ALL students of the medieval crusade are familiar with the ill-starred attack which Bohemund, Prince of Antioch, launched in 1107 from southern Italy against the western flank of the Byzantine Empire. The siege of Durazzo and Bohemund's subsequent defeat at the hands of the Emperor Alexius Comnenus have been examined in detail by many writers, the accounts of Chalandon and Yewdale being perhaps the best. Yet there are still some problems which deserve further examination, and chief among these is the role played by the Papacy in the creation of this abortive expedition.

Most historians are persuaded that Pope Paschal II gave his

blessing to Bohemund’s invasion. For example, Sir Steven Runciman judges Paschal to be a weak man who felt constrained to encourage Bohemund’s desire to conquer the Byzantine Empire, thus hastening the development of that great tragedy of medieval Christendom, the schism between the Greek and Latin churches. Professor Harold Fink agrees although he is not so decided in his views. In the American History of the Crusades, Fink thinks it “likely” that Paschal “succumbed to the anti-Byzantinism of the day and fell in with Bohemund’s plans”.

On the other hand, the distinguished American medievalist Marshal W. Baldwin suggested years ago that Paschal was hoodwinked by Bohemund. The wiles of the guileful Norman prince prevented the Pope from perceiving the sinister meaning of his attempts to gather men in Western Europe for a new expedition which, although ostensibly destined for Jerusalem, was eventually transformed into an attack on the Byzantine


3 Setton and Baldwin, op. cit. i. 391.
Empire. In short, Baldwin proposed that the Papacy never knowingly gave its official sanction to Bohemund's perversion of the crusade.  

The purpose of this essay is to give Baldwin's suggestion the thorough examination it deserves. This will require a rigorous critique of the evidence, presented in chronological fashion for the sake of clarity. An irrefutable defence of Baldwin's hypothesis will not be forthcoming. The fragmentary nature of the evidence renders such a happy result impossible. It will suffice if I am able to cast some doubt on the current interpretation of an important event in the history of the Papacy in its relation to the crusade.

I. Paschal II and the Byzantine Empire (1099-1105)

It is a widely accepted opinion that Pope Urban II hoped that the *iter Hierosolymitanum* would have a beneficial effect upon relations between the Greek and Latin churches. A display of Latin courage and sacrifice in giving assistance to eastern Christians, hard pressed by the infidel, might bring forgetfulness of past estrangements and pave the way for a reconciliation based upon Byzantine acceptance of that papal supremacy which had so nobly demonstrated its generosity and zeal in the inauguration of the crusade.  

Although there were at the beginning some signs which augured good relations between the Byzantine Empire and the crusaders,  Urban's hopes for reconciliation unfortunately did not

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3 For early co-operation and harmony between the Latins and Eastern Christians see H. Hagenmeyer, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100: Epistulae et chartae ad historiam primi Belli Sacri spectantes* (Innsbruck, 1901),
materialize. As the crusaders advanced beyond Constantinople and closer to Jerusalem, mutual friendliness and helpfulness gradually disappeared beneath a rising tide of animosity and suspicion.

The Greeks were naturally disturbed to see their countryside ravaged as if by an army of enemies, not friends.¹ Worse still, a fundamental incomprehension of the purpose of the crusade left the Greeks with feelings of contempt for Latin ignorance and religious naïveté as well as a predisposition to see in every Latin action the expression of a covert desire for the conquest of their Empire.² These suspicions grew stronger when early manifestations of religious unity at Antioch and elsewhere were replaced by a Latin separatism which revealed itself in the introduction of the Latin hierarchy into Syria-Palestine, the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch John the Oxite from Antioch and a brief persecution of eastern Christians in Jerusalem.³ Contrary to an

¹ The opinions of Anna Comnena are characteristic of her generation. See her Alexiad, x. 5, ed. and trans. B. Leib (Paris, 1937-45), ii. 206-7.

² The hostile intentions of the Normans towards the Byzantine Empire were known to many Latin writers, among them Richard of Poitiers, Chronicon, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz and others (MGHSS) (Hanover, 1826- ), xxvi. 79, William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, iv. 344, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1887), ii. 390-1 and Gauffredus Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae Comitis et Roberti Guiscardi Ducis fratris eius, iv. 24, ed. E. Pontieri, in L. A. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, ed. G. Carducci and others (RISS-2) (Citta di Castello, 1902- ), V, i, p. 102. Anna’s comments are well known, Alexiad, xiv, 4, iii, p. 160. For a resumé of Byzantine attitudes, see the article by Charanis, op. cit. passim.

agreement made between the Emperor Alexius and the crusaders, Antioch remained in Latin hands, and to this hostile action were added the vicious attacks on Greek islands in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean by the fleets of the Italian maritime cities. Confronted by these developments, the Greeks looked


2 For the attack of the Pisan fleet on Byzantine islands and then on Laodicea, see Annales Pisani and Gesta Triumphalia per Pisanos, RISS-2, VI, ii, pp. 7, 89, Albert of Aachen, vii, RHCOc IV. 500-1, and Anna Comnena, Alexiad, XI, 10, III, pp. 41-46. Other attacks on Byzantine possessions are recorded in the Translatio S. Nicolai, IV-VII, RHCOc, V, i. 256-9, a report repeated in Dandolo, Chronicon, RISS-2, XII, i. 221-3. The triumphant record of Genoese expansion in the East may be read in the Liberatio Orientis of Caffaro, printed in the first volume of the Annales Ianuenses, ed. L. T. Belgrano, being v. XI in the Fonti per la Storia d'Italia (FSI) published by the Istituto Storico Italiano (Roma, 1887- ). The basic secondary work is C. Manfroni, "Le relazioni fra Genova, l'Impero Bizantino e i Turchi", Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, xxviii (Genova, 1896), 577-858, here, 587-8.
more and more to the preservation of their Empire and its exalted traditions from Latin aggression, and Byzantine policy towards the crusaders became increasingly compounded of evasion, deceit and hostility.¹

As for the crusaders, the strain and suffering of the arduous journey, the sense of isolation and danger in an alien environment, the failure of the Greeks to deliver substantial aid as promised and then, despite these difficulties, the overwhelming, almost unbelievable success, combined to make the Latins more insistent on their superiority. Supernatural forces seemed to favour this development. Heavenly visitors in dreams and visions cast aspersions upon eastern Christians, and many crusaders were quick to follow their example.² On a more earthly plane, it was increasingly bruited about that the Greeks were fickle and unreliable, men of little faith who had put obstacles in the path of the pilgrims. When the Crusade of 1101 perished in the mountain passes of Asia Minor, those who survived, as well as many in the Latin Orient, needed a scapegoat to bear the blame for the fate of the unfortunate expedition. The Greeks were there, ready made for that burden.³ The *Hierosolymita* of Ekkehard still conveys the flavour of Latin hatred for the Greeks in its

¹ Both Chalandon and Runciman interpret Byzantine policy in a sympathetic light. H. S. Fink, in Setton and Baldwin, op. cit. i 366-7, also does so, but with greater restraint. Yewdale, op. cit. p. 84, represents the traditional hostility of Western writers which derives from the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum* and Ekkehard (*infra*, p. 171, n. 1). Alexius Comnenus was perhaps too quickly disposed to regard the Latins as his enemies. This is revealed by his approach to the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt for co-operation against the crusaders, recorded in Raymond of Aguilers, XVI, XVII, *RHC*, III, 277, 286. See F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des ostromischen Reiches* (DR) (being Reihe A., Abt. 1, *Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit*, München-Berlin, 1924-32), II, no. 1209, to Afdal, the vizier of the Caliph, dated June 1098.


³ Chalandon, op. cit. p. 219, errs when he declares that the only real discord existed between Alexius and Bohemund and that (p. 239) "... les relations entre Byzance et les États latins étaient restés assez cordiales". When the Crusade of 1101 met its end in a Turkish ambush, William of Aquitaine immediately assumed the Greeks were guilty of treachery, Matthew of Edessa, *RHC*, *Documents Arméniens*, i. 56-60.
first burst of strength, and through Ekkehard the picture of the Emperor Alexius Comnenus as the enemy of the crusade, the ally of the infidel, and the persecutor of Christians passed into European history.¹

To what extent did the Papacy share in this mounting Latin antipathy for the Byzantine Empire and its ruler? This is a difficult question to answer. For one thing, Alexius's ransoming of Frankish prisoners from the infidel attracted much attention in the West, and it is unlikely that this exhibition of goodwill completely escaped papal attention.² For another, the Emperor had friends in southern Italy, notably the Abbot Oderisius of Monte Cassino, and letters remain to show that he had defended his treatment of the crusaders to the Abbot. We may safely assume that echoes of this skilful apologia reached the papal court. Paschal II was undoubtedly aware of his predecessor's conciliatory attitude towards the Greeks. He might therefore be inclined to appreciate the difficulties which Alexius had encountered in his dealings with the crusaders, realizing that

¹ Ekkehard, Hierosolymita, XXIII-XXVI, XXXIII, RHC Oc, V, i. 29-32, 37-38. Hostility towards the Greeks may be traced through Bernold of Constance, Chronicon, MGH SS, V. 466 and Richard of Poitiers, Chronicon, Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France (RHF), xii. 412: “Willelmus autem Dux Aquitanorum, dum cum magno exercitu ad eorum auxilium properaret, turpiter in Graecia a Turcis, amisso exercitu, superatur, consensu, ut aiunt, Alexii Imperatoris Constantinopolitanis, eo quod strenuisset Francorum semper Graeci invidian.” Even Fulcher of Chartres, usually so impartial, echoes this sentiment, ii, 38, p. 521. This conviction will find its way into the writings of Orderic Vitalis, x. 19, iv. 120 f., Otto of Freising, Chronicon, vii. 2, ed. A. Hofmeister, MGH, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usu scholarum (Hanover-Leipzig, 1912), pp. 310-12, and William of Tyre, ii. 5, xi. 6, RHC Oc, I, 79-80, 460-2. The Anonymi Gesta and its continuators ring the changes on the theme of Alexius and the Greeks as traitors. For example, see Guibert of Nogent, Historia Hierosolymitana i. 1-5, RHC Oc, IV, 124-31. For the growth of a Latin polemic against Greek faith and practice which preceded and accompanied the rising tension between the Greeks and the crusaders consult Leib, op. cit. pp. 298-307.

hatred for the Greeks might only be the flimsiest of camouflage for Latin folly and failure.¹

On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest that Paschal gave Hugh of Lyons, the papal legate on the Crusade of 1101, any special instructions as to his relations with the Greeks.² No evidence can be found which shows that the Papacy remonstrated with the Italian maritime cities for their raids on Byzantine possessions. Of course, we might inquire just what control the Papacy could be expected to exercise over these fleets whose marauding activities lay hidden beneath the excitement and exaltation of the crusade. When we consider the activities of Cardinal Maurice of Porto, papal legate to the Latin Orient in 1100, we find no indication that he questioned the expulsion of the Patriarch John the Oxite from Antioch. In all likelihood, the Cardinal judged that the matter must be allowed to rest since the Latins in the East clearly wished to be ruled spiritually by Latins.³ When another legate, the Cardinal Robert of Paris, arrived in

¹ For the letters to Monte Cassino, see DR, II, nos. 1207-8, dated August-June 1097-8, Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, pp. 140-1, 152-3 and Peter the Deacon, Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, MGHSS, vii. 770. See also H. Bloch, “Monte Cassino, Byzantium and the West in the Earlier Middle Ages”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, iii (1946), 166-224, here, 222. With her usual self-satisfaction, Anna Comnena relates Alexius’s considerate treatment of the survivors of the Crusade of 1101, XI, 8, 111, p. 38. It is appropriate to recall in this context, the letter of Bohemund and other crusaders, written in September 1099, to the Pope; see Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, pp. 161-5, esp. pp. 164-5, where Bohemund announces that all have been defeated save the heretics and therefore: “tu vero debes separare ab inusto imperatore, qui multa bona promisit nobis, sed minime fecit. Omnia enim mala et impedimenta quaecumque facere potuit, nobis fecit.”


Jerusalem in 1102, he found the Patriarch Daimbert of Pisa arraigned by his enemies in a series of charges, one of which was that Daimbert had been directly involved in the murder of Greek Christians during the voyage of the Pisan fleet to the Holy Land in 1098-9. The cardinal eventually deposed Daimbert from his high office, but it is not clear that this particular accusation counted for much in shaping his decision.\footnote{Supra, p. 169, n. 2. Daimbert at first pleaded in his own defence that the Greeks were false Christians who persecuted pilgrims (Albert of Aachen, vi, 57, RHCoC, IV, 502). He later assumed the role of a mediator and blamed Bohemund for the attack on the Greeks (Albert, vi, 57, 59, RHCoC, pp. 502, 503-4, and Fulcher of Chartres, I, 33, pp. 326 f.). For his removal from office see Albert, viii. 45-7, ix. 16, RHCoC, IV, 584-5, 599-600. For further information on this important prelate, who was for a time Patriarch of Jerusalem, consult J. G. Rowe, "Paschal II", pp. 475-489. The Cardinal Robert is identified in Klewitz, ibid. p. 127.}

All this is prolegomena to one particular incident: the appearance of Manasses of "Barzenona" before Paschal II. The Liber Christianae Expeditionis pro Ereptione—Sanctae Hierosolimitanea Ecclesiae of Albert of Aachen tells us that anti-Byzantine feeling ran so high in the Latin Orient after the disasters of 1101 that King Baldwin I of Jerusalem sent an embassy to Alexius Comnenus to expostulate with him over his "hostile" treatment of the crusaders. The embassy was composed of Gerald, Archbishop of Mount Thabor, and one Manasses, described by Albert as Bishop of "Barzenona". They arrived in Constantinople in the early summer of 1102. After patiently enduring their reproaches, Alexius responded with a defence of his own conduct. The Emperor convinced Manasses, who in turn agreed to defend Alexius's reputation before the Pope when he returned to Western Europe. Unfortunately for Alexius, Manasses proved to be too clever by far. When he arrived at the papal court at Benevento in the fall of 1102 he denounced, not defended, the Emperor. According to Albert, his tirade was accepted without hesitation by the Pope, who encouraged Manasses to repeat his accusations to the Franks.\footnote{DR, II, no. 1218; Albert of Aachen, viii. 41, 47-48, RHCoC, IV, 582, 584-5: "... in amaritudinem animi Romam tendens, ipsum imperatorem criminatus est in ecclesia Beneventana; et ideo, assumptis litteris ipsius Apostolici, querimonia gravis apud omnes principes Galliae super ipso imperatore facta est."}
With regard to Albert's historical reliability, the day is long passed when a von Sybel could reduce Albert's value to the level of anecdote, reminiscence and gossip. The tide of reaction against this attitude has been running strong since B. Kugler published his studies on Albert of Aachen. We now more correctly judge that while Albert preserved much legendary material, he also included in his work much of the highest historical value. Since, therefore, this account of the mission of Manasses has a certain verisimilitude, it is not surprising that many scholars have accepted it at face value. Certainly, from the standpoint of chronology, the story of Manasses is satisfactory. It comes at the proper place in the narrative. It fits in with the general chronology of events in East and West during the year 1102. For example, Paschal II was in Benevento for the last five months of 1102, and thus the interview with the Pope becomes chronologically possible. On the other hand, much research has failed to shed any light on Manasses himself. Albert tells us nothing about him except to say that he was bishop of "Barzenona", but the suggestion that this is Barcelona and that Manasses was bishop of that city has long been rejected. Albert's story is not corroborated by any other historical writer, and we must remember that there were many annalists in early twelfth century Europe who would have been only too eager to record anything derogatory of the Emperor Alexius. The story of Manasses is, therefore, for these reasons, open to question.


3 For the papal itinerary, *JL*, i. 713.

4 Albert of Aachen, viii. 41, *RHCOr*, IV, p. 582: "... Manasses de Barzenona, alii quoque episcopi Italiae...." There is no trace of Manasses among the episcopal lists for Italy at this time. *DR*, II, no. 1212, and Chalandon, op. cit. p. 237 accepted Barcelona, but this cannot be sustained. See J. L. Cate in Setton and Baldwin, op. cit. i. 366, n. 37.
There is, however, a far more powerful objection to its reliability. This story appears in Book VIII of Albert’s history at the conclusion of what is unquestionably the finest description remaining to us of the Crusade of 1101. One of the most arresting characteristics of this account is its partiality towards the Emperor Alexius. By and large, the weather, the food or lack of it, Latin cowardice and folly (not Greek treachery, as in Ekkehard) are the true reasons for the disasters which overwhelmed the ill-fated expedition. It was this partiality to the Byzantine monarch which led Fritz Kühn to suggest correctly years ago that this account of the Crusade of 1101 could never be ascribed to a Latin living in Syria-Palestine shortly after the debacle. It could only be attributed to someone living in the Byzantine Empire, probably at Constantinople, and well disposed towards the Greeks. Yet, when this unknown author came, years after the event, to write his account of the Crusade, he was well aware of the sinister reputation which the Emperor Alexius had acquired in the Latin Orient and Europe for his treatment of the crusaders. How then was the author to reconcile his account of the Crusade, so flattering to the Emperor, with this widespread anti-Byzantine feeling? He found his answer in the story of Manasses which offered him a fitting conclusion to his narrative, explaining as it did why and how the Emperor Alexius, who had done so much for the crusaders, suffered such a grievous decline in prestige and reputation among the Latins. We shall have a few more words to say at a later point in this article concerning the genesis of this story and others like it. Suffice it to say here that the story is clearly eastern in origin, a fact already

1 Albert of Aachen, viii. 2, pp. 559-60, emphasizes the emperor’s kind reception of the armies; 3, p. 560, records Latin atrocities at Constantinople with an impartial account of Alexius’s response to these provocations, 4-5, pp. 561-2; 7, pp. 563-4 demonstrates the Lombards’ folly in their choice of a route across Asia Minor (against imperial advice). For the horrors of the journey, the exhaustion, cowardice and weakness of the crusaders and the cruelty of the Turks, see 8-12, 16, pp. 564-7, 569-70. However, our account explicitly refers at the close to the growth of rumours accusing Alexius of having betrayed the crusade to the Turks, 46, p. 584, and some suspicion of Greek motivation and action may be found woven into Albert’s account, viii. 5, 9, RHCOc, IV, 561-2, 564.

2 F. Kühn, op. cit. pp. 554-6. The lack of hostility towards the Greeks has been noted by many, e.g. J. L. Cate, “A Gay Crusader”, p. 520.
suggested by our inability to identify Manasses more closely as well as by the lack of corroboration of the incident in western writers.

We may therefore conclude that the more we scrutinize the account of Manasses, the more we are led to doubt, if not the truth of the story in its entirety, at least its reliability as regards the attitude of Paschal towards the Byzantine Empire in the early years of his pontificate.

Can anything be said with certainty concerning Paschal's attitude? Very little. It would surely be unwise if we deduced from the above evidence that Paschal was overtly hostile to Constantinople. On the other hand, we could never say that Paschal had showed himself friendly to the Greeks. In actual fact, he had done nothing at all, one way or the other. The evidence surveyed suggests that Paschal had no policy at all or that if he had one, it was indistinguishable from indifference and apathy.

II. Bohemund's return to the West

The prologue to the drama is over. Enter now the villain of the piece, Bohemund of Antioch, one of the leaders of the First Crusade, a man who was "always seeking the impossible".¹

The story of Bohemund's departure from Antioch, his arrival at Bari in January 1105, and his activities in Italy during the ensuing months has already been told by Yewdale.² There is no need to do it again. Our problem is this: Did Bohemund at this time obtain papal permission to launch a crusade against the Byzantine Empire?

We turn, first of all, to a group of Western sources. Most of the writers who mention Bohemund's visit to the West merely say that he arrived, collected an army and attacked the Byzantine Empire.³Ekkehard of Aura and Albert of Aachen report that

¹ Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, RISS-2, VII, i. 206: "... semper inpossi- bilia appetens...."
³ To choose among many examples, Sigebert of Gembloux, Chronica, MGHSS, vi. 372: "Boiamundus dux Apuliae contracto undeunde exercitu, accingitur ad invadendum Constantinopolitanum imperium." This is repeated under 1108
Bohemund's purpose in coming to Western Europe was to get troops to attack Alexius. Their accounts give the impression that from the moment he arrived in Italy, Bohemund in season and out demanded a crusade against Alexius Comnenus. However, these accounts in both Ekkehard and Albert are so brief that they are limited in their usefulness to us. Obviously, they are only short summaries made after the event. The Anonymous of Bari has more solid information. He tells us that Bohemund came back to Italy to get military assistance, that he found in France both an army and a wife (the Princess Constance, daughter of Philip I of France) and that in August 1106 he returned to Bari. The writer has nothing more to say about Bohemund beyond an obituary notice inserted in the proper place, i.e. under A.D. 1111.

The evidence in the Historia belli sacri is pertinent here. According to this source, Bohemund, while still at Antioch, recalled that during his captivity by the Turks he had made a vow to the shrine of St. Leonard at Noblac in the Limousin in France that if he were liberated he would place his chains in the shrine in grateful acknowledgement of celestial favours received. He now realized that during the course of paying his vows he might be able to raise an army to fight both the infidel and the Emperor Alexius, the persecutor of the Christians. He therefore came to Italy, accompanied by Daimbert, Patriarch of Jerusalem, and made a triumphal tour of the cities of southern Italy, everywhere received as a veritable "martyr of Christ". He visited Pope Paschal, and the Pope assigned Bruno, Bishop of Segni, to accompany Bohemund on his journey. Bohemund then proceeded to France, discharged his obligations to St. Leonard, married the Princess Constance and urged all and sundry "pro divino amore trans mare secum abirent, gentilium multitudinem obpugnaturi". He succeeded in gathering an army, returned to Bari, crossed the Adriatic and placed Durazzo under siege. The Emperor

by Robert de Monte, Chronicon, with the addition, under 1107, MGHSS, vi. 483: "Boamundus remeavit de Gallia in Apuliam cum magno exercitu, et cepit vastare terram Alexii imperatoris Grecorum."

1 Ekkehard, Hierosolymita, xxxiii, RHCOC, V, i. 37-38; Albert of Aachen, ix, 47, RHCOC, IV, 620. 2 RISS-1, V. 155.
Alexius then inquired why Bohemund had invaded his realm. Bohemund answered that Alexius deserved punishment for attacking the crusaders. In reply, Alexius promised to mend his ways. Whereupon, Bohemund returned to Italy in peace and honour while some of his army went on to Jerusalem and some returned to their homes in France.¹

Current historical opinion judges the Historia to be the work of a monk at Monte Cassino who in the third decade of the twelfth century compiled his history from works such as the Anonymi Gesta Francorum, adding a good measure of legendary material.² The result is a mishmash of dubious value. The account of Bohemund's war against the Emperor is so inaccurate as to cast doubt on the value of the entire passage under discussion. Still, it is worth noting that while the author knows of Bohemund's ultimate purpose in coming to the West, he does not say that Bohemund recruited in Italy at this time for his new expedition, nor does he explicitly describe Bohemund as appealing to anti-Byzantine feeling in Italy prior to his departure for France. Furthermore, the Pope is described only as authorizing Bohemund's visit to France and assigning Bruno of Segni to act as Bohemund's companion.

A final western source is Peter the Deacon writing in the great Chronica of Monte Cassino.³ While there is reason to think that Peter had seen the Historia belli sacri, yet by comparison his account of Bohemund's sojourn in the West is curiously abbreviated. He limits his report to the papal authorization of Bruno of Segni to accompany Bohemund on his visit to France in the capacity of a papal legate. The author adds that as

1 Historia belli sacri, CXL-CXLII, RHCOC, III, 228-9. The standard work on Bruno is Gigalski, op. cit. However, a brief but highly accurate account of his life and position in the government of Urban II and Paschal II may be found in K. Ganzer, Die Entwicklung des auswärtigen Kardinalsats im hohen mittelalter (Tübingen, 1963), pp. 57-62. For information on his writings, see Gigalski, op. cit. pp. 283-5, Leib, "Deux inéditions", and Runciman, Eastern Schism, pp. 75-76, n. 3.
2 Cahen, op. cit. p. 9; Jamison, op. cit. p. 184, n. 1.
3 A summary of critical work done on Peter the Deacon may be found in M. Manitius, Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters (München, 1911-31), iii. 546-52.
legate Bruno held a synod in France. Beyond this, he says nothing. Of agitation against the Byzantine Empire, of the Epirot war, this writer makes no mention. He probably found it convenient to do so. The great abbey of Monte Cassino had been for centuries the recipient of the pious generosity of the Byzantine Emperors, and it may well be that Peter judged it wiser to gloss over incidents the memory of which was embarrassing.¹

So far, the sources examined have failed to give us direct evidence which would enable us to say that the Papacy sanctioned a crusade against the Greeks in 1105. What of sources eastern in origin? Fulcher of Chartres gives only a cursory account of Bohemund's journey to Italy and of his expedition against Alexius.² William of Tyre, writing much later, refers to the collection of men and money for the crusade and to Bohemund's marriage in France. In a subsequent chapter, William describes Bohemund as deciding to use his army against Alexius who deserved to be punished for his repeated betrayal of the crusaders. The brief account of the war which follows is of little consequence.³ Neither of these sources assists us in our particular task. Little more can be said for Anna Comnena. In a memorable passage in the Alexiad she records Bohemund's escape from Antioch. She quotes in detail his parting message to the Emperor, an act of defiance which left no doubt that Bohemund's purpose in going to the West was to raise troops for a war against the Emperor which, he confidently boasted, would lead to the conquest of Constantinople itself. Yet, her account of Bohemund's activities in Western Europe seems all but useless. She knows only one important fact: Bohemund's marriage to Constance. For the rest, she represents Bohemund's visit as one long, continual tirade against the Greeks. However, she does so in terms so vague as to tell us nothing of the time, place and circumstances under which Bohemund conducted his anti-Byzantine campaign. We may therefore conclude that her account is not factual in character but rather an interpretation, in the light of subsequent events, of the rumours and fears

¹ MGHSS, VII, 777.
³ William of Tyre, xi. 1, 6, RHCOc, 1, 450-1, 461-2.
concerning the meaning of Bohemund's voyage to the West which circulated at that time through the imperial court and disturbed the minds of the Emperor and his advisors.¹

The evidence in Bartolf of Nangis is quite different. This writer records a visit of Bohemund to Paschal. There, before the Pope, Bohemund poured out his woes and accused Alexius of crimes against himself and the crusaders. Paschal accepted this indictment and told Bohemund to seek aid against Alexius in Gaul "et partes occidentis". As a sign of his approval, Paschal constituted Bohemund "signiferum Christi exercitus" and presented him with the banner of St. Peter. Here is at least one source which states clearly that in 1105 Paschal II gave his consent to a crusade against the Byzantine Empire.²

We know that Bartolf was a continuator of Fulcher of Chartres, writing in Syria around the years 1108-9.³ His account is quite persuasive in its simplicity. The reference to the banner of St. Peter is a nice touch of detail, and besides, Bartolf knows that the Patriarch Daimbert had accompanied Bohemund on his visit to the West.⁴ However, Bartolf knows nothing about Bohemund's activities in Italy in 1105, and he is silent concerning Bruno of Segni. This combination of what he does know and what he does not know suggests that Bartolf received his information from those who had served in Bohemund's army, from men who believed that the attack on the Byzantine Empire had received papal sanction and who lived to tell their story to those in the Latin Orient. It does not follow that their conviction concerning papal support was founded upon fact. It would surely be unwise to accept Bartolf's evidence as conclusive proof that Paschal had agreed with Bohemund's plans for a crusade against the Greeks.

¹ Alexiad, XI, 12, XII, 1, III, pp. 50-56, conveys accurately the anxiety, military preparations and diplomatic manoeuvring of the Byzantine court during Bohemund's sojourn in the West.

² Bartolf of Nangis, Gesta Francorum Iherusalem Expugnantium, c. 65, RHCOc III, 538: "... Boamundum vero trans Alpes in Gallias et partes Occidentis, ut contra imperatorem sibi adutoria quareret, legavit, atque signiferum Christi exercitus eum constituit, vexillumque sancti Petri ei tradens, in pace dimisit."

³ Cahen, op. cit. p. 11 and Runciman, History, i. 329.

⁴ Bartolf of Nangis, c. 65, RHCOc, III, 538.
What reconstruction of events in Italy involving Bohemund and Paschal II in 1105 may then be offered as the result of a critical examination of the evidence? It is clear that Bohemund, hard pressed in Antioch, returned to the West to get aid against Byzantium. Yet, contrary to the opinions of Yewdale and others, it seems likely that upon his arrival in Italy he was disposed to be circumspect. Perhaps he spoke in general terms of a new crusade, for he would, after all, be willing to accept men and money wherever and whenever he could. However, there is little reliable evidence that he made a serious attempt to recruit a crusade army in Italy at this time and equally little evidence to suggest that he openly stirred up hatred against the Emperor Alexius and his empire. Immensely shrewd, Bohemund knew that such action might boomerang. The Greeks still had some influence in southern and central Italy, and any plea for an attack on them might cast doubt upon the sincerity of Bohemund's self-appointed role as a "martyr of Christ". The Norman's eyes were on France where he knew he could find help for an expedition against Constantinople. There, the disastrous outcome of the Crusade of 1101 remained for many a vivid memory.

Accordingly in Italy Bohemund bided his time and was content to present himself as the hero of the crusade. In this role, he appeared before Paschal II who received him gladly. To the Pope Bohemund now revealed his desire to pay his vows at the shrine of St. Leonard in France and his determination to raise a new crusade army in that country. To these proposals the Pope could do nothing but give an enthusiastic response. This son of St. Peter, this hero whose exploits in the Holy War were already half swathed in legend, had been acclaimed by the faithful in Italy. Could the Papacy do any less? Could the Pope refuse to sanction Bohemund's proposal

1 This interpretation is directly opposed to the opinion of Yewdale, op. cit. p. 107, who believes that Bohemund's itinerary through Italy was "taken up with attacks upon the Greek emperor". However, he cites as evidence for his judgement only the reports in Anna Comnena, supra, p. 180, n. 1.

2 Supra, pp. 170, n. 3, 171, n. 1; infra, p. 184, n. 2.

3 For the papal itinerary, JL, i. 722. JL 6053 is a privilege granted at Bohemund's request, dated 18 November 1105. See Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 107-8.

4 Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 104-5.
for a new expedition to the East? Hardly, and France, the home of crusading valour, was the most likely place for the Norman prince to win support for his crusade. As a sign of papal approval, the "vexillum sancti Petri" was given to Bohemund. Yet something more was added. If the Pope could not lend the authority of his personal presence to Bohemund's appeal in France, then the presence of a papal legate was the next best thing, and Bruno of Segni was chosen to accompany Bohemund in that capacity. Bruno had been with Urban II during the memorable visit to France in 1095-6. He had had first-hand experience in procedures proper to the inauguration of a new crusade. He was therefore a logical choice.1

Alas for Paschal. He was soon to discover that he had unwittingly given his blessing, not to a crusade, but to an act of vengeance and aggression.2

III. Bohemund in France

The year 1106 found the redoubtable Norman adventurer in France. His journeys in that country, his visit to the shrine of St. Leonard (an ostentatious piece of pious humbug) as well as his marriage to Constance of France (a superb demonstration of diplomatic skill) need not detain us. Our concern must be directed elsewhere.3

1 There is no doubt that Paschal placed Bohemund in command of the army which (presumably) he would raise in France. Concerning the vexillum, see Erdmann, op. cit. pp. 170, 173 f. However, it was Bruno of Segni, not Bohemund, who received the apostolic legation. See Gigalski, op. cit. pp. 56-58, and Ganzer, op. cit. p. 61. Holtzmann thought differently on the basis of other evidence, infra, p. 193, n. 2. Bruno's presence on Urban's journey is well attested, Ganzer, op. cit. p. 60, n. 34. There is no reason to think with Cartellieri, op. cit. p. 303, that Paschal sent Bruno along as legate precisely because he was so completely behind Bohemund's plans to attack the Emperor Alexius.

2 Yewdale built his entire account of Bohemund's visit to the West upon his conviction that Paschal sanctioned Bohemund's proposed attack on Byzantium. Yet, it should be pointed out that at one point Yewdale seems to support the interpretation presented here. On p. 135, he writes: "... he (Bohemund) therefore turned to the Pope for aid and concealed behind the pontiff's plan for a crusade his own selfish designs for personal aggrandizement."

First of all, although the exact course of the itinerary of Bruno and Bohemund is unknown to us, it is clear that both were indefatigable in their preaching of a new crusade against the infidel. The climax of their joint activities in this regard came at the council held at Poitiers on 26 June 1106. While the council dealt with a few matters touching the spiritual discipline of the Church, the crusade was the chief business at hand. Bruno’s experience with Urban at Clermont stood him in good stead here. He knew that while councils might legislate on behalf of the crusaders, it was the preaching that mattered. If there was no pope on hand to inspire the multitude, there was Bohemund, the veteran crusader, to urge men to fight the infidel for the love of God. Accordingly, our sources indicate that Bruno presided while Bohemund spoke movingly “ad invitandum et confortandum sancti sepulchri viam”. Great enthusiasm was the result. The evidence preserved in the writing of Suger of St. Denis and others is clear. Suger’s witness is especially important in that he was an eyewitness to the proceedings at Poitiers.


2 Suger, Vie de Louis VI le Gros, ed. H. Waquet (Paris, 1929), pp. 44-50, reports Bohemund’s marriage at Chartres just after Easter, 1106, in the presence of Bruno, the papal legate (48): “Austitit etiam ibidem Romane sedis apostolice legatus, dominus Bruno, Signinus episcopus, a domino Paschali papa, ad invitandum et confortandum sancti sepulchri viam dominum Boamundum comitatus.” Neither here nor in his report concerning the Poitiers council does Suger refer to any proposed attack on Byzantium. The Chronicon Malleacense, RHF, XII, 405, reports concerning the Poitiers council: “Boamundus dux, quem Bruno legatus sanctae Romanae ecclesiae adduxit, et tenuit concilium, et viam S. Sepulcri confirmavit.” Ex chronico Kemperlediensi, RHF, XII, 562, confirms the presence of Bruno at Poitiers. Suger’s presence there is accepted by M. Aubert, Suger (Paris, 1950), p. 72. It should be noted that I have accepted the traditional date for the council, following Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, ed. A. Theiner (Barri-Ducis, 1869), xviii, c. 178. Monod, op. cit. pp. 46-47, n. 9, dates it 26 May, 1106. General accounts of the council may be found in J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Amplissima Collectio (Florence, Milan, 1759-98), xx, cc. 1205-8, and K. J. Hefele, Histoire des Conciles, ed. and trans. H. Leclercq (Paris, 1907- ), V, i.
Yet none of these sources indicates that Bohemund exhorted the French to attack the Byzantine Empire. On the other hand, Orderic Vitalis, one of the principal historical writers of twelfth century France, emphasizes the theme of anti-Byzantine agitation in his account of Bohemund’s visit to France.¹ This is particularly true of Orderic’s report concerning the council of Poitiers and Bohemund’s marriage to Constance at Chartres. According to Orderic, Bohemund took it upon himself at both events to launch an impassioned plea to the assembled nobles to take up arms to punish the Greeks for their many “treacheries”. He offered as bait the rich plunder and booty awaiting those who participated in a successful attack upon the Empire.²

In considering this report, the question naturally arises as to Orderic’s general reliability. His work has not received the detailed critical study which it deserves although a recent monograph by Hans Wolters has done much to illuminate the aims and methods of this important writer.³ Suffice it for our purpose here to say that even though Orderic’s account of Bohemund’s visit may have been written thirty years or so after the event, it rings true. It may even be that Orderic was present at the marriage and that, like Suger, his report has the great authority of an eyewitness. Beyond this, it is clear that Bohemund captured Orderic’s imagination and even though, after Bohemund’s eventual defeat, Orderic expressed some second thoughts on the essential righteousness of Bohemund’s expedition,


² XI, 12, IV, pp. 210-13. At Poitiers Bohemund naturally expected the memory of Greek “treachery” on the crusade of 1101 to be strong (supra, p. 171, n. 1.) and hence the choice of this city as the site for the council.

he was clearly in sympathy with Bohemund's attacks on Alexius Comnenus.¹

The same author also tells us that Bohemund did more than merely talk about the iniquitous Greeks. He also exhibited a man who claimed to be the son of the Emperor Romanus Diogenes and who had been unjustly excluded from the imperial throne by the Emperor Alexius. This was, of course, an old Norman trick. Robert Guiscard had used it back in the days of his war against the Byzantine Empire. The ruse had deceived even Gregory VII. What had worked for Robert Guiscard might also prove effective for Bohemund. Naturally, the trick could not be played twice in southern Italy. Many there and at the papal court might remember the deception. However, it could be tried in France where lack of previous experience with Norman trickery made the French all the more gullible. Indeed, no one seems to have questioned the impostor.²

We know, too, that Bohemund had other stratagems up his sleeve. Modern research had demonstrated that during his sojourn in France Bohemund distributed copies of the Anonymi Gesta Francorum. This act of generosity had many purposes. It reminded the French of the crusading valour of the previous generation. It recorded for all Bohemund's great contribution to the crusade. Above all, the Gesta had by this time been doctored so as to establish the invincibility of Bohemund's claims to the principality of Antioch, and, more generally, to magnify the heroism of the crusaders and make even more desperate the wickedness of the Emperor Alexius.³ In conclusion, it is worth noting that in the opinion of some scholars, the fierce hatred of the Byzantine Empire, which Bohemund's visit enkindled in the French at this time, contributed to the production of the celebrated and much discussed forgery, the Letter to Flanders. Much of this vulgar example of twelfth-century crusade propaganda is devoted to a highly coloured account of the sensual and material joys to be found in Constantinople. Since, as Orderic tells us, Bohemund was only too eager

¹ Infra, p. 199, n. 3.
² Orderic Vitalis, XI, 12, IV, p. 212; Yewdale, op. cit. p. 110; Gigalski, op. cit. p. 59.
³ A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage", pp. 70-78.
to expatiate on the rewards awaiting those who conquered the Byzantine Empire, this suggestion may well be correct.\(^1\)

Attention must now be paid to a curious discrepancy in our sources. On the one hand, we have Orderic Vitalis, who places the preaching of a new crusade almost exclusively within the context of Bohemund’s ambition to punish the “guilty” Greeks. On the other, we have, in sources equally reliable, the picture of Bohemund, supported by Bruno, the papal legate, urging all and sundry to take arms for the relief of the Latin Orient. On the one hand, all is hatred for the Greeks. On the other, all is love for Jerusalem and the crusade. This discrepancy is paralleled by the reports in our sources concerning Bruno himself. In Orderic Vitalis, the papal legate does not appear. He is not present either to support or condemn Bohemund’s denunciations of the Greeks. He is simply not there, and it is quite consistent with this that nowhere does Orderic tell us explicitly whether or not Bohemund’s expedition had papal approval. By way of contrast, the other group of sources refer to Bruno as the papal legate who presided over the council of Poitiers and who, in the name of the Pope, pronounced a blessing on a crusade to Jerusalem. Yet, once again, in these sources nothing is said of a war against Byzantium.\(^2\)

In order to explain this apparent contradiction another tentative reconstruction of events is in order. Acting under papal authority Bruno and Bohemund came to France to preach a new crusade to Jerusalem. Together they accomplished their mission with considerable success. However, whenever the time was ripe or an occasion such as his marriage offered, Bohemund


\(^2\) Ex *historiae Franciae fragmento*, *RHF*, XII, 6, records Bohemund’s attack on the Emperor but fails to mention Bruno of Segni or any papal approval of the expedition. Richard of Poitiers, *RHF*, XII, 412, reports his marriage but nothing more. Albert of Aachen, X, 40, *RHCOc*, IV, 650, says that Bohemund collected an army from France and Italy but omits any reference to the Papacy and Bruno of Segni. Throughout his analysis Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 111-2, ignored the contradictory nature of the sources.
struck out on a policy of his own. By various methods, he sought to inflame the French against the Byzantine Empire, proposing in effect that the new crusade proceed to Jerusalem via the conquest of the Greek Empire. His plan was enthusiastically received. Although many rallied to his standard out of a desire to serve God on a legitimate crusade to Jerusalem, many more joined Bohemund out of a desire either to share in the pillage of the Empire or to punish the Greeks for their "betrayal" of previous crusades—or both. A large army began to collect around Bohemund who became increasingly explicit about his real objective, the conquest of Constantinople.

If this reconstruction of events here and in the previous section of this article is sound, we can only imagine the concern which Bruno felt when he saw Bohemund effecting this perversion of the crusade. What was he to do? Speak out against Bohemund? Perhaps he tried to dissociate himself from Bohemund when it was clear that the Norman prince intended to ring the changes on the "iniquities" of the Greeks. This might explain why Bruno is absent from our sources when Bohemund is busy denouncing the Emperor Alexius and present when Bohemund is warming to the subject of a crusade to Jerusalem. At any rate, more than this Bruno could not do. He could only complete as best he could the task which the Papacy had set before him. Events had clearly passed beyond his control. He dared not oppose the rapidly gathering avalanche. Perhaps he thought that if anyone could stop Bohemund, it would have to be the Roman pontiff.

It would be unfair to accuse Bruno of cowardice. None the less, the tragedy remains that the papal blessing of a legitimate crusade to the East was cleverly extended by Bohemund to include a crusade against Constantinople. Bruno might try to express his disapproval by silence or absence. Yet this would have had little effect on those who joined Bohemund's army. The Norman prince had the "vexillum sancti Petri" to prove that his actions had papal blessing and that sufficed for those who rallied to his standard.¹

¹Gigalski, op. cit. pp. 56-68, completely ignored the problem of Bruno's attitude towards Bohemund's anti-Byzantine campaign although he was well
IV. Bohemund's Invasion of the Byzantine Empire

Late in the summer of 1106 Bohemund returned to southern Italy, fresh from his triumphant tour north of the Alps. Just how large an army returned with him we do not know. We do know that he delayed for more than a year before invading the Byzantine Empire. The delay may be explained, in part, by the illness which he sustained shortly after his return. We may also suppose that time was needed to assemble a fleet to carry the army across the Adriatic. Perhaps, too, the delay was judged advisable since it gave latecomers from France a chance to join the expedition and increase its strength.

Did Bohemund at this time attempt to gain papal approval for his war on the Greeks? Further consideration of the evidence in Anna Comnena belongs here. She describes at some length the raid made on the port of Otranto by the Greek admiral Isaac Kontostephanos. The Admiral’s purpose was to divert Bohemund from preparations for his own expedition against the Empire. That this surprise attack had little effect does not concern us. What is important is that during the raid several of the Scythian mercenaries serving with the Byzantine forces fell into the hands of the Normans. These were sent to Bohemund who in turn took them with him to Rome to seek audience with Paschal II.

In the papal presence, according to Anna, Bohemund now presented a compelling appeal for papal approval of his plans. That Alexius was a traitor to Christendom could be demonstrated by his employment of heathen Scythians against Christians. Besides, Bohemund argued, an army had already been collected.

aware of the Norman’s activity in this regard. Chalandon, op. cit. p. 242, conflates the sources and implies that Bruno supported Bohemund in his preaching of a crusade against Byzantium. Nowhere does he state whether or not Bruno considered himself to be acting under papal authority in this regard. Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 108-12, has no doubts since he believes that Paschal had commissioned both Bruno and Bohemund to preach the crusade against the Greeks in France.

1 Anonymous of Bari, RISS-I, V. 155 ; Orderic Vitalis, XI, 24, IV, pp. 239-42 ; Yewdale, op. cit. p. 112.

2 Holtzmann, op. cit. p. 280 : “. . . quod per me ipsum fecisset, si a tempore mei reditus, postquam gravedine infirmitatis, qua Deus aliquantulo tempore me detineri voluit. . . .”
Many had come, confident of papal approval. Would the Pope disappoint them? The account in Anna is remarkable for its restraint in dealing with the Papacy. In effect, writes Anna, Bohemund presented the Pope with a *fait accompli*, and Anna records that Paschal agreed with Bohemund and gave his approval for an invasion of the Empire. It should be noted that Anna refers neither to the commissioning of a papal legate to accompany the army nor to the bestowal of the "*vexillum sancti Petri*" as a sign of papal approval.¹

The question here is whether or not Anna's evidence for this interview between Bohemund and Paschal is any more reliable than her general account of Bohemund's activities in the West. I think not. We may begin by considering the papal itinerary for the years 1106-7. Our information here is lamentably incomplete. Not even the labours of Kehr, Holtzmann and so many others in the fertile fields of *Papsturkunden* can fill as many lacunae as we would like. All we can say is that Paschal was in central Italy as late as July 1106, and that by the middle of September he was in Florence, well along on a journey which would ultimately take him to France. He arrived at Cluny in time for Christmas 1106, and spent the next months on a leisurely circuit through France, a visit which culminated in the great council at Troyes at the end of May 1107. We have no evidence which indicates that he was back in Rome prior to the middle of November in the same year.² Bohemund, however, had already left. On 9 October 1107, he crossed the Adriatic and began the war.³ Our conclusion must therefore be that, for all their incompleteness, our records of the papal itinerary make it exceedingly difficult for us to assign a time for any meeting between Bohemund and Paschal. When Bohemund returned to southern Italy from France, Paschal was already on his way

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¹ *DR*, II, no. 1225; *Alexiad*, XII, 8, III, pp. 77 f. Chalandon, op. cit. p. 243, n. 3, sees in Anna's evidence the decisive moment for Paschal's approval of Bohemund and his plan to attack Byzantium. Norden, op. cit. p. 71, n. 4, also held to this view. *DR* assigned this development to September 1105. The date should have been somewhere between August 1106 and September 1107.

² *JL*, i. 725-7, 733.

³ Yewdale, op. cit. p. 115; *Alexiad*, XII, 9, III, pp. 81-83, esp. p. 82, n. 1; Anonymous of Bari, *RISS-I*, V, 155.
to the north of Italy. When the Pope returned from France, Bohemund had already placed Durazzo under siege. In this connection we may refer to a letter written to Paschal by Bohemund. This letter shall be examined at some length at a later point in this article. As we shall see, there is some question concerning its date. Yet, whether we date the letter in September 1106, or sometime in 1108, the result is the same since Bohemund there states that he had had no opportunity for a personal interview with the Pope prior to the papal departure from Rome and central Italy.¹ And, if Bohemund failed to make contact with Paschal then, he failed completely because, once again, Bohemund had already left Italy before Paschal returned to Rome late in 1107. Anna’s account is therefore suspect to the point where it should be set aside. In a way this is unfortunate since her story of Bohemund’s visit to the papal court would at least support our suggestion that the Norman prince did not gain papal approval for the war on the Greeks prior to his journey into France. However, we cannot have it both ways. Anna’s account must be judged unreliable.

In the course of this investigation we have considered three writers who clearly depict the Roman pontiff giving encouragement to Bohemund of Antioch in his plans for the conquest of the Byzantine Empire: Albert of Aachen, Bartolf of Nangis and Anna Comnena. Since in all three cases I have cast doubt on the reliability of their accounts, it might be well to pause and make a final comment upon these three considered as a group. In the first place, both Bartolf and Anna wrote in the East, and I have already suggested that the report of the mission of Manasses in Albert of Aachen is eastern in origin. However, the similarity between these accounts goes far beyond this. The stories in Bartolf and Anna explain how the Papacy became involved with Bohemund. There are divergences in detail. While both agree that it was Bohemund who persuaded the Pope, in Anna the Norman’s denunciations of Alexius take place after Bohemund

¹ Holtzmann, op. cit. p. 280: "... quod per me ipsum fecissem, si a tempore mei reditus, postquam gravedine infirmitatis, qua Deus aliquantulo tempore me detineri voluit, adleviatus fui, presentiam vestram Romae vel in partibus Apuliae invenire potuisset."
PASCHAL II, BOHEMUND OF ANTIOCH

has already assembled his army and is fully prepared for his attack on Durazzo. In Bartolf, papal agreement is won before Bohemund goes into France. In Albert of Aachen, the story of Manasses is set in a different context. I have stated that the author intended the story to explain how and why the Emperor Alexius acquired a sinister reputation with the Latins in Western Europe. It was Manasses who sowed the seeds of distrust in the minds of the Pope and others. None the less, the fact that the author records that Paschal sent Manasses to repeat his accusations before "all the princes of Gaul" indicates that he was well aware that at a later date Bohemund found in France most of the men for his war on the Empire. Therefore, the author, like Bartolf and Anna, may have been concerned to show how the Papacy became involved in Bohemund's perversion of the crusade. The three stories should therefore be regarded as variations on a single theme.

What is the genesis of these stories? The answer, if there be an answer, is to be found in the climate of opinion which prevailed in both the Byzantine Empire and the Latin Orient after Bohemund's defeat. As I have already suggested, the fortunate survivors of Bohemund's army, who eventually reached the Latin Orient, brought with them the conviction that the Papacy had given its sanction to the attack on the Byzantine Empire, and among many Greeks, there was always the willingness to believe that the Roman Church was at all times the gullible tool of Norman ambition. From this conviction, it was but a short step to the assumption that this time, as in the case of Robert Guiscard's invasion years before, the Papacy had agreed to an attack on the Empire.

Given these convictions, the question naturally arose as to how the Pope had become involved with Bohemund. Doubtless many answers to this question circulated through the East. Gradually the stories took shape, and our writers have utilized three of them to serve their own particular historical purposes.

There were probably many more which failed to find a historian to give them immortality. In conclusion, then, these three stories are not based upon historical truth. Rather they are witnesses to the conviction, widely held in the East, that Paschal II had been the willing accomplice of Bohemund in the attempted fulfilment of the latter's aggressive ambitions.

We turn now to the letter of Bohemund to Paschal. As indicated above, the dating of this document, far and away the most important piece of evidence to be considered in this article, presents many problems. The letter was first edited by W. Holtzmann more than thirty years ago.\(^1\) Holtzmann argued that the reference to the papal departure from Rome and central Italy as well as the phrase "concilio in proximo convocato" suggested September 1106 as the likely date, the reference to a council being an ecclesiastical gathering which the Pope had summoned to meet at Guastalla in the closing week of October of that year. Paul Kehr agreed with this argument and thus conferred his great authority in these matters upon the date assigned by Holtzmann.\(^2\) However, more recently the distinguished German scholar Carl Erdmann called attention to the phrase "transfretaretis et—ad nos usque accederetis". This, he insisted, showed that Bohemund was already across the Adriatic and encamped before Durazzo. Since, in the summer of 1108, Bohemund's military position at Durazzo was rapidly deteriorating under the weight of the Byzantine counter-attack, Erdmann argued that this appeal for help from the Pope belonged to that time, adding that the reference to the church council might be to a council held in the Lateran in October 1108. Erdmann's argument seems to be correct although the reference to a Church council may not be to any particular council at all. Accordingly, one might date the letter earlier, putting it back as far as the beginning of 1108, i.e. to the time when Bohemund

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heard that Paschal had returned to Rome. Be this as it may, I think that we must assign this letter to 1108, not 1106.1

What then is the content of this letter? First of all, the Norman prince expresses his gratitude to Paschal for urging him to go to France “pro servicio Dei”. The Pope had even granted Bohemund the honour of an apostolic legation.2 Unfortunately, when Bohemund returned to Italy, he was ill for a short period. When he recovered, he would have thanked the Pope in person had he been able to find Paschal in Rome or southern Italy.3

These preliminaries dispensed with, Bohemund now informs the Pope that the “army of God” has been assembled “ammonicione beati Petri”. It cannot be disbanded. The army has the following message for Paschal and the Roman Church.4 Paschal must consult with his cardinals or with the next church council “ad expediendum iter Ierosolimitanum” either by acting as a judge between Bohemund and the Emperor Alexius or by removing Greek “heresies” on the Double Procession, the Eucharist, etc., from the Church. This portion of the letter is given over to a crude summary of Greek “errors” in faith and practice.5 The tirade concluded, the army urges the Pope to cross the sea and join the crusaders (at Durazzo). By this

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1 Erdmann, op. cit. p. 303, n. 68. See infra, n. 5.
2 Holtzmann, op. cit. p. 280: “Grates non modicas, pater reverende, vestrae sublimitati refero, quoniam, prout decuit tantum patrem et dominum, me filium imo servum beati Petri et vestrum, quando peregrinationem in Galliarum partes pro servicio Dei suscepi, honore apostolice legationis, ad id proficiendum corrborare voluistis; ...”. For Holtzmann, op. cit. pp. 274-5, this was decisive proof that Bohemund had been made a legate for his journey into France. His interpretation of this text is inconclusive. See supra, p. 182, n. 1.
3 Supra, p. 190, n. 1.
4 Ibid. p. 280: “Nunc autem, quoniam Dei exercitus ammonicione beati Petri congregatur, nullatenus dimittere potui et proprios legatos vestro conspectui destinare curavi, qui vobis totique ecclesiae Romanae voluntatem meam tociusque Christiane exercitum scripto et viva voce significaret mihique vestram renuntiare satagerent.”
5 Ibid. p. 280: “Haec autem esset nostra voluntas, si Deus vestro cordi inspirare dignaretur, ut cum episcopis et cardinalibus et clero Romano sive etiam concilio in proximo convocato consilium caperetis et ad expediendum iter Ierosolimitanum sive ad iusticiam inter nos et imperatorem tenendum sive ad scismata et hereses et diversas traditiones removendas, quae in ecclesiae—existuunt.”
action, Paschal will fulfil the vow which Urban II had made years before at Bari. Evidently, Bohemund believed that at the council of Bari in April 1099, Urban II promised to participate personally in the crusade. Bohemund assures the Pope that his personal presence on the crusade will give joy to Latin Christendom.¹

Bohemund now vents his wrath on those enemies who, seduced by Byzantine gold, have slandered him to the Pope and upheld the Emperor Alexius.² A long list of charges against Alexius is recited. There is nothing to surprise us here. Alexius is a usurper, an old Norman accusation. He is responsible for the persistence of the Greek Church in “heresy”, for its alienation from the Church of Rome. He has injured the crusade. And so on.³ The Pope should exercise his spiritual

¹ Supra, pp. 280-1: “… si audo dicere, transfretaretis et cum alto corde, ut Deus exaltaretur, per presentiam vestram ad nos usque accederetis et quod papa Urbanus beate memoriae, sicut promiserat in concilio apud beatum [Nicolaum?] celebrato vobis presentibus, morte superveniente minime conplere potuit, vos successor eius sicut et multa alia preclara, quae vestro tempore contigerunt, perficere studeretis, unde tota latinitas solatium, haberet et gaudium.” Bohemund had urged direct papal involvement in the crusade before in the letter to the Pope of September 1099 (supra, p. 172, n. 1. For the council of Bari, see JL, I, p. 694 and the extensive discussion in F. Nitti di Vito, La Ripresa Gregoriana di Bari (1087-1105) e i suoi riflessi nel mondo contemporaneo politico e religioso (Trani, 1942), pp. 371-435. At the close of the letter to Lucca (Hagenmeyer, Epistolae, p. 167) we find: “… quod dominus papa Urbanus apud Barum tenet concilium, tractans et disponens cum multis terrae senatoribus ad lerusalem profecto tendere.” Did Urban actually promise to join the crusade? Holtzmann, ibid. p. 272, nn. 4-5, Erdmann, op. cit. pp. 302-3 and notes, and Leib, op. cit. pp. 287 f., discuss the problem but fail to reach any certain conclusion. Urban probably had a desire to go to the East, but I doubt if he ever made any binding promise to do so. This is but another example of Bohemund’s skill in distorting the truth.

² Ibid. p. 281: “Ut enim detractiones omnium tam longe quam prope removeantur, qui auri vel argenti gratia potius quam dilectione vel alia ratione partes imperatoris substantare videntur, offero [me] facturum et accepturum in presentia vestra ab inperatore iusticiam, si ita, sicut rogamus, feceritis. Quod enim quidam pecuniae pocius quam justiciae amatores pretendunt nos super imperatorem Christianum iniuste arma cepisse. . . .” Who are these enemies? Among others, Bruno of Segni? He joined Paschal and the curia at Parma in early November 1106. The Pope was on his way to France, infra, p. 196, n. 1. See Schieffer, op. cit. p. 177.

³ Ibid. p. 281: “Quoniam vero hec iniuria in omnes filios matris nostrae Romanae ecclesiae redundare dinosectur, hanc cum multis alis, [que] leroso-limitanis sua rapiendo, interficiendo, spoliando, in mare mergendo. . . .”
power against this enemy of Christendom. His punishment of Alexius and the purging of the Church of Greek “errors” will be profitable, spiritually and temporally, to the Church of Rome.¹ In conclusion, Bohemund writes that if Paschal decides that he cannot come in person, he must at least send a legate, perhaps the Cardinal John of Burgundy.²

By way of commentary on this letter, we may note, first of all, that its intimidating tone reflects Bohemund’s desperate situation at Durazzo which would be improved greatly if the Pope himself joined the crusaders and thus boosted their sagging morale. The letter also confirms the fact that Paschal had sent a papal legate to accompany Bohemund on his journey into France. The failure to mention Bruno of Segni by name is perhaps a significant omission. However, the true importance of this letter lies elsewhere. The entire direction of its argument—the fact that an army has been assembled at papal command and cannot be sent home, the dreary rehearsal of the “sins” of the Emperor Alexius, the attack on those close to the Pope who have slandered Bohemund and defended Alexius, the demand for a papal judgement between Bohemund and his imperial adversary and for a condemnation of Greek “errors”, and the request for the papal presence, or, at least, the presence of a papal legate—suggests that Bohemund knows that he, his plans and ambitions are without papal support. Put differently, does not this letter tell us that Bohemund is asking for papal approval of his war on the Byzantine Empire, for the first time? Thus interpreted, this letter to Paschal is the cap-stone of our argument that Bohemund had indeed deceived the Papacy. He had used the Pope’s support for a crusade to Jerusalem to create a

¹ Supra, p. 282: “Si vetus fermuntum grecorum expurgari valeret et sex inobediencie et rebelliosis et scismatium et diversarum traditionum ablui, mirabilis lecia esset toti ecclesiae Christi et exaltatio Romanae ecclesiae et tam spiritualibus quam corporalibus utilitas.”

crusade whose destination was not Jerusalem, but Constantinople. Now, in 1108, in danger at Durazzo, he attempted to persuade the Papacy to grant its approval for his perversion of the crusade.

It does no injustice to Paschal to say that Bohemund was offering him a tempting prize. The conquest of the Byzantine Empire would effect a "reconciliation" between the Greek and Latin churches. The Papacy stood to profit much by joining in with Bohemund's plans. Perhaps, therefore, Paschal succumbed at this last, decisive moment.

Let us return to Paschal's journey through Italy and France in 1106-7. The surviving evidence for the various councils held at Guastalla, Troyes and elsewhere offers little assistance. Even Suger, who recounted the papal visit in some detail, has nothing to show that Paschal indicated at this time any interest whatsoever in the crusade. Only one source tells us that at Troyes the Pope legislated "de Hierosolomitano itinere et de treuva dei". The report is so formal in character that it must arouse our suspicion. Yet even if it were authentic, we could not use it as evidence that Paschal gave his approval to the expedition which at that time was in southern Italy, poised to strike at the Empire.¹

The evidence we are looking for will not be found in that direction. If it exists at all, it is in Anna Comnena's report of the treaty which concluded the conflict between Bohemund and the Empire in September 1108.² One of the witnesses who subscribed to the Treaty of Devol was Maurus, Bishop of Amalfi, and this bishop Anna describes as papal legate to the Emperor Alexius. Many scholars have accepted this evidence without question and have drawn the conclusion that Maurus's

¹ For the itinerary through France, JL, I, 725-33. The quotation is from the Chronicon S. Petri Vivonensis, RHF, XII, 281. N. F. Cantor, op. cit. pp. 262-4, believes that during his sojourn in France, Paschal sought ways and means of gaining support for Bohemund's "holy war against Byzantium". However, his opinion is not supported by direct evidence.

² For the Epirot war, see Albert of Aachen, x. 40-45, RHCoC, IV, 650-2; Alexiad, XII-XIII, iii, pp. 53-125; Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 115-31; Chalandon, op. cit. pp. 243-50. The treaty is DR, II, no. 1243, Alexiad, XIII, 12, III, pp. 125-39.
The presence at Durazzo signified papal approval of Bohemund’s expedition.\(^1\)

The strength of this interpretation must rest entirely upon the text in Anna Comnena, and it should be admitted at once that her account of the provisions of the treaty is such as to make us believe that she is quoting from the copy of the original document as it was preserved in the imperial archives. However, when she comes to list the names of those witnesses who signed (ὑπογεγραφότες) the treaty, I think that she has adopted a rather different procedure. To make my meaning clear, here is the pertinent portion of the text as presented in the Leib edition:

The witnesses who were there and before whom the treaty had been concluded and who subscribed are the following:

The bishops, most dear to God, Maurus of Amalfi and Renardus of Taranto with the clergy who accompanied them;

The most pious abbot (καθηγούμενος) of the holy monastery of St. Andrew in Lombardy which is on the island of Brindisi,—

The chiefs of the pilgrims, who made a mark with their own hands and whose names were written under these marks by the hand of the bishop of Amalfi, most dear to God, who also had come from the Pope as a legate to the emperor (ὅσ καὶ πρέοις παρὰ τοῦ πάσα πρὸς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἐληλύθει.)

From the imperial court, there were:

the sebastos, Marinos
Roger, the son of Dagobert,
Peter Aliphas,
William of Ghent, etc.\(^2\)

First of all, it is clear that Anna is no longer quoting directly from the text of the treaty. Rather she is presenting both an enumeration of and a commentary on the names she has found at the end of her copy of the treaty. Enough has been quoted to suggest that Anna was content to record merely the names of some of the witnesses but in the case of others she felt compelled to say a little more. Thus, on the one hand, the names of Roger, son of Dagobert, and Peter Aliphas are sufficient for themselves. On the other, the two bishops and the abbot are important

\(^1\) For example, Chalandon, op. cit. p. 260, and Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, p. 94.

\(^2\) Alexiad, XIII, 12, III, p. 138.
enough to receive some identifying phrases. The abbot's monastery is carefully located in an explanatory note at Brindisi.\(^1\) As for Maurus of Amalfi, Anna alludes to his high episcopal rank in the usual terms of Byzantine hyperbole. She indicates that he wrote in the names of those leaders of the Latin army who could not write, and then at the end she adds the information that Maurus was also (καί) papal legate to the Emperor. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that Anna certainly saw Maurus's signature at the bottom of her copy of the treaty, but I judge it doubtful if Maurus was actually described in the treaty as a papal legate or that he had acted as such during the negotiations which had led to the treaty.

If there is any cogency in this suggestion, we must then ask what led Anna to attribute to Maurus the high office of papal legate? The answer is twofold. First of all, she believed that Paschal had sanctioned Bohemund's attack on the Empire, and secondly, she may have had some knowledge of the fact that at one point in her father's reign Maurus had actually appeared at the imperial court, acting in the capacity of a papal legate. In the years 1111-12 there was an exchange of embassies between Rome and the Byzantine court. These negotiations have been studied by others, and it will be sufficient for our purpose to say that the matters under discussion included the reunion of the Greek and Latin churches as well as the possible unification of the imperial crowns of East and West in the person of Alexius Comnenus. Maurus acted as papal legate during these negotiations.\(^2\) It is unfortunate that we know so little about this bishop.\(^3\) However, the fact that he was bishop of Amalfi suggests that he had first-hand knowledge of the traditions of Byzantine Christianity and would therefore make an admirable representative of the Papacy in these negotiations. As far as Anna is concerned, I think it likely that she made the natural mistake of assigning his

\(^1\) Kehr, Italia Pontifica, ix. 400.
\(^3\) F. Ughelli, Italia Sacra (Rome, 1643-62), vii, cc. 263-5, the Vita for Maurus and ix, cc. 172-5, the Vita for Renardus (Raynaldus).
legateship to Bohemund's expedition rather than to the negotiations of 1111-12 which, incidentally, find no mention at all in her history. We must remember that Anna was writing more than thirty years after these events.¹

It is thus proposed that Maurus was not acting as a papal legate accompanying Bohemund's army. Along with others, such as the Bishop of Taranto and the Abbot of St. Andrew's monastery in Brindisi, he was drawn into Bohemund's plans after the Norman prince returned to southern Italy with the army he had collected north of the Alps. Needless to say, his presence at Durazzo did not indicate papal approval of the expedition.

V. Conclusion

After his defeat at Durazzo, Bohemund returned to southern Italy and died there in 1111.² Western reaction to his failure ranged from outright misrepresentation of his defeat as victory, to pious moralizing, to something which we can only call shame-faced embarrassment.³ That the Papacy was informed of the terms which Alexius imposed upon the Norman adventurer at Durazzo is certain. Yet there is no evidence that Paschal raised his voice in protest against those clauses in the treaty wherein the Emperor stipulated the eventual withdrawal of the Latins from Antioch and the immediate introduction of a Greek

¹ Runciman, Eastern Schism, p. 110 and History, i. 327-8.
² Yewdale, op. cit. pp. 131-4.
³ For William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, ii. 454, and Albert of Aachen, x. 45, RHCOc, IV, 652, Bohemund perverted the crusade and deceived the West. Although he approved of Bohemund's attack on the Empire, Orderic Vitalis still rendered a moralistic judgement, V. 19, II, p. 449: "Caeterum justissima Dei dispositio conatus concupiscentium invadere rem proximi sui frustrata est; unde superba conglomeratio ambitiosorum nihil eorum, quae incassum rata fuerat, adepta est." The same writer knows that Bohemund swore fealty to Alexius, XIII, 34, V, p. 101, but in another place he concludes complacently that Bohemund forced Alexius to swear to protect pilgrims to Jerusalem, XI, 24, IV, p. 242. Fulcher of Chartres, II, 39, pp. 522-5, presents a truthful picture of Bohemund's defeat but attempts to mitigate his humiliation. William of Tyre, xi. 6, RHCOc, I, 461-2, and the Narratio Floriacensis, RHCOc, V, ii. 362, go farther, presenting Bohemund more as victor than vanquished in his war with Alexius.
patriarch into the city. Perhaps the firm resistance offered to the Byzantines by Prince Tancred, the barons and clergy of Antioch made any such protest unnecessary. Equally interesting is the fact that there was no mention of Bohemund's unfortunate venture in the negotiations on church union between Paschal and Alexius in 1111-12. It is almost as if the Papacy hoped that Bohemund's war might be forgotten as quickly as possible.

The Greeks did not forget so easily. Bohemund's perversion of the crusade added to the number of those Greeks who were firmly convinced that the Empire, having survived the onslaughts of Islam and the barbarians for generations, now faced a new enemy: the Latins. More, the Greeks believed that Bohemund's invasion had been approved by the Papacy, and this conviction did great harm to relations between the Greek and Latin churches. For Anna Comnena and many of her contemporaries, the Papacy was little more than a worldly, militaristic power.

It is impossible to be unsympathetic towards this Byzantine attitude. Even if our attempt to show how the Papacy became unwittingly involved in Bohemund's plans for the conquest of the Byzantine Empire were completely convincing—and it certainly is not that—we should still find ourselves faced with troubling questions. Why is it possible to describe Paschal's attitude towards the Byzantine Empire prior to 1105 in the terms of indifference and apathy? Perhaps the answer to this question is to be found in a papal letter directed in December 1107 to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, its king, clergy and people. Here the Pope declared that the proper role of the Latins in Jerusalem was, among other things, to bear witness to Christianity

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1 *Alexiad*, XIII, 12, 111, p. 134.
2 Runciman, *History*, ii. 53-5.
3 *Supra*, p. 198, n. 2.
as regards the heathen and to “Latin purity” as regards others, i.e. the eastern Christians. While this is scarcely indicative of an anti-Byzantine attitude, can it not be argued that Paschal’s inactivity, his indifference towards the Greeks, his apathy in the face of the manifest deterioration of good relations between Greek and Latin Christians, may have had as their root this self-conscious sense of superiority which found illustration in his reference to “Latin purity”? Or again, why was Paschal so inept in handling Bohemund? Why did he fail to condemn openly Bohemund’s expedition when it became clear that Constantinople, not Jerusalem, was its destination? In addition to being afflicted with a crippling sense of Latin superiority, was Paschal unsure of his goals, doubtful of his methods and lacking in moral courage?

Perhaps Paschal deserves this bill of indictment, perhaps not. A decision either way lies far beyond the purview of this article. Besides, an accusation of this kind may rest upon a fundamental misunderstanding. Even though we know better, we still tend to depict the role played by the Papacy vis-à-vis the crusade as more dominant, more directive, than it actually was. It is this misunderstanding which encourages us to attribute to Paschal confusion and even cowardice when he failed to do with Bohemund and his “crusade” what we think he should, or better, could have done.

We must always remember that the crusade to Jerusalem was the dramatic manifestation of Western civilization in the act of discovering its own strength. The abiding significance of Urban’s speech at Clermont is that he discerned that strength, summoned it forth and directed it against the external enemies of Latin Christendom by holding out Jerusalem as a spiritual and temporal goal to which all men might aspire. The enthusiastic response engendered by Urban’s spirited appeal

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1 *L., 6175, PL, clxiii, cc. 230-2, here, 230B-C: “...quia Jerusolymitana civitas et Sepulcri Dominici reverentia illustris est et in medio multarum posita nationum, quarum aliae Christianam fidem, aliae Latinae puritatis consuetudinem irridere conantur.”

2 Holtzmann, op. cit. pp. 270-1, calls him a “wenig zielsichere Papst”. Runciman, *History*, ii. 35, says that he was short-sighted and easily influenced.
provided the Papacy with a rare moment of triumph, but the future was to show that the Pope had unleashed energies which neither he nor his successors could effectively control. The Popes might proclaim and legislate, but, in the last analysis, the fortunes of the crusade were disposed by other voices, other authorities, other interests and other ambitions. That Paschal could not prevent Bohemund’s perversion of the crusade is therefore a sobering testimonial, not to Paschal’s shortcomings, but rather to the fact that while the Papacy could justly claim to be the founder of the crusade, the Papacy could never really act as its master.¹

¹ For the contrary interpretation of the Papacy as creator, perverter and, ultimately, destroyer of the crusade, see J. L. LaMonte, “La Papauté et les Croisades”, Renaissance, II-II (1944-5), 154-67.