PEACE, WAR AND CULTURE-PATTERNS.¹

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THIS is the tenth lecture which I have had the honour to give annually in this Library. The themes treated in them have many inner connexions, and as the general argument has developed, it has become more and more concerned with questions concerning the nature and the relationships of Personality and Culture.

It was, however, when reading Professor Ralph Linton's chapter in The Science of Man in the World Crisis² that I learned how interest in the study of these twin subjects has developed in the United States: indeed, they may perhaps be regarded as forming a special branch of study: "Personality in Culture".

Such a discipline might link up psychology, individual and social sociology, anthropology, ethnology, geography and economics with linguistics, phonology, history, philosophy, art, music and the study of manners and morals. A life work for the fortunate professor of this future 'subject'! A John Rylands lecture, "Personality in its Cultural Context"³ attempted to indicate part of its scope.

In this series, the last few discourses have often mentioned war as a new problem for social psychology. Such references are new features in publications concerned with social psychology, and this fact is psychologically interesting.

Obviously, psychologists ought to examine or extend the idea in Dr. Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture⁴ that war itself "is a social theme that may or may not be used in any culture" (p. 30). The purpose of this lecture is to discuss this suggestion.

¹ Amplified from notes of a lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, on the 12th March, 1947.
² Columbia University Press, 1944.
³ BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXX, no. 1, 1946.
In the limited time, I can offer only brief definitions of terms and they will be used in order to focus our minds. Complete and formally satisfactory definitions would be far from brief, but in partial compensation references will be given.

To-day I ask, "Can modern war (the adjective is emphasised) and the types of warfare, if indeed they can be so called, which now threaten us, be understood better by the aid of the culture-pattern theory in some form? May not warfare only, but the state of uneasy peace which we have suffered since 1910 be the expression of a vast culture-pattern, or a relatively minor pattern, superimposed upon a major one, in which the many varieties of behaviour called war have grown, slowly or quickly? If so, to what extent may even recent psychological, sociological and ethnological attempts to explain war be already out of date? And if the culture-pattern theory is helpful, then since culture-patterns can be changed quickly (cf. the Maoris, the Japanese, the Russians) there may either be hope that the next war could be postponed indefinitely, or fear that it may come sooner even than most people expect. Moreover, since culture-patterns not dominated by the idea of the 'naturalness' of war still exist, can we study them with profit? For reasons I have never quite understood, certain expounders and students of religion in this country also delight to describe and study sordid crimes: could militarist-nationalists be persuaded to examine non-warlike cultures in a similarly ambivalent way? The experiment seems worth trying.

Let us consider a brief definition of 'culture-pattern' (fuller accounts are given in my two preceding Rylands lectures). Culture-pattern is the general principle of integration by means of which the customs, institutions and dogmas, the sentiments, interests and values of a culture are woven into a more or less coherent 'pattern'. As Dr. R. H. Thouless writes:

\begin{quote}
The motives to which men may respond and the goals towards which their behaviour may be directed are multitudinous, and every society makes use only of a certain selection of these. The particular selection of potential human purposes that any particular society employs may be said to give it its
\end{quote}

1 "Psychological Implications of the Culture-Pattern Theory", BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXIX, no. 1, 1945 and the 1946 lecture (above).

2 In The Study of Society, ed. by F. C. Bartlett and others, Kegan Paul, 1939.
characteristic 'pattern'. Different cultures may differ both in the extent to which their activities are subordinated to a single pattern of motivation, and in the kind of pattern they have adopted.

We may focus attention upon this last description, especially upon 'selection' and 'pattern'. The pattern may be woven about different 'centres', such as the ego, age, sex, property or power. Possibly many of the inter-weavings that an armchair theorist's ingenuity could suggest may be found working fairly well in some part of the world. After all, a female film-star functioning as colonel of a regiment of fighting men might seem too fantastic to have been invented by any sane person.

As time (about thirteen years) has gone on, the concept has taken more complicated forms, some of which are due to psychological re-thinking of implications of the original idea. A useful distinction is between explicit and implicit culture. To borrow from Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, explicit culture comprises "all features of a group design for living which might be described to an outsider by participants in the culture".

To illustrate this from war, a Bren gun is an object of explicit culture. The uniform of a unit of the fighting forces might suggest itself as another, were it not for the fact that combatant officers sometimes suddenly refuse to recognise certain uniforms, and 'execute'—using whatever euphemisms may occur to them; to be vehemently rejected by their enemies—certain wearers of explicit badges. This ambiguity in practice, attached to a distinction understood and accepted in theory, strengthens my central argument: that war is rapidly ceasing to have rules.

Implicit culture is "that section of behaviour of which members of the group are unaware, or minimally aware". In many countries the connexion of the Churches with warfare shows both explicit and implicit elements. A British army chaplain may wear combatant officer's uniform with a priest's collar. The first of any letter-group which may follow his name,

signifying special distinction is 'C.F.' 'D.D.' would, I believe, come second. These are explicit, but there are implicit features of the culture-pattern. Presumably no clergyman is explicitly bound to hold a sacred service to bless a lethal weapon: while some willingly do this, others probably have declined. To many, perhaps to most educated people, the long-standing tendency of our ruling families to put their sons in the Navy, Army or Church, often in this order of preference, is known or acknowledged implicitly rather than explicitly. The custom, up to 1939, that great armament firms appointed to their boards of directors combatant officers of high rank immediately upon their retirement, is implicit to many people; but explicit to students of the international arms trade. The present-day link-up of many physical and biological scientists with preparations for war is implicit to most men in the street—even to a certain number of social philosophers.

Two kinds of patterns, distinguished from configurations; to be explained in a moment, are defined by Kluckhohn:

A sanctioned pattern, if described, would convey to the hearer or reader an idea of what, in a defined situation, people would do or say if they conformed completely to ideals accepted in the culture.

For example, in stating an ideal English sanctioned pattern, "more than three people at a bus-stop form a queue", the degree of deviation of actual instances of relevant behaviour from the ideal does not matter, but in a behavioural pattern, the attention is focussed upon some mode of what people in fact do.

The expression in behaviour of a sanctioned pattern is to shoot an enemy in uniform unless he surrenders, but the behavioural pattern of bombing Hiroshima has been described by Group-Leader Chester and Dr. J. Bronowski,¹ and by John Hersey in the famous special edition of the New Yorker, 31st August, 1946. And this, though speakers in Parliamentary debates in the House often seem studiously to avoid mentioning it, is likely to be the behavioural pattern in future warfare.

Let us distinguish between pattern and configuration:

Pattern is 'a structural regularity . . . to which there is some degree of conformance on the part of a number of persons', 'a . . . generalisation of behaviour or of ideals for behaviour'.

¹ The Listener, XXXVII, no. 946, 13th March, 1947.
Configurations are Edward Sapir's "unconscious systems of meanings" and Benedict's "unconscious canons of choice". Perhaps 'minimally aware' or 'unverbalised' are better descriptive terms than 'unconscious'. These configurations are not unconscious in everyone and are not necessarily unconscious in the sense used by Freud or Jung, though to explain the attitude of some persons, the action of such mechanisms might be postulated with advantage.

Let us take an example which illustrates all these points, and is now sufficiently 'distanced' in time to be discussed coolly. Between 1930 and 1933, the presence and the activities of the Officers' Training Corps in English schools were matters of active discussion. Critics were not necessarily pacifists—in fact, many supported the League of Nations. Some, quoting published opinions of army officers, said that the Corps was not preparing schoolboys for the next war, and while not criticising the infantry training, cited the absence of instruction in gas warfare, or about tanks, though these were certain to play a great part in any war. Others focused upon the overt aim of the Corps, to train officers, not soldiers in general, and asserted that if no elementary and few secondary schools had O.T.C.'s, the army would be undemocratic. Some pointed out that unless a public school was powerful enough in numbers, prestige or both, to flout the Head Masters' (self elected) Conference, it would not be recognised as 'public'.

A psychologist who asked his friends for their frank opinions might receive answers like these:

1. If war breaks out, I don't want my son to serve in the ranks.
2. I expect him to be commissioned; that is one reason why I made sacrifices to send him to a public school.
3. Officers ought to be gentlemen.
4. I wish my boy to be trained to lead others (this often went with an overt assumption that a complementary class existed, fitted to be led, and not attending public schools).

Any or all of these arguments were often combined. It might too have been possible to find an ambitious schoolmaster who said frankly that promotion depended in part upon being
a keen O.T.C. officer, and that therefore this consideration guided him. So anyone who writes a social-psychological account of British officer-selection between 1927 and 1947 might usefully draw a distinction between pattern and configuration. In 1940 this distinction might have been easier to explain to some generals than to others. As our configurations turn into patterns we become sophisticated.

What is modern warfare, regarded from the social psychologist's point of view? We may begin with Professor Lasswell's "Violence directed against people outside the community, justified in the name of the community, and accepted by the community". One may ask "Who and what is the Community?" If Mass-Obervers had recorded what thousands of people in this country said at 11 a.m. on 3rd September, 1939, would this, even if the sample had been "representative", have really represented the community? Would it have corresponded entirely with what its members thought? And since no plebiscite was held, how could the community have nullified or rejected the Cabinet's decision? Certainly different levels of Public and Private opinion might be distinguished in one and the same person. A definition of war becomes even more difficult if we ask whether the present events in Palestine (April, 1947) are to be called war, for the soldier there feels that the absence of rules causes many conflicts in deciding how to behave.

We pass to the definition of Doctors E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bowlby: "War is organised fighting between large groups of adult human beings". Yet World War II blurred distinctions between adults and non-adults. In many countries, children helped valuably in the war. Our own Government spoke of 'men' of eighteen, but considered them too immature to vote, and in law they were 'infants'. When a handful of uniformed adults dropped an atom bomb, devised by civilians, which annihilated tens of thousands of adults and children, was this warfare or did it symbolise the end of war as historians and

1 World Politics and Social Insecurity, 1935.
3 Personal Aggressiveness and War, Kegan Paul, 1939.

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lawyers knew it? In any case, a definition which includes the
term ‘fighting’ is only with difficulty applicable to conflicts
in which atomic bombs and bacteria may be used, since the
counter-attack, if any, is not made by the persons attacked, and
bacteria will probably harm both sides.

As recently as 1941, Professor D. W. Harding wrote 1 “A
surprising feature of much social violence, including war, is its
moderation (p. 13). There is in fact extraordinarily little cool
extermination of other people” (p. 15). So even recent defini-
tions of warfare require re-phraseing.

What are the rules of warfare to-day? Do they exist any-
where, codified and accepted even by the Great Powers? Could
students like ourselves ascertain these rules if we tried? Some
American physicists who worked upon the atom-bomb dis-
agreed with both President Truman and the Navy about the
way in which the bomb was to be employed. It is relevant to
mention that the chief argument put forward for its use was that
it would shorten the war against Japan, not that it was allowable
by the rules of warfare. Matters had already got past even that
stage of mental tidiness.

A definition to which we shall return to is that of Emery
Reves: 2 “War takes place whenever and wherever non-in-
tegrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact”.

Is there any agreed definition of Peace other than the purely
negative one of absence of war? By many the absence of such
a positive concept is tacitly accepted, yet to a peace-lover it would
seem that just as the absence of a satisfactory agreed definition
of love does not prevent him from experiencing and knowing
that he experiences it, so there can be positive experience of
peace, even if it “passeth understanding”. That such mental
conditions may bore some people is beside the point. But the
war-lover may ask “How do people behave peacefully?”
The answer is that people are behaving peacefully most of the
time.

Dr. Lewis F. Richardson 3 has suggested as a criticism of a

1 The Impulse to Dominate, Allen and Unwin, 1941.
3 “Generalised Foreign Politics”, British Journal of Psychology, Monograph
Supplement, no. 23, 1939.
peaceful attitude vis à vis another group, "proved readiness to co-operate". We may leave the matter there: towards people who say they don't know what peace is, I feel like the professor of philosophy who in anguish of spirit said to an unusually persistent questioner "You know damned well what the mind is, so shut up!"

Let us look at a few recent contributions from specialists on the subject of war.

A monumental pair of volumes by Professor Quincy Wright on *The Causes of War* have recently appeared. He classifies and summarises recent contributions.

Biologists emphasise the impropriety of analogies between animal and human warfare. The chief contribution to our knowledge of the causes of modern war have been made by psychologists, particularly the analysts and the attitude-measurers. All consider war to be a function of social customs and institutions.

Anthropologists emphasise the conventional and customary nature of war, and regard it as an invention, widely diffused in the world.

While the older sociologists assumed the correctness of the analogy between international conflict and the biological struggle for existence, and therefore tended to regard war as 'necessary' for human progress, their successors regard it as a species of the genus conflict, applicable to strife between classes, in industry, in the family and civil strife. (The attitude of the social psychologist makes him doubt the usefulness of calling these war.) All the above investigators tend to insist that the factors causing war are extremely complex but inherently controllable.

Wright asserts that most publications about the 'economic causes' or determinants of war have been by historians or publicists rather than by professional economists. He says that in textbooks of economics studied at present, war hardly figures at all. Thorstein Veblen in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* and the Marxists mention and discuss war.

He is optimistic about the contributions of those social psychologists who employ the concepts of personality and culture.

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1 Cambridge University Press, 1942.
combining the data of psychology, sociology and anthropology. They, he thinks, may be able to suggest cures.

It is not irrelevant to interpolate the suggestion that since for centuries it has been easy to make a profession of writing about war (the ability has been known to run in distinguished political families) and after every war leaders usually write their memoirs, war themes form a powerful vested interest. Writing about peace is less esteemed socially, less popular, less lucrative—and less easy. Such facts may deter the spread of thinking about peace.

A point made by Wright is that the waging of war by the political leaders occurs in a highly symbolic form. Until recently, they and the masses led had no acquaintance with the actual conditions of war "behind" the symbols, and this is still true of many Americans. Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister declared "We shall not sheathe the sword" before entering upon a war in which probably nobody who mattered, including himself, believed that the sword would be used. Blockade and propaganda were in fact the knock-out blows of World War I. The orators employ easily understood symbols, or abstractions which are not understood. Both these forms of expression may be seriously misleading, and not always by accident. Yet as Wright puts it, the muscle-movements which actually declare war "must occur in a context of verbal legitimacy".

He suggests that the concepts of psycho-analysis and of relativity have helped to promote a general feeling of insecurity in the post-war world.

Much remains to be done by psychologists if they wish to reduce the threat of war for, as he says:

Arguments which influence opinion often have little support in social science, and truths affirmed by social scientists often have little influence upon the movements of opinion in contemporary societies. This suggests that little should be expected from studies of the statistics of populations, commerce, finance and armaments or the technicalities of law and procedure in explaining war. It is only as such matters affect opinion that they cause war, and opinion is moved by symbols of such vague meaning that no precise correlation with statistical series or refined analyses is to be expected. The causes of wars must be studied directly from indices of opinion, not indirectly from indices of conditions, even though the two have an overlapping vocabulary.
This points to the necessity of studying to-day's channels of communication, particularly the Press, radio and films, to see how this state of affairs can be improved. As an example may be quoted the publicity given by the B.B.C. to Hersey's account of Hiroshima, and a whole week's broadcasts upon the uses and abuses of atomic energy.

Wright points out that while, in the past, small wars had localised effects, like small eruptions on the skin, the events of the last two wars have been comparable to the outbreak of a general fever, seriously involving the whole organism, i.e. the whole world.

Perhaps it is now unnecessary to spend much time in refuting the belief that war is a biological necessity, a universal law of Nature, though the assertion, in one of its many forms, that war is 'due to human instincts' needs more consideration. Yet it should be noted that recently throughout a whole week, experts tried to explain on the radio how the next war might be fought. And it is hard to conceive anything less instinctive than the behaviour of the atomic scientists and of their thousands of helpers who telescoped fifty years into four as the result of super-human efforts of thinking, experimenting and organisation at the very highest level. Yet we still read certain 'explanations' of warfare by writers who seem not to have noticed even the last stages of World War I.

In his article "The Nature of War and the Myth of Nature" reprinted as a chapter of his book *Man's Most Dangerous Fallacy: the Myth of Races*, Professor M. F. Ashley Montagu points out the very different types of conflict between organisms which some writers term 'fighting'. He writes:

The illegitimate use of such terms as struggle, fighting, force and so on, when applied to plant and animal life, and the deliberate confusion of these terms with war, is too often made and far too often allowed to pass unchallenged. I cannot resist quoting Professor Pollard in this connexion, who entertainingly remarks of this confusion:

The sun and the moon, we suppose, declare war with great regularity because they get into opposition every month. Parties in the House of Commons are perpetually at war because they are opposed. The police wage war because they are a force; for naturally if we use force against a criminal, we must needs make

1 *Scientific Monthly*, LIV, pp. 342-353, 1942.
war upon other communities. War, indeed, will last for ever, because men will never "cease to struggle". So the League of Nations has obviously failed whenever a stern parent is caught chastising a peccant child: and "fighting" will go on without end because drowning men will fight for life, doctors will fight disease and women will fight for places at drapery sales. And this is war! 1

Professor Bryce is quoted as asserting that until the days of the French Revolution, men never fought to impose their own type of civilisation upon others. Professor Montagu argues that war did not arrive until men reached the agricultural state of development, not more than 20,000 years ago. Then came property, then industry, then wealth, power, ambition and finally the desire to acquire additional property, including slaves, in war. "The modern most potent cause of war is economic rivalry—a purely cultural phenomenon having no biological base whatsoever."

Recently Dr. Ruth Benedict's article "The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations", 2 approximates two concepts; one ancient, and, some would say, shaky, the other new, plastic and perhaps untried. The first is National Character, the second, Culture-Pattern.

She says, "Every nation in Europe and Asia has simultaneously denied and boasted that it had a National Character". It has been called a myth in an eloquent book by Mr. Hamilton Fyfe 3 and has been carefully examined from the sociologist's standpoint by Professor Morris Ginsberg 4 who shows that much of what is called 'national character' is national reputation. In a slightly different form the valuable concepts, that a community may have a 'modal personality-structure' or 'basic character-structure' have been put forward by Erich Fromm, 5 Abram Kardiner, 6 and Ernest Beaglehole. 7 They are all developed from ideas closely related to those of culture-patterns.

1 Vincula, London, 1925.
3 The Illusion of National Character.
5 The Fear of Freedom, Kegan Paul.
To the anthropologist, the study of national character is a study of learned cultural behaviour. For several decades before the war, anthropologists had done pioneer work, in this field, in compact primitive communities. During the last decade, theoretical points made by anthropologists about cultural conditioning had been widely accepted. Anthropologists had presented their case convincingly enough so that there was wide agreement that social arrangements are of fundamental importance in shaping any people's tenets about life, whether they are assumptions about the function of the State, economic motivations, relations between the sexes, or dependence upon the supernatural. The forms these tenets take in our own cultural background were no longer generally considered to be direct consequences of human biology, and 'human nature' was no longer considered as a sufficient explanation of them. Behaviour, even in civilised nations, was increasingly understood as ways of acting and thinking which developed in the special kind of social environment characteristic of that part of the world.

Dr. Benedict makes the point that an anthropologist, asked to describe a primitive society, will focus upon certain features which he has been trained to regard as especially important, yet so far few or no European nations have been studied in this way.

Habit formation in a special social environment; the rewards and punishments bestowed by society; the praise allotted to certain kinds of achievement; the connotations given to exercise of authority, and to submission to it, in day-by-day living; the degree to which responsibility for his own conduct was entrusted to the individual—all such questions had been regarded as essential in cultural investigations of behaviour in primitive societies, and had hardly been raised in studies of European nations. In classic studies of civilised countries, the approach is, ordinarily, either historical or economic, or political.

Such segmental approaches are valuable and necessary, yet they need much supplementation. Let us look at the questions which an ethnologist might ask about a simple community, and suggest examples bearing upon war and peace in our own English culture-pattern.

1. Habit formation. Consider the public school and the elementary schools. How far do they respectively induce in later life, anxiety to find and then to follow a leader, a readiness to lead or a love of independence? Are early habits of obedience implanted in the home—if so, is this done by parents or nurses? Or in schools for the young; if so, in nursery schools or 'prep.' schools? Are some habits of obedience to verbal commands or precepts grafted on to earlier conditionings, connected with feeding, weaning and elimination, and therefore possibly supported by intense unconscious feelings of guilt? Professor Kimball
Young's *Handbook of Social Psychology*\(^1\) gives a set of tables comparing the early education of various nations, e.g. the Americans, Marquesans, Balinese, the Nazis, Japanese, etc.

2. **Social rewards and punishments.** What is the social and financial value attached to rewards for prowess in war and in peace respectively? Note, for example, in our country the surprise with which some older M.P.’s greeted Parliament’s recent decision not to reward the leaders in World War II with money, and the differences of opinion, possibly following an ‘age-line’, concerning the cessation of the nation’s pension to the Nelson family. Compare this with the present difficulty in finding incentives for certain kinds of necessary or dangerous work like house-building, coal mining and nursing.

3. **Degrees of individual responsibility for one’s conduct.** In peace-time it might be said that the individual is held completely responsible; in war, as Professor J. C. Flugel says,\(^2\) he may delegate his conscience, unless he is a conscientious objector. The position was not always clear here, but it was far simpler than in Nazi Germany. Whether the majority in a country thinks war to be ‘natural’ or not depends largely upon such facts, as dictators know well.

One may ask whether civilised nations are not too complicated to study by methods which may be sufficient for small communities. Dr. Ruth Benedict answers that partly offsetting this defect are certain great advantages; the multiplicity of the facts known and recorded about Western nations; the historical research, the statistics, the many available records of personal experience, the novels and the fact that civilised languages are recorded and ordered in grammatical categories.

4. **Social stratification and attitudes towards property and authority.** There has been little attempt in England to investigate class differentiation and attitudes towards property and authority in the detached way in which they would be approached by an anthropologist studying a primitive tribe.

The relation of warfare to property is strikingly illustrated in this country: note, for example, the willingness to conscript

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\(^1\) Kegan Paul, 1946.

\(^2\) Chapter XIX of *Man, Morals and Society*, Duckworth, 1945.
life but not property, shown in the last ten years. The attitude to property depends only in part upon whether one is rich or poor. Dr. Benedict says:

Property may be, as in Holland, something which is an almost inseparable part of one's own self-esteem, something to be added to, kept immaculately, and never spent carelessly. This is true, whether the individual belongs to court circles or can only say in the words of a proverbial expression: "If it's only a penny a year, lay it by". Alternatively, the attitude toward property may be quite different, as in Roumania. An upper-class person may be, or become, a pensioner of a wealthy man, without loss of status or self-confidence; his property, he says, is not "himself". And the poor peasant argues that, being poor, it is futile for him to lay anything by: "he would", he says, "if he were rich". The well-to-do increase their possessions by other means than thrift, and the traditional attitude toward property differences associate wealth with luck or exploitation, rather than with assured position as in Holland. In each of these countries, as in other European nations, many of which have deeply embedded special attitudes toward property, the specific nature of these assumptions can be greatly clarified by study of what is required of the child in his handling and ownership of property, and under what sanctions and conditions expanding opportunities are allowed in adolescence, and at his induction into full adult status.

I leave to experts the task of framing answers to Dr. Benedict. As a social psychologist, I anticipate that to be valuable, these replies should be thought out with particular reference to the sub-culture pattern of the writer. For example, the relation of warfare to social stratification is complex but its importance is undoubted. And many historians themselves are part of a fairly homogeneous social stratum. The theory of Elliot Smith and Perry, relating the early cause of war to social stratification has not been properly discussed. (See also J. Cohen.)

Let us turn to the definition of warfare already given by Emery Reves in his book *The Anatomy of Peace*. Presumably it will be criticised on the ground that Reves, like so many of his predecessors, attributes war to one cause only. Yet probably few will disagree with his tenet that to-day the main stumbling-block to world peace is national sovereignty.

Can insistence upon national sovereignty, and the actions which accompany it, be regarded as derived from a

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1 Loc. cit.


culture-pattern which dominates and integrates almost all other designs for living? It is clear that belief in national sovereignty does not arise out of original 'Human Nature', but is a very recent development.

Without mentioning the culture-pattern theory, so far as I can ascertain, Reves gives some excellent examples. He mentions that educated people have abandoned the idea that their planet is the centre and the most important part of the universe, and that the Copernican theory is generally accepted by them. Yet

Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the centre of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Yet this is the only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national governments of our world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our Press and radio. All the conclusions, principles and policies of the peoples are necessarily drawn from the warped picture of the world obtained by so primitive a method of observation.

Within such a contorted system of assumed fixed points, it is easy to demonstrate that the view taken from each point corresponds to reality. If we admit and apply this method, the viewpoint of every single nation appears indisputably correct and wholly justified. But we arrive at a hopelessly confused and grotesque over-all picture of the world.

Our Government and all the other national governments construct round our own centre a mental pattern which we regard as the only 'real' ones. So Reves quotes, in ways which in turn would be supremely irritating to an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, etc., different national accounts of international events between the two world wars, looked at from some of the major national vantage-points.

The Englishman may read about America's point of view, which perhaps he has never seen stated as a whole, with some sympathy, some scepticism and, as he reads further, with not a little irritation. The same twenty years looked at from the fixed point of the British Isles is described (p. 15) in a way which will seem only natural and right to a British reader, but reassuring in a queer way which might suggest a few problems to a questing mind. The account from the point of view of France may stun him. The Italian apologia will annoy and the German infuriate him. From "the vantage point of Moscow" comes a summary
of 'events' which may split his mind. The Swiss, the Swedish, the Japanese accounts are not given. Whom should you choose to write the Spanish one?

The dramatic and strange events between the two world wars could be just as well described from the point of view of any other nation, large or small. From Tokyo or Warsaw, from Riga or Rome, from Prague or Budapest, each picture will be entirely different and, from the fixed national point of observation, it will always be indisputably and unchallengeably correct. And the citizens of every country will be at all times convinced—and rightly so—of the infallibility of their views and the objectivity of their conclusions.

It is surely obvious that agreement, or common understanding between different nations, basing their relations on such a primitive method of judgment, is an absolute impossibility. A picture of the world pieced together like a mosaic from its various national components is a picture that never and under no circumstances can have any relation to reality, unless we deny that such a thing as reality exists.

_The world and history cannot be as they appear to the different nations, unless we disavow objectivity, reason and scientific methods of research._

But if we believe that man is, to a certain degree, different from the animal and that he is endowed with a capacity for phenomenological thinking, then the time has come to realise that our inherited method of observation in political and social matters is childishly primitive, hopelessly inadequate and thoroughly wrong. If we want to try to create at least the beginning of orderly relations between nations, we must try to arrive at a more scientific, more objective method of observation, without which we shall never be able to see social and political problems as they really are, nor to perceive their incidence. And without a correct diagnosis of the disease, there is no hope for a cure.

So Reves argues, there are different patterns in the minds of observers in different countries. To make or to alter such patterns is the aim of the modern propagandist, who is immensely powerful in these days of the Press, films and radio. But the concept of national sovereignty dominates all these patterns, and seriously menaces the continuance of civilisation. Perhaps President Truman, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Molotov would not agree. Yet how can there be World Peace if there are eighty different national sovereignties?

Only a few years ago it was common to hear "What has World Peace to do with psychologists?" Now the question seems oftener to be "How can psychologists help to make World Peace a reality?" Probably no serious psychologists doubt that great psychological issues are involved, whatever can be done about them, now or later.
It might be useful for those of us who are connected with universities to ascertain if recently there has been a closer link between scientists' activities and considerations of national 'welfare'.

After any victorious war many people feel a strong upsurge of national sentiment, for a variety of reasons. It is, however, obvious that this is likely to happen in the defeated countries too. But while between the wars we used often to hear "Science is international", in 1947 we hear with increasing frequency that in the 'national interest' (not 'in the interests of national security', the phrase during the war) this or that ought to be done. And whether the action in any particular instance is morally desirable or not, the fact of the increase in the nationalisation of science is a matter of special psychological interest, in that it has now spread to psychology itself. We frequently read of psychological reforms urged to increase our national prosperity.

A considerable part in forming this nationalistic-intellectual culture-pattern is played by scientists of different kinds. The activities of scientists will be considered instead of 'Science' a misleading word, which can even be used deliberately to mislead unphilosophical thinkers. But, for reasons not difficult to discover, though seldom sought, it is impossible to trace and record all the behaviour of present-day scientists in a scientifically satisfactory way. Not only is there deliberate concealment, or a ban by "M.I. 5" upon knowing what is done: there is also the difficulty that some of the scientists' researches—atomic energy perhaps being the most overt—are being developed simultaneously for both peaceful and warlike purposes. It is no secret that an important task of the American scientists in the last year of the War, as well as to-day, was to 'handle' psychologically and administratively, their military colleagues. This and many other signs show that scientists are deeply involved in the military machine. Many physical scientists may now be working in an organisation for whose members the immediate prospects of national strife seem much more probable than those of even long-distant international peace.

Is this position of being 'caught up', however, peculiar to the physical scientists? Is not some important bacteriological
research governed entirely by considerations of unrestricted germ-warfare? Moreover a few psychological writings seem coloured by similar assumptions. I am merely recording this fact in the positive, i.e. non-normative, manner that psychologists desire.

The title of an oft-quoted book is The "Fight for Our National Intelligence" (Professor Pollard might wish to add this to his list of uses of the word 'fight'). In a recent article its author remarks: "The greatest amount of work on intelligence tests has been done with school children, but fortunately the needs of the Services during the war (italics mine) have greatly stimulated the development of intelligence tests appropriate for adults". The article quotes a psychologist as saying (in March, 1939) in an address to educationalists "This part of the nation's capital (i.e. highly intelligent children) must not be wasted by failing to provide education for those able to profit by it. In the fierce competition of to-day between national groups, no nation can hope to survive if it persistently ignores these considerations". One nation, which perhaps before 1939 ignored them less than we did, was Germany. Still, she ignored others much more important, and paid for it.

The possibility that a branch of psychology may be developed and used by the British as a means of fighting for their national intelligence, or upholding it against all comers, is fairly new. Yet why try to increase the use of our national intelligence unless one of its most important functions will be to preserve a state of affairs in which intelligent people of all nations can co-operate to prevent the destruction of civilised man? Half a dozen atom bombs dropped upon the English cities would render the intelligence of most inhabitants useless.

The statement sometimes made, both here and in the U.S.A., that World War II put psychology and ethnology on the map might suggest that some who helped in this operation are illustrating the functional autonomy of untransformed motives. A demonstration of this possibility appears in Chapter XIV of Professor Kimball Young's Handbook of Social Psychology (1946). Though entitled "The Psychology of War and of Military Moral" the chapter opens at the point where war is
supposed to have been declared: "We shall begin with the selection and training of military personnel". Professor Young then proceeds to describe in detail what psychologists, under direction from the Government, do. Yet this may cast little more light upon the really important and difficult question, why wars occur nowadays, than would accounts of the activities in wartime, of manufacturers of uniforms or of patriotic songs—for these practitioners, too, are put on the map by wars. There is really little about the causes of war in Professor Young's book.

With a closely reasoned argument Dr. R. H. Thouless, in his *General and Social Psychology*,\(^1\) attributes warfare, at least, perhaps, as we knew it up to about say 1930, to our aggressive-acquisitive culture-pattern, coming into conflict with rather similar ones. Were this a discussion at a popular level, I might be strongly tempted to assent, probably with approval from very many professional colleagues. A book often quoted is Durbin and Bowlby's *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, which, however, has been criticised by Dr. J. M. Blackburn in his *Psychology and the Social Pattern*.\(^2\)

Criticism of their explanation of war in terms of human aggressiveness is chiefly along the lines that though their book contains much (usually uncritically quoted from the Freudians) about human aggressiveness, there is in it little about war, as it actually happened, even in 1914-1918.

I should like, however, to begin my examination of this view of aggressiveness by going back farther than is customary. The subject-matter of science is of two kinds: phenomena or *appearances* (not to sight only) and concepts, or patterns in someone's mind, made in order to subsume the experiences into comprehensible schemes. You and I may have no doubt that light is falling upon this desk, yet the concepts introduced to explain 'light' will vary with the progress of physics, often usually becoming more complicated and difficult to grasp as the science progresses.

We begin with phenomena to which the name 'aggressive action' is given. It will conduce to clearness if we confine

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\(^1\) University Tutorial Press, London.
\(^2\) Kegan Paul, 1945.
ourselves at present to recordable acts and postpone the consideration of alleged or imputed experiences. Let us then speak of acts of aggression rather than of 'aggressiveness'.

What does aggression mean? A dictionary, citing as sources of its derivation *ad* and *gressus*, suggests that it means "taking a step towards". With what purpose, it may be asked? One human being (and it is human aggressiveness we are considering) might take the first step towards another with intent either to help or to injure. Perhaps any behaviour, whether consciously or unconsciously motivated, which alters or interferes with another person's complete freedom of action, thought or feeling, is aggressive in this 'pure' sense. Yet, does a parent who succours a child commit an act of aggression?

To write like this is not to indulge in quibbles or mere word-spinning; a phrase occasionally used by people who dislike having their verbal habits upset. Apparently, for some psychologists, if A does anything which modifies what B was doing or intending to do, since A "takes a step towards", his action is aggressive. He may touch your arm to deter you from walking into the traffic, or save you from a fit of depression by offering a loan—is this aggressive? A phrase sometimes used in psychological writings is 'aggressive love-making'. Apart from the possible and frequent confusion, common in these writings, of love with sexual desire, the consideration may be omitted that any expression of love for another involves taking a step towards him or her, literally or metaphorically.

If, however, we allow that aggression nowadays means 'step-taking with intent to hurt', we now come up against the problem "Is aggressiveness a human instinct?" I have discussed this at length in a previous Rylands lecture,¹ and will not repeat the argument here. But since the word 'instinct' may have been ambiguous from the start, and many years have been necessary to tease out all the possible meanings of Freud's term 'sexuality'—if indeed the task is yet complete—so perhaps 'aggressiveness' will be analysed into simpler concepts. It is not irrelevant to mention that if its use by English-speaking psychologists

¹ "Are there Human Instincts?", BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXVII, 1942.
owes anything to the fact that it arrived in our textbooks via German and Latin, the circumstance that both these languages belonged to culture-patterns in which militarism or intent-to-hurt were dominant, might be taken into account. It would be interesting to know the number and range of synonyms for aggressiveness in the languages of gentler peoples who yet take steps towards others.

Clearly too, Gordon W. Allport's theory 1 that motives may be transformed, especially through fusion with others, and that these transformed motives may become functionally autonomous, may alter the whole picture. The best type of school prefect who seeks for and enjoys taking responsibility is aggressive in a loose sense, but his aggressiveness can be very complex and subtle.

It is difficult to decide whether to spend much time upon the next hypothesis, but since it seems to be accepted by many psychologists (certainly not by all) it should be mentioned. It is that we possess a reservoir of unconscious hatred and destructive impulses, constantly replenished. What, we may ask, is the evidence, except that some leading thinker said so? This is not the place to argue in detail the view that Freud's use of pictorial analogies, obviously useful and perhaps necessary in developing an entirely new concept, has retarded progress in psychological thinking. As a constant visualiser, I must confess that I find the greatest difficulty in imagining both the reservoir and its contents. I constantly ask myself "Does this assumption make sense, psychologically, physiologically, neurologically or metaphysically?" Many psychologists including some, like Professor Flügel, deeply influenced by psychoanalysis, are far from dogmatic about this. They, with Professors W. McDougall 2 and J. Drever, 3 point with much more justification to the fact that whether a human tendency towards aggression, pugnacity or self-assertion (for they use different terms) is innate or not, it will have plenty of chances to arise during life as a result of the thwarting of other impulses, either by the physical environment

1 Personality, Constable, and Henry Holt, New York.
2 Introduction to Social Psychology, Methuen.
3 Instinct in Man, Cambridge University Press.
or by other people. Professor Dollard and others \(^1\) have studied extensively the conditions of such thwarting and the different types of behaviour which result from it. This naturally leads to psychoanalytic explanations, e.g. often the aggressive impulse is repressed into the unconscious or the repressed person is ambivalent, i.e. feels emotions of opposite tendency towards the thwarting cause.

Perhaps a little re-examination is allowable. In particular one wishes to know if this concept of ambivalence is believed to be applicable to all love. Is there no perfect love, free from any admixture of hate? Fortunate people who believe this are unlikely to seek the professional services of psychoanalysts, or indeed of psychotherapists at all.

It is fair to speculate, as Dr. J. Cohen does in his unusually penetrating analysis of this subject in reference to warfare, that inferences are possible from the fact that Freud developed his later ideas of human aggressiveness and hatred during the most depressing time in Vienna. He never rose mentally above the sub-culture-pattern in which he lived, and as Professor Harding suggests, Freud's ideas on Government were not far removed from Hitler's. Writers like Christopher Caudwell, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm have made this point. It is time that social psychologists defined their attitude towards such criticism of what by some Freudians seem to be regarded as axioms, and in doing so, assessed the significance of the possibility that at least for a short time, they may expect professional advancement in a society which puts hatred and malice before friendliness, dominance before co-operation. Until recently almost all doctors made their living from disease and disability, not from health, yet the concept of social medicine is rapidly developing.

Nobody will deny that aggressiveness played a great part in waging the last war—even to write this might seem a blasphemous use of understatement—but while in wars centuries ago a very high percentage of the armies was aggressive, and the civilians kept out of the fighting, it cannot be emphasised too often that in World War II a high percentage of people participated

\(^1\) Frustration and Aggression, Kegan Paul, 1944.
unaggressively, including many in uniform. It is perhaps significant that recently an otherwise undistinguished examination script contained the not entirely muddled query "If this war is due to instinct, why must we have a large Pay Corps?"

Recent criticism of the aggressiveness theory of war is along the following lines. It fails to distinguish between the aggressiveness of the war-makers, which can be very real indeed (though frequently personal greed, still socially disapproved if found out, masquerades as socially approved aggressiveness) and the attitudes of the general population, many of whom may not know of the impending war, of the combatant, semi-combatant, and non-combatant soldiers, and of the victims. In a war involving more than half the population of the world, a vast number of people who had nothing to do with declaring war suffered passively. Often aggressiveness had to be stirred up and intensified even in the fighters (we have recently read about the experimental army 'hate schools', abolished as a result of psychiatrists' reports), in the uniformed sections many people of both sexes lived an unaggressive life and yet helped to win the war, 'back-room boys' and scientists are unlikely to have done their best thinking if viscerally stirred; 'beating the enemy' cannot have been a constant day-and-night goal giving incentive to all non-combatants, as the excellent book *War-Factory* among others, showed. Primitive aggressiveness—if one can use such a term, would probably become transformed and fused with other 'drives'. As a result, the fusion may be more correctly described by another name and perhaps by that of another drive with which it has become fused. A man might have enlisted to beat the enemy, then have become fascinated by a new mechanical means of doing so, have found that he could improve it and conduct important research, rewarded by promotion, and eventually have enjoyed ordering people about. His final experience will be far removed from primitive aggressiveness.

Yet if the kind of culture-pattern in which Freud, we, and many Americans have been brought up is to be described as 'aggressive-acquisitive', and if we assume that this fact has played a great part in causing wars in the past, the main thesis

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1 By Mass Observation, Gollancz.
of this lecture is unaffected—that war is the expression of a culture pattern.

Positive criticism of the culture-pattern theory has taken directions like the following:

1. Is the pattern which one observer 'perceives' in a community (the verb is used vaguely) likely to be 'perceived' by others, expert and inexpert? An account of 'the Germans' by someone who is at present on the Continent primarily as a soldier in the army of occupation, and speaks little German, would obviously differ from that by an English observer who spoke German fluently and had lived there between the World Wars. Such a person is Lord Vansittart, though in his accounts of the Germans he seldom or never mentions that he had talked to, to say nothing of sympathising with, German working-men and women. Elsewhere I have pointed out the tendency, at one time, for writers and speakers to be content with comparing the alleged mentality of nations with the alleged mentality of animals—dogs (preferably mad), bees, wolves, vampires. Later, perhaps, came the custom of applying one adjective to a whole nation—at the moment the fashionable one, both in politics and in psychology, appears to be 'aggressive'.

Is it completely fatuous to apply an adjective to the observed behaviour of a social group? Perhaps not, if the group is small enough to be really observable, if all reporters attach the same meaning to the word and if translated from one language to another, this fact is stated, together with some indication whether the word 'dates' in the first language. Lastly, it would be good if users of the borrowed term really understood both languages.

Here the distinction between 'pattern' and 'configuration' is useful. The number of instances in which the pattern was observed, and their statistical significance, should be stated.

People who have lived all their lives in England, with its very striking varieties of behaviour characterising different geographical areas, its distinctions between urban-residential, urban-industrial and rural life, and its complicated and ever-present social stratification, occasionally raise a quizzical eyebrow when our national character is confidently described by
the stranger within our gates. But the English ought to admit that their own views of other nations are open to the same criticism.

Perhaps the comment has not been made often enough, that several different patterns may be perceived in the same culture, by people especially prone through temperament, training or education to notice them, and again the 'pattern-configuration distinction' should be remembered here. Very complex patterns appear to be perceptible at present in the French nation (cf. Phyllis Bottome's *Individual Countries*¹ and *Faith in France,*² with preface by Professor D. W Brogan) I offer a concrete example. English people who have merely spent holidays in France sometimes ask "How can a nation claim to lead the World's culture when one goes about its country in imminent risk of contracting typhoid fever?" The answer that culture must not be confused with plumbing comes readily to the intellectual's tongue, yet I remember the look of baffled amusement with which it was received by members of an American Air Force Unit stationed in England.

It might be possible to employ another method of investigation, to enquire into the factors 'beneath' the culture-pattern which so to speak, push up one piece of the fabric as in a relief, or (to mix metaphors) may stain parts of it so that the pattern is more easily visible. Perhaps, too, antagonistic sets of forces may be discovered tending to make different patterns—themselves antagonistic.

Little has been written about how it feels to be part of a well-marked culture-pattern; though presumably a good deal of the work carried out under the titles of 'mass-observation', and 'participant observation' might be re-examined with this in view. Certain autobiographies might also be studied. Dr. Marie Jahoda once suggested to me that social psychologists in training might undertake a 'social analysis' of themselves and their colleagues. This would be different from Freudian psychoanalysis, which seems sometimes to create a special culture-pattern grafted on to Freud's.

¹ Allen and Unwin, 1947.
² *Faith in France,* Sherratt and Sons, Manchester, 1947.
Let us consider a way in which this might be attempted. After preliminary talks and discussions, and reading of books by writers like Margaret Mead's *Growing Up in New Guinea*¹ and *Coming of Age in Samoa*,² articles by Marie Jahoda³ and Florence Kluckhohn⁴ and selected publications of 'Mass-Observation', the investigator-in-training might be asked to write an account of his or her own Growing up in Great Britain, with special reference to social stratum, religious and political affiliations and the attitudes inculcated towards parents, siblings and the opposite sex. Certain parts might be marked 'Confidential', to be read only by selected persons. As a result of comparing the accounts in class discussion, a picture of the general culture-pattern and of its sub-patterns might be drawn. Help could be obtained from schemes of investigation used by Kardiner, Beaglehole and from studies made by Dr. J. A. Waites.⁵

Of particular interest might be a detailed account of the 'subject's' attitude to parents, to authority in general, to religion (both as experience and as a formal frame for behaviour) and to social strata 'above' and 'below' him, with special reference to the degree to which he 'knows his place' and accepts it, considers himself movable or immovable in the social scale of his own country, or estimates that he would be socially happier in another.

It might be possible to study by questionnaires and interviews the nature and the relative strength of sentiments connected with parents, religion, social stratum and country, to see how their relative strength compares in different people of apparently the same culture-pattern. Protestants, Catholics and Jews living...

in the same town and of similar economic status might be com-
pared. The mutual relationships of sentiments might be studied.
To what extent are certain types of sentiment bound up with
each other, and has the degree of intimate interlocking varied
as years went on? In parts of England there is a strong tendency
for land-owners to be Church of England and Conservative,
and in the Fens at least, agricultural workers tend to be non-
conformist and non-Conservative. Attitude measurement and
factor analysis may throw light upon this (a possibility suggested
in an unpublished paper read by Dr. H. J. Eysenck to the British
Psychological Society on 11th April, 1947).

Since sentiments are more easily developed around persons
and things than around ideas, it might be possible to examine
whether there is a significant correlation between lack of ' in-
tellectual' education, and the tendency to think of abstract
political and moral issues primarily in terms of persons (leader,
Führer). Does the person of the Archbishop of Canterbury,
for example, exert such an influence on the Church of England
as that of the Pope on the Church of Rome? Can workers for
peace hope to weave a sentiment around any living leader com-
parable to that which existed for 'Monty' in the war? If not,
what can be done?

The investigator's complexes, both in the psychoanalytic
sense and in the sense of 'untidy' or unformed sentiments
should also be studied. 'Uprooted' or 'displaced' persons
are unlikely to be free from complexes about both their native
country and the land or lands in which they are guests.

But if, as seems possible, a sentiment in its early formative
stages may resemble a complex, in its 'untidiness' and lack
of understandable inner structure, that this too may be true
of the late stages of its decay and that repression may also occur
in the formation of a sentiment, these possibilities seem important
in the study of one's own culture-pattern.

In this connexion, the recent rapid development of methods
and channels of communication (Press, radio, film)\(^1\) is very
important. By presenting ideas visually to millions who cannot

\(^1\)Footnote of Made for Millions (ed. F. Laws) 1947, London. Contact
Publisher.
read or write (cf. the early film instruction methods of the U.S.S.R.) or even to those who can, but 'only just' (cf. many films shown in Great Britain and America) a powerful impression can be made, and quickly. So a new culture-pattern can be built up, perhaps deliberately 'contrived' out of an old one. And the films and radio have made the phrase the 'inevitability of gradualness' almost obsolete.

Many questions remain. Do the various uses of the term 'culture-pattern' mean the same thing? I doubt it; further agreement about terminology is urgently desirable. Is a culture pattern judged by reference to the common people, to their leaders, especially those who speak and write with authority, to their heroes or to their ideal personalities? Presumably different judges may employ any or all of these criteria, and this is a source of ambiguity.

But upon one thing students of culture patterns all seem agreed: modern warfare is not due to simple instincts, nor is it inevitable.