features of the research design. The three central boxes represent welfare state preferences, political participation and socioeconomic position. The two unbroken lines represent how social position determines both attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation: relationships established in previous research. These patterns of social stratification, and their potential to overlap, premise the hypothesis that there is an association between preferences and participation, which the dashed line depicts. The study also recognises contextual factors such as the welfare state and institutions of political system can shaped these patterns of relationship.





The empirical research then centres upon four successive research questions:

- 1. How do attitudes towards the role of government vary within a society?
- 2. How do participatory inequalities coincide with social differences in preferences about the welfare state?
- 3. How are preferences about the welfare state represented among the politically active?
- 4. How do participatory inequalities affect how political activity relates to preferences about the welfare state?

The first question focuses on preferences about the welfare state. The question reflects how the welfare state is a complex mix of polices and institutions serving varied purposes. Previous research shows that benefits for the poor and unemployed tend to engender lower levels of public support, especially compared to provision for the sick and old (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Larsen 2006). Conceivably, individuals may also support some functions of governments but not others. For example, some individuals may endorse aspects of the welfare state such as healthcare but not provision for the unemployed. Such differentiation in attitudes towards the role of government could have important implications for the politics of the welfare state, especially in a context of austerity. Where governments are making decisions about retrenchment and reform, the greater popularity of some areas may shape which options governments consider politically acceptable. In other words, it may matter if support for certain elements of the

welfare state become over-represented among political activists whilst others areas become under-represented. As a result, establishing how attitudes towards the role of government vary is an important first step in understanding how the politically active citizens represent preferences about the welfare state.

The second research question relates to the social stratification of preferences about the welfare state and rates of political activity. The objective is to establish how both preferences about the welfare state and political activity vary across social and economic groups. For example, are advantaged citizens more likely to reject aspects of collective provision and be more active in politics? The third and fourth research questions then shift the focus towards the relationship between preferences about the welfare state and political participation. The third question addresses how different preferences about the welfare state are represented among the politically active and how patterns vary across types of political action and countries. Finally, bringing the preceding elements together, the focus of the fourth research question is on how the underlying patterns of social stratification affect the relationship between political activity and preferences about the welfare state.

#### Data and case selection

The research employs data from Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS), which was conducted in 2008. The fourth wave of this cross-national social survey includes a dedicated module on attitudes towards the welfare state alongside questions on political participation and demographics. Using this data, the thesis is able to consider five major types of political action: voting, trade union membership, contacting an official, joining a demonstration and organisation work. To explore preferences, the thesis examines attitudes towards the responsibilities of government in relation to health, old age, unemployment, income inequality, childcare and ensuring paid leave for workers when providing short-term care to others.

The selection of Germany, Spain Sweden and the UK provides contrasting contexts. These countries are primary examples of the different welfare regimes found across Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990; Arts and Gelissen 2002). In summary,

Sweden is the archetypal social democracy, where generous and universal welfare provision combines with comparatively low poverty rates and a more egalitarian income distribution. Germany exemplifies the conservative-corporatist welfare model that centres upon occupational social insurance schemes; contributors and their families are entitled to generous benefits but labour market outsiders depend on the support of family or minimal social assistance schemes. The UK follows a more liberal welfare model that emphasises the provision of a safety net through targeting minimal welfare payments towards those in need. Finally, Spain is an example of a later developing Southern European welfare state, which has foundations in the occupational schemes but with a weak national minimum of welfare and high rates of poverty. As explored further in the next chapter, welfare regimes are theoretically and empirically linked to patterns of public opinion and research into political participation has shown distinct patterns of political participation across Scandinavia, other parts of northern Europe and Southern Europe. Thus, this small set of cases provides varied set of contexts in which to explore the impact of participatory inequalities on the welfare state preferences of the politically active.

The focus on a small number of cases enables the thesis to examine patterns of social contention and participatory inequalities within specific contexts. An advantage of the case study approach is that it gives the scope to explore types of political action and differences in attitudes towards government intervention across different welfare domains. There are, however, limitations to examining a small number of cases. As the forthcoming chapters will show, the empirical analyses reveal that the patterns of relationships vary across the four countries. The thesis therefore provides evidence to underlie the importance of context on issues regarding who participates in politics and the political preferences they hold. The discussion in the following chapter draws on the literature to highlight significant contextual factors but the thesis does not provide a systematic assessment of contextual effects on the representativeness of participant preferences.

#### Thesis outline

These final paragraphs outline the structure of the rest of the thesis. The following two chapters expand on ideas presented in this introduction to provide the framework for the thesis. Frist, chapter two reviews the existing literature for both theoretical and empirical insights. The chapter discusses theories of the welfare state that indicate a role for the public and democratic politics. This area of research provides insight into how welfare state preferences have been understood, their role in shaping policy and how the political preferences and behaviour of the mass public might be influenced by the welfare state. The remainder of the chapter then examines attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation. These largely separate bodies of research confirm that attitudes and political participation are both related to similar sets of social and economic characteristics. However, in both cases there are important crossnational variations and scholars are increasingly identifying contextual factors that might influence these patterns, especially the institutions of the welfare state and political actions.

Chapter three provides further details of the research design, including further details of the case selection, data and key considerations of comparative analysis of cross-sectional survey data. The chapter also provides details of the variables used to measure welfare state preferences and political participation and the main stages of empirical analysis. The results of the empirical analyses are presented and discussed in chapters four, five and six.

Chapter four focuses on addressing the first research question with the aim of understanding how attitudes towards the different domains of welfare are related at the level of individuals. The main empirical focus is on the results of a Latent Class Analysis (LCA), which is used to group individuals according to their patterns of responses across all the questions measuring attitudes towards the role of government. The resulting 'preference groups' vary from each other in both their level of support for the welfare state and how they differentiate their level of support across welfare domains. The country specific preference groups are then used to re represent welfare preferences in the remainder of the thesis

Chapter five addresses the second research question. Using multivariate regression models, the chapter establishes how preferences and political action vary across social and economic groups within the four countries. With a focus on social class, this chapter establishes how participatory inequalities coincide with social differences in preferences about the welfare state in different ways across the four countries. Significantly, where the welfare state is most socially divisive, less advantaged groups are not necessarily less likely to participate and, conversely, wide participatory inequalities can occur when preferences are more similar across social groups.

Chapter 6 presents empirical analyses addressing the relationship between participating in politics and welfare state preferences. In relation to the third research question, the chapter considers models examining how preference groups vary in their patterns of political activity and how preferences vary between participants and the wider population. Then, the chapter considers a model examining how the social characteristics of participants influence the relationship between preferences about the welfare state and political action.

The concluding discussion in chapter seven reviews the relationships between social position, welfare state preferences and political action found within the four countries. The chapter discusses the potential implications of these empirical findings for the democratic process and the politics of welfare state, and also, draws on the discussion of contextual factors to identify potential explanations for the variations in the relationships uncovered.

# 2 Welfare state, public preferences and political participation

The welfare state is a firmly established feature of European societies with studies showing there is widespread public support (Coughlin 1980; Roller 1995; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2007; Mau and Veghte 2007). However, institutions that pool social risks and redistribute resources are likely to engender some degree of social contention. Indeed, socio-political perspectives on the welfare state present social conflict as an important influence on welfare state politics. However, certain preferences about the welfare state may not be represented well if there are considerably lower rates of political activity among less advantaged socioeconomic groups. To consider this proposition further, this chapter studies the connections between social stratification, attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation. The first section examines important ideas about social conflict over the welfare state. The second section then considers the determinants of welfare state preferences in more detail. The third section focuses on political participation, examining why some groups participate more than others. Finally, building on insights from the preceding sections, the fourth section turns to the association between welfare preferences and political participation.

#### 2.1 Contention over the welfare state

Social conflict became prominent in theories of the welfare state in order to explain the pace and diversity of social policy development (Korpi 1989; Myles and Quadagno 2002; Brooks and Manza 2007). Many theories of the welfare state emphasise 'the determining role of impersonal economic forces' (Myles and Quadagno 2002, p.35). For example, the *logic of industrialism thesis*, prominent throughout the 1960s and 1970s, saw welfare states as a response to the rapid industrialisation of Europe creating the need and resources for social policy (Kerr et al. 1960; Wilensky 1975). Economic factors are undeniably important and measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage of elderly are standard variables in empirical models of welfare state outputs (Myles and Quadagno 2002, p.36). However, economic arguments imply that social policy output will converge when economic and associated demographic drivers are at comparable levels. Thus, purely economic theories of the welfare state were less useful as welfare states increasingly diverged throughout the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in 1960, both Sweden and the US spent around 6-7 percent of GDP on social welfare but by 1980, Swedish expenditure had risen to over 17 percent, compared to 9.75 percent in the US (Myles and Quadagno 2002).

#### Social conflict shaped welfare state development

Social perspectives on the welfare state identify how social and economic inequalities drive differences in the interests and preferences of social groups, above all social classes. As Baldwin summarises, "[o]bservers commonly draw a direct link between workers, their disadvantaged position in the social hierarchy and their interest in solidaristic welfare policy" (1990, p.288). In turn, social and economic disadvantages give the working classes incentives to take political action. The *power resources approach* offers a formalised example of the class mobilisation thesis. Developed by Walter Korpi (1983; 1989), the power resources approach emphasises the institutionalising of social conflict within democratic systems. Variations in welfare state arrangements result from different distributions of power resources, above all, the relative power of working class organisation within trade unions and left-wing parties. Sweden represents the classic example of the power of social democracy, with strong trade unions and left-party government coinciding with a markedly generous welfare system.

The power resources approach dominated welfare state scholarship during the 1980s and 1990s and subsequently the varied quantitative and comparative historical studies produced convincing evidence that government partisanship and trade unions affected social policy development (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 2003). Indeed, this socio-political perspective on social policy development underlines Esping-Andersen's (1990) influential theory of *welfare regimes*. Analysing welfare states in the early 1980s, Esping-Andersen argued that patterns of socio-political conflict led to three distinct 'worlds of welfare': liberal, conservative-corporatist,

social democratic. These well-known regime labels indicate the political origins of each regime. Infused by liberal principles, English-speaking countries developed social safety nets consisting of targeted and primarily means-tested state provision. In contrast, the conservative-corporatist regimes of continental Europe centre on occupation-based social insurance with contributions based entitlement. Finally, the social democratic regimes of Scandinavia build on the principle of social citizenship rights with universal entitlement, limited dependency on the market and high levels of social benefits.

Most socio-political perspectives extend beyond the focus on working class mobilisation to offer fuller accounts of welfare politics. Perhaps above all, they recognise the role of other socioeconomic groups, in particular, the middle classes (Esping-Andersen 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Goodin 1987). Scholars have, for instance, shown that even Swedish social policy development, including the adopting of universal entitlement, reflected the interests of the middle classes (Baldwin 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). There is also the distinctive impact of political mobilisation based on interests other than class such as Christian identities (Van Kersbergen 1995) and gender (Huber and Stephens 2001). In turn, these perspectives highlight the significance of coalitions across social groups and political actors (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Van Kersbergen 1995; Huber and Stephens 2001). A further development is then to see how, political systems influence patterns of contention and coalitions by determining key factors such as the number of political parties and veto points. Equally, patterns of interaction occur over time; for instance, Huber and Stephens (2001) identify how political actors gain 'ideological hegemony', which contributes to 'policy ratchet effects', whereby once introduced, social policies tend to become the accepted position.

#### A new politics of the welfare state

The notion of the welfare state as entrenched within society plays an important role in discussions of the 'new politics of the welfare state'. The basis of this scholarship is the recognition that social and economic changes linked to globalisation, post-industrialism and population ageing are having fundamental effects on the politics of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001b; Huber and Stephens 2001). Understanding of these effects is however incomplete. Factors such as slow economic growth, unemployment and population ageing initially supported crisis theories of the welfare state, which alongside the rise of neo-liberal ideology made radical welfare state retrenchment seem probable. The welfare state remains largely resilient and expectations of radical change have become less prominent; though there is evidence of some welfare state retrenchment (Korpi and Palme 2003; Huber and Stephens 2001; Allan and Scruggs 2004). Most scholars now accept that fiscal pressures to contain costs and reform welfare remain, creating an 'era of permanent austerity' (Pierson 1996) where "it has become harder to assemble political coalitions supporting further expansions of the welfare state" (Kitschelt 2001, p.265).

In this context, Paul Pierson (1996; 2001) championed the need for a new approach to the politics of welfare, arguing "there is a profound difference between extending benefits to large numbers of people and taking benefits away" (Pierson 1996, p.144). Pierson (1996; 2001b) contends that radical retrenchment of the welfare state is unlikely. From the outset, reforming established programmes is difficult and costly. Adding to this, Pierson draws on the widespread popularity of the welfare state. Arguing first that the public have become accustomed to welfare arrangements and are likely to oppose reforms "in return for diffuse and uncertain gains" (Pierson 1996, p.145). Additionally, the welfare state is popular because social policies create new constituencies with direct interests in maintaining current welfare state arrangements such as pensioners, health-care consumers and welfare state employees.

This scholarship on the new politics of the welfare state gives emphasis to the role of 'public opinion' in determining social policy. Drawing on democratic theory and scholarship on policy responsiveness, scholars emphasise how elections incentivise politicians to respond to public opinion (Pierson 1994; 1996; Brooks and Manza 2007). Indeed, Brooks and Manza (2006; 2007) directly incorporate a measure of 'public opinion' into a model of welfare state output to create 'an index of government responsiveness'. The causal nature of the link, however, remains

complex as welfare state arrangements are also likely to influence public opinion.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, welfare state constituencies can have networks and groups such as patient or pensioners associations to represent interests, channel information and mobilise collective action. As a result, political elites, who are wary of making visible cutbacks for fear of public disapproval and negative electoral consequences, focus on 'blame avoidance' tactics with hidden reforms.

With the focus on public opinion, there is a tendency for these approaches to de-emphasise social conflict, especially between socioeconomic classes and discount the role of government partisanship. For example, Pierson argues that widespread support and the potential for beneficiary groups to mobilise "make the welfare state less dependent on the political parties, social movements, and labor organizations that expanded social programs in the first place" (Pierson 1996, p.147). Public opinion polls offer some evidence to support the argument that popular support underlines the general resilience of the welfare state. There is also evidence for the declining significance of government partisanship. For instance, Pierson highlights the resilience of the welfare state despite the declining power of organised labour and left parties. More substantially, Huber and Stephens (2001) found the explanatory power of government partisanship to have declined over time in large scale comparative study. A trend they link to fiscal pressures constraining parties on the left from expanding welfare and the popularity of the welfare state limiting retrenchment efforts of parties on the right. However, evidence is not clear-cut; for instance, Allan and Scruggs (2004) find welfare state entitlement continues to affected by government partisanship.

The argument that socio-political conflict has lost significance can be challenged in further ways. Perhaps above all, the proposition of popular consensus becomes less plausible in relation to welfare provision for small marginalised

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Brooks and Manza (2006; 2007) recognise the bi-directional nature of the relationship and try to account for this empirically with a control for the effect of current levels of social spending on public preferences. However, as Myles (2006, p.496) discusses, the pooled time series model provides limited insight into the within-country relationship between changes in public opinion and changes in social spending.

groups such as the unemployed of working age and immigrants. One of the most consistent patterns found by public opinion research is that some parts of the welfare state are less popular and more socially contentious than others. In his seminal analysis of data from the 1960s and 1970s, Coughlin (1980) found pubic support to be much greater in relation to provision for the sick and old, followed by programmes for the young and disabled and much lower for government intervention for the working age population such as social assistance and unemployment benefits. Finding striking cross-national similarity, Coughlin (1980) proposed there is a universal dimension of support and with subsequent studies indicating that the pattern has persisted over-time, van Oorschot describes the pattern as "a truly universal element in the popular welfare culture of present Western welfare states" (2006, p.25).<sup>8</sup> Significantly, Pierson recognised that beneficiary groups for these less popular areas of welfare are also much less likely to be organised, leaving these aspects of the welfare state more vulnerable to retrenchment. Scholars have also identified how welfare state reforms can provide political elites with credit claiming opportunities (Vis 2009). For example, reforms to unemployment benefits can provide opportunities to claim credit if 'the public' begin to perceive governments as failing to address growing unemployment (Davidsson and Marx 2012).

Socio-political conflict may, however, be changing in response to emerging forms of social stratification. For instance, changing employment patterns such as increasing unemployment, part-time work and 'flexible' contracts could all affect patterns of political attitudes and behaviour. However, there is little consensus regarding the implication of these broad changes; on the one hand, increasing exposure to risk among some socioeconomic groups could strengthen class differences; however, greater heterogeneity in circumstances could weaken class differences by creating more 'individualised inequality'. Relevantly, Rueda (2007) has argued that a growing distinction between labour market 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is dividing the traditional working class supporters of the welfare state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Subsequent studies have also indicated that provision targeted at immigrant groups sits at the bottom of the hierarchy of public support (van Oorschot 2006).

The interests and preferences of insiders and outsiders will diverge, which in turn creates a dilemma for parties on the left. Indeed, by integrating survey data into his analysis of partisanship and policy, Rueda (2007)shows that the preferences of insiders and outsider vary and left-parties tend to favour insiders. Thus, the welfare state is likely to remain a source of contention but the nature of conflict can change. As a result, the micro-processes underlying socio-political theories of the welfare state, which are not always made explicit, need theoretical and empirical study.

#### 2.2 Determinants of welfare preferences

Most socio-political theories of the welfare state assume that welfare state support derives from the benefits it provides, with individuals motivated by either self or group based interests. This plausible proposition can help account for the widespread support across European societies as welfare states provide considerable benefits to citizens. However, for some a moral dimension to welfare state preferences is crucial for understanding the widespread support for the welfare state as individuals appear willing to support redistributive social policies that do not maximise their own interests (Rothstein 1998b; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2007; Mau and Veghte 2007; Larsen 2006). Recently, scholars have discussed a *moral economy of welfare* to convey how welfare state arrangements are grounded in social norms such as the belief that access to healthcare should not depend upon an ability to pay (Mau 2004, p.59; Svallfors 2006b).

The combination of 'beneficial involvement' and moral judgements has been usefully conceptualised in terms of reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Mau 2003). "Reciprocity refers to exchanges that are neither reducible to people's generosity nor to their self-regarding preference defined by beneficial outcomes. Rather, people's deliberations are based upon moral assumptions that determine whether people regard a certain distribution of costs and benefits as fair" (Mau 2004, p.54). Costs and benefits do not need to be evenly distributed. For instance, a belief that societies should offer a safety net can underpin redistributive social

policy; however, in return, contributors might expect that those who do receive help have genuine needs and make efforts to improve their own situation.

Recognising that perceptions of interests and judgements about fairness influence preferences about welfare state, we should expect a link between social position and welfare preferences. As contained within theories of the welfare state, social and economic inequalities create differences in the interests and therefore preferences of social groups. Equally, socialisation and distinct life experiences mean social position is likely to influence what individuals see as fair and just. However, we should not expect the relationship between social position and welfare preferences to be straightforward. Various factors will mediate and moderate how life experiences determine norms and attitude formation. Interests are also multifaceted, comprising current and future use of various welfare programmes along with the payment of contributions and taxes (Andreß and Heien 2001). Individual interests can also be intertwined with the interests of those within their network of family and friends (Mau 2003).

#### Socioeconomic differences in preferences

The growing number of empirical studies of attitudes towards the welfare state offer support for the proposition that preferences about the welfare state relate to social position. In particular, studies consistently find support for the welfare state relates negatively to measures of socioeconomic advantage such as social class, income and employment status (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Svallfors 2007; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). However, confirming the proposition that the connection is not straightforward, it is important to recognise that models based solely on socioeconomic characteristics leave considerable variation in attitudes towards the welfare state unexplained (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003).

Considering variations in attitudes across domains is important. If welfare preferences reflect perceptions of interests and judgements about fairness, attitudes towards some parts of the welfare state are likely to be more closely associated with social position. Social differences in attitudes towards welfare
reflect the universal dimension of support, with less popular welfare domains being subject to much greater social contention. In particular, the most pronounced social differences in attitudes relate to unemployment benefits and social assistance schemes. In relation to these aspects, the higher support among lower social classes and the unemployed is more pronounced (Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). The varying distribution of social risks offers a basis for this pattern; for example, the majority of citizens will feel some concern about illness and old age. In contrast, unemployment and poverty are of more concern to disadvantaged groups. The deservingness of the poor and unemployed is also open to question if we judge the poor and unemployed as responsible for their need if they 'chose not to work' or 'make irresponsible choices'. Survey data offers some evidence of the significance of this type of normative judgement as doubts about the willingness of the unemployed to find work are common throughout European societies and perceptions of the causes of poverty have been shown to predict attitudes towards government intervention (Coughlin 1980; Larsen 2006).

Beyond measure of socioeconomic status, gender, public sector employment and age are other commonly examined determinants of attitudes towards the welfare state. In relation to gender, studies typically expect and find that women support the welfare state more than men (Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). A relationship linked to women's socialisation into caring roles and their dependence on the welfare state "as employees, as family members relieved of heavy and unrewarded care work, and as recipients of benefits from the state" (Svallfors 1997, p.290). Similarly, public sector workers have an interest in protecting their jobs, income and profession and can be socialised into caring for the needs of welfare state clientele. However, considering the high proportion of women working in the public sector, sector based conflict could overlap with gender divisions (Esping-Andersen 1990; Taylor-Gooby 1984) and interact with social class. Indeed the empirical findings are somewhat unclear. Some studies find those working in public sector hold more favourable attitudes

towards the welfare state but the association is small compared to class and gender and inconsistent across studies (Svallfors 1993; van Oorschot 2006).

Studies primarily examine age as a determinant of attitudes towards the welfare state because immediate welfare needs relate to life stage. For example, the young often face greater risks of unemployment and those who are older make greater use of pensions and health care (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Age related differences have been of increasing interest in response to population ageing, as scholars discuss the potential for 'gerontocracy politics', where the interests of the increasingly large, but active older generations dominate politics at the expense of younger generations (e.g. Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009; Busemeyer et al. 2009). However, studies provide an unclear picture of the relationship between age and attitudes, an outcome that is not surprising considering age also reflects generational differences. There is evidence that younger people support more spending on education (Busemeyer et al. 2009); however, preferences for health care and support for older people are not related directly to age (Busemeyer et al. 2009; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). The finding of conflicting evidence with regards to welfare provision for the working-age population, including benefits for the unemployed, importantly suggests that the relationship between age and preferences varies across countries and over time (Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Busemeyer et al. 2009).

Studies integrating measures of political ideology and values can explain more of the variation in attitudes towards the welfare state (Cnaan et al. 1993; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Studies have also shown that values and ideology mediate the connection between social position and attitudes towards the welfare state (Cnaan et al. 1993; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Kulin 2011). For example, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) show a greater prevalence of egalitarian values in the early postwar generations accounts for higher support for the welfare state among older people. Yet, the role of values and ideology in determining attitudes appears complex. Kulin and Svallfors (2011) found significant differences in the association

between values and attitudes across both countries and social groups; which, as they discuss, could reflect how context can affect how individuals relate complicated policies to their value positions and reconcile any potential conflict between their interests and values. It also appears that the issue of deservingness may affect this relationship between values and attitudes as study using survey experiments shows that the effect of values diminishes when individuals are presented with cues about deservingness (Petersen et al. 2011).

### Role of institutional frameworks and contextual factors

How an individual perceives their interests and what they judge to be fair is likely to be shaped by aspects of the context in which they are situated. Indeed, research shows there are significant cross-national variations in attitudes towards the welfare state and contextual determinants of attitudes have received considerable attention within both welfare state scholarship and research into attitudes towards the welfare state. In particular, scholars from various perspectives address how the institutions of the welfare state may have systematic effects on public attitudes along with prevalent forms of political articulation.

Associated most closely with Esping-Andersen (1990), the concept of welfare regimes provide a useful framework for conceptualising the differences between welfare states. Welfare regimes theories have caused considerable debate with questions over the suitability of typological approaches and method for classifying welfare states. <sup>9</sup> Yet, even with such debate, the welfare regime concept remains a widely used tool for representing differences between welfare states (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Myles and Quadagno 2002). At its core, the regime concept recognises that the institutions of welfare states can differ fundamentally. Moreover, Esping-Andersen (1990) emphasised how welfare arrangements interconnect with the structure of the labour market and patterns of social stratification. For example, high female labour market participation in social democratic regimes coincides with extensive public services, which relieve women of caring responsibilities and provide employment opportunities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For a review of contrasting regime classifications, see Arts and Gelissen (2002).

In recognising the considerable differences between welfare states, some distinctive effect on public preferences seems highly plausible. Esping Andersen included such an idea when speculating that welfare regimes would nurture distinctive lines of socio-political conflict (Esping-Andersen 1990, chap.9). The suggestion was that the liberal regime would sustain social class conflict because the middle classes meet their welfare needs primarily through the market and considerable material inequalities reinforce social differences. In contrast, the social democratic and conservative regimes lessen class conflict by encompassing the middle classes within the welfare state. However, institutional arrangements within social democratic and conservative regimes could nurture new lines of social division around gender, sector and insider-outsider status.<sup>10</sup> For Esping-Andersen, these distinctions in public preferences form part of the distinct logics of the regime types and will serve to reinforce the differences between welfare states. Esping-Anderson did not offer a complete theoretical or empirical account of these complex connections between institutions and public preferences and subsequent empirical research suggests some inaccurate speculation. However, the ideas proved undeniably important in furthering research.

A broad effect was to emphasise how contemporary social science must seek to understand the effects of the welfare state on social, economic and political life. In doing so, the ideas fed into a developing discussion around 'policy feedback effects' (Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004; Campbell 2012). 'Policy feedback effects' refer to the idea that, along with politics influencing policy, policy choices will influence politics. Discussion of policy feedback effects has focused primarily on political actors rather than the public (Skocpol 1992; Pierson 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mettler and Soss 2004). Policy decisions are, however, likely to have considerable effects on the political preferences and behaviour of the public. Underlining this issue, Pierson (1993)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In the social democratic regime, the large workforce of public sector employees, who are primarily women, could generate sector, or gender, based conflict due to centralised wage policies requiring wage moderation within the public sector to be spread across the entire economy. In conservative regimes occupation based entitlement could create insider-outsider conflict, with insiders increasingly opposed to the costs of maintaining a large non-working population (Esping-Andersen 1990, chap.9).

distinguished two distinct mechanisms through which policy can influence political preferences and behaviour of the public. First, since welfare policies allocate resources the welfare state will exert *resource and incentive effects*. Second, *cognitive and interpretive effects* could occur as welfare policies play a "significant role in our efforts to understand and act in an enormously complex political world" (Pierson 1993, p.624).

Esping-Andersen's predictions also stimulated a proliferation of studies examining cross-national, or regime differences, in attitudes towards the welfare state (Svallfors 1997; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Andreß and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2001). The results of these studies are partially inconsistent and contradicted elements of Esping-Andersen's speculations. As reviews have highlighted the inconsistency largely reflects how studies measure attitudes towards the welfare state since regime differences tend only to be discerned by studies examining attitudes towards welfare provision for the working age poor and unemployed.<sup>11</sup> When looking at these areas of social policy, a regime pattern emerges in relation to levels of popular support for the welfare state with the populations of social democratic regimes showing high levels of support than those in conservative, and especially, liberal regimes (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Jæger 2007). Studies have also identified comparable regime patterns in the prevalence of values such as egalitarianism (Coughlin 1980; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Cnaan et al. 1993).

The differences among the publics of different welfare regimes support a potential link between institutions and public attitudes. Moreover, the combining of both attitudinal and value differences has led to speculation about a further 'normative' policy feedback effect with welfare state institutions influencing public views of what society should look like (Svallfors 2007). However, as identified in the discussion of contention over welfare state, causal connections are difficult to untangle because they work in both directions. For example, strong egalitarianism

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For useful summaries, see Larsen (2006, chap.3) and Mau and Veghte (2007, pp.4–5.)

in the values of a population could help explain differences in social policy arrangements (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003).

Current scholarship therefore recognises the need to address the underlying causal mechanisms (Pierson 1993; Larsen 2006; Svallfors 2007). A prominent example, is Rothstein's (1998b) ideas around the implications of selective welfare state arrangements, which he argues can provoke public debate about "what the well-adjusted majority should do about the less well-adjusted, in varying degrees, socially marginalized minority" (Rothstein 1998b, p.158). In turn, these debates raise difficult questions about where, and how, to draw a line between the needy and non-needy; debates which can influence perceptions of the fairness of the system. In this case, survey data offers some supporting evidence as establishing deservingness appears to be more significant for populations of liberal welfare regimes, where there are also greater doubts about the deservingness of the poor and unemployed (Larsen 2006; 2008).

### **Conflict in context**

The influence of institutional design becomes important within considerations of class differences in attitudes. However, in contrast to Esping-Andersen's predictions, empirical research has shown that social divisions in attitudes are very similar across countries (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2001; Bean and Papadakis 1998). Attitudes towards welfare typically relate most to social class, followed by gender, sector or insider-outsider status (Larsen 2006; Svallfors 1997; Taylor-Gooby 2001). Thus, welfare states might have resource, cognitive and normative effects, but these do not fundamentally alter the role of social position in determining attitudes.

There are, however, discernible cross-national differences in the intensity of class differences in attitudes. Above all, contrary to the prediction that an expansive welfare state might dilute the class cleavage, studies commonly find larger class differences in social democratic regimes and smaller class differences in liberal

welfare states (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Edlund 2007).<sup>12</sup> The large class differences in social democratic regimes indicate that class differences appear not to relate to the level of material inequality. A pattern, Kumlin and Svallfors (2007) affirm in a large comparative study combining macro-level indicators and data on public opinion. Thus, as Kumlin and Svallfors propose it appears that "it is not the realities in risks and resources that foster attitudinal class differences. Rather, it is the social interpretations of the stratification order that are on offer, which make class differences small in some contexts and large in others" (2007).

Institutional design could help explain differences in social interpretations of the stratification order. Kumlin and Svallfors propose one mechanism is that expansive and redistributive social policies bring issues of redistribution "into the fore of political thinking and debate" (2007, p.39). Thus, disadvantaged groups have more reason to see social policy as a means to tackle inequality and more advantaged groups have reason to resist further redistribution of resources. The tangible redistributive capacity of welfare state leads social democratic regimes to have a "much sharper class profile than the liberal welfare regime" (Edlund 2007, p.43). A further effect of institutional design on class differences in attitudes could relate to judgements about deservingness. If those in more advantaged positions are more disposed to question deservingness, institutions prompting judgements about deservingness could intensify class differences in attitudes. However, the evidence supports the reverse pattern with class differences in attitudes diminishing as questions about deservingness divide less advantaged groups. For instance, Larsen (2006) found working classes in liberal welfare contexts to be more likely to indicate that the poor and unemployed are responsible for their deprived economic position. This proposition relates to older arguments concerning working class anger, where less advantaged socioeconomic classes do not support the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The evidence for regime differences relating sector, gender and employment status is varied. Andreß and Heien (2001) did find a greater distinction between the unemployed and employed in Germany compared to countries of other regime types. There is also some evidence of slightly greater gender or sector differences in Scandinavian countries (Svallfors 1997). However, Taylor-Gooby concluded that "it is interesting that government employees do not identify with state welfare more closely in Sweden, or those full time in the labour market in Germany" (2001, p.142).

welfare state because they resent paying taxes, especially to support those 'choosing not to work' (Cnaan et al. 1993).

Discussions of class differences in attitudes also consider how political actors and intermediary organisations such as social democratic parties and trade unions shape social interpretations of the social stratification order (Edlund 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). A further critique of Esping-Andersen's theory of welfare regimes is that he did not address how political parties and trade unions would be influenced by emerging conflicts centred on gender and employment (Pierson 1993; Edlund 2007). Edlund (2007) proposes that by preserving their position as instigators or opponents of welfare policies, political actors help maintain welfare as a class issue and inhibit new lines of socio-political conflict from developing (Edlund 2007). It is argued that where political actors 'provide citizens with more arguments and information about redistributive issues, citizens are more likely to discover their own position in the stratification system, and more likely to develop attitudes consistent with that position' (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007, p.21). Thus, class articulation by political actors can intensify the link between class and attitudes. The dominance of social democratic parties and trade unions in Scandinavia offer some evidence that the institutionalising of conflict and political articulation. Additionally, a large comparative study suggests that parties and trade unions affect the link between social class and attitudes, and that the effect is independent from institutional effects (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007).

# 2.3 Participatory inequalities

Socio-psychological models have long been used to explain citizen political behaviour. Following the Second World War, research into political participation flourished often with interest in the underpinnings of stable democracy. Early survey research has had a lasting influence on how we understand political behaviour by demonstrating that political behaviour relates strongly to social position, especially social class, and by establishing concepts such as party identification (Campbell et al. 1960). Social characteristics were found to be highly predictive of voting behaviour (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) and the party systems in the

1960s were still reflecting the cleavages from the interwar years (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Most relevantly, studies found that political participation itself was highly socially stratified; for example, Almond and Verba's (1963) pioneering comparative study *The Civic Culture* found that the ideal citizen, who was interested, informed and active in politics, was more likely to be a well-educated individual of higher social status.

By focusing on democratic stability, *The Civic Culture* did not conceptualise the social stratification of political participation as a problem. However, concern grew as the social stratification of political participation became one of the most established findings in political behaviour research (Verba et al. 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 2000; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). However, evidence suggests that participatory inequalities vary across countries and over time. For example, a clear class bias among voters appeared particular to the US (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995) as turnout in European countries was found to be similar across socio-economic groups (Crewe et al. 1977; Parry et al. 1992; Topf 1998b). However, the relative equality of electoral turnout in Europe appears to be changing as more recent studies find discernible social inequalities (Gallego 2010). Hence, an association between social position and participation appears clear, but the association is not fixed and needs continued empirical and theoretical consideration.

## Socioeconomic differences in political participation

Studies of political participation present a common portrait of the citizen most likely to participate in politics. For instance, following a systematic analysis of civic behaviour in Britain, Pattie, Seyd and Whitely (2004) describe how it is "the well educated and the well heeled who are more likely to be engaged in politics and voluntary activities" (Pattie et al. 2004, p.107). In relation to other European nations, Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen (2007) conclude, "generally speaking, participants speak with the accent of highly educated middle-aged male urbandwellers" (p.410). The clear tendency is that socio-economically advantaged citizens are more likely to participate in politics.

The pattern occurs across most forms of political activity. For instance, rather than being a weapon of the weak, protest activity has more commonly offered a tool for more advantaged citizens to voice their preferences (Brady et al. 1995; Pattie et al. 2004; Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007). However, inequalities in 'unconventional' types of participation have decreased as they have come more established within the political action repertoire. Significantly, empirical research reveals that the highly politically active tend to participate across different forms of political participation. As Teorell, Torcal and Montero report, "[it] is not the case, as is commonly held, that some citizens continue to use the traditional channels of participation, such as contacting officials and modes such as protest or consumer participation. On the contrary activists within one mode of activity tend to be activists within the others as well" (Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007, p.354). The inclination for those who are politically active to participate in different types of political action could further compound political inequality (Stolle and Hooghe 2011). Those who are better resourced have an array of political activities they can utilise to voice their preferences.

Age is a core predictor of political participation with studies showing a systematic life cycle model of participation (Verba and Nie 1972). Until late in life, individuals are increasingly more likely to engage in political activity as they age (Verba and Nie 1972; Brady et al. 1995; Topf 1998b; Topf 1998a). In addition to age, further life-course related characteristics such as being married, owning a house and having children are all associated with increased political activity. An exception to the common age pattern concerns less institutionalised forms of activity such as joining demonstrations, which are more commonly associated with young citizens (Dalton 1996; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). However, this pattern is changing for boycotts and signing petitions, where the more standard curvilinear age pattern now applies (Stolle and Hooghe 2011); a change that reflects the ageing of the generation who were young when radical protest emerged.

A lower rate of political participation among women has been a common feature in Western democracies. Verba et al (1978) highlighted a substantial gender

gap in participation across several countries and several other studies confirmed how women were less likely to be politically active (Parry et al. 1992; Topf 1998a; Pattie et al. 2004; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; Morales 2009; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). However, the gender gap in participation has essentially closed in relation to voting and emerging forms of participation. Indeed, Stolle and Hooge (2011) argue that declining gender differences is the biggest shift in patterns of political participation. Yet, inequality remains in relation to institutionalised political activity relating to political parties and trade unions, where men continue to outnumber women (Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012).

### Why are there participatory inequalities?

There are several explanations for why political participation relates systematically to social and economic advantage. In developing the resource model of political participation, Verba, Scholzman and Brady focus on three reasons for why citizens do not participate in politics: "because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked" (1995, p.269). Their resource model summarises and develops social-psychological models of political participation to explain why socioeconomic position shapes the ability, willingness and opportunities for people to take part in politics. Above all, the model concentrates on the role of resources. Political action requires resources such as money, time and civic skills. The resources required vary across forms of political action, with non-electoral forms of political action often requiring greater inputs (Verba et al. 1995). Individuals with limited access to such resources face greater barriers to participating in politics. A key dimension to Verba et al.'s (1995) argument was the role of life-experiences. For instance, experiences in education, the workplace and social organisations are vital for developing the skills needed to participate in politics such as the ability to communicate effectively. Life-experiences are influenced by factors such as social class, age and gender and the experiences of more socioeconomically advantaged groups increases their access to the relevant resources.

We can also consider the mediating role of political attitudes and orientations. Political knowledge, an interest in politics and a sense of political efficacy, are all factors related to political participation. A lack of interest in politics

can derive from a range of factors; individuals may see politics as irrelevant, focus on their own personal issues or even fear the consequences of becoming active. Socioeconomic status and resources relate to specific social norms that condition how individuals are politically socialised. Individuals from more privileged backgrounds are more likely to develop positive attitudes towards politics including a greater sense of political efficacy, feelings of obligation and a psychological engagement with political issues. Social norms can also limit people from taking part in politics. For instance, lower rates of participation among women have been associated with women being socialised into perceiving politics as a largely male domain. The mediating role of political attitudes and orientations was a key element in earlier versions of the resource model (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978). However, a shift from psychological engagement to the resources needed to participate can offer a less analytically problematic approach. Psychological engagement in politics is difficult to measure and the direction of causality is problematic since participating in politics will also influence political attitudes and orientations. The focus on resources also highlights normative concerns about non-participation and participatory inequalities as it is more objectively problematic if people do not participate because they lack resources rather than just through a lack of interest (Brady et al. 1995).

The third component of the resource model emphasises recruitment and mobilisation with the proposition that individuals are more likely to participate if they are asked (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Brady et al. 1995; Knoke 1990). Through a variety of means, social and economic status can affect the likelihood of being asked to participate. Social networks formed through family, experiences in education and work and your local area will influence the likelihood of encountering requests and opportunities to participate. Since privileged citizens are more likely to be in networks where others are participating, they will be asked to participate more often. Social networks can also create pressure to meet certain civic obligations. There is evidence that recruitment efforts are biased towards the more privileged because they are more likely to respond positively and have more available resources. However, when the less advantaged are targeted, recruitment

and mobilisation efforts, especially through churches, political organisations and trade unions may have an equalising effect on the stratification of political participation. This third dimension is crucial when examining non-electoral forms of participation, as the recruitment of participants tends to be more biased (Verba et al. 1995).

The resource model has offered a standard model of participation. However, a significant criticism is its limited consideration of the reasons why individuals participate (Aldrich et al. 1997). There are several contrasting arguments concerning the role of incentives to participate in determining participatory inequalities. As an instrumental activity for protecting interests, those with more resources have more interests to protect and therefore feasibly have the greatest incentives to engage in politics (Parry et al. 1992). However, socioeconomic disadvantage also gives incentives to participate in democratic politics. Indeed, this idea underlines socio-political perspectives on the welfare state such as the *power resources* theory. Moreover, evidence suggests that socioeconomic advantage does not always lead directly to greater participation; for instance, the relationship between income and participation is sometimes curvilinear, suggesting the rich can choose to opt out of politics (Morales 2009, p.74; Beramendi and Anderson 2008b).

There are therefore important questions about the circumstances in which individuals perceive politics as a vehicle to further political demands (Aldrich et al. 1997). Explanations will vary across forms of political participation; however, a general approach is to consider a 'political perspective' on political behaviour (Mettler and Soss 2004). For example, Schattschneider (1960) argued that patterns of non-voting will reflect the structure of political system and limited nature of the political issues presented to the public. Thus, similar to the research on attitudes towards the welfare state, scholars have considered how institutional frameworks and prevalent forms of political articulation will affect who can, who wants to and who is asked to participate in politics.

### Role of institutional frameworks and contextual factors

Research into political participation has consistently revealed cross-national variations (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). The older richer democracies tend to have higher levels of participation and fewer participatory inequalities (Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). A broad division exists between northern and southern Europe. The countries of Northern Europe have higher and more socially equal rates of participation, especially the countries of Scandinavia, whilst in southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, participation tends to be lower and more unequal (Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). The finding of considerable cross-national variations in patterns of political participation has long stimulated interest in contextual influences. For instance, in The Civic Culture (1963), Almond and Verba proposed the institutions of a political system and political activity represent a country's political culture. The idea and analytical usefulness of the political culture concept has been contested (Kaase 1983; Dalton 2000) and research that is more recent has predominantly focused on how institutions shape the costs, incentives and opportunities to participate (Andersen and Singer 2008).<sup>13</sup>

Similar to preferences, various factors influence the link between class and political action. Patterns of social stratification, in particular, levels of poverty and inequality will have an impact on who can participate in politics. There are two types of effect. First, levels of poverty and disadvantage will have an impact of who can participate. Additionally, levels of inequality could affect incentives to participate; for instance, inequality could reduce participation among the less well off, if they perceive the system as favouring those who are better off (Beramendi and Anderson 2008). This resource based argument has been used to explain differences in electoral participation by the level of redistribution (Franzese and Hays 2008) and income equality (Beramendi and Anderson 2008). Similarly, the role of resources is thought to underlie a relationship between extensive welfare

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For discussions on the interaction between contextual factors and individual characters see, for example, Anduiza (2002) and Anderson and Singer (2008).

provision and higher voluntary activity among low-income groups (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011).

Patterns of social stratification relate to the institutional set-up of the welfare state and highlight the potential role of policy feedback effects. The policy feedback literature includes some relevant discussions of how policy design can foster or suppress political activity within certain sections of society.<sup>14</sup> For instance, in a notable example, Campbell (2003) shows how the American public pension system increased the resources and incentives for senior citizens to become politically active. More generally, welfare reforms will influence both the resources and incentives to participate; however, the effects are potentially diverse. For instance, drawing on Pierson's ideas of a new politics of the welfare state, welfare reforms could stimulate political activity. However, there is also evidence that welfare state retrenchment could foster political alienation among disadvantaged groups (Oskarson 2007).

Political institutions can also modify rewards and costs of political action in ways that differentially affect socio-economic groups. First, institutional frameworks can increase the costs of participation; for example, rules making it harder to participate can differentially affect the less advantaged. For instance, examining the relationship between education and voting, Gallego (2010, p.246) argues that the social bias in the electorate decreases where voting is made easy through the use of simple ballots, state-initiated registration and a limited number of parties. A further feature of the political system that appears important for fostering equal rates of participation is access to the decision-making process. In this case, Morales (2009) shows that contexts with more open political structures such as consensual arrangements of interest representation foster more socially equal membership of political associations.

Political mobilisation is a further factor that can reduce barriers to political activity among weaker socio-economic groups. Verba et al. (1978) discussed how members of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups can be mobilised to participate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For reviews of the policy feedback literature, see Mettler and Soss (2004) and Campbell (2012)

at the group level. Group-based mobilisation has commonly come through strong left-wing parties and trade unions. Political actors can incentivise and facilitate political participation. Parties and trade unions provide incentives for those in weaker positions to participate by appealing to the interests of workers, providing information and enhancing solidarity. Moreover, trade unions can help shift the political agenda and the platforms of left-wing parties. Indeed, the more equal electoral participation in Europe compared to the US has been largely attributed to the role of left-wing parties and trade unions mobilising lower socio-economic groups (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Crewe et al. 1977; Verba et al. 1978). In turn, the increasingly inequality is potentially a result of declining labour movements.

Studies examining the contemporary impact of left parties and trade unions on the equality of political participation do not find a clear association. There is evidence that strong left-wing parties raise levels of overall turnout and that declines in turnout relate to declining union membership (Gray and Caul 2000). However, when specifically looking at turnout among groups with different levels of education, Gallego (2010) found that neither strong left-wing parties (measured by share of the vote) nor trade unions are associated with greater equality. However, as part of the debates about declining patterns of class voting, Evans and Tilley (2011) offer evidence that the changing position of parties on the left has an impact on the political behaviour of social groups.

The relationship between left-wing parties and participatory inequalities is, however, unlikely to be simple. First, mobilisation strategies will not be exogenous from existing patterns of political participation. For instance, political actors will have less incentive to invest in mobilisation strategies for groups unlikely to participate (Anderson and Beramendi 2012). There are also important arguments to suggest that parties on the left are not incentivised to mobilise the most disadvantaged groups. For instance, returning to the distinction between labour market insiders and outsiders, Rueda (2007) argues that by catering to insiders, leftwing political parties can push outsiders away from mainstream parties and politics altogether (Rueda 2007; Lindvall and Rueda 2013). There is also evidence that the

efforts of parties on the left to mobilise less advantaged groups is contingent upon other contextual factors. For instance, Anderson and Beramendi (2012) present an interesting study drawing several dimensions together. Starting with the idea that greater income inequality reduces the inclination of low-income groups to participate in politics because they perceive the political system to be favouring the better off, parties on the left have less incentive to invest resources in mobilising low-income voters; that is, unless they face considerable party competition. Thus, the argument implies that mobilisation efforts may reduce the inequality of participation but only within contexts where income inequality is smaller and there is party competition on left.

# 2.4 Welfare state preferences and political action

This final section discusses the association between welfare state preferences and political participation. The main idea this thesis examines is that differences between groups resulting from socioeconomic inequalities could create an association between preferences and participation. As the previous sections have established, preferences about the welfare state and political activity are socially determined in similar ways. Specifically, socioeconomic resources are associated with lower support for the welfare state whilst increasing capacity and opportunity to participate in politics. Thus, a key hypothesis is that socioeconomic inequalities could lead to an under-representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens.

A similar argument appears in the US focused literature on non-voting and candidate choice, with non-voters assumed to be disproportionate supporters of the Democrats due to their class position (Griffin and Newman 2005; Grofman et al. 1999). However, the hypothesis that socioeconomic inequalities could lead to an under-representation of support for the welfare state has not received sufficient attention, either empirically or theoretically. For example, as the introduction to the thesis emphasised, only a few studies examine the association between preferences and participation. Moreover, these few studies provide limited theoretical accounts of the relationship and offer a conflicting picture of the association between preferences and participation. Several studies find no

association (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Studlar and Welch 1986; Verba et al. 1995), while others find non-participants are more favourable than participants in relation to social policy issues (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Gant and Lyons 1993; Leighley and Nagler 2014).

Themes from the previous sections give some potential insights to the association but further add to the need to consider the association more closely. For instance, the discussions signal that socioeconomic differences in preferences and participation may not be sufficient to result in a discernible association between preferences and participation. For example, research shows that the welfare state is generally popular, in part because wide sections of society derive substantial benefits. There are also deeply engrained social norms and moral factors contributing to popular endorsement of welfare state programmes (Mau 2003; Svallfors 2007; Mau and Veghte 2007; Larsen 2006). It is therefore important to consider that whilst socioeconomic inequalities create differences in the interests and preferences of social groups, an underlying consensus over the welfare state remains an important element of European societies. Equally, whilst socioeconomic groups vary in their rates of political activity, electoral participation has tended to be more equal in European democracies (Crewe et al. 1977; Parry et al. 1992; Topf 1998b). Thus, in addition to empirical examination of the association between preferences and participation, exploration of the hypothesis should also include an examination of the underlying patterns of social difference.

Another feature emerging from previous discussions is the potential differences across domains of the welfare state. The consensus over the welfare state appears much more vulnerable in relation to aspects of the welfare state for socioeconomically marginalised groups (van Oorschot 2005; Larsen 2006). Aspects of the welfare state catering to the poor and unemployed of working age have smaller beneficiary groups and can lack moral legitimacy. Research shows that these forms of welfare not only engender lower levels of public support but that attitudes link more closely to social position (Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Thus, the hypothesis that socioeconomic

inequalities could lead to an under-representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens may perhaps most concern programmes benefitting socioeconomic disadvantaged groups.

The previous sections emphasise how political attitudes and behaviours vary due to the influence of contextual factors such as institutional frameworks and the position of political actors. For example, support for the poor and unemployed appears particularly vulnerable within liberal welfare regimes, where there are greater debates about deservingness and the legitimacy of the system (Mau 2003; Larsen 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2013). Of particular relevance is that the determining role of socioeconomic inequalities is greater in some contexts (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Jæger 2007). Therefore, the hypothesis that socioeconomic inequalities could lead to an under-representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens may apply in some contexts more than others.

Social inequalities will understandably lead to a greater association between preferences in contexts where there substantial social differences in both preferences and participation. Untangling the impact and interactions of the various contextual factors is a difficult task and current scholarship only provides partial insight. For example, it is argued that to fully understand the effects of institutional design on attitudes towards the welfare state it, research needs to move beyond the analysis of 'welfare regimes' (Svallfors 2007). However, the existing bodies of scholarship indicate some factors thought to foster wider social differences in preferences and participation. For example, attitudes towards the welfare state appear to be more polarised in contexts where there is a greater redistribution of resources and stronger political articulation of class differences (Edlund 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007).

One important feature of contextual influences may be that they simultaneously affect political preferences and action in ways that reduce the likelihood of an association between preferences and participation. For instance, contexts where welfare provision is more generous and redistributive are

associated with greater social differences in attitudes towards welfare provision (Edlund 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). The greater socioeconomic differences in preferences could increase the under-representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens. However, redistributive social policy and lower levels of inequality support greater political participation among socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Franzese and Hays 2008); thus, an under-representation of support for the welfare state becomes less likely. Conversely, in contexts with limited welfare provision, socioeconomic differences in participation are greater. A pattern that supports the hypothesis that socioeconomic inequality could lead to an under-representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens. However, the prospect becomes less likely when we consider that the preferences of socioeconomic groups are less likely to differ substantially. Again, these patterns suggest that to understand the association between preferences and participation it is important to consider the underlying patterns of social stratification.

As indicated above, the main idea this thesis examines is that differences between groups resulting from socioeconomic inequalities could create an association between preferences and participation. However, it is important to recognise other casual connections between welfare state support and political action. For example, participating in politics could affect preferences. This effect could occur through an increasing interest in politics and political knowledge alternating perceptions of interests or judgements about fairness. In turn, we could also posit that this could affect the association between socioeconomic position and preferences. Full consideration of these other causal connections is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, chapter six will include some further discussion.

These arguments affirm the need to consider the association between preferences and participation further. The review highlights factors to consider when developing an agenda for empirical work. There is need to examine different contexts, ideally contexts varying in terms of welfare state institutions and patterns of political participation. To understand the association fully there is a need to

consider the underlying social differences in welfare state support and patterns of participatory inequalities. Considering the interplay of these different patterns of social stratification will help establish how social inequalities affect the relation between welfare state support and political action.

# Conclusion

Socioeconomic inequalities create contention over redistributive politics. The resulting patterns of socio-political conflict are an important dimension to the politics of the welfare state, and are factor behind the wide differences in institutional arrangements. Patterns of socio-political conflict may be changing, partly, because of extensive welfare policies and processes of social, economic and political change. However, democratic politics, above all elections, incentivise political elites to respond to public opinion and the preferences of their core constituencies.

Individual support for the welfare state reflects agreement with the distribution of costs and benefits. Due to socioeconomic inequalities, preferences vary between socioeconomic groups. However, many factors influence how people perceive their interests and make judgements about fairness, including institutional arrangement and prevalent forms of political articulation. Thus, we find that the connection between social position and preference varies in strength across societies and across aspects of the welfare states. Similarly, by determining the costs and rewards of participating, socioeconomic inequalities lead to participatory inequalities with more advantaged groups being more politically active. Though by modifying the rewards and costs of political articulation can reduce or intensify participatory inequalities.

Drawing on these patterns of relationship, the final section of this chapter underlined how the differences between groups resulting from socioeconomic inequalities could create an association between preferences and participation. The key hypothesis is that socioeconomic inequalities could lead to an under-

representation of support for the welfare state among politically active citizens. Such a hypothesis requires empirical study of the association between preferences and participation as well as the underlying pattern of social differences. Moreover, a framework for such empirical study needs to consider potential differences across countries, aspects of the welfare state and forms of political action. The remainder of the thesis presents empirical research examining these themes with and the research design outlined in the next chapter.

# 3 Researching political participation and welfare state preferences

A comparative study of political participation and attitudes towards the welfare state is conceivable for small scale project due to the availability of high quality survey data. However, there are a number of issues to address when developing a research design involving the secondary analysis of survey data. This chapter outlines key aspects of the analytical approach adopted in this thesis. It begins with the case study design and discusses the choice of Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The second section discusses cross-section survey research and the European Social Survey (ESS) as a source of data. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss how we can measure political participation and attitudes towards the welfare state and describe the levels of political activity and support for the role of government within each of the four countries. The chapter concludes by outlining the main stages of the empirical analyses presented in the thesis.

# 3.1 A comparative study of four European countries

There are two main reasons for adopting a comparative approach in this study. First, comparing countries offers a means of evaluating the relationships of interest within a specific context; for example, it becomes possible to say if the politically active are more or less representative in one country compared to another. The second reason comes from the potential for the relationships of interest to vary across countries. Research has shown that there are cross-national differences in both the social stratification of attitudes towards the welfare state and political activity. These patterns of social stratification could overlap in different ways within specific national contexts and therefore have different determining effects upon how preferences about the welfare state are represented through political participation. By enabling exploration of these differences, a comparative study can enhance understanding of how representative the politically active are in their preferences and how participatory inequalities impact upon the representation of preferences. The number of countries is limited to a small number of purposefully selected cases. Limiting the number of cases gives the study the scope to examine both preferences and participation and their underlying social stratification and also consideration of the multi-dimensional nature of political participation and welfare state preferences. The selected countries also provide a varied set of contexts in which to explore how the relationships of interest might be affect by context.

Both similarities and differences motivate the choice of Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. First, the selection represents 'most similar systems' in regards to economic, political and social organisation. They are all advanced industrial societies that share comparable levels of economic development and members of the European Union have institutionalised long-standing political and economic connections.<sup>15</sup> In these countries, common democratic forms of government operate and citizens possess equivalent political rights. Hence, concerns with the equality of participation and democratic legitimacy are comparable across the cases. There are also common concerns about how the welfare state can be sustained since the governments of these countries intervene within the social and economic spheres through similar institutional frameworks. The similarities ensure the themes of the thesis are equivalently relevant. However, the substantial differences across Western European countries make it meaningful to examine participatory inequality and the welfare state preferences of the politically active within contrasting contexts, which the selection of countries aims to provide.

#### Welfare regimes

The framework for identifying cases is influenced by welfare regime theory. As discussed in the previous chapter, welfare regime theory has played an important role in understanding the differences between welfare states, and in framing research into attitudes towards the welfare state. Significantly, the research into attitudes towards the welfare state indicates that public attitudes vary across regimes in two ways that are highly relevant to the themes in this study. First, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Significantly, Pierson argues that EU provides constraints on government that intensify demands for welfare state retrenchment (Pierson 2001b, p.1).

relationship between social position and attitudes towards the welfare state vary in strength across regimes. Second, attitudes towards welfare provision primarily benefitting less advantaged socio-economic groups is a further point of differences between the different welfare regimes (see Larsen 2006). As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of welfare regimes is associated most with Esping-Andersen (1990). However, welfare state classifications and typologies have been subject to extensive debate and there are alternative schemes, as a result it is appropriate to specify how the concept is approached within this study.

The number of regimes has been widely debated. Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three distinctive models of welfare state; however, other classification schemes propose that additional regime types are required to capture the major differences between welfare states (e.g. Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1992; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; for a state-of-art report see Arts and Gelissen 2002). In relation to Europe, the debate centres upon the southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece. Several scholars argue for a distinctive 'Southern' or 'Mediterranean' model. For example, Leibfried (1992) emphasises how a weak articulation of rights to welfare and minimum level of social security differentiate southern European countries from continental Europe. Alternatively, other scholars recognise that these welfare states developed differently, often noting their later consolidation and stronger familist character, but argue that they essentially follow conservative-corporatist regime logic. A further aspect of this controversy is the idea that the evidence for a typical southern European welfare model is not convincing, especially in light of the pace of change within these countries (Guillén and León 2012).

The debates about a Southern European model suggest classifications should not simply be accepted. However, there are reasons to propose that Southern European countries offer contexts that are sufficiently different enough to warrant inclusion in this study. One type of difference relates to the context of welfare state politics as poverty rates remain higher alongside levels of income inequality. Moreover, a further difference directly relevant to this study is that research has shown that the populations of countries such as Spain vary from other

European countries in terms of both their attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation.

### **Selecting countries**

The debates about the classification of the Southern European countries highlight some of the difficulties in selecting countries from regime groups. One issue to consider is how closely countries correspond to the archetype of a regime typology. Since the aim is to select contrasting contexts, the appropriate strategy is to select countries that best fit the regime types. Germany and Sweden come close to the ideal conservative and social democratic welfare regimes and Spain provides a good example of a late developing Southern European model. The UK as a liberal regime is more awkward.

The UK demonstrates characteristics of the liberal model. However, universal characteristics of the British welfare state such as the National Health Service, reveal the social democratic influence on post-war social policy development. Scholars discuss the UK as a hybrid case (Taylor-Gooby 1991) and Esping-Andersen described a "stalled social democratisation" (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.87). As a result, scholars testing regime differences and attitudes towards the welfare state have often opted to "avoid borderline cases like Britain" (Svallfors 1997, p.286). However, the stronger focus on means-testing and targeting means the UK differs substantially from countries within Scandinavia and continental Europe, especially following the welfare state reforms from the 1980s onwards. As a result, although the UK varies from the standard liberal welfare state, it represents a distinct model within the European context. Moreover, as elaborated upon in further stages of the thesis, public opinion in the UK (at least in recent years) differs in significant ways from other European countries, for example, research shows that public support for redistribution and benefits for the unemployed has declined markedly in the UK in recent decades (Taylor-Gooby 2013).

A further issue to consider is that countries within one regime classification might vary in ways not considered within the dimension of a typology. These contextual differences could influence attitudes towards the welfare state. Thus,

results for these four countries will not necessarily apply to other countries within a regime type. For example, research suggests that divisions in preferences are more pronounced in Sweden than its social democratic neighbour Norway (Svallfors 1997); hence, results for Sweden might vary from Norway. Issues about generalising results across regimes are further intensified because the thesis is also concerned with patterns of political participation. Research into political participation has shown distinct patterns in political participation across Scandinavia, other parts of Northern Europe and Southern Europe. Thus, this small set of cases provides varied contexts in which to explore the impact of participatory inequalities on the welfare state preferences of the politically active. However, as the previous chapter discussed, various contextual factors including the institutions of the political system and mobilising efforts of political actors shape patterns of political participation and open the potential for differences within regime types.

A final point in relation to the multi-country design concerns the choice of countries as the main unit of analysis. The choice reflects how countries are political entities and a bias in citizen voice could potentially determine the direction of policy. However, complexities lie within the cases. In particular, Germany was divided into two countries for 45 years (1945-1990) and is often treated as two separate units in studies of political preferences and participation; an approach which reveals differences between individuals within the former communist East and those in the West.<sup>16</sup> Equally, regional focuses could be applicable because subnational levels of government such as the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) and the devolved parliaments in the UK have autonomy over aspects of social policy. These important issues could form the basis of interesting research but are beyond the bounds of this current study.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For example, Andreß and Heien (2001) show support for government intervention is higher in East Germany than West Germany.

# 3.2 Cross-sectional survey research

The aim of the study requires cross-national data relating to attitudes towards the welfare state, political participation and socio-demographic variables. Attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation are often measured by social surveys; however, they are rarely examined in depth in the same survey. For instance, the International Social Survey programme (ISSP) module on the Role of Government provides a rich source of data in relation to attitudes, but with regards to political activity asks only about voting. Equally, the rotating module in the 2002 ESS survey included very detailed questions about political activities but the core ESS questionnaire asks only whether people agree that government should reduce income differences.

The best data currently available for examining attitudes towards the welfare state, political participation and socio-demographic variables comes from Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS), which took place in 2008 (ESS4-European Social Survey Round 4 2008/2009). The core ESS questionnaire contains questions about political views and behaviour alongside socio-demographics. Additionally, this particular wave includes the rotating module *Welfare State Attitudes in a Changing Europe*. The module was designed by leading researchers in the area such as Stefan Svallfors, Wim van Oorschot, and Peter Taylor-Gooby and includes 50 items relating to attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the welfare state. The combination of the core questionnaire and welfare attitudes module makes Round 4 of the ESS the most appropriate source of data for investigating the themes of the research.

The resources, skills and expertise drawn upon to create large social surveys mean that secondary data can provide reliable and extensive information. In particular, some advantages to using the ESS include the scientific rigor employed in its development and fieldwork and the attempts made to ensure comparability across countries. In each of the countries, the data was collected during an hourlong face-to-face interview using standard computer based questionnaires translated into the relevant languages. Crucially, the ESS teams provide extensive documentation relating to questionnaire development, fieldwork procedures and

assessments of data quality.<sup>17</sup> However, there are a number of issues to consider in the secondary analysis of cross-sectional survey data.

A key consideration is that the data relates to a single point in time. The fieldwork dates for ESS4-2008 are within the period from September 2008 to February 2009, inferring findings from cross-sectional research beyond this specific period requires caution. For example, this period marked the start of economic change in relation to financial markets and national economies with governments giving financial support to banks and national economies experiencing recession.<sup>18</sup> These economic events later went on to have an impact on debates about the welfare state with the concept of austerity becoming an active part of the political vocabulary. The years following this survey also saw mass political mobilisation opposing government 'austerity' such as Spanish 15m movement (Likki 2012). Hence, there are reasons to propose that the relationships examined in this thesis might have subsequently changed.

A second issue concerns the representativeness of the sample data. The ESS is designed to obtain representative samples of the population aged 15 years and over and resident within private households. Table 3-1 provides a summary of the sample designs for each country. For the countries where the sample design includes unequal selection probabilities, a design weight is provided to adjust the data and all results reported in this thesis are based on weighted data. Additionally, the table displays the response rates and achieved sample sizes for each country. The response rates, which vary across countries, fall below the preferred minimum set by the ESS and the German response rate (48%) is a particular concern.<sup>19</sup> The response rates give the potential for the achieved samples to be unrepresentative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Documentation relating to questionnaire development, fieldwork procedures and data quality are freely available from the ESS website (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For example, in the US on 7th September there was a federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and on the 15th September Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In relation to Europe, on 6th October Germany announced a 50bn euro plan to save one of the country's biggest banks and 13th October the UK government nationalised three UK banks Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Matsuo et al.'s (2010) *Response-based Quality Assessment of ESS Round 4* indicates the low response rate is the product of both high refusals and non-contacts. Moreover, the report highlights how contact attempts were not made during evenings and weekends, which is likely to decrease the representativeness of the sample.

of the population. Comparing the data with the data from the population statistics report provided in the ESS4-2008 documentation<sup>20</sup> indicates some slight but not substantial deviations. For example, in Germany, Spain and the UK younger adults are underrepresented.

Differences between the sample and population can bias estimates of population characteristics when they relate to the probability of responding to the survey; for example, the under-representation of young people could produce a downward bias when estimating the proportion of non-voters. Weights that adjust the sample for known socio-demographic differences offer a means to address these concerns; equally, an alternative approach is to use control variables within statistical models. However, these approaches do not adjust for direct or more complex relationships between the subjects of interest (welfare state preferences and political activity) and the likelihood of non-response. For example, the probability of participating in a social survey is thought to be related to levels of political engagement. As a result, unrepresentative samples and biased estimates from survey non-response remain concerns with this kind of analysis.

	Sample design	Achieved sample size	Response rate (%)
Germany	Individuals are sampled from a residents register using stratified two-stage (areas, individuals) probability sampling.	2,751	48
Spain	Individuals are sampled from a population census using stratified two-stage (areas and individuals) probability sampling.	2,576	69
Sweden	Individuals are sampled from a population register using one-stage equal probability sampling.	1,830	62
UK	Addresses are sampled from the Postcode Address File (PAF). Stratified three stage (areas, address, individuals) probability sampling	2, 352	56

Table 3-1 Sample design, size and response rates in Round 4 ESS (2008) for the UK,Germany, Sweden and Spain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Appendix 1 of *ESS Round 4 (2008/2009) Final Activity Report* (European Social Survey 2010).

A third issue, or set of issues, relate to the content of the survey. A particular concern for comparative research is the comparability of concepts and survey questions. The scholars developing the ESS invest resources during questionnaire development in improving cross-national comparability. Therefore, whilst the comparability of data from different context will remain problematic, it is beneficial that the data used in this study was collected following a cross-national effort to limit concepts and question wording that could impede comparability. A further issue surrounding the analysis of survey data is that people may not provide accurate and honest responses due to problems such as recall error and social desirability bias. For example, it is commonly known that more people report having voted than official turnout figures suggest. The impact of these problems is difficult to ascertain, and will be specific to concepts and survey questions. Issues relevant to political participation and welfare state preferences are considered in the following two sections, which discuss the measurement of these concepts.<sup>21</sup>

# 3.3 Measuring political participation

This study examines different forms of political participation. This aspect of the analysis reflects how the literature on political participation indicates that the social bias of participants varies across types of political activity and that types of political activity vary in how they convey participant preferences and exert influence on political processes.<sup>22</sup> Thus, by analysing individual types of political activity the thesis aims to understand bias in the voice of citizens across avenues of participation and the underlying role played by the social bias among participants in different types of political activity.

# **Questions in the European Social Survey**

Comparative social surveys are widely used to chart levels of participation and the characteristics of participants. Many of the large-scale social surveys ask about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The measurement of socio-economic position is discussed in chapter five.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In addition, other factors shaping the relationship between preferences and participation will vary across types of political activity, for example, study show with left-wing preferences are more likely to demonstrate (Jennings and Van Deth 1990; van der Meer et al. 2009). These influences are not explicitly examined in the thesis; however, the empirical analysis in chapter six examines the connections between preferences and participants whilst controlling for their social characteristics.

political behaviour; however, the range and content of questions vary across surveys. The ESS contains several questions referring to a various types of political activity. From the items available, five indicators of political activity have been developed relating to *voting, trade union membership, contacting a politician or official, organisation work* and *joining demonstrations*<sup>23</sup>. The indicators reflect the repertoire of political participation and include political action within and outside of the formal representative channels. Table 3-2 displays the survey questions used to derive the indicators of political action and the following paragraphs outline their key features.

Variable	Questions in the ESS4-2008				
[variable name]					
Voting [vote]	Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you				
Voters/No and not-	vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]*?				
eligible	Response categories 'Yes'. 'No' and 'Not eligible to vote'				
Trade union membership	Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar				
[trade union]	organisation? IF YES, is that currently or previously?				
	Response categories 'Yes, currently', 'Yes, previously' 'No'				
	There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you				
Contacting a politician or official	Contacted a politician, government or local government official? Response categories (ves' and 'no'				
[contact]					
Organisation work	Worked in another organisation or association?				
[org work]	Worked in a political party or action group?				
	Response categories 'yes' and 'no'				
Joining demonstrations	Taken part in a lawful public demonstration?				
[demo]	Response categories 'yes' and 'no'				

Table 3-2 Political participatior	variables based on	n questions in the	ESS4-2008
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Notes: For each question 'don't know' responses are recorded but not offered as response category. The square brackets indicate a short label applied to the variables in many of the tables and graphs throughout the thesis.

\*The elections referred to took place in 2005 for Germany and the UK, 2006 in Sweden and 2008 in Spain.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Questions about petitions and the boycotting of some products were excluded from the analysis on the basis of the relevance to the issues at hand and the desire to limit the scope.

Since the voting question refers to the last national election there is the possibility of recall error and social desirability bias; for example, respondents may report voting when they did not, or identify themselves incorrectly such as not voting when ineligible. In Table 3-3, we can see that the proportion of voters is higher in the sample than the population. The over-reporting of voting is common in social survey data and is likely to stem from a lower participation in social surveys by non-voters and a propensity for people to falsely report that they voted. The pattern could have several implications for the analysis in the study. First, the under-reporting of non-voting could reduce the precision of estimates, thus making associations harder to establish statistically. Additionally, it could result in biased estimates when the factors leading to the under-reporting systematically relate to the relationships being investigated. Whilst possible, the effects are hard to establish because multiple processes could be operating and there is only limited information about many of the possible relationships<sup>24</sup>. Equally, the composition of the non-voter group varies across elections, for example, the dynamics of election campaigns can influence the groups that are mobilised to participate (Leighley and Nagler 2014).<sup>25</sup> Hence, caution extrapolating across elections is needed. The voting variable has three response categories. However, when vote is a dependent variable it was recoded into a binary indicator that distinguishes 'voters' from 'nonvoters and those not eligible'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The problem emerges if falsely claiming to vote relates systematically to the socio-demographic or welfare state preferences variables. In relation to the first, Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy (2001) show that in the US the better educated are more likely to falsely report voting; since this group has a generally higher propensity to vote, the over-reporting of voting could overemphasise the differences in the propensity to participate between more advantaged and less advantaged citizens. In turn, this could artificially inflate the attitudinal differences between voters and non-voters. In relation to preferences, it is difficult to establish how holding certain preferences could affect the propensity to lie about voting in the last election. One possible dynamic could be that if there was an election fought over welfare state issues, stronger supporter of the welfare state may feel under pressure to say the voted even if they did not.
<sup>25</sup> Additionally, the composition of the not eligible group depends upon the length of time between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Additionally, the composition of the not eligible group depends upon the length of time between the last election and the fielding of the survey as this determines the proportion of younger survey participants that were too young to vote. However, since the group is small its effect on the results will be limited.

Tab	le 3·	-3	Voters	in t	he ESS	and	official	record	s of	f voter	turnout
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Data http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/.

	Germany	Spain	Sweden	UK			
Percentage of those eligible voting in the ESS4-2008 sample data	83.7	81.9	91.1	70.3			
Official turnout as a percentage of registered voters	77.7	75.3	81.99	61.4			
Ratio of percentage in sample to							
official turnout	1.08	1.09	1.11	1.14			
Source: ESS4-2008 and Official Turnout Data taken from the following sources: Germany, the Federal Returning							

Officer <u>http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/fruehere\_bundestagswahlen/btw2005.html;</u> Spain, the Ministerio del Interior (<u>www.elecciones.mir.es</u>); Sweden, Valmyndigheten (Swedish Election Authority)( http://www.val.se/ ); and the UK, the Electoral Commission (2005) General Election 2005 Turnout

The question on trade union membership identifies members rather than those actively involved in union activity. The question asks about both current and previous trade union membership; however, the desire to code variables parsimoniously led to a binary item being used to differentiate current members and non-members. This variable differs from measures of 'union density' that reflect trade union membership for the working age population.

The items used to construct the participation variables *contacting*, *organisation work* and *joining demonstrations* come from a question module headed with the following statement: "There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong." Respondents are left to interpret the types of activity that can be classified as 'trying to improve things' or 'help prevent things from going wrong'; but generally, the statements add a political dimension to actions that could be non-political such as involvement with leisure organisations or contacting elites in relation to personal affairs such refuse collection. It is relevant to note that the questions do not ask about the aims or target of the political activity; ask about activities within the last 12 months and only about whether participation has happened and not about the volume of activity. As a result, the indicators are binary items that distinguish participants from non-participant and relate to the propensity to engage in political activity and not activity specifically relating to the welfare state

Unlike the other item *organisation work* derives from combining two survey questions, which relate to whether participants have worked in 'a political party or action group' and 'another organisation or association'. In both cases, the phrase 'worked in' suggests active, as opposed to passive, involvement within the organisations. The main reason for combining items was a problem with low frequencies within the sample data for working in a political party or action group. The approach produces a measure of activity within a heterogeneous mix of associations, which is likely to include work in political parties, environment groups and community associations. The item also blurs the distinction between activities within and outside institutional politics. The heterogeneity is not analytically ideal. However, deriving an indicator to show a general propensity to engage collectively within an organisation diminishes a problem of low frequencies and avoids excluding forms of organised action from the analysis. The items combine so that a positive response to either question leads to the classification as a participating in *organisation work*.

### Levels of political activity

Figure 3-1 shows levels of political activity measured by each of the items. Reflecting patterns documented in the literature, the data reveals considerable differences in prevalence within and between countries. First, within each country, voting is clearly the most widespread form of political participation; however, the proportion of the population that voted in the last election varies across the countries. Turnout is highest in Sweden at around 82 percent, followed by Germany at 76 percent and Spain at 72 percent. At about 64 percent, the proportion of the population voting is notably lower in the UK.<sup>26</sup>

Beyond voting, far fewer people tend to be politically active; for example, across all countries those who have contacted a politician or official represent less than 15 percent and those who have joined a demonstration less than 10 percent. Across Europe, trade union membership varies considerably (see Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Scruggs and Lange 2002) and Figure 3-1 shows substantial differences

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Prior to 2001, turnout (percentage of those eligible voting) in the UK had been at over 70 percent. In 2001 it dropped to 59.4 percent and has been increasing in each subsequent election.

across the four cases. Most notable are the higher rates of trade union membership in Sweden, where nearly 50 percent of the adult population is a member<sup>27</sup> compared to an average of less than 12 percent in the other three countries. The lower levels in the UK and Germany reflect declines in trade union membership during the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000) whilst membership in Spain has consistently been low.<sup>28</sup>



Figure 3-1 Levels of political activity in Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, percentage (%) of adults participating

In relation to cross-national differences, the data reflects the general picture found within the literature that levels of political activity and engagement tend to be highest in Scandinavian countries and lower across Southern Europe (Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007). More specifically, scholars examining participation in Spain since democracy was re-established have noted the comparatively low levels of

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2,751, Spain n= 2,576, Sweden, n=1,830, UK, n=2, 352 Notes: Countries ordered in terms of proportion of voters, with highest proportion first.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Trade union membership is typically higher in countries with the Gent system, in which unions manage unemployment insurance, which it is argued offers Unions valuable selective incentives to get workers to join (Rothstein 1992).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> In Spain, trade union membership rates had been increasing in the years prior to the survey as a result of an employment boom; however, rising membership stopped with the financial crisis that started in 2008 (Köhler and Calleja 2012, p.284).
political interest, knowledge, and political activity (Morales 1999; Montero et al. 1997; Montero and Torcal 1990). However, in line with the typical Southern European pattern, the data indicates how joining demonstrations is comparatively more common in Spain than in the other three countries.

In Figure 3-1, organisation work represents a key difference between the countries with much higher rates in Germany and Sweden than Spain and the UK. Table 3-4 provides a breakdown of participation captured by the two items, highlighting the much lower prevalence of activity within a 'political party or action group'. Considerable cross-national differences in involvement within both political and non-political organisations have been established within previous analyses (Morales 2009; Morales and Geurts 2007; Dekker and van den Broek 1998). The data confirms how involvement in associations (both political and non-political) is considerably higher in Scandinavia and lower in Southern (and Eastern) Europe.

	Germany	Spain	Sweden	UK
Political party action group	3.8	2.9	4.4	2.2
Another organisation	25.9	9.5	27.0	6.6
N=	2751	2576	1830	2352

Table 3-4 Rates of activity within 'Political party action' group and 'another organisation'

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2,751, Spain n= 2,576, Sweden, n=1,830, UK, n=2, 352

The prevalence of activity has implications for the relationships examined in this study. First, where the number of participants is low there is a greater potential for participants to be unrepresentative. Moreover, the prevalence of political activity affects the link between bias in political activity and the representation of public preferences. For example, when turnout at elections is high, even if nonvoters are quite distinctive in their preferences, attitudinal differences between voters and non-voters would have a limited effect on determining how representative voters are of the whole population. Conversely, in cases where participants represent a small proportion of the population, holding a distinctive set of preferences. A further implication of the low prevalence of most political activities (and the electoral abstention) is that certain frequencies are low. In each case, the recode of variables ensures each category represents over three percent of the population but the number of cases in some categories is low. Low frequencies are problematic from an analytical perspective as estimates will be less precise, which makes it harder to establish the differences between groups. In total, there are five instances where the number of cases within a category falls below 200 cases. Three relate to the different non-voting categories. The other instances refer to the frequency of *trade union membership* in Spain (181 cases), joining *demonstrations* in the UK (92 cases) and *organisation work* in the UK (179 cases).

# 3.4 Measuring welfare state preferences

Since welfare states comprise different goals, policies and programmes, welfare state preferences are likely to be complex. Beginning with the most fundamental, citizens can hold views regarding what *should be* the role of government in welfare provision. Underlying these views, there may be broader notions about state versus individual responsibility and the roles of the market, family and civil society. There are issues of cost and taxation, means-testing versus universalism and conditions of entitlement. Questions persist as to whether the state, non-profit or private sector organisations best provide welfare services and the social and economic consequences of state intervention. Acknowledging these differences, Andreβ and Heien (2001) discern four key dimensions: attitudes towards (1) the functions of the welfare state; (2) the means (institutions, programmes, actors) of the welfare state; (3) the (intended and unintended) effects of the welfare state and (4) the financing of the welfare state. The majority of the research and data available relate to the first dimension but increasingly scholars have been addressing the other dimensions and the relationships between dimensions.<sup>29</sup>

The welfare state attitudes module in the ESS4-2008 reflects the range of themes including for example questions relating to the responsibilities of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Several studies consider the empirical relationships within public attitudes of different theoretical dimensions of welfare state preferences; for example how normative welfare state support relates to attitudes towards taxation (Taylor-Gooby 2001) and dissatisfaction with welfare state performance (Kumlin 2011). A number of studies use latent variable techniques to test multi-dimensional models of welfare state preferences, for example, Van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012) consider both a general construct of welfare state support and several underlying sub-dimensions that distinguish normative attitudes from perceptions of the moral and economic consequences of the welfare states.

government, the social and economic consequence of welfare provision and the sustainability of key programmes. Hence, the analysis could encompass a wide variety of items, each potentially interesting when assessing how welfare state preferences relate to political activity. Despite the potential offered by the ESS4-2008, this study narrows its focus to the first of Andreß and Heien's (2001) dimensions, which is commonly referred to as 'attitudes towards the role of government' or 'range of government action'. These concepts are typically measured with questions asking whether it should be the government's responsibility to, for example, 'provide a decent standard of living for the old' or 'reduce income differences between the rich and poor'. The concept is further distinguished by the *degree of government action*, which reflects attitudes towards the intensity of government intervention within a domain (Roller 1995, p.167).<sup>30</sup>

There are four main reasons for focusing upon this small part of the wider terrain of welfare preferences. First, it is relevant to examine bias in the voicing of these preferences as previous studies show they vary across social groups. Second, normative attitudes are theoretically, at least, distinct from attitudes towards current policy. This distinction makes them suitable for comparative analyses as they are more comparable across welfare systems and less prone to short-term fluctuations linked to changes in policy, the economy and the political saliency of welfare issues (Roller 1995).<sup>31</sup> Third, the scope of this study requires limits and since the issue of what governments should and should not do is fundamental, it represents a good place to start. Finally, governments intervene across many domains of life and individuals may hold different attitudes about the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> The difference between range and degree of government action can be illustrated with references to health care. Most governments have responsibility for providing healthcare and this responsibility is widely supported by citizens across Europe (Coughlin 1980; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Questions about how much public money should be devoted to healthcare and the standard at which it should be provided represent questions about degree (Borre and Goldsmith 1998, p.4). The degree of government action is often measured with questions about whether spending levels should be increased or decreased.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> There is evidence that questions relating to preferences about spending reflect both levels of spending and political rhetoric and are therefore more subject to short-term fluctuations. For example, Pettersen (1995) highlighted declines in demands for increased spending at a time of strong anti-welfare state campaigns by right-wing parties but that demand for spending increased following welfare cutbacks.

responsibilities of government across domains of welfare. Limiting the focus to normative questions permits a more detailed exploration of these potential variations, a theme which forms basis of the first research question.

# Attitudes towards the 'Role of Government'

Although research examining attitudes towards the role of government has increased in recent years, there is no standard practice concerning how they are conceptualised, measured and analysed (Roller 1995; Larsen 2006; van Oorschot 2006). As Roosma et al. (2012) note, analytical concepts of welfare state attitudes remain largely data-driven. For comparative studies, large cross-national social surveys comprise the main source of data with a large proportion based on data from the International Social Survey programme (ISSP) Role of Government module.<sup>32</sup> The scope of comparative social surveys means the questions refer to a limited range of welfare state features such as health care, pensions and unemployment benefit. As a result, studies of attitudes towards the 'role of government' refer to a small set of core government activities.

Seven survey questions in the ESS4-2008 measure attitudes towards the role of government.<sup>33</sup> Table 3-5 displays the wording for each question. The first question relates to whether governments should reduce differences in income levels. The question is from the core ESS questionnaire and measures the strength of agreement with five categories (strongly agree-strongly disagree). The other six questions measure attitudes towards government responsibility for different domains of welfare using 0-10 scales. These questions refer to areas of government responsibility at a general level; for example, the income differences question does not specify a mechanism or level of redistribution. In addition, the question relating

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The main sources of data are the International Social Survey programme (ISSP) Role of Government (1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006) and Social Inequalities (1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) modules, the European and World Values Studies (1981, 1990, 1999 and 208) and the European Social Survey (every two years from 2002 plus the Welfare attitudes in a changing Europe rotating module in 2008). There are a greater number of national studies, often with more questions and sometimes conducted longitudinally. However, the focus here is on the comparative studies, which provided the main body of comparative knowledge on attitudes towards the welfare state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Additionally, a question about how levels of taxation should vary depending upon income could measure support for the redistributive aspects of the welfare state. However, the question wording is long and complicated, it has a high non-response rate and notes from the questionnaire pilot indicate it was problematic.

to childcare refers only to an ambiguous responsibility to ensure 'sufficient' childcare and not responsibility to provide, subsidise or regulate. Significantly, there is evidence to suggest that individuals respond to questions relating to the welfare state at a general level more positively than questions referring to specific programmes and policies. Hence, general type questions may overestimate popular support for the welfare state and under-estimate the extent of contention (Kangas 1997). With this in mind, it is possible that, by conservatively representing variations in attitudes, these items could contribute to an under-estimate of the bias in the preferences of the politically active.

Variable	Questions in the ESS4-2008
[Variable name]	
Governments should	Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with
reduce differences in	each of the following statements.
income	'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income
[income]	levels'
	Response categories 'agree strongly', 'agree', 'neither disagree nor agree' 'disagree and disagree strongly'.
	People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments' responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments' responsibility. Firstly to
Ensure jobs [jobs]	ensure a job for everyone who wants one?
Ensure healthcare [Healthcare]	ensure adequate health care for the sick?
Provide for the old [old]	ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?
Provide for the unemployed [unemployed]	ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?
Ensure child care	ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?
[child]	
Provide paid leave to	provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care
care	for sick family members?
[leave]	

Table 3-5 Welfare state preferences variables based on questions in the ESS4-2008

#### Levels of support for the welfare state

To examine how support varies across the different welfare state domains responses to the different questions need to be compared. This task is complicated as the question relating to reducing income difference is measured and located in the survey differently to the other six items. It is also relevant to consider that inferring that there are differences in the level of support across welfare domains depends upon the assumption that the six government responsibility questions equivalently measure support. For example, does a response of 8 in relation to a question about health care reflect the same level of support for intervention in this domain as an 8 in relation to the question about ensuring jobs? Since participants answer the questions consecutively (in the order shown in Table 3-5) it is tenable that participants respond to the later items with reference to their previous responses.

As the previous chapter discussed, public support for the welfare state is widespread but noticeably greater for some aspects of the welfare state than others. The data from the ESS4-2008 reflects these patterns. Figure 3-2 displays the country means for the seven items. In this figure, the item relating to governments reducing income differences has been rescaled to go from 0-10 to aid comparison with the other items. Significantly, the means are all above the scale mid-points, thus demonstrating the broad support for the welfare state across Europe. Moreover, in many cases, the means come close to upper scale ends, signifying that many respondents fully endorse government responsibility in these areas.

The data confirms the notion of the 'universal dimension of support' discussed in chapter two (Coughlin 1980; van Oorschot 2006). The means are highest in relation to government responsibility for ensuring health care and provision for the old and lowest in relation to ensuring jobs and provision for the unemployed. Germany deviates from the other countries with regards to provision for the old, where support is noticeably lower than in the other countries and there is greater difference between levels of support for health care and provision for the old. This pattern has not been explicitly discussed in the literature, and could reflect differences in how the phrase 'reasonable standards of living' is interpreted, a

factor that would also affect responses to the unemployed question. Alternatively, it is possible that the prevalence of occupation and contributory based pension schemes could limit the extent to which governments are seen as responsible for the old. In relation to reducing income differences, the means suggest the majority agree governments should play some role in reducing income differences.



Figure 3-2: Welfare state support found in ESS4-2008

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2,751, Spain n= 2,576, Sweden, n=1,830, UK, n=2, 352

Notes: The variables are measured on a 0-10 scale (to assist comparison, the income differences question was rescaled from 1-5 to 0-10 to aid).

Confidence intervals around the mean values have not been show because they were too small to visually represent on this page.

For the question wording and scales, see Table 3-5 on page 77.

Responses to the questions relating to government responsibility towards childcare and paid leave to care are interesting to examine as attitudes towards these domains of welfare have not been measured in previous cross-national social surveys The ESS04-2008 data therefore provides new knowledge of public support for these features of the welfare state. From the figure, the evidence suggests that on average the public view governments as less responsible for these areas of social policy than they do for health care and the living standards of the old but more than in relation to ensuring jobs and provision for the unemployed. Except in Germany, where ensuring childcare ranks higher than an adequate standard of living for the old. Responses to the two rank similarly within each country; except that in Germany public support is greater for government responsibility for childcare compared to paid leave to care and in the UK the is the reverse pattern.

As discussed in the previous chapter, cross-national differences in public support for the welfare state appear to be concentrated in relation to provision that primarily benefits the poor and unemployed. The ESS4-2008 does not include measures directly relating to provision for the poor; however, the pattern is visible in relation to public support for government responsibility to ensure jobs and provide for the unemployed. Most notably, comparing Sweden and the UK, the mean for provision for the unemployed is notably higher in Sweden. Germany stands closest to the UK. It is interesting to note that support for jobs in Sweden is low like Germany and the UK. Observing a similar pattern, Svallfors (2003, p.182) suggests support for welfare state interventionism in Sweden is perhaps lower than assumed. However, this weaker support among Swedes appears limited to a responsibility to ensure work. As a result, Spain is exceptional among the four countries examined in having high levels of public support for government responsibility for ensuring jobs. Levels of support are higher in Spain across all domains, a findings that follows previous studies indicating prevalence of egalitarian values and support for a welfare state (Calzada and del Pino 2011; Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012).

With regards to provision benefitting workers with caring responsibilities, cross-national differences in public opinion should perhaps be anticipated if we consider the wide variations in current provision and female labour market participation. Looking at the data, it is most notable that support in the UK is comparatively low. Since childcare services are predominantly provided through the

market in the UK, the lower levels of support could be interpreted as supporting the theory that public preferences reflect current welfare arrangements. Levels of public support are comparatively high in both Sweden and Spain. Interestingly, levels of support are similar in Germany and Sweden, despite the substantial differences between the countries in terms of female labour market participation. Finally, contention over the redistributive function of the welfare state could be expected to vary cross-nationally; however, other than higher support in Spain, data show similar levels of support across the countries.

The extent to which government responsibility is endorsed by citizens is problematic when undertaking statistical analyses of the data. The ordinal attitude variables have a large number of response levels, especially those based on the 0-10 scales. It is difficult to interpret results when the frequencies are spread over a large number of categories. Moreover, the frequencies across some response levels are low. Ordinal variables are commonly treated as if they were continuous variables as this can be a simpler approach. However, statistical techniques for analysing continuous variables are often based on the assumption that they are normally distributed. In this case, the high levels of support mean the variable distributions are not only skewed, but responses cluster at the highest response level. The problem applies to the analysis of attitudes developed in the following chapter. As a result, the variables were treated as ordered categorical variables but were recoded to reduce the number of categories. Such a procedure is inherently challenging as recoding the variables implies both a loss of information and introduction of artificial distinctions. The steps taken to develop the measure are described further in the following chapter and in more detail in Appendix B.

#### Examining attitudes towards the Role of Government

Researchers use different approaches to analysing attitudes towards the role of government. One approach has been to devise a one-dimensional scale representing overall levels of support. Reducing information to a single variable is potentially a useful parsimonious approach that helps mitigate problems associated with using single survey questions to represent attitudes. However, a one dimensional measure can overlook important forms of attitudinal variation; as

Larsen succinctly remarks, "Both logically and based on [...] empirical findings, 'provide a decent standard of living for the old' and 'reduce income differences between the rich and poor' are very different things" (Larsen 2006, p.29). The comment underlines how welfare state preferences are more complex than just being more or less in favour of a role for government.<sup>34</sup> Individuals may support some aspects but not others. This complexity is potentially relevant to the study of how preferences are represented through political participation as bias in participant preferences could relate to specific patterns of support across domains of the welfare state. The challenge is therefore how to conceptualise and measure attitudes towards these "very different things".

The literature contains various discussions about the dimensions of the role of government. One of the clearest analytical concepts of attitudes towards the role of government was developed by Roller (1995), who focused on the welfare state as comprising government policies relating to the provision of socio-economic security and socio-economic equality. Roller's approach was to use these two abstract goals as the objects of analysis and to classify individual government policies and programmes according to the goal they mainly fulfil. Socio-economic security refers to welfare policies protecting citizens against risks, such as illness and loss of income through age or unemployment whilst redistribution through taxes and transfers forms the basis of government's role in promoting socioeconomic equality. Both theory and evidence indicates that socio-economic equality represents the more contested domain (Roller 1995; Pettersen 1995) and it is credible to conceive that a citizen can support the state's role as insurer against risk but not agree that the state should act to provide equality of outcome.

The equality-security distinction helps theorising about how 'the role of government' encompasses attitudes towards different objects. However, there are

 $<sup>^{34}</sup>$  A further problem with one dimension scales within this field of research is that researchers often apply labels such as 'range of government action' or 'role of government' to scales based on different items and different labels to scales based on the same items. For example, using confirmatory factor analysis Andreß & Heien (2001) derive a scale termed 'range of government action' on the indicators 'reduce income differences', 'provide jobs' and 'basic income' but León (2012) uses the six government responsibility questions from the ESS4-2008 ESS 2008 to produce a summative scale termed level of support for redistribution. As a result, when comparing results across studies it is vital to refer back to the original indicators used.

many problems in using such an approach. As Roller recognised, the conceptualisation is prone to classification problems as welfare policies "often aim to achieve socio-economic security and, at the same time, socio-economic equality" (Roller 1995 p.170). The proposed solution is to classify policies according to the goal they primarily further. However, the means of provision can affect such classifications; for example, in the UK the low-level flat-rate unemployment benefit corresponds more to a national minima than the insurance based schemes of other European countries.<sup>35</sup> A further issue is that both theoretical discussions and empirical evidence suggest a need for greater distinctions. For instance, Roller found support for governments providing a 'guaranteed income' to be weaker than a 'guaranteed job', which in turn suggests people differentiate between the type of good being distributed (1995, p.176). Equally, Pettersen (1995) considered how some social risks are more unevenly distributed towards more marginalised sections of society. This therefore creates a distinction between support for what are essentially universal welfare programmes and those aimed at socioeconomically weaker groups, especially those of working age who are not in work.<sup>36</sup>

Discussions of the welfare state's evolution into an institution for 'social investment' highlight a further potential dimension of the role of government. Taylor-Gooby summaries this perspective on the welfare state as focusing on "proactive individual responsibility with a role for government in making opportunities available" (2010, p.7). In terms of policies and programmes, this welfare state goal includes schemes that aim to develop human capital and help individuals reconcile work with family life. Thus, the ESS questions relating to childcare and paid leave could fall within this category. It is therefore an interesting to empirically examine how attitudes towards these aspects of the welfare state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> A broader empirical problem with the equality-security distinction as an analytical approach is that the indicators of 'social-economic-security' and 'socio-economic equality' vary across surveys. Hence, these abstract concepts would be measured by varied indicators.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Returning to the equality-security distinction, it can be argued that welfare provision relating to risks that concentrated among economically weaker groups who contribute less tax are conceptually closer to the goal of equality of outcome. Conversely, provision of a national minima could relate to security for the unevenly distributed risk of poverty.

The survey items in the ESS make it possible to examine attitudes across different welfare state domains. However, there are clear limits to how this data can be used to test the complex theoretical ideas of welfare state preferences. Specifically, there are too few indicators representing each potential dimension. For example, the measurement of attitudes towards the role of government in promoting socio-economic equality is measured only by the item income differences. Moreover, the question does not refer to a radical equalising of incomes, only that income differences should be reduced (Roller 1995, p.176). Hence, the item measures only a small aspect of attitudes towards the role of government in promoting equality and redistribution. The chosen strategy is therefore to follow an exploratory approach to examining the inter-relationships between these seven items, rather than use the items to form pre-specified dimensions of attitudes. However, in light of this discussion, a key interest concerns how attitudes vary in relation to 1) Providing social security for universal needs 2) Supporting those with weaker market positions i.e. the unemployed and 3) Supporting workers with caring responsibilities. The strategy for uncovering these relationships and others within the thesis is outlined below.

# 3.5 Outline of the empirical analyses

The empirical analysis is a four-stage consecutive process based on four research questions. Leaving the relevant chapters to give details of the statistical models; this section aims to provide a general overview of the main stages of analysis.

The first stage is to focus on attitudes towards the welfare state and is guided by the question 'How do attitudes towards the role of government vary within a society?' The aim is to explore how individuals might have varying attitudes towards different aspects of the welfare state. The primary technique used to examine how individuals differentiate support across areas of government responsibility is Latent Class Analysis (LCA). Latent variable techniques, which have been used increasingly in social science research, offer a way of 1) measuring complex concepts that cannot be measured by a single survey item; 2) alleviating measurement error problems associated with using single survey items and 3)

examining theories about the dimensions of a construct. The common modelling assumption is that underlying the observed data are one or more unobserved latent constructs, for example, responses to individual survey questions about the welfare state vary because of a broader latent construct such as *attitudes towards the role of government*. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) identifies population sub-groups and describes their characteristics and prevalence in the population. The analyses therefore offer both a tool for understanding how individuals vary their support across different welfare domains and a means to reflect these differences in the following stages of analysis.

The next step is to address the question 'How do participatory inequalities coincide with social differences in preferences about the welfare state?' The analysis uses multivariate modelling techniques to examine how welfare state preferences and political activity vary across social groups. The aim is not to develop comprehensive models of the determinants of welfare state attitudes or political action but to understand how both vary across key social groups within a national context. Reflecting this aim, the analyses centre upon a series of models that use equivalent measures of social position with both political activity and welfare state preferences as the dependent variables. The details of the independent variables come in chapter five, which presents this part of the empirical analysis. Each type of political activity is examined individually, thus offering empirical insight into how closely each relates to social position. Welfare state preferences are represented with the latent classes and as a result the analyses offer insights into how social position relates to distinct patterns of support across welfare state domains.

The third stage is to consider how welfare state preferences relate to political participation. Here, the models relate the indicators of political activity to the latent classes representing welfare state preferences. As will be discussed further in chapter six, there are different strategies for examining these relationships. For example, a participatory consequences approach considers how rates of political activity vary across the latent classes and provides insight into the

types of political activity associated with certain patterns of support for the welfare state. Additionally, a further element of the analysis uses the probabilities of belonging to the latent classes to compare participant preferences with those of the wider populations of the four countries. Collectively, this third stage offers insight into the representativeness of the politically active and the contexts and forms of political participation where a bias in preferences is greatest.

Having established the associations between political activity and preferences, the final stage considers the question of 'how do participatory inequalities affect how political activity is related to preferences about the welfare state?' The empirical analyses bring together the previous two stages in order to examine how the relationship between preferences and political activity is affected by their social stratification. The models examine *attitudinal differences* between participants and non-participants both with and without controlling for social differences in participation. The main aim is to determine if the association between participation and preferences stems from the fact that they are both determined by social position.

## Conclusion

This chapter has introduced key features of the study's analytical approach to research the representativeness of the welfare state preferences of the politically active and the impact of participatory inequalities. A multi-country design, focusing on a small number of countries, reflects the expectation that the relationships between preferences and political activity will be contingent upon context. Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK provide contrasting contexts in terms of institutions and patterns of welfare state preferences and political activity. With extensive questions about political activity, the welfare state and social and economic circumstances, Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008 represents the best source of data for the study. This study examines different a varied types of political participation with the aim of establishing the avenues of participation where there might be greatest bias. In relation to welfare state preferences, the study focuses on attitudes towards the role of government. Since the state pursues multiple goals benefitting groups in society differentially, this

represents a potentially complex dimension of welfare preferences. The first stage of the empirical analysis is therefore to examine how attitudes towards the role of government vary within societies. These insights into the nature of welfare state preferences will then support the further stages of analysis, which consider 1) how social groups vary in their welfare preferences and patterns of political participation; 2) the associations between political activity and welfare state preferences; and 3) how participatory inequalities determine the preferences of the politically active.

# 4 Welfare preferences: what should governments be responsible for providing?

Research into public attitudes has consistently shown that levels of support vary across aspects of the welfare state. For example, healthcare and support for the elderly, which are the most extensive and costly parts of the welfare state, engender greater public support than aspects focused on benefitting weaker socioeconomic groups, especially individuals of working age. The patterns in the attitudes of individual's underlying these national level differences are less clear, however. For example, how common is it for an individual to endorse a role of government in relation to health care but not in relation to supporting the unemployed? Such questions are relevant in an 'age of austerity' (Pierson 1996; 1994; 2001b) as governments may feel heightened pressure to preserve popular functions at the expense of other less popular functions. Accordingly, identifying variations in the 'package' of welfare endorsed is relevant to our understanding of welfare state preferences and how such preferences are represented among the politically active parts of the population.

To uncover these patterns, this chapter examines how individuals vary their attitudes towards the different forms of government intervention. The chapter first explores the limited evidence available from existing studies before examining variations in responses to the questions in the 4<sup>th</sup> Round of the European Social Survey, 2008 for the four case study countries. The empirical content focuses primarily on the use of Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify 'preference groups' from patterns of responses to the attitude items. Estimating the number, characteristics and size of these 'preference groups' reveals how individuals within European societies can vary in their support for the different roles of government.

# 4.1 Studies of dimensions in attitudes towards the role of government

The existing research on attitudes towards the welfare state includes studies providing insight into how individual attitudes vary across domains. In particular, a number of studies have used latent variable modelling techniques to examine the dimensions of welfare state preferences. However, these studies present a partially conflicting picture with some identifying multiple dimensions and others indicating that attitudes towards the role of government can be represented through a onedimensional measure.

# **Evidence of multiple dimensions**

Two studies using latent variable models provide evidence that attitudes towards the roles of government contain several dimensions. First, Van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012) examine a broad range of welfare state related attitudes, beliefs and perceptions. They develop a CFA model with ten factors, which differentiates attitudes towards *the role of government* into attitudes towards the 'protection from social risks', 'protection of the weak' and 'a principle of equality'.<sup>37</sup> However, whilst Van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012) indicate that there are distinctive dimensions of attitudes, the factors are correlated and belong to a higher order 'welfarism' dimension. Similarly, Edlund (2007), who focuses on attitudes towards the role of government, concludes that "support for the welfare state tends to be grouped along two separate components. The first is risk-reducing, social security components provided by the welfare state. The second component is the redistribution of financial resources via taxation and transfers" (Edlund 2007, p.57). In this case, the evidence came from a Latent Class Analysis that culminated in four different groups. Two of these groups showed support for the welfare state;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Protection of the weak comprises responses to questions relating to whether governments should reduce income inequalities; offer more chances for children of poor families to go to university; spend less on benefits for the poor; guarantee a reasonable standard of living to unemployed people and offer a basic minimum income to everybody. The 'protection from social risks' dimension consists of responses to questions about whether government should organise statutory social benefit schemes to cover people if they become unemployed, incapacitated for work, a widower or ill. Finally, the principle of equality combines an evaluation of the justice of inequality with a belief about whether governments should intervene.

however, significantly, the group limited their support to the *social security* component; <sup>38</sup> the other two classes responded similarly across the two components. Thus, both these studies suggest that there is a general dimension of support but that we can empirically distinguish support for collective protection from social risks from support for the more redistributive elements of the welfare state.

In addition to studies using latent variable models, other studies offer insight into how support for different aspects of the welfare state inter-relate. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) examine how 'egalitarian ideology', measured with a question on governments reducing income differences, predicts attitudes towards the role of government. The analysis shows that support for reducing income differences relates more strongly to government responsibilities in relation to the unemployed than the sick and old. It is also relevant to consider that studies of the determinants of attitudes indicate that the significance of socio-demographic variables varies in relation to different aspects of the welfare state. For example, specifically, social class is more closely related to attitudes towards provision for the unemployed than healthcare (Svallfors 2004).

## A single dimension of attitudes towards the role of government

There are studies that have used latent variable models to define a single dimension of attitudes towards the role of government (Andreß and Heien 2001; Gelissen 2000; Kulin and Meuleman 2011). The conclusions from some of these studies is however limited because they use a fairly narrow range of indicators. For example, Andreß and Heien (2001) use CFA to derive a factor termed *range of government action*, based on items referring to reducing income differences, providing jobs and ensuring a basic income. Whilst the model shows these items can form a single dimension, the study does not show how this dimension relates to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>The analysis used the following items: governments should reduce income differences; increase spending on health; increase spending on old-age pensions; increase spending on unemployment benefits; provide jobs; provide for the unemployed; reduce differences between the rich and the poor; provide financial help for education; provide decent housing; and increase taxes on high incomes. The limiting of support for the social security component was indicated by low probabilities of agreeing that governments should reduce income differences; increase spending on old-age pensions; increase spending on unemployment benefits; provide jobs; reduce differences between rich and the poor and increase taxes on high incomes.

other government roles. Gelissen (2000) also presents attitudes towards the role of government as a single dimension, termed *extensiveness of government action*, and shows that it can be distinguished from attitudes to *intensiveness of government action*. In this case, the survey items refer to the welfare state in general; for example, one question asks whether survey participants agree that 'Social security is a major achievement of modern society. The government should make sure that nobody is left deprived when unemployed, poor, ill or disabled'. As a result, the possibility of differentiating support across domains is limited.

Studies that employ more varied indicators offer stronger evidence that attitudes towards the role of government consist of only one dimension. For instance, Arts and Gelissen (2001) present a one factor model using indicators referencing, among others, government responsibility to provide jobs, health care and a decent standard of living for the unemployed.<sup>39</sup> The model fits the data sufficiently, however some indices suggest possible model misfit. A study by Roosma et al. (2012) indicates that responses to the six government responsibility questions in the ESS4-2008 can be represented by a single factor. In this case, the factors form part of a large multi factor CFA model reflecting welfare state support more broadly. Equally, Kulin and Meuleman (2011) use the same data and variables to devise a one dimensional scale to represent attitudes towards the role of *government.* However, they report that a one factor model does not fit the data well unless additional inter-relationships are allowed between items showing stronger association, which included jobs-unemployed, healthcare-old, and childcare-leave. Significantly, they comment that "[we] do not deny that the Role of Government items contain domain-specific components that merit further investigation" (Kulin and Meuleman 2011, p.7 footnote 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> They conducted analysis for 14 individual countries and a multiple group analysis using the indicators: provide a job for everybody who wants one; provide health care for the sick; provide a decent standard of living for the old; provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed; reduce income differences between the rich and the poor; give financial help to college students from low-income families and provide decent housing for those who can't afford it.

# **Cross-national variation**

The evidence becomes sparser when we consider how dimensions of attitudes might vary across countries. Many studies use cross-national data but with limited consideration of cross-national variations. For example, Edlund (2007) allows latent classes to vary in size across countries but keeps the class characteristics constant. Other studies have examined cross-national differences but with the aim of establishing a cross-nationally equivalent construct. Both Roosma et al. (2012) and Kulin and Meuleman (2011) derive a latent variable that is sufficiently comparable for comparative analyses. However, in both studies, parts of the latent model are country specific.<sup>40</sup> For instance, Kulin and Meuleman (2011) allow a distinctive relationship between attitudes towards welfare for the elderly and the general role of government dimension (i.e. a country specific factor loading) for Germany. The need to adjust the models indicates that there are potentially interesting cross-national differences.

More general signals that cross-national differences are worthy of further study can be found within research on attitudes towards the welfare state. As discussed in previous chapters, levels of support across domains vary across countries. For example, the previous chapter showed that levels of endorsement for government responsibility for the unemployed and health care vary considerable in the UK but are similar in both Sweden and Spain. Second, as discussed in chapter two, the evidence suggests social contention in relation to the welfare state is greater in some countries than others. Hence, the existing research offers evidence that attitudes towards the role of government are unlikely to be a case of being more or less in favour but that the ways in which individuals vary from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Roosma et al. (2012) indicate that partial scalar invariance (the agreed minimum standard for comparing factor means across countries) holds for the 22 countries examined. Partial scalar invariance means some intercepts are allowed to vary in the model across groups. In a CFA model the intercept indicates the response to the observed item for those with the mean score on the latent factor. Therefore, partial scalar invariance means that across countries those scoring averagely on the latent factor will respond differently for some item(s). In this case the intercepts for healthcare and paid leave were constrained (i.e. the same across countries) whilst the others were allowed to vary across countries. Analysing the same dataset, Kulin and Meuleman (2011) (but for 21 countries) allow the association between some items and the factor (the factor loadings) to vary in some countries (i.e. establish partial metric invariance).

each other in their attitudes might not be the same across countries. The remainder of this chapter explores these possibilities within Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

# 4.2 Examining attitudes towards the role of government

The analyses use the seven attitude items from Round 4 of the ESS, which were outlined in section 3.4. The focus of the chapter is to apply Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to examine patterns of association across all items. However, to obtain an initial impression of relationships between the items within each of the countries, a preliminary stage is to briefly examine associations between pairs of variables. Subsequently, details of the latent class model are outlined below with a discussion of two of the most central issues in latent class analysis: deciding the number of classes and interpreting their characteristics.

# Associations between variable pairs

To provide initial insight into the empirical patterns, this section considers associations between pairs of variables in two ways. The discussions above and in the previous chapter suggest that attitudes towards the different domains are related but that relationships are weaker between certain domains. Examining correlations between items (Figure 4-1) offers a simple way to explore the proposition. As Figure 4-1 shows, each item pair is significantly and positively correlated in all countries, which shows how greater support for one welfare domain is associated with greater support for other domains. Equally, we can observe how the associations vary in strength in a similar way across countries. In line with previous research, the association between 'healthcare' and 'old' is the strongest in all countries – suggesting that the public similarly regard these two welfare state domains. The item pair showing the weakest association varies across countries but in each case includes 'income'. This pattern could reflect the distinctiveness of support for redistribution; however, the survey design could be a further factor behind the differences in responses because 'income' is measured on a different scale and located in an earlier part of the questionnaire to the other items.



Figure 4-1 Association between support across welfare domains – correlation coefficients for variable pairs

Source: 2008 ESS for Germany (n=2,352), Spain, (n=2,576), Sweden (n=1,830) and UK (n=2,352). Notes: All correlations significant at p<0.001. The full question wording and scales can be found in Table 3-5.

Although the patterns across countries are similar, two cross-national differences stand out. First, associations vary in strength across the countries, tending to be highest in Spain and lowest in the UK. This pattern suggests there is greater variation in how people respond across the items in some countries than in others. Related to this, the second difference is that three correlations stand out as

being markedly lower in the UK than in the other countries. Notably, two of these deviations concern 'unemployed' and its relationship with the core aspects of 'healthcare' and the 'old', which suggests that, in the UK, greater distinctions are made between the role of government in relation to the unemployed compared to other parts of the welfare state<sup>41</sup>. Additionally, the correlation between 'child' and 'healthcare' is lower in the UK, indicating a distinction in public support in the UK. Conversely, since the previous chapter highlighted how support for 'jobs' tends to be much lower than 'unemployed' in Sweden, the comparatively similar correlation is interesting as it suggests there is a general trend in Sweden for people to respond less favourably in relation to governments providing jobs than supporting those who are unemployed.

# Latent Class Analysis (LCA)

Reviewing other studies indicated how latent variable modelling techniques can provide a useful way to examine inter-relationships between multiple items and to represent complex concepts. Within this context, latent variable models propose that the observed variables, and the interrelationships between them, reflect one or more unobserved latent variables. The models specify the latent variable as a predictor of the observed response variables, <sup>42</sup> hence, the observed variables reflect the unobserved latent variable, but not as perfect measures - a feature that can help to mitigate problems associated with measurement error. Latent variable modelling is very flexible and allows a diverse range of models with model choice depending upon both the nature of the observed variables and expectations about the patterns of association. This study used a traditional Latent Class Analysis (LCA). In traditional LCA, we specify a categorical variable with unordered categories (a nominal variable).<sup>43</sup> By partitioning the population into discrete groups, this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> The correlation between 'unemployed' and 'old' is over 0.5 in Germany, Spain and Sweden but only 0.32 in the UK, whilst the correlation between 'healthcare' and 'unemployed' is 0.25 in the UK compared to 0.46 in Spain, 0.44 in Sweden and 0.39 in Germany.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Models can be specified the other way with the observed items predicting the latent variable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> The LCA model was originally developed by Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968) to analyse dichotomous survey items. However, reflecting the flexibility of latent variable modelling, we can specify a variety of other latent class models, for example, classes can be ordered. Moreover, recent advances in the field mean it is possible to develop models that combine both categorical and continuous elements

technique is commonly used to find "substantively meaningful groups of people that are similar in their responses to measured variables" (Nylund et al. 2007, p.536). Hence, in this case the aim of the analysis is to understand how, within countries, we can group individuals according to response patterns to the seven attitude variables.

The choice of a nominal latent variable does not mean that we cannot gain useful insight from alternative forms of latent variables such as continuous factors, ordered categories or combinations of the two. However, a nominal variable has three key benefits in this case. First, it is expected that attitudes towards the role of government comprise multiple dimensions. Discrete groups offer an efficient way to examine configurations of attitudes towards the different domains, for example, the extent to which support for providing for the unemployed exists with and without support for healthcare. Second, the number and range of survey items makes it difficult to specify separate dimensions of attitudes toward the role of government. Based on the available items, dimensions could only be represented with a limited number of items; for example, only one item taps into support for redistribution. As a result, the data limits the ability to systematically test theories about dimensions of attitudes towards the role of government and dimensions could be prone to substantial measurement error. Latent class analysis is not free of this problem; it offers a way to examine how responses vary, but from the results it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about dimensions of attitudes towards the role of government. Finally, a nominal variable brings a practical advantage to later stages of the analysis as it makes it easy to examine different possibilities in how

such as Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA) where the observed items are related to a factor, which in turn is influenced by a latent class (Muthén 2006). In addition to expectations about the latent construct, the characteristics of the observed variables determine how the model should be specified. Traditionally, the term LCA relates to the analysis of categorical observed variables; whilst modelling categorical latent variables with continuous observed variables is commonly referred to as Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). The distinction is important because in the model the observed variables are response variables and categorical and continuous response variables require different types of equation to link them to explanatory variables. However, advances in latent variable modelling have made it possible to combine different types of analysis into one latent variable model, making the distinctions in terminology less relevant. In this case, the attitude variables are all ordinal (however, as will be detailed below, they have been recoded to reduce the number of levels) and related to the latent variable with logistic regression equations using a proportional odds specification.

preferences relate to political activity. For example, based on their social characteristics, non-participants may be more supportive of the welfare state however lower levels of political interest could mean they are more likely to respond in the middle of political attitude scales.

The core assumption of LCA is that, given latent class membership, the observed variables are independent of each other, termed the local independence assumption. Given this assumption, we can specify the model parameters in the form of two types of probability — latent class probabilities and conditional probabilities<sup>44</sup>— and following McClutcheon (2002), formally express the model as:

$$\pi_{ijklt}^{ABCDX} = \pi_t^X \pi_{it}^{A|X} \pi_{jt}^{B|X} \pi_{kt}^{C|X} \pi_{lt}^{D|X}$$

In this expression, X denotes the latent variable and A, B, C and D the observed variables. The *latent class probability* ( $\pi_t^X$ ) indicates the probability that a randomly selected unit belongs to latent class t. These parameters indicate the size of each latent class. For example, if attitudes towards the role of government can be summarised as welfare state supporters (t=1) and welfare state opponents (t=2), latent class probabilities of 0.5 and 0.5, indicate the groups are of equal size. The conditional probabilities  $(\pi_{it}^{A|X}\pi_{jt}^{B|X}\pi_{kt}^{C|X}\pi_{lt}^{D|X})$  indicate the probabilities that a member of latent class t will be at a specified level of the observed variable. They therefore provide the means to interpret the characteristics of the latent classes. For example, a higher conditional probability of agreeing strongly that governments should reduce income differences would signify that latent class one (t=1) were welfare state supporters. In addition, two restrictions are imposed on the probabilities. First, the latent class probabilities are constrained so that they sum to one ( $\sum_t \pi_t^X = 1$ ) and within a class the conditional response probabilities must also sum to one (e.g.  $\sum_{i} \pi_{it}^{A|X} = 1$ ).

In the analysis presented here, the models are estimated in M*plus* Version 6 (B. O. Muthén and Muthén 2010) via the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm, which is an iterative maximum likelihood approach (for details of the EM alorithm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Loglinear parameterisation can also be used, McClutcheon (2002) provides a useful discussion of the advantages and relations between the two approaches.

see McClutcheon (2002, pp.64–65) and Bartholomew and Knott (1999, pp.137– 139). A risk with maximum likelihood estimation is that the models may converge around a local rather than global maximum. To increase confidence that the true maximum has been obtained, the study follows the recommendation to use multiple starting values in model estimation and to check that the best solution is replicated (McClutcheon 2002, p.65; Bartholomew and Knott 1999, p.139). Mplus Version 6 includes a random start feature that generates a specified number of different random starting values. The default setting in Mplus is 10 random sets of starting values in the initial stage and 2 optimizations in the final stage (10 2); however, to provide further assurance, the number of random starts were increased to 100 10.

## **Recoding the observed variables**

As discussed in the previous chapter, the observed attitude variables are ordinal with a large number of levels, especially those with the 0-10 scales. The number of levels presents a technical problem because low frequencies can stop a latent class model being correctly estimated. Additionally, including variables with many categories makes it difficult to interpret the resulting classes. One option is to treat the observed items as if they were continuous. However, as the previous chapter noted, the high levels of support mean some variables are highly skewed with a strong clustering of responses at the upper ends of the scale, making this approach inappropriate.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, the variables should stay as ordered categories; however, to enable the models to be estimated and interpretable, response categories need to be aggregated. Since the coding scheme is likely to affect the results, multiple approaches were tested before making a choice. Testing alternative coding schemes revealed that the coding scheme affects the number, size and characteristics of the resulting classes. However, comparing models

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> This judgement is made on the basis of advice provided through Mplus technical support, which advised that it is inappropriate to treat variables as continuous in what would be termed a Latent Profile Analysis, if there are strong ceiling effects, such as more than 25% giving 0s or 10s. This recommended limit applies in relation to: 'healthcare' in all countries, 'old' in all countries except Germany and 'paid leave' and 'childcare' in Spain. There are also examples where the ceiling effect is close to 30%; for example, 'income differences' and 'unemployed' in Spain and 'childcare' in Germany all have more than 25 per cent of responses at the most positive end.

indicates that the differences were not of large analytical concern because they tend to be small, follow logical patterns and have limited impact on overall interpretation. Appendix B includes details of the alternate coding schemes.

Table 4-1 details the chosen coding scheme for the variables used in the LCA, which is to make ordinal variables with four levels. Ten is left separate to indicate maximum support; 8 and 9 are combined to indicate high support; 6 and 7 indicate moderate support; and 0-5 is combined to indicate no or low support. The final group covers half of the measurement scale, which, although not ideal, was preferred due to the scarcity of responses between 0 and 5 for some items. This coding assumes responses between 0 and 4 can be interpreted as being negative and those at five are not endorsing government responsibility. Substantively, this can be justified by the strong levels of support making variation across the positive side of the scale the main point of interest, especially in relation to health care and provision for the old. Combining 0-4 with 5 is more problematic with the other forms of welfare, especially in relation to provision for the unemployed and providing jobs, where larger proportions select five. However, analyses where the middle category was separate for these two items produced similar results. The 'reduce income differences' variable was also reduced to four categories by collapsing 'disagree' and 'disagree strongly' into one 'disagree' category. This solution maximises the information retained whilst sufficiently reducing categories to avoid problems of low cell counts and improving the interpretability of results. Further details of the coding procedure are provided in Appendix B.

Response level label	0-10 scales	Agree scale
Low support	0-5	Disagree + Disagree strongly
Moderate support	6-7	Neither
High support	8-9	Agree
Maximum Support	10	Agree strongly

Table 4-1 Recoding scheme for the observed attitude variables

# Determining the number of classes in LCA

In LCA, we need to specify the number of population sub-groups. Current evidence contains only partial clues to the different attitude types that may exist. The clearest indicator comes from Edlund's (2007) previous use of LCA analysis, which resulted in four distinct preference groups. Hence, an objective here is to test Edlund's four class typology. However, even if the theoretical distinctions identified by the model are correct, there are four reasons why an alternative class structure may emerge. First, Edlund uses data from the 1996 ISSP, which includes different questions to the ESS data. For example, the 1996 ISSP includes questions on housing and education but not childcare or paid leave. Significantly, attitudes towards childcare and paid leave to care conceivably relate to an additional dimension such as support for workers with caring responsibilities that could cut across dimensions such as 'attitudes towards redistribution' and increase the number of classes that can be identified. Second, the number of classes might also be higher due to the format of the observed variables. Edlund's analysis is based on binary indicators indicating whether someone agrees or does not agree with a specific area of government responsibility. In contrast, the variables used in the analysis have a greater number of levels and, therefore, the analysis could further differentiate individuals by their level of support. Finally, an alternative class structure may emerge because Edlund (2007) executed the analysis for all countries simultaneously, whilst this study primarily considers data from individual countries. Moreover, the data relates to a different set of countries and Edlund's analysis was limited to countries classified as either liberal or social democratic welfare regimes.

Considering limited expectations about the number of groups, the study adopts an exploratory approach to the analysis. The number of classes is determined by specifying successive models where the number of latent classes (T) is 2 in the first model and, until T=7, increases by 1 in each subsequent model. Model selection is made with reference to the various fit statistics and consideration of the substantive interpretation of the resulting latent classes.

Model selection remains a difficult area for LCA (Nylund et al. 2007). Various types of model fit statistics are available; however, they can suggest

different solutions and there is limited evidence regarding their relative performance (Nylund et al. 2007). This chapter makes use of four different types of model fit statistics: the LMR likelihood ratio test, BIC and the percentage of large residuals. Summaries of the fit statistics are provided in Appendix C. These fit statistics inform model selection in terms of understanding the number of classes required to represent variation in the data. However, fit statistics do not provide definite answers about a correct number of classes. Potentially, indices can indicate a more complex model than is of substantive interest and, for the analyses to be of value, we need to be able to interpret both the model as a whole and the characteristics of individual classes. As a result, the researcher needs to apply judgement when evaluating alternative class solutions.

## **Determining the characteristics of latent classes**

The *conditional probabilities* indicate the characteristics of the latent classes. For each class, these values indicate the probability of responding at each level of each item, for example the probability of responding 'agree' or 'disagree' in relation to the item 'income'. When examining class characteristics we are interested in how groups vary in their 1) *level* of support and 2) *response pattern* across items, and if response patterns tend to be 3) *uniform* or *mixed* across items.

Figure 4-2 provides a simplified illustration of these four points of difference. First, Model A (on the left-hand side) displays only differences in the *level of support* – the two groups respond in the same way across the items but one group responds at a higher level than the other. When groups vary only in their level of support, we can infer that attitudes comprise only one dimension. In contrast, the two groups in Model B (on the right-hand side) vary in their *response pattern* across items: the probabilities of providing a positive response are the same across items 1 and 2 for both groups; but for items 3 and 4, group 1 shows lower support whilst group B gives the same response. Groups varying in their *response pattern* indicate that attitudes may comprise multiple dimensions. In this example, the different pattern suggests the first two items may form a different dimension to the last two. Additionally, model B highlights the distinction between uniform and mixed preferences. The responses for Group 2 are *uniform* across items whilst

Group 1 has a *mixed* response pattern. The *uniform-mixed* distinction enables us to identify how support for intervention varies across welfare state domains.



Figure 4-2 Illustration of differences in the characteristics of latent classes

#### Individual country analyses or multiple groups analysis

The discussion of the existing evidence indicated that there is value in examining the structure of attitudes towards the role of government within each country individually. Thus, LCA analyses were run on each of the individual country samples. Analysing each country individually produces latent class models that are unique for each country. The results of these analyses reveal interesting cross-national variations, which are the main focus of the discussion below. However, multiplegroup analysis is a technique used within latent variable modelling for examining model fit across groups. Multiple-group analysis is useful for cross-national analyses as it offers a tool for assessing whether latent constructs measure the same thing across countries, which is important for making valid cross-national comparisons about the distribution of a latent construct and how it relates to other constructs.

Multiple-group analysis works by specifying model parameters to be either fixed or freely estimated across groups and then comparing the fit of the different models. In doing so, a multiple group analysis can indicate if a latent construct is the same, partially the same or completely different across the groups. A model where the class conditional response probabilities are fixed across countries would mean the characteristics of the latent classes are the same for each country. If valid, such a model would allow cross-national comparison of the distribution of the attitude groups. Thus, a multiple group approach could be advantageous in later stages of the study as it could allow greater cross-national comparisons about the relationships being examined. For example, from the model results, we could infer cross-national differences in the strength of association between belonging to a specific latent class and *voting*.

Multiple-group LCA was tried on the data; however no optimal solution could be reached to adequately represent response patterns for the four countries combined. Further details of the multiple group analyses are presented in Appendix B. Since an equivalent model could not be developed, country specific latent class models are used to represent preferences throughout the thesis. The individual country analyses ensure the models best represent the structure of preferences within each of the societies. Using separate models for each country does limit how results can be compared in later stages and adds a layer of complexity to interpreting patterns across countries. However, the small number of countries considered in the study enables such an individual approach.

# 4.3 LCA results for the individual countries

This section discusses the results of the LCA. The first step is to consider the model fit statistics. As mentioned above, these often suggest that different numbers of classes are required to represent patterns of responses.

# Determining the number of classes - examining the fit statistics

Table 4-2 displays the fit statistics for models with 2 to 7 classes, with highlighted values indicating the optimal solution. For the UK, Germany and Spain the model fit statistics are more wide-ranging in the number of classes they suggest than for Sweden. Focusing first on Germany, the Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR) likelihood ratio test for the three-class solution indicates that two classes to be sufficient, yet the BIC continues to reduce until the five-class solution. For Spain and the UK, the LMR likelihood ratio test and BIC also disagree, with the LMR likelihood ratio test indicating the simpler solution (a 4-class and 3-class solution respectively) and BIC the more complex (6-class solution in both cases). Sweden is the only instance where the LMR likelihood ratio test and BIC indicate the same, five-class, solution.

Across the countries, adding additional classes reduces the proportion of large residuals. For Spain, Sweden and UK, the percentage of large residuals (those greater than 4) drops below ten percent at the class solution prior to the one indicated by the BIC. However, in the German case, the percentage of large residuals is higher than ideal across all six models. The entropy values for the solutions implied by the fit statistics are all above 0.7 (one suggested rule of thumb) but below 0.8 (the more strict rule of thumb), signifying the models are adequately classifying respondents to classes.

	LL	LMR	AIC	BIC	% res	Entropy	LR Chi <sup>2</sup>
Germany (n=2749)		LN LESI			24		
2 class (43 parameters)	-22853	0.00	45791	46046	49	0.86	7551, d.f=16274, p=1
3 class (65 parameters)	-22061	1.00	44253	44638	29	0.79	6112, d.f=16274, p=1
4 class (87 parameters)	-21822	0.75	43817	44332	18	0.76	5691, d.f=16231, p=1
5 class (109 parameters)	-21686	0.76	43589	44234	21	0.73	5457, d.f=16212, p=1
6 class (131 parameters)	-21605	0.76	43473	44248	18	0.75	5307, d.f=16191, p=1
7 class (153 parameters)	-21551	0.76	43408	44314	17	0.73	5191, d.f=16168, p=1
Spain (n=2572)							
2 class (43 parameters)	-17795	0.00	35677	35928	49	0.86	5460, d.f=16213, p=1
3 class (65 parameters)	-17003	0.00	34136	34517	23	0.86	4860, d.f=16228, p=1
4 class (87 parameters)	-16676	0.00	33525	34034	17	0.83	4416, d.f=16222, p=1
5 class (109 parameters)	-16535	0.32	33287	33925	9	0.83	4328, d.f=16217, p=1
6 class (131 parameters)	-16427	0.54	33116	33883	8	0.82	4161, d.f=16195, p=1
7 class (153 parameters)	-16356	0.76	33019	33914	7	0.83	4025, d.f=16170, p=1
Sweden (n=1830)							
2 class (43 parameters)	-14105	0.00	28296	28533	43	0.87	4192, d.f=16251, p=1
3 class (65 parameters)	-13470	0.00	27070	27429	18	0.82	3337, d.f=16256, p=1
4 class (87 parameters)	-13302	0.00	26779	27258	6	0.82	3065, d.f=16235, p=1
5 class (109 parameters)	-13198	0.00	26615	27216	4	0.77	2897, d.f=16217, p=1
6 class (131 parameters)	-13141	0.79	26544	27267	3	0.77	2782, d.f=16196, p=1
7 class (153 parameters)	-13093	0.82	26491	27335	2	0.76	2690, d.f=16172, p=1
UK (n=2351)							
2 class (43 parameters)	-18885	0.00	37856	38103	40	0.85	6531, d.f=16284, p=1
3 class (65 parameters)	-18319	0.00	36768	37143	20	0.77	5565, d.f=16261, p=1
4 class (87 parameters)	-18157	0.76	36488	36989	15	0.79	5254, d.f=16235, p=1
5 class (109 parameters)	-18022	0.42	36261	36890	7	0.77	5041, d.f=16214, p=1
6 class (131 parameters)	-17935	0.35	36131	36886	5	0.75	4889, d.f=16194, p=1
7 class (153 parameters)	-17861	0.76	36027	36909	4	0.75	4758, d.f=16171, p=1

Table 4-2 Model fit information for latent class analysis models with 2-7 classes

Source: ESS4-2008

Note: The highlighted values indicate the optimal solution suggested by each fit statistic; for example, LMR LR test indicates that in Germany two classes are sufficient to represent the variation in responses.

More complex models most likely better represent the variation within the data; however, simpler solutions may be sufficient to understand the main patterns in responses. To understand further, the subsequent step is to examine the characteristics of the class within the different solutions.

#### The characteristics of the classes

To aid interpretation of the results, conditional probabilities above 0.4 are highlighted to indicate the more likely responses of each class; additionally, boxed cells indicate situations where there are conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the most likely response. Moreover, each latent class has a label that reflects its characteristics in relation to the level and pattern of support and how uniform or mixed response patterns are across items. Labels take the standard form of General level ('+' '-' ). General Level indicates the modal response level of a class, and following the recoding of the variables, the response levels are Low, Mod, High and Max. The sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (-) a negative bias, towards some items. The label *Mixed* is applied when responses are very mixed across items; in these cases, the information in brackets indicates the range of levels across items, for example Mixed (Low-Max) would indicate that responses vary across all four levels. This system efficiently indicates how groups vary in both their level of support and pattern of responses across the items. When groups vary only in terms of their level of support, the composition of the label will be similar across classes, for example, with a four class solution where groups respond more favourably towards healthcare and living standards for the old but at different levels of support, the labels would be Low(+), Mod(+), High(+) and Max(+).

In addition to interpreting patterns of responses within each county, it is useful to evaluate the utility of the different solutions for use in later stages of the research. The decision should balance how well solutions capture important distinctions in response patterns whilst upholding a desire for parsimony. Specific issues relate to the fact that it is useful to avoid models producing classes with similar profiles or groups representing very small subpopulations. Moreover, it is preferable for latent classes to have distinct response profiles, with one conditional

probability being distinctly higher than others. For example, with regards to reducing income differences, a distinct response profile could be a probability of 0.9 for 'agree' and 0.1 for 'not agree'. A distinctive response profile indicates a homogenous grouping and makes the characteristics easier to interpret. The focus in this section is on each country individually, but the following section discusses the similarities and differences.

#### Germany

The fit statistics differ widely for Germany, indicating that either a two- or five-class solution might best represent the data. To understand what the wide variation reveals about patterns of responses, this section compares these two solutions and, due to the high proportion of large residuals, considers possible causes of model misfit with reference to the residuals and a further six-class solution.

Table 4-3 presents the simpler two-class solution, where the class probabilities indicate a smaller group of 30 percent and a larger group of 70 percent. The conditional probabilities reveal that the smaller group is the more supportive, with high probabilities of responding at the maximum level. However, the probabilities of giving this maximum response vary across items, for example, 0.85 in relation to 'healthcare' compared to 0.38 for 'unemployed'. The lower probabilities apply to 'jobs', 'unemployed' and 'income', which suggests the class encompasses more diverse responses in relation to these more contentious domains. Here, the label Max (-) reflects both the group's tendency to respond at the maximum level and the lower probabilities for certain items. The larger group indicates a more mixed response pattern with the most likely response varying from low to high across items. Specifically, the group indicates a bias against 'jobs' and 'unemployed' and has higher probabilities of not agreeing that governments should reduce income differences. Reflecting how responses vary, the group is labelled *Mixed* (low-high). The two-class solution therefore discerns a large minority with a propensity to show strong support for the role of government and a majority group that is favourable towards the role of government but less so in relation to government intervention in the labour market and the distribution of income.

		Conditional probabilities						
Label (class probabilities)	돈 Response Level	Income differences	Jobs	Unemployed	Healthcare	Old	Child care	Leave to care
Mix (low-high)	Low	0.22	0.52	0.47	0.10	0.23	0.16	0.24
0.70	Mod	0.19	0.27	0.36	0.25	0.36	0.28	0.34
	High	0.47	0.21	0.16	0.55	0.39	0.48	0.38
	Max	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.04
Maximum (-) 0.30	Low	0.11	0.18	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.13
	Mod	0.10	0.12	0.18	0.01	0.07	0.06	0.10
	High	0.43	0.24	0.25	0.13	0.25	0.17	0.22
	Max	0.36	0.46	0.38	0.85	0.63	0.69	0.56

#### Table 4-3 Latent class model results for the 2-class solution for Germany

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2749

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (-) a negative bias.

Response profiles in the two-class solution are not always well defined, suggesting further classes might better represent the variation in responses. Accordingly, the five-class solution, displayed in Table 4-4, provides a more differentiated picture of welfare preferences. Examining the labels and highlighted cells indicates that the five groups primarily vary in terms of *level* of support. There is a broad tendency to respond uniformly across the items, except that responses to 'jobs' and 'unemployed' are likely to be lower than the others. At the extremes, the *Low* and *Max* groups respond similarly low or high across the items<sup>46</sup>. Notably, the *Max* group is smaller (13 percent compared to 30 percent) and more consistently likely to give the highest level of support across items than the most favourable group in the two-class solution. The groups in between show more mixed response to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> In these cases, the differences between supporting healthcare and the old in Germany emerges, for example, less than 45 percent of those within the *low* group could be expected to respond at the lowest level for healthcare compared to 77 percent in relation to the old.

labour market intervention items are likely to be lower. Finally, just under half of the sample fall within the two remaining classes, Mod(+/-) and High(+/-), which show more mixed response profiles and a stronger bias against 'unemployed' and 'jobs'. The two- and five-class solutions suggest a similar underlying pattern, where preferences vary primarily by level of support, with a common tendency for Germans to respond at a lower level in relation to 'jobs' and 'unemployed'. The more complex solution clearly distinguishes the strongest and lowest welfare supporters, which offers an interesting advantage for the later analyses of how preferences vary across groups and relate to political action.
		Conditional probabilities						
<i>Label</i> Class probabilities	E esponse Level	Income differences	lobs	Unemployed	healthcare	DIO	Child	Leave
Low	0-5/D	0.41	0.92	0.92	0.45	0.77	0.53	0.52
0.12	6 7/N	0.21	0.06	0.05	0.20	0.09	0.21	0.31
	8 9/A	0.29	0.01	0.03	0.29	0.12	0.22	0.14
	10/AS	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.03
Mod (+/-)	0-5/D	0.24	0.61	0.49	0.04	0.18	0.10	0.26
(0.25)	6 7/N	0.22	0.33	0.48	0.52	0.66	0.46	0.49
	8 9/A	0.47	0.06	0.02	0.39	0.15	0.38	0.23
	10/AS	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.01
High	0-5/D	0.13	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.11
0.27	6 7/N	0.17	0.32	0.40	0.06	0.21	0.17	0.26
	8 9/A	0.55	0.43	0.34	0.85	0.73	0.70	0.59
	10/AS	0.16	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.04
	·							
High (+/-)	0-5/D	0.16	0.32	0.30	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.12
0.23	6 7/N	0.14	0.18	0.27	0.03	0.16	0.10	0.11
	8 9/A	0.45	0.30	0.34	0.28	0.42	0.31	0.39
	10/AS	0.26	0.21	0.10	0.67	0.32	0.53	0.38
	-, -			1				
Мах	0-5/D	0.07	0.09	0.12	0.02	0.01	0.12	0.16
0.13	6 7/N	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.10
-	8 9/A	0.40	0.12	0.08	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
	10/AS	0.46	0.72	0.70	0.97	0.94	0.82	0.71

### Table 4-4 Latent class model results for the 5-class solution for Germany

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2749

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

The indistinct response patterns and the high proportion of large residuals (Table 4-2) suggest the latent classes do not fully represent response patterns. Examining the two-way standardised residuals for the five-class solution revealed that larger residuals primarily relate to the maximum response level, which suggests that the latent classes do not fully represent how responses vary at higher levels of support. The results of the six class solution (in Table 4-5 below) offer an example, as it includes the groups identified in the five-class solution and a small group (labelled max (-) with a class probability of 0.04) characterised by strong support except in relation to 'childcare' and 'paid leave'. Hence, the six-class solution suggests that a small minority may favour welfare in general, but not government responsibility in relation to family policy.<sup>47</sup> These less common types of response pattern could be interesting to examine; however, the model fit information suggests that the greater complexity added to the model is not justified in terms of its contribution to explaining the variation in responses. Moreover, additional classes would apply to very few cases, which limits their use in statistical analyses.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, although there are problems with the fit of the five-class solution, it can sufficiently represent the main patterns of responses within the German data for use in further analyses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> This pattern can also be seen in other LCMs. First, the five-class solution's Maximum group has higher than could be expected conditional probabilities of responding at the lower end of the scale. Additionally, analyses with alternative coding schemes revealed a similar group; for example where 8, 9 and 10 are collapsed into the upper end, the six class model produced a group with a class probability of 0.2 which had high conditional probabilities of responding at the upper end for all items except 'childcare' and 'leave'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> A further factor adding to the misfit is the differences in attitudes between East and West Germany. Separate analyses of respondents in West Germany produced better fitting models (not shown).

		Conditiona	Conditional probabilities						
	ltem			oyed					
Label Class probabilities	Response Level	Income	sdol	Unempl	health	plo	Child	Leave	
Low	0-5/D	0.42	0.92	0.91	0.43	0.78	0.51	0.50	
0.13	6 7/N	0.21	0.06	0.06	0.23	0.11	0.22	0.33	
	8 9/A	0.29	0.01	0.03	0.30	0.12	0.23	0.14	
	10/AS	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.03	
Moderate (+/-)	0-5/D	0.23	0.60	0.48	0.04	0.17	0.10	0.26	
0.24	6 7/N	0.22	0.34	0.50	0.52	0.68	0.46	0.49	
	8 9/A	0.48	0.06	0.03	0.39	0.15	0.39	0.24	
	10/AS	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.01	
High (-)	0-5/D	0.13	0.26	0.25	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.12	
0.27	6 7/N	0.17	0.32	0.39	0.06	0.21	0.17	0.26	
	8 9/A	0.55	0.43	0.34	0.84	0.72	0.69	0.59	
	10/AS	0.16	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.04	
High (+/-)	0-5/D	0.16	0.31	0.28	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.09	
0.22	6 7/N	0.13	0.17	0.27	0.03	0.16	0.10	0.11	
	8 9/A	0.44	0.31	0.35	0.27	0.42	0.31	0.39	
	10/AS	0.27	0.21	0.10	0.68	0.33	0.55	0.41	
Max (-)	0-5/D	0.08	0.22	0.34	0.10	0.04	0.48	0.59	
0.04	6 7/N	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.14	0.24	
	8 9/A	0.51	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.04	0.00	
	10/AS	0.25	0.65	0.59	0.88	0.77	0.34	0.17	
Maximum	0-5/D	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	
0.09	6 7/N	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	
	8 9/A	0.35	0.14	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	
	10/AS	0.54	0.73	0.72	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.90	

### Table 4-5 Latent class model results for the 6-class solution for Germany

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2749

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

### Spain

The model fit information implies four to six classes are required to represent patterns of response in Spain. Above all, the three different solutions confirm the positive attitudes of the Spanish towards the role of government and the critical difference between the simplest four-class and the more complex five- and six-class solutions is the identification of small groups showing lower levels of support for the role of government.

The simplest four-class model, displayed in Table 4-6, does not include a grouping showing clear opposition to government intervention. The least supportive group, *Mod* (+), is most likely to give responses at the moderate and high points of the scales, with the higher responses for 'healthcare' and 'old'. This group represents just under a quarter of cases and the remaining three quarters belong to one of three groups tending to respond higher. The *Max* group shares with the similar group in Germany high probabilities of the maximum response; however, higher conditional probabilities make this group more distinctly defined. The *High* and *High* (+) group sboth tend to respond at around eight or nine; however, the *High* (+) group responds more favourably towards 'healthcare' and 'old' and has more divided response probabilities for 'unemployed' and 'leave'. Collectively, these groups represent more than three-fifths of the Spanish respondents, demonstrating high endorsement of the role of government even in relation to the unemployed and reducing income differences.

However, the five-class solution, in Table 4-7 includes a small (5 percent) group, Low (+), revealing more negative preferences regarding the welfare state. This characteristic is indicated by higher probabilities of responding at the lower half of the scale, especially in relation to 'jobs', 'unemployed', 'childcare' and 'leave'. In this solution, the other four groups reflect those from the four-class solution; however, the class membership probabilities have reduced because of the additional class. Thus, the five-class solution highlights a distinctive, though uncommon, response pattern not identified in the simpler solution.

Finally, Table 4-8 shows the six-class solution. The classes remain similar to the four- and five-class solutions but adding a further class affects their size. In this case, the additional class, *Mix (low-max)*, demonstrates a mixed response pattern where support is discernibly higher for 'healthcare' and 'old' whilst responses to 'jobs' and 'unemployed' are lower. Responses to 'childcare' and 'leave' remain indistinct. This change suggests that the additional class identifies an interesting

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and distinctive pattern of responses; moreover, in the six-class model, the High (+) group becomes more clearly defined.

By identifying groups indicating low support for the role of government in general, and for the more contentious domains, the more complex solutions provide a more comprehensive representation of preferences in Spain. As a result, although parsimony and the size of latent classes are important, the six-class solution will be interesting to consider in further stages of analysis.

		Conditional	probabiliti	es				
Label Group size	Response Level	Income differences	sdol	Unemployed	Health	old	Child	Leave
Mod+	0-5/D	0.12	0.27	0.37	0.08	0.08	0.21	0.23
0.24	6 7/N	0.22	0.52	0.54	0.33	0.43	0.52	0.54
	8 9/A	0.50	0.21	0.10	0.51	0.48	0.24	0.23
	10/AS	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.01
High	0-5/D	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
0.29	6 7/N	0.11	0.18	0.20	0.04	0.03	0.14	0.15
	8 9/A	0.55	0.69	0.76	0.86	0.93	0.82	0.80
	10/AS	0.28	0.03	0.00	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.03
High+	0-5/D	0.07	0.18	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.06
0.25	6 7/N	0.10	0.19	0.26	0.02	0.03	0.11	0.17
	8 9/A	0.54	0.41	0.35	0.12	0.15	0.43	0.38
	10/AS	0.29	0.23	0.24	0.87	0.81	0.41	0.39
Max	0-5/D	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.22	6 7/N	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02
	8 9/A	0.46	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04
	10/AS	0.42	0.82	0.96	0.99	1.00	0.95	0.93

Table 4-6: Latent class model results for the 4-class solution for Spain

Source: ESS4-2008 Spain n=2572

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (-) a negative bias.

		Conditional	l probabilitie	S				
Label Group size	Response Level	Income differences	sdol	Unemployed	Health	Old	Child	Leave
Low (+)	0-5/D	0.18	0.65	0.80	0.29	0.34	0.69	0.64
0.5	6 7/N	0.25	0.13	0.14	0.23	0.27	0.20	0.26
	8 9/A	0.36	0.16	0.05	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.10
	10/AS	0.21	0.06	0.01	0.35	0.25	0.00	0.00
Mod (+)	0-5/D	0.11	0.19	0.27	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.15
0. 23	6 7/N	0.20	0.57	0.60	0.31	0.41	0.54	0.56
	8 9/A	0.53	0.24	0.13	0.59	0.56	0.30	0.28
	10/AS	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.01
High	0-5/D	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
0.27	6 7/N	0.11	0.15	0.16	0.04	0.02	0.12	0.13
	8 9/A	0.54	0.73	0.80	0.86	0.94	0.85	0.82
	10/AS	0.29	0.03	0.00	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.03
High (+)	0-5/D	0.06	0.16	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03
0.24	6 7/N	0.10	0.19	0.27	0.02	0.03	0.11	0.17
	8 9/A	0.54	0.42	0.37	0.13	0.16	0.44	0.40
	10/AS	0.30	0.23	0.26	0.86	0.81	0.42	0.40
Max	0-5/D	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0. 22	6 7/N	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02
	8 9/A	0.46	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04
	10/AS	0.42	0.82	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.95	0.94

### Table 4-7: Latent class model results for the 5-class solution for Spain

Source: ESS4-2008 Spain n=2572

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (-) a negative bias.

		Condition	nal probab	ilities				
	ltem	e nces		oloyed				
Label Group size	Response Level	lncom differe	sqof	Unem	Health	old	Child	Leave
Low (+)	0-5/D	0.15	0.55	0.67	0.38	0.42	0.56	0.51
0.4	6 7/N	0.30	0.33	0.26	0.50	0.58	0.34	0.41
	8 9/A	0.37	0.11	0.07	0.13	0.00	0.10	0.08
	10/AS	0.18	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mix (Low-Max)	0-5/D	0.11	0.40	0.37	0.00	0.02	0.15	0.16
0.12	6 7/N	0.16	0.25	0.40	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.23
	8 9/A	0.45	0.24	0.14	0.19	0.28	0.23	0.24
	10/AS	0.27	0.12	0.09	0.76	0.61	0.48	0.38
Mod (+)	0-5/D	0.11	0.16	0.26	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.14
0.22	6 7/N	0.19	0.57	0.59	0.27	0.36	0.55	0.55
	8 9/A	0.55	0.26	0.16	0.65	0.62	0.33	0.31
	10/AS	0.16	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.00
High	0-5/D	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
0.26	6 7/N	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.11	0.12
	8 9/A	0.54	0.73	0.81	0.85	0.94	0.85	0.83
	10/AS	0.30	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.04
High (+)	0-5/D	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
0.15	6 7/N	0.06	0.14	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.14
	8 9/A	0.60	0.51	0.47	0.07	0.08	0.58	0.49
	10/AS	0.30	0.32	0.37	0.93	0.92	0.32	0.37
Max	0-5/D	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.22	6 7/N	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02
	8 9/A	0.45	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03
	10/AS	0.42	0.81	0.95	0.99	1.00	0.96	0.94

### Table 4-8: Latent class model results for the 6-class solution for Spain

Source: ESS4-2008 Spain n=2572

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

### Sweden

As noted above, the analysis of the Swedish data stood apart from other countries in terms of model fit as the indices commonly indicated the five-class solution to fit best. Before discussing the characteristics of the five-class solution, it is relevant to comment on how the low support for 'jobs', which was noted earlier, features across the latent classes. Since, lower support represents a general trend, responses to 'jobs' are not considered when applying labels; thus, a group that generally indicates high support is labelled *High* regardless of a lower level of response for 'jobs'.

Table 4-9 presents the class characteristics. Among the five classes, three indicate high probabilities of responding towards, or at, the upper scale sections: High (31 percent), High(+) (23 percent) and Max (17 percent). As in other countries, the High (+) responds to 'healthcare' and 'old' at a higher level than for the other domains. Collectively, 70 percent fall within these three groups highly endorsing the role of government. However, as mentioned above, even the most ardent group of welfare state supporters hesitate in supporting government responsibility to ensure jobs. The remaining 30 percent fall within two classes, which have been labelled Mod and Low (+). As the label implies, the Mod group is most likely to respond at the moderate level; except response to 'healthcare' could be higher. The group showing the lowest levels of support, Low (+), relates to just 10 percent of respondents. They are most likely to respond at the lower half of the scales; however, the responses of this group in relation to 'healthcare' and 'old' are varied and likely to be higher. The LCA confirms that the Swedish strongly support a role for government; moreover, with the exception of providing jobs, the majority retain an expansive view of the role of government and tend to respond similarly across items<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> The proportion of large residuals suggests that a model with one fewer class could be sufficient. This model will not be considered here; however, the main difference is that the *High(+)* group is not identified, resulting in higher class probabilities, increasing the size of the *Max* and *High* groups and increasing the spread of the class conditional probabilities, especially in relation to 'unemployed', 'child' and 'leave'.

		Conditi	onal prob	abilities				
Label	ltem	Income	sqoſ	Unemployed	Healthcare	Old	Child	Leave
Group size	Response category	0.00					a	
Low (+)	0-5/D	0.32	0.90	0.76	0.24	0.34	0.57	0.54
0. 10	6 7/N	0.31	0.06	0.15	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.28
	8 9/A	0.30	0.03	0.04	0.37	0.29	0.11	0.12
	10/AS	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.16	0.10	0.04	0.06
Mod	0-5/D	0.12	0.57	0.18	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.16
0 20	6 7/N	0.36	0.41	0.76	0.52	0.63	0.62	0.52
	8 9/A	0.44	0.02	0.06	0.45	0.35	0.28	0.31
	10/AS	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01
High	0-5/D	0.08	0.29	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02
0.31	6 7/N	0.22	0.42	0.25	0.06	0.02	0.18	0.24
	8 9/A	0.54	0.29	0.66	0.83	0.97	0.75	0.68
	10/AS	0.17	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.07
High (+)	0-5/D	0.11	0.35	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06
0. 23	6 7/N	0.19	0.32	0.30	0.03	0.04	0.15	0.12
	8 9/A	0.48	0.31	0.49	0.23	0.35	0.47	0.44
	10/AS	0.22	0.03	0.09	0.74	0.60	0.34	0.38
Max	0-5/D	0.10	0.17	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03
0. 17	6 7/N	0.15	0.24	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05
	8 9/A	0.34	0.31	0.10	0.05	0.01	0.11	0.12
	10/AS	0.41	0.28	0.85	0.95	0.98	0.85	0.80

#### Table 4-9 Latent class model results for the 5-class solution for Sweden

Source: ESS4-2008 Sweden n=1830

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

### UK

For the UK, the fit statistics mainly indicated that either three or six classes are required. Most notably, examining these two solutions confirms and elaborates upon the finding from the bivariate associations that responses to 'unemployed' and 'jobs' vary from responses to 'healthcare' and 'old' more in the UK than the other countries. First, Table 4-10 shows the three-class solution, which essentially distinguishes responses at the low-to moderate, moderate-high and high-maximum

levels. To varying degrees across the three classes, responses towards the items are mixed. Significantly, none of the groups show opposition across all domains. The group showing the least support, *Mix (low-high)*, has high conditional probabilities of giving low support, especially for 'jobs' and 'unemployed', but is likely to respond highly in relation to 'healthcare'. Equally, at the other end, the grouping showing the highest support, *Max(-)*, has indistinct responses in relation to 'jobs' and 'unemployed' and lower probabilities of giving maximum support for the family policy items.

The six-class solution, in Table 4-11, further reveals the extent of mixed preferences in the UK. Only the *Max* group is likely to respond similarly across items; however, reflecting overall levels of support in the UK, this group represents less than 10 percent of respondents. *High* (+) shows a more uniform pattern, with support being either at the high or maximum level. All other groups indicate mixed preferences. Indeed, two groups are assigned the mixed label, *Mix* (*low-high*) and *Mix* (*low-max*) due to the likelihood of responses for healthcare and old being high or at the maximum level whilst being low in relation to other aspects of the welfare state. None of the class solutions produces a class characterised by overall low levels of support, suggesting that even when all other roles are opposed, a high degree of support remains for government responsibility for healthcare and the old. The responses of the *Mod* (+/-) and *High* (-) groups tend to centre at one response level but are then higher in regards to the more popular forms of welfare and/or lower in relation to the less popular forms. These results therefore confirm the proposition that preferences in the UK are comparatively more mixed.

The percentage of large residuals suggests that a five-class solution may be sufficient. The BIC was lowest at the six-class solution; but the change between the five- and six-class solutions is marginal (36890 compared to 36886). Examining the five-class solution (not shown here) revealed that it was similar to the six class solution; however, the groups *High (+)* and *Mix (low-max)* in the six-class solution, formed one class with indistinct response probabilities. Hence, although the six-class solution is more complex it is easier to interpret.

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		Conditional probabilities						
Label Class probability	E 한 한	Income differences	lobs	Unemployed	Health	old	Child	Leave
Mix (Low to high)	0-5/D	0.33	0.70	0.72	0.11	0.11	0.54	0.45
0.32	6 7/N	0.29	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.43	0.39	0.45
	8 9/A	0.31	0.05	0.01	0.45	0.39	0.07	0.10
	10/AS	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.18	0.08	0.01	0.00
High (-) 0.38	0-5/D	0.16	0.31	0.29	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.08
	6 7/N	0.19	0.40	0.42	0.07	0.06	0.38	0.35
	8 9/A	0.50	0.28	0.29	0.72	0.85	0.51	0.54
	10/AS	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.20	0.09	0.03	0.04
Max(-) 0.30	0-5/D	0.16	0.24	0.29	0.00	0.02	0.16	0.11
	6 7/N	0.13	0.18	0.24	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.13
	8 9/A	0.41	0.27	0.21	0.06	0.07	0.27	0.29
	10/AS	0.30	0.31	0.26	0.93	0.90	0.42	0.48

### Table 4-10 Latent class model results for the 3-class solution for the UK

Source: ESS4-2008 UK n=2572

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

		Conditional probabilities						
		Income differences	sdol	Unemployed	Health	old	Child	Leave
Mix (Low-High) 0.13	0-5/D	0.38	0.77	0.92	0.20	0.22	0.79	0.65
	6 7/N	0.28	0.17	0.06	0.12	0.18	0.15	0.28
	8 9/A	0.23	0.04	0.02	0.51	0.56	0.05	0.07
	10/AS	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.17	0.04	0.02	0.00
Mod (+/-) 0.15	0-5/D	0.29	0.62	0.55	0.06	0.04	0.30	0.28
	6 7/N	0.30	0.35	0.45	0.49	0.73	0.61	0.62
	8 9/A	0.37	0.04	0.00	0.42	0.20	0.09	0.11
	10/AS	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00
High (-) 0.35	0-5/D	0.16	0.35	0.33	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.09
	6 7/N	0.20	0.38	0.41	0.07	0.04	0.39	0.36
	8 9/A	0.50	0.26	0.26	0.78	0.91	0.49	0.53
	10/AS	0.14	0.01	0.00	0.15	0.04	0.01	0.02
Mix (Low to Max) 0.12	0-5/D	0.28	0.48	0.53	0.00	0.01	0.52	0.35
	6 7/N	0.19	0.17	0.32	0.00	0.13	0.31	0.23
	8 9/A	0.32	0.20	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.30
	10/AS	0.21	0.15	0.08	0.93	0.78	0.04	0.12
High (+) 0.18	0-5/D	0.13	0.17	0.23	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01
	6 7/N	0.11	0.28	0.31	0.03	0.01	0.16	0.16
	8 9/A	0.49	0.39	0.40	0.14	0.20	0.50	0.41
	10/AS	0.27	0.16	0.06	0.83	0.77	0.32	0.42
Max 0.08	0-5/D	0.12	0.18	0.14	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.07
	6 7/N	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05
	8 9/A	0.37	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.07
	10/AS	0.39	0.63	0.75	0.97	0.98	0.89	0.82

### Table 4-11 Latent class model results for the 6-class solution (UK)

Source: ESS4-2008 UK n=2572

Note: To indicate the most likely responses across classes, conditional response probabilities of 0.4 and higher are highlighted. The boxes indicate situations where there are other conditional probabilities within 0.1 of the highest probability.

Latent class labels reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (-) a negative bias.

### 4.4 Comparing the countries

This section summarises and compares the patterns of responses across the four countries revealed by the individual latent class analyses. In doing so, it highlights

both similarities and differences across countries and identifies three common response patterns.

Groups indicating maximum support for the role of government across all the domains represent a notable similarity between the countries. In this case, the class conditional probabilities relating to this group vary across the countries; however, the differences do not substantially effect interpretation of the class characteristics. Additionally, even though the classes are not equivalent, the different class membership probabilities imply that the prevalence of this response pattern varies across countries. Most notably, about 22 percent fall within the Spanish Max group, compared to 8 percent falling into the similar group in the UK. In addition to reflecting the higher support for the welfare state, the larger group size in Spain reveals it is far more common, when answering these questions, for the Spanish to respond at the highest level irrespective of the type of welfare role considered. More broadly, in each country we can identify groups emerging at different levels of support, and equally, increasing the number of classes increases differentiation by level of support so that in the more complex models, we find groups with responses clustering around the low, moderate, high and max response categories. However, interesting differences in response patterns underlie these broad similarities.

A key focus in adopting the analytical approach was to explore how individuals within a society might vary in terms of their responses across the items. The pattern followed by the *Max* group reflects a *uniform* response pattern. Further examples of this pattern type emerge at different levels of support, for example, in the five-class model for Germany, the *Low* group indicates low support across all welfare state domains. In relation to patterns with *Mixed* responses across items, two common types emerge across the individual country analyses. The first pattern is characterised by lower responses for government responsibility for providing jobs, the living standards of the unemployed and reducing income differences. This pattern therefore captures individuals hesitant towards intervention relating to the labour market and the distribution of income compared to its role in meeting core social needs and supporting workers with caring responsibilities. The second

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pattern is characterised by stronger support for government responsibility to ensure healthcare and a decent standard of living for the old. It captures those that first and foremost support the core social insurance aspects of the welfare state and see weaker justification for state intervention related to the labour market, the income distribution and the 'social investment' strategies that support individuals to combine work and caring responsibilities. Significantly, across countries we can see differences in how these patterns emerge, and in relation to both patterns, the differentiation in support across welfare state domains can vary from slight to substantial.

Table 4-12 links the latent classes (from the preferred latent class solution for each country)<sup>50</sup> to one of the three response patterns. The percentage values indicate the estimated prevalence of each of the classes and collectively reflect the dominance of each response pattern within a country.

		Response pattern (and description	)
	Uniform	Hesitant towards intervention	Core social insurance
	Groups responding in a similar	in the labour market and	(Stronger support for
	way across the items	distribution of income	government responsibility to
		(weaker support for 'jobs',	ensure healthcare and a
		'unemployed' and 'income')	standard of living for the old)
Germany	Low: 12%	Mod (+/-): 25%	
	LOW: 12%	High (-): 27%	-
	IVIAX. 15%	High (+/-): 23%	
Spain	High: 26%		Low (+):4%
	Max: 22%	Mix (Low-Max): 12%	Mod (+): 22%
			High (+): 15%
Sweden	Mod: 20%		100(+): 10%
	High: 31%	-	L0w(+). 10/8
	Max:17%		Higii (+): 23%
UK		Mod (+/-): 15%	Mix (low-high): 13%
	Max: 8%	High (-): 35%	Mix (low-max): 12%
			High (+): 18%

 Table 4-12 Summary of latent classes by the three main response patterns across the countries

The percentages indicate the estimated prevalence of the different classes within each country

In Germany, groups either show a uniform response pattern, or are hesitant towards intervention in the labour market and distribution of income. The classifying of about three quarters of respondents to the latter pattern reflects how

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> The latent class solution is seen to be most fruitful for indicating substantively different patterns in response and is selected to be used in further stages of research, i.e. to compare social differences in preferences and participation and the link between preferences and political activity.

Germans tend to respond lower in relation to government intervention linked to the labour market. Excluding responses in relation to 'Jobs', Swedes show a comparatively strong tendency to respond similarly across the items with about two-thirds following a uniform response pattern. The remaining third respond slightly higher in relation to the core social insurance features. Interestingly, in Sweden, the group showing the lowest support for the welfare state follows this core social insurance pattern, suggesting these features of the welfare state can engender support even from those hesitant towards state intervention more broadly. The more oppositional groups in Spain and the UK share this characteristic. Overall, the Spanish and UK analyses reveal greater within country differences in response patterns. In Spain, about half belong to a group with mixed responses, most of which follow the core social insurance pattern that privileges healthcare and care for the old, with another group that shows support across welfare state domains, except for intervention in the labour market and distribution of income. The scarcity of uniform response patterns makes the UK stand out comparatively in terms of the extent to which people differentiate support across welfare state domains. Moreover, the extent to which individuals differentiate tends to be more substantial; significantly, in a way not seen in the other countries: about a quarter of UK respondents belong to a group that supports the core social insurance elements whilst indicating opposition to intervention in other areas.

These patterns reveal potential dimensions within public attitudes and suggest how components of public attitudes can intersect in different ways within and across countries. The groups support the indications from the previous studies discussed earlier in this chapter, in particular, Edlund's (2007) identification of groups defined by their support for two separate components: "risk-reducing social security" and "redistribution of resources". However, the analysis highlights cross-national differences in the extent to which support for these dimensions diverges across groups within a population. Moreover, across countries, support for welfare state intervention benefitting workers with caring responsibilities both coincides with support for the core social insurance elements and receives lower support alongside labour market intervention. As discussed above, the patterns vary across

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countries. In Sweden, there is little differentiation across the items whilst in Germany responses to these items generally follow those for healthcare and the old. In Spain and the UK, support for these items can coincide with weaker support for intervention linked to the labour market and income distribution. Except for a small group identified in the most complex model considered for Germany, individuals supporting intervention in the labour market tend to support these forms of welfare.

### Conclusion

Motivating this first stage of the study was an interest in how the 'package' of welfare supported might vary within a society, potentially, affecting how governments seek to contain the costs of the welfare states. Building on previous studies examining the dimensions of attitudes towards the welfare states, the empirical analyses presented in the chapter examined how, within the four selected countries, support for different domains of government intervention inter-relate. The analyses indicate that individuals within societies vary in their strength of support for the welfare state. Beyond this broad finding, the analysis also shows how individuals differentially support different areas of government intervention. The results indicate that individuals differentiate between healthcare and support for the old and intervention in the labour market. Additionally, government responsibilities for supporting workers to reconcile work with caring responsibility, a 'social investment' dimension of the welfare state, add a further point of differentiation.

Across the four countries, the LCA revealed three common patterns of response. First, some individuals express similar levels of support across all aspects of the welfare state, which is most common among those showing strong support for the welfare state. Second, the analysis reveals groups that show weaker support for intervention in the labour market and the distribution of income. Third, some groups show higher levels of support for healthcare and provision for the old compared to all other areas considered. The prevalence of these patterns varies

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across countries, which show how differentiating support across aspects of the welfare state is more common in some countries than others, notably in the UK.

The analysis indicates similarities across countries but sufficient differences that an equivalent-grouping scheme could not be established across countries. However, a single variable for all countries is not essential for this study, where the concern is not so much comparative analysis of preferences across countries but comparisons of groups within countries. As a result, the most appropriate way forward is to use country specific attitude groupings to ensure the best representation of preferences in each country. The following chapters use this information about welfare preferences to examine how social groups vary in their preferences and the association between preferences and participation.

# 5 The social stratification of political participation and welfare state preferences

There is substantial evidence to show that there are cross-national differences in both the extent of contention over the welfare state (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Svallfors 2006b; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Svallfors 2007) and participatory inequalities (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1978; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007). This chapter examines these two patterns of social stratification with the objective of establishing how they overlap within specific national contexts. For example, the chapter will consider whether disadvantaged groups are both more in favour of the welfare state and less politically active. Establishing these patterns can offer insights into how social contention over the welfare state becomes represented through political participation.

Focusing on Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, the chapter examines social contention over the welfare state and participatory inequalities. The first section starts by examining concepts of social inequality and social stratification used in research and then reviews the evidence from existing studies. The remainder of the chapter presents new analysis of the ESS data. The aim of this new analysis is to explore more systematically how social advantage increases the propensity to participate *and* reduces support for government intervention within different contexts. To achieve this aim, equivalent indicators of social position were used, with a primary focus upon the differences between social classes. The chapter finds different patterns across the cases. Social disadvantage is not always related to discernible differences in preferences and rates of political activity. In some contexts, there may be inequalities in participation but preferences are similar across groups; conversely, groups can vary in their preferences but not rates of political activity.

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## 5.1 Social-economic differences: social class, education and income

The concepts of social inequality and social stratification describe how access to valued resources, services and positions varies between members of a society. These differences result in positions of social advantage or disadvantage. Differences that are either systematic or institutionalised within societies are denoted by the idea of social stratification. Various differences between individuals can engender unequal social positions; scholars typically recognise differences by occupation, gender, and ethnicity. Inequality can relate to differential access to a variety of resources, assets and services such as income, wealth, political power, education and health. Reflecting the importance of the market in distributing resources within capitalist economies, a key focus of attention in the literature is on socio-economic classifications based around occupation such as social class and social economic status (SES). The various concepts encompass a great deal of theoretical and methodological variation. For instance, there are various versions of social class; both categorical schemes and scales; single indicators and indicators that combine factors such as occupation, income and education; and, both hierarchical and non-hierarchical approaches.

The scope to differentiate individuals across domains and through a variety of methods is reflected in research on political participation and preferences. For instance, studies of political participation and attitudes towards the welfare state share an interest in the role of social inequalities; however, the two fields of research have employed varied approaches. Research into attitudes towards the welfare state often, though not exclusively, examine differences between social classes whilst socio-economic status (SES) and level of education are used most frequently in studies of political participation.<sup>51</sup> These differences add difficulty to the comparison of findings across studies; a difficulty that is further complicated by the various techniques that have been used, including both bivariate and multivariate methods and various combinations of social class, level of education

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Social class is, however, a significant factor in studies of voting behaviour and partisanship (Butler and Stokes 1969; Evans 1999).

and income. Studies using multivariate models with multiple indicators of socioeconomic status (i.e. including social class, level of education and income) are difficult to compare, especially when they indicate only some measures as significant predictors.

A further important issue when looking at the empirical connections between social inequality and political outcomes is that the underlying processes are complex and not fully understood. For example, research into political participation tends to show that level of education is the strongest predictor of political activity. However, whether education influences the propensity to participate or whether the relationship between education and participation results from other characteristics that may also influence selection into education is an issue of long-standing debate.<sup>52</sup> Specifying theoretical connections is also complicated by the scope to differentiate individuals by factors such as occupation, income and education. Occupation, income and level of education are connected; however, any effects may work through both distinctive and interactive processes. Moreover, phenomena such as political participation and preferences about the welfare state are also complex and multi-dimensional. Verba et al. (1995) clearly demonstrated how the individual components of SES exert varying effects across different types of political activity. There is also much ambiguity about the relationship between education and welfare state preferences. It is theoretically conceivable that those with higher levels of education possess social advantage that may reduce their interest in redistributive social policy; however, education may increase awareness of social need and foster tolerance and egalitarianism. Empirically, current evidence is conflicting and the connection needs further examination.53

These varied approaches to examining the connection between social inequality and political activity and preferences are reflected in the available

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> For recent contributions to this debate, see Mayer (Mayer 2008) and Berinsky and Lenz (Berinsky and Lenz 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> For example, Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) hypothesised that education fosters democratic values, which in turn, would relate to higher support for the welfare state; however, their analysis found the opposite relationship. In contrast, Gelissen (2000, p.298) found education to be positively related to support for the welfare state and to interact with political beliefs.

evidence for Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Thus, the following discussions of patterns in participation and preferences refer to differences by social class, level of education and income. The discussion first draws on the comparative research into attitudes towards the welfare state, which has proliferated since the 1990s due to the interest around regime theory and the growing availability of cross-national survey data (e.g. Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001). Then, the discussion turns to patterns in political activity drawing upon several recent cross-national studies of the levels of inequality in participation (Topf 1998b; Topf 1998a; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; Gallego 2007; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). Finally, this section concludes by considering what these separate fields suggest about how socio-economic groups vary in both preferences and political activity within these different national contexts.

### Preferences about the welfare state

As indicated in chapter 2, Esping-Andersen's (1990) regime typology stimulated numerous studies of cross-national differences in the relationship between social class and attitudes towards the welfare state (e.g Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2001). Contradicting Esping-Andersen's (1990) speculation that the social democratic regime could dilute class cleavages, studies typically found class differences are largest in social democratic countries, especially Sweden (Edlund 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Svallfors 2004; Svallfors 2003).<sup>54</sup> More detailed studies of Swedish public opinion, by Svallfors (1999; 2011), identified how the Swedish middle class became more divided in terms of welfare state preferences following the recession in the 1990s. Higher level non-manuals became more oppositional towards the welfare state whilst support from both lower- and middle- level non-manual groups increased to the levels similar to manual workers. Consequently, the evidence suggests that there are comparatively large class

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Comparison of Sweden and Norway suggests class differences are substantially larger in Sweden (Svallfors 2003).

differences within Sweden and that these divisions are primarily between the most advantaged section of the middle class and the other social classes.<sup>55</sup>

With regards to the UK, a number of factors make differences between socioeconomic groups in relation to the welfare state particularly interesting. First, as discussed in the section on case selection in chapter 3, the UK model of welfare is a hybrid-case that is closest to the liberal model of welfare, which is thought to foster more limited class differences in preferences about the welfare state. Yet, the UK has a historically strong class cleavage (Butler and Stokes 1969); however, the ideological position of political parties and class voting have changed over time (Evans and Tilley 2011).

The evidence, perhaps reflecting this complexity, provides a mixed picture and indicates change over time. First, there is evidence suggesting that, although there has been a traditionally strong class cleavage in terms of electoral behaviour, the British working class were not radical and attitudinal differences between classes were never substantial (Gallie 1983; Welch and Studlar 1983). The comparative studies into attitudes towards the welfare state since the 1990s found discernible differences in the attitudes of the most and least advantaged classes (Svallfors 1993; 2004). Interestingly, research relating class differences in attitudes to class articulation through intermediary organisations suggested class differences in attitudes in the UK were larger than current trade union strength or left party position would predict (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). However, data from the British Social Attitudes survey suggests that by 2007 class differences had declined, with the lower social classes showing declining support for redistribution, poverty alleviation and unemployment benefit (Pearce and Taylor 2013, p.52). For example, in 1995, 44 percent of those in 'professional/managerial' class agreed that governments should reduce income differences, compared to 54 percent of the 'working class'. However, by 2007 those agreeing represented only 32 percent of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Recent evidence suggests that this pattern may be changing further. Data from 2010 indicates that class differences in Sweden have declined with support from higher level non-manuals and the self-employed increasing (Svallfors 2011).

the professional/managerial class and 31 percent of the working class.<sup>56</sup> As a result, the evidence suggests that around the time of Round 4 of the ESS, there were either no or relatively small class differences in attitudes towards the welfare state.

As discussed in chapter 2, welfare regime theory proposed that the major lines of division in conservative welfare regimes should pivot on employment status rather than social class or socio-economic status. However, studies of attitudes towards the welfare state point to class differences within all regimes. It is notable, though, that early studies of welfare state attitudes presented Germany as somewhat remarkable in the lack of social division over the welfare state. Coughlin's (1980) pioneering analysis of data from the 1960s and 1970s found very limited differences in attitudes within Germany. However, analyses of data from the 1990s has commonly found attitudinal differences between socioeconomic groups (Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Andreß and Heien 2001)<sup>57</sup>; though, the link between socio-economic classifications and attitudes towards the welfare state appears smaller in Germany compared to either Sweden or the UK (Svallfors 2004; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007).

The comparative literature includes less theoretical and empirical analysis of patterns of welfare state preferences in Spain or more broadly the 'Mediterranean', or 'Southern European', regime (Gelissen 2000). However, Kumlin and Svallfors (2007) report that class differences in attitudes are often smaller in Southern Europe, and specifically, are lower in Spain than Germany, the UK or Sweden. Recent studies specifically examining Spain also indicate a limited relationship between social class and preferences about the welfare state (Calzada and del Pino 2008; Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012). These two studies of Spain interestingly find an association between level of education and welfare state preferences but in opposite directions. Fernández-Albertos & Manzano (2012) report a positive association between level of education and attitudes towards the welfare state (when measured in regards to increasing/decreasing welfare and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Interestingly, data for 2012 suggests the trend of narrowing class differences may be reversing (Pearce and Taylor 2013, p.49).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> An alternative explanation is that the finding of limited differences in Germany was a result of the weakness of the variables used to measure social class (Svallfors 1997)

taxes), whilst Calzada and del Pino (2008) show a negative association between education and support for increased spending across social policy domains. The two studies vary in terms of the response variable and both include a variety of sociodemographic and 'ideological' control variables, which could differentially affect the connection between education and welfare preferences.

### **Participatory inequalities**

Research has previously indicated that participatory inequalities vary across the four countries studied in this thesis (Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Gallego 2007; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; Morales 2009; Gallego 2010). As already discussed, patterns of participation vary across forms of participation. Starting with voting, the common finding has often been that levels of turnout were mostly equal across socioeconomic groups (Crewe et al. 1977; Verba et al. 1978; Topf 1998b). However, recent evidence is challenging this consensus. In particular, Gallego (2008; 2010) found various degrees of unequal levels of turnout when examining differences by education level, which was measured in years, controlling for age. In Germany and the UK, the propensity to vote varies more considerably by education; indeed, out of the 28 countries examined, the strongest education effect was in Germany (Gallego 2010). In contrast, excluding countries where voting is a compulsory activity, the association between education and voting is lowest in Spain (Gallego 2010, p.242). Finally, in Sweden the association between education and the vote is comparatively moderate.<sup>58</sup>

Beyond voting, other institutional types of political activity such as party activism and contacting tend to be highly stratified by socio-economic status (Teorell 2006; Stolle and Hooghe 2011)<sup>59</sup>. In relation to contacting, Teorell et al. (2007) indicate that the more highly educated are more likely to participate in contacting activity in Germany, Spain and Sweden with the largest difference in Germany. With regards to the UK, Pattie et al. (2004, pp.85–88) indicate a similar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Gallego's (2010) findings in relation to Sweden and Spain conflict with Teorell et al. (2007), who indicated the effect of education (when measured as high, mid and low) on voting to be more substantial in Spain than Sweden.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> However, in contrast to the general trend party activity is greatest among the least educated (Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007).

bias. Turning to the non-institutional forms of participation, Teorell et al.'s (2007) cross-national comparison shows those with a high level of education are disproportionately represented among protesters and that the level of inequality is greatest in Spain. Moreover, in contrast to other forms of political activity, the bias is not lower in Sweden.<sup>60</sup> Finally, in an extensive cross-national analysis of membership of political associations, Morales (2009) indicated different patterns across these four countries. Differences by level of education and social class are greatest in Spain; however, the effect of income is comparatively weak. Equally, the analysis shows comparatively large differences by education, income and social class in the UK. In Germany and Sweden, the links are weaker.<sup>61</sup>

In summary, the evidence points towards varied patterns across the four countries. Political activity is generally more egalitarian in Sweden; however, there are still discernible participatory inequalities and Sweden varies less than other countries in relation to joining demonstrations. The level of participatory inequality is frequently highest in Germany except in relation to membership of political associations, which are more prevalent in Germany than other European countries. In Spain, voting is comparatively egalitarian but the non-institutional forms of political activity are highly unequal and participation in the UK is consistently unequal across types of political activity.

### Summary

The current evidence derives from the use of varied approaches and different timepoints. Nevertheless, it offers some important insights into the way social inequality relates to both preferences about the welfare state and political activity within each of these four countries. The evidence confirms that there are socioeconomic differences in relation to both preferences and political activity but that patterns vary across countries. First, in Germany, class differences in preferences about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> The level of inequality by education in relation to protest activity in Sweden noticeably deviates from other Scandinavian countries, where the inequality is much smaller. The pattern in Germany slightly deviates from the other two countries, as those with a medium level of education are also under-represented among political protesters, which suggests an even narrower section of the population participates through this form of activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Morales (2009, p.74) notes a significant curvilinear relationship between income and political membership in Sweden, with rates of membership lowest among the middle income groups.

welfare seem to coincide with notable participatory inequalities. In contrast, in Sweden groups are divided in their preferences but participation is often more egalitarian; however, participatory inequalities are still present. In Spain, there are substantial participatory inequalities but there seem to be weaker connections between socio-economic position and welfare state support. Finally, in the UK, participation is unequal but class differences in attitudes towards the welfare state may be weak. These scattered observations therefore suggest that social advantage does not always substantially increases the propensity to participate *and* reduce support for government intervention, a prospect explored more systematically in the analysis of the ESS data.

## 5.2 Examining social differences in welfare preferences and political activity

This section outlines the approach used to examine social differences in preferences and participation. The first part summarises the variables used in the analysis to represent preferences and participation, which are the response variables in the models. The measurement of both preferences and participation follows on from previous chapters, and is therefore described briefly. The second part describes the explanatory variables used to indicate social position and the third part describes the statistical models used to examine these relationships.

### Preferences and participation: the response variables

In the analysis, preferences about the welfare state are represented by the preference groups, which were derived through the latent class analysis outlined in the previous chapter. For each country, the latent classes represent groups responding in different ways across the seven survey questions. The subsequent analyses examine the different patterns of response found at the national level and are related to social characteristics such as social class. As the previous chapter highlighted, patterns of response vary across countries and, as a result, the characteristics of the latent classes are particular to each country.

The analysis considers the five types of political activity outlined in chapter 3. The results presented here use a voting item that distinguishes voters from those 'not-voting', a category which includes abstainers and those not eligible to vote. This binary indicator allows examination of how representative voters are in terms of their social characteristics compared to the adult population. It is important to note that abstaining from voting is different to being ineligible to vote. These categories have distinct theoretical links with social position and notions of participatory and political equality. For example, foreign workers and young people without a right to vote is a distinct process from the socially disadvantaged choosing not to vote. Since the young and foreign workers will come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, the impact of social class as a predictor of voting could be underestimated.

### Indicators of social position: the explanatory variables

As discussed above, this analysis aims to examine the extent to which both welfare state preferences and political activity relate to positions of social inequality rather than to develop comprehensive models for explaining these outcomes. Using social class as a single indicator of social-economic status reflects this aim as it helps uncover the extent to which both preferences and participation can vary between significant social groups. The choice of social class reflects its importance in discussions of welfare state politics and the theoretical ambiguity regarding the influence of education. The choice does not imply that factors such as education and income do not influence political behaviour and attitudes. Income and education are important factors; however, the complex inter-relationships between these dimensions of inequality, and the various mechanisms that link them to political orientations and behaviour, would make it difficult to determine overall differences between groups.

The indicator of social class derives from the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) schema (Harrison and Rose 2006)<sup>62</sup> and the household is the unit of analysis. Derived from the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) sociological class schema, the ESeC aims to differentiate positions within labour

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> The scheme was developed by an expert group that was working as part of Eurostat's statistical harmonisation programme. (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/esec/)

markets in terms of 'employment relations' (Harrison and Rose 2006)<sup>63</sup>. A key distinction is between employees, employers and the self-employed. Then, the schema aims to differentiate employees to reflect the diversity of employment relations and conditions such as "source of income, economic security and prospects of economic advancement... location in systems of authority and control at work" (Harrison and Rose 2006, p.4). To reflect these differences in 'labour market' and 'work situations', a key distinction is between the 'service relationship' and a 'labour contract'. The service relationship is characterised by employees rendering service to the employer in exchange for both immediate and future benefits. In contrast, a labour contract typically involves the employee giving labour in return for a set wage for time spent or amount worked. The schema differentiates both pure and modified versions of these relationships along with 'intermediate' or mixed forms of employment that reflect elements of both.

Recognising that social class is a commonly used yet highly contested concept, the decision to adopt the ESeC was based on a number of factors. By focusing on the employment relations that typify different positions within society, the schema reflects a minimalist concept of social class. Without notions of class identity or action, the ESeC identifies groups with different socio-economic risks and resources. The extent to which these different positions lead to differences in political outcomes can therefore become the subject of empirical analysis. As Edlund describes, this "conceptual clarity and consistency is a true advantage" (Edlund 2007, p.37). The underlying EGP class scheme has also been used effectively in research predicting differences in social and political outcomes (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Evans 1999; Svallfors 2006a; Edlund 2007; Brooks and Svallfors 2010). Furthermore, Evans (1992) and Mills and Evans (2000) have shown the EGP to possess criterion validity. A further advantaged of the ESeC was that it was specifically designed for comparative research and extensive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> The theory underlying the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) scheme changed over time. The emphasis on employment relations was developed in Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), see also (Evans 1992).

documentation, including a syntax file, is publically available (Harrison and Rose 2006).

In terms of operationalizing the schema, the ESeC uses information relating to occupation, employment status and the size of the workplace to distinguish nine classes in its most extensive version. However, for the purposes of this analysis a simpler version of the schema sufficiently captures major social differences. Five main classes are distinguished in the analysis: the upper sections of the service class (service class I), the lower service class (service class II), intermediate, self-employed) positions and those where work is typically undertaken via a labour contract<sup>64</sup>. Appendix A includes the technical aspects of coding the variable.

In addition to social class, other socio-demographic factors that have shown to be associated with welfare state preference and political participation are included in the model as controls. The variable selection was informed by the literature reviewed in chapter 2 and includes age, gender, sector of employment and current employment status. The main aim of including these additional variables is to examine class differences net of other factors that might confound the relationship. However, as drivers of both welfare state preferences and political activity they also represent additional ways that participatory inequalities might overlap with the distribution of preferences. For example, age is a key factor influencing the propensity to participate (Verba et al. 1995; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007) and has been shown to be related to preferences (Busemeyer et al. 2009; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Therefore, although social class represents the focus, the final section of the chapter comments on how these other markers of social position relate to preferences about the welfare state and political activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> With the aim of minimising the number of classes, the recommended three class schema was followed but with two exceptions: the service class remains split into two and 'small employers and the (non-professional) self-employed, are kept separate from the rest of the intermediate class of higher-grade (both blue and white-collar) workers. The rationale for keeping these distinctions is that evidence suggests these groups demonstrate significant differences in welfare state preferences and political activity; for example, Svallfors (2004) shows the upper sections of the salariat are often more oppositional to welfare than other sections and self-employment is strongly connected with trade union membership.

The additional characteristics are all included as categorical variables: Age as three separate age groups ('younger' (16-35), 'middle' (35-55) and 'older' (56+)). Current employment status comprises three categories of the 'employed', 'unemployed' and 'inactive'; 'Public sector' is a binary indicator identifying those who indicate working in the public sector in their current or last employment.<sup>65</sup> Table 5-1 lists the percentage within each category of the explanatory variables for each country. In some cases, categories representing small sub-populations are represented by a small number of cases, which will limit the precision of the analysis. This issue most concerns the unemployed category in Sweden.

Indicator	Categories	Germany	Spain	Sweden	UK
Gender	Female	46.6	51.8	49.8	52.4
Age	Younger (35 and under)	23.8	33.6	31.2	30.1
	Middle (36 to 55)	40.2	34.4	32.3	38.1
	Older (56 plus)	36.0	32.0	36.5	31.9
Social Class	Service Class I	19.0	9.2	20.5	20.3
	Service Class II	22.8	9.1	24.9	22.3
	Intermediate Class	23.9	19.6	18.3	20.2
	Small employers/self- employed	8.2	19.1	8.5	10.6
	Labour class	26.0	43.1	27.9	26.5
Employment status	Employed	52.0	53.0	60.8	53.2
	Unemployed	4.7	6.1	3.0	4.3
	Out of labour force	43.3	40.9	36.2	42.4
Public sector	Public sector	17.6	10.6	33.8	24.8

	Table 5-1 Indicators of soci	al position, perc	entage (%) v	within each gr	roup
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Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2,751, Spain n= 2,576, Sweden, n=1,830, UK, n=2, 352

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> The inactive group is heterogeneous: including students, those looking after the home and the permanently sick and disabled. When interpreting results relating to this group this mix should be remembered as substantial within group variation is likely.

### Models

Figure 5-1 illustrates the modelling framework used to examine social differences in preferences and political activity. Although the aim is to use equivalent models and indicators, features of the response variables mean that different statistical models are required. For political activity, the binary indicators are related to explanatory variables through logistic binary regression models. In relation to the latent classes, it is useful to view the model as comprising both 1) the measurement part representing the latent construct (preferences groups) and 2) a structural part that represents the association between the construct and covariates such as social class. Following Clark and Muthén (2009), the underlying analysis involves estimating both the latent class solution and the regression model simultaneously.<sup>66</sup> However, the previous chapter discussed the measurement model in detail and this chapter focuses on the structural part.

Figure 5-1 Illustration of models used to examine social differences in preferences and political activity



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Clark and Muthén (2009) propose that a single-step approach is preferable to alternative twostep approaches, where the first step estimates the latent class and assigns cases to specific groups. Two-step approaches effectively treat the latent class variables as an observed variable removing the probabilistic nature of class membership, which can mean incorrect estimation of the parameter estimates and standard errors. Including new variables into the model can affect the latent class parameters (with substantial change suggesting model misspecification or a strong relationship between a variable in the 'structural part' and the 'measurement part' of the model). Hence, although the parameters of the measurement models are not the focus, they need to be examined when adding covariates. In this case, the process revealed that for each country the measurement model remains largely similar with no changes to the class conditional probabilities or class membership probabilities exceeding 0.01.

For each country, the measurement part of the model includes more than two classes and therefore the structural part takes the form of a multinomial regression model. The model specification is presented below and follows Clark and Muthén (2009, p.11). Representing a covariate by x and the probability that individual i falls in class k of the latent class variable X, the model is

$$P(c_i = k | x_i) = \frac{e^{a_{k+\gamma_k x_i}}}{\sum_{s=1}^{K} e^{a_s + \gamma_i x_i}}$$

Where  $\alpha_K = 0$ ,  $\gamma_k = 0$  so that  $e^{\alpha_{k+\gamma_k}x_i} = 1$ , which implies that the log odds of comparing class k to the last class K is  $\log[P(c_i = k | x_i)/P(c_i = K | x_i) = \alpha_k + \gamma_k x_i$ .

A multinomial model can be difficult to interpret. The parameters indicate how values of the explanatory variables affect the response variable by comparing differences in the likelihood of belonging to one category compared to a 'reference' category, for example, how social class affects the likelihood of someone belonging to the *Maximum* support preference group compared to the *Low* support preference group. Alternating the reference category enables different contrasts; however, the parameters produced through the process are difficult to interpret directly. Therefore, to make it easier to discern differences between social classes, the following section uses predicted probabilities of latent class membership, calculated from the model parameters. Likewise, to compare the patterns of social stratification, differences in political activity are also presented as predicted probabilities. When calculating the probabilities for social classes, the other variables in the model refer to a middle age man, currently employed but not in the public sector. In both cases, the full model results are in Appendix C.

### 5.3 Social class differences in preferences and political activity

To examine how social classes vary in their welfare state preferences and rates of political activity, this section presents the predicted probabilities of belonging to the preferences groups and of participating in the various forms of political action. The results are presented for each country separately in a series of figures.

### Germany

Figure 5-2 shows the predicted probabilities for Germany. In the figure, social classes vary in both their preferences about welfare and political activity. In the upper part of the figure, the different social classes vary in their estimated probabilities of belonging to the different preference groups. A likelihood ratio test further indicates that there is an association between social class and preferences as allowing the latent class membership to vary across social classes significantly improves the fit of the model (61.08, df=16, p<0.000).<sup>67</sup>

Beyond a general association, the probabilities indicate that in terms of preferences the labour class is the most distinctive. As a group, they are on average much more likely to belong to the *Maximum* support preference group; indeed, they are 4.5 times more likely to than those in Service Class I. Conversely, Service Class I and the Self-Employed and Smaller Employer Class are more likely to show lower levels of support. Both Service Class II and the Intermediate Class show higher support than Service Class I. However, their support appears more constrained than that of the Labour Class; for example, Service Class II has a higher probability of belonging to the *High* support group, which suggests they are favourable but less inclined to confer total responsibility towards governments by using the upper point of the response scales. The model parameters (in Appendix C) offer some further evidence in relation to this proposition: at the 10 percent level of significance, those in Service Class II are more likely than Service Class I to belong to the *High* group compared to Mod(+/-) and Low.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> The likelihood ratio test compares the fit of a model where class membership probabilities are constrained to be equal across classes to the fit of the model, allowing them to vary.





Source: European Social Survey 2008, Germany n= 2679

Notes: The predicted probabilities of participating derive from separate analyses of the five modes of participation and the attitude groups. Other variables in the model are age (Middle 36 to 55), gender (male), current employment status (employed) and public sector (non-public section). The full model parameters are in Appendix C.

The preference groups correspond to latent classes. The latent classes reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

The lower part of Figure 5-2 shows differences in the propensity to participate. Significantly, the labour class shows a remarkably lower propensity to participate. Members of this least advantaged class are less likely to vote, contact an official, demonstrate and participate in an organisation. Differences are often substantial, particularly in regards to voting, contacting and organisation work. With regards to trade union membership, which conceivably offers an avenue for reversing the social bias in participation, rates of participation are broadly comparable to other classes.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, even though the probability of having demonstrated varies less across classes, those in the Labour Class are still significantly less likely to have demonstrated than those in Service Class I.<sup>69</sup>

The evidence summarised in Figure 5-3 therefore indicates that in Germany social classes vary in both their preferences about welfare and their propensity to participate. Moreover, the differences are concentrated around the most disadvantaged class (the Labour Class), which is distinctive in its lower rates of participation and propensity to endorse government responsibility for all aspects of social welfare.

### Spain

Turning to Spain, existing evidence suggested the pattern would be different to Germany as welfare preferences are not strongly linked to social class. The analysis of the ESS data confirms this proposition. In the upper part of Figure 5-4, the predicted probabilities of belonging to the attitude groups vary across social classes; however, the full model parameters (in Appendix C) indicate no significant differences at the 95 percent level. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test (LR=26.03 at 20 df, p=0.16) suggests that allowing membership to vary across classes does not significantly improve the model.<sup>70</sup> The analysis did confirm that the propensity to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Those in the intermediate class have the highest predicted probability of being a trade union member (when controlling for age, gender, employment status and working in the public sector) and are significantly more likely to be trade union members than those in Service Class I.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> This difference is seen better by examining the full model results in Appendix C.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Since the six-class latent class model includes numerically small groups, the results were compared to results from models based on simpler latent class solutions and the individual attitude

participate varies across classes. As with the German data, those in the Labour Class display a lower propensity to participate (significantly lower from Service Class I for all forms of participation except trade union membership). However, in contrast to Germany, those in Service Class II show a greater propensity to vote, join a demonstration and participate through organisation work. The intermediate class participate at a similar rate to Service Class I. Collectively, these patterns suggest that participation is greatest among lower level professionals, lowest among the working class and varies little across other classes.

variables. These additional analyses primarily substantiate the picture of limited class differences in Spain. Using the four class latent variable model achieved similar results (as a result analyses are not reported here) i.e. some variations in the predicted probabilities but few significant parameters in the multinomial model and allowing membership to vary across classes does not improve overall model fit.


### Figure 5-3 Social class differences in preferences and political activity in Spain

Source: European Social Survey 2008, Spain n= 2515

Notes: The predicted probabilities of participating derive from separate analyses of the five modes of participation and the attitude groups. Other variables in the model are age (Middle 36 to 55), gender (male), current employment status (employed) and public sector (non-public section). The full model parameters are in Appendix C.

The preference groups correspond to latent classes. The latent classes reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

### Sweden

Previous research suggested the pattern in Sweden might be the reverse of the pattern in Spain. A key part of this is the proposition of strong differences in preferences between social classes in Sweden. An analysis of the ESS data confirms there are substantial class differences in attitudes. Overall, a likelihood ratio test suggests that including social class differences in preferences significantly improves the model (LR 28.14 16 df, p=0.03) and in Figure 5-4 we can see considerable differences between classes. Service Class I, along with the Self-Employed and Smaller Employers, are more likely to belong to the small group indicating low support for government responsibility and less likely to belong to the *Maximum Support* group. A further difference is that the Labour class show a considerably higher probability of belonging to the *Maximum Support* group. This finding corresponds to Edlund's (2007) analysis, which emphasised the distinctively strong support of Swedish working class for an 'encompassing' versus 'social security' model of welfare state.

With regards to the expected egalitarian nature of political participation, the results here indicate that social classes differ in their rates of political activity. The differences appear comparatively small but more pronounced in relation to contacting and organisation work. As a result, the less advantaged social class can be clearly associated with higher welfare state support and some participatory inequality. How the participatory inequality compares to the other countries will be considered further, subsequent to consideration of the UK pattern.



Figure 5-4 Social class differences in preferences and participation in Sweden

Source: European Social Survey 2008, Sweden = 1817

Notes: The predicted probabilities of participating derive from separate analyses of the five modes of participation and the attitude groups. Other variables in the model are age (Middle 36 to 55), gender (male), current employment status (employed) and public sector (non-public section). The full model parameters are in the Appendix C.

The preference groups correspond to latent classes. The latent classes reflect the modal response level of a class (Low, Mod, High and Max) and the sign in brackets indicates deviations from the modal level towards some items, with (+) indicating a favourable bias, and a (–) a negative bias.

Figure 5-5 shows differences between social classes in the UK. In relation to participation, the results show similar propensities to participate among the upper and lower sections of the service class; thus, the main point of interest becomes how less likely the other classes are to participate. Voting is interesting in this regard, as two distinct groups emerge: the service class and all others. Class differences concerning contacting and organisation work are most marked, a pattern which is similar across the countries. Other than a lower propensity among the Self-Employed and Small Employers, trade union membership does not significantly vary between social classes.

Turning to preferences, the evidence in relation to the UK offers greater ambiguity about what pattern to expect. Overall, the analysis of the ESS data suggests that class differences in preferences are small compared to Sweden and Germany. Most of all, the likelihood ratio test suggests that allowing membership of the latent classes to vary by social class does not significantly improve model fit at the 95 percent level (LR 28.85 at 20 df, p=0.09). In relation to the probabilities in Figure 5-1, Service Class I are less likely to belong to the small group that indicates strong support, a pattern which is reflected in the full model parameters. Service Class I are also more likely to belong to the more moderate and mixed preferences groups, which further suggests they are less supportive of extensive welfare provision. The Labour Class have a higher probability of belonging to the High (+) group, which indicates some hesitancy to supportive provision for the unemployed compared to the social insurance aspects of the welfare state. The main differences in preferences centre around membership of the larger and more moderate groups: Mod and High(-). An unexpected finding for the UK is the high probability of the Self-Employed and Small-Employer class belonging to the Maximum support group, suggesting a relatively greater inclination to confer total responsibility upon governments.<sup>71</sup> Hence, the data for the UK indicate that social class differences in respect of voting, contacting and organisation work are of particular interest.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Analysis of the individual attitude items revealed a similar pattern in relation to income differences, jobs, childcare and paid leave.

However, social differences in preferences are less concentrated than in Germany and Sweden where large differences emerge in relation to the group showing most support.





Source: European Social Survey 2008, UK = 2293

Notes: The predicted probabilities of participating derive from separate analyses of the five modes of participation and the preferences groups. Other variables in the model are age (Middle 36 to 55), gender (male), current employment status (employed) and public sector (non-public section). The full model parameters are in the Appendix C

#### **Comparing participatory inequalities across countries**

For further insight into how participatory inequalities vary across countries, Table 5-2 reports ratios of the probability for Service Class I participating to the Labour Class participating. A value of one indicates that the two social classes are equally as likely to have participated, while values above one indicates that Service Class I are more likely and values below one that the Labour Class are more likely. The ratios show that in Sweden there are differences between these two classes; however, the difference is often comparatively small, especially in relation to voting. For the UK, Table 5-2 confirms that participatory inequalities across classes are comparatively large; for example, those in Service Class I are more than 2.5 times more likely to have contacted a politician and more than 3 times as likely to be involved in organisation work.

Table 5-2 Ratios showing the probability of participating for Service Class I compared to Labour class

	Vote	Party ID	Trade union	Contact	Org work	Demo
Germany	1.23	1.54	0.77	2.82	2.28	1.90
Spain <sup>a</sup>	1.14	1.21	1.10	2.34	1.51	1.35
Sweden	1.09	1.16	0.94	1.86	1.70	1.03
UK	1.19	1.28	1.10	2.54	3.14	1.09

Source: European Social Survey 2008, Germany n= 2679 Spain n= 2515 Sweden = 1817 UK = 2293 Notes: Ratios calculated from the predicted probabilities displayed in figures 5.2-5., which were based on logistic regression model parameters (in Appendix C).

a In Spain Service Class II are the most likely to be a participant and therefore the ratios do not indicate the greatest differences.

# 5.4 Other forms of social differences in preferences and participation

As discussed earlier, the models include additional individual characteristics that have been associated with preferences about the welfare state and political activity within previous research. This section briefly summarises what the analysis of the ESS data indicates about these differences. Similarly to the discussion of social class, the emphasis is upon how characteristics of individuals relate to both preferences about the welfare state and political participation. Additionally, predicted probabilities have been calculated to aid comparison of the differences between social groups, which are displayed in Table 5-3. When calculating the probabilities the other variables refer to a common reference category, for example, when comparing men and women the probabilities refer to someone aged 36-55, in the intermediate class, employed and not in the public sector.

In relation to the labour market the analysis includes an indicator of current employment status and sector of employment. These characteristics have been especially significant in relation to preferences about the welfare state in light of Esping-Andersen's regime theory. Consequently, employment status has commonly been used to examine differences between insiders and outsiders (the 'employed' group includes 'outsiders' in the sense of having insecure and insufficient work) (Svallfors 1997). As discussed in chapter 2, the common expectation is that the employed will be less favourable towards the welfare state. Regime theory proposed that insider-outsider conflicts were more likely to emerge within conservative regimes; however, past research has provided mixed evidence. Employment status can affect political activity in various ways since it determines the resources available such as money and time. Additionally, experiences towards the welfare state related to employment status can potentially impact upon political orientations such as political efficacy and trust (Campbell 2012).

Welfare state preferences (class membership probabilities)					Political activity (participatory probability)							
Germany	Low	(-/+)	High (-)	High (+/-)	Мах			Vote	Trade union	Contact	Org work	Demo
Younger	0.09	0.38	0.26	0.21	0.07			0.55	0.15	0.08	0.30	0.13
Middle	0.10	0.33	0.25	0.23	0.09			0.83	0.28	0.16	0.33	0.08
Older	0.18	0.29	0.21	0.23	0.08			0.92	0.25	0.15	0.27	0.04
Male	0.10	0.33	0.25	0.23	0.09			0.83	0.28	0.16	0.33	0.08
Female	0.07	0.28	0.28	0.23	0.14			0.82	0.14	0.11	0.23	0.06
Employed	0.10	0.25	0.23	0.33	0.09			0.83	0.28	0.16	0.33	0.08
Unemployed	0.04	0.22	0.36	0.20	0.18			0.64	0.11	0.13	0.25	0.08
Out of labour force	0.11	0.27	0.25	0.27	0.10			0.71	0.15	0.18	0.35	0.08
Not public	0.10	0.25	0.23	0.33	0.09			0.83	0.28	0.16	0.33	0.08
Public sec	0.09	0.23	0.22	0.35	0.11			0.91	0.39	0.23	0.43	0.14
Spain	(+) MOJ	Mix (L-M)	ро W (+)	High	High (+)	Max		Vote	Trade union	Contact	Org work	Demo
Younger	0.07	0.10	0.28	0.26	0.14	0.16		0.67	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.18
Middle	0.07	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.16		0.83	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17
Older	0.04	0.12	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.20		0.91	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.13
Male	0.07	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.16		0.83	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17
Female	0.03	0.11	0.18	0.31	0.16	0.21		0.83	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.18
Employed	0.07	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.16		0.83	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17
Unemployed	0.09	0.16	0.14	0.30	0.12	0.20		0.82	0.07	0.18	0.15	0.13
Out of labour force	0.06	0.13	0.18	0.29	0.20	0.14		0.76	0.03	0.12	0.11	0.13
Not public	0.07	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.16		0.83	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17
Public sec	0.05	0.13	0.26	0.28	0.13	0.16		0.88	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.21
Sweden	(+)	ром	High	High (+)	Max			Vote	Trade union	Contact	Org work	Demo
Younger	0.18	0.29	0.26	0.23	0.05			0.41	0.31	0.07	0.20	0.05
Middle	0.14	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.10			0.47	0.41	0.09	0.24	0.03
Older	0.15	0.16	0.30	0.30	0.08			0.49	0.36	0.08	0.23	0.03
Male	0.14	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.10			0.47	0.41	0.09	0.24	0.03
Female	0.09	0.18	0.21	0.17	0.35			0.47	0.40	0.08	0.19	0.02
Employed	0.14	0.22	0.28	0.10	0.25			0.47	0.41	0.09	0.24	0.03
Unemployed	0.20	0.23	0.38	0.05	0.13			0.45	0.35	0.09	0.22	0.04
Out of labour force	0.18	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.26			0.43	0.18	0.08	0.21	0.03
Not public	0.14	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.10			0.47	0.41	0.09	0.24	0.03
Public sec	0.18	0.19	0.27	0.26	0.11			0.48	0.46	0.10	0.25	0.04

## Table 5-3 Differences in preferences and political activity by age, gender, employment status and sector

UK	Mix (L-H)	Mix (L-M)	(-/+) poW	High (-)	High (+)	Max	Vote	Trade union	Contact	Org work	Demo
Younger	0.14	0.07	0.28	0.37	0.13	0.01	0.23	0.13	0.06	0.04	0.03
Middle	0.18	0.11	0.22	0.38	0.09	0.03	0.39	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.05
Older	0.24	0.22	0.15	0.31	0.07	0.02	0.46	0.14	0.13	0.05	0.02
Male	0.18	0.11	0.22	0.38	0.09	0.03	0.39	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.05
Female	0.18	0.09	0.20	0.39	0.12	0.03	0.38	0.15	0.11	0.04	0.03
Employed	0.18	0.11	0.22	0.38	0.09	0.03	0.39	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.05
Unemployed	0.20	0.10	0.12	0.35	0.08	0.16	0.33	0.04	0.15	0.07	0.07
Out of labour force	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.36	0.10	0.10	0.36	0.04	0.14	0.06	0.05
Not public	0.18	0.11	0.22	0.38	0.09	0.03	0.39	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.05
Public sec	0.15	0.10	0.17	0.44	0.11	0.03	0.43	0.37	0.13	0.08	0.09

Source: ESS4-2008 Germany n=2,751, Spain n= 2,576, Sweden, n=1,830, UK, n=2, 352

Notes: The predicted probabilities of participating derive from separate analyses of the five modes of participation and the attitude groups

Reference categories Intermediate class, middle age, male, employed and non-public sector

The results of the analysis indicate that there is greater support among the unemployed in Germany. In particular, the unemployed are more likely to belong to the Maximum Support preference group, which is the only preference group that shows strong support towards the areas of provision relating to unemployment. The results also suggest that the unemployed are more likely than the employed to belong to the Maximum support group. For Sweden, the results are less clear. The probabilities and parameters point towards the unemployed being likely to belong to the Maximum Support group; however, the model parameters are not statistically significant. Additionally, there are no significant differences in relation to unemployment status in Spain. Turning to politically activity, the employed are more likely to be trade union members. Otherwise, the main difference relates to voting, where the results indicate that the unemployed may be less likely to vote in Germany (and to a lesser extent in the UK and Sweden where the differences are not significant at 95% level). It is therefore noticeable that in Germany the unemployed, as well as the most disadvantaged social class, have distinctive welfare state preferences and there are indications of being less likely to participate in politics, thus opening the potential for strong support for all areas of welfare provision to be under-represented.

With regards to public sector employment, the pattern expected is that employment in the public sector is associated with both higher support for the welfare state and higher political activity. The analysis shows many instances of higher rates of political activity among public sector workers in most countries. However, as other studies have found, the results indicate that public sector workers are generally not significantly different in their preferences about the welfare state when controlling for the other factors. In line with studies suggesting a greater difference in social democratic regimes (Svallfors 1997), the main significant difference relates to public sector workers in Sweden, who are less likely to belong to the more moderate attitude group.<sup>72</sup>

The results of this analysis confirm the relationship between gender and welfare state preferences. In particular, women show high probabilities of belonging to the *Maximum* support preference group. However, gender differences in preferences about the welfare state are non-significant in the UK. The results suggest a notable gender difference in Sweden, with women having a higher probability than men of belonging to the *Maximum* support group and a lower probability of belonging to the *Low* support group. In terms of participation, the analysis indicates few gender differences. The differences vary across the countries and include men being more likely to participate in organisation work in Sweden, in organisation work and in Spain, a gap emerges in relation to contacting.

Finally, in relation to age, generalising across types of political activity and countries, the model results confirm the higher rates of political activity among

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> The relationship between sector and preferences about the welfare state could be further understood by examining public sectors within different social classes. Studies indicate differences in relation to the service classes such as teachers and social workers. Some preliminary analysis of the ESS data suggested that in relation to the UK, public sector workers from service class II show some of the highest levels of support for the welfare state.

those who are older.<sup>73</sup> In line with other studies, the main exception concerns those in the younger groups who are more likely to have joined a demonstration.<sup>74</sup> As discussed in the literature review, the relationship between age and welfare state preferences is still uncertain. The results corroborate the variability between age and welfare state preferences across countries. However, there is evidence of a common tendency across the countries for those who are younger to belong to the preference groups that show moderate levels of support and to be less likely to belong to the *Maximum* support groups. This pattern could reflect varied processes; for instance, potentially, the young, at this time, were less supportive of the idea that governments should be entirely responsible for welfare, or perhaps, those who are younger are less willing to use the more extreme responses on attitude scales.

Otherwise, differences between age groups are more specific to countries. The results indicate that in Germany and the UK, those resistant to the welfare state, or at least parts of it, are more likely to be older. In contrast, in Sweden, the younger group are more likely to show the most negative preferences about the welfare state. This contrasts with Busemeyer et al. (2009) who found, using the 1996 ISSP dataset, large age divisions in attitudes in Sweden, but with the young showing considerably more support. These conflicting patterns underscore the need for further work examining differences between age groups and over time. One possibility is that the difficult economic environment in Sweden in the mid-1990s increased support for welfare among the young, and this has subsequently declined.

### **Discussion and conclusion**

This chapter has focused on social differences in both preferences and participation within each of the four countries. The aim was to establish how social groups can vary in both their preferences and political activity. The chapter drew on existing evidence from different bodies of work and then provided a more systematic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> In this analysis, curvilinear dimension of the relationship, where the likelihood keeps increasing until quite late in life and then declines, does not appear due to broad age groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> In the UK and Spain, there is limited difference between the younger and middle groups but the oldest group is less likely to have demonstrated.

comparison based on analysis of the ESS. The main focus has been on differences linked to socio-economic position and the interest was in how social advantage fosters political activity but is associated with weaker levels of support for the welfare state.

Both previous studies and the analysis of the ESS data confirm that there are social differences in preferences and political activity within the four countries. However, different patterns emerge across the four countries. Even though studies have previously indicated Germany to have more constrained class differences in attitudes towards the welfare state, the analysis pointed towards social advantage being associated with both increased political activity and lower support for the welfare state. Moreover, differences are concentrated around the most disadvantaged class (the labour class), who are notably more likely to fully endorse government responsibility but less politically active. As Table 5-4 summarises, this results in a combination of comparatively greater contention over the welfare state alongside higher participation inequalities. In Sweden, the analysis confirms substantial differences in welfare preferences between social classes but rates of political activity are more equal across social classes. As a result, the patterns of social stratification are less related because there is comparatively low participatory inequality.

Table 5-4 Summar	<pre>/ of social stratification  </pre>	patterns
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		Participatory Inequalities				
		Lower	Higher			
Contention over the welfare state	Lesser	-	UK, Spain			
	Greater	Sweden	Germany			

In contrast to Sweden, participatory inequalities in Spain occur alongside more limited class differences in preferences about the welfare state. The patterns of social stratification are therefore less related because there is less *contention over the welfare state*. The same pattern is also found in the UK, but to a lesser extent because there are more discernible class differences in preferences. A further difference between Spain and the UK is that the 'class consensus' over the welfare state in Spain corresponds to a much higher level of public support than in the UK, where public support is much lower, especially for social policy linked to jobs and employment.

In addition to social class, the analysis pointed towards other characteristics of individuals that link with both differences in preferences about the welfare state and political activity. Above all, the results suggest that in Germany and the UK being unemployed is associated with both strong welfare state support and lower political activity through trade unions and voting. Additionally, participation increases with age and in Germany and the UK, this overlaps to a small extent with either more negative preferences or a strong preference for the core social insurance aspects of the welfare state. However, more broadly, the younger groups are both less likely to participate and more likely to display moderate support. Additionally, men and women vary in their preferences about welfare and political activity, specifically, women show higher support and in some countries are less likely to be in trade unions and participate through contacting or organisation work. The results also highlight how gender and age are some of the few characteristics associated with welfare preferences in Spain.

Turning to consider the potential effect of these patterns on the representing of preferences by the politically active, Germany fits the hypothesised pattern. Moreover, the evidence suggests that in Germany participatory inequality centres on the most disadvantaged class and accumulates across different types of political activity. As a result, the voicing of support for government responsibility across welfare domains may be muted through political activity, especially voting, contacting and organisation work. In other countries, social class differences in preferences and participation are less related: either participation is less different or there is greater class consensus over preferences. As a result, class differences are less likely to contribute to a strong association between preferences and participation. However, to different extents across countries, the differences relating to unemployment, age and gender might distort the preferences of the politically active, which will be explored in the next chapter.

# 6 The welfare state preferences of the politically active

As not everyone participates in politics, the preferences of the politically active may not be representative in relation to critical issues such as the welfare state. Moreover, since those who are more socio-economically advantaged participate more, it seems unlikely that those who participate will be representative. The potential that those who participate in politics are biased in their preferences is important to examine due to the potential effects on the political process, especially if the under-representation results from socioeconomic inequality transforming into participatory inequality.

This chapter examines the relationship between preferences about the welfare state and types of political action in Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The chapter has three main sections. Section 6.1 discusses reasons why welfare state preferences and political activity may be related. The focus in this thesis is on the potential effect of participatory inequalities overlapping with the distribution of preferences; however, other factors may also influence the connection between political participation and preferences about the welfare state. The remaining two sections then discuss the empirical analyses of the data for Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Section 6.2 examines the relationship between preferences and participation in two ways. First, models are used to examine if the propensity to participate in politics varies across the different preference groups. Then, the welfare state preferences of the politically active are compared to the wider population. This wide-ranging approach identifies differences across countries and types of political activity and therefore offers insight into where there could be most distortion in 'voice'. Subsequently, section 6.3 examines the extent to which the link between preferences and political activity within each of the four countries results from differences between social groups. In doing so, this final stage provides insight into the relationship between welfare state preferences and political activity after controlling for the social bias among participants.

### 6.1 Preferences about the welfare state and political activity

The underlying concern of this thesis is that a relationship might exist between welfare state preferences and political activity because 1) social inequalities transform into participatory inequalities and 2) the welfare state preferences of the more advantaged diverge from the less advantaged. As a result, participatory inequalities potentially overlap with the distribution of preferences towards the welfare state, which leads to the expectation that those who participate will show lower levels of support for welfare state.

The previous chapter showed that participatory inequalities and the distribution of preferences overlap in different ways across countries. For example, in Sweden there are long noted class differences in welfare state preferences (Svallfors 2004; Edlund 2007) but political activity tends to be more evenly distributed across social groups (though participatory inequalities are present, especially in relation to contacting and organisation work). In contrast, in Spain, political activity is comparatively more unequal but preferences about the welfare state do not vary much between social classes. Hence, within these two countries the patterns of social stratification are less related. In contrast, the analysis suggested that Germany comes closest to the hypothesised pattern, with political activity and welfare state preferences varying across social classes. Significantly, in this case, the results indicated that political inequality accumulates among the most disadvantaged class, which also holds distinctive views about government responsibility. In regards to the UK, the resulting pattern lies somewhere between Germany and Spain; there are clear inequalities in political activity but social differences in preferences are less concentrated than in Germany and Sweden. Equally, within countries, participatory inequalities vary across the type of political activity. Hence, the impact of social inequalities in shaping the representativeness of participant preferences varies depending on the country and type of activity.

There are other processes that could create a link between preferences about the welfare state and political activity. For example, a causal relationship

could operate whereby holding certain preferences could make political activity more likely, or conversely, being politically active could influence a person's preferences about the welfare state. Furthermore, other factors such as values and political orientations could influence both welfare state preferences and political activity. The remainder of this section briefly draws on aspects of the literature that identify some additional theoretical connections or offer relevant empirical evidence.

### **Preferences shape participation**

The literature on political behaviour suggests political preferences can shape incentives and opportunities to engage in political action. A common proposition is that having strong or extreme preferences gives greater incentive to participate (van der Meer et al. 2009). Using self-placement on the left-right political spectrum, several studies find evidence that those placing themselves nearer to the poles are more likely to be politically involved and participate in a range of political activities (Martin and Van Deth 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009). Equally, this effect could apply in the case of preferences about the welfare state; those with strong views about the role of government could be more likely to participate in order to try to influence policy.

Concerning the content of preferences, several authors suggest the progressive nature of left wing political ideology gives further incentives to those on the left to engage in political action (Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Martin and Van Deth 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009). Furthermore, this argument relates to Inglehart's (1990; 1997) proposition that post-materialists, who tend to be on the left of the ideological spectrum, are more likely to engage, especially in expressive, elite-challenging forms of political action such as protesting. Moreover, Inglehart (1997) found that in addition to benefits from the outcomes of political activity, post-materialists derive intrinsic value from participatory activities. Studies examining the effect of left-right ideology and/or post-materialist values on political activity find an effect in some countries (see for example Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009; Morales 2009). Corresponding to the theoretical propositions, the evidence suggests that being left

wing or post-materialist is associated with protest activity and involvement in political associations, but not with action within the representative framework such as voting, contacting and campaign work (Teorell, Sum, et al. 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009)<sup>75</sup>.

With the left traditionally furthering issues around redistribution and equality, left-right ideology clearly relates to conflict concerning the welfare state. Several scholars include left-right ideology as a predictor of attitudes towards the welfare state and find a positive association between being left wing and welfare state support (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Jæger 2008; Gelissen 2000). In these studies, the theoretical proposition is that left-right ideology drives welfare state support. Hence, left-right ideology potentially provides a stimulus for political participation and has been shown to be related to attitudes towards the welfare state. The evidence suggests the effect of both ideological extremism, left-wing ideology or post-materialist values vary across countries (Teorell, Torcal, et al. 2007; van der Meer et al. 2009; Morales 2009). For example, Morales (2009, pp.91–92) found that in Spain those with more radical ideals are more likely to join political groups but in Britain and Germany it is political reformists who are more likely to join. As a result, context appears to shape the connection between preferences and political activity.

Considering the role of context, van der Meer et al. (2009) propose that citizens are incentivised to participate when faced with governments or policies they oppose. Significantly, they find that citizens who perceive themselves as further ideologically from their government are more likely to engage in political action beyond voting. Moreover, they refer to studies showing that following elections those voting for the losing party become more open to political action. They frame their argument within the equity-fairness model of political participation (Pattie et al. 2004), arguing that ideological distance causes a sense of political loss that can motivate political action, especially protest behaviour. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Van der Meer et al (2009) provide a systematic analysis of the effect of left-right ideology across types of political activity, with and without controlling for demographic characteristics of participants.

argument translates well to issues around the welfare state and corresponds to the arguments about social policies creating constituencies with specific preferences and the propensity to mobilise to preserve their benefits. Empirically, studies have found that dissatisfaction with policy is related to political activity (Pettersen 2007). However, the relationship between dissatisfaction with social policy and political orientation appears complex. For example, Oskarson (2007) shows a relationship between policy dissatisfaction and political alienation and Kumlin (2007), a negative relationship with political trust.

#### A complex set of interactions

In the other direction, political activity could influence welfare state preferences. For example, belonging to a trade union could influence preferences about the welfare state by providing information about social policy and promoting values of social solidarity and equality. Indeed, a number of studies use trade union membership as a predictor in models of welfare state support (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Gelissen 2000). Moreover, studies of class differences in attitudes towards the welfare state have emphasised the importance of political parties and trade unions articulating arguments about redistributive issues (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007; Edlund 2007). For example, Kumlin and Svallfors argue that "Where intermediate organisations provide citizens with more arguments and information about redistributive issues, citizens are more likely to discover their own position and develop attitudes consistent with that position" (2007, p.21). They focus on the impact of political articulation on class differences overall; however, conceivably, the argument applies most directly to those individuals who have closer connections to actors such as political parties and trade unions. As a result, within classes, the politically engaged and active could develop different preferences.

This example of trade union membership highlights how the link between participation and preferences may be two-way as those holding pro-welfare state attitudes are more likely to join trade unions, and being linked to a trade union can shape your preferences. The proceeding analysis does not disentangle these complex processes. The aims are to examine the overall relationship between preferences and participation and the influence of participatory inequalities.

However, it offers insight into how preferences about the welfare state relate to political activity when controlling for the social characteristics of participants.

# 6.2 The relationships between welfare state preferences and political activity

This section presents the analysis of the relationships between preferences about the welfare state and political participation for the four countries. The measures of welfare state preferences and political activity are the same as the previous chapter. Hence, the models relate country-specific nominal variables representing different preferences about the welfare state to the indicators for each type of political action. One way to express the relationship between the attitude groups and political activity is by considering the *participatory consequences* of belonging to the different attitude groups, for example, whether those in the *maximum* group are more or less likely to vote than those in the *low* group. Alternatively, we can examine the relationship in terms of *attitudinal differences* between participants and non-participants, for example, if voters are more or less likely to belong to the maximum support group than non-voters. Figure 6-1 illustrates the two approaches.

### Figure 6-1 Two views of the relationship between preferences and political activity



Since the focus is not upon a causal relationship, there is flexibility in terms of which approach to consider. From both approaches, the results point towards the same underlying relationships, for example, where a particular attitude group is more likely to participate, participants will be more likely to belong to that attitude group. However, the distinction between the two approaches is significant because it affects the nature of the dependent variable and therefore the underlying model. To examine the participatory consequences of belonging to the different attitude groups, a logistic regression model is used to relate the binary indicators of participation with the latent classes. Conversely, to consider attitudinal differences, a multinomial logit model indicates how participants and non-participants differ in their preferences about the welfare state. Through the different stages of the analysis, the decision regarding which results to present reflects an emphasis on model simplicity and the interpretability of the results.

### The relationship between preferences and participation

This section examines the relationship between welfare state preferences and political activity. Specifically, the analysis considers the *participatory consequences* of belonging to the different attitude groups by examining how the likelihood of participating varies across the latent classes. As described above, logistic regression offers a way to link the binary indicators to the latent class variable.<sup>76</sup> Using the model results, the probability of participating can be calculated for each latent class, which are presented, for each country, across a series of graphs with 95 percent confidence intervals.<sup>77</sup>

First, Figure 6-2 presents the results for Germany. Across the attitude groups, the probabilities vary considerably with significant differences in relation to *voting, contacting,* and *organisation work*. Moreover, there is a common pattern, whereby, greater support for the welfare state relates to lower rates of participation. In particular, the *Maximum* group has notably lower probabilities of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Similar to the previous chapter, the vote variable similarly classifies those not eligible and those abstaining as non-voters; consequently, the analysis examines how attitude groups relate to the probability of having voted overall.
<sup>77</sup> The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable simply extends the classic latent class model detailed in chapter four (where the observed attitude variables are regressed on the latent classes). *Mplus* estimates class conditional probabilities with standard errors, which have been used to calculate confidence intervals. The latent class parameters (i.e. the class membership probabilities or the class conditional probabilities) do not substantially change as a result of the additional indicators in the model.

participating in these activities. Additionally, the highest probabilities relate to the two groups showing the lowest levels of support (*Moderate(+/-)* or *Low*). As a result, one of the most notable findings is that in Germany the strongest supporters of the welfare state engage less, especially in the institutional aspects of politics. Most strikingly, those in the *Moderate(+/-)* group are nearly twice as likely to have *contacted a politician or official* as the *Maximum* group. However, the difference is largest in relation to *organisation work*, with the *Moderate (+/-)* group more than twice as likely to have been active in an organisation. In relation to *trade union membership* and *joining demonstrations*, which are more likely to be associated with pro-welfare state attitudes, the probabilities do not significantly differ. However, in contrast to the other activities considered, the higher probabilities of participating belong to groups showing high levels of welfare state support. Additionally, with *trade union membership*, the *Low* support group has the lowest probability but for *joining a demonstration*, the lowest probability still relates to the *Maximum* group.

Figure 6-3 displays the association between preferences and participation in Spain. Considering the high level of support and limited social difference in preferences about the welfare state the results suggest more of an association than anticipated. In comparison to Germany, a more varied range of patterns emerge across the types of activity. First, the results suggest that the preference groups that differentiate most across social policy fields show a greater likelihood of participating in activities within the representative framework. Most notably, the *Mixed(L-M)* group, which is hesitant towards intervention in the labour market and distribution of income, is about two to three times more likely to have *contacted an official* compared to the other groups, except Low(+). Additionally, both the *Mixed(L-M)* and *High(+)* groups have higher probabilities of voting;<sup>78</sup> however, only the probabilities between the *High* and *High(+)* group significantly differ. In relation to the voting probabilities, an interesting observation is that the probability is lowest among the group demonstrating the most oppositional views. As the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> The High (+) group responds more favourably towards 'healthcare' and 'old' and has more divided response probabilities for 'unemployed' and 'leave'.

confidence interval shows, the estimate is imprecise and the differences are nonsignificant; however, it raises the prospect that, in Spain, a small group shows both opposition to the welfare state and lower rates of electoral participation. The pattern for organisation work is similar to Germany, with a lower rate of activity among those in the *Maximum* support group.

In contrast to Germany, there is a stronger association between trade union membership and support for welfare state, with the *Maximum* group significantly more likely to be members. Finally, the comparatively high rate of participation makes demonstrations a particularly interesting activity to examine for Spain. The results suggest that, not including the strongest supporters, those indicating high levels of support for the welfare state are more likely to join demonstration; however, the confidence intervals indicate the differences are not significant.





Source: ESS4-2008

Note: The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable is a classic latent class model, as outlined in chapter four. The predicted probabilities and confidence intervals derive from the class conditional probabilities and their standard error, which was obtained using the software package Mplus.



## Figure 6-3 Association between preferences and participation - probability of each attitude group participating (Spain)

Source: ESS4-2008

Note: The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable is a classic latent class model, as outlined in chapter four. The predicted probabilities and confidence intervals derive from the class conditional probabilities and their standard error, which was obtained using the software package Mplus.

Turning to Sweden, the results indicate different patterns. In contrast to Germany, *trade union membership* relates to higher levels of support for the welfare state. In contrast, in regards to *voting*, *contacting* and *organisation work*, the probabilities do not differ significantly. However, in relation to *contacting* and *organisation work*, the *Max* group have a lower probability of being participants. Moreover, the *Low (+)* group has a notably higher probability of contacting. Finally, there is an association between preferences and joining a demonstration, with higher rates of involvement associated with more positive welfare state preferences, in particular the *High* group, and the lowest rate among those with moderate levels of support.

Finally, for the UK (in Figure 6-5), the results provide less clear evidence of the relationships. The probabilities for the attitude groups vary, often substantially, but the wide confidence intervals overlap, indicating that preferences about the welfare state do not significantly relate to political activity. There are, however, indications of potential relationships. First, the group in the UK that differentiates most across welfare state domains, *Mix (L-M)*, has a higher probability of voting. Second, not surprisingly, the most oppositional group *Mix (L-H)* is least likely to be a trade union member; <sup>79</sup> however, it is interesting to note that the *Maximum* group has the second lowest probability of being a trade union member. Third, in relation to contacting an official, the probabilities suggest that the two 'extreme' attitude groups are most likely to contact politicians.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Additionally, the analysis of the individual attitude variables shows that those with low support for government responsibility for the old are especially unlikely to be trade union members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Though few differences reach the 95 percent level of statistical significance, the analysis of the individual attitude variable reflected this pattern, with those responding at either moderate and high levels less likely to have contacted than those responding at the low or maximum level.



## Figure 6-4 Association between preferences and participation - probability of each attitude group participating (Sweden)

### Source: ESS4-2008

Note: The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable is a classic latent class model, as outlined in chapter four. The predicted probabilities and confidence intervals derive from the class conditional probabilities and their standard error, which was obtained using the software package Mplus.



## Figure 6-5 Association between preferences and participation - probability of each attitude group participating (UK)

#### Source: ESS4-2008

Note: The underlying statistical model for relating the indicators of political activity to the latent variable is a classic latent class model, as outlined in chapter four. The predicted probabilities and confidence intervals derive from the class conditional probabilities and their standard error, which was obtained using the software package Mplus.

### How representative are the politically active of the wider population?

Studies examining the preferences of participants tend to compare participants to non-participants by looking at the association between political preferences and political behaviour. For example, a common approach has been to compare average scores of voters and non-voters on policy questions in surveys (Gant and Lyons 1993; Bennett and Resnick 1990; Welch and Studlar 1983). However, comparing participants and non-participants does not directly address the issue of whether the politically active are representative of the wider population. The extent to which participants become unrepresentative of the population depends upon the size of participant and non-participant groups. For example, when turnout is high, a distinctive set of preferences among non-voters would have a marginal effect on the overall representativeness of voters. Hence, comparing participants to the population represents an wider important step in establishing the representativeness of participants.

The aim of this section is to compare the preferences of participants to the wider populations. The section examines the attitudinal differences between participants and non-participants by using a multinomial regression model to estimate the prevalence of the preference groups across participants. Figure 6-6 includes a graph for each country, showing the distribution of the attitude groups for the population and the different participant groups. Comparing the distributions offers insight into how representative each group is of the wider population. Additionally, 95 percent confidence intervals reveal statistically significant differences.<sup>81</sup> Where a participant group varies significantly from the population, this are indicated by a circle that is white, rather than black.

The analysis shows few significant differences between participants and the population. Noticeably, even where voting relates to preferences such as in Germany, the estimated prevalence does not substantially shift from those within

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> The formula for calculating predicted probabilities from the parameters of a multinomial model is set out in Muthén and Muthén (2010, pp.441–445). Following advice from the Mplus Support, confidence intervals were calculated using the Mplus model constraint command to specify the probabilities as a parameter in the model and obtain the standard error. During this stage, to make the model identifiable the measurement model was fixed using the estimated thresholds.

the population (however, in Germany the probability of belonging to the *Maximum* group does drop for voters).

In relation to contacting and organisation work there are cases where participants are unrepresentative of the population. First, in Germany, those who have contacted an official or been active in an organisation under-represent the strongest level of welfare state support; membership of the *Maximum* group represents about 13 percent of the population compared to 8 and 7 percent of those contacting an official and or active through organisation work. Additionally, in Spain the *Mix (L-M)* group is over-represented amongst those contacting an official (21 percent compared to 12 percent in the population).

In Germany, the *Maximum* group is underrepresented in relation to joining a demonstration; however, the wider confidence interval overlaps with the population estimate. However, the pattern for joining a demonstration varies from contacting (and to a lesser extent organisation work) in an important way, as the under-representing of the *Maximum* group is accompanied by an over-representing of the groups showing high levels of support, which suggests a tilt towards a more pro-welfare profile than the population. Similarly, in Sweden, the estimates for demonstrators indicate a bias in favour of the welfare state with an underrepresenting of the *Mod* group accompanied by an over-representing of the *High* and *Max* groups; however, the wide confidence intervals for joining demonstrations overlap with the population estimates.

Finally, we could expect trade union members, to be more in favour of the welfare state. Confirming this potential, trade union members tend to underrepresent the most oppositional preferences, a trend clearest for Spain and the UK, where trade union members are significantly less likely to belong to the *Low* and *Mix (L-H)* groups compared to the population as whole. However, other than in Spain, trade union members tend to be similar to the population in terms of expansive/restrictive welfare state support.









Source: ESS 2008

Notes: White circles indicate where the estimated prevelance among the participant significantly different from the population.

Figures calculated from a multinomial regression model (see footnote 81 for further details).

### 6.3 The role of social differences

In this section, the analysis aims to uncover the extent to which associations between political activity and welfare state preferences are due to the patterns of overlap examined in chapter five. To examine the social base of the associations between participation and preferences, this section considers attitudinal differences between participants and non-participants. Figure 6-7 illustrates the modelling approach, which comprises two stages. First, a multinomial regression model examines the likelihood of participants belonging to the different attitude groups. Subsequently, model 2 combines the first model with the model in the previous chapter. Comparing the two models indicates how differences between social groups affect the relationship between welfare state preferences and political activity. The models take the same form as outlined in the previous chapter.

Figure 6-7 Illustration of model to assess social base of the association between preferences about the welfare state and political action



As with the preceding analyses, from the model parameters we can calculate the predicted probabilities of membership for participants and nonparticipants. In this case, the differences are summarised using a ratio indicating how likely participants are to belong to the attitude groups compared to nonparticipants. Values over 1 indicate that those who participate are more likely to belong to an attitude group and values below 1 that they are less likely. A likelihood ratio test (LRT) is used to indicate if participants and non-participants significantly differ overall in regards to their preferences<sup>82</sup>. The test compares the fit of the model to a model where class membership probabilities are constrained to be equal for participants and non-participants. A significant p-value indicates that allowing class membership to vary significantly improves model fit. Both the ratios and the LRT test indicate the effect of including the covariates on the relationship between welfare state preferences and political activity. If the association is due to the overlap, the ratios should move towards 1 and the LRT test become insignificant.

Before discussing the results in detail, it is relevant to note that in relation to Model 1, the LRT tests indicate more significant relationships between political activity and welfare state preferences than the confidence intervals in the participatory consequences approach used in the previous section. This difference is perhaps unsurprising. The LRT is sensitive to differences between groups and the change occurs where the previous model showed that the probabilities of the different attitude groups participating varied, but the confidence intervals overlapped.

Table 6-1 shows the results for Germany. The highlighted rows indicate significant overall attitudinal differences. The results for Model 1 reflect the differences found in the participatory consequence approach, which indicated significant associations between preferences and voting, contacting and organisation work. Here, the ratios indicate that participants tend to be almost half as likely to belong to the most supportive group as those not participating. Significantly, controlling for the social differences in participation affects the attitudinal differences identified. In the case of voting and contacting, although the ratios still suggest attitudinal differences between participants and non-participants, they reduce in size and the LRTs indicate that overall differences are no longer significant. In regards to organisation work, the LRT indicates that significant differences remain; however, after including the social controls the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> A slight adjustment to the standard likelihood ratio test is required due to using the MLR estimator.

ratios change in a way that suggests a slightly different relationship. Whilst those involved in organisation work might still be less likely to belong to the *Maximum* support group, the ratios for the *High* and *High* (+) preference groups suggest that, when taking into account the social bias in organisation work, those involved show relatively high levels of support for the welfare state. Finally, attitudinal differences between trade union members and non-members are marginal, and non-significant, before and after including the social control variables. However, it is interesting to note that after controlling for social differences in membership, trade union members indicate a higher probability of belonging to the Maximum support group. This change suggests that within social groups trade union members tend to be more favourable of conferring total responsibility upon governments.

	Low	Mod(+/-)	High	High(+/-)	Max	Likelihood ratio test*
Voters/non-voters						
Overall	1.18	1.46	1.08	0.93	0.51	38.006, p<0.001
With controls	1.08	1.23	0.97	0.83	0.59	11.35, p= 0.18
Trade union members						
Overall	0.63	1.04	1.17	0.97	1.00	5.87, p=0.209
With controls	0.61	1.01	1.20	1.03	1.19	4.13, p=0.389
Contact						
Overall	1.18	1.27	1.00	0.88	0.57	15.56, p=0.003
With controls	0.99	1.17	0.94	0.87	0.72	4.87, p=0.30
Organisation work						
Overall	0.81	1.26	1.16	0.99	0.48	33.52, p<0.001
With controls	0.82	1.08	1.23	1.14	0.68	11.89, p=0.02
Demo						
Overall	0.78	0.97	1.20	1.14	0.64	6.43, p= 0.17
With controls	0.95	0.90	0.97	1.00	0.94	3.17, p=0.53

 Table 6-1 Participant/non-participant ratios of predicted probabilities of class

 membership - Germany

\*Df=4 except voting where df=8

Source: ESS 2008, Germany

The table reports ratios of predicted probabilities of participants and non-participants belonging to each preference group, both with and without controlling for the social characteristics of participant. Grey shading indicates significant difference in the preferences of participants and non-participants. The estimated class membership probabilities derive from separate analyses of the latent classes regressed on one of the five modes of participation. The control variables are age, gender, current employment status and public sector. Full model parameters are in Appendix D.

Table 6-2 displays the results for Spain, which suggest the differences between preferences and participation relate less to the differences between groups. In relation to voting, in contrast to the analysis of participatory consequences, the LRT for Model 1 suggests an overall association between preferences about the welfare state and electoral participation. As with the previous analysis, the results indicate that voting is associated with belonging to the more mixed preference groups: *Mix(L-M)* and *High(+)*. In model 2, the results show the link is partly due to social differences in electoral participation; in particular, there is a decrease in the likelihood of non-voters belonging to the most oppositional groups once we control for the social characteristics of voters. However, the ratios continue to suggest that voters are more likely to belong to the mixed preference groups.

	Low+	Mix (Low-Max)	Mod +	High	High+	Max	Likelihood ratio test*
Voters/non-voters							
Overall	0.87	1.37	1.00	0.90	1.61	0.78	52.024 p<0.001
With controls	0.95	1.30	0.93	0.89	1.61	0.79	17.22 p=0.07
Trade union members							
Overall	0.24	1.18	0.74	1.01	1.01	1.33	11.61 p=0.04
With controls	0.32	1.13	0.66	0.83	0.89	2.15	9.99 p=0.08
Contact							
Overall	1.27	2.13	0.79	1.01	0.58	0.84	19.00 p=0.002
With controls	1.30	1.98	0.80	1.03	0.57	0.87	75.13 p<0.001
Organisation work							
Overall	0.93	1.34	1.09	1.05	0.85	0.78	4.89 p=0.43
With controls	1.04	1.30	1.00	1.14	0.75	0.81	3.88 p=0.57
Demo							
Overall	0.66	0.62	1.22	1.16	1.23	0.74	15.17 p=0.01
With controls	0.68	0.55	1.14	1.23	1.26	0.76	3.86 p=0.57

 Table 6-2 Participant/non-participant ratios of predicted probabilities of class

 membership - Spain

\*Df=5 except voting where df=8

Source: ESS Spain

The table reports ratios of predicted probabilities of participants and non-participants belonging to each preference group, both with and without controlling for the social characteristics of participant. Grey shading indicates significant difference in the preferences of participants and non-participants. The estimated class membership probabilities derive from separate analyses of the latent classes regressed on one of the five modes of participation. The control variables are age, gender, current employment status and public sector. Full model parameters are in Appendix D.

Controlling for the characteristics of trade union members appears to affect the overall relationship with preferences about the welfare state. The LRT test indicates that the association is no longer significant at the five percent level and therefore, the social characteristics of trade unions members account for the distinctness of their preferences. However, after controlling for social differences in membership, trade union members are twice as likely to belong to the maximum group as non-members. The analysis indicates the association between contacting and more negative views of the welfare state does not depend upon the social characteristics of those contacting. After controlling for the higher rates of contacting among some social groups, those adopting this political action are still nearly twice as likely to belong to the very mixed preference group. For organisation work, the LRT test suggests there is no overall association. However, the ratios reflect the finding from the previous analysis that organisation work is lower among those in the *Maximum* group and including the social controls does indicate substantial changes. Finally, for demonstrating the LRT test indicates an overall association, with those participating more likely to belong to the groups with moderate and high support. Controlling for social differences in demonstrating results in the association no longer being significant; however, the ratios suggest a similar pattern whereby demonstrators are less likely to belong to the most oppositional or favourable groups, i.e. they tend to show moderate to high levels of support.

Table 6-3 includes the results for Sweden. In contrast to the previous analysis, the LRT test in Model 1 suggests a significant overall association between voting and preferences about the welfare state. In both cases, the probabilities suggest that the likelihood of voting is related to less 'extreme' preferences. For example, voters are less likely to belong to both the Low(+) and Max groups and more likely to belong to the High and High(+). When including the social control variables, the p-value for the LRT test is above 0.05, but the ratios suggest voters remain less likely to belong to more extreme preference groups. Equally, the results are unclear for joining a demonstration. The results with and without controls suggest that those joining a demonstration are more likely to show High or Max support; however, controlling for social differences, the p-value increases but the ratios indicate the same pattern. In contrast, for trade union membership, the analysis more clearly indicates an association between being a member and support for the welfare state and this relationship holds once controlling for social differences in trade union membership. Finally, the most interesting pattern emerges in relation to contacting an official. Similarly, to the previous analysis, Model 1 suggests there is no association between having contacted an official and
welfare state support; however, when the social controls are applied, contactors display significantly different attitudes to non-contactors. In this case, those who have contacted an official have a higher propensity to be more oppositional and a lower probability of indicating moderate support.

	Low (+)	Mod	High	High (+)	Max	Likelihood ratio test*
Voters/non-voters						
Overall	0.67	0.99	1.43	1.26	0.62	18.04, p=0.021
With controls	0.57	1.27	1.39	1.25	0.57	14.69, p=0.07
Trade union members						
Overall	0.58	0.75	1.19	1.11	1.22	23.97, p<0.001
With controls	0.66	0.77	1.44	1.10	1.39	14.91, p=0.015
Contact						
Overall	1.51	0.71	1.00	1.20	0.79	6.49, p=0.17
With controls	1.57	0.67	0.96	1.10	0.84	10.34, p=0.04
Organisation work						
Overall	1.06	1.11	0.99	1.08	0.77	4.28, p= 0.37
With controls	1.08	1.05	0.98	1.03	0.79	1.92, p=0.75
Demo						
Overall	0.91	0.43	1.41	0.86	1.23	10.72, p= 0.03
With controls	0.92	0.49	1.53	0.87	1.66	9.2, p=0.06
*Df=8 or 4						

 Table 6-3 Participant/non-participant ratios of predicted probabilities of class

 membership - Sweden

\*Df=5 except voting

Source: ESS 2008, Sweden

The table reports ratios of predicted probabilities of participants and non-participants belonging to each preference group, both with and without controlling for the social characteristics of participant. Grey shading indicates significant difference in the preferences of participants and non-participants. The estimated class membership probabilities derive from separate analyses of the latent classes regressed on one of the five modes of participation. The control variables are age, gender, current employment status and public sector. Full model parameters are in Appendix D.

The results for the UK (Table 6-4) largely confirm the limited relationship between political activity and preferences about the welfare state. One difference, however, is that Model 1 suggests an overall association between being a trade union member and higher welfare state support. In particular, trade union members are more than half as likely to show the most oppositional preferences. Interestingly, the UK follows the pattern of other countries, and, after controlling for social characteristics the ratios suggest that trade union membership is associated with more favourable attitude positions. In the case of the UK, trade union members are more than 1.5 times more likely to belong to the maximum support group. Furthermore, as with contacting an official in Sweden, the LRT test indicates a significant association between preferences and organisation work after controlling for social differences. However, the relationship is difficult to characterise as the ratios suggest that those involved in organisation work indicate a lower likelihood of belonging to both the the Moderate(+/-) and Maximum groups.

	Mix (L-H)	Mix (L-M)	Mod (+/-)	High (-)	High (+)	Max	Likelihood ratio test*	
Vote								
overall	0.93	1.18	0.89	1.02	1.09	0.84	3.23, p=0.66	
with controls	0.82	0.95	0.94	1.10	1.33	0.90	1.96, p=0.69	
Trade union members								
overall	0.49	0.98	1.13	1.07	1.27	0.81	12.154 , p=0.03	
with controls	0.53	1.00	1.29	0.98	1.31	1.56	9.41, p=0.09	
Contact								
overall	1.59	0.99	0.66	0.95	0.80	1.42	4.90, p=0.43	
with controls	1.59	0.84	0.56	0.97	1.02	1.31	3.88, p=0.57	
Organisation								
overall	1.12	1.05	0.55	1.09	1.22	0.72	5.336, p=0.38	
with controls	1.15	1.05	0.48	1.15	1.46	0.65	17.12, p=0.004	
Demo								
overall	1.18	0.93	0.76	0.95	1.13	1.23	1.288, p=0.94	
with controls	1.07	1.30	0.70	0.99	1.25	0.71	1.33, p=0.93	

 Table 6-4 Participant/non-participant ratios of predicted probabilities of class

 membership - UK

\*Df=5 except voting

Source: ESS 2008, UK

The table reports ratios of predicted probabilities of participants and non-participants belonging to each preference group, both with and without controlling for the social characteristics of participant. Grey shading indicates significant difference in the preferences of participants and non-participants. The estimated class membership probabilities derive from separate analyses of the latent classes regressed on one of the five modes of participation. The control variables are age, gender, current employment status and public sector. Full model parameters are in Appendix D.

#### **Discussion and conclusion**

How representative are those who participate in politics in terms of their preferences about the welfare state? And, how do political inequalities determine which preferences get represented through political action? This chapter has presented analyses to try to answer these questions. The analysis produced varied results, which can be summarised as six key findings.

First, the results from the first two stages indicate that there are relationships between preferences about the welfare state and political activity. Additionally, there are instances where participant groups are unrepresentative of the population in terms of their preferences. Hence, the results, in part, challenge the idea that the preferences of participants and non-participants are the same. However, the relationships vary in size and nature across countries and types of political activity. To help summarise these varied findings, table 6-5 provides an overview of the associations found between preferences about the welfare state and political action across the four countries. The cell entries describe the different patterns of association and the shaded cells in the table indicate where the preferences of participants significantly differ from the population.

	Germany	Spain	Sweden	UK	
Voting	Lower support (with a low association with Maximum)	Mixed preferences higher support	-	-	
Trade union membership	-	Higher support	Higher support	Higher support	
Contacting	Lower support (with a low association with Maximum)	Mixed preferences	-	-	
Organisation work	Moderate-to-high support (with a low association with Maximum)	Lower support (with low association with Maximum)	-	-	
Demonstration	-	-	Higher support	-	

Table 6-5 Summary of the relationship between political activity and preferences aboutthe welfare state

Notes: Highlighted cells indicate where the preferences of participants vary significantly from the population.

Second, the analysis in the chapter 5 showed that the distributions of preferences and participation overlap in different ways across countries and types of political activity. Most notably, in Germany, both welfare state preferences and political activity vary across social groups; the more disadvantaged social class and the unemployed indicate both higher levels of welfare state support and a lower propensity to participate in a range of activities. The results for Germany conform to the expected pattern in relation to voting, contacting an official and organisation work. In relation to these types of political participation, the preference group showing greatest support for all aspects of the welfare state are more likely to be participants. Additionally, including the indicators of social position in the model reduced the relationship between strong support for the welfare state and political activity, which shows that in part the relationship reflects the way social groups vary in both their welfare state preferences and political activity.

Third, beyond Germany, there is less evidence that the politically active under-represent support for the welfare state. In Spain, those active through contacting over-represent the mixed preference group, which shows low support for government intervention in the labour market but high support in other areas.

Fourth, types of political action such as joining a demonstration, being active in organisation work and trade union membership are associated with more prowelfare state preferences in some countries. In Sweden, joining a demonstration is related to higher support for the welfare state and an under-representation of the more moderate preference group. Equally, trade union membership is associated with higher support for the welfare state; however, trade unions members remain largely representative of the population. In both Spain and the UK, trade union members, unsurprisingly, under-represent the preference groups that show least support for the welfare state.

Fifth, the results reveal that there are cases where participants are unrepresentative of the population. However, the associations between preferences and political activity do not always result in a discernible difference between the preferences of participants and those in the wider population. The

first stage of the analysis found associations were between voting and belonging to certain preferences groups in Germany and to a smaller degree in Spain; however, due to the small number of non-voters, voters remain generally representative of the population. However, in the case of contacting an official and organisation work, the prevalence of the preference group showing most support is significantly lower than in the population.

Finally, the models including the social control variables suggested that the relationships between political action and preferences do not derive solely as a result of the social bias in participation. For example, in Germany, controlling for social differences, participants in organisation work are more likely to belong to the groups *High* and *High(+)* An interpretation of this finding is that although participatory inequalities result in participants showing less support for the welfare state, those involved in organisation work tend to have higher levels of support for the welfare state. Conversely, in Spain and Sweden the results show that controlling for the social characteristic, those who engage in contacting continue to show less support for the welfare state.

The results from examining the four countries suggest that there are relationships between political participation and welfare state preferences, which can result in participant preferences being unrepresentative of the preferences of non-participants and the wider population. The relationships, however, vary across countries and type of political action. Moreover, participants' preferences are neither consistently more nor less opposed to the welfare state. It is worth noting that many of the estimates are imprecise and therefore there may be greater differences than discerned here. Potentially, larger samples could provide evidence that is more conclusive, especially for the less prevalent types of political activity. The implications of these findings will be further discussed in the concluding chapter, which follows.

## 7 Conclusion

To understand how the inequality of participation shapes the preferences of the politically active, this thesis has examined the relationships between participatory inequality and the distribution of preferences about the welfare state. Motivating this research was an incomplete picture of the preferences of the political active. Most studies examining the preferences of political participants conclude that the politically active are broadly representative of the broader public in terms of their policy preferences (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Bennett and Resnick 1990; Studlar and Welch 1986). This is, however, a puzzling conclusion in relation to socially contentious forms of policy. Rates of political activity fall unequally throughout society and since social position helps determine preferences, it is more conceivable that some preferences will be under-represented among the political active. From this basis, the thesis asked whether those who participate in politics are representative in their preferences about the welfare state and how participatory inequalities affect which welfare state preferences become represented among the politically active.

The thesis used survey data for Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK to address the different aspects of these relationships. The study started by examining how support for different aspects of the welfare state varies within societies. It then considered how social groups, in particular different social classes, vary in both their preferences about the welfare state and political activity. Subsequently, the analyses examined the relationship between political activity and welfare state preferences and the relationship reflects social differences in the propensity to participate in politics. Concluding the thesis, this chapter summarises the key findings from the research and their potential implications for the political process. The chapter then discusses both the limitations of the thesis areas for further research.

# Are those who participate in politics representative in their preferences about the welfare state?

This thesis revealed associations between political activity and preferences about the welfare state and found some evidence that the preferences of participants are unrepresentative of the wider population. Hence, the results offer some support to Leighley and Nagler (2007) in countering the broad assertion that participants are essentially the same as non-participants in terms of policy preferences (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995). However, as chapter six discussed, varied patterns of relationships between preferences and participation emerged.

The main hypothesis in the thesis was that the politically active will underrepresent support for the welfare state because 1) social inequalities transform into participatory inequalities and 2) the preferences of the more advantaged vary from the less advantaged. In relation to Germany, the relationships that emerged correspond to the hypothesis, with a clear relationship between the strongest support for the welfare state and the propensity to vote, contact an official or be active in an organisation. Additionally, in relation to Spain, there was evidence suggesting that political participants may be unrepresentative in their support for aspects of the welfare state benefitting the unemployed. However, the analyses of the UK and Sweden found that there was no under-representation of support for the welfare state. In contrary to the main hypothesis, the analyses also revealed bias in the preferences of participants in the opposite direction. First, the results indicate that in Spain, Sweden and the UK, trade union members indicated higher levels of support for the welfare state. Additionally, in Sweden, stronger supporters of the welfare state are also more likely to join demonstrations.

These patterns relate to a further question about representation across the repertoire of political participation. A contribution this thesis sought to make was to extend the traditional focus on voters by examining preferences in relation to other forms of political action. The expectation was that there would be a larger bias in participant preferences in relation to non-electoral modes of participation as the social bias is greater. In light of the limited and varied findings across countries and types of participation, the data only partially confirms this pattern. Returning to the

German case, those active by contacting officials or being active in organisations appear to show lower levels of support for the welfare state; it is also important to note, that because so few people participate in these ways, the bias in participant preferences results in the preferences of these participants being observably unrepresentative of the population. A further expectation, discussed in chapter six, was that certain forms of political action could relate positively to welfare state support; in particular, trade union members and those joining demonstrations may show higher levels of support for the welfare state. As indicated above, the data offers evidence for this pattern; however, it is not present in all countries.

A final comment on types of participation relates to the proposition that preference bias could feasibly compound across different forms of participation and thus amplify the under-representation of support for the welfare state. In the German case, it is noticeable that welfare state support is under-represented across several forms of action and not countered by an over-representation of support through alternative forms of participation such as joining demonstrations or trade unions. However, the evidence does not support the proposition of a strong compounding effect beyond this case.

The question then emerges of whether these preference biases in participation have implications for the political process. A suggestion common within the existing literature is that the differences between participants and nonparticipants in terms of preferences are small and therefore unlikely to have a considerable impact on the political process (Bennett and Resnick 1990; Verba et al. 1995, p.167). The results of this study also suggest the any differences are small, especially when comparing how representative participants are of wider society. There is, however, no formula for judging what extent differences between participants and non-participants would affect the political process. Thus, it is difficult to claim that the under-representation of preferences would have no effect on the political process, especially, in the case of Germany where the data points towards a consistent under-representation of support for the welfare state. Additionally, the reasons for anticipating bias in the preferences of participants

make it also relevant to evaluate the implications of these patterns with reference to the underlying patterns of social stratification.

#### The role of social stratification

The starting point of the thesis was the puzzle that if the welfare state is a focus of contention and there are participatory inequalities, then why are the preferences of participants and non-participants found not to vary. Neither the research on political participation nor attitudes towards the welfare state had examined how these patterns of social stratification interact and affect the preferences of the politically active. In light of this gap, a key contribution of the thesis was to explore the preferences of the politically active in light of the underlying patterns. In doing so, one potential explanation explored drew upon the evidence suggesting that participatory inequalities and social differences in preferences vary across countries. Thus, the thesis considered that there may be cross-national variations in the representativeness of participant preferences reflecting how preferences and participation are socially stratified. This suggestion informed the selection of Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, as they provide distinctive contexts in terms of patterns of attitudes towards the welfare state and political participation.

Focusing on the differences between social classes, the analysis in chapter 5 confirmed that inequalities in political activity and the distribution of preferences coincide in different ways. For example, the analysis suggests that in Sweden, considerable class differences in attitudes coexist with relatively equal rates of political activity.<sup>83</sup> In contrast, in Spain and the UK, there are considerable inequalities in political activity but class differences in preferences are more marginal. In both these cases, the way in which participation and preferences are distributed across groups curtails how social bias in the political activity leads to the preferences of the politically active being biased. The analysis pointed towards a further pattern in Germany as social advantage more clearly associates with both increased political activity and lower support for the welfare state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> However, it was noted that there are still participatory inequalities in Sweden.

In finding that the patterns vary across the four countries, the thesis indicates that context helps determine how representative the politically active are in terms of their preferences about the welfare state. This was not surprising in light of the growing appreciation of context in the literature on attitudes towards the welfare state and participatory inequalities. Chapter two considered some of the potential contextual factors that may be significant, in particular, the role of the welfare state and the actions of organised interest groups such as political parties. A theme identified in the literature review is that the effects of these contextual factors could limit preference bias in participation. For example, factors contributing to a greater polarisation in attitudes such as an expansive welfare state and class articulation by political parties (Edlund 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007) could support more egalitarian patterns of political participation (Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Franzese and Hays 2008). Conversely, limited class articulation by political parties welfare provision could increase participatory inequalities but reduce class conflict over the welfare state.

These theories are especially interesting to consider in relation to the contrasting cases of Sweden and the UK. Sweden is famously egalitarian, with a strong social democratic regime. Whilst an obvious over-simplification, research shows substantial differences in relation to class attitudes and comparatively limited participatory inequalities. In contrast, the UK welfare state falls closer to the liberal model and has greater socio-economic inequalities. Additionally, whilst there was a historically strong labour movement, the UK Labour Party has become more centrist (Evans and Tilley 2011). Potentially, the combination of these two factors underlie the way political inequality coincides with more limited class differences in preferences.

The contrast of the countries underlies important issues in relation to the representation of preferences and concerns about unequal influence in the political process. For instance, in both Sweden and UK, the preferences of the politically active are representative; however, in one case there are underlying participatory inequalities. It is therefore timely to remember Verba et al's argument that

preferences are not the only politically salient characteristics. Additionally, in relation to Germany there is not only a social bias in participation but also a bias in terms of the preferences of participants. Thus, in order to identify the impact of non-participation on the political process, these cases suggest it is necessary to examine both patterns in participation and preferences.

# How attitudes vary towards the role of government in different welfare domains

A further set of findings relate to the nature of welfare state preferences. Public opinion research clearly shows that certain features of the welfare state engender lower levels of public support. In particular, government intervention to support the poor and unemployed is less popular than the broader reaching welfare programmes relating to heath and supporting the old (Coughlin 1980; van Oorschot 2006). Using latent class analysis (LCA), the first stage of the thesis examined patterns of responses across seven survey questions measuring attitudes towards the role of government within each of the four societies. This analysis revealed three common patterns of support across welfare domains. First, there are individuals that support the role of government equally across domains of welfare. Second, there are individuals that hesitate in their support of government intervention in relation to employment and the labour market and the distribution of income. Finally, there are individuals much more willing to support the broad reaching sharing of social risks in relation to sickness and old age than income redistribution, provision for the unemployed and policies supporting those working with caring responsibilities.

The results also indicated that the prevalence of these three patterns varies across countries. It is more common in some countries than others for individuals to show varying support across domains of the welfare state. With respect to this result, the UK was an extreme case as the majority show higher support for government responsibilities in relation to healthcare and the living standards of the old compared to supporting the unemployed. Noticeably, even those holding the most oppositional views in the UK are likely to endorse government responsibilities in these areas. This finding of mixed preferences adds to the theme from the

literature review that low levels of public support make provision for the unemployed politically vulnerable. In particular, if those who oppose welfare for the unemployed are not anti-welfare state in general; the pressure to retrench welfare for the unemployed could be greater as other reform options are less politically acceptable. Furthermore, it is significant that the pattern is more prevalent in the UK since the welfare state is financed through general taxation and there are limited numbers of veto points (Huber and Stephens 2001); factors that help make the idea of a choice between healthcare and providing for the unemployed more conceivable.

#### Limitations of the study

There are a number of limitations to this study coming from both the data and the research design. As discussed in chapter three, the data raises issues relating to both bias and precision. First, despite the outstanding organisation of the European Social Survey, the response rates are low and it is likely that the resulting samples are not fully representative of the populations of interest. Second, the sample sizes are also a limit to the study because the low prevalence of most forms of participation and non-voting means a low number of cases, which will have contributed to the lack of precision in some estimates.

A further set of limits stems from the survey questions used to collect the data. Concerning welfare state preferences, this thesis has focused on attitudes towards the role of government, which is a normative dimension of welfare state preferences relating to views of government responsibility. The role of government dimension was favoured because the question of which welfare domains fall under the responsibility of government is fundamental. Moreover, this normative element is arguably a dimension of attitudes that is more comparable across countries than, for example, attitudes towards spending levels. However, this abstract dimension of preferences not only is limited in its scope but potentially under-estimates the divisiveness of the welfare state, which has been shown to be more apparent in relation to specific policies and programmes (Kangas 1997). Thus, there are possibly further biases in the welfare state preferences of the politically active. A further issue with the survey questions used concerns how well they are able to measure

attitudes. In particular, Berinsky (2002) indicates that less advantaged groups face greater difficulties in answering survey question relating to political preferences. It is also relevant to reiterate that this study has examined a general propensity to participate, rather than political action relating to the welfare state.

Another type of limitation concerns the use of a latent variable model to measure welfare state preferences. Data from large-scale social surveys, like the ESS, make latent variable modelling techniques attractive for measuring complex concepts across countries and the study had an explicit rationale for using Latent Class Analysis (LCA). However, the expectation that it could yield clearly defined classes that form a neat typology, similar to Edlund (2007), was not realised due to difficulties in applying LCA to the survey data. One limit came from the number and varied nature of the observed variables, which gave limited scope to differentiate and test sub-dimensions and made it difficult to interpret and label the latent classes. The distributions of the variables created further problems. In particular, the use of 0-10 scales resulted in the heavily skewed distributions for popular welfare state domains, with strong ceiling effects. A suitable scheme for recording the variables was reached through the testing of various coding schemes; however, the coding of the variables resulted in complex class structures that are difficult to interpret.

#### Areas for further research

The themes, findings and limitations of the thesis signal a number of avenues for future research. Responding to the limitations of the statistical modelling in the thesis, future work could look to extend the modelling framework and revise the measure of welfare state support. In particular, since the underlying argument is that preferences, participation and social position are all inter-related, a simultaneous equations modelling framework would be advantageous. The family of models under the label of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) would allow joint estimation of all the relationships. This form of modelling framework could improve the estimation of the key relationship of interest, which is the indirect association between preferences and participation resulting from the social stratification of preferences and participation. An extended SEM framework would also enable the

study of other important relationships between political action and preferences; for example, if participating in politics affects policy preferences or moderates the relationship between social position and preferences.

A simultaneous equations modelling framework thus gives a clear direction for extending the statistical modelling in the thesis to address important questions about the links between social position, political and welfare state support. This work could utilise the widening availability of software capable of performing such analyses such as sem or gsem in Stata. It is however useful to consider that categorical variables present greater challenges in an SEM framework. Developments in SEM models and software capability are continuously expanding the range of models than can be analysed including models for categorical variables (Muthén and Muthén 2000). Nevertheless, models for continuous variables remain more flexible, less computationally demanding and supported by more extensive model fit statistics. Thus, there would be benefits in developing continuous measures such as factor models.

Concerning the measurement of attitudes, one path would be to consider more specific policies and programmes, which can vary more across social groups (Kangas 1997). Additionally, whilst the public are supportive of the welfare state in principal, studies show that they are less in favour of increased taxation (Taylor-Gooby 2001). Issues around taxation are particularly great in some countries, for instance, the German public are especially concerned about high levels of taxation (Svallfors 1997; Taylor-Gooby 2001). This work may utilise some of the national survey series such as British Social Attitudes (BSA) or Swedish Welfare State Surveys (SWS), which include a more varied, and importantly, more country specific measures of attitudes towards the welfare state. This approach emphasises the analysis of specific contexts to understand contention over the welfare state and the representation of different preferences. Alternatively, an extended SEM framework could help develop the comparative element. This approach would focus on using statistical models to derive cross-nationally equivalent measures of welfare state support. Then, with equivalent measures, SEM offers options for

testing country differences through multi-group analyses for small-n studies and multi-level SEM models for larger scale comparative studies. A more formalised comparative element could then support research linking patterns of preferences and political mobilisation to contextual measures such as measure of welfare state output or the articulation of welfare state issues.

Finally, another important way to extend the research is to examine data for different time points. The potential that these relationships might vary over time increases the value of such further research. For instance, since 2008 there has been considerable political discourse surrounding the welfare state and changes in the composition of governments. It would thus be valuable to re-examine these types of relationship when the European Social Survey (ESS) next includes the rotating module on welfare state attitudes. A time-series analysis could also look to integrate contextual measures such as measure of welfare state output or the articulation of welfare state issues if suitable data exists, again national survey series may be most useful.

### Conclusion

This thesis has examined the welfare state preferences of the politically active with the aim of understanding the potential for a distortion in the representation of public preferences about the welfare state. A core concern was whether the presence of participatory inequalities results in the under-representation of support for the welfare state. Based on survey data for four European countries, the analysis found that the politically active are not always representative in their preferences; however, the preference bias of participation varies in direction across countries and forms of political participation. The thesis did find that participatory inequalities can lead to the underrepresentation of support for the welfare state among the politically active; however, this did not apply in all cases. By examining the social stratification of preferences and participation, the thesis explored how cross-national variations in the representativeness of participants result from how preferences and participation are socially stratified. For instance, significant

participatory inequalities can occur in contexts where there is less contention over the welfare state; conversely, contention over the welfare state can coincide with more equal rates of political participation. In revealing these patterns, the thesis shows the value of considering both the patterns of preferences and political behaviour for our understanding of how preferences in relation to contentious issue are represented. Equally, the study reinforced the significance of understanding contextual influence on the preferences and behaviour of the European publics in an ever-changing context for the welfare state.

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## **Appendices**

## A. Constructing social class variable

The social class variable was constructed using the syntax from the ESeC project website.<sup>84</sup> The syntax generates an individual social class variable. To use the syntax, the ISCO variable in the ESS was recoded from 4 to 3 digits. Those not currently employed were assigned on the basis of their last period of employment. The variable was then aggregated into the five category variable of interest to the research (Service Class I, Service Class II, Intermediate, Self-employed/small employer and working).

The next stage was to determine social class as a 'household variable' through the dominance method (Erikson 1984). This stage included dealing with married or co-habiting couples and assigning younger respondents, who primarily have no independent social class, according to parental occupational information. The syntax file was modified to derive partners' social class. At this stage, unclassified respondents, either because they do not have an independent social class or through missing data, were given their partners' social class. In cases of two-earner households, Erikson's dominance principle implies that the service classes should dominate over the others. Then, full-time, self-employment or being a small employer dominates over intermediate and working class groups, and intermediate dominates over working class. If one partner works part-time and the other fulltime, the class of the fulltime worker then dominates. Fulltime work was classified as working more than 35 hours.

Those 35 and under, with no independent social class or living at home and with parents of a higher social class, were coded according to their parents using variables for parental occupation and employment status when the respondent was 14. There are two key issues with this approach. First, the information is both second-hand and retrospective, and therefore likely to suffer from measurement error. Secondly, the parental employment variables are less detailed and do not directly correspond to those used in the ESeC scheme. The occupation variables (occf14b and occm14b) include seven categories (Professional and technical, Higher administrator, Clerical, Sales, Service, Skilled, Unskilled and Farmer). Occupational information was used in conjunction with measures of employment status (emprf14 and emprm14), supervisory responsibility (jbspvf and jbspvf) and number of employees (emplnof and emplnom). From this information, an ESeC social class could be approximated. Cases where parents are professional and self-employed were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/esec/guide/docs/Appendix6.sps

classified, in line with the ESeC scheme, as Service Class 1. Otherwise the available data means that distinguishing Service Class I from Service Class II is difficult. The following approximation was used: those classified as having 'professional and technical' or 'higher administrator' occupations were classified as Service Class I if they were also supervisors and others were classified as Service Class II. Large employers, which are classified as Service Class 1 under the ESeC schema, were identified as those employing more than 24 people. Employers with less than 24 employees were classified as 'self-employed or small employers'. This varies slightly from the ESeC scheme, where large employers were identified as those employing ten or more. Corresponding to the ESeC scheme, clerical and skilled workers were identified as Intermediate. The other occupational groups were classified as Working class or Intermediate, if coupled with supervisory responsibilities.

This process produces a variable that covers between 92 per cent and 99 per cent of cases across the four samples. There are two unclassified groups: the 'No class' group represents those who have no independently derived social class, because they have not worked and have no working partner, and the 'missing' group represents cases where classification was not possible due to missing data on the items used to determine social class. A key contributor to the 'no class' unclassified group is that information on partners' employment is only collected if the partner is currently working. As a result, the social class of older respondents who have not been in employment themselves, i.e. housewives, cannot be determined because their partners' previous occupational information is unknown. This is reflected in the lower coverage for Spain and Germany, the countries with lower rates of female labour market participation. The problem is particularly important in relation to the Spanish sample, which, at 7%, has the largest proportion of 'no class' unclassified cases on the social class variable. Of this unclassified group, 86 per cent are women over 55, and they represent 6% of the whole Spanish sample.

The size of the unclassified group in Spain and its clear relationship with a specific group within the population (i.e. older women) led to the choice to approximate the social class of these unclassified cases using other information within the dataset. The alternative options were to exclude these unclassified cases, either from the analysis as a whole or when the social class variable is used; however this could introduce varying levels of bias across the samples. One option was to include an additional category for the unclassified; however, this creates situations of structural dependence between the independent variables as those within the unclassified category on the social class variable could not also be currently employed.

Potential information that could be used to infer social class was household income, parental occupational information and level of education. However, Income has problems of high levels of item non-response among those unclassified (up to 45 per cent in the case of Spain). Furthermore, level of education had limited ability to differentiate between the unclassified cases as, primarily, they fell into the group with 'less than secondary education' (86% in the Spanish cases). Hence, the better option appeared to be to derive the social class of the father and use this as a proxy measure for respondents' social class. This was adopted with the assumption that the father's occupation is the closest approximation available to the occupation of the respondents' partner. The father's social class was determined using the same variables and method as when parental occupation was used to determine the social class of the younger respondents. As a result, the difficulties described above regarding the equivalence of the parental occupational information and the individual/partner variables used to determine the ESeC classes also apply here.

The association between ESeC social class and the father's social class was examined using the cases where data was available for both variables. The results indicate a significant association between the two variables (Table 2), which validates the approach; however the overall strength of the association is weaker than ideal. The analysis was repeated on a sub-sample of those over 50, producing very similar results (not shown here). The potential impact of including the unclassified cases by approximating their social class was examined by comparing regression results for the analyses with the variables measuring attitudes towards the welfare state regressed on age, gender and social class when the cases were excluded with the results of analyses when the cases were included and in both cases the parameter estimates and explained variance are similar.

	X <sup>2</sup>	Cramer's V	Lambda symmetric	Lambda ESeC as dependent variable
Germany	438.516 d.f. 16, p<.001	0.21, p<.001	0.063 p<.001	0.113 p<.001
Spain	686.166d.f. 16, p<.001	0.271, p<.001	0.096 p<.001	0.092 p<.001
Sweden	337.000 d.f. 16, p<.001	0.194 p<.001	0 .064 p<.001	0.092 p<.001
UK	219.972 d.f 16, p<.001	0.175 p<.001	0.070 p<.001	0.67 .001

Appendix table A-1 Relationship between ESeC social class and the father's social class

### **B. Latent Class Analysis**

This appendix includes additional information relating to the latent class. The individual sections discuss the coding the observed attitudes variables, latent class fit statistics and multiple group analysis.

#### Coding of the observed attitudes variables

The observed attitude variables (which are ordinal) need recoding to reduce the number of categories, especially the variables using 0-10 scales. Recoding the attitude variables is not a straightforward process; in particular, the most appropriate approach to collapsing responses across the 0-10 scales is not self-evident and loosing information and introducing artificial groupings could both distort the results. As a result, the process of developing the latent class analysis included the comparison of different coding schemes.

Table B-1 below shows the five coding schemes used in the testing process. The selection, whilst clearly not exhaustive, includes varied approaches to collapsing responses along the 0-10 scale. All schemes combine 0-5 into one category because the frequencies at the lower part of the scale are too low for latent class analysis. Hence, the differences between the schemes relate to the coding of the upper part of the scale. Scheme 1, which is the approach used in the main body of thesis, produces a four level variable where 10 is a 'maximum support' category and responses between 6 and 9 combine in pairs into 'moderate support' and 'high support'. Scheme 1 produces the highest number of categories and the other schemes all offer ways to reduce the scale further. In Scheme 2, the number of categories reduces to three by combining 9 with 10 into a measure of 'high support' and then 6-8 into 'moderate support' level. The approach therefore combines a wider range of responses from the upper part of the scale into a single category. In contrast, schemes 3 and 4 successively widen the 'low support' level to include responses from the upper part of the scale with the remainder of the upper part of the scale left distinct or paired. Lastly, scheme 5 produces a simple binary variable by collapsing the upper part of the scale into the wide 'low/mod support' category and including a wider range of responses from the upper part of the scale into a 'High' category.

Scheme	Coding of the 0-10 scales										Notes		
Number	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
										Greatest categories			
1	Low			Mod		High		Max	0-5 wide grouping				
									Fewer categories				
2	Low			M	bc	High		gh	Wide groups: 0-5, 6-8				
	Low			od High			Fewer categories						
3			M			gh	Wide groups: 0-6						
												Combines lower and upper	
								Fewer categories					
4 Low/Mod				Hi		High		Max	Wide groups:0-7				
						Combines lower and upper							
							Fewest categories						
5	Lo	Low/Mod							High			Wide groups: 0-7 8-10	
												Combines lower and upper	

#### B-1 Coding schemes for the observed attitudes variables

Note: The income differences question is coded to have the same number of categories; Scheme 1 categories are 'Disagree', 'Neither', 'Agree' and 'Agree Strongly'; schemes 2, 3, 4 the three categories are 'Not agree', 'Agree' and 'Agree Strongly' and for scheme 5 the binary coding is 'Not agree' /'Agree'.

The schemes all offer advantages and disadvantages. The chosen approach, scheme 1, yields the highest number of categories and thus a relative disadvantage of this approach is greater model complexity. Conversely, by reducing the number of parameters, the other approaches loose more information. The balance between parsimony and retaining sufficient information is especially significant considering that the analysis aims to establish how responses vary across items. On the one hand, a complicated model makes patterns more difficult to discern, whilst grouping a wider range of responses could potentially obscure patterns. For example, under scheme 2 (i.e. the combining of 6-8 into one category) we would classify a response pattern of 9 in relation to healthcare and 8 in relation to jobs the same as a response of 10 in relation to healthcare but just 6 in relation to jobs. Thus, under coding scheme 2, we can no longer distinguish small and large differences in response patterns across items. A further issue appears for schemes 3, 4 and 5, as the scale mid-point becomes lost, and therefore these approaches involve some misclassification of what are arguably negative, positive and neutral responses.

Tables B-2 to B-6 show the model fit statistics for successive latent class models for the different coding schemes by country. The details of the best latent class solution for each coding scheme appear in tables B-7 to B-22. These results confirm that the coding of the observed variables can affect the number, size and characteristics of the resulting latent classes. Largely, the differences are relatively small and practicable in nature. For example, schemes combining 9 and 10 into one category tend to produce a larger 'most supportive' group than when 10 is a distinct category, a pattern that is logical because membership of the most supportive group becomes 'easier' when 9 and 10 are combined. Such a relationship between class size and the measurement scale is not problematic and can be useful for avoiding problems of small class sizes; however, since latent class size is contingent upon the measurement scale used, the values must be interpreted cautiously when making inferences about prevalence in the population. A further difference is that more aggregated coding schemes tend to produce models with fewer latent classes. Again, this is a logical pattern since less aggregated coding schemes give more potential response patterns and allow the population to be differentiated more in terms of level of support.

The comparison highlights how the coding scheme used in the main part of the thesis does not produce the most parsimonious latent class measure. The models are more complicated to interpret compared to the models based on more aggregated coding schemes, with three aspects contributing to the problem. First, there are more parameters to interpret. Second, the models tend to include a higher number of latent classes (which not only makes interpretation of the latent class models more difficult but also complicates the interpretation of subsequent analyses using latent classes). Finally, the latent class structure is more complicated because classes are varying from each other in terms of both their response pattern and level of support. In contrast, the coding schemes with fewer classes tend to produce fewer and often more clearly defined classes. For example, LCA based on coding scheme 2 (0-5, 6-8, 9-10) tends to result in four classes the correspond to theory and previous studies (i.e. one group showing high support for 'health' and 'old' and lower support for other aspects).

When deciding the coding scheme to use the challenge is to balance the desire for a parsimonious model with the potential loss of important information and any distortion of the data. Clearly, the greater simplicity of the more aggregated coding schemes is beneficial. However, the disadvantages of these coding schemes make them less suitable for establishing how responses vary across items. In part, the relative simplicity of the latent class results is partially artificial as important differences in response patterns are obscured. Thus, the chosen approach (0-5, 67, 89, 10) is more complicated but can better capture how responses vary across the items. Thus, whilst not an ideal solution, the selected four-category scheme appears to best balance the need for detail and parsimony.

Scheme Number	Model	Р	LL	BIC	LMR	LR Chi2	d.f	p value
	2 class	29	-17454.9	35139.46	0.00	2765.85	2137	0.00
	3 class	44	-16980.6	34309.56	0.82	2045.85	2125	0.89
	4 class	59	-16819.4	34106.09	0.00	1773.52	2114	1.00
2	5 class	74	-16754.3	34094.5	0.78	1649.34	2098	1.00
	6 class	89	-16696.3	34097.43	0.76			
	7 class	104	-16661.1	34145.86	0.82			
	2 class	29	-17953.9	36137.34	0.00	2861.88	2142	0.00
	3 class	44	-17483.1	35314.61	1.00	2109.77	2126	0.60
2	4 class	59	-17344.6	35156.32	0.00	1849.06	2113	1.00
3	5 class	74	-17270.6	35127.21	0.7614	1721.06	2098	1.00
	6 class	89	-17202.3	35109.37	0.3214	1590.95	2083	1.00
	7 class	104	-17160.5	35144.62	0.7606	1513.90	2067	1.00
	2 class	29	-17001.2	34232.12	0.04	2896.33	2139	0.00
	3 class	44	-16331.2	33010.92	0.42	2033.04	2123	0.92
4	4 class	59	-16197.3	32861.9	0.58	1782.96	2109	1.00
4	5 class	74	-16127	32839.93	0.79	1645.70	2093	1.00
	6 class	89	-16070.7	32846.17 0.76		1541.44	2078	1.00
	7 class	104	-16022.6	32868.86	0.76	1447.52	2063	1.00
	2 class	15	-11026.7	22172.1	0.00	432.80	111	0.000
	3 class	23	-10905.4	21992.99	0.00	252.79	103	0.000
5	4 class	31	-10854.8	21955.01	0.47	160.51	95	0.000
	5 class	39	-10827.5	21963.74	0.20	110.61	87	0.045
	6 class	47	-10812.4	21996.9	0.38	82.01	79	0.386
	7 class	55	-10802.7	22040.88	0.67	64.61	71	0.691

Appendix table B-2 Latent class model fit statistics for coding schemes 2-5 – Germany
Scheme Number	Model	Р	LL	BIC	LMR	LR Chi2	d.f	p value
	2 class	29	-13448.96	27125.64	0.00	1953.32	2126	1.00
	3 class	44	-13142.42	26630.34	0.00	1497.60	2114	1.00
2	4 class	59	-12947.94	26359.17	0.00	1303.78	2109	1.00
2	5 class	74	-12879.91	26340.90	0.04	1342.91	8664	1.00
	6 class	89	-12832.29	26363.44	0.77	1102.98	2080	1.00
	7 class	104	-12801.40	26419.45	0.66	1044.82	2063	1.00
	2 class	29	-14528.57	29284.85	0.00	2658.32	2139	0.00
	3 class	44	-14172.34	28690.19	0.00	1971.01	2124	0.99
2	4 class	59	-13993.94	28451.18	0.00	1638.57	2107	1.00
5	5 class	74	-13900.12	28381.31	0.03	1489.72	2095	1.00
	6 class	89	-13844.98	28388.82	0.11	1395.99	2079	1.00
	7 class	104	-13803.73	28424.12	0.13	1331.55	2065	1.00
	2 class	29	-15140.6	30508.97	0.00	3047.06	2140	0.00
	3 class	44	-14387.8	29121.18	0.00	2234.85	2127	0.05
4	4 class	59	-14060.9	28585.02	0.00	1686.03	2113	1.00
4	5 class	74	-13967.2	28515.42	0.53	1521.99	2099	1.00
	6 class	89	-13877.5	28453.86	0.76	1378.09	2085	1.00
	7 class	104	-13831	28478.74	0.77	1280.81	2070	1.00
	2 class	15	-8124.62	16367.03	0.00	496.22	111.00	0.00
	3 class	23	-7994.73	16170.07	0.00	399.17	971.00	1.00
E	4 class	31	-7948.82	16141.06	0.01	170.67	95.00	0.00
5	5 class	39	-7927.48	16161.2	0.40	130.99	87.00	0.00
	6 class	47	-7915.78	16200.63	0.27	109.98	78.00	0.01
	7 class	55	-7902.56	16237	0.72	84.05	69.00	0.10

Appendix table B-3 Latent class model fit statistics for coding schemes 2-5 – Spain

Scheme Number	Model	Р	LL	BIC	LMR	LR Chi2	d.f	p value
	2 class	29	-10432.4	21082.7	0.00	1548.1	2129	1.00
	3 class	44	-10158.8	20648.1	0.00	1195.3	2117	1.00
2	4 class	59	-10048.2	20539.6	0.00	964.5	2102	1.00
2	5 class	74	-10009.9	20575.8	0.26	897.2	2087	1.00
	6 class	89	-9976.4	20621.4	0.14	876.1	2077	1.00
	7 class	104	-9950.2	20681.8	0.76	826.4	2063	1.00
	2 class	29	-11164.7	22547.3	0.00	2057.6	2130	0.87
	3 class	44	-10821.2	21972.9	0.00	1416.5	2122	1.00
2	4 class	59	-10711.1	21865.4	0.00	1186.7	2107	1.00
5	5 class	74	-10660.5	21876.8	0.02	1097.6	2092	1.00
	6 class	89	-10627.0	21922.5	0.28	1028.6	2077	1.00
	7 class	104	-10605.4	21992.0	0.67	966.4	2059	1.00
	2 class	29	-11151.3	22520.4	0.00	2414.0	2134	0.00
	3 class	44	-10584.0	21498.4	0.00	1486.9	2119	1.00
4	4 class	59	-10478.1	21399.4	0.00	1279.3	2105	1.00
-	5 class	74	-10411.3	21378.4	0.02	1146.5	2091	1.00
	6 class	89	-10375.6	21419.8	1.00	1077.0	2075	1.00
	7 class	104	-10346.1	21473.5	0.54	1020.2	2059	1.00
	2 class	15	-6635.0	13382.6	0.00	410.3	108	0.00
	3 class	23	-6525.7	13224.2	0.00	194.1	101	0.00
5	4 class	31	-6500.3	13233.4	0.03	142.7	94	0.00
5	5 class	39	-6484.2	13261.3	0.00	111.0	86	0.04
	6 class	47	-6474.6	13302.3	0.32	92.0	77	0.12
	7 class	55	-6469.2	13351.7	0.14	80.8	69	0.16

Appendix table B-4 Latent class model fit statistics for coding schemes 2-5 – Sweden

Scheme Number	Model	Р	LL	BIC	LMR	LR Chi2	d.f	p value
	2	29	-14272.4	28769.88	0.00	2209.718	2138	0.1368
	3	44	-13980.2	28302.04	0.00	1789.763	2129	1.00
2	4	59	-13799.7	28057.36	0.00	1303.784	2109	1.00
2	5	74	-13720	28014.5	0.41	1330.457	2097	1.00
	6	89	-13665.7	28022.28	0.11	1236.33	2082	1.00
	7	104	-13621.7	28050.64	0.73	1159.223	2066	1.00
	I	I	1	1			I	Γ
	2	29	-17953.9	36137.34	0	2347.338	2144	0.0013
	3	44	-17483.1	35314.61	1	1838.704	2127	1.00
3	4	59	-17344.6	35156.32	0	804.621	5860	1.00
	5	74	-17270.6	35127.21	0.7614	795.721	5860	1.00
	6	89	-17202.3	35109.37	0.3214	806.141	5860	1.00
	2 class	29	-13790.4	27805.82	0	2364.837	2142	0.00
	3 class	44	-13356.8	27055.19	0	1736.723	2124	1.00
4	4 class	59	-13188.7	26835.35	0.749	1436.139	2108	1.00
4	5 class	74	-13113	26800.42	0.1555	1316.458	2095	1.00
	6 class	89	-13045.1	26781.03	0.7816	1200.288	2080	1.00
	7 class	104	-13016.9	26841.12	0.8047	1180.891	2067	1.00
	2	15	-8857.47	17831.39	0.000	394.817	109	0.00
	3	23	-8707.12	17592.78	0.000	183.966	102	0.00
5	4	31	-8665.86	17572.36	0.002	113.13	94	0.09
	5	39	-8653.25	17609.24	0.208	288.955	629	1.00
	6	47	-8641.78	17648.39	0.471	70.744	78	0.71

Appendix table B-5 Latent class model fit statistics for coding schemes 2-5 – UK

Notes – for coding scheme details see

Class membership probabilities	0.15	0.34	0.34	0.16
Conditional probabilities				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.11	0.32	0.38	0.62
Agree	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.30
Agree Strongly	0.44	0.21	0.10	0.08
Jobs				
Low (0-5)	0.08	0.32	0.44	0.90
Mod (6-8)	0.17	0.47	0.56	0.10
High (9-10)	0.75	0.22	0.00	0.01
Living of unemployed				
Low (0-5)	0.09	0.32	0.35	0.88
Mod (6-8)	0.20	0.56	0.65	0.11
High (9-10)	0.71	0.13	0.00	0.01
Healthcare				
Low (0-5)	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.35
Mod (6-8)	0.00	0.23	0.85	0.53
High (9-10)	0.98	0.75	0.13	0.12
Living of old				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.68
Mod (6-8)	0.03	0.52	0.89	0.30
High (9-10)	0.97	0.40	0.03	0.03
Childcare				
Low (0-5)	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.46
Mod (6-8)	0.06	0.37	0.79	0.44
High (9-10)	0.85	0.58	0.13	0.10
Paid leave to care				
Low (0-5)	0.14	0.12	0.20	0.48
Mod (6-8)	0.12	0.45	0.74	0.47
High (9-10)	0.75	0.43	0.07	0.06

### Appendix table B-6 Germany 4-class model using coding scheme 2

Class membership probabilities	0.34	0.36	0.23	0.07
Conditional probabilities				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.11	0.19	0.28	0.39
Agree	0.50	0.52	0.56	0.42
Agree Strongly	0.38	0.30	0.16	0.20
Jobs				
Low (0-5)	0.05	0.14	0.17	0.50
Mod (6-8)	0.13	0.57	0.82	0.43
High (9-10)	0.82	0.29	0.01	0.06
Living of unemployed				
Low (0-5)	0.01	0.11	0.16	0.72
Mod (6-8)	0.06	0.64	0.82	0.27
High (9-10)	0.92	0.26	0.02	0.01
Healthcare				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.21
Mod (6-8)	0.00	0.17	0.74	0.40
High (9-10)	0.99	0.83	0.24	0.40
Living of old				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.23
Mod (6-8)	0.00	0.19	0.95	0.47
High (9-10)	0.99	0.81	0.04	0.31
Childcare				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.63
Mod (6-8)	0.06	0.54	0.82	0.32
High (9-10)	0.94	0.44	0.15	0.06
Paid leave to care				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.58
Mod (6-8)	0.05	0.51	0.85	0.40
High (9-10)	0.95	0.45	0.09	0.02

### Appendix table B-7 Spain 4-class model using coding scheme 2

Class membership probabilities	0.18	0.37	0.34	0.11
Conditional probabilities		•		
Income differences				
Not agree	0.19	0.33	0.39	0.63
Agree	0.39	0.48	0.49	0.31
Agree Strongly	0.42	0.18	0.12	0.06
Jobs				
Low (0-5)	0.12	0.33	0.45	0.91
Mod (6-8)	0.50	0.58	0.54	0.08
High (9-10)	0.38	0.09	0.01	0.01
Living of unemployed				
Low (0-5)	0.01	0.13	0.10	0.76
Mod (6-8)	0.04	0.62	0.88	0.24
High (9-10)	0.96	0.25	0.02	0.00
Healthcare				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.22
Mod (6-8)	0.03	0.13	0.84	0.54
High (9-10)	0.97	0.86	0.16	0.24
Living of old				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.30
Mod (6-8)	0.01	0.21	0.89	0.57
High (9-10)	0.99	0.78	0.10	0.13
Childcare				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.54
Mod (6-8)	0.04	0.48	0.85	0.45
High (9-10)	0.96	0.47	0.09	0.01
Paid leave to care				
Low (0-5)	0.01	0.06	0.08	0.51
Mod (6-8)	0.12	0.41	0.79	0.45
High (9-10)	0.87	0.53	0.13	0.04

### Appendix table B-8 Sweden 4-class model using coding scheme 2

Class membership probabilities	0.13	0.38	0.30	0.20
Conditional probabilities				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.23	0.35	0.43	0.65
Agree	0.42	0.44	0.48	0.26
Agree Strongly	0.35	0.21	0.09	0.09
Jobs				
Low (0-5)	0.17	0.28	0.45	0.78
Mod (6-8)	0.24	0.54	0.55	0.20
High (9-10)	0.59	0.18	0.01	0.02
Living of unemployed				
Low (0-5)	0.16	0.33	0.37	0.86
Mod (6-8)	0.27	0.56	0.63	0.14
High (9-10)	0.58	0.11	0.00	0.00
Healthcare				
Low (0-5)	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.15
Mod (6-8)	0.06	0.08	0.78	0.46
High (9-10)	0.94	0.91	0.21	0.40
Living of old				
Low (0-5)	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.16
Mod (6-8)	0.05	0.11	0.91	0.61
High (9-10)	0.94	0.89	0.08	0.24
Childcare				
Low (0-5)	0.03	0.19	0.11	0.74
Mod (6-8)	0.02	0.59	0.85	0.23
High (9-10)	0.95	0.23	0.05	0.03
Paid leave to care				
Low (0-5)	0.03	0.12	0.13	0.57
Mod (6-8)	0.10	0.56	0.80	0.42
High (9-10)	0.87	0.32	0.08	0.01

### Appendix table B-9 UK 4-class model using coding scheme 2

	2 Class		3-Class		
Class membership probabilities	0.41	0.59	0.28	0.48	0.24
<b>Class conditional probabilities</b>					
Income					
Not agree	0.22	0.45	0.20	0.34	0.56
Agree	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.51	0.36
Agree Strongly	0.31	0.10	0.35	0.16	0.07
Healthcare					
Low (0-6)	0.01	0.19	0.02	0.03	0.38
Mod (7-8)	0.10	0.62	0.03	0.56	0.53
High (9-10)	0.89	0.20	0.95	0.41	0.09
Living of old					
Low (0-6)	0.06	0.42	0.07	0.16	0.73
Mod (7-8)	0.27	0.53	0.13	0.70	0.25
High (9-10)	0.67	0.05	0.81	0.14	0.02
Jobs					
Low (0-6)	0.24	0.69	0.21	0.47	0.91
Mod (7-8)	0.30	0.29	0.20	0.47	0.08
High (9-10)	0.46	0.01	0.59	0.06	0.01
Living of unemployed					
Low (0-6)	0.28	0.72	0.26	0.49	0.94
Mod (7-8)	0.35	0.27	0.26	0.47	0.06
High (9-10)	0.37	0.01	0.48	0.04	0.01
Childcare					
Low (0-6)	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.11	0.52
Mod (7-8)	0.19	0.53	0.10	0.57	0.40
High (9-10)	0.72	0.18	0.80	0.32	0.08
Paid leave					
Low (0-6)	0.16	0.41	0.18	0.22	0.60
Mod (7-8)	0.26	0.49	0.16	0.57	0.36
High (9-10)	0.58	0.10	0.66	0.21	0.04

### Appendix table B-10 Germany 2-class and 3-class model using coding scheme 3

Model	5 class							
Class membership	0.31	0.30	0.19	0.09	0.11			
Class conditional probabilities								
Income								
Not agree	0.11	0.16	0.27	0.37	0.30			
Agree	0.50	0.54	0.56	0.49	0.41			
Agree Strongly	0.39	0.30	0.18	0.14	0.29			
Healthcare								
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.41	0.01			
Mod (7-8)	0.00	0.17	0.69	0.59	0.05			
High (9-10)	1.00	0.83	0.30	0.00	0.94			
Living of old								
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.43	0.07			
Mod (7-8)	0.00	0.16	0.90	0.55	0.25			
High (9-10)	0.99	0.84	0.09	0.02	0.68			
Jobs								
Low (0-6)	0.07	0.17	0.27	0.66	0.37			
Mod (7-8)	0.10	0.53	0.71	0.34	0.38			
High (9-10)	0.83	0.30	0.02	0.00	0.25			
Living of unemployed								
Low (0-6)	0.02	0.14	0.29	0.79	0.64			
Mod (7-8)	0.05	0.55	0.68	0.21	0.27			
High (9-10)	0.93	0.31	0.04	0.00	0.09			
Childcare								
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.59	0.50			
Mod (7-8)	0.06	0.50	0.73	0.35	0.29			
High (9-10)	0.94	0.49	0.19	0.06	0.21			
Paid leave								
Low (0-6)	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.67	0.48			
Mod (7-8)	0.04	0.45	0.73	0.32	0.32			
High (9-10)	0.95	0.51	0.12	0.01	0.20			

### Appendix table B-11 Spain 5-class model using coding scheme 3

	4 - class						
Class membership	0.19	0.35	0.31	0.14			
Class conditional probabilities							
Income							
Not agree	0.20	0.34	0.38	0.58			
Agree	0.39	0.48	0.50	0.35			
Agree Strongly	0.41	0.18	0.13	0.07			
Healthcare							
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.36			
Mod (7-8)	0.04	0.11	0.78	0.49			
High (9-10)	0.96	0.88	0.19	0.15			
Living of old							
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.48			
Mod (7-8)	0.02	0.18	0.86	0.46			
High (9-10)	0.98	0.79	0.13	0.06			
Jobs							
Low (0-6)	0.19	0.50	0.62	0.94			
Mod (7-8)	0.45	0.42	0.36	0.06			
High (9-10)	0.37	0.08	0.02	0.01			
Living of unemployed							
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.26	0.24	0.89			
Mod (7-8)	0.09	0.49	0.73	0.11			
High (9-10)	0.91	0.24	0.03	0.00			
Childcare							
Low (0-6)	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.68			
Mod (7-8)	0.06	0.43	0.78	0.31			
High (9-10)	0.95	0.45	0.12	0.01			
Paid leave							
Low (0-6)	0.02	0.12	0.16	0.69			
Mod (7-8)	0.12	0.36	0.68	0.30			
High (9-10)	0.86	0.52	0.16	0.02			

### Appendix table B-12 Sweden 4-class model using coding scheme 3

Model		3 - clas	s	4 - class			
Class membership	0.37	0.35	0.28	0.19	0.32	0.26	0.23
Class conditional probabilities							
Income							
Not agree	0.28	0.40	0.63	0.22	0.42	0.38	0.62
Agree	0.44	0.48	0.29	0.46	0.39	0.50	0.31
Agree Strongly	0.29	0.12	0.08	0.32	0.20	0.12	0.07
Healthcare							
Low (0-6)	0.01	0.02	0.20	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.24
Mod (7-8)	0.04	0.52	0.47	0.06	0.03	0.68	0.56
High (9-10)	0.95	0.46	0.33	0.93	0.96	0.30	0.21
Living of old							
Low (0-6)	0.01	0.03	0.25	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.30
Mod (7-8)	0.05	0.64	0.52	0.05	0.09	0.79	0.60
High (9-10)	0.94	0.34	0.22	0.94	0.89	0.18	0.10
Jobs							
Low (0-6)	0.30	0.52	0.87	0.22	0.47	0.55	0.88
Mod (7-8)	0.31	0.47	0.11	0.28	0.37	0.45	0.11
High (9-10)	0.39	0.01	0.02	0.51	0.17	0.00	0.02
Living of unemployed							
Low (0-6)	0.36	0.59	0.91	0.23	0.58	0.58	0.92
Mod (7-8)	0.33	0.41	0.09	0.30	0.33	0.42	0.08
High (9-10)	0.32	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.09	0.00	0.00
Childcare							
Low (0-6)	0.18	0.22	0.87	0.03	0.40	0.19	0.88
Mod (7-8)	0.29	0.69	0.11	0.12	0.46	0.71	0.11
High (9-10)	0.54	0.09	0.02	0.85	0.14	0.10	0.01
Paid leave							
Low (0-6)	0.13	0.22	0.71	0.04	0.27	0.22	0.73
Mod (7-8)	0.29	0.67	0.28	0.14	0.49	0.66	0.27
High (9-10)	0.59	0.12	0.00	0.82	0.23	0.12	0.00

Appendix table B-13 UK 2-class and 3-class model using coding scheme 3

Model	3 class model					
Class membership	0.21	0.42	0.37			
Class conditional probabilities						
Income						
Not agree	0.20	0.30	0.51			
Agree	0.41	0.52	0.41			
Agree Strongly	0.39	0.18	0.08			
Healthcare						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.03	0.07	0.59			
High (8-9)	0.03	0.69	0.36			
Max (10)	0.94	0.25	0.05			
Living of old						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.11	0.26	0.85			
High (8-9)	0.12	0.65	0.14			
Max (10)	0.77	0.09	0.01			
Jobs						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.27	0.57	0.95			
High (8-9)	0.17	0.39	0.04			
Max (10)	0.57	0.04	0.01			
Living of unemployed						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.35	0.63	0.98			
High (8-9)	0.17	0.35	0.02			
Max (10)	0.49	0.02	0.00			
Childcare						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.15	0.21	0.63			
High (8-9)	0.08	0.60	0.33			
Max (10)	0.77	0.19	0.05			
Paid leave						
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.25	0.31	0.79			
High (8-9)	0.11	0.56	0.19			
Max (10)	0.65	0.13	0.01			

### Appendix table B-14 Germany 3-class model using coding scheme 4

4 class								
0.23	0.30	0.23	0.24					
0.12	0.17	0.17	0.34					
0.46	0.55	0.54	0.50					
0.42	0.29	0.29	0.16					
0.01	0.04	0.01	0.40					
0.00	0.86	0.12	0.51					
0.99	0.10	0.87	0.09					
0.00	0.02	0.03	0.50					
0.00	0.94	0.16	0.48					
0.99	0.04	0.81	0.02					
0.09	0.26	0.36	0.78					
0.10	0.71	0.41	0.21					
0.82	0.03	0.23	0.01					
0.03	0.22	0.41	0.89					
0.02	0.77	0.35	0.11					
0.96	0.00	0.24	0.00					
0.01	0.14	0.16	0.71					
0.05	0.83	0.43	0.26					
0.95	0.03	0.41	0.03					
0.03	0.16	0.23	0.75					
0.04	0.81	0.39	0.24					
0.93	0.03	0.38	0.01					
	0.23 0.12 0.46 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.95 0.03 0.04 0.03	4 0   0.23 0.30   0.12 0.17   0.46 0.55   0.42 0.29   0.01 0.04   0.00 0.86   0.99 0.10   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.00 0.94   0.01 0.71   0.02 0.71   0.03 0.22   0.01 0.71   0.02 0.77   0.96 0.00   0.01 0.14   0.05 0.83   0.95 0.03   0.03 0.16   0.04 0.81	4 class   0.23 0.30 0.23   0.12 0.17 0.17   0.12 0.17 0.17   0.46 0.55 0.54   0.42 0.29 0.29   0.42 0.29 0.29   0.01 0.04 0.01   0.01 0.04 0.01   0.01 0.04 0.01   0.00 0.86 0.12   0.99 0.10 0.87   0.00 0.02 0.03   0.00 0.02 0.03   0.00 0.94 0.16   0.99 0.04 0.81   0.00 0.71 0.41   0.09 0.26 0.36   0.10 0.71 0.41   0.82 0.03 0.23   0.03 0.22 0.41   0.02 0.77 0.35   0.96 0.00 0.24   0.01 0.14 0.16   0.05 0.83 0.43   0.95 0.03 0.41 <t< td=""></t<>					

### Appendix table B-15 Spain 4-class model using coding scheme 4

Class membership	0.27	0.46	0.28
Class conditional probabilities			
Income			
Not agree	0.26	0.32	0.54
Agree	0.39	0.52	0.40
Agree Strongly	0.36	0.17	0.07
Healthcare			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.01	0.07	0.53
High (8-9)	0.06	0.69	0.41
Max (10)	0.93	0.25	0.07
Living of old			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.03	0.04	0.66
High (8-9)	0.06	0.82	0.31
Max (10)	0.92	0.14	0.04
Jobs			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.49	0.71	0.98
High (8-9)	0.32	0.28	0.02
Max (10)	0.19	0.01	0.00
Living of unemployed			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.18	0.38	0.95
High (8-9)	0.22	0.61	0.04
Max (10)	0.60	0.01	0.01
Childcare			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.09	0.22	0.79
High (8-9)	0.20	0.69	0.20
Max (10)	0.72	0.09	0.01
Paid leave			
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.11	0.24	0.75
High (8-9)	0.19	0.64	0.22
Max (10)	0.70	0.12	0.03

### Appendix table B-16 Sweden 3-class model using coding scheme 4

Class membership	0.06	0.30	0.37	0.27
Class conditional probabilities				
Income				
Not agree	0.23	0.33	0.37	0.62
Agree	0.38	0.41	0.49	0.32
Agree Strongly	0.39	0.26	0.14	0.07
Healthcare				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.45
High (8-9)	0.01	0.11	0.78	0.43
Max (10)	0.99	0.86	0.16	0.12
Living of old				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.63
High (8-9)	0.00	0.14	0.92	0.32
Max (10)	1.00	0.81	0.03	0.05
Jobs				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.13	0.53	0.73	0.95
High (8-9)	0.17	0.30	0.30 0.26	
Max (10)	0.70	0.17	0.01	0.01
Living of unemployed				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.15	0.66	0.74	1.00
High (8-9)	0.07	0.25	0.26	0.00
Max (10)	0.79	0.09	0.00	0.00
Childcare				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.03	0.43	0.50	0.93
High (8-9)	0.04	0.34	0.48	0.07
Max (10)	0.93	0.24	0.02	0.00
Paid leave				
Low/Mod (0-7)	0.07	0.33	0.45	0.92
High (8-9)	0.04	0.36	0.52	0.08
Max (10)	0.89	0.32	0.03	0.00

### Appendix table B-17 UK 4-class model using coding scheme 4

Class membership	0.27	0.38	0.12	0.23
Class conditional probabilities				
healthcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.01	0.17	0.05	0.72
High (8-10)	0.99	0.83	0.95	0.28
Living of old				
Not high (0-7)	0.04	0.52	0.15	0.92
High (8-10)	0.96	0.48	0.85	0.08
Jobs				
Not high (0-7)	0.28	0.76	0.40	0.98
High (8-10)	0.72	0.24	0.60	0.02
Living of unemployed				
Not high (0-7)	0.26	0.84	0.62	0.98
High (8-10)	0.74	0.16	0.38	0.02
Childcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.01	0.18	0.70	0.75
High (8-10)	0.99	0.82	0.31	0.25
Paid leave				
Not high (0-7)	0.12	0.40	0.63	0.87
High (8-10)	0.88	0.60	0.37	0.13
Income differences				
Not agree	0.15	0.43	0.24	0.52
Agree	0.85	0.57	0.76	0.48

### Appendix table B-18 Germany 3-class model using coding scheme 5

Class membership	0.08	0.12	0.21	0.58
Class conditional probabilities				
healthcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.94	0.00	0.12	0.01
High (8-10)	0.06	1.00	0.88	0.99
Living of old				
Not high (0-7)	0.86	0.26	0.14	0.01
High (8-10)	0.14	0.74	0.86	1.00
Jobs				
Not high (0-7)	0.90	0.54	0.76	0.11
High (8-10)	0.10	0.46	0.24	0.89
Living of unemployed				
Not high (0-7)	0.93	0.86	0.64	0.11
High (8-10)	0.07	0.14	0.36	0.89
Childcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.79	0.81	0.29	0.06
High (8-10)	0.21	0.19	0.71	0.94
Paid leave				
Not high (0-7)	0.86	0.95	0.29	0.08
High (8-10)	0.15	0.05	0.71	0.92
Income differences				
Not agree	0.35	0.27	0.31	0.12
Agree	0.65	0.73	0.69	0.88

### Appendix table B-19 Spain 4-class model using coding scheme 5

Class membership	0.40	0.44	0.16
Class conditional probabilities			
healthcare			
Not high (0-7)	0.00	0.14	0.72
High (8-10)	1.00	0.86	0.28
Living of old			
Not high (0-7)	0.00	0.14	0.89
High (8-10)	1.00	0.86	0.11
Jobs			
Not high (0-7)	0.46	0.87	0.98
High (8-10)	0.54	0.13	0.02
Living of unemployed			
Not high (0-7)	0.11	0.64	0.98
High (8-10)	0.90	0.36	0.02
Childcare			
Not high (0-7)	0.04	0.42	0.88
High (8-10)	0.96	0.58	0.12
Paid leave			
Not high (0-7)	0.08	0.40	0.86
High (8-10)	0.92	0.60	0.14
Income differences			
Not agree	0.21	0.43	0.53
Agree	0.79	0.57	0.47

Appendix table B-20 Sweden 3-class model using coding scheme 5

Class membership	0.15	0.39	0.25	0.20
Class conditional probabilities				
healthcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.61
High (8-10)	0.99	0.92	1.00	0.39
Living of old				
Not high (0-7)	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.79
High (8-10)	0.99	0.93	0.92	0.21
Jobs				
Not high (0-7)	0.16	0.74	0.74	0.96
High (8-10)	0.85	0.26	0.26	0.04
Living of unemployed				
Not high (0-7)	0.19	0.76	0.87	1.00
High (8-10)	0.81	0.24	0.13	0.01
Childcare				
Not high (0-7)	0.07	0.34	0.93	0.93
High (8-10)	0.93	0.66	0.07	0.07
Paid leave				
Not high (0-7)	0.13	0.30	0.77	0.92
High (8-10)	0.87	0.70	0.23	0.08
Income differences				
Not agree	0.21	0.33	0.54	0.60
Agree	0.79	0.67	0.46	0.41

#### Appendix table B-21 UK 4-class model using coding scheme 5

#### **Latent Class Fit Statistics**

#### Likelihood-based

For successive LCMs, the standard likelihood ratio test (LRT) for comparing nested models is inappropriate because the change in log likelihood does not follow a chi-square distribution (Nylund et al. 2007). Using simulation studies, Nylund et al. (2007) also demonstrate its poor performance in assessing the number of latent classes. The Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR) likelihood ratio test (LRT) (Lo et al. 2001) provides an alternative test that compares improvement in fit between a specified model (the k class solution) and a model with one fewer class (k-1 class-solution). The resulting p-value indicates if the additional class of the k solution significantly improves model fit. Nylund et al (2007) demonstrate that the LMR likelihood ratio test can perform well; however, Jefferies (2003) suggested there is a flaw in its mathematical proof. In some contexts, the LMR LRT may lack power and underestimate the number of classes (Nylund 2007). A potentially preferable method could be to use the bootstrap likelihood ratio test (BLRT) (for a description see Nylund et al. (2007)). However, the BLRT is not used because in Mplus it cannot be used with survey weights. Moreover, exploratory analyses using the BLRT showed that it suggests that additional classes improve model fit across all successive models. A similar pattern was reported by Stares (2008) in relation to analyses based on a similarly sized survey sample. This characteristic of the BLRT may be because the deviance is sensitive to sample size.

#### Information criteria (IC)

Based on the log likelihood, the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) apply penalties for the number of parameters in a fitted model (AIC=-2logL+2p and BIC=-2logL+plog(n), where p is the number of free model parameters and n is the sample size). Lower IC values indicate better models. Typically, as the number of classes increases, IC values reduce until a point is reached where the IC value starts to increase. This point signifies where the statistic suggests that adding additional classes no longer sufficiently improves model fit. Since different information criteria apply different penalties, they tend to indicate different solutions. The BIC tends to be relied on more widely and Nylund et al (2007) find the BIC to perform better. Additionally, an adjusted BIC has been developed, which replaces the sample size in the formula above with n\*, where n\*= (n+2)/24. However, since Nylund et al. (2007) indicate that the BIC performs better, the adjusted BIC is not considered.

#### Residuals

A less commonly used approach, advocated in Bartholomew et al (2002), is to examine bivariate marginal residuals. Creating a two-way table for responses to each pair of items, by collapsing over responses to other variables, we can compare the observed frequency (O) to the expected frequency (E) for a single cell of the table. The residual is calculated as  $(O-E)^2/E$ . Assuming residuals have a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom, standardised residuals greater than four are classed as large and taken as a sign of poor fit. Overall model fit is evaluated with reference to the proportion of residuals that large, which Stares (2008) recommends should represent less than 10 percent. Additionally, examining individual large residuals offers a tool for identifying areas of misfit in the model. These were calculated using the LCAT R function, developed as part of the "Latent Modelling of Categorical Data: Tools of Analysis for Cross-National Surveys" (LCAT) at the Departments of Statistics and Methodology of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

### Entropy

Entropy values provide a measure of how well latent classes are distinguished. They range between 0–1, with 1 being optimal.

#### Multi-group latent class analysis

A model was specified where the characteristics of the latent classes are the same for each country by fixing the class conditional response probabilities across countries. The class membership probabilities can vary across the countries, which allow country differences in the size of latent classes. If valid, this model would allow cross-national comparison of the distribution of the attitude groups. Appendix table B-22 displays the model fit statistics for this multiple group analysis with an equivalent measurement model. The number of latent classes incrementally increases across the models, in this case from to 2 to 8 classes. Critically, the fit statistics show no optimal solution, implying that a model with up to eight different sub-groups does not adequately represent response patterns for the four countries combined. Potentially, the model could include further classes. However, the sample size, number of items, the difficulty of interpreting complex latent class models means this approach is not ideal for understanding response patterns or representing them in further stages of the analysis.

Appendix table B-22 Model fit information for multiple latent class analysis model 2-8 classes

Model	LL	AIC	BIC	Residuals
2 class (46 parameters)	-75979.6	152051.2	152380.5	66
3 class ( 71 parameters)	-72806.7	145755.4	146263.7	51
4 class (96 parameters)	-71924	144039.9	144727.2	43
5 class (121 parameters)	-71225.5	142693.1	143559.3	26
6 class (146 parameters)	-70748.6	141789.2	142834.5	26
7 class (171 parameters)	-70379.6	141101.3	142325.5	23
8 class (196 parameters)	-70049	140489.9	141893.1	19

N=9502

This result is not surprising considering the individual country analyses, which revealed cross-national variations in the number and characteristics of classes including differences in the patterns of response and striking country differences in the behaviour of some items such as jobs in Sweden. The low support for providing jobs in Sweden is an interesting example of the problems of establishing a cross-national equivalent construct. There appears to be a consensus that governments should not be entirely responsible for providing jobs. However, feasibly Sweden's strong social democratic history could mean explicit government commitments to full employment policy and state employment programmes are more in the minds of Swedish respondents than those in countries with less of socialist history. As a result, the question is perhaps understood differently in Sweden. However, with the available data it becomes unclear what drives the distinct

pattern. As a result, a completely homogenous latent class structure for the four countries appeared unworkable.

An alternative approach would be to try a partially equivalent latent class structure with country specific estimation of some parameters. The possible models are extensive and include, for example, allowing response probabilities for specific items to vary across countries/classes or country specific classes (Eid et al. 2003). Assessing how alternative models fit the data across the four studies could provide firmer statistical evidence of the cross-national differences discussed in chapter four. However, beyond some initial explorations this route was extensively followed for this study. The main reason is pragmatic. Both the small and considerable differences in the patterns of response across the four countries mean it becomes difficult to establish a partially homogenous model that fits the data well. Moreover, examining the models for the individual countries showed there was likely to a complex mix of country specific parameters. This problem is heighted by the use of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic (the deviance) for model comparison, which is known to be sensitive to sample size, and therefore, likely to suggest small differences between the latent class structures are statistically significant. Hence, a partially equivalent model fitting this data could share little across countries. As a result it may not reduce the complexity of the models or increase comparability of the results.

## **C. Social Differences**

#### Participation

	Vote		Trade ur	Trade union		Contact			Org work	
Younger	-1.40	0.13	-0.82	0.20	-0.82	0.17	0.46	0.18	-0.17	0.13
Older	0.81	0.16	-0.18	0.17	-0.13	0.14	-0.74	0.22	-0.31	0.13
Female	-0.10	0.11	-0.84	0.14	-0.44	0.12	-0.31	0.16	-0.51	0.10
Service Class II	-0.23	0.20	0.38	0.20	0.06	0.15	0.06	0.21	-0.15	0.13
Intermediate	-0.81	0.18	0.48	0.20	-0.69	0.17	-0.30	0.22	-0.40	0.14
Self-employed	-0.68	0.24	-1.32	0.45	-0.01	0.21	-0.66	0.36	-0.29	0.19
Labour Class	-1.33	0.19	0.33	0.21	-1.26	0.19	-0.62	0.25	-1.17	0.15
Unemployed	-1.04	0.21	-1.18	0.42	-0.30	0.32	-0.04	0.38	-0.42	0.26
Inactive	-0.69	0.13	-0.80	0.17	0.08	0.13	-0.08	0.18	0.07	0.11
Public sector	0.68	0.18	0.51	0.16	0.44	0.14	0.58	0.18	0.40	0.12
Intercept	2.42	0.18	-1.42	0.16	-0.93	0.14	-2.08	0.19	-0.30	0.12
n=	2673		2679		2678		2678		2681	

#### Appendix table C-1 Logistic regression model - Germany

The table cells show the parameter estimates and standard error

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

	Vote		Trade u	nion	Contact	Contact		Org work		
Younger	-0.88	0.12	-0.84	0.22	-0.38	0.18	-0.29	0.17	0.10	0.14
Older	0.68	0.16	-0.01	0.29	-0.13	0.22	-0.30	0.22	-0.36	0.20
Female	-0.04	0.10	-0.07	0.18	-0.54	0.16	-0.16	0.15	0.12	0.13
Service Class II	0.57	0.17	0.37	0.33	-0.01	0.28	0.67	0.15	0.71	0.13
INT	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.31	-0.14	0.26	0.07	0.13	0.05	0.11
Self-employed	-0.11	0.11	-1.28	0.43	-0.28	0.27	-0.27	0.15	-0.40	0.13
Labour Class	-0.55	0.09	-0.11	0.30	-0.99	0.26	-0.47	0.12	-0.36	0.10
Unemployed	-0.08	0.21	-0.90	0.42	0.18	0.31	0.09	0.29	-0.36	0.27
Inactive	-0.45	0.13	-1.62	0.33	-0.44	0.21	-0.32	0.20	-0.38	0.17
Public sector	0.41	0.21	0.90	0.22	0.64	0.20	0.57	0.19	0.35	0.18
Intercept	1.50	0.12	-1.92	0.28	-1.32	0.22	-1.73	0.14	-1.45	0.13
n=	2521		2529		2544		2548		2546	

#### Appendix table C-2: Logistic regression model - Spain

The table cells show the parameter estimates and standard error

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

	Vote		Trade u	inion	Contact		Demo		Org work	
Younger	-1.30	0.17	-0.99	0.14	-0.19	0.17	0.67	0.26	-0.27	0.14
Older	1.01	0.26	-0.55	0.16	-0.10	0.19	0.31	0.31	-0.04	0.15
Female	-0.18	0.14	-0.12	0.12	-0.10	0.14	-0.10	0.20	-0.33	0.11
Service Class II	-0.09	0.23	0.34	0.17	-0.10	0.18	-0.09	0.28	0.02	0.15
INT	-0.58	0.22	-0.05	0.18	-1.00	0.24	-0.56	0.34	-0.38	0.17
Self-employed	-1.05	0.26	-0.73	0.24	-0.30	0.26	0.09	0.38	-0.13	0.21
Labour Class	-0.91	0.21	0.23	0.16	-0.75	0.20	-0.03	0.28	-0.56	0.16
Unemployed	-0.59	0.34	-0.69	0.31	0.04	0.40	0.45	0.50	-0.12	0.31
Inactive	-1.04	0.18	-2.05	0.15	-0.13	0.18	0.08	0.26	-0.17	0.13
Public sector	0.41	0.16	1.00	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.39	0.21	0.10	0.12
Intercept	2.71	0.23	0.85	0.16	-1.25	0.17	-3.05	0.27	-0.43	0.14
n=	2287		1814		1814		1817		1817	

Appendix table C-3: Logistic regression model - Sweden

The table cells show the parameter estimates and standard error Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

	Vote	Vote		nion	Contact		Demo		Org work	
Younger	-1.35	0.13	-0.36	0.17	-0.79	0.18	-0.37	0.29	-0.25	0.24
Older	1.16	0.16	-0.26	0.20	0.17	0.15	-0.76	0.34	-0.03	0.22
Female	-0.05	0.11	-0.20	0.14	-0.05	0.13	-0.47	0.26	-0.27	0.19
Service Class II	0.14	0.18	0.24	0.19	0.02	0.17	0.30	0.34	-0.05	0.22
INT	-0.55	0.16	0.10	0.21	-0.63	0.19	0.22	0.37	-0.65	0.28
Self-employed	-0.49	0.22	-0.98	0.33	-0.16	0.23	0.69	0.43	-0.11	0.31
Labour Class	-0.57	0.16	-0.11	0.22	-1.09	0.20	-0.09	0.38	-1.22	0.30
Unemployed	-0.54	0.31	-1.88	0.75	0.33	0.34	0.52	0.68	0.34	0.49
Inactive	-0.31	0.13	-1.73	0.22	0.29	0.15	0.19	0.31	0.16	0.20
Public sector	0.65	0.14	1.70	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.81	0.26	0.56	0.19
Intercept	1.08	0.15	-1.48	0.17	-1.27	0.16	-3.22	0.30	-2.14	0.21
n=	2287		2293		2292		2293		2293	

#### Appendix table C-4: Logistic regression model - UK

The table cells show the parameter estimates and standard error

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

#### Cross-tabulations of social class with the individual attitude variables

		For une	employe	ed		Jo	bs		Redu	ce incon	ne differ	ences
Germany	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	D	N	Α	AS
Service I	0.44	0.34	0.15	0.07	0.53	0.23	0.18	0.06	0.28	0.20	0.41	0.11
Service II	0.35	0.34	0.22	0.09	0.47	0.21	0.22	0.10	0.23	0.17	0.42	0.18
Intermediate	0.41	0.29	0.20	0.10	0.40	0.27	0.21	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.46	0.19
Self-employed*	0.47	0.28	0.16	0.09	0.47	0.20	0.18	0.15	0.24	0.13	0.47	0.17
Working class	0.36	0.29	0.18	0.17	0.34	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.11	0.13	0.51	0.26
Total	0.39	0.31	0.19	0.11	0.43	0.23	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.16	0.46	0.19
	n=25	12; chi2	?=53.6; I	(11.96,	n=25.	13; chi2=	=106.4; F	(11.9,	n=249	)2; chi2=	109.6; F(	11.95,
	300	)35.13)=	4.07, P<	<0.001	299	981.9)=8.	17, P<0.	001	297	778.1)=8	.12, P<0.	001
Spain	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	D	Ν	Α	AS
Service I	0.17	0.23	0.37	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.36	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.50	0.23
Service II	0.15	0.28	0.31	0.26	0.17	0.24	0.37	0.22	0.11	0.12	0.48	0.28
Intermediate	0.11	0.27	0.36	0.25	0.14	0.26	0.37	0.24	0.08	0.15	0.56	0.22
Self-employed	0.15	0.25	0.33	0.26	0.16	0.23	0.40	0.21	0.07	0.11	0.54	0.28
Working class	0.13	0.24	0.33	0.30	0.13	0.22	0.38	0.28	0.05	0.12	0.49	0.33
Total	0.14	0.25	0.34	0.27	0.15	0.23	0.38	0.24	0.07	0.13	0.51	0.29
	n=24	78; chi2	= 13.4;	F(11.98,	n=24	44; chi2=	=25.5; F(	11.99,	n=246	58, chi2=	49.04; F(	11.98,
	29	6666.8)=	:0.93, P=	=0.51	292	87.6)=1.	75, P = 0	.051	295	551.9)=3	.40, P<0.	001
Sweden	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	D	Ν	Α	AS
Service I	0.19	0.33	0.33	0.15	0.50	0.33	0.15	0.02	0.19	0.30	0.37	0.14
Service II	0.15	0.30	0.37	0.17	0.38	0.35	0.23	0.05	0.10	0.26	0.46	0.18
Intermediate	0.17	0.29	0.37	0.16	0.42	0.34	0.20	0.05	0.11	0.19	0.48	0.21
Self-employed	0.20	0.39	0.28	0.14	0.45	0.34	0.16	0.04	0.13	0.26	0.44	0.17
Working class	0.16	0.30	0.36	0.19	0.34	0.29	0.27	0.09	0.10	0.18	0.48	0.24
Total	0.17 0.31 0.35 0.17			0.40	0.32	0.22	0.06	0.12	0.23	0.45	0.20	
	n=1	747; chi	2=12.3;	F(12.0,	n=17	744; chi2	=56.53;	F(12,	n=174	19, chi2=	52.97; F(	12.00,
	20	952.0)=	1.02, P=	=0.42	20	916)=4.7	71, P<0.0	001	209	76.00)=4	4.41, P<0	.001

0-5

0.52

0.46

0.38

0.46

0.37

0.43

8,9

0.15

0.20

0.21

0.14

0.26

0.20

10

0.05

0.06

0.09

0.15

0.13

0.09

6,7

0.29

0.28

0.32

0.25

0.25

0.28

n=2232; chi2=74.43; F(11.92,

26592.23)=4.97, P<0.001

N

0.22

0.20

0.19

0.21

0.18

0.20

n=2222; chi2=85.63; F(11.85,

26315.76)=5.76, P<0.001

А

0.32

0.40

0.47

0.37

0.46

0.41

AS

0.12

0.14

0.15

0.21

0.22

0.17

D

0.34

0.26

0.19

0.21

0.14

0.22

Appendix table C-5 Attitudes towards government responsibility for living standards of the unemployed, providing jobs and reduce income differences by social class

\*Self-employed includes small employers

0-5

0.45

0.43

0.45

0.46

0.41

0.43

8,9

0.17

0.15

0.18

0.14

0.21

0.18

n=2236; chi2=27.0; F(11.81,

26401.9)= 1.77, P = 0.048

10

0.03

0.07

0.06

0.10

0.09

0.07

6,7

0.35

0.34

0.31

0.30

0.30

0.32

UΚ

Service I

Service II

Total

Intermediate

Self-employed

Working class

Appendix table C-6 Attitudes towards government responsibility for healthcare and livin	g
standards of the old by social class	

		Healt	h care			Living stand	dards of old	1
Germany	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10
Service I	0.08	0.21	0.45	0.26	0.22	0.36	0.29	0.13
Service II	0.06	0.18	0.48	0.28	0.16	0.30	0.39	0.15
Intermediate	0.07	0.18	0.42	0.33	0.17	0.24	0.37	0.22
Self-employed *	0.08	0.18	0.42	0.32	0.22	0.25	0.35	0.18
Working class	0.07	0.16	0.38	0.40	0.15	0.23	0.34	0.28
Total	0.07	0.18	0.43	0.32	0.17	0.27	0.35	0.20
	n=2523; c	hi2(12) = 3	8.20; Desig	n-based	n=2523; c	:hi2(12) = 8	4.14; Desig	n-based
	F(11.98, 3	80219.4)=2.	80, P<0.001	1	F(11.97, 3	80184.8)=6.	28, P<0.00	1
Spain	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10
Service I	0.02	0.10	0.37	0.51	0.02	0.13	0.45	0.39
Service II	0.02	0.09	0.35	0.55	0.01	0.13	0.39	0.47
Intermediate	0.02	0.10	0.40	0.49	0.02	0.11	0.40	0.47
Self-employed	0.01	0.10	0.44	0.44	0.02	0.12	0.47	0.39
Working class	0.03	0.09	0.40	0.48	0.03	0.12	0.41	0.44
Total	0.02	0.09	0.40	0.48	0.02	0.12	0.42	0.44
	n=2524; c	hi2(12) = 1.	3.2079; Des	sign-	n=2522; c	:hi2=14.77;	Design-bas	ed
	based F(1	1.94, 30110	5.98)=0.958	80, P=0.49	F(11.92, 3	80040.40)=2	1.05, P = 0.3	396
Sweden	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10.00
Service I	0.02	0.14	0.45	0.39	0.05	0.17	0.49	0.29
Service II	0.02	0.13	0.45	0.40	0.02	0.16	0.48	0.34
Intermediate	0.03	0.14	0.46	0.38	0.03	0.13	0.51	0.33
Self-employed	0.03	0.17	0.49	0.32	0.03	0.15	0.50	0.31
Working class	0.05	0.16	0.40	0.39	0.05	0.18	0.44	0.33
Total	0.03	0.15	0.44	0.38	0.04	0.16	0.48	0.32
	n=1759; c	hi2(12)=15	.72; Design	-based	n=1759; d	:hi2(12)=13	.08; Design	-based
	F(12.00, 2	21096)=1.31	l, P = 0.20		F(12.00, 2	21096)=1.09	9, P=0.36	
UK	0-5	6,7	8,9	10	0-5	6,7	8,9	10
Service I	0.05	0.10	0.48	0.37	0.04	0.22	0.50	0.23
Service II	0.02	0.10	0.44	0.44	0.03	0.18	0.44	0.35
Intermediate	0.03	0.11	0.46	0.40	0.03	0.13	0.53	0.31
Self-employed	0.04	0.11	0.45	0.41	0.05	0.17	0.46	0.32
Working class	0.05	0.13	0.40	0.42	0.05	0.13	0.43	0.40
Total	0.04	0.11	0.44	0.41	0.04	0.16	0.47	0.33
	n=2244; c	h2=15.35; I	F(11.30,		n=2242; c	hi2(12)=55	.87; Design	-based
	25350.95	)=0.93, P =	0.51		F(11.33, 2	25393.51)=3	3.42, P = 0.0	)001

\*Self-employed includes small employers

#### Preferences

	Max								High (	+/-)					High				Mod(+	/-)
	High (	+/-)	High		Mod(+	·/-)	Low		High		Mod(+	·/-)	Low		Mod(+	·/-)	Low		Low	
Younger	0.22	0.26	0.35	0.22	0.46	0.23	0.16	0.31	0.13	0.23	0.24	0.20	-0.06	0.30	0.11	0.21	-0.19	0.29	-0.30	0.30
Older	0.12	0.23	-0.05	0.21	-0.01	0.22	0.70	0.25	-0.17	0.21	-0.13	0.20	0.58	0.24	0.04	0.22	0.75	0.24	0.71	0.26
Female	-0.49	0.20	-0.35	0.17	-0.61	0.17	-0.91	0.21	0.14	0.18	-0.11	0.16	-0.42	0.20	-0.25	0.16	-0.56	0.19	-0.30	0.21
Service Class II	-0.29	0.37	-0.10	0.33	-0.57	0.32	-0.60	0.36	0.19	0.28	-0.28	0.23	-0.31	0.28	-0.47	0.25	-0.50	0.28	-0.03	0.29
INT	-0.70	0.35	-0.65	0.33	-0.88	0.32	-1.11	0.36	0.05	0.28	-0.18	0.23	-0.41	0.29	-0.23	0.28	-0.46	0.29	-0.23	0.31
Self-employed	-0.81	0.42	-0.98	0.40	-1.10	0.39	-0.84	0.42	-0.17	0.36	-0.29	0.31	-0.03	0.35	-0.13	0.36	0.14	0.37	0.26	0.38
Labour Class	-1.43	0.35	-1.35	0.33	-1.75	0.32	-1.79	0.36	0.08	0.30	-0.32	0.25	-0.36	0.30	-0.40	0.30	-0.44	0.30	-0.04	0.33
Public sector	-0.24	0.25	-0.04	0.22	-0.13	0.23	-0.38	0.29	0.21	0.22	0.11	0.20	-0.14	0.27	-0.10	0.21	-0.35	0.26	-0.25	0.28
Unemployed	-0.24	0.31	-0.82	0.32	-1.18	0.39	-1.51	0.87	-0.58	0.36	-0.94	0.40	-1.27	0.88	-0.36	0.46	-0.69	0.88	-0.33	1.03
Inactive	-0.03	0.22	-0.02	0.20	-0.30	0.20	0.02	0.24	0.01	0.19	-0.27	0.18	0.05	0.23	-0.28	0.19	0.04	0.22	0.32	0.24
Intercept	1.65	0.32	1.66	0.37	2.16	0.34	1.23	0.39	0.02	0.31	0.52	0.24	-0.41	0.32	0.50	0.35	-0.43	0.35	-0.93	0.38

n= 2679

The table cells show the parameter estimates and standard error

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table C-7 Social differences in preferences in Germany

	Max										High (-	+)						
	High (+	-)	High		Mod(+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low (+	)	High		Mod(+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low (+	)
Younger	-0.18	0.25	-0.01	0.17	-0.26	0.28	0.34	0.20	0.06	0.51	0.17	0.23	0.52	0.24	-0.08	0.35	0.24	0.53
Older	-0.11	0.28	-0.47	0.21	-0.27	0.29	-0.05	0.23	-0.88	0.72	-0.36	0.26	0.06	0.26	-0.16	0.35	-0.77	0.74
Female	-0.28	0.23	-0.09	0.15	-0.37	0.26	-0.33	0.16	-1.10	0.51	0.19	0.22	-0.06	0.21	-0.10	0.36	-0.83	0.53
Service Class II	-0.25	0.50	-0.52	0.35	0.26	0.48	-0.16	0.36	-0.53	0.83	-0.27	0.47	0.08	0.46	0.51	0.64	-0.29	0.87
Intermediate	0.10	0.43	-0.19	0.30	0.18	0.45	-0.03	0.34	-0.70	1.07	-0.29	0.40	-0.13	0.41	0.08	0.60	-0.80	1.09
Self-employed	-0.71	0.45	-0.01	0.30	-0.11	0.46	-0.02	0.33	-0.59	0.69	0.70	0.42	0.69	0.41	0.60	0.61	0.12	0.73
Labour Class	-0.40	0.45	-0.23	0.28	-0.28	0.44	-0.23	0.31	-0.14	0.51	0.17	0.42	0.18	0.41	0.12	0.65	0.26	0.58
Public sector	-0.26	0.42	0.06	0.25	0.03	0.36	0.27	0.26	-0.40	0.63	0.32	0.38	0.53	0.37	0.29	0.51	-0.14	0.69
Unemployed	-0.48	0.48	-0.05	0.28	0.04	0.44	-0.56	0.35	0.00	0.76	0.43	0.47	-0.08	0.50	0.52	0.67	0.48	0.84
Inactive	0.29	0.28	0.24	0.19	0.17	0.27	0.00	0.21	-0.05	0.54	-0.05	0.25	-0.29	0.26	-0.12	0.36	-0.34	0.57
Intercept	0.03	0.53	0.48	0.30	-0.26	0.55	0.20	0.31	-0.83	0.50	0.45	0.52	0.17	0.51	-0.29	0.88	-0.86	0.63

	High						Mod(+	)			Mix (L-	M)
	Mod(+)		Mix (L-	M)	Low (+)		Mix (L-	M)	Low (+)		Low (+)	)
Younger	0.35	0.20	-0.25	0.28	0.07	0.50	-0.60	0.31	-0.28	0.57	0.33	0.51
Older	0.42	0.24	0.20	0.28	-0.42	0.71	-0.22	0.30	-0.84	0.76	-0.62	0.74
Female	-0.24	0.16	-0.28	0.25	-1.01	0.50	-0.04	0.28	-0.77	0.52	-0.73	0.57
Service Class II	0.36	0.38	0.78	0.48	-0.01	0.81	0.43	0.49	-0.37	0.88	-0.80	0.91
Intermediate	0.15	0.34	0.36	0.45	-0.51	1.06	0.21	0.50	-0.66	1.16	-0.87	1.11
Self-employed	-0.01	0.33	-0.10	0.44	-0.58	0.66	-0.09	0.48	-0.57	0.71	-0.48	0.77
Labour Class	0.00	0.31	-0.05	0.44	0.09	0.49	-0.06	0.48	0.09	0.55	0.14	0.62
Public sector	0.21	0.26	-0.03	0.34	-0.47	0.63	-0.24	0.36	-0.67	0.63	-0.43	0.68
Unemployed	-0.51	0.36	0.09	0.43	0.05	0.76	0.60	0.50	0.56	0.85	-0.04	0.83
Inactive	-0.24	0.20	-0.07	0.26	-0.28	0.54	0.17	0.27	-0.05	0.59	-0.22	0.57
Intercept	-0.27	0.33	-0.73	0.55	-1.30	0.48	-0.46	0.57	-1.03	0.52	-0.57	0.68

n= 2515

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

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#### Appendix table C-8 Spain

	Max								High (·	+)					High (+	+)			Mod	
	High (+	-)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Younger	0.64	0.29	0.98	0.25	0.98	0.28	1.04	0.42	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.25	0.40	0.41	0.01	0.25	0.06	0.39	0.05	0.48
Older	0.29	0.33	0.53	0.26	-0.22	0.29	0.30	0.38	0.24	0.29	-0.51	0.27	0.01	0.43	-0.74	0.27	-0.23	0.36	0.52	0.43
Female	-0.71	0.28	-0.51	0.19	-0.65	0.22	-1.33	0.26	0.20	0.26	0.06	0.25	-0.62	0.32	-0.14	0.21	-0.82	0.24	-0.68	0.30
Service Class II	-0.33	0.36	-0.24	0.27	-0.22	0.32	-1.26	0.41	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.28	-0.93	0.41	0.02	0.28	-1.02	0.37	-1.04	0.42
Intermediate	-0.04	0.38	0.00	0.30	-0.20	0.35	-0.57	0.41	0.04	0.30	-0.15	0.30	-0.52	0.40	-0.19	0.31	-0.56	0.35	-0.37	0.45
Self-employed	-0.39	0.47	-0.32	0.38	-0.04	0.40	-0.19	0.45	0.07	0.42	0.35	0.38	0.20	0.45	0.28	0.40	0.13	0.41	-0.15	0.47
Labour Class	-0.85	0.37	-0.71	0.27	-0.85	0.33	-1.24	0.36	0.14	0.33	0.00	0.31	-0.40	0.39	-0.14	0.31	-0.54	0.31	-0.40	0.43
Public sector	-0.10	0.23	0.18	0.19	-0.31	0.22	0.20	0.29	0.28	0.21	-0.21	0.21	0.30	0.30	-0.49	0.21	0.02	0.28	0.51	0.32
Unemployed	0.95	0.77	0.69	0.68	0.02	0.79	0.99	0.79	-0.26	0.62	-0.92	0.58	0.05	0.64	-0.66	0.64	0.31	0.63	0.97	0.77
Inactive	-0.41	0.32	-0.18	0.23	-0.13	0.27	0.07	0.31	0.23	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.49	0.31	0.06	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.20	0.32
Intercept	0.98	0.31	0.76	0.34	0.87	0.39	0.31	0.63	-0.23	0.33	-0.11	0.33	-0.67	0.65	0.12	0.43	-0.44	0.54	-0.56	0.81

n=1817

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

#### Appendix table C-9 Sweden

	Max										High (+)							
	High (+)		High (-)		Mod		Mix (L-M)		Mix (L-H)		High (-)		Mod		Mix (L-M)		Mix (L-H)	
Younger	1.31	0.39	0.91	0.37	1.17	0.40	0.44	0.69	0.64	0.46	-0.40	0.25	-0.13	0.29	-0.86	0.63	-0.67	0.37
Older	0.38	0.39	0.43	0.33	0.23	0.56	1.34	0.50	0.91	0.39	0.05	0.25	-0.15	0.52	0.97	0.43	0.53	0.32
Female	0.57	0.35	0.30	0.29	0.17	0.34	0.07	0.33	0.27	0.33	-0.27	0.19	-0.40	0.23	-0.50	0.26	-0.30	0.23
Service Class II	-0.28	0.61	-0.80	0.46	-0.78	0.51	-0.56	0.55	-0.81	0.51	-0.52	0.35	-0.50	0.37	-0.28	0.56	-0.53	0.41
Intermediate	-0.04	0.55	-0.55	0.43	-0.89	0.49	-0.89	0.51	-0.96	0.51	-0.51	0.33	-0.86	0.37	-0.86	0.47	-0.93	0.41
Self-employed	-0.90	0.65	-1.48	0.46	-1.40	0.52	-1.67	0.63	-1.48	0.54	-0.58	0.47	-0.50	0.48	-0.77	0.75	-0.58	0.52
Labour Class	-0.17	0.58	-0.87	0.42	-1.35	0.50	-0.69	0.56	-1.09	0.49	-0.69	0.43	-1.18	0.42	-0.52	0.68	-0.92	0.51
Public sector	0.34	0.39	0.28	0.33	-0.13	0.42	0.09	0.41	-0.10	0.40	-0.05	0.21	-0.46	0.32	-0.25	0.37	-0.43	0.29
Unemployed	-1.67	1.04	-1.61	0.60	-2.11	0.75	-1.58	1.05	-1.45	0.89	0.07	0.85	-0.44	0.79	0.09	0.98	0.22	0.91
Inactive	-0.98	0.48	-1.12	0.43	-1.07	0.50	-1.32	0.55	-1.30	0.47	-0.15	0.21	-0.09	0.30	-0.34	0.40	-0.32	0.30
Intercept	0.96	0.54	2.42	0.42	1.87	0.68	1.14	0.52	1.69	0.64	1.46	0.36	0.91	0.57	0.19	0.50	0.74	0.63

	High (-)						Mod				Mix (L-M)	
	Mod		Mix (L-M)		Mix (L-H)		Mix (L-M)		Mix (L-H)		Mix (L-H)	
Younger	-0.47	0.54	0.26	0.26	-0.27	0.34	-0.73	0.58	-0.53	0.40	0.20	0.61
Older	0.91	0.35	-0.20	0.51	0.48	0.29	<u>1.11</u>	<u>0.61</u>	0.68	0.66	-0.43	0.42
Female	-0.23	0.20	-0.13	0.21	-0.03	0.20	-0.10	0.26	0.10	0.28	0.19	0.25
Service Class II	0.24	0.38	0.02	0.30	-0.02	0.30	0.22	0.46	-0.04	0.41	-0.26	0.43
Intermediate	-0.35	0.33	-0.35	0.30	-0.42	0.34	0.00	0.41	-0.07	0.46	-0.07	0.44
Self-employed	-0.19	0.52	0.08	0.37	0.00	0.39	-0.27	0.61	-0.08	0.51	0.19	0.58
Labour Class	0.18	0.44	-0.49	0.40	-0.23	0.36	0.66	0.57	0.26	0.56	-0.40	0.53
Public sector	-0.20	0.29	-0.41	0.30	-0.38	0.27	0.21	0.37	0.03	0.45	-0.19	0.37
Unemployed	0.03	0.78	-0.51	0.65	0.15	0.70	0.54	0.93	0.66	0.95	0.13	0.92
Inactive	-0.19	0.32	0.05	0.30	-0.17	0.28	-0.25	0.43	-0.23	0.43	0.02	0.41
Intercept	-1.27	0.36	-0.55	0.58	-0.72	0.51	-0.72	0.63	-0.17	0.99	0.55	0.62

n=2293

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

#### Appendix table C-10 UK

Germany Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square

Value		1731.08
Degrees		
of	Freedom	2113.00
P-Value		1.00

#### Reference class =Expansive

	Mod		SS		Min	
UNDER36	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.22	0.04	0.26
OLDER	0.11	0.19	-0.04	0.20	0.54	0.23
FEMALE	-0.46	0.15	-0.39	0.16	-0.82	0.18
SII	-0.30	0.29	-0.45	0.31	-0.70	0.32
INT	-0.69	0.28	-1.01	0.30	-1.29	0.31
SELF	-1.11	0.34	-1.39	0.37	-1.09	0.36
LAB	-1.38	0.28	-1.66	0.29	-1.84	0.31
PUBSEC	-0.01	0.20	-0.30	0.22	-0.37	0.25
UNEMP	-1.05	0.34	-0.26	0.28	-1.23	0.55
EDLABF	-0.29	0.17	0.01	0.19	-0.07	0.21
Intercept	1.83	0.31	2.07	0.25	1.47	0.33

# D. Preferences and participation

#### Germany

	Max								High(+	/-)					High				Mod(+,	/-)
	High(+	/-)	High		Mod(+	/-)	Low		High		Mod(+,	/-)	Low		Mod(+	/-)	Low		Low	
Non-voters	-0.60	0.21	-0.75	0.19	-1.05	0.22	-0.84	0.25	-0.15	0.23	-0.45	0.23	-0.24	0.26	-0.30	0.25	-0.09	0.25	0.22	0.30
Not eligible	-0.12	0.34	0.06	0.29	0.08	0.30	-0.51	0.41	0.18	0.32	0.19	0.29	-0.40	0.41	0.02	0.30	-0.57	0.38	-0.59	0.44
Intercepts	0.72	0.13	0.87	0.16	0.85	0.17	0.16	0.24	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.17	-0.56	0.22	-0.02	0.22	-0.71	0.24	-0.69	0.31
With controls																				
Non-voter	-0.35	0.24	-0.51	0.21	-0.74	0.23	-0.61	0.28	-0.16	0.24	-0.40	0.23	-0.27	0.28	-0.24	0.25	-0.11	0.28	0.13	0.31
Not eligible	-0.23	0.39	0.06	0.32	-0.02	0.33	-0.22	0.49	0.29	0.35	0.22	0.31	0.01	0.48	-0.08	0.31	-0.28	0.44	-0.20	0.49
Younger	0.28	0.27	0.36	0.23	0.50	0.23	0.24	0.32	0.08	0.25	0.22	0.22	-0.04	0.32	0.14	0.22	-0.12	0.30	-0.26	0.32
Older	0.09	0.23	-0.07	0.21	-0.04	0.22	0.66	0.27	-0.15	0.21	-0.12	0.20	0.58	0.26	0.03	0.22	0.73	0.25	0.70	0.27
Female	-0.50	0.20	-0.34	0.17	-0.60	0.17	-0.91	0.21	0.16	0.18	-0.10	0.16	-0.41	0.20	-0.26	0.17	-0.57	0.19	-0.31	0.21
Service Class II	-0.26	0.36	-0.06	0.32	-0.53	0.32	-0.56	0.36	0.21	0.28	-0.27	0.23	-0.30	0.28	-0.47	0.26	-0.51	0.28	-0.03	0.29
Intermediate	-0.65	0.36	-0.58	0.33	-0.79	0.33	-1.04	0.37	0.07	0.28	-0.14	0.24	-0.39	0.30	-0.21	0.29	-0.46	0.29	-0.25	0.33
Self-employed	-0.79	0.41	-0.94	0.40	-1.05	0.39	-0.80	0.42	-0.15	0.37	-0.26	0.32	-0.01	0.35	-0.11	0.37	0.14	0.37	0.25	0.38
Labour Class	-1.34	0.35	-1.24	0.33	-1.61	0.33	-1.67	0.37	0.09	0.30	-0.27	0.25	-0.33	0.31	-0.37	0.30	-0.42	0.30	-0.06	0.33
Public sector	-0.28	0.25	-0.06	0.22	-0.16	0.23	-0.41	0.30	0.22	0.22	0.11	0.20	-0.14	0.28	-0.10	0.21	-0.36	0.27	-0.25	0.29
Unemployed	-0.19	0.31	-0.74	0.33	-1.06	0.42	-1.41	1.07	-0.55	0.37	-0.88	0.42	-1.23	1.08	-0.32	0.49	-0.67	1.07	-0.35	1.28
Inactive	0.00	0.22	-0.01	0.20	-0.29	0.21	0.05	0.25	-0.01	0.20	-0.29	0.18	0.05	0.23	-0.28	0.19	0.06	0.22	0.34	0.25
Intercept	1.66	0.31	1.67	0.37	2.18	0.34	1.27	0.44	0.00	0.31	0.52	0.25	-0.40	0.38	0.52	0.37	-0.40	0.40	-0.92	0.48

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* 

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-1 Preferences of voters in Germany, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High(+/-)							High			Mod(+	/-)
	High(+/-)		High		Mod(+/-)		Low		High		Mod(+/-)		Low		Mod(+/-)		Low		Low	
Trade union	-0.02	0.28	0.16	0.24	0.05	0.25	-0.46	0.33	0.19	0.26	0.07	0.23	-0.44	0.32	-0.12	0.25	-0.63	0.31	-0.51	0.33
Intercept	0.59	0.12	0.74	0.15	0.67	0.17	0.01	0.22	0.15	0.15	0.08	0.16	-0.58	0.21	-0.06	0.21	-0.72	0.22	-0.66	0.30
With controls																				
Trade Union	-0.14	0.30	0.01	0.26	-0.16	0.26	-0.66	0.35	0.15	0.27	-0.02	0.24	-0.52	0.33	-0.29	0.19	0.00	0.22	-0.50	0.35
Younger	0.21	0.26	0.35	0.22	0.44	0.23	0.13	0.32	0.14	0.23	0.23	0.20	-0.07	0.30	-0.17	0.25	-0.67	0.33	-0.31	0.31
Older	0.11	0.23	-0.05	0.21	-0.03	0.22	0.70	0.26	-0.16	0.21	-0.14	0.20	0.59	0.25	0.09	0.21	-0.22	0.29	0.73	0.27
Female	-0.50	0.20	-0.36	0.17	-0.63	0.17	-0.95	0.21	0.15	0.18	-0.13	0.16	-0.45	0.20	0.02	0.22	0.75	0.24	-0.32	0.21
Service Class II	-0.30	0.37	-0.11	0.33	-0.57	0.33	-0.58	0.36	0.19	0.28	-0.28	0.23	-0.29	0.28	-0.27	0.16	-0.59	0.19	-0.01	0.29
Intermediate	-0.70	0.35	-0.65	0.32	-0.88	0.32	-1.10	0.36	0.05	0.28	-0.18	0.23	-0.40	0.30	-0.47	0.25	-0.48	0.28	-0.23	0.33
Self-employed	-0.82	0.42	-0.98	0.40	-1.12	0.40	-0.90	0.42	-0.16	0.36	-0.30	0.31	-0.07	0.35	-0.22	0.28	-0.45	0.29	0.22	0.38
Labour Class	-1.43	0.35	-1.36	0.32	-1.75	0.32	-1.78	0.36	0.08	0.30	-0.32	0.25	-0.35	0.30	-0.14	0.37	0.09	0.37	-0.03	0.33
Public sector	-0.24	0.25	-0.04	0.22	-0.12	0.23	-0.34	0.30	0.20	0.22	0.11	0.20	-0.11	0.28	-0.40	0.30	-0.43	0.30	-0.22	0.30
Unemployed	-0.26	0.31	-0.83	0.32	-1.21	0.41	-1.53	0.98	-0.57	0.36	-0.95	0.41	-1.28	0.99	-0.08	0.21	-0.30	0.27	-0.33	1.18
Inactive	-0.04	0.22	-0.02	0.20	-0.31	0.20	-0.02	0.24	0.02	0.19	-0.27	0.18	0.02	0.23	-0.37	0.48	-0.70	0.98	0.29	0.24
Intercept	1.68	0.33	1.68	0.37	2.20	0.35	1.34	0.43	0.01	0.30	0.53	0.25	-0.33	0.36	0.52	0.37	-0.34	0.38	-0.86	0.46

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-2 Preferences of trade union members Germany, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High(+,			High				Mod(+/-)				
	High(+/-)		High		Mod(+/-)		Low		High		Mod(+/-)		Low		Mod(+/-)		Low		Low	
Contact	0.43	0.26	0.57	0.23	0.80	0.23	0.73	0.28	0.13	0.24	0.37	0.20	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.21	0.16	0.24	-0.07	0.28
Intercept	0.53	0.12	0.67	0.15	0.56	0.17	-0.15	0.22	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.17	-0.68	0.22	-0.11	0.21	-0.82	0.23	-0.71	0.30
With controls																				
Contact	0.19	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.49	0.25	0.32	0.29	0.09	0.27	0.30	0.21	0.13	0.27	0.21	0.23	0.04	0.25	0.32	0.24
Younger	0.23	0.26	0.37	0.22	0.50	0.23	0.18	0.31	0.14	0.23	0.27	0.20	-0.05	0.30	0.13	0.21	-0.19	0.29	-0.17	0.27
Older	0.12	0.23	-0.04	0.21	-0.01	0.22	0.71	0.25	-0.16	0.21	-0.13	0.20	0.59	0.24	0.04	0.22	0.75	0.24	-0.32	0.31
Female	-0.48	0.20	-0.34	0.17	-0.58	0.17	-0.89	0.21	0.14	0.18	-0.10	0.16	-0.41	0.20	-0.24	0.16	-0.55	0.19	0.71	0.26
Service Class I	-0.29	0.37	-0.11	0.32	-0.57	0.32	-0.60	0.36	0.18	0.28	-0.28	0.23	-0.30	0.28	-0.46	0.25	-0.49	0.28	-0.31	0.21
Intermediate	-0.69	0.35	-0.63	0.33	-0.83	0.32	-1.08	0.36	0.06	0.28	-0.15	0.23	-0.39	0.29	-0.20	0.29	-0.45	0.29	-0.03	0.29
Self-employed	-0.82	0.42	-0.99	0.40	-1.10	0.39	-0.84	0.42	-0.17	0.36	-0.28	0.31	-0.02	0.35	-0.11	0.36	0.15	0.37	-0.25	0.31
Labour Class	-1.41	0.35	-1.32	0.32	-1.68	0.33	-1.74	0.36	0.09	0.30	-0.27	0.25	-0.34	0.30	-0.36	0.30	-0.42	0.30	0.26	0.38
Public sector	-0.25	0.25	-0.05	0.22	-0.16	0.23	-0.41	0.29	0.20	0.22	0.09	0.20	-0.16	0.27	-0.11	0.21	-0.36	0.26	-0.07	0.33
Unemployed	-0.24	0.31	-0.82	0.32	-1.17	0.39	-1.51	0.88	-0.58	0.36	-0.93	0.40	-1.27	0.90	-0.35	0.46	-0.69	0.89	-0.25	0.28
Inactive	-0.04	0.22	-0.03	0.20	-0.31	0.20	0.01	0.24	0.01	0.19	-0.27	0.18	0.05	0.23	-0.28	0.19	0.04	0.22	-0.34	1.05
Intercept	1.60	0.33	1.61	0.37	2.03	0.35	1.14	0.39	0.02	0.30	0.43	0.24	-0.45	0.32	0.42	0.37	-0.47	0.34	-0.88	0.39

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-3 Preferences of contacting participants Germany, overall and controlling for their social characteristics
	Max								High(+	/-)					High				Mod(+,	/-)
	High(+	/-)	High		Mod(+,	/-)	Low		High		Mod(+,	/-)	Low		Mod(+	/-)	Low		Low	
Org work	0.72	0.23	0.88	0.20	0.96	0.21	0.52	0.40	0.16	0.21	0.24	0.18	-0.20	0.40	-0.16	0.21	0.08	0.19	-0.44	0.44
Intercept	0.42	0.13	0.53	0.16	0.49	0.15	-0.26	0.22	0.11	0.16	0.08	0.16	-0.68	0.21	-0.11	0.16	-0.04	0.19	-0.76	0.27
With controls																				
Org work	0.55	0.24	0.61	0.21	0.66	0.21	0.26	0.31	0.02	0.20	-0.27	0.18	0.09	0.24	0.05	0.19	-0.35	0.28	-0.40	0.32
Younger	0.24	0.26	0.37	0.22	0.47	0.22	0.18	0.31	0.06	0.19	0.12	0.18	-0.29	0.29	0.1	0.21	-0.19	0.29	-0.29	0.31
Older	0.15	0.23	-0.02	0.21	0.03	0.22	0.73	0.25	0.13	0.23	0.23	0.20	-0.06	0.30	0.05	0.22	0.75	0.24	0.70	0.26
Female	-0.44	0.19	-0.30	0.17	-0.55	0.17	-0.89	0.21	-0.18	0.21	-0.13	0.20	0.58	0.24	-0.26	0.16	-0.59	0.20	-0.34	0.21
Service Class II	-0.24	0.36	-0.06	0.32	-0.53	0.32	-0.57	0.36	0.15	0.17	-0.11	0.16	-0.44	0.20	-0.47	0.25	-0.51	0.28	-0.04	0.29
Intermediate	-0.65	0.34	-0.58	0.32	-0.83	0.32	-1.06	0.36	0.19	0.27	-0.28	0.22	-0.33	0.28	-0.25	0.28	-0.48	0.29	-0.23	0.32
Self-employed	-0.80	0.41	-0.95	0.39	-1.07	0.38	-0.83	0.42	0.07	0.28	-0.18	0.23	-0.41	0.30	-0.11	0.36	0.12	0.38	0.23	0.38
Labour Class	-1.33	0.34	-1.22	0.32	-1.62	0.31	-1.72	0.36	-0.15	0.37	-0.26	0.31	-0.03	0.36	-0.4	0.29	-0.49	0.30	-0.09	0.33
Public sector	-0.28	0.25	-0.08	0.22	-0.18	0.23	-0.39	0.29	0.11	0.30	-0.30	0.25	-0.39	0.30	-0.11	0.21	-0.31	0.26	-0.21	0.29
Unemployed	-0.23	0.30	-0.80	0.32	-1.14	0.38	-1.6	0.97	0.21	0.21	0.10	0.20	-0.11	0.28	-0.34	0.46	-0.80	0.98	-0.46	1.13
Inactive	-0.05	0.22	-0.03	0.20	-0.32	0.20	0.04	0.25	-0.57	0.36	-0.91	0.39	-1.37	0.98	-0.29	0.19	0.07	0.23	0.36	0.26
Intercept	1.43	0.33	1.41	0.36	1.92	0.34	1.05	0.4	-0.02	0.30	0.50	0.24	-0.38	0.33	0.51	0.34	-0.36	0.35	-0.87	0.39

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-4 Preferences of organisation work participants in Germany, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High(+	/-)					High				Mod(+,	/-)
	High(+	-/-)	High		Mod(+,	/-)	Low		High		Mod(+	/-)	Low		Mod(+	/-)	Low		Low	
Demo	0.58	0.35	0.63	0.31	0.42	0.32	0.20	0.41	0.05	0.32	-0.16	0.27	-0.38	0.40	-0.21	0.29	-0.43	0.37	-0.21	0.41
Intercept	0.54	0.12	0.69	0.15	0.65	0.17	-0.06	0.22	0.15	0.16	0.11	0.17	-0.60	0.22	-0.04	0.21	-0.75	0.23	-0.71	0.31
With Controls																				
Demo	0.46	0.36	0.38	0.34	0.12	0.34	0.11	0.44	-0.08	0.33	-0.34	0.27	-0.35	0.40	-0.26	0.31	-0.27	0.39	-0.01	0.42
Younger	0.20	0.26	0.33	0.22	0.45	0.22	0.16	0.31	0.13	0.23	0.25	0.20	-0.04	0.30	0.12	0.21	-0.17	0.28	-0.30	0.30
Older	0.14	0.23	-0.04	0.21	-0.01	0.22	0.71	0.25	-0.18	0.21	-0.15	0.20	0.56	0.24	0.03	0.22	0.74	0.24	0.72	0.26
Female	-0.49	0.20	-0.34	0.17	-0.61	0.17	-0.91	0.21	0.15	0.18	-0.12	0.16	-0.42	0.20	-0.27	0.16	-0.56	0.19	-0.30	0.21
Service Class II	-0.28	0.37	-0.09	0.32	-0.56	0.32	-0.59	0.36	0.19	0.28	-0.28	0.23	-0.31	0.28	-0.47	0.26	-0.50	0.28	-0.03	0.29
Intermediate	-0.66	0.35	-0.61	0.33	-0.85	0.32	-1.09	0.36	0.05	0.28	-0.20	0.23	-0.43	0.30	-0.24	0.28	-0.47	0.29	-0.23	0.31
Self-employed	-0.78	0.41	-0.95	0.40	-1.09	0.39	-0.83	0.42	-0.17	0.36	-0.31	0.31	-0.05	0.35	-0.14	0.37	0.13	0.37	0.26	0.38
Labour Class	-1.40	0.34	-1.32	0.32	-1.73	0.32	-1.77	0.36	0.08	0.30	-0.33	0.25	-0.37	0.30	-0.42	0.30	-0.45	0.30	-0.04	0.33
Public sector	-0.26	0.25	-0.05	0.22	-0.13	0.23	-0.38	0.29	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.20	-0.12	0.27	-0.08	0.21	-0.33	0.26	-0.25	0.28
Unemployed	-0.24	0.31	-0.82	0.32	-1.19	0.39	-1.51	0.89	-0.57	0.37	-0.95	0.40	-1.27	0.91	-0.38	0.47	-0.70	0.90	-0.32	1.06
Inactive	-0.03	0.22	-0.02	0.20	-0.30	0.20	0.02	0.24	0.02	0.20	-0.27	0.18	0.05	0.23	-0.28	0.19	0.04	0.22	0.32	0.24
Intercept	1.57	0.33	1.60	0.36	2.14	0.34	1.20	0.39	0.03	0.30	0.56	0.24	-0.38	0.32	0.54	0.36	-0.40	0.35	-0.94	0.39

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-5 Preferences of demonstrating participants Germany, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

#### Spain

	Max										High (·	+)							High						Mod (-	+)			Mix (L-	-M)
	High (-	+)	High		Mod (-	+)	Mix (L-	-M)	Low		High		Mod (·	+)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mod (·	+)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mix (L-	·M)	Low		Low	
Non-voters	-0.73	0.28	-0.14	0.18	-0.25	0.21	-0.57	0.30	-0.12	0.40	0.59	0.27	0.48	0.28	0.16	0.40	0.61	0.44	-0.10	0.22	-0.42	0.30	0.02	0.39	-0.32	0.32	0.12	0.45	0.44	0.48
Not eligible	0.36	0.36	0.97	0.26	0.88	0.27	0.14	0.39	1.26	0.38	0.62	0.30	0.52	0.30	-0.21	0.47	0.91	0.40	-0.09	0.24	-0.83	0.36	0.29	0.34	-0.73	0.37	0.38	0.37	1.12	0.45
Intercepts	-0.28	0.28	0.13	0.11	-0.04	0.12	-0.53	0.29	-1.71	0.30	0.40	0.27	0.24	0.29	-0.26	0.52	-1.43	0.38	-0.16	0.14	-0.66	0.29	-1.83	0.34	-0.50	0.29	-1.67	0.30	-1.17	0.41
With controls																														
Non-voter	-0.72	0.30	-0.12	0.19	-0.17	0.21	-0.51	0.32	-0.19	0.41	0.60	0.29	0.55	0.29	0.21	0.43	0.53	0.47	-0.05	0.22	-0.39	0.31	-0.07	0.41	-0.34	0.34	-0.02	0.44	0.20	0.92
Not eligible	0.42	0.40	0.99	0.27	0.94	0.29	0.27	0.45	1.00	0.45	0.57	0.34	0.52	0.33	-0.15	0.57	0.58	0.49	-0.06	0.25	-0.72	0.42	0.01	0.41	-0.66	0.45	0.06	0.44	-0.54	1.27
Younger	-0.17	0.24	-0.14	0.18	0.23	0.24	-0.27	0.28	-0.08	0.94	0.03	0.23	0.40	0.27	-0.10	0.35	0.10	0.95	0.37	0.25	-0.13	0.28	0.07	0.92	-0.50	0.34	-0.31	1.07	-0.73	1.02
Older	-0.10	0.29	-0.37	0.22	0.04	0.25	-0.25	0.30	-0.79	1.28	-0.27	0.26	0.14	0.28	-0.15	0.35	-0.69	1.30	0.41	0.25	0.12	0.29	-0.42	1.27	-0.29	0.32	-0.83	1.37	-0.83	1.38
Female	-0.25	0.23	-0.08	0.15	-0.32	0.16	-0.37	0.26	-1.10	0.95	0.18	0.22	-0.07	0.21	-0.11	0.36	-0.85	0.95	-0.24	0.16	-0.29	0.26	-1.02	0.93	-0.05	0.28	-0.78	0.95	-0.95	2.51
Service Class II	-0.21	0.51	-0.54	0.36	-0.17	0.39	0.25	0.48	-0.57	1.31	-0.34	0.47	0.03	0.48	0.46	0.65	-0.37	1.33	0.37	0.41	0.80	0.49	-0.03	1.28	0.43	0.51	-0.40	1.44	-0.54	1.04
Intermediate	0.14	0.43	-0.22	0.31	-0.04	0.39	0.17	0.46	-0.78	2.50	-0.35	0.39	-0.18	0.44	0.03	0.60	-0.92	2.51	0.17	0.40	0.38	0.45	-0.57	2.49	0.21	0.54	-0.74	2.70	0.02	0.75
Self-employed	-0.66	0.45	-0.04	0.31	-0.03	0.34	-0.10	0.46	-0.64	0.98	0.62	0.42	0.62	0.42	0.56	0.62	0.02	1.00	0.01	0.34	-0.06	0.45	-0.60	0.94	-0.06	0.49	-0.60	1.03	-0.41	0.76
Labour Class	-0.34	0.46	-0.31	0.29	-0.29	0.32	-0.27	0.44	-0.24	0.65	0.03	0.43	0.05	0.42	0.07	0.65	0.10	0.72	0.02	0.32	0.05	0.44	0.07	0.63	0.03	0.48	0.05	0.73	-0.02	1.41
Public sector	-0.19	0.45	0.13	0.26	0.33	0.28	0.06	0.35	-0.35	0.72	0.32	0.39	0.52	0.38	0.25	0.52	-0.16	0.77	0.20	0.28	-0.07	0.34	-0.48	0.72	-0.27	0.37	-0.68	0.69	-0.27	1.06
Unemployed	-0.43	0.48	-0.04	0.28	-0.55	0.39	0.06	0.45	0.04	1.33	0.39	0.47	-0.12	0.53	0.49	0.68	0.47	1.35	-0.51	0.40	0.10	0.43	0.08	1.34	0.61	0.52	0.59	1.52	0.32	0.47
Inactive	0.31	0.29	0.19	0.20	-0.05	0.25	0.18	0.27	-0.09	1.04	-0.12	0.25	-0.36	0.28	-0.12	0.34	-0.39	1.04	-0.24	0.24	0.00	0.26	-0.27	1.02	0.24	0.29	-0.03	1.17	0.73	0.54
Intercept	0.07	0.53	0.49	0.31	0.21	0.32	-0.20	0.56	-0.81	0.54	0.43	0.53	0.15	0.51	-0.26	0.88	-0.88	0.67	-0.28	0.36	-0.69	0.56	-1.30	0.49	-0.41	0.58	-1.02	0.57	-0.61	0.71

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

#### Appendix table D-6 Preferences of voters in Spain, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max										High (+	·)							High						Mod (+	)			Mix (L-	M)
	High (+	)	High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mix (L-	M)	Low		Low	
Trade union	-0.28	0.38	-0.28	0.25	-0.58	0.31	-0.12	0.38	-1.75	0.92	0.00	0.38	-0.30	0.40	0.16	0.53	-1.47	0.96	-0.31	0.34	0.16	0.38	-1.48	0.92	0.46	0.44	-1.17	0.96	-1.63	0.96
Intercept	-0.40	0.29	0.20	0.10	0.03	0.10	-0.60	0.27	-1.54	0.36	0.60	0.28	0.43	0.31	-0.20	0.52	-1.14	0.45	-0.17	0.13	-0.80	0.28	-1.74	0.40	-0.63	0.27	-1.57	0.38	-0.94	0.45
With controls																														
Trade Union	-0.38	0.41	-0.26	0.26	-0.77	0.33	-0.21	0.42	-1.98	1.04	0.13	0.41	-0.39	0.43	0.17	0.57	-1.60	1.09	-0.52	0.35	0.05	0.41	-1.72	1.04	0.56	0.48	-1.20	1.08	-1.77	1.06
Younger	-0.20	0.25	-0.03	0.18	0.30	0.20	-0.28	0.29	-0.01	0.41	0.17	0.23	0.50	0.24	-0.09	0.36	0.19	0.43	0.33	0.20	-0.26	0.28	0.01	0.40	-0.59	0.31	-0.32	0.45	0.27	0.45
Older	-0.12	0.28	-0.47	0.21	-0.06	0.23	-0.27	0.30	-0.89	0.64	-0.36	0.26	0.06	0.27	-0.16	0.35	-0.77	0.66	0.42	0.24	0.20	0.29	-0.41	0.63	-0.21	0.30	-0.83	0.67	-0.62	0.66
Female	-0.28	0.23	-0.09	0.15	-0.34	0.16	-0.38	0.28	-1.11	0.43	0.19	0.22	-0.06	0.21	-0.10	0.37	-0.83	0.46	-0.25	0.16	-0.28	0.27	-1.02	0.42	-0.04	0.30	-0.77	0.44	-0.74	0.51
Service Class II	-0.23	0.52	-0.50	0.35	-0.15	0.36	0.28	0.48	-0.49	0.73	-0.27	0.49	0.08	0.47	0.51	0.66	-0.26	0.79	0.35	0.38	0.77	0.49	0.00	0.72	0.42	0.50	-0.35	0.76	-0.77	0.81
Intermediate	0.10	0.45	-0.18	0.30	-0.04	0.33	0.18	0.50	-0.60	0.79	-0.28	0.42	-0.14	0.41	0.08	0.69	-0.70	0.84	0.14	0.34	0.36	0.50	-0.42	0.78	0.22	0.55	-0.56	0.84	-0.78	0.85
Self-employed	-0.75	0.45	-0.03	0.30	-0.06	0.33	-0.12	0.48	-0.64	0.64	0.72	0.42	0.68	0.41	0.63	0.63	0.11	0.69	-0.04	0.33	-0.10	0.46	-0.62	0.62	-0.06	0.50	-0.58	0.66	-0.52	0.73
Labour Class	-0.42	0.47	-0.23	0.28	-0.25	0.31	-0.28	0.46	-0.13	0.49	0.19	0.44	0.17	0.42	0.14	0.70	0.29	0.58	-0.01	0.31	-0.05	0.46	0.11	0.47	-0.04	0.50	0.12	0.52	0.16	0.61
Public sector	-0.20	0.43	0.10	0.25	0.37	0.27	0.06	0.37	-0.29	0.61	0.30	0.39	0.57	0.37	0.26	0.53	-0.09	0.67	0.27	0.26	-0.04	0.36	-0.39	0.60	-0.31	0.37	-0.66	0.62	-0.35	0.66
Unemployed	-0.51	0.50	-0.06	0.28	-0.60	0.34	0.03	0.46	-0.11	0.64	0.44	0.49	-0.10	0.50	0.54	0.71	0.40	0.73	-0.54	0.36	0.09	0.45	-0.05	0.64	0.63	0.52	0.49	0.70	-0.14	0.73
Inactive	0.26	0.29	0.22	0.19	-0.05	0.21	0.16	0.28	-0.14	0.48	-0.04	0.27	-0.31	0.26	-0.10	0.39	-0.40	0.51	-0.27	0.20	-0.06	0.27	-0.36	0.47	0.22	0.28	-0.09	0.51	-0.30	0.52
Intercept	0.09	0.61	0.51	0.30	0.30	0.32	-0.23	0.60	-0.66	0.49	0.42	0.59	0.21	0.60	-0.32	1.03	-0.75	0.67	-0.21	0.33	-0.74	0.61	-1.17	0.47	-0.53	0.62	-0.96	0.50	-0.43	0.72

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-7 Preferences of trade union members Spain, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max										High (+	)							High						Mod (+	)			Mix (L-	M)
	High (+	·)	High		Mod (+)	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mix (L-	M)	Low		Low	
Contact	-0.36	0.40	0.18	0.25	-0.05	0.30	0.93	0.29	0.41	0.46	0.54	0.38	0.31	0.40	1.29	0.42	0.78	0.53	-0.24	0.30	0.75	0.26	0.23	0.44	0.98	0.32	0.47	0.54	-0.52	0.47
Intercept	-0.43	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.00	0.10	-0.66	0.16	-1.65	0.34	0.60	0.16	0.43	0.17	-0.23	0.26	-1.22	0.36	-0.17	0.12	-0.83	0.16	-1.82	0.38	-0.66	0.17	-1.65	0.36	-0.99	0.37
With controls																														
Contact	-0.42	0.44	0.16	0.25	-0.09	0.28	0.82	0.30	0.40	0.46	0.59	0.41	0.33	0.42	1.24	0.47	0.82	0.57	-0.25	0.27	0.66	0.28	0.24	0.45	0.91	0.32	0.49	0.49	-0.42	0.48
Younger	-0.19	0.25	-0.01	0.17	0.35	0.19	-0.25	0.27	0.00	0.39	0.18	0.23	0.54	0.23	-0.07	0.33	0.19	0.41	0.36	0.19	-0.25	0.26	0.01	0.38	-0.60	0.27	-0.35	0.41	0.25	0.43
Older	-0.14	0.29	-0.48	0.22	-0.06	0.23	-0.32	0.32	-1.02	0.52	-0.34	0.26	0.08	0.26	-0.18	0.36	-0.89	0.54	0.43	0.23	0.16	0.29	-0.54	0.51	-0.27	0.31	-0.97	0.54	-0.70	0.55
Female	-0.30	0.23	-0.09	0.15	-0.34	0.16	-0.34	0.25	-1.16	0.39	0.21	0.21	-0.04	0.21	-0.04	0.33	-0.86	0.42	-0.25	0.16	-0.25	0.24	-1.07	0.39	0.00	0.26	-0.82	0.41	-0.82	0.43
Service Class II	-0.23	0.50	-0.51	0.35	-0.15	0.36	0.28	0.48	-0.60	0.70	-0.27	0.47	0.09	0.45	0.51	0.64	-0.36	0.76	0.36	0.37	0.79	0.47	-0.09	0.69	0.43	0.49	-0.45	0.72	-0.88	0.76
Intermediate	0.07	0.43	-0.17	0.30	0.00	0.33	0.18	0.45	-0.98	0.68	-0.25	0.39	-0.07	0.38	0.11	0.59	-1.06	0.71	0.18	0.33	0.36	0.45	-0.81	0.66	0.18	0.48	-0.99	0.70	-1.17	0.75
Self-employed	-0.77	0.46	-0.01	0.30	-0.02	0.33	-0.09	0.46	-0.68	0.63	0.76	0.43	0.75	0.42	0.68	0.63	0.09	0.69	-0.01	0.32	-0.08	0.45	-0.67	0.61	-0.08	0.48	-0.67	0.65	-0.59	0.70
Labour Class	-0.45	0.43	-0.22	0.28	-0.22	0.31	-0.22	0.44	-0.19	0.48	0.23	0.40	0.22	0.39	0.23	0.61	0.26	0.55	-0.01	0.31	0.00	0.43	0.03	0.46	0.01	0.47	0.04	0.51	0.03	0.58
Public sector	-0.19	0.41	0.07	0.25	0.28	0.26	-0.05	0.35	-0.45	0.65	0.25	0.37	0.47	0.35	0.14	0.48	-0.26	0.69	0.22	0.25	-0.11	0.34	-0.52	0.64	-0.33	0.34	-0.73	0.66	-0.40	0.68
Unemployed	-0.46	0.44	-0.09	0.29	-0.60	0.34	-0.13	0.51	0.09	0.57	0.38	0.43	-0.14	0.46	0.33	0.63	0.55	0.65	-0.51	0.35	-0.05	0.47	0.18	0.57	0.46	0.52	0.69	0.62	0.22	0.68
Inactive	0.31	0.27	0.26	0.19	0.00	0.21	0.23	0.27	0.08	0.45	-0.05	0.24	-0.32	0.24	-0.08	0.33	-0.23	0.48	-0.26	0.20	-0.03	0.25	-0.18	0.44	0.23	0.26	0.08	0.47	-0.15	0.48
Intercept	0.09	0.47	0.46	0.30	0.22	0.32	-0.38	0.51	-0.85	0.50	0.37	0.43	0.13	0.42	-0.47	0.72	-0.94	0.57	-0.24	0.32	-0.84	0.50	-1.31	0.48	-0.60	0.53	-1.07	0.51	-0.48	0.64

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-8 Preferences of contacting participants in Spain, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max										High (+	)							High						Mod (+	)			Mix (L-	M)
	High (+	)	High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mix (L-	M)	Low		Low	
Org work	0.07	0.43	0.30	0.24	0.33	0.26	0.53	0.32	0.17	0.46	0.23	0.40	0.26	0.39	0.46	0.52	0.11	0.56	0.03	0.25	0.23	0.29	-0.12	0.44	0.20	0.32	-0.15	0.48	-0.35	0.48
Intercept	-0.45	0.27	0.15	0.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.62	0.24	-1.69	0.31	0.60	0.26	0.41	0.28	-0.18	0.47	-1.24	0.37	-0.19	0.12	-0.78	0.25	-1.84	0.35	-0.59	0.24	-1.66	0.33	-1.06	0.40
With controls																														
Contact	-0.08	0.46	0.35	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.48	0.32	0.26	0.57	0.43	0.43	0.30	0.42	0.56	0.55	0.33	0.68	-0.13	0.26	0.13	0.30	-0.09	0.56	0.26	0.33	0.04	0.60	-0.22	0.60
Younger	-0.19	0.25	0.00	0.17	0.35	0.20	-0.24	0.27	0.07	0.52	0.19	0.24	0.53	0.25	-0.05	0.35	0.26	0.54	0.35	0.20	-0.24	0.27	0.07	0.51	-0.59	0.30	-0.28	0.58	0.31	0.52
Older	-0.12	0.29	-0.46	0.21	-0.04	0.23	-0.25	0.29	-0.88	0.72	-0.34	0.26	0.08	0.27	-0.13	0.35	-0.76	0.74	0.42	0.23	0.21	0.28	-0.42	0.71	-0.20	0.30	-0.84	0.76	-0.64	0.74
Female	-0.27	0.23	-0.08	0.15	-0.33	0.16	-0.37	0.24	-1.10	0.52	0.19	0.22	-0.06	0.21	-0.10	0.34	-0.83	0.54	-0.25	0.16	-0.28	0.24	-1.02	0.50	-0.03	0.26	-0.77	0.52	-0.73	0.57
Service Class II	-0.24	0.51	-0.53	0.35	-0.17	0.36	0.25	0.48	-0.54	0.89	-0.29	0.48	0.07	0.47	0.49	0.65	-0.31	0.93	0.36	0.38	0.78	0.48	-0.02	0.87	0.42	0.49	-0.38	0.95	-0.80	0.97
Intermediate	0.10	0.43	-0.17	0.30	-0.03	0.34	0.21	0.45	-0.68	1.07	-0.26	0.40	-0.12	0.41	0.11	0.60	-0.78	1.09	0.14	0.34	0.38	0.44	-0.51	1.05	0.24	0.49	-0.66	1.15	-0.89	1.10
Self-employed	-0.73	0.46	0.02	0.30	-0.01	0.33	-0.08	0.46	-0.58	0.69	0.74	0.43	0.72	0.42	0.65	0.63	0.15	0.74	-0.02	0.33	-0.09	0.45	-0.59	0.66	-0.07	0.48	-0.57	0.72	-0.50	0.77
Labour Class	-0.42	0.46	-0.20	0.28	-0.21	0.31	-0.23	0.45	-0.12	0.51	0.22	0.43	0.21	0.42	0.19	0.66	0.30	0.59	-0.01	0.31	-0.03	0.44	0.08	0.49	-0.02	0.48	0.09	0.55	0.11	0.62
Public sector	-0.26	0.42	0.04	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.01	0.35	-0.42	0.66	0.30	0.39	0.53	0.37	0.27	0.51	-0.16	0.71	0.22	0.27	-0.03	0.34	-0.46	0.66	-0.25	0.36	-0.68	0.66	-0.43	0.71
Unemployed	-0.46	0.48	-0.06	0.28	-0.56	0.35	0.01	0.43	0.00	0.79	0.41	0.47	-0.10	0.50	0.48	0.66	0.46	0.87	-0.50	0.37	0.07	0.42	0.06	0.79	0.57	0.49	0.56	0.88	-0.01	0.85
Inactive	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.19	0.00	0.21	0.19	0.26	-0.04	0.55	-0.04	0.25	-0.28	0.25	-0.10	0.34	-0.33	0.58	-0.25	0.20	-0.06	0.25	-0.29	0.54	0.19	0.27	-0.04	0.60	-0.23	0.57
Intercept	0.03	0.52	0.42	0.30	0.17	0.32	-0.33	0.54	-0.87	0.49	0.39	0.50	0.14	0.49	-0.36	0.84	-0.90	0.61	-0.25	0.33	-0.75	0.54	-1.29	0.48	-0.50	0.57	-1.04	0.51	-0.54	0.67

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-9 Preferences of organisation work participants in Spain, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max										High (+	)							High						Mod (+	)			Mix (L-	M)
	High (+	·)	High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		High		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mod (+	)	Mix (L-	M)	Low		Mix (L-	M)	Low		Low	
Demo	0.51	0.26	0.45	0.20	0.50	0.21	-0.18	0.52	-0.11	0.39	-0.06	0.24	-0.02	0.23	-0.69	0.59	-0.62	0.40	0.05	0.20	-0.63	0.50	-0.56	0.37	-0.67	0.54	-0.61	0.40	0.07	0.61
Intercept	-0.43	0.29	0.11	0.10	-0.09	0.11	-0.66	0.32	-1.64	0.32	0.54	0.29	0.34	0.30	-0.24	0.58	-1.21	0.40	-0.20	0.13	-0.77	0.32	-1.75	0.36	-0.57	0.32	-1.55	0.35	-0.98	0.46
With controls																														
Demo	-0.16	0.25	0.49	0.21	0.41	0.23	-0.31	0.76	-0.11	0.45	-0.03	0.25	-0.10	0.26	-0.83	0.78	-0.62	0.46	-0.08	0.23	-0.80	0.75	-0.59	0.44	-0.72	0.83	-0.52	0.49	0.21	0.85
Younger	-0.12	0.30	-0.02	0.18	0.34	0.20	-0.31	0.41	0.07	0.44	0.14	0.24	0.51	0.25	-0.14	0.51	0.24	0.46	0.37	0.20	-0.29	0.41	0.09	0.43	-0.65	0.42	-0.27	0.49	0.38	0.57
Older	-0.30	0.33	-0.47	0.22	-0.05	0.24	-0.30	0.33	-0.87	0.69	-0.35	0.26	0.07	0.27	-0.19	0.39	-0.75	0.71	0.42	0.24	0.17	0.32	-0.40	0.68	-0.25	0.34	-0.81	0.73	-0.56	0.69
Female	-0.19	0.50	-0.11	0.15	-0.35	0.17	-0.43	0.47	-1.10	0.44	0.19	0.32	-0.05	0.27	-0.13	0.71	-0.79	0.49	-0.24	0.17	-0.32	0.47	-0.99	0.43	-0.08	0.52	-0.75	0.45	-0.67	0.65
Service Class II	0.11	0.46	-0.54	0.35	-0.18	0.37	0.26	0.48	-0.46	0.77	-0.35	0.48	0.02	0.44	0.46	0.59	-0.27	0.82	0.36	0.39	0.80	0.50	0.08	0.76	0.44	0.50	-0.28	0.83	-0.72	0.84
Intermediate	-0.63	0.45	-0.15	0.30	-0.01	0.34	0.20	0.51	-0.69	0.85	-0.26	0.43	-0.11	0.44	0.09	0.71	-0.79	0.91	0.15	0.34	0.35	0.51	-0.54	0.84	0.20	0.54	-0.68	0.91	-0.88	0.93
Self-employed	-0.37	0.54	0.06	0.31	0.04	0.34	-0.15	0.46	-0.59	0.64	0.69	0.41	0.67	0.40	0.48	0.59	0.04	0.69	-0.02	0.33	-0.21	0.45	-0.65	0.62	-0.18	0.49	-0.63	0.67	-0.44	0.71
Labour Class	-0.28	0.42	-0.17	0.28	-0.18	0.31	-0.31	0.52	-0.17	0.49	0.20	0.51	0.20	0.50	0.06	0.85	0.21	0.61	-0.01	0.31	-0.14	0.52	0.00	0.47	-0.13	0.56	0.01	0.52	0.14	0.66
Public sector	-0.47	0.60	0.04	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.08	0.41	-0.38	0.62	0.32	0.39	0.53	0.35	0.36	0.57	-0.10	0.68	0.22	0.27	0.05	0.39	-0.42	0.62	-0.17	0.43	-0.63	0.63	-0.46	0.69
Unemployed	0.30	0.37	-0.05	0.29	-0.56	0.35	-0.05	0.67	-0.07	0.68	0.42	0.61	-0.09	0.58	0.42	1.04	0.40	0.81	-0.51	0.37	0.00	0.62	-0.02	0.70	0.51	0.71	0.50	0.76	-0.02	0.96
Inactive	0.51	0.26	0.27	0.19	0.03	0.21	0.18	0.36	-0.07	0.52	-0.03	0.35	-0.27	0.34	-0.12	0.59	-0.37	0.57	-0.24	0.20	-0.09	0.35	-0.33	0.51	0.15	0.36	-0.09	0.55	-0.25	0.60
Intercept	-0.02	0.80	0.36	0.30	0.08	0.32	-0.25	0.79	-0.79	0.49	0.37	0.81	0.10	0.85	-0.23	1.46	-0.77	0.84	-0.27	0.34	-0.60	0.77	-1.14	0.49	-0.33	0.76	-0.87	0.53	-0.54	0.91

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-10 Preferences of demonstrating participants in Spain, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

Sweden

	Max								High (·	+)					High				Mod	
	High (·	+)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Non-voters	-0.71	0.37	-0.84	0.28	-0.47	0.32	-0.07	0.38	-0.13	0.38	0.24	0.37	0.64	0.45	0.37	0.36	0.77	0.38	0.40	0.47
Not eligible	0.10	0.39	0.27	0.29	0.47	0.33	0.68	0.39	0.17	0.33	0.37	0.31	0.58	0.41	0.20	0.29	0.41	0.34	0.21	0.42
Intercepts	0.39	0.15	0.66	0.19	0.16	0.19	-0.62	0.26	0.27	0.16	-0.23	0.18	-1.01	0.25	-0.50	0.21	-1.27	0.23	-0.78	0.33
With controls																				
Non-voter	-0.78	0.46	-0.89	0.31	-0.80	0.35	0.00	0.43	-0.11	0.47	-0.02	0.42	0.78	0.54	0.09	0.38	0.89	0.41	0.81	0.49
Not eligible	-0.13	0.45	-0.05	0.33	-0.29	0.37	0.27	0.44	0.08	0.41	-0.16	0.35	0.40	0.48	-0.24	0.34	0.32	0.39	0.56	0.47
Younger	0.73	0.31	1.05	0.27	1.08	0.29	1.05	0.41	0.32	0.27	0.34	0.26	0.31	0.40	0.03	0.24	0.00	0.38	-0.03	0.44
Older	0.27	0.36	0.54	0.26	-0.26	0.30	0.40	0.40	0.26	0.32	-0.53	0.28	0.13	0.47	-0.80	0.29	-0.13	0.38	0.66	0.46
Female	-0.72	0.30	-0.50	0.18	-0.65	0.21	-1.33	0.26	0.22	0.29	0.07	0.27	-0.61	0.34	-0.15	0.20	-0.82	0.24	-0.67	0.29
Service Class II	-0.33	0.37	-0.22	0.27	-0.22	0.32	-1.31	0.42	0.12	0.30	0.12	0.28	-0.98	0.42	0.00	0.28	-1.10	0.38	-1.09	0.43
Intermediate	-0.06	0.39	0.03	0.30	-0.19	0.34	-0.61	0.40	0.08	0.30	-0.13	0.30	-0.56	0.39	-0.21	0.30	-0.64	0.34	-0.43	0.42
Self-employed	-0.33	0.48	-0.25	0.39	0.05	0.40	-0.23	0.46	0.08	0.43	0.38	0.38	0.10	0.46	0.30	0.40	0.02	0.42	-0.28	0.48
Labour Class	-0.77	0.38	-0.59	0.27	-0.77	0.32	-1.22	0.36	0.17	0.34	-0.01	0.32	-0.45	0.40	-0.18	0.30	-0.63	0.31	-0.45	0.40
Public sector	-0.12	0.23	0.16	0.19	-0.34	0.22	0.23	0.29	0.28	0.22	-0.22	0.21	0.34	0.30	-0.50	0.21	0.07	0.28	0.57	0.32
Unemployed	0.97	0.83	0.74	0.68	0.02	0.83	1.06	0.78	-0.22	0.67	-0.95	0.59	0.10	0.65	-0.73	0.66	0.32	0.61	1.04	0.76
Inactive	-0.41	0.34	-0.22	0.24	-0.09	0.28	0.01	0.32	0.20	0.26	0.32	0.25	0.42	0.32	0.12	0.23	0.23	0.28	0.10	0.32
Intercept	1.00	0.31	0.74	0.36	0.93	0.38	0.19	0.64	-0.26	0.35	-0.07	0.32	-0.81	0.68	0.18	0.43	-0.55	0.56	-0.74	0.81

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-11 Preferences of voters in Sweden, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High (-	+)					High				Mod	
	High (+	+)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Trade union	-0.10	0.21	-0.02	0.16	-0.49	0.18	-0.75	0.23	0.07	0.19	-0.40	0.18	-0.65	0.23	-0.47	0.17	-0.73	0.21	-0.26	0.24
Intercept	0.39	0.17	0.61	0.21	0.40	0.18	-0.17	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.01	0.18	-0.56	0.23	-0.21	0.20	-0.77	0.21	-0.57	0.27
With controls																				
Trade union	-0.24	0.28	0.03	0.20	-0.59	0.22	-0.75	0.29	0.27	0.25	-0.36	0.23	-0.52	0.32	-0.62	0.20	-0.78	0.27	-0.16	0.31
Younger	0.57	0.30	0.97	0.26	0.85	0.30	0.87	0.43	0.40	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.30	0.44	-0.12	0.26	-0.10	0.41	0.02	0.51
Older	0.25	0.34	0.53	0.25	-0.32	0.30	0.20	0.39	0.28	0.31	-0.57	0.27	-0.05	0.46	-0.85	0.29	-0.33	0.37	0.52	0.46
Female	-0.73	0.31	-0.52	0.18	-0.66	0.22	-1.37	0.26	0.21	0.29	0.07	0.26	-0.64	0.34	-0.14	0.21	-0.85	0.24	-0.71	0.30
Service Class II	-0.33	0.36	-0.23	0.27	-0.20	0.32	-1.20	0.42	0.11	0.29	0.14	0.28	-0.86	0.42	0.03	0.29	-0.97	0.38	-1.00	0.43
Intermediate	-0.04	0.38	0.01	0.30	-0.19	0.35	-0.56	0.42	0.05	0.30	-0.16	0.30	-0.52	0.40	-0.21	0.31	-0.57	0.36	-0.37	0.46
Self-employed	-0.42	0.49	-0.31	0.38	-0.11	0.41	-0.26	0.45	0.11	0.44	0.31	0.39	0.16	0.46	0.20	0.41	0.04	0.41	-0.16	0.47
Labour Class	-0.84	0.37	-0.69	0.27	-0.82	0.33	-1.20	0.36	0.15	0.34	0.02	0.32	-0.36	0.41	-0.13	0.32	-0.51	0.31	-0.38	0.43
Public sector	-0.07	0.23	0.17	0.19	-0.20	0.22	0.34	0.29	0.24	0.21	-0.13	0.22	0.41	0.30	-0.37	0.21	0.17	0.28	0.54	0.32
Unemployed	0.92	0.78	0.69	0.68	-0.08	0.80	0.88	0.80	-0.22	0.62	-1.00	0.59	-0.04	0.65	-0.77	0.65	0.18	0.63	0.96	0.79
Inactive	-0.51	0.33	-0.16	0.24	-0.35	0.28	-0.22	0.34	0.35	0.27	0.16	0.28	0.29	0.34	-0.18	0.23	-0.06	0.30	0.12	0.36
Intercept	1.15	0.38	0.71	0.38	1.26	0.43	0.81	0.68	-0.44	0.45	0.11	0.38	-0.34	0.77	0.56	0.50	0.10	0.60	-0.45	0.91

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-12 Preferences of trade union members in Sweden, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High (	+)					High				Mod	
	High (·	+)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Contact	0.42	0.34	0.24	0.27	-0.10	0.33	0.65	0.32	-0.19	0.24	-0.53	0.28	0.23	0.28	-0.34	0.27	0.42	0.26	0.76	0.34
Intercept	0.31	0.15	0.63	0.19	0.19	0.17	-0.57	0.22	0.32	0.16	-0.12	0.15	-0.87	0.20	-0.44	0.17	-1.19	0.19	-0.76	0.25
With controls																				
Contact	0.28	0.41	0.14	0.30	-0.22	0.35	0.63	0.35	-0.14	0.26	-0.49	0.31	0.35	0.31	-0.36	0.29	0.49	0.26	0.85	0.35
Younger	0.65	0.29	0.99	0.26	1.01	0.29	1.01	0.39	0.35	0.25	0.37	0.25	0.36	0.38	0.02	0.24	0.02	0.35	0.00	0.43
Older	0.31	0.34	0.54	0.27	-0.20	0.30	0.27	0.36	0.23	0.28	-0.51	0.27	-0.04	0.40	-0.74	0.27	-0.27	0.34	0.47	0.40
Female	-0.69	0.29	-0.52	0.19	-0.64	0.22	-1.34	0.26	0.17	0.27	0.05	0.25	-0.65	0.32	-0.12	0.20	-0.82	0.24	-0.70	0.28
Service Class II	-0.29	0.38	-0.22	0.28	-0.17	0.33	-1.27	0.41	0.07	0.28	0.13	0.28	-0.98	0.39	0.06	0.27	-1.05	0.35	-1.10	0.41
Intermediate	0.02	0.41	0.03	0.31	-0.16	0.36	-0.51	0.40	0.00	0.31	-0.18	0.31	-0.53	0.38	-0.19	0.30	-0.54	0.33	-0.35	0.40
Self-employed	-0.36	0.48	-0.29	0.39	-0.06	0.42	-0.12	0.45	0.07	0.41	0.31	0.40	0.24	0.44	0.24	0.40	0.17	0.40	-0.06	0.48
Labour Class	-0.80	0.38	-0.70	0.27	-0.82	0.33	-1.22	0.35	0.11	0.33	-0.02	0.32	-0.41	0.38	-0.13	0.30	-0.52	0.30	-0.39	0.39
Public sector	-0.10	0.24	0.16	0.19	-0.30	0.22	0.15	0.28	0.27	0.21	-0.20	0.21	0.25	0.29	-0.47	0.21	-0.02	0.26	0.45	0.30
Unemployed	0.95	0.81	0.72	0.73	0.08	0.82	0.95	0.83	-0.24	0.60	-0.87	0.57	0.00	0.62	-0.63	0.61	0.24	0.62	0.87	0.74
Inactive	-0.42	0.33	-0.19	0.24	-0.13	0.28	0.06	0.31	0.23	0.24	0.29	0.25	0.48	0.29	0.07	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.29
Intercept	0.92	0.32	0.77	0.35	0.86	0.37	0.29	0.54	-0.15	0.36	-0.06	0.32	-0.63	0.57	0.09	0.41	-0.48	0.45	-0.57	0.66

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-13 Preferences of contacting participants in Sweden, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High (·	+)					High				Mod	
	High (·	+)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Org work	0.26	0.19	0.33	0.28	0.37	0.22	0.35	0.22	0.08	0.25	0.11	0.20	0.09	0.18	0.04	0.31	0.02	0.27	-0.02	0.20
Intercept	0.55	0.18	-0.60	0.22	0.07	0.17	0.25	0.16	-1.14	0.19	-0.48	0.18	-0.30	0.16	0.66	0.26	0.85	0.20	0.18	0.16
With controls																				
Demo	0.27	0.24	0.22	0.19	0.29	0.23	0.32	0.32	-0.05	0.19	0.02	0.21	0.05	0.32	0.07	0.20	0.10	0.29	0.03	0.37
Younger	0.65	0.29	0.99	0.25	1.00	0.28	1.05	0.41	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.25	0.40	0.41	0.01	0.25	0.07	0.39	0.06	0.47
Older	0.28	0.33	0.52	0.25	-0.22	0.29	0.30	0.38	0.24	0.30	-0.50	0.27	0.02	0.43	-0.74	0.27	-0.22	0.36	0.52	0.43
Female	-0.70	0.28	-0.50	0.19	-0.64	0.22	-1.31	0.26	0.20	0.26	0.06	0.25	-0.62	0.32	-0.14	0.21	-0.81	0.24	-0.68	0.30
Service Class II	-0.33	0.35	-0.24	0.27	-0.22	0.32	-1.26	0.42	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.28	-0.93	0.42	0.02	0.28	-1.02	0.37	-1.04	0.43
Intermediate	-0.03	0.38	0.01	0.30	-0.18	0.36	-0.54	0.44	0.04	0.30	-0.15	0.31	-0.51	0.43	-0.19	0.32	-0.55	0.38	-0.36	0.50
Self-employed	-0.38	0.47	-0.32	0.38	-0.03	0.41	-0.18	0.45	0.06	0.42	0.35	0.38	0.21	0.45	0.29	0.40	0.14	0.41	-0.15	0.47
Labour Class	-0.82	0.37	-0.68	0.27	-0.82	0.33	-1.21	0.36	0.14	0.33	0.00	0.31	-0.39	0.39	-0.13	0.31	-0.53	0.31	-0.40	0.43
Public sector	-0.11	0.23	0.17	0.19	-0.32	0.22	0.19	0.29	0.28	0.21	-0.21	0.22	0.30	0.30	-0.49	0.21	0.02	0.28	0.51	0.32
Unemployed	0.94	0.77	0.68	0.68	0.02	0.80	0.99	0.81	-0.26	0.62	-0.92	0.59	0.05	0.65	-0.66	0.64	0.31	0.65	0.98	0.81
Inactive	-0.40	0.32	-0.17	0.23	-0.12	0.28	0.09	0.32	0.23	0.25	0.28	0.26	0.49	0.33	0.05	0.23	0.26	0.28	0.21	0.36
Intercept	0.89	0.32	0.68	0.34	0.77	0.39	0.19	0.62	-0.21	0.33	-0.12	0.33	-0.69	0.64	0.09	0.43	-0.48	0.54	-0.58	0.80

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-14 Preferences of organisation work participants in Sweden, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max								High (-	+)					High				Mod	
	High (-	+)	High		Mod		Low		High		Mod		Low		Mod		Low		Low	
Demo	-0.35	0.45	0.14	0.29	-1.05	0.47	-0.31	0.46	0.49	0.40	-0.70	0.51	0.05	0.52	-1.18	0.45	-0.44	0.44	0.74	0.60
Intercept	0.35	0.15	0.56	0.20	0.20	0.17	-0.52	0.22	0.21	0.17	-0.15	0.15	-0.87	0.20	-0.36	0.17	-1.08	0.20	-0.72	0.25
With controls																				
Demo	-0.65	0.56	-0.09	0.31	-1.22	0.46	-0.59	0.51	0.56	0.48	-0.57	0.56	0.06	0.61	-1.14	0.43	-0.51	0.49	0.63	0.62
Younger	0.66	0.29	0.97	0.25	1.00	0.28	1.06	0.42	0.31	0.26	0.34	0.26	0.40	0.42	0.04	0.25	0.10	0.40	0.06	0.49
Older	0.30	0.33	0.53	0.25	-0.22	0.29	0.32	0.39	0.23	0.30	-0.51	0.27	0.02	0.45	-0.75	0.28	-0.21	0.36	0.53	0.43
Female	-0.75	0.31	-0.52	0.18	-0.67	0.22	-1.34	0.26	0.23	0.29	0.08	0.27	-0.60	0.34	-0.15	0.21	-0.82	0.24	-0.67	0.29
Service Class II	-0.36	0.36	-0.24	0.27	-0.24	0.32	-1.29	0.41	0.12	0.31	0.12	0.29	-0.93	0.42	0.00	0.29	-1.05	0.38	-1.05	0.43
Intermediate	-0.08	0.38	0.01	0.30	-0.25	0.35	-0.59	0.41	0.09	0.31	-0.17	0.30	-0.51	0.40	-0.25	0.31	-0.59	0.35	-0.34	0.45
Self-employed	-0.38	0.47	-0.29	0.38	-0.03	0.40	-0.16	0.46	0.09	0.42	0.34	0.38	0.22	0.46	0.25	0.40	0.13	0.42	-0.12	0.48
Labour Class	-0.87	0.38	-0.69	0.27	-0.87	0.33	-1.24	0.36	0.18	0.35	0.00	0.32	-0.37	0.41	-0.18	0.32	-0.55	0.31	-0.37	0.43
Public sector	-0.08	0.23	0.18	0.19	-0.28	0.22	0.23	0.30	0.27	0.21	-0.20	0.21	0.31	0.30	-0.46	0.21	0.04	0.28	0.51	0.32
Unemployed	0.94	0.77	0.65	0.67	0.04	0.77	0.97	0.77	-0.29	0.70	-0.90	0.58	0.03	0.66	-0.61	0.67	0.32	0.64	0.93	0.75
Inactive	-0.42	0.32	-0.19	0.23	-0.11	0.26	0.08	0.31	0.24	0.26	0.32	0.26	0.50	0.31	0.08	0.22	0.27	0.26	0.19	0.31
Intercept	1.01	0.31	0.72	0.35	0.92	0.39	0.29	0.65	-0.29	0.34	-0.09	0.32	-0.72	0.69	0.20	0.43	-0.43	0.56	-0.63	0.84

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-15 Preferences of demonstrating participants in Sweden, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max										High (+	·)							High (-	)					Mod (-	+/-)			Mix (L t	to M)
	High (+	·)	High (-	)	Mod (-	+/-)	Mix (Lt	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	High (-	)	Mod (	+/-)	Mix (L 1	to M)	Mix (L-	Н)	Mod (	+/-)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L-	н)	Mix (L t	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	Mix (L-	н)
Non-voters	-0.26	0.34	-0.19	0.27	-0.05	0.35	-0.33	0.35	-0.09	0.34	0.06	0.22	0.21	0.28	-0.08	0.33	0.16	0.30	0.14	0.26	-0.14	0.25	0.10	0.26	-0.28	0.31	-0.04	0.39	0.24	0.34
Not eligible	1.19	0.67	0.98	0.66	1.25	0.68	-0.65	1.17	0.70	0.74	-0.21	0.43	0.06	0.45	-1.84	1.04	-0.49	0.53	0.27	0.38	-1.62	0.90	-0.28	0.44	-1.90	0.94	-0.56	0.55	1.34	0.98
Intercepts	0.79	0.54	1.49	0.44	0.60	0.52	0.60	0.37	0.50	0.49	0.70	0.21	-0.20	0.33	-0.20	0.36	-0.29	0.36	-0.90	0.30	-0.90	0.22	-0.99	0.29	0.00	0.34	-0.09	0.52	-0.09	0.34
With controls																														
Non-voter	-0.39	0.32	-0.20	0.28	-0.04	0.31	-0.05	0.39	0.10	0.35	0.19	0.24	0.35	0.27	0.34	0.39	0.48	0.30	0.16	0.24	0.15	0.30	0.29	0.27	-0.01	0.35	0.14	0.36	0.15	0.35
Not eligible	0.43	1.06	0.90	0.88	1.02	0.95	0.22	1.24	0.78	0.99	0.47	0.45	0.59	0.44	-0.22	1.00	0.34	0.60	0.12	0.40	-0.68	0.91	-0.12	0.56	-0.80	0.94	-0.25	0.64	0.56	1.03
Younger	1.27	0.40	0.74	0.36	0.97	0.39	0.39	0.70	0.47	0.46	-0.53	0.30	-0.30	0.31	-0.88	0.70	-0.80	0.39	0.23	0.27	-0.35	0.57	-0.27	0.36	-0.58	0.61	-0.50	0.40	0.08	0.64
Older	0.36	0.40	0.45	0.33	0.31	0.61	1.32	0.52	0.96	0.42	0.10	0.25	-0.04	0.56	0.96	0.45	0.61	0.35	-0.14	0.56	0.87	0.37	0.51	0.31	1.01	0.67	0.65	0.73	-0.36	0.46
Female	0.55	0.34	0.28	0.29	0.15	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.24	0.32	-0.26	0.19	-0.39	0.23	-0.48	0.26	-0.30	0.24	-0.13	0.21	-0.21	0.21	-0.04	0.20	-0.09	0.26	0.09	0.28	0.18	0.25
Service Class II	-0.27	0.65	-0.77	0.48	-0.75	0.52	-0.53	0.57	-0.78	0.52	-0.50	0.37	-0.49	0.39	-0.26	0.59	-0.51	0.43	0.02	0.30	0.24	0.39	-0.01	0.31	0.22	0.47	-0.03	0.42	-0.25	0.45
Intermediate	0.02	0.56	-0.52	0.44	-0.89	0.49	-0.89	0.52	-0.97	0.53	-0.54	0.33	-0.91	0.37	-0.91	0.47	-0.99	0.42	-0.36	0.30	-0.37	0.33	-0.45	0.36	0.00	0.40	-0.08	0.47	-0.08	0.45
Self-employed	-0.82	0.75	-1.42	0.49	-1.37	0.55	-1.63	0.63	-1.45	0.57	-0.60	0.52	-0.54	0.52	-0.81	0.80	-0.63	0.57	0.06	0.36	-0.21	0.52	-0.03	0.39	-0.27	0.60	-0.09	0.51	0.18	0.59
Labour Class	-0.12	0.58	-0.84	0.44	-1.36	0.51	-0.68	0.59	-1.07	0.51	-0.72	0.45	-1.24	0.42	-0.56	0.72	-0.95	0.54	-0.52	0.41	0.16	0.47	-0.23	0.37	0.68	0.59	0.29	0.59	-0.39	0.57
Publicsector	0.31	0.42	0.30	0.34	-0.08	0.43	0.12	0.42	-0.08	0.42	0.00	0.22	-0.39	0.33	-0.19	0.38	-0.38	0.31	-0.39	0.30	-0.18	0.29	-0.38	0.29	0.20	0.37	0.01	0.47	-0.20	0.39
Unemployed	-1.57	1.06	-1.59	0.60	-2.12	0.79	-1.56	1.05	-1.42	0.92	-0.02	0.89	-0.55	0.78	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.96	-0.53	0.69	0.02	0.78	0.17	0.73	0.56	0.94	0.70	1.02	0.15	0.93
Inactive	-1.00	0.50	-1.18	0.44	-1.16	0.54	-1.30	0.58	-1.32	0.50	-0.18	0.22	-0.16	0.31	-0.31	0.42	-0.33	0.33	0.02	0.33	-0.13	0.35	-0.15	0.30	-0.14	0.47	-0.16	0.49	-0.02	0.45
Intercept	1.02	0.55	2.43	0.44	1.87	0.75	1.15	0.56	1.60	0.73	1.41	0.38	0.85	0.63	0.13	0.54	0.58	0.74	-0.56	0.67	-1.27	0.40	-0.83	0.60	-0.71	0.70	-0.27	1.17	0.44	0.73

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

### Appendix table D-16 Preferences of voters in UK, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max						High (+)					High (-)						Mod (+/-)				Mix (Lt	to M)							
	High (+	·)	High (-	)	Mod (	+/-)	Mix (Lt	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	High (-	)	Mod (	+/-)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	Mod (	+/-)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L-	H)	Mix (L-	H)
Trade union	0.47	0.38	0.29	0.34	0.34	0.38	0.21	0.41	-0.49	0.45	-0.17	0.22	-0.13	0.27	-0.26	0.32	-0.95	0.36	0.05	0.25	-0.08	0.27	-0.78	0.35	-0.13	0.32	-0.83	0.41	-0.70	0.41
Intercept	0.77	0.33	1.47	0.28	0.65	0.33	0.43	0.30	0.57	0.32	0.70	0.20	-0.12	0.26	-0.34	0.36	-0.21	0.27	-0.82	0.22	-1.04	0.23	-0.91	0.21	-0.22	0.29	-0.08	0.35	0.14	0.29
With controls																														
Trade union	-0.18	0.44	-0.46	0.22	-0.19	0.44	-0.45	0.49	-1.08	0.49	-0.29	0.25	-0.01	0.33	-0.27	0.40	-0.90	0.39	0.27	0.30	0.02	0.33	-0.62	0.36	-0.25	0.41	-0.89	0.44	0.19	0.62
Younger	1.30	0.39	0.89	0.02	1.16	0.40	0.45	0.69	0.63	0.46	-0.41	0.26	-0.14	0.29	-0.85	0.64	-0.67	0.36	0.27	0.26	-0.45	0.54	-0.26	0.33	-0.72	0.59	-0.53	0.38	-0.47	0.43
Older	0.36	0.39	0.41	0.22	0.23	0.56	1.33	0.50	0.85	0.42	0.04	0.25	-0.13	0.51	0.96	0.44	0.49	0.35	-0.17	0.50	0.92	0.35	0.45	0.31	1.09	0.59	0.62	0.69	0.18	0.25
Female	0.57	0.36	0.29	0.34	0.17	0.34	0.07	0.34	0.25	0.33	-0.28	0.19	-0.40	0.23	-0.50	0.26	-0.31	0.23	-0.12	0.21	-0.22	0.21	-0.04	0.20	-0.10	0.26	0.09	0.28	-0.22	0.44
Service Class II	-0.27	0.61	-0.79	0.09	-0.78	0.51	-0.56	0.56	-0.79	0.50	-0.52	0.35	-0.51	0.38	-0.29	0.58	-0.52	0.40	0.01	0.30	0.22	0.39	0.00	0.29	0.21	0.47	-0.01	0.40	-0.03	0.44
Intermediate	-0.03	0.55	-0.54	0.22	-0.90	0.50	-0.91	0.52	-0.94	0.51	-0.51	0.33	-0.87	0.38	-0.88	0.48	-0.91	0.40	-0.36	0.31	-0.37	0.34	-0.40	0.34	-0.01	0.42	-0.04	0.46	0.14	0.58
Self-employed	-0.92	0.65	-1.52	0.00	-1.42	0.52	-1.72	0.63	-1.58	0.54	-0.60	0.47	-0.50	0.47	-0.79	0.74	-0.65	0.50	0.10	0.36	-0.19	0.52	-0.05	0.37	-0.30	0.59	-0.15	0.48	-0.39	0.53
Labour Class	-0.17	0.60	-0.87	0.04	-1.36	0.50	-0.72	0.57	-1.11	0.47	-0.71	0.46	-1.20	0.43	-0.55	0.73	-0.94	0.49	-0.49	0.39	0.16	0.45	-0.24	0.33	0.65	0.58	0.25	0.51	-0.02	0.36
Public sector	0.35	0.39	0.37	0.25	-0.14	0.42	0.17	0.42	0.15	0.38	0.02	0.22	-0.49	0.33	-0.18	0.39	-0.20	0.28	-0.51	0.31	-0.20	0.31	-0.22	0.25	0.31	0.40	0.28	0.42	0.06	0.92
Unemployed	-1.68	1.14	-1.69	0.01	-2.16	0.78	-1.67	1.08	-1.61	0.88	-0.01	0.95	-0.48	0.85	0.01	1.10	0.07	0.93	-0.47	0.65	0.02	0.80	0.08	0.68	0.49	0.96	0.55	0.91	-0.05	0.41
Inactive	-1.01	0.51	-1.21	0.01	-1.13	0.52	-1.41	0.57	-1.45	0.50	-0.20	0.23	-0.12	0.31	-0.39	0.43	-0.44	0.31	0.08	0.31	-0.20	0.34	-0.24	0.28	-0.28	0.44	-0.32	0.44	-0.63	0.46
Intercept	1.01	0.60	2.54	0.00	1.93	0.66	1.27	0.56	2.54	0.46	1.53	0.37	0.92	0.52	0.26	0.53	0.92	0.53	-0.61	0.52	-1.27	0.38	-0.61	0.41	-0.66	0.60	0.00	0.80	0.66	0.53

The table cells show the parameter estimates and *standard error* Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-17 Preferences of trade union members in the UK, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max									
	High (	+)	High (	-)	Mod	(+/-)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L	H)
Contact	-0.58	0.46	-0.41	0.31	-0.77	0.57	-0.36	0.38	0.11	0.34
Intercept	0.89	0.46	1.54	0.41	0.68	0.44	0.50	0.34	0.53	0.44
With controls										
Contact	-0.25	0.41	-0.30	0.33	-0.85	0.65	-0.44	0.41	0.20	0.35
Younger	1.28	0.39	0.88	0.37	1.16	0.41	0.42	0.67	0.66	0.44
Older	0.38	0.39	0.44	0.33	0.13	0.47	1.36	0.49	0.89	0.36
Female	0.56	0.36	0.29	0.30	0.18	0.35	0.05	0.34	0.24	0.33
Service Class II	-0.27	0.59	-0.78	0.45	-0.74	0.51	-0.55	0.55	-0.84	0.48
Intermediate	-0.05	0.53	-0.57	0.42	-0.94	0.49	-0.91	0.50	-0.93	0.49
Self-employed	-0.92	0.62	-1.49	0.45	-1.39	0.53	-1.68	0.62	-1.50	0.52
Labour Class	-0.18	0.58	-0.89	0.40	-1.40	0.50	-0.72	0.55	-1.09	0.46
Public sector	0.31	0.39	0.27	0.33	-0.16	0.43	0.08	0.42	-0.12	0.39
Unemployed	-1.68	1.02	-1.61	0.58	-2.05	0.74	-1.59	1.01	-1.55	0.82
Inactive	-0.97	0.47	-1.11	0.42	-1.04	0.47	-1.30	0.54	-1.27	0.46
Intercept	1.01	0.53	2.49	0.41	1.87	0.61	1.23	0.50	1.77	0.59

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-18 Preferences of contacting participants in the UK, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max									
	High (	+)	High (	-)	Mod	(+/-)	Mix (L	to M)	Mix (L	-H)
Org work	0.50	0.71	0.40	0.59	-0.28	0.69	0.36	0.65	0.42	0.64
Intercept	0.84	0.29	1.52	0.25	0.73	0.30	0.47	0.32	0.54	0.31
With controls										
Org work	0.81	0.71	0.58	0.63	-0.30	0.78	0.48	0.69	0.58	0.67
Younger	1.28	0.38	0.88	0.36	1.16	0.40	0.37	0.63	0.63	0.44
Older	0.36	0.39	0.41	0.33	0.20	0.51	1.29	0.47	0.90	0.39
Female	0.57	0.36	0.29	0.30	0.16	0.34	0.07	0.33	0.26	0.33
Service Class II	-0.36	0.61	-0.84	0.47	-0.84	0.52	-0.57	0.53	-0.85	0.51
Intermediate	-0.08	0.52	-0.57	0.43	-0.99	0.49	-0.91	0.51	-0.96	0.51
Self-employed	-0.99	0.60	-1.52	0.45	-1.45	0.50	-1.68	0.62	-1.52	0.53
Labour Class	-0.18	0.59	-0.87	0.42	-1.42	0.50	-0.68	0.56	-1.09	0.49
Public sector	0.28	0.39	0.25	0.33	-0.13	0.42	0.06	0.43	-0.14	0.40
Unemployed	-1.49	0.86	-1.53	0.55	-2.03	0.71	-1.39	0.79	-1.38	0.80
Inactive	-0.95	0.46	-1.09	0.42	-1.03	0.48	-1.26	0.53	-1.28	0.47
Intercept	0.97	0.51	2.42	0.41	1.93	0.61	1.18	0.49	1.71	0.58

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-19 Preferences of organisation work participants in UK, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

	Max									
	High (	+)	High (	-)	Mod	(+/-)	Mix (L	.to M)	Mix (L	H)
Demo	-0.08	0.55	-0.25	0.45	-0.48	0.62	-0.27	0.59	-0.04	0.67
Intercept	0.86	0.35	1.53	0.30	0.73	0.37	0.47	0.32	0.51	0.37
With controls										
Demo	0.30	0.78	0.78	0.57	0.88	0.63	1.11	0.53	0.88	0.52
Younger	-1.16	0.40	-0.78	0.55	-0.53	0.38	0.13	0.29	-0.28	0.26
Older	-0.20	0.51	1.09	0.54	0.69	0.57	0.16	0.46	0.21	0.45
Female	-0.16	0.34	-0.10	0.26	0.09	0.28	0.41	0.24	0.13	0.22
Service Class II	0.84	0.52	0.27	0.44	-0.01	0.41	0.48	0.37	0.00	0.30
Intermediate	0.99	0.49	0.09	0.42	0.03	0.49	0.91	0.37	0.42	0.32
Self-employed	1.45	0.50	-0.23	0.60	-0.07	0.51	0.46	0.47	-0.07	0.37
Labour Class	1.42	0.50	0.74	0.57	0.33	0.53	1.24	0.42	0.55	0.39
Public sector	0.13	0.42	0.19	0.38	-0.01	0.44	0.40	0.31	0.38	0.30
Unemployed	2.03	0.71	0.64	0.79	0.65	0.89	0.54	0.70	0.50	0.64
Inactive	1.03	0.48	-0.23	0.40	-0.25	0.41	0.08	0.29	-0.06	0.29
Intercept	-1.93	0.61	-0.75	0.58	-0.22	0.83	-0.97	0.49	0.49	0.50

Darker shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 5% level

Lighter shaded cells represent parameters significant at the 10% level

Appendix table D-20 Preferences of demonstrating participants in UK, overall and controlling for their social characteristics

### E. Models using an alternative latent class structure

This appendix includes models using an alternative latent class structure to the ones presented in the main body of the thesis. The models are to check if the patterns of relationship substantial vary if using one of the alternative coding schemes. The coding schemes are discussed in appendix B and the scheme here relates to scheme 2, where the 0-10 scales are coded as 0-5, 6-8, 9-10.

The models examine 1) social differences in preferences and 2) the association between preferences and participation (using indicators of voting and contacting an official. The following tables and figures report the results for each country, including the latent class structure, the parameters of a multinomial regression model of latent classes regressed on social characteristics and class conditional probabilities of voting and contracting an official.

To help give content to the results, the latent classes have been assigned the following labels

Expansive:	the class most likely to support all aspects of the welfare state
Social security:	the class likely to support healthcare and provision for the old but
	less likely to support other domains
Moderate:	the class showing moderate levels of support
Minimal:	the showing low levels of support

# Germany Appendix table E-1 Alternative latent class structure (Germany)

Label	Expansive	Social Security	Moderate	Minimal
Class membership	0.15	0.34	0.34	0.16
Indicators				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.11	0.32	0.38	0.62
Agree	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.30
Agree Strongly	0.44	0.21	0.10	0.08
Jobs				
Low	0.08	0.32	0.44	0.90
Mod	0.17	0.47	0.56	0.10
High	0.75	0.22	0.00	0.01
Living of unemployed				
Low	0.09	0.32	0.35	0.88
Mod	0.20	0.56	0.65	0.11
High	0.71	0.13	0.00	0.01
Healthcare				
Low	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.35
Mod	0.00	0.23	0.85	0.53
High	0.98	0.75	0.13	0.12
Living of old				
Low	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.68
Mod	0.03	0.52	0.89	0.30
High	0.97	0.40	0.03	0.03
Childcare				
Low	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.46
Mod	0.06	0.37	0.79	0.44
High	0.85	0.58	0.13	0.10
Paid leave to care				
Low	0.14	0.12	0.20	0.48
Mod	0.12	0.45	0.74	0.47
High	0.75	0.43	0.07	0.06

	Mod	erate	Social S	Security	Min	imal
Younger	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.22	0.04	0.26
Older	0.11	0.19	-0.04	0.20	0.54	0.23
Female	-0.46	0.15	-0.39	0.16	-0.82	0.18
Service Class II	-0.30	0.29	-0.45	0.31	-0.70	0.32
Intermediate	-0.69	0.28	-1.01	0.30	-1.29	0.31
Self-employed	-1.11	0.34	-1.39	0.37	-1.09	0.36
Labour Class	-1.38	0.28	-1.66	0.29	-1.84	0.31
Unemployed	-0.01	0.20	-0.30	0.22	-0.37	0.25
Inactive	-1.05	0.34	-0.26	0.28	-1.23	0.55
Public sector	-0.29	0.17	0.01	0.19	-0.07	0.21
Intercept	1.83	0.31	2.07	0.25	1.47	0.33

### Appendix table E-2 Social differences in attitudes (Germany)

Reference class =Expansive

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 1731.08, d.f 2113, p=1.00

### Appendix figure E-1 Probability of participating by preferences (Germany)



# Spain

# Appendix table E-3 Alternative latent class structure (Spain)

Label	Expansive	Social Security	Moderate	Minimal
Class membership	0.34	0.36	0.23	0.07
Indicators				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.11	0.19	0.28	0.39
Agree	0.50	0.52	0.56	0.42
Agree Strongly	0.38	0.30	0.16	0.20
Jobs				
Low	0.05	0.14	0.17	0.50
Mod	0.13	0.57	0.82	0.43
High	0.82	0.29	0.01	0.06
Living of unemployed				
Low	0.01	0.11	0.16	0.72
Mod	0.06	0.64	0.82	0.27
High	0.92	0.26	0.02	0.01
Healthcare				
Low	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.21
Mod	0.00	0.17	0.74	0.40
High	0.99	0.83	0.24	0.40
Living of old				
Low	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.23
Mod	0.00	0.19	0.95	0.47
High	0.99	0.81	0.04	0.31
Childcare				
Low	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.63
Mod	0.06	0.54	0.82	0.32
High	0.94	0.44	0.15	0.06
Paid leave to care				
Low	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.58
Mod	0.05	0.51	0.85	0.40
High	0.95	0.45	0.09	0.02

	Moderat	e	Social Sec	urity	Minim	al
Younger	0.22	0.16	-0.15	0.17	0.26	0.25
Older	-0.44	0.21	-0.33	0.21	0.07	0.29
Female	-0.19	0.16	-0.37	0.14	-0.85	0.24
Service Class II	0.08	0.34	-0.19	0.32	-0.26	0.48
Intermediate	0.31	0.30	0.06	0.28	-0.34	0.42
Self-employed	0.13	0.30	-0.33	0.28	-0.35	0.40
Labour Class	0.06	0.28	-0.48	0.26	-0.35	0.37
Unemployed	0.06	0.25	0.22	0.24	0.15	0.38
Inactive	-0.32	0.28	-0.13	0.29	-0.34	0.51
Public sector	0.07	0.18	0.30	0.17	-0.09	0.25
Intercept	-0.27	0.30	0.61	0.27	-0.69	0.38

Appendix table E-4 Social differences in attitudes (Spain)

Reference class =Expansive

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 1332.35, d.f = 8664, p=1.



### Appendix figure E-2 Probability of participating by preferences (Spain)

### Sweden

Label	Expansive	Social Security	Moderate	Minimal
Class membership	0.18	0.37	0.34	0.11
Indicators				
Income differences				
Not agree	0.19	0.33	0.39	0.63
Agree	0.39	0.48	0.49	0.31
Agree Strongly	0.42	0.18	0.12	0.06
Jobs				
Low	0.12	0.33	0.45	0.91
Mod	0.50	0.58	0.54	0.08
High	0.38	0.09	0.01	0.01
Living of unemployed				
Low	0.01	0.13	0.10	0.76
Mod	0.04	0.62	0.88	0.24
High	0.96	0.25	0.02	0.00
Healthcare				
Low	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.22
Mod	0.03	0.13	0.84	0.54
High	0.97	0.86	0.16	0.24
Living of old				
Low	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.30
Mod	0.01	0.21	0.89	0.57
High	0.99	0.78	0.10	0.13
Childcare				
Low	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.54
Mod	0.04	0.48	0.85	0.45
High	0.96	0.47	0.09	0.01
Paid leave to care				
Low	0.01	0.06	0.08	0.51
Mod	0.12	0.41	0.79	0.45
High	0.87	0.53	0.13	0.04

# Appendix table E-5 Alternative latent class structure (Sweden)

	Moderat	e	Social Sec	curity	Mini	mal
Younger	0.69	0.30	0.58	0.23	0.66	0.27
Older	-0.03	0.33	-0.19	0.24	0.24	0.29
Female	-1.35	0.24	-0.55	0.19	-0.92	0.21
Service Class II	-1.07	0.36	-0.02	0.26	-0.60	0.33
Intermediate	-0.56	0.37	0.28	0.30	-0.17	0.34
Self-employed	-0.08	0.43	0.01	0.36	-0.39	0.39
Labour Class	-1.30	0.32	-0.56	0.27	-1.20	0.31
Unemployed	-0.15	0.27	-0.24	0.17	-0.04	0.21
Inactive	1.03	0.75	0.36	0.66	1.24	0.70
Public sector	0.17	0.28	0.06	0.21	-0.04	0.26
Intercept	0.52	0.44	0.81	0.36	1.30	0.28

### Appendix table E-6 Social differences in attitudes (Sweden)

Reference class = Expansive

## Appendix figure E-3 Probability of participating by preferences (Sweden)



	Expansive Social Security		Moderate	Minimal	
Class membership	0.13	0.38	0.30	0.20	
Indicators					
Income differences					
Not agree	0.23	0.35	0.43	0.65	
Agree	0.42	0.44	0.48	0.26	
Agree Strongly	0.35	0.21	0.09	0.09	
Jobs					
Low	0.17	0.28	0.45	0.78	
Mod	0.24	0.54	0.55	0.20	
High	0.59	0.18	0.01	0.02	
Living of unemployed					
Low	0.16	0.33	0.37	0.86	
Mod	0.27	0.56	0.63	0.14	
High	0.58	0.11	0.00	0.00	
Healthcare					
Low	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.15	
Mod	0.06	0.08	0.78	0.46	
High	0.94	0.91	0.21	0.40	
Living of old					
Low	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.16	
Mod	0.05	0.11	0.91	0.61	
High	0.94	0.89	0.08	0.24	
Childcare					
Low	0.03	0.19	0.11	0.74	
Mod	0.02	0.59	0.85	0.23	
High	0.95	0.23	0.05	0.03	
Paid leave to care					
Low	0.03	0.12	0.13	0.57	
Mod	0.10	0.56	0.80	0.42	
High	0.87	0.32	0.08	0.01	

# Appendix table E-7: Alternative latent class structure (UK)

UK

	Moderate		Social Security		Minimal	
Younger	0.37	0.24	0.14	0.32	-0.03	0.29
Older	0.30	0.23	0.88	0.28	0.91	0.27
Female	0.01	0.20	0.10	0.23	-0.15	0.22
Service Class II	-0.74	0.33	-0.38	0.36	-0.74	0.34
Intermediate	-0.85	0.34	-0.78	0.36	-1.17	0.37
Self-employed	-1.18	0.37	-1.10	0.43	-1.31	0.41
Labour Class	-1.10	0.34	-0.89	0.36	-1.31	0.33
Unemployed	-0.28	0.22	-0.16	0.27	-0.39	0.25
Inactive	-1.68	0.42	-1.52	0.70	-1.33	0.54
Public sector	-0.70	0.24	-0.81	0.26	-0.80	0.28
Intercept	1.72	0.41	1.40	0.42	1.41	0.40

### Appendix table E-8 Social differences in attitudes (UK)

Reference class = Expansive

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 1467, d.f. =2114, p=1



