

**THE MILITARY PAPERS, 1940–48, OF  
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK:  
A CALENDAR AND INDEX**

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## CONTENTS

Introduction to the Auchinleck Papers	146
List of abbreviations	151
Calendar:	
Norway, 1940 (documents 3–69)	153
Southern Command, 1940 (documents 70–120)	158
India, 1941 (documents 121–274)	162
Middle East, 1941–43 (documents 275–1023)	176
India, 1943–48 (documents 1024–1312)	283
Undated papers (documents 1332–1333)	372
Dispatches and official accounts of military operations (documents 1334–1353)	372
Appendix 1: Notes on Auchinleck’s principal correspondents	374
Appendix 2: Index	377

## INTRODUCTION TO THE AUCHINLECK PAPERS

Claude John Eyre Auchinleck was born at Aldershot on 21 June 1884, the son of a Colonel in the Royal Horse Artillery. He was educated at Wellington College (1896–1901) and the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, from which he graduated in 1903, and began his military career in April 1904 as a subaltern in the 62nd Punjab Regiment of the Indian Army. Sent with this Regiment to the Middle East at the outbreak of the First World War, he served with distinction against Turkish and Arab forces in Egypt, Aden and Mesopotamia, rising in rank from Captain to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel in 1919, and winning both the DSO and OBE. During the 1920s he held a number of staff assignments in India and studied, from 1927, at the newly-formed Imperial Defence College in London. After a brief spell as Commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment in 1929–30, and promotion to full Colonel, he became an instructor at the Staff College, Quetta in 1930–33 before resuming active duties as Commander of the Peshawar Brigade, then (1933–36) engaged in mountain warfare against the Mohmands, an Afghan tribe, on the North-West Frontier. Twice mentioned in dispatches, he was promoted successively to the ranks of Brigadier and Major-General and, in 1936, appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India. The year 1938 saw him progress to become the Commander of the Meerut District and to sit as a member of the Expert (Chatfield) Committee on the Defence of India, a position which he used to press forcefully for the modernization of the Indian Army.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War Auchinleck was recalled from the Meerut District to England to form, train and command 4th Corps in readiness for war in France and promoted to Lieutenant-General. Allied operations in Norway, however, were going badly under Major-General Mackesy, and in May 1940 Auchinleck replaced Mackesy as Commander of the Anglo-French land and air forces in the north of the country [documents 3–69]. His troops successfully held and expanded their position at Narvik but had to be withdrawn when the rapid German advance through Western Europe necessitated the evacuation at Dunkirk and cut off planned reinforcements for Norway. Auchinleck then (July–November 1940) became General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, planning coastal defences against a possible German invasion of England [documents 70–120]. In January 1941 he was sent to India, with the rank of General and a knighthood, to succeed General Cassels

as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army [documents 121–274]. After only six months Auchinleck was again transferred, this time to replace General Wavell as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East in the wake of the failure of the ‘Battleaxe’ offensive in the Western Desert and the advances of the Axis forces under Field-Marshal Rommel [documents 275–1023]. Early gains at Rommel’s expense in the ‘Crusader’ offensive were quickly reversed during the first half of 1942, and Auchinleck’s forces suffered a series of ignominious defeats, culminating in the loss of Tobruk, before the defensive line was stabilized at the First Battle of El Alamein. Auchinleck, whose relations with Winston Churchill had never been easy, was summarily dismissed as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East in August and offered a new command in Iran and Iraq, which he refused. He returned to India without a formal position until, in June 1943, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief, India for a second time [documents 1024–1312]. Although no longer involved in actual military operations, he played a vital role as War Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council and as Commander of the main staging-area for operations against the Japanese in Burma, and in June 1946 he was nominated Field-Marshal in recognition of his wartime service. His final period in India was spent in preparing that country’s Armed Forces for the constitutional process of transferring power from Great Britain which led to the formation of the independent states of India and Pakistan; but, in November 1947, frustrated by dissensions within the Armed Forces and by frequent clashes with Indian nationalist leaders, his Supreme Headquarters were closed, and he returned to England before his work in India was fully done.

After a brief sojourn in Italy, Auchinleck retired first to London and Beccles and then, at the close of 1967, settled in Marrakesh where he eventually died of influenza on 23 March 1981. It was while preparing for his emigration to Morocco that he decided, through the good offices of Michael Elliott-Bateman and Eric Dorman O’Gowan, to present his military correspondence and official papers to what was, at that time, the Library of the University of Manchester and has since become the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Dr Margaret Wright, the Library’s Keeper of Special Collections, immediately set about the task of compiling a list and index to the papers which she had finished, much to Auchinleck’s delight, by early October 1968. For some time, and especially between 1975 and 1978, there was a possibility that the papers might be prepared for publication in their entirety by a small editorial team. However, for a variety of reasons, this option had to be abandoned, and, after many delays occasioned by her other duties, Dr Wright subsequently embarked upon a more modest enterprise, a calendar of the papers. The fruits of her work are substantially printed in this issue of the Library’s *Bulletin*.

The vast majority, and historically the most significant, of Auchinleck’s papers deal with the period 1940–48, and, for the sake of

editorial tidiness, these alone are calendared here. Documents which are not now being reproduced in summary are as follows:

- (a) 2 papers from Auchinleck's pre-war Indian days, dated 4 August 1919 and 24 October 1938 [documents 1–2];
- (b) 18 miscellaneous papers from the years 1950–62, the most interesting of which comprise correspondence in February – March 1961 between John Connell, Auchinleck's biographer, and the editor of the *Sunday Times* concerning the representation of Auchinleck in Field-Marshal Alexander's memoirs [documents 1313–1330];
- (c) 16 papers from the files of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Manchester, 11 of them relating to an invitation to Auchinleck to receive an honorary LL.D. from the University in 1970–71 [document 1354];
- (d) 104 papers from the files of the Librarian of the University of Manchester, dated 22 December 1966 to 2 February 1983, and including a run of 57 letters exchanged between Auchinleck and Dr F.W. Ratcliffe (the Librarian) in 1967–75 relating to the deposit and subsequent scholarly use of the Auchinleck Papers and to the activities of the Manchester Tactical Society of which Auchinleck had accepted the Presidency [unnumbered].

Significant though the Auchinleck Papers have already proved to be, and will continue to be, for historical research, it is important that they should not be seen in isolation. A balanced understanding of their content can only be reached by reference to other collections of official and private papers which complement and supplement them at critical points. Some of these collections are also housed in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester; especially notable, in this respect, are those of Eric Dorman O'Gowan (who, as Eric Dorman-Smith, was Auchinleck's Chief-of-Staff for six weeks in the summer of 1942), which contain his recollections of the Middle East campaigns in 1940–42 and his correspondence with Auchinleck in 1958–68, and of Robin Ridgway (Private Secretary to Auchinleck in India) covering the years 1939–44. Others, as is evident from Appendix 1, are located elsewhere. The National Army Museum, for example, contains further papers of Ridgway relating to Narvik in 1940 and to India in 1941–47 (call number: 6305–49) as well as correspondence from 1943–44 between Auchinleck and Brigadier-General G.N. Molesworth, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, India (6505–55). The Imperial War Museum has several relevant collections including the papers of General Sir Neil Ritchie (Commander of the 8th Army in 1941–42) which were deposited there by his nephew after his death in 1983 and which cast a somewhat different light on those crucial months in the Western Desert than may be gleaned from Auchinleck's own accounts. The Public Record Office holds the appropriate

Cabinet, War Office and other Departmental documents, whilst the India Office preserves both the official archives of that Office and private collections of Viceregal papers. Much of the India Office material, including documents from and concerning Auchinleck, has now appeared in print as *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, Editor-in-Chief: Nicholas Mansergh (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970–83, 12 volumes). For a full survey of unpublished primary sources, readers should consult *Sources in British Political History, 1900–1951*, compiled for the British Library of Political and Economic Science by Chris Cook, *Volume 2: A Guide to the Private Papers of selected Public Servants* (London: Macmillan Press, 1975) and *The two World Wars: A Guide to Manuscript Collections in the United Kingdom* by S.L. Mayer and W.J. Koenig (London: Bowker, 1976).

Those who seek to relate Auchinleck's career to the wider historiography of the Second World War and of the Partition of India are best advised to start with the three biographies of him, all written from a sympathetic perspective. *Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck* (London: Cassell, 1959) by John Connell (the pseudonym of John Henry Robertson) was the first to appear and, at nearly 1,000 pages, is by far the longest of the three; it consists very largely of documents from the Auchinleck Papers, woven into a connecting narrative with the aid of information derived from extended conversations between the author and his subject. Well over half of Roger Parkinson's *The Auk: Auchinleck, Victor at Alamein* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon Ltd., 1977) is given over to a consideration of Auchinleck's time at Middle East Command in 1941–42, stressing in particular the importance of Auchinleck's victory at the First Battle of El Alamein in making possible Montgomery's triumph at the better-known Second Battle; despite a fiercely partisan tone ('I feel so strongly about the ill-treatment which I believe Auchinleck received both at the time and by history'), the book does incorporate the results of significant research on War Cabinet and other official records which, not being opened to scholars until 1970, were not available to Connell. The third study, by Philip Warner: *Auchinleck: The Lonely Soldier* (London: Buchan & Enright, 1981; London: Sphere Books, 1982), presents a much more balanced chronological account of Auchinleck's life and is unusual in including a chapter on his eventide years after 1947; it also has the advantage of drawing upon hundreds of hours of reminiscences by Auchinleck's family, friends and army colleagues and upon the transcripts of interviews which Auchinleck gave to David Dimbleby of the BBC in 1974 and 1976, interviews which formed the basis of a 1975 television programme 'The Auk at 90' and which Dimbleby had originally intended to edit into a book to be published by Leo Cooper.

The secondary literature of the Second World War is obviously enormous, and, apart from the major biographies (see Appendix 1),

space does not permit a comprehensive guide to it to appear here. The most recent bibliography is by Alfred George Sidney Enser: *A Subject Bibliography of the Second World War: Books in English*, published in two volumes dealing with works printed between 1939 and 1974 (London: André Deutsch, 1977) and between 1975 and 1983 (Aldershot: Gower, 1985). Some of the titles cited are of direct relevance to Auchinleck, for instance, Correlli Barnett's *The Desert Generals* (London: William Kimber, 1960) which includes a sixty-page account of his actions in the Middle East from June to August 1942 together with portraits of the three Commanders who preceded him (O'Connor, Cunningham and Ritchie) and of Montgomery who followed him. Since 1985, of course, important publications have continued to appear, foremost amongst which is Michael Carver's *Dilemmas of the Desert War: A new Look at the Libyan Campaign, 1940-1942* (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd. in association with the Imperial War Museum, 1986) which makes effective use of Ritchie's newly-accessible papers.

For the longer-term background to Auchinleck's years in India Command, Judith M. Brown's *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985) is invaluable on politico-constitutional matters, whilst Philip Mason's *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976) and Charles Chenevix Trench's *The Indian Army and the King's Enemies, 1900-1947* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988) may be recommended on the military side. There are many works dealing with events of the 1940s in general and with the transfer of power in particular, including a substantial volume of conference papers on *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947*, edited by Cyril Henry Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), with contributions by those who were journalists and politicians at the time as well as by academics, and a monograph on *The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement* by K.K. Ghosh (Begum Bridge: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969). Recollections of the final days of British India are also legion, one of the most recent being *Last Post: An Indian Army Memoir* (London: Leo Cooper in association with Secker and Warburg, 1985), written by Eric Wilfred Robinson-Horley who was Comptroller of Auchinleck's Household in India in 1945-47.

In the continued evolution of this historiographical tradition, the Auchinleck Papers at the John Rylands University Library of Manchester deserve to be better-known and better-used. By compiling such a detailed calendar and index to them, Dr Margaret Wright has opened a door through which, one hopes, scholars will now enter in increasing numbers.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anti-aircraft
ADC	Aide-de-Camp
AFI	Armed Forces of India
AFV	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AG	Adjutant-General
AHQ	Air Headquarters
AOC	Air Officer Commanding
AOC-in-C	Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
BGS	Brigadier, General Staff
Brig.	Brigadier
Capt.	Captain
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
CO	Commanding Officer
Col.	Colonel
CRA	Commander, Royal Artillery
DAG	Deputy Adjutant-General
DCGS	Deputy Chief of the General Staff
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence
DMO	Director of Military Operations
DMS	Director of Medical Services
DMT	Director of Military Training
ENSA	Entertainments National Service Association
FM	Field-Marshal
FO	Foreign Office
Gen.	General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Gp.Capt.	Group Captain
GS	General Staff
GSI	General Staff Intelligence
HMS	His Majesty's Ship
HQ	Headquarters
IA	Indian Army
IAC	Indian Armoured Corps

IAF	Indian Air Force
IAOC	Indian Army Ordnance Corps
IC	India Command
INA	Indian National Army
IO	India Office
Lt.	Lieutenant
Lt.-Col.	Lieutenant-Colonel
Lt.-Gen.	Lieutenant-General
Maj.	Major
Maj.-Gen.	Major-General
ME	Middle East
MEC	Middle East Command
MM	Military Medal
MT	Motor Transport
NAAFI	Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NWEF	North-Western Expeditionary Force
OC	Officer Commanding
PAO	Principal Administrative Officer
PM	Prime Minister
QMG	Quartermaster General
RA	Royal Artillery
RAC	Royal Armoured Corps
RAF	Royal Air Force
RASC	Royal Army Service Corps
RIASC	Royal Indian Army Service Corps
RIN	Royal Indian Navy
RN	Royal Navy
RSM	Regimental Sergeant-Major
RTR	Royal Tank Regiment
SC	Southern Command
SEAC	South-East Asia Command
VAD	Voluntary Aid Detachment
VCAS	Vice-Chief of the Air Staff
VCIGS	Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff
WO	War Office

## CALENDAR

*Norway 1940*

- 3 *n.d.* List of officers, HQ, NWEF. 3 leaves. Typescript.
- 4 2 May. Appreciation of climate, Norway. 3 leaves. Typescript.
- 5 2 May. Appreciation of roads and railways, Norway. 4 leaves. Typescript.
- 6 3 May. Narvik: appreciation of situation. Copy no. 1. With marginal comments by Sir John Dill, VCIGS. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed by Auchinleck.
- 7 3 May. Narvik: appreciation of situation. Copy no. 3. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed by Auchinleck.
- 8 4 May. Defence of Narvik: note on requirements by Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.
- 9 5 May. Personal instructions from the CIGS to Auchinleck, appointing him commander of the Anglo-French forces when it has been decided that the system of unified command should cease. Signed by Sir John Dill, VCIGS. 1 leaf. Typescript.
- 10 6 May. List of points agreed between GS branches at the WO and HQ, 4th Corps before their departure for Norway. Signed by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 3 leaves. Typescript.
- 11 6 May. Message from the WO to Rupertforce. Personal to Lord Cork and Orrery and Maj.-Gen. P.J. Mackesy, announcing the appointment and imminent arrival of Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.
- 12 11 May. Note by Lord Cork and Orrery to Auchinleck, given on board HMS *Effingham*, off Skaanland, expressing his views on the proposed attempt to capture Narvik. 2 leaves. Typescript.
- 13 12 May. Appreciation of the administrative situation at 1500 hrs, 12 May, at Harstad. With letter accompanying report, both signed by Brig. R.M. Wootten. Marginal comment by Auchinleck. 4 leaves. Typescript.
- 14 13 May. Report by Auchinleck addressed to Sir John Dill, VCIGS, describing the first meeting with Lord Cork. From HMS *Effingham*. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**15** *c. 13 May.* 1st Light Division of Chasseurs Alpins and attached troops: order of battle. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**16** *13 May.* Operation instruction no. 1, addressed to Brig. W. Fraser, OC, 24th Guards Brigade, commanding him to proceed to Bodo. Initialled by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**17** *13 May.* Operation instruction no. 2, addressed to Brig. W. Fraser. Arrangements for naval and air co-operation during the forthcoming operations in the Mo-Bodo area. Initialled by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**18** *13 May.* Report by Maj. C.E.R. Hirsch who visited HQ, 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion at 1945 hrs on 13 May. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**19** *14 May.* Message from Auchinleck to Gen. O. Ruge, C-in-C, Norwegian Forces, announcing his new command. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**20** *14-15 May.* Personal letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, describing the circumstances in which he assumed command of the Anglo-French land and air forces in place of Maj.-Gen. Mackesy. 4 leaves. Holograph.

**21** *15 May.* Note by Maj.-Gen. P.J. Mackesy, written just before his departure for England, restating his view that Mo should be held at all costs. With marginal comments by Auchinleck. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**22** *15 May.* Report by Maj.-Gen. P.J. Mackesy on his service as Commander of Rupertforce from 14 April to 13 May. Addressed to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, WO. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**23** *15 May.* Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, suggesting that another battalion be sent to take the place of the Irish Guards whose transport ship the *Chrobry* was sunk. With pencilled note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**24** *15 May.* List, signed by Auchinleck, of arrangements made with Gen. Bethouart. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**25** *16 May.* Letter from Auchinleck to Col. C. McV. Gubbins, commanding troops in the Bodo-Mo area, ordering him to hold Mo. With a note in the hand of Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**26** *17 May.* Naval message from the Chiefs of Staff to Auchinleck, indicating limitations on the size of the forces in Norway because of events on the Western Front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**27** *17 May.* Two letters from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, one

personal, the other official, reporting increased German activity. 2 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**28** 17 May. Letter from Auchinleck in reply to Lord Cork, with news of discussions with Gen. Bethouart. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**29** 17–18 May. Report from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, announcing the loss of HMS *Effingham* and consequent inability to reinforce Bodo immediately. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**30** 19 May. Report of a telephone message for Auchinleck from Col. C. McV. Gubbins concerning Trappes-Lomax's plan for withdrawal. With autograph note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**31** 20 May. Report on the situation in Finmark and Tromso, from the Vice-Admiral commanding the 1st Cruiser Squadron. Referred to Auchinleck by direction of Lord Cork. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**32** 20 May. Message no. G130 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff, announcing that the Norwegians have shown signs of refusing use of Tromso as a base unless AA defences are provided. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**33** 20 May. Naval message no. 274 from Lord Cork to the Chiefs of Staff, stating that the capture of Narvik depends on adequate forces and a sufficient air force. With autograph notes by Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**34** 20 May. NWEF Operation Instruction no. 3: Employment of Fighter Aircraft. Copy no. 6. From Auchinleck to OC, Air Component. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**35** 20 May. Unloading of storeships at base area, NWEF. Report by Auchinleck to Lord Cork, FO commanding Allied Forces in Narvik area. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**36** 21 May. Office Instruction no. 2: Force Commander's Routine. Memorandum sent out on behalf of Brig. J.A.H. Gammell, BGS, NWEF. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**37** 21 May. French operation for the capture of Narvik: outline plans. Copy no. 3. Signed by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**38** 21–22 May. Notes on a visit to Bodo by Col. A.A.B. Dowler. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**39** 22 May. Statement signed by Auchinleck, appointing R.M. Wootten in his place should he become a casualty. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**40** 22 May. Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck on the necessity of lending guns to Tromsø to protect the congestion of shipping in the harbour. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**41** 23 May. Report by Auchinleck to Lord Cork on a visit by Col. Dowler (GS) to Brig. Gubbins at Bodo. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**42** 23 May. Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, complaining about the meagre offer of support from the RAF. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**43** 23 May. Record of a conference held by Auchinleck to discuss plans for the capture of Narvik. Approved by Lord Cork. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**44** 24 May. Special Order of the Day, at the beginning of the assault on Narvik. Issued by Lord Cork, Auchinleck and Gp.Capt. M. Moore. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet.

**45** 24 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Brig. C. McV. Gubbins of Bodoforce, informing him of the dispatch of supplies and reinforcements. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**46** 24 May. Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, reluctantly accepting the prime importance of the needs of Bodo and temporary postponement of the Narvik operation. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**47** 24 May. Gist of a message for Auchinleck received by telephone from Col. T.P. Trappes-Lomax at Bodo, announcing that he had been relieved of his command by Brig. Gubbins. With a note in the hand of Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**48** 24 May. Naval message from the Chiefs of Staff to Lord Cork, announcing the need for immediate evacuation of Northern Norway in order that troops, ships and guns can be used for the defence of the UK. However, destruction of railway and Narvik port facilities make its capture highly desirable. With a pencilled note in the hand of Lord Cork. 4 leaves. Manuscript.

**49** 25 May. Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, suggesting a meeting to discuss Narvik. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**50** 25 May. Strength state of personnel of the NWEF as at 1800 hrs, 25 May. Signed by Maj. R. Sugden. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**51** 26 May. Notes on a visit to Brig. Gubbins by Col. A.A.B. Dowler at Bodo, stating his present position and future requirements. Copy no. 1. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**52** 26 May. Message no.A150 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff, announcing that he has removed Lt.-Col. Trappes-Lomax from

his SG command and has replaced him by Maj. H.L. Graham. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**53** 26 May. Letter from Maj.-Gen. R.H. Dewing to Auchinleck, giving him an account of recent events on the Western Front. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**54** 28 May. Norwegian text and English translation of a direction for the operations against Bjørnefjell. With brief note from Capt. E.A.W. Watney. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**55** 29 May. Report by Capt. H. Rycroft on the landing at Narvik, with hand-sketched map. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**56** 29 May. NWEF Operation Instruction no. 5. Copy no. 12. From Auchinleck to Gp.Capt. Moore, OC, Air Component. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**57** 29 May. Notice headed 'To be prominently displayed. Narvik, Fagernes, Forsneset – all in possession of French by 2200 hours yesterday'. With a message of congratulations from Auchinleck to Gen. Bethouart. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**58** 29 May. Letter from Brig. C. McV. Gubbins, Bodoforce, to Auchinleck, giving the present disposition of troops, and asking if evacuation can be arranged for 31 May. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**59** 29 May. Special Order of the Day, warning troops to carry arms at all times; to treat strangers with caution; and to avoid giving any military information to civilians. Subscribed with Auchinleck's name and rank. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet.

**60** 29 May. Message no.1894 from the WO to Rupertforce, giving details of the German advance in France, the defeat of Belgium, and movement of Spanish troops. 3 leaves. Manuscript.

**61** 30 May. Carbon copy of an autograph letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, congratulating him on his promotion, describing the capture of Narvik, the problems of the evacuation planned for completion by 7 June, and listing outstanding officers in his command. From Harstad. 4 leaves. Holograph.

**62** 31 May. Memorandum addressed to all recipients of NWEF Movement Order no.1. Announcement of measures taken to protect the secrecy of Alphabet, i.e. the evacuation of the NWEF from Norway. Signed by Col. A.A.B. Dowler on behalf of Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**63** 1 June. Instructions concerning the evacuation from Norway, sent by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell to Col. H.L. Graham, commanding troops at Tromsø. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**64** 1 June. Operational Instruction no.3: provision of aerial protec-

tion for re-embarkation, information regarding the action of the Fleet Air Arm, schedule of embarkation. To Gp.Capt. Moore, OC, Air Component. Signed by Capt. W.R.P. Ridgway on behalf of Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**65** 2 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. C.G. Fleischer, commanding 6th Norwegian Division, asking him to undertake personal control of the whole of the operations in the area north of Rombaksfjord. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**66** 6 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. C.G. Fleischer, informing him that the troops under the command of Gen. Bethouart are to withdraw from their positions on the night of 7/8 June. 1 leaf. Typescript, initialled.

**67** 8 *June*. Order of the Day. Issued by Auchinleck on re-embarkation for the UK, thanking all members of the NWEF for the part they have played in the Norwegian campaign. With a pencilled note by Brig. J.A.H. Gammell. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**68** 19 *June*. Draft report to the Secretary of State for War on the operations in Northern Norway, 14 May – 7 June, by Auchinleck. With autograph corrections. 10 leaves. Typescript.

**69** 19 *June*. Report on Norway by Auchinleck. 30 leaves. Printed.

### *Southern Command 1940*

**70** 21 *June*. Letter from R.H. Dewing, Director of Military Operations and Plans at the WO, writing, on behalf of the CIGS, to Auchinleck to ask for a report on the reasons which led Auchinleck to exercise the authority given to him to assume command of land and air forces in Northern Norway in place of Maj.-Gen. Mackesy on 13 May, 1940. With Auchinleck's report in reply, dated 24 June, from Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**71** 21 *June*. Memorandum from Sir John Dill, CIGS, urging the need for the development of an offensive spirit in the British Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**72** 25 *June*. Special Order of the Day, issued by Auchinleck as Commander, 5th Corps, warning his troops that they are now in a forward area of a theatre of war and must act accordingly. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**73** 30 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Robert Haining, VCIGS, containing his views on tactics to be employed in the case of attempted invasion. 2 leaves. Typescript, initialled.

**74** 3 *July*. Copy of a letter from Sir J.S. Barnes, on behalf of the Admiralty, to Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of Cork and Orrery,

asking why such a small proportion of AA guns was brought back from Norway. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**75** 4 *July*. Report from Lord Cork to Sir J.S. Barnes, the Secretary of the Admiralty, listing the reasons why more AA guns could not be saved in the evacuation from Norway. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**76** 4 *July*. Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, concerning some criticisms of the way in which the evacuation from Norway was carried out. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**77** 7 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Cork, asserting his belief that the evacuation from Norway had been carried out in the best possible way, given the difficult circumstances. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**78** 9 *July*. 5th Corps, Conference no.1. Record, outlining policy in the event of an invasion. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**79** c. 9 *July*. Moves of Corps HQ, 5th Corps, during operations. 12 leaves. Typescript.

**80** 15 *July*. Letter of thanks from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. G. Le Q. Martel, Commander, 50th Division, after a visit to Martel's division. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph note.

**81** 18 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. C.G. Fleischer. With Fleischer's letter of 25 June from London, and another letter from him dated 3 June from Norway. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**82** 18 *July*. Narrative of events by Auchinleck, GOC-in-C, NWEF, 11 May – 21 June, 1940. 24 leaves. Mainly typescript, last 2 leaves pencilled holograph.

**83** 29 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. B.L. Montgomery, commanding 5th Corps, commenting on his notes on the 50th Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**84** 14 *August*. Letter from J.L. Wickham, Private Secretary to Queen Mary, to Auchinleck, writing on behalf of the Queen to invite him to visit her at Badminton. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**85** 15 *August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. B.L. Montgomery, rebuking him for going straight to the AG about a matter which directly concerned Auchinleck's HQ. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph note.

**86** 19 *August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Robert Haining, VCIGS, explaining that the soldier of today, more intelligent and experienced than his predecessor, is likely to be more critical of incompetence in his officers. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**87** 20 *August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir R. Stephens,

Zone Commander for Gloucestershire Home Guard, asking him to relinquish his command on attaining the age of 65. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**88** 27 August. Memorandum from Auchinleck addressed to Lt.-Gen. H.E. Franklyn, Lt.-Gen. B.L. Montgomery and Maj.-Gen. J.A.H. Gammell, expressing concern lest restrictions imposed on the use of transport in the interests of economy should adversely affect war efficiency and training. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**89** c. 28 August. Undated report from Auchinleck, defending the appointment of Col. C. Turner as Zone Commander, Gloucestershire Home Guard. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**90** 1 September. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. B.C.T. Paget, CGS, Home Forces, concerning the appointment of Col. C. Turner as Zone Commander, Gloucestershire Home Guard. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph note.

**91** 7 September. SC Operation Instruction no. 27, concerning the role of the Home Guard in the defence of the country. Copy no. 251. Issued by Auchinleck. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**92** 20 September. SC Order no.78. Special Order of the Day by Auchinleck, describing what the enemy may do when he attempts an invasion, and what the British Army must do to repel his attack. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet. 3 copies.

**93** 2 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, Home Forces, complaining about a paragraph in *The Spectator* in which it was suggested that soldiers should be used to reinforce the civilian defence services. With a copy of the extract from *The Spectator*. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**94** 18 October. Letter of thanks from J.L. Wickham, Private Secretary to Queen Mary, writing from Badminton, on behalf of the Queen, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**95** 18 October. Letter from Maj.-Gen. G.J. St. Clair to Auchinleck, on problems involving platoon commanders. From HQ, Hampshire Area. With enclosure of a letter from Col. A.Q. Archdale to Maj.-Gen. St. Clair on the same subject. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**96** 19 October. Letter from Sir Cecil Dormer, Minister to Norway, to Auchinleck, inviting him to visit King Haakon at Newbury. With Auchinleck's reply accepting the invitation, dated 23 October. 3 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**97** 19 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. B.L. Montgomery, rebuking him for dealing directly with the WO in the selection of officers for his Corps from other sections of the command. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**98** 19 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. H.C.B.

Wemyss, AG, complaining about Montgomery's habit of kidnapping officers. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**99** *21 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. St. Clair, Area Commander, Hampshire, with advice on a problem concerning one of his Home Guard officers in the Area. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**100** *25–26 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, Home Forces, indicating the dangers involved in the further separation of AA formations from the rest of the Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**101** *3 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir John Cole-ridge, concerning Home Guard affairs in Hampshire. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**102** *5 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Sydney Muspratt of the IO, concerning the problems of an officer in the IA serving with the British Service. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**103** *11 November.* Letter from Gen. Sir Sydney Muspratt in reply to Auchinleck's letter, describing the steps he has taken to remedy unfair treatment of officers in the IA. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph notes.

**104** *22 November.* Letter of congratulations from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, Home Forces, to Auchinleck on his appointment as C-in-C, India. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**105** *23 November.* Letter of congratulations from Sir Stuart K. Brown, IO, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**106** *24 November.* Letter of congratulations from Lord Birdwood to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**107** *27 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Col. Claude Erskine, IO, concerning the career of an Australian Air Force observer, formerly in his battalion (1/1 Punjab). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**108** *29 November.* Letter of congratulations from Lord Cork and Orrery to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**109** *29 November.* Letter of congratulations from the Southern Regional Commissioner, Civil Defence, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**110** *30 November.* Letter of congratulations from the Lord Mayor of Portsmouth to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**111** *30 November.* Letter of thanks from Auchinleck to Admiral Sir M.E. Dunbar-Nasmith, C-in-C, Plymouth. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**112** *1 December.* Letter from the Regional Commissioner, Civil Defence, South-West Region, to Auchinleck, expressing congratula-

tions and thanks for the help given by the Army to civil defence in Bristol. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**113** *1 December.* Letter of congratulations from Maj.-Gen. H.E. Franklyn, Commander, 5th Division, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**114** *2 December.* Letter of congratulations from Admiral Sir William M. James, C-in-C, Portsmouth, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**115** *3 December.* Letter of congratulations from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. the Hon H.R.L.G. Alexander, his successor as C-in-C, SC, with details of his domestic arrangements in Salisbury. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**116** *9 December.* Letter of congratulations from G.G. Thornton, Mayor of Salisbury, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**117** *9 December.* Letter of congratulations from Lord Gort to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**118** *11 December.* Letter of congratulations from two Chief Clerks of 5th Corps, E.R. Davidson and A.E. Quick, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**119** *12 December.* SC Order no.103. Special Order of the Day by Auchinleck: to the troops of SC, conveying thanks on his departure from the Command. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet. 2 copies.

**120** *12 December.* SC Order no.104. Special Order of the Day by Auchinleck: to the Home Guard of SC, conveying thanks on his departure from the Command. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet.

### *India 1941*

**121** *21 January.* Letter from Maj.-Gen. Arthur Smith, writing on behalf of Gen. Wavell, C-in-C, ME, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph. With enclosure: Operations in Western Desert, October to December 1940, by Gen. Wavell, dated 15 December 1940; with appendices by Wavell and Brig. A. Gallwey. 14 leaves. Typescript.

**122** *5 February.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. A.P. Wavell, asking for more publicity about the work of Indian troops in the MEC. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**123** *8 February.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. A.P. Wavell, suggesting the possibility of sending a force to Iraq in case of an emergency before Sybil and Sabine Forces are ready. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**124** 13 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, describing a new syllabus for the training of Indian Infantry recruits. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**125** 19 February. Letter from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Auchinleck, asking him for information concerning the first stage of the expansion of the IA. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**126** 20 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, on the present state of the Army in India and on measures required for the defence of India. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**127** 21 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, suggesting that IC should have operational control of Sabine Force, for the time being at least. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**128** 21 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. A.P. Wavell, enclosing a copy of a memorandum on Sabine Force. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**129** 10 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. E.P. Quinan, Commander, Western District, Quetta, informing him that he has been nominated Commander-designate of Sabine Force. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**130** 13 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. A.P. Wavell concerning the use of Indian troops and Gurkhas in the ME theatre and the appointments to be made to Sabine Force. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**131** 13 March. Letter from Sir John Dill (from HQ, ME, Cairo) to Auchinleck concerning control of Sabine Force by Auchinleck, conditions in Iraq, the attitudes of the Turks, the Greeks and the Yugoslavs. 5 leaves, one mutilated. Holograph.

**132** 17 March. Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, on the expansion of the IA, the need for more Indian cadets, for equality of pay and conditions between English and Indians, and for a stronger IAF. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**133** 3 April. Telegram no.265 from Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, British Ambassador to Iraq, to the FO, announcing the *coup d'état* in Iraq by Rashid Aali al-Gaylani. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**134** 4 April. Telegram no.242 from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, expressing anxiety concerning the anti-British régime in Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**135** 9 April. Report by Auchinleck of a conversation with Lt.-Gen. W.H. Hamilton, DMS. With pencilled note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**136** 9 April. Telegram no. 0/55526 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir

Robert Haining, describing the situation at Tobruk. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**137** *10 April.* Cipher message no. 3628/G from Auchinleck to Gen. A.P. Wavell, concerning correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy regarding the immediate dispatch of a force to Basra and a battalion by air to Shaiba. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**138** *10 April.* Cipher message no. 0/55767 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Auchinleck, reporting that he cannot spare any forces for Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**139** *12 April.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, stressing his opinion that it is important to establish a British base at Basra, despite the Government's reluctance to take action. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**140** *17 April.* Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, writing on behalf of the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, on the occupation of Basra. 2 leaves. Typescript, with holograph note. With enclosure: a draft telegram from the Viceroy to L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**141** *17 April.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, with an account of the arrangements for the occupation of Basra. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**142** *18 April.* Telegram no.357 from Sir K. Cornwallis, British Ambassador in Baghdad, to the FO announcing the conditions under which the Iraqi leaders will reluctantly accept the presence of British troops in Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**143** *25 April.* Cipher message no.63277 from Sir John Dill, on behalf of the War Cabinet, to Auchinleck, asking him to send reinforcements to Basra as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**144** *26 April.* Telegram from Lord Linlithgow to Auchinleck, transmitting a message of thanks from the Secretary of State for India for the successful occupation of Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**145** *26 April.* Telegram from Lord Linlithgow to Auchinleck, transmitting a message sent to Linlithgow by L.S. Amery on behalf of the PM and the Foreign Secretary, urging the speedy dispatch of more troops to Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**146** *28 April.* Telegram no.63891 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing thanks for sending reinforcements to Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**147** *29 April.* Situation report no.19 from Iraq: the situation is

grave, and the treaty may be repudiated by the Iraqis. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**148** *30 April*. Message no.402 from HQ, RAF, Iraq to the British Ambassador in Baghdad, warning him that Iraqi troops have occupied Habbaniya Hills and are ready to attack British aircraft in that area. 1 leaf. Manuscript.

**149** *30 April*. Message no.406 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting that Habbaniya is entirely surrounded by Iraqi troops. 2 leaves. Manuscript.

**150** *30 April*. Message no.4925/G from HQ, IC to HQ, MEC, announcing that air action should be taken immediately against Iraqi forces threatening Habbaniya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**151** *1 May*. Paraphrase of cipher message no.412 from HQ, RAF, ME, describing the text of leaflets intended for the people of Iraq explaining the British position. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**152** *1 May*. Paraphrase of a cipher message from the Air Ministry to AHQ, Iraq, containing an injunction from the PM to attack, if and when necessary. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**153** *1 May*. Naval message to C-in-C, East Indies, containing the decision made by AOC, Iraq that air action will be taken unless Iraqi forces surrounding Habbaniya are withdrawn forthwith. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**154** *1 May*. Capacity of lines of communication in Iraq: a report by Auchinleck, sent, with covering letter, to the Viceroy. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**155** *1 May*. Telegram from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, authorizing any measures to ensure the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**156** *1 May*. Cipher message no.4980/G from HQ, IC to HQ, MEC, announcing the boundaries of control by the IC and MEC in the campaign in Iraq: C-in-C, India is to assume overall responsibility. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**157** *2 May*. Paraphrase of cipher message from AHQ, Iraq, to Air HQ, ME, stressing the need for both ground and air reinforcements. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**158** *2 May*. Situation report no.25, from AHQ, Iraq, to Air HQ, ME, announcing that the situation is still critical. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**159** *2 May*. Draft appreciation: India and the situation in the ME by Auchinleck. C-in-C's working copy, with notes and corrections in Auchinleck's hand. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**160** 2 May. Memorandum from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. E.P. Quinan, outlining his duties and responsibilities as commander of the land forces in Iraq, under Auchinleck's orders. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**161** 2 May. Cipher message from HQ, India to the Chiefs of Staff, London, summarizing the directive sent to Lt.-Gen. Quinan. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**162** 2 May. Cipher message no.64676 from the Chiefs of Staff to C-in-C, India and C-in-C, ME, informing them that operational command in Iraq should now pass temporarily from IC to MEC. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**163** 3 May. Cipher message no.5032/G from HQ, India to the Chiefs of Staff, accepting the temporary transfer of command, but asking that higher operational control by MEC, in so far as it affects the situation at Basra, may be exercised through IC. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**164** 3 May. Cipher message no.5056/G from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, CIGS, containing an appreciation of India's situation in relation to Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**165** 3 May. Cipher message no.0/61450 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Auchinleck, announcing the occupation of Rutba by a strong Iraqi force. With cipher message no.0/61448 from Wavell to the Chiefs of Staff, informing them that all refineries and oil installations are in Iraqi hands. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**166** 3 May. Cipher message no.0/61447 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, describing what support in men and equipment he can expect from Palestine for the Iraq front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**167** 3 May. Letter of thanks from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, to Maj. A.B. Phillpotts, Auchinleck's Secretary. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**168** 3 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, expressing his opinion on the question of spending money for propaganda purposes in Iraq and on the necessity of establishing a hold over Baghdad. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**169** 3 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, notifying him of the dispatch by air of more troops to Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**170** 4 May. Cipher message no.594 from the British Military Attaché in Tehran to Auchinleck, warning him that the Germans in Iran are aware of the approach of troopships before they reached Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**171** 4 May. Telegram no.2737 from the British Ambassador in

Baghdad to the FO, announcing that the Iraqi Government is allowing him to send and receive 'en clair' telegrams. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**172** 4 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, describing the steps he is taking to deal with the crisis in Iraq. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**173** 4 May. Cipher message no.2718/D from the Defence Department to L.S. Amery, expressing concern about the general shortage of aircraft in India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**174** 4 May. Cipher message no.65023 from the Chiefs of Staff to Gen. A.P. Wavell, explaining why a commitment in Iraq was inevitable. 2 leaves. Typescript. With copy of another cipher telegram, no.63039, from the Chiefs of Staff to Wavell, concerning the date of transfer of control of operations from IC to MEC. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**175** 5 May. Letter of thanks from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Maj. A.B. Phillpotts. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**176** 5 May. Cipher message no.5097/G from Auchinleck to the WO, concerning the transport and diversion of troops to reinforce Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**177** 5 May. Cipher message no.0/61872 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to the Chiefs of Staff, expressing doubt about the possibility of relieving Habbaniya in time, and concern that operations in Iraq are endangering the defence of Palestine and Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**178** 6 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, asking for the Viceroy's approval that two naval vessels should be sent to protect the waters around Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**179** 6 May. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, expressing the Viceroy's approval. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**180** 6 May. Situation Report no.37 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting successful bombardment and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Habbaniya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**181** 6 May. Telegram no.501 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, recounting in detail the successes and the casualties of the fighting around Habbaniya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**182** 6 May. Telegram no.65319 from the WO to Auchinleck, thanking him for his offer of help (176, above) and accepting it. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**183** 6 May. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, expressing the opinion of the Viceroy that, if Wavell is so pessimistic about holding Habbaniya (177, above), the manpower sent from India has been wasted. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**184** 6 May. Telegram no.65336 from the Chiefs of Staff to Gen. A.P. Wavell, informing him that Rashid Aali has been working with the Axis powers all the time, and that intervention in Iraq was inevitable. With a copy of another telegram, no.65347, from the Chiefs of Staff to Wavell, describing measures to be taken to enlist the friendship of the Iraqi people against the regime of Rashid Aali. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**185** 6 May. Telegram no.904-S from Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, to L.S. Amery, expressing his own views on the military position in the ME and the importance of Basra and Baghdad in the line of communication. 2 leaves. Typescript. With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck.

**186** 7 May. Paraphrase of cipher message. Situation Report no.40 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, describing successful salvage operations around Habbaniya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**187** 7 May. Cipher message no.65559 from the Chiefs of Staff to Gen. A.P. Wavell, urging renewed efforts to cripple the Iraqi armed forces without directly attacking civilians. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**188** 8 May. Telegram no.0/62719 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to the WO, predicting limits on military action in Iraq without the co-operation of local people, and recommending a political solution. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**189** 8 May. Situation Report no.42 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting that the enemy has withdrawn to Fallujah following fierce aerial bombardment. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**190** 9 May. Cipher message no.5365/C from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, CIGS, pointing out that he, with the consent of the Viceroy, sent ill-equipped Indian troops to Iraq, and that he should be responsible for them and their equipment, not the C-in-C, ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**191** 9 May. Cipher message no.5412/8 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, reiterating his belief that IC cannot be dissociated from events in Iraq, and that it is essential to get firmly established in Baghdad. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**192** 9 May. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, on behalf of the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, asking him about the supply of cement for defensive works in Iraq. With autograph note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**193** 9 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, explaining why he thinks that a sudden move of the Government from Simla to Delhi is not practicable before the end of the summer. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**194** 10 May. Telegram no. 0/63234 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to the

WO, pointing out that there is a divergence of view between himself and Auchinleck: Wavell, primarily concerned with the security of Egypt and Palestine, is anxious to limit the conflict in Iraq; Auchinleck, concerned about India and Indian troops, favours the occupation of Baghdad. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**195** *10 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite on the subject of damaged railway bridges in Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**196** *10 May*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, concerning the Viceroy's proposal to send a personal telegram to the Secretary of State for India. With autograph note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**197** *10 May*. Copy of telegram no.960-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, expressing his anxiety that Wavell, now in charge of the Iraq operation, is too preoccupied with North Africa and Egypt to recognize the strategic importance of Iraq. With a letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, dated 15 May, and a letter from Auchinleck to Laithwaite, dated 17 May. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**198** *10 May*. Cipher message no. 0/63262 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to the WO, concerning the disposition of troops and the reinforcement of the force at Basra. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**199** *11 May*. Personal letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, concerning the replacement of Maj.-Gen. W.A.K. Fraser, Commander, 10th Division, by Brig. Slim. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**200** *11 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, expressing concern about the parochial views of GHQ, ME on the strategic situation in Western Asia, with a diagram illustrating the two different concepts: the 'isolated fortress' and the 'continuous front' views. 2 leaves. Typescript and holograph.

**201** *11 May*. Letter of thanks from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, on behalf of the Viceroy, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**202** *11 May*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of a personal telegram to the Viceroy from the Secretary of State for India, pointing out, on the instructions of the PM, that, since operations in Iraq are now under the control of the C-in-C, ME, the Government of India has no right to issue communiqués about that area. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**203** *12 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, indicating that he has been most careful not to issue operational communiqués since control in Iraq passed to C-in-C, ME. With a copy of the telegram sent to the Secretary of State for India by the Viceroy, containing the same information. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**204** *12 May*. Cipher message no.063777 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to

Sir John Dill, expressing his opposition to the policy of military occupation of Iraq desired by India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**205** *12 May*. Cipher message no.66336 from Sir John Dill to Gen. A.P. Wavell and Auchinleck, suggesting an early meeting at Basra between them, and indicating that the force prepared in Palestine should move to Habbaniya and thence, possibly, to Baghdad. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**206** *13 May*. Extract from a private letter from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, describing the conflict of view between HQ, MEC and HQ, IC, and expressing his own opinion that Wavell is inclined to underestimate the critical significance of Iraq. With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**207** *13 May*. Situation Report no.52 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting the presence of German aircraft in Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**208** *13 May*. Cipher message no.0/63897 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Auchinleck and message no.5631/G from Auchinleck to Wavell, fixing a date for a meeting, 23 May. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**209** *13 May*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, on behalf of the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, suggesting that the Indian Foreign Secretary should be present at the meeting with Wavell. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**210** *14 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, reporting that he is arranging for O.K. Caroe (the Indian Foreign Secretary) to accompany him to the meeting with Wavell. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**211** *14 May*. Telegram no.66554 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, welcoming the meeting with Wavell, but indicating that a victory in Libya is a more important goal than an advance towards Baghdad and that the immediate task of IC is to strengthen the hold on Basra. With a letter from Auchinleck to the Viceroy accompanying the telegram. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**212** *15 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, enclosing the draft of telegram no.5769/C to the PM, expressing understanding of the situation. With an acknowledgement from Laithwaite. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**213** *15 May*. Letter of thanks from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**214** *16 May*. Telegram no.1014-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, expressing annoyance at Wavell's description of the troops sent to Basra from India as untrained. With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck from the Viceroy. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**215** *16 May*. Telegram no.1197 from the British Ambassador to Turkey to the FO, reporting the appearance of German officers in Baghdad in uniform, the information being given by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**216** *16 May*. Letter from Lord Linlithgow to Auchinleck, suggesting that the force at Basra could be improved by the introduction of a larger proportion of European troops. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**217** *17 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, enclosing the draft of a telegram to the CIGS for the Viceroy's opinion. In the telegram Auchinleck recommends an intensification of activity in Iraq to take full advantage of the occupation of Basra and the advance on Baghdad. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**218** *18 May*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, on behalf of the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, expressing broad agreement with the text of the telegram. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**219** *18 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, agreeing with the idea of increasing the proportion of British to Indian troops in Iraq, and suggesting ways of implementing it. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**220** *18 May*. Cipher message no.A643 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting an attack by German aircraft on a column which nonetheless arrived safely at Habbaniya. With telegram no. 107/4/G/239 from Gen. Quinan at Basra to HQ, ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**221** *19 May*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, on behalf of the Viceroy, to Capt. A. MacKinnon, concerning an appointment in the Iraq Combined Intelligence Centre. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**222** *20 May*. Cipher message no.A668 from AHQ, Iraq to HQ, RAF, ME, reporting consolidation of the British position in Fallujah and the bombing of the Habbaniya cantonment by German aircraft. With telegram no. 107/4/G/255 from Gen. Quinan at Basra to HQ, ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**223** *20 May*. Cipher message no.67769 from Sir John Dill, CIGS, to Auchinleck, stating that there is no change in the policy that operations in Iraq should become the responsibility of C-in-C, India, directly under the WO, but, because of the involvement of Palestine and Syria at the present time, C-in-C, ME must continue to control all forces in Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**224** *20 May*. Copy of a telegram from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, expressing the thanks of the Chiefs of Staff for his telegram (185, above) and their general agreement with the contents. With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**225** 20 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, enclosing a note by the QMG on administrative control in Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**226** 21 May. Letter from Sir John Dill, CIGS, to Auchinleck, agreeing with Auchinleck's view of the importance of Iraq, and warning him that the PM has lost confidence in Wavell and that Auchinleck would be the obvious choice as his successor. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**227** 21 May. Report from Maj. R.S. Raikes of a Himalaya Broadcast. With autograph notes by Maj. J. Inglis and by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**228** 21 May. Paraphrase of cipher message no. ROB-26 from Force HQ, Habbaniya for the attention of Gen. Quinan, containing an urgent request for more officers. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**229** 24 May. Cipher message no. 102/4/G/308 from Gen. E.P. Quinan at Basra to HQ, India, announcing the arrival of Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**230** 25 May. Cipher message no. 0/67273 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, stating that he and Auchinleck have totally different attitudes to Iraq and that, in view of her greater interest in Iraq operations, India should resume control as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**231** 25 May. Telegram no. 1095-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, expressing his concern about the lack of equipment for the land and air forces in India. With a compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**232** 26 May. Telegram no. 731 from the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, to the Colonial Office, London, announcing that distribution by the RAF of the proclamation of the Regent of Iraq has begun. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**233** 27 May. Extract from a letter from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, urging the need to concentrate in India a sufficient proportion of protective AA material. With an extract from a letter from Amery to Linlithgow, dated 7 May, and a covering letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, dated 29 May. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**234** 27 May. Cipher telegram no. 5 from the Chargé d'Affaires, Iraq to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reporting that the Regent's camp is on the Middle Euphrates at present, but that he intends to go to Basra at an early date. With pencilled note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**235** 27 May. Cipher telegram no. 6 from the Chargé d'Affaires, Iraq to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the influence of BBC

broadcasts in Iraq. With pencilled note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**236** 28 May. Cipher telegram no.427 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to the WO, transmitting a request from Gen. Quinan at Basra to sanction developments at Un Qasr. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**237** 29 May. Telegram no.6570/G from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff, asking for permission to send 60th Squadron to Iraq. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**238** 29 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, reporting a better understanding between himself and Wavell after their meeting, and reiterating his belief that the next step in Iraq is to take Baghdad. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**239** 29 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. E.P. Quinan, giving his own opinion on future operations in Iraq because he expects that control of operations will shortly revert to GHQ, India. 2 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**240** 30 May. Notes on the conference held between Gen. A.P. Wavell and Auchinleck on 24 May 1941 at Basra. With covering letter dated 31 May from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, for the attention of the Viceroy; and with a letter of acknowledgement dated 2 June from Laithwaite. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**241** 30 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, enclosing a copy of a personal letter to Sir John Dill (238, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**242** 30 May. Cipher telegram no.69468 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, asking him to give his impressions of the meeting with Wavell at Basra. With Auchinleck's reply, telegram no.6627/G, declaring that he and Wavell reached an agreed opinion expressed in Wavell's telegram (230, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**243** 30 May. Telegram no.6628/G from Auchinleck to the WO, proposing that IC should now assume responsibility for control of all land defence measures in the Persian Gulf apart from Kuwait. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**244** 30 May. Telegram no.241 from Sir Reader Bullard, British Minister at Tehran, to the FO with the news that Rashid Aali and his Chief of Staff have crossed the Persian frontier. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**245** 31 May. Cipher message no.0/69075 from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, recommending that the Persian Gulf area should be under the control of C-in-C, India for land operations. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**246** 31 May. Telegram no. NIL T.O.O. 1600 from De Gaury

(British Chargé d'Affaires?) to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reporting the surrender of Baghdad. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**247** 31 May. Another, slightly different, version of the same telegram (numbered 4724) from De Gaury to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. With autograph comments by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**248** 31 May. Cipher telegram no.123/1/G/406 from Gen. E.P. Quinan at Basra to GHQ, India, announcing that the armistice terms have been accepted. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**249** 1 June. Telegram from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, suggesting that the military presence in Iraq should not be so manifest that it obscures the negotiations of the diplomats. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**250** 1 June. Cipher message no.69929 from the Chiefs of Staff to Gen. A.P. Wavell, containing a brief review of the present strategic position in every theatre of war. With autograph notes by Auchinleck. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**251** 2 June. Letter of thanks from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, expressing agreement with the Viceroy's views on the need to defend India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**252** 2 June. Copy of a telegram no.1583-S from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, expressing agreement with the latter's opinion contained in his telegram (249, above). With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**253** 3 June. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite. With a copy of telegram no.1180-S, dated 4 June, from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, protesting against the Air Ministry's proposal to divert transport aircraft from operations in Iraq. With compliment slip addressed to Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**254** 4 June. Report from the Chief Equipment Officer, RAF, Iraq, on the production of aviation fuel from Bahrein. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**255** 5 June. Telegram from Auchinleck to Gen. E.P. Quinan, containing proposals aimed at regularizing the political position of the Force Commander in relation to the British Ambassador, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi defence forces. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**256** 5 June. Report by Air Marshal P.H.L. Playfair, AOC, RAF, India on aerodromes on the north side of the Persian Gulf. Addressed to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**257** 6 June. Letter of thanks from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**258** 10 June. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, thanking him for his appreciation of 3 May (164, above), praising the Viceroy,

expressing concern about the ME and the lack of equipment. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**259** 13 *June*. Letter from Gen. E.P. Quinan to Auchinleck, concerning the disposition of troops and immediate objectives in Iraq. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**260** 17 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Linlithgow, concerning the formation of an airborne brigade in India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**261** 17 *June*. Extract from a letter from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, supporting Auchinleck's plea for more equipment to support airborne warfare. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**262** 18 *June*. Letter from Lord Linlithgow to the Governors of Madras, Bengal, the Punjab, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, the North-West Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind, suggesting ways of stimulating public interest in India's war effort. 1 leaf. Printed broadsheet.

**263** 18 *June*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, about the need for the development of a port at Un Qasr. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**264** 19 *June*. Auchinleck's reply to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite's letter, expressing agreement. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**265** 22 *June*. Cipher message no.73664 from Sir John Dill, CIGS, to Auchinleck, welcoming him as the new C-in-C, ME, and assuring him of support. With autograph draft by Auchinleck of a reply expressing thanks. 1 leaf. Typescript and manuscript.

**266** 22 *June*. Letter from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Auchinleck, with a copy of a telegram sent by the PM to the Viceroy with the message for Auchinleck that he is to take over as C-in-C, ME as soon as possible. Wavell is to succeed him as C-in-C, India. 2 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**267** 23 *June*. Telegram no.1342-S from Lord Linlithgow conveying a message to the PM from Auchinleck to the effect that he hopes to arrive in Cairo by 30 June. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**268** 23 *June*. Telegram from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, conveying a message for Wavell from the PM, suggesting that he takes up his command in India before going home for consultation and a rest. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**269** 24 *June*. Telegram no.1353-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, conveying a message for the PM, suggesting that Wavell should take over command in India about 10 July and should stay for about ten weeks before going home. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**270** 24 *June*. Telegram no.1354-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S.

Amery, describing emergency arrangements to cover the interregnum of ten days before Wavell takes over in India. 1 leaf. Typescript, with manuscript note.

**271** 25 *June*. Telegram no.1817-S from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, stating that he has strongly urged the PM to make the change-over a temporary one so that Auchinleck can eventually return to India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**272** 25 *June*. Telegram no.1358-S from Lord Linlithgow to L.S. Amery, indicating that Auchinleck is anxious that the announcement of the change-over should be simultaneous in India and England. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**273** 25 *June*. Letter from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Auchinleck, with thanks, congratulations and observations on his own views on the organization of the army. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**274** 26 *June*. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, summing up the situation in the ME; describing Wavell's difficulties; warning him that the Commander in the field will always be subject to great and often undue pressure from his Government, and that sometimes broad political considerations make it necessary to take risks which, from a purely military point of view, may seem inadvisable; stating that it is the duty of the Commander to indicate the risks involved and, in extreme cases, to dissociate himself from the consequences. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

### *Middle East Command 1941*

**275** 1 *July*. Cipher message no. 061 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, describing to him the various theatres of war in his Command where grave decisions may have to be made and where operations may have to be renewed or reinforced. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**276** 1 *July*. Cipher message no.75303 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, on the role of Gen. Sir R. Haining as Intendant-General in the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**277** 1 *July*. Cipher message no.75357 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, on the terms of reference of Oliver Lyttelton's appointment as Minister of State representing the War Cabinet in the Middle East. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**278** 2 *July*. Cipher message no. 0/78268 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, commenting on the appointments of Haining and Lyttelton. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**279** 2 *July*. Cipher message no. 1/78351 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, protesting about Gen. De Gaulle's disregard for his authority in affairs concerning Syria. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**280** 4 *July*. Cipher message no. 0/78729 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, pointing out that he is aware of the critical nature of the situation, and setting out his view that no further offensive in the Western Desert should be contemplated until the base is secure. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**281** 6 *July*. Cipher message no. 064 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, agreeing with Auchinleck's priorities, but stressing that the Western Desert remains the decisive theatre for the defence of the Nile Valley. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**282** 15 *July*. Cipher message no. 0/81906 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, pointing out that he is not so well equipped with tanks and troops for immediate use as Churchill appears to think. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**283** 16 *July*. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, with comments on the appointments of Lyttelton and Haining and on the progress of the Russian – German conflict. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**284** 17 *July*. Cipher message no. 9392/G from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, stressing that it is essential to the defence of India that the Germans should be cleared out of Iran immediately. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**285** 19 *July*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the successful outcome of the Syrian campaign, and commenting on the problems of Palestine. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**286** 19 *July*. Cipher message no. A1/83380 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, concerning the scale of reserves in the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**287** 20 *July*. Cipher message no. 0/83570 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, expressing support for Wavell's suggestion that maximum Anglo – Russian pressure should be brought to bear on Iran and Afghanistan to extinguish German influence. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**288** 20 *July*. Cipher message no. 0.69 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reiterating the importance of the defence of Egypt and the advisability of a hard and decisive battle in the Western Desert by the autumn. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**289** 21 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, complaining of Churchillian interference in matters within the authority of the C-in-C; and describing his immediate aims, namely, to hold Tobruk and Cyprus, to defend Syria and Palestine, and to take a reasonable

risk in the Western Desert when he is ready and equipped to do so. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**290** *23 July*. Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, expressing his awareness that his most important task is to clear the enemy out of North Africa, having secured Syria. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**291** *29 July*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, suggesting a private meeting in London when Auchinleck returns to England to see the PM. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**292** *5 August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, requesting the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Pope, as a senior officer of the RAC, to his HQ to co-ordinate training, and of Gen. McCreery to replace Gen. Creagh in command of the 7th Armoured Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**293** *14 August*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, announcing that the Defence Committee has authorized the implementation of Auchinleck's 1942 expansion programme for the IA. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**294** *16 August*. Cipher message no.1548 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, suggesting changes in command: Cunningham to be GOC-in-C, Western Desert, Beresford-Peirse to go to Khartoum in place of Platt, and Holmes to replace Beresford-Peirse in command of the Coast Corps, Western Desert. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**295** *16 August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill on his return to HQ, ME from England, commenting on his proposed changes in command in the Western Desert. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**296** *20 August*. Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, commenting on the successful outcome of the Syrian campaign, on the Jewish question, and on the situation in the Western Desert. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**297** *20 August*. Cipher message no.85190 from Sir John Dill to Gen. A.P. Wavell and Auchinleck, informing them that the New Zealand PM is uncertain whether Freyberg is the right man to command the New Zealand Division, and asking for their opinion. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**298** *21 August*. Cipher message no.11519/M from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, commending Freyberg's command of his Division, but suggesting that he was unpopular with his staff because he wanted to do all the work himself and was obsessed with detail. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**299** *23 August*. Cipher message no.CS/10 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, agreeing to the appointment of Platt to succeed Cunningham; and requesting that Beresford-Peirse should be officially appointed to the Sudan, that Godwin-Austen should command East

Africa temporarily, and that Gott should command the 7th Armoured Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**300** 24 August. Cipher message no.0/95463 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, suggesting ways of reducing the travelling time of liaison officers working between the WO and MEC. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**301** 27 August. Cipher message no.11931/M from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, asking whether a decision had been made about Freyberg's command of the New Zealand Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**302** 28 August. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, commenting on the situation in Persia, asking for Charles Gairdner to be sent home to take over an Armoured Brigade, expressing doubts about Freyberg's efficiency. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**303** 28 August. Letter from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, reporting on the PM's visit to the President, on his own disappointment that the USA has not yet fully participated in the war, on his impression of Smuts, and on Churchill's critical attitude which could be softened if Auchinleck would write him long private letters describing his hopes and fears. Signed 'Pug'. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**304** 29 August. Memorandum by Winston Churchill, addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the CIGS, the VCIGS and the C-in-C, ME, reasserting the prime importance of artillery on the battlefield from which it has been ousted by armoured tanks. With annotation by Auchinleck: 'Keep as history!'. 6 leaves. Typescript, initialled.

**305** *n.d.*, August. Letter from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his disappointment at the news that Auchinleck did not intend to take action in the Western Desert until November; offering him additional reinforcements and the suggestion that a gnawing action developed from Tobruk could embarrass the enemy until a proper offensive can be launched. With autograph additions by Churchill. 9 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**306** 2 September. Cipher message no.CS/28 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, strongly recommending the retention of Freyberg in command of the New Zealand Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**307** 2 September. Cipher message no.CS/31 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, notifying him of his change of mind concerning the successor to Beresford-Peirse as Corps Commander, Western Desert: he would now prefer Godwin-Austen to Holmes in this command, suggesting that Holmes should be employed as 10th Corps Commander, Western Desert. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**308** 3 September. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, commenting on the successful campaign in Persia, and enclosing a copy of a memorandum addressed to the PM, dated 25 August, suggesting

means of improving railway communications in the ME. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**309** 4 *September*. Cipher message no.AI/00020 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, expressing concern about the lack of trained reinforcements for the 1st and 2nd South African Divisions. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**310** 6 *September*. Memorandum from Oliver Lyttelton, the Minister of State, inviting comment from the C-in-Cs on the situation in the ME. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**311** 6 *September*. Cipher message no.HO5144 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, assuring him that some trained South African reserves are ready for dispatch and others now in training will be available soon. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**312** 7 *September*. Cipher message no.085 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, advising him that it would be desirable, if possible, to meet the wishes of the Australians concerning reconcentration of the Australian Imperial Force as a single force in one Corps and the relief of the 9th Division at Tobruk. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**313** 7 *September*. Cipher message no.086 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, conveying the text of the message from A.W. Fadden, the Australian PM, concerning the urgency of reconcentration and withdrawal of Australian forces. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**314** 8 *September*. Cipher message no.CS/41 from Auchinleck to Nairobi Force for transmission to Brig. De Waal, inviting him to stay with him during his visit to Cairo. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**315** 9 *September*. Message from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, concerning air co-operation with the Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**316** 9 *September*. Comments by Auchinleck on the Minister of State's memorandum of 6 September (310, above). 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**317** 9 *September*. Notes on the Minister of State's memorandum (310, above) by Air Marshal A.W. Tedder, AOC-in-C, RAF, ME. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**318** 9 *September*. 'What are the most awkward things the enemy can do to us? The question of Tripoli. Tactical co-operation between the Services.' Problems considered in a reply by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, C-in-C, Mediterranean to the Minister of State's memorandum (310, above). 4 leaves. Typescript.

**319** 10 *September*. Cipher message no.AFS 747 from Brig. P. De Waal to Auchinleck, accepting the invitation to stay with him in Cairo. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**320** *10 September.* Cipher message no.CS/1558 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, describing the difficulties encountered in the large-scale relief of the Australian forces at Tobruk; and stating his belief that any attempt at further relief is not a justifiable military operation, and that reinforcement of the garrison is desirable. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**321** *10 September.* Cipher message no.89361 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, bearing the news that President Roosevelt has promised to provide shipping to transport 20,000 men to the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**322** *11 September.* Cipher telegram no.2834 from Oliver Lyttelton to Winston Churchill, supporting Auchinleck's views on the relief of the Australians at Tobruk. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**323** *11 September.* Cipher message no.89412 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, conveying the Army Council's decision concerning the downgrading of CRAs. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**324** *11 September.* Message from Capt. H.G. Norman, RN, GHQ, ME to Oliver Lyttelton, adding a paragraph on the mining of the Suez Canal to Admiral Cunningham's memorandum entitled 'What are the most awkward things the enemy can do to us?' (318, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**325** *12 September.* Cipher message no. CS/52 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, stating that, in the dispatch of troops to the ME, priority should be given to draft and reinforcements for units already there, not to the two Divisions offered by the PM. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**326** *12 September.* Message no. 0/02384 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking for the recall of the 5th Indian Division by mid-October to act as GHQ Reserve during the Crusader campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**327** *12 September.* Letter from T.W. Corbett to Auchinleck, reporting on progress in the training of Indian armoured troops, on conditions in the IA and in his Division, and on his own views of the tank battle at Sollum in June. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**328** *13 September.* Message no. 0/02792 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, reporting on his discussions with De Waal concerning the problem of meeting the shortage of personnel for the two South African Divisions. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**329** *13 September.* Cipher message no. 0/02809 from Brig. P. De Waal to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, stating that, if Auchinleck's proposals are accepted, 1,500 reinforcements from four battalions will not be required immediately. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**330** *14 September.* Cipher message no.089 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, conveying the contents of a telegram from the PM to the

PM of Australia, indicating how difficult it would be to relieve all the Australians in Tobruk before the preparations for the next offensive in the Western Desert demand the concentration of all forces on that operation. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**331** *15 September.* Cipher message no.091 from the Chiefs of Staff to the C-in-Cs, conveying a statement from the PM of Australia that, after careful consideration, the Commonwealth Cabinet has decided to request the continuation of the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk and the reconcentration of the Australian Imperial Force. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**332** *15 September.* Cipher message no.092 from the Chiefs of Staff to Auchinleck, conveying the text of the telegram from the PM of Australia declaring that he and his Cabinet do not consider that the military considerations put forward by Auchinleck outweigh the case for the relief of the garrison at Tobruk. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**333** *15 September.* Cipher message no.G05537 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, deploring Auchinleck's scheme of reducing the two South African Divisions, and promising him additional troops in the hope of maintaining both Divisions at full strength. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**334** *16 September.* Report by Lt.-Col. R. Laycock on the employment of Special Service troops in the ME. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**335** *16 September.* Abbreviated version of the same report. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**336** *16 September.* Cipher message no. 0/03808 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, acknowledging the problem of reduction of the two South African Divisions, but expressing doubt whether any other plan would give him two divisions ready for active operations at the appropriate time. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**337** *16 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, stating his opinion that a real offensive would not be possible before November; describing preparations for this campaign; expressing gratitude for the dispatch of the 1st Armoured Division; and reporting on the situation in Persia, Syria, Palestine, Turkey and Cyprus. 6 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**338** *16 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, giving news of troop movements, of the situation in the Western Desert, of German reconnaissance around Sidi Barrani, of his tour of Syria and Cyprus. In a postscript Auchinleck expresses his dismay on receiving a telegram conveying the Australian Government's decision concerning Tobruk. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**339** *17 September.* Cipher message no. 093 from the Secretary of State to Auchinleck, conveying a message from the PM expressing concern about the Australian attitude but also about world opinion, which could gain the impression that the British were fighting all their battles in the ME only with Dominion troops – another reason why he feels it necessary to send two additional British divisions to the ME. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**340** *17 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, expressing his opinion of the reorganization programme of the IA and his belief that some reformation is required of the stereotyped infantry division to cope with modern needs in mobile warfare. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**341** *17 September.* Letter from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, declaring his aim of making South Africa the base workshop for the ME campaign, and expressing his dislike of Auchinleck's plan effectively to reduce the two South African Divisions to two brigades each. With a copy of a telegram from Smuts to Churchill, containing a description of tests carried out on an experimental armoured fighting vehicle manufactured in the Union. With another copy of a telegram from Smuts to the South African High Commissioner in London, containing the same information. 9 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph additions by Smuts.

**342** *17 September.* Cipher message no. CS/61 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, containing a detailed situation report on the ME covering the last two months. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**343** *18 September.* Cipher message no. 094 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing sympathy with Auchinleck's dismay at the Australian attitude to the Tobruk garrison, but affirming the necessity of preventing an open dispute with the Australian Government. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**344** *19 September.* Cipher message no. Q05760 from Gen. P. Van Ryneveld to Auchinleck, reminding him of the need to assign priority to South African personnel. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**345** *19 September.* Cipher message no. G05781 from Gen. P. Van Ryneveld to Auchinleck, announcing that the arrangements made by Auchinleck in discussion with Brig. De Waal have been confirmed. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**346** *21 September.* Cipher message no. CS/69 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, describing forces available, average strengths, and his fear that the use of air cover for the relief of the Tobruk garrison may prejudice chances of gaining air superiority before the planned offensive and may therefore delay the start of land operations. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**347** 23 *September*. Cipher message no. CS/74 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, complaining that he is not to receive as many Bofors AA guns as promised. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**348** 23 *September*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, concerning the manpower shortage in the IA, spheres of authority, particularly with regard to Air Force operations in Iraq, the desirability of having a larger airborne force in the ME and India. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph comments by Auchinleck.

**349** 23 *September*. Comments by Brig. A.J.C. Pollock on the PM's memorandum on the impending Desert operations. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**350** 23 *September*. Comments by Brig. A.H. Maxwell, RA, on the PM's memorandum. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**351** 23 *September*. Cipher message no. SD/06485 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, concerning priorities in the distribution of South African personnel. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**352** 28 *September*. Cipher message no. 92627 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, asking him to convey congratulations to the Long Range Desert Patrols on their latest reconnaissance west of Agheila. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**353** 28 *September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, expressing concern about the BBC's coverage of future military operations in the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**354** 29 *September*. Cipher message no. 099 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, informing him of the dispatch of further reinforcements and of Bofors guns, of the appointment of Gen. Riddell-Webster as his PAO, and of his intention to persuade the Australians not to pull out their last two brigades from Tobruk in the October moonless period. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**355** 29 *September*. Cipher message no. 92764 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, informing him of the appointment of Gen. Riddell-Webster and of the change in the role of the Intendant-General whose work will now be confined to inter-service matters under the authority of the Minister of State. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**356** 29 *September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, announcing that Creagh has now been replaced by Gott as commander of the 7th Armoured Division, and expressing the hope that Creagh will not be regarded in any way as a failure. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**357** 29 *September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, concerning Syria and problems with the Free French, his visit to Iraq, the excellence of the new American tanks, preparations for the offensive in the Western Desert, the use of artillery against tanks, the

relief of the Tobruk garrison, his visit to Suez and Port Said, the situation in Turkey. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**358** *30 September*. Cipher message no. CS/94 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, expressing his delight at the appointment of Riddell-Webster as PAO. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**359** *30 September*. Cipher message no. CS/96 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, expressing thanks for the arrangements made concerning RASC personnel, extra Bofors, the appointment of Riddell-Webster and for reopening the question of Tobruk with the Australian Government. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**360** *30 September*. Cipher message no. CS/97 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, concerning the successor to the Australian Morshead as Commandant, Tobruk garrison, whether Evetts would be fit enough to serve, and whether Martin should be considered. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**361** *30 September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, concerning the visit of Wavell, the arrival of senior officers, notably Pope and Norrie, the relief of Australians in Tobruk, the future of Gen. Marshall-Cornwall, the conference with Wavell in Baghdad, military defensive strategy in the ME, the duties of Gen. Riddell-Webster, the possibility of giving Gen. Holmes a Corps, the upgrading of some administrative posts. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**362** *30 September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, indicating that if Charles Gairdner is needed at home to take charge of an armoured brigade, with a view to receiving early command of a division, then he can be replaced in MEC. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**363** *1 October*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, concerning efforts to send junior officers from England to help with the expansion of the IA, a discussion with Oliver Lyttelton on railway projects in the ME, and the Army career of his son Julian. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**364** *1 October*. Telegram no. SD/09558 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking for the immediate dispatch of ammunition and Browning guns to relieve the present shortage. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**365** *3 October*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, enclosing a memorandum on airborne divisions for India by H.R. Pownall, the VCIGS. With holograph comments by Auchinleck. With a copy of a letter from L.S. Amery to Sir John Dill on the same subject. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**366** *4 October*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, complaining about the failure of the Air Ministry to provide a proper mail and passenger service between London and Cairo; recommending that Scobie should be considered for command of the Tobruk garrison if

Evetts remains unfit; nominating six officers regarded as potential commanders of divisions; describing the training of units using American tanks; and raising the question of taking over control of the desert Arabs from the French. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**367** 4 October. Cipher message no. CS/103 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, recommending that Scobie should replace Evetts as divisional commander, and that Martin should remain in Tobruk as Chief Staff Officer. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**368** 5 October. Cipher message no. CS/106 from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, in the absence of the C-in-C in Palestine, informing Sir John Dill of the deaths in an air crash of Gen. Pope and Brigs. Russell and Unwin. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**369** 5 October. Cipher message no. CS/107 from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, reporting to Sir John Dill that the C-in-C has selected Gen. Willoughby Norrie for command of the Armoured Corps in succession to Gen. Pope. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**370** 5 October. Cipher message no. SD/10928 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, describing measures he is taking to relieve shortages in men and equipment for the 1st South African Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**371** 6 October. Cipher message no. 101 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reporting that he did not receive a helpful response from the last Australian Government on the question of Tobruk, and that he has not yet made contact with the new one. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**372** 10 October. Cipher message no. CS/118 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 371, above, expressing his understanding of the situation and his determination not to delay the proposed offensive because of the continuance of the withdrawal, unless there is a sudden change in enemy air activity. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**373** 10 October. Letter from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, wishing him success in the new offensive, and expressing pride in the presence of two South African Divisions in the ME theatre and confidence in Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron, their GOC. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**374** 11 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, informing him of various aspects of the present situation in his Command, of the enemy's strength in Cyrenaica, and of the existence of a plan and a tentative date for the new offensive to be undertaken by Gen. Cunningham. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**375** 12 October. Cipher message no. CS/121 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, expressing his view that the publicity given to the deaths of Pope and the others was detrimental to morale and to the prestige of the RAF. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**376** *13 October.* Cipher message no. SD/13812 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking for more ammunition to be sent out by air. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**377** *13 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, describing the situation in the ME, the activities of various senior officers, the state of supplies, the problems of an untidy army, his visit to Syria and Palestine, and the British relationship with Turkey. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**378** *14 October.* Cipher message no. 105 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, repeating a telegram sent to the Australian Government asking them to allow the last two Australian brigades to remain in Tobruk until the result of the approaching battle is decided. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**379** *15 October.* Cipher message no. CS/132 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 378, above, announcing that the operation to relieve the last two Australian brigades in Tobruk has begun, and it is now necessary to complete the relief of at least one brigade and to stick to the original programme unless notice of cancellation is given quickly. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**380** *15 October.* Cipher message no. 106 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, informing him that Air Vice-Marshal Tedder has announced that he will not have air superiority in the forthcoming attack; repeating a telegram from the New Zealand PM demanding adequate air support for the New Zealand Division involved in the campaign; and communicating his decision to send Air Chief Marshal Freeman to Cairo to investigate conflicting reports of enemy air strength. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**381** *16 October.* Cipher message no. CS/133 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting shortages, according to War Establishment requirements, in infantry rifle battalions and in artillery regiments. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**382** *16 October.* Letter from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, conveying his conviction, established through the Air Staff in London, that there will be substantial numerical air superiority in the battle zone, his belief that the forthcoming Crusader campaign will have dramatic effects upon the whole immediate future of the war and on the attitudes of the Russians and the British themselves, and his forecast of how to exploit success by further victorious action in Tripoli, perhaps, or from Norway or against Sicily. 5 leaves. Typescript, with holograph additions, signed.

**383** *16 October.* Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, wishing him success in the forthcoming campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**384** 16 October. Letter from Lt.-Col. J. Kreft to Auchinleck, forwarding, on behalf of FM Smuts, a copy of the book *Vanguard of Victory*, describing how South African forces helped to clear the Fascist menace from East Africa. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**385** 17 October. Letter from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, indicating that it is not his wish that the whole of the armoured car output should be earmarked for the South African forces, and that he does not want the present restriction against service outside Africa to stand in the way of the training and equipment of the South Africans. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**386** 17 October. Cipher message no. CS/136 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking for H. Lumsden to be appointed commander of the 1st Armoured Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**387** 17 October. Cipher message no. CS/138 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 380, above, stating that he can reassure the New Zealand Government that, if their forces are committed to battle, the measure of support by tanks and aircraft will be adequate for the tasks they will be called upon to perform. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**388** 17 October. Cipher message no. 107 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reporting that the Australians are obdurate and the relief of their forces in Tobruk must proceed, and expressing disquiet at Auchinleck's statement that the start of Crusader may be retarded by other factors. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**389** 17 October. Cipher message no. CS/139 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, stating that the date for Crusader is later than that mentioned by Churchill to the Minister of State but earlier than that which seemed possible when the total relief of the Tobruk garrison was first planned. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**390** 18 October. Cipher message no. 108 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reproving him for delaying the date of Crusader; pointing out that it is difficult for him to explain to Parliament and the nation why the ME army has been idle for 4½ months whilst Russia is being battered to pieces; and declaring that it had been his intention to send a personal letter to the American President stating that Auchinleck intended to attack in moonlight in early November. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**391** 18 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, delivered by hand by Brig. Whiteley, giving reasons why troops and equipment will not be available for the Crusader attack until 15 November, by which time modifications will have been made to the tanks for desert warfare, and the troops will have been trained in desert fighting. 2 leaves. Typescript, initialled.

**392** 18 October. Cipher message no. CS/142 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking for more American medium tanks and fewer American light tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**393** *18 October.* Cipher message no. 0/16012 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, giving details of future needs in tank landing ships, MLC carrying ships and infantry assault ships. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**394** *18 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, carried to London by Brig. Whiteley, Auchinleck's Deputy Director of Operations whose task it is to inform the PM and the CIGS of the secret plans for the Crusader attack and the likely dates. 1 leaf. Typescript, initialled.

**395** *19 October.* Letter of thanks from Auchinleck to FM Smuts in answer to 373, above, assuring him of his concern for the well-being of the South African troops and of the warm welcome he has given to Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**396** *19 October.* Cipher message no. CS/146 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 390, above, stating that he cannot accept that any important changes have been made in plans agreed upon, without warning or reason. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**397** *21 October.* Cipher message no. CS/157 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, announcing the discovery made during training that the tracks of American light tanks suffer damage when used in stony country. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**398** *21 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, enclosing a copy of a letter from him to FM Smuts on the proposed reorganization of the South African contingent in the ME theatre. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**399** *21 October.* Cipher message no. 1583 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in answer to 382, above, expressing full confidence in Air Vice-Marshal Tedder as AOC, ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**400** *21 October.* Cipher message no. 110 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, in reply to 396, above, stating that he has no choice but to accept Auchinleck's proposal; blaming the belated arrival of reinforcement tanks and personnel on delay in unloading the ships; and asserting that he has given no firm date to the American President for the launch of the offensive. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**401** *22 October.* Cipher message no. 97272 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, expressing his disagreement with the idea that Riddell-Webster should act as GOC, Egypt as well as Auchinleck's PAO. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**402** *22 October.* Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, asking for his reactions to a proposal made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that some Turkish generals should be invited to visit Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**403** *23 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill,

stating that he is not unduly anxious about the air situation, but he has misgivings about the projected invasion of Sicily (Whipcord), planned as a sequel to an advance into Tripolitania (Acrobat), because he feels that the Crusader offensive will absorb most of his resources. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**404** 23 October. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, concerning some senior officers and the upgrading of certain appointments, distortion of military operations by the BBC, the need to defend Syria in Anatolia, and the importance of good relations with the Turks. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**405** 23 October. Telegram no. 15872/G from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, concerning the defence of Iraq. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**406** 24 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, expressing his opinion that it would be wrong to attempt an invasion of Sicily before the Allies have cleared the enemy out of North Africa and have stabilized the situation in Anatolia and the Caucasus. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**407** 24 October. Cipher message no. 111 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that, although he is disappointed by the delay in the start of the offensive, he accepts the new arrangements and hopes that Auchinleck will press on to Tripoli if the attack is successful. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**408** 25 October. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, explaining the problems facing Churchill, especially the growing clamour that Britain should do more to help Russia and the consequent pressure on Auchinleck to strike in the Western Desert, although Dill himself is aware that Wavell's mistake in attempting the disastrous Battleaxe campaign was to yield to over-pressure. 8 leaves. Holograph.

**409** 25 October. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, thanking him for the book *Vanguard of Victory* (see 384, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**410** 27 October. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, in reply to 385, above, promising to fulfil his wishes concerning the training and equipment of South African troops as armoured units, and agreeing with him that the rapid German advance towards the Caucasus is a matter of grave concern. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**411** 28 October. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, concerning the possibility of partial decentralization of authority on matters of War Establishments. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**412** 29 October. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, telling him not to worry about Churchill's disturbing telegrams which are often sent without consultation with the Chiefs of Staff. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**413** 29 October. Letter from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, asking him not to take too seriously Churchill's hard, sarcastic comments which politicians may shrug off with ease but which soldiers are prone to take to heart. Signed 'Pug'. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**414** 30 October. Cipher message no. 0530 from Gen. A.P. Wavell for Sir John Dill, expressing concern about the weakness of Allied forces in Persia and Iraq in view of the German approach to the Caucasus. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**415** 30 October. Letter from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his dismay that Britain has nothing to her military credit at present, his sorrow that the projected invasion of Sicily (Whipcord) has had to be abandoned, and his annoyance at the lack of contact between the WO and Ministry of Supply on the one hand and ME reception on the other in the matter of the weak front axles of the tanks delivered to the 22nd Armoured Brigade. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**416** 31 October. Cipher message no. CS/176 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, asking him to delay the appointment of a new GOC, Egypt until he has had time to receive Riddell-Webster's considered opinion on his proposal, and recommending Dorman-Smith as DMT. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**417** 31 October. Cipher message no. CS/177 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, supporting Wavell's plea (414, above) for extra personnel and equipment for the IA in order to defend Iraq and Persia, but insisting at the same time that the capture of Tripolitania is a most important target. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**418** 31 October. Cipher message no. 0/20831 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, asking permission for one South African field regiment from the 2nd South African Division to be detailed for a role in the forward area. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**419** 1 November. Cipher message no. G.07737 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, giving the permission requested in 418, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**420** 1 November. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, informing him that there should be sufficient tanks to complete the equipment of the South African Brigade by the end of June. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**421** 1 November. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, concerning the expansion of the IA, the whereabouts of Quintin Hogg who served in the ME, and the insurrection in Yugoslavia. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**422** 2 November. Cipher message no. 99412 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, expressing his conviction that Riddell-Webster has

enough to do (401 and 416, above), and offering Nosworthy or Pakenham-Walsh for GOC, Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**423** 3 November. Cipher message no. 115/3 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, informing him that he is sending out two A22 'Churchill' tanks so that Auchinleck can test them for desert work and suggest improvements. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**424** c. 3 November. Tables giving average strength of units, taking into consideration units and drafts on W.S.12. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**425** 6 November. Cipher message no. CS/189 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, suggesting Holmes rather than Pakenham-Walsh or Nosworthy as GOC, Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**426** 6 November. Letter from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, wishing him success, and expressing thanks for his proposals concerning the armouring and mechanization of the South African Division. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**427** 8 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, reporting on the preparations for the offensive in the Western Desert after a visit there, and on the need for a delay of three days to allow the South African Division to complete divisional exercises in desert movement. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**428** 8 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting on his visit to the Western Desert; apologizing for the delay of three days in the start of Crusader; explaining why the South Africans are not ready for the offensive and why another division could not be substituted. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**429** 10 November. Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, describing the smooth co-ordination between the three divisions of GS in his Command, the recruitment of Assyrians, Maltese and Cypriots, the good performance of the Polish Brigade Group in Tobruk, the problems of redistributing control of air and land forces to cope with future developments, and his own conviction that Iran and Iraq should remain the concern of C-in-C, India. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**430** 11 November. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, declaring that he has asked Gen. Theron to delay his return to Pretoria for a few days in order to convey back to Smuts the latest confidential information; and describing his visit to the Western Desert without mentioning the proposed delay in the start of the offensive. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**431** 12 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, in reply to 402, above, stating that it was the opinion of his Defence Committee that it would be better to begin the projected staff talks with the Turks

before inviting high Turkish officers to visit Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript, initialled.

**432** *13 November.* Cipher telegram no. 3554, conveyed, through the British Ambassador in Cairo, to the FO from Oliver Lyttelton, containing proposals for the reorganization of the Intendant-General's Department. With an autograph note by Auchinleck, containing a query answered by Maj.-Gen. Spears. 4 leaves. Mainly typescript.

**433** *13 November.* Note by Oliver Lyttelton on the offices of the Minister of State and Intendant-General. With a letter from A.N. Rucker, the Minister's secretary, to Maj. A.B. Phillpotts, Auchinleck's secretary. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**434** *14 November.* Letter of thanks from Auchinleck's secretary to the Minister of State's secretary. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**435** *14 November.* Cipher message 17867/C from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Sir John Dill, denying Gen. Blamey's assertion, reported in the press, that Wavell's setback in Cyrenaica was due to misinformation received from Intelligence Staff in Cairo. 1 leaf. Typescript. With newspaper cutting.

**436** *16 November.* Cipher message no. 119 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, declaring that he has been charged by the King to express, to all ranks of the Army and RAF in the Western Desert and to the Mediterranean Fleet, His Majesty's confidence that they will do their duty in the battle ahead, which is likely to affect the whole course of the war. To be issued publicly at the right time. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**437** *18 November.* Cipher message no. 121 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, speculating on possible future operations following success in Crusader and Acrobat, especially the possibility of bringing the French in North Africa over to the British side, thus giving access to Bizerta. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**438** *19 November.* Cipher message no. 52851 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, in answer to a very private note, assuring him that he has everyone's confidence not only for the present battle but for future successes. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**439** *20 November.* Cipher message no. 124 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, declaring that he is glad that things have opened well; deploring the fact that Auchinleck issued an optimistic communiqué from Cairo; and directing him to issue his communiqués through London for the next few days. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**440** *20 November.* Cipher message no. CS/205 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, concerning 435, above, stating his belief that Blamey, as Deputy C-in-C, had no right to criticize in public a section of what is his staff as well as Auchinleck's. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**441** 20 November. Cipher message no. 28660 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, announcing his conviction that the King's message (436, above) should not be issued yet because of the lack of information concerning the progress of the battle. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**442** 20 November. Cipher message no. I/28754 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 439, above, expressing strong objection to the editing of his communiqués in London because the procedure would be dangerous and unworkable; and asking that today's communiqué, which he may well have to issue immediately in Cairo to allay local fears, should not be altered. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**443** 20 November. Cipher message no. 53108 from Sir John Dill to Gen. A.P. Wavell, reporting that the Defence Committee has re-examined the whole question of tank distribution and has made allocations, from December to March, to India, ME and Home Forces, based on monthly production forecasts. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**444** 20 November. Letter from Christopher Fuller, in the Western Desert, to Oliver Lyttelton, reporting on his attempt to find the HQ of 7th Armoured Division, with a vivid description of desert warfare and of the success of British armour. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**445** 21 November. Cipher message no. 125 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, authorizing him to issue future communiqués without reference to London, but reminding him of the inconvenience of receiving important information via public messages and of the fact that he has Parliament, Press, Public and President Roosevelt to impress with good news. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**446** 21 November. Cipher message no. 53282 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, acknowledging receipt of his communiqué and describing the contents as admirable. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**447** 22 November. Cipher message no. 18665/C from Gen. A.P. Wavell to Auchinleck, repeating a message sent to the CIGS concerning equipment and the supply of officers for the defence of Iran and Iraq, and the need for armoured divisions in India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**448** 22 November. Cipher message no. 127 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing congratulations on the successes in the Western Desert, hope that Roosevelt will help to persuade the French to hold Bizerta, and confidence that a further advance westwards will be possible soon. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**449** 23 November. Cipher message no. 127 (*sic*) from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, carrying an enthusiastic message of confidence to be passed on to the Desert Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**450** c. 23 November. Communiqué from Battle HQ, 30th Corps to Lt. Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, GOC-in-C, 8th Army, reporting

heavy German casualties in the Sidi Rezegh area, and praising 7th Armoured Brigade, 5th South African Brigade and other units involved in the victory. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**451** 23 November. Cipher message no. CS/221 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, stating that he has asked Gen. Blamey to desist from public comment on operations in the Western Desert because he has no real inside knowledge. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**452** 23 November. Cipher message no. CS/224 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, reporting a critical shortage of 37mm. ammunition for American M.3 tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**453** 23 November. Cipher message no. 53692 from Sir John Dill to 'Britman', conveying Auchinleck's urgent message (452, above) asking for more ammunition for tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**454** 23 November. Gist of a conversation between Auchinleck and Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, GOC-in-C, 8th Army, on the evening of 23 November, Cunningham reporting that, due to British losses of tanks, the enemy had now probably acquired superiority over the Allies in the supply of fast tanks, and asking Auchinleck to visit HQ to decide whether it was necessary to break off battle to adopt a defensive attitude or whether to continue the offensive. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**455** 24 November. Cipher message no. 131 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, announcing the arrival at Suez of the remainder of the 1st Armoured Division, and subjoining a report on the state of their equipment. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**456** 24 November. Memorandum from Auchinleck addressed to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, presenting the two alternatives, to adopt a defensive position or to continue the attack, deciding firmly on the latter course, and suggesting means of achieving success. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**457** 25 November. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, asking him to discourage FM Smuts from visiting the ME by air because the maintenance of the South African war effort depends on his safety and well-being. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**458** 25 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, after his visit to 8th Army HQ, announcing his decision to relieve him of his command and to replace him by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie. 1 leaf. Typescript, initialled.

**459** 25 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, accompanying the official letter, expressing his gratitude and his sense of pain in fulfilling what he regards as his duty, and suggesting that Cunningham should go on the sick list for a time to avoid public knowledge of his supersession. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**460** 25 November. Letter from Sir Charles Portal, CAS, to Auchinleck, suggesting the possibility of replacing Air Vice-Marshal Tedder by Air Marshal Peirse as AOC, ME, and giving Tedder an Air Council post. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**461** 25 November. Cipher message no. 53925 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, announcing the dispatch by sea and air of consignments of 37mm. ammunition to the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**462** 25 November. Cipher message no. 132 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing complete agreement with Auchinleck's determination to fight the battle out to the last inch and the hope that the 1st Armoured Division can be used for the fray immediately on arrival. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph notes.

**463** 25 November. Cipher message no. CS/232 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, informing him of the change in command of the 8th Army and of his reasons for relieving Cunningham. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**464** 25 November. Cipher message no. CS/233 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, describing his visit to HQ, 8th Army, his optimism despite the enemy's attempt to regain the initiative, his decision to relieve Cunningham, his efforts to replace losses of equipment, and his relief at the arrival of the 1st Armoured Division. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**465** 25 November. Extract relating to Cunningham from Auchinleck's message to the PM (464, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**466** 25 November. Cipher message no. CS/234 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, repeating the rousing Order of the Day which he issued to troops from HQ, 8th Army, urging them to attack and pursue until the enemy is finished. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**467** 26 November. Cipher message no. 54154 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, declaring that Auchinleck can count upon his approval and support in what he has done. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**468** 26 November. Cipher message no. 54174 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, expressing his sadness that their military collaboration is to end and his conviction that their friendship will remain. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**469** 26 November. Cipher message no. 133 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, asking him about his resources and ideas concerning the movement forward of reserves towards the battle zone. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**470** 26 November. Letter from Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham to Auchinleck, expressing understanding of the situation concerning his brother and appreciation of Auchinleck's letter; and concluding with

an account of the sinking of HMS *Barham* and of naval efforts to cut the enemy's oil and petrol supplies. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**471** 26 November. Cipher message no. G09054 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, asking him to make sure that his personal operational summaries are marked 'most immediate'. With Auchinleck's autograph draft reply agreeing to this. 1 leaf. Typescript and holograph.

**472** 26 November. Cipher message no. CS/235 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, stating that the change-over in command of the 8th Army should not be published. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**473** 26 November. Repeat of cipher message no. 54154 (467, above) from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**474** 26 November. Letter from Maj.-Gen. F. Messervy, Commander, 4th Indian Division, addressed to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham (because he did not know there had been a change in command), describing events of the previous day when the enemy twice attacked the 4th Indian Division at Sidi Omar and was driven off with heavy loss. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**475** 27 November. Cipher message no. CS/242 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, giving details of troop movements and replacements in reply to Churchill's enquiry (469, above) concerning the movement forward of reserves towards the battle zone. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**476** 27 November. Cipher message no. CS/244 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, announcing that Cunningham has agreed to go into hospital; and asking that he should be recalled home after examination and treatment. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**477** 27 November. Cipher message no. 134 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing the view of himself and the CIGS that Auchinleck should consider going to the Western Desert front again to give inspiration to the troops. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**478** 27 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, Commander, 8th Army, to Auchinleck, announcing his arrival at Advanced HQ, the capture of El Duda by the Tobruk force which has now joined up with the advanced main force, his intention to concentrate on this area and to leave the Menastir-Halfaya-Omar area in the care of Maj.-Gen. F. Messervy. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**479** 27 November. Cipher message no. CS/241 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, the official reply to 471, above, reporting that the Allies are making good progress although the enemy is fighting hard. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**480** 27 November. Cipher message no. I/31490 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, describing the action in which the 5th South African

Brigade suffered heavy losses in casualties and in prisoners of war. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**481** 28 November. Cipher message no. 54593 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, expressing sorrow at the news of Lt.-Gen. Cunningham's illness; and suggesting that he should be sent home as soon as he is fit to travel. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**482** 28 November. Cipher message no. CS/251 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 477, above, declaring that he had considered carefully the possibility of personally taking over command of the 8th Army from Cunningham, but decided to appoint Ritchie instead because of the need to see the whole picture at GHQ and because Ritchie is fully aware of his plans. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**483** 28 November. Cipher message no. 54594 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, explaining Churchill's message expressed in 477, above, that the morale of the troops at times of crisis can receive a tremendous boost from the inspiration of a C-in-C who takes personal charge of his army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**484** 28 November. Cipher message no. CS/253 from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, stating that Cunningham is suffering from exhaustion and will need time to recover. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**485** 28 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham to Auchinleck, in reply to 458, above, expressing his strong objection to the suggestion that his attitude to battle had become defensive rather than offensive; and expressing the hope that, if things go badly, his removal from command should not indicate that the failure was his sole responsibility. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**486** 28 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham (in hospital) to Auchinleck, stating that he would like to return home by the quickest route, and that a consultant is to visit him. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**487** 28 November. Letter from Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham to Auchinleck, reporting on a visit to his brother Alan in hospital, on the state of his health, and on his desire to get home as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**488** 28 November. Situation reports, 0900 hrs and 1100 hrs, from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie on the Tobruk area, the 4th Indian Division area, and the tank battle. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with autograph additions.

**489** 29 November. Cipher telegram no. 135 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, in reply to 482, above, declaring that it was not his intention that Auchinleck should supersede Ritchie, but that he should visit the battlefield when a new impulse is clearly needed to

inspire the troops. 1 leaf. Manuscript.

**490** 29 November. Cipher message no. CS/259 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 489, above, promising to maintain the momentum of the attack, ably seconded by Ritchie. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**491** 29 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, in reply to 486, above, giving details of his travelling arrangements; and telling him that he has informed the CIGS that Cunningham is suffering from exhaustion and needs to rest. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**492** 29 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, informing him of his brother's travelling arrangements. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**493** 29 November. Letter from Auchinleck in reply to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham's letter of 28 November (485, above), explaining in detail how he came to the decision to relieve him of his command; and accepting personal responsibility for the outcome of the battle inaugurated by Cunningham. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**494** 29 November. Situation report at 0930 hrs from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, describing the Tobruk battle, the movement of HQ, 13th Corps into the Tobruk fortress, the progress of the tank battle, and the efforts to stop enemy forces from receiving supplies from Bardia. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**495** 29 November. Cipher message no. G09192 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing thanks for Auchinleck's explanation of 27 November (480, above) and confidence in the ultimate success of the campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**496** 29 November. Cipher telegram no. CS/265 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, thanking him for his inspiring message. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**497** 30 November. Medical report on the health of Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham by Col. W.D.D. Small, Consultant Physician. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**498** 30 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham in reply to Auchinleck's letter of 29 November (493, above), denying any suggestion that he wanted to call off the offensive; and pointing out that Tobruk was relieved on the day he was removed from his command. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**499** 30 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, in reply to Auchinleck's letter of 29 November (491, above), asking for some indication of the line he should take in face of the publicity which will attend his arrival home. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**500** 30 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham to

Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, asking him to find other work in MEC for his ADC. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**501** *30 November.* Cipher messages no. 137 and 138 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, proposing to inform the House of Commons of the change in command in the near future; and, in the second telegram, congratulating Lt.-Gen. Godwin-Austen on the relief of Tobruk. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2nd copy of no. 137.

**502** *30 November.* Cipher message no. CS/272 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting on the unsuccessful attempts by the enemy to encircle and destroy the New Zealand Division and to reconcentrate 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions; and announcing his intention to visit the front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**503** *30 November.* Situation report at 0700 hrs from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, describing the concentration of effort on the Tobruk battle and the need to reinforce the New Zealand Division by the 4th Indian Division in the Tobruk area. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with autograph additions.

**504** *1 December.* Cipher message no. 55189 from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, announcing his departure from the WO and the appointment of Gen. Alan Brooke as the new CIGS. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**505** *1 December.* Cipher message no. CS/274 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill asking him not to announce the change in command of the 8th Army until the enemy realizes that he is on the defensive, and to modify his proposed statement to give credit to Cunningham for the initiation of the present successful offensive. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**506** *1 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith (CGS) to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham, written on behalf of Auchinleck who has gone to Advanced HQ, 8th Army, acknowledging his letters, stating that no public announcement of the change in command should be made at present, that his travelling arrangements have been made, and that the sick leave he has been granted is no camouflage. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**507** *2 December.* Cipher message no. 139 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, agreeing with him that public announcement of the change in command must be postponed until the battle is decisive. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**508** *2 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, asking the whereabouts of the 'I' tanks; and reporting on the movement of units of the 1st Armoured Division, on the possibility of using Egyptian troops on the line of communication, on the employment of the 2nd Armoured Brigade, on Lt.-Gen. Cunningham's

imminent departure, on the content of communiqués. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**509** 3 December. Letter from Auchinleck at Advanced HQ to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, concerning the withdrawal from Sidi Rezegh, the casualties among the New Zealand Division, the state of optimism in the Tobruk garrison, the consolidation of units of 30th Corps, the plan to train 2nd Armoured Brigade in the desert, the need for further training of the South Africans. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**510** 3 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, concerning a request for reinforcements for Tobruk, the capture of Gen. von Ravenstein, a misunderstanding by some staff officers of Auchinleck's attitude to the public display of prisoners of war in Cairo, and Ramsden's plea to allow the 50th Division to leave Iraq for the Western Desert. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**511** 3 December. Cipher message no. G09413 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing the hope that the 2nd South African Division is being equipped with all necessary transport and armament, and that all possible tank reinforcements are being sent to the 4th Armoured Brigade. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**512** 3 December. Cipher message no. CS/286 from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to FM Smuts, in reply to 511, above, reporting that Auchinleck is visiting the front, and that every effort is being made to expedite the dispatch of reinforcements to the battle area. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**513** 4 December. Cipher message no. CS/288 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, stating that experience in battle has proved that the South African divisions are too overloaded with transport to achieve maximum efficiency, and that it has been decided to reduce the numbers of their vehicles temporarily to the level of British war establishment ratios. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**514** 4 December. Cipher message no. 141 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, asking whether he has sufficient reinforcements to maintain the momentum of prolonged battle; and suggesting that both the 50th and the 18th Divisions could be claimed for Libya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**515** c. 4 December. Extract from Field Censorship Summary no. 6, comprising quotations from the letters of soldiers in praise of Auchinleck and his leadership. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**516** 4 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting on the use of the 'I' tanks, the move forwards of the 2nd Armoured Brigade, the enemy's concentration of forces at El Adem-Sidi Rezegh-Zaafran, the possibility that he will go for Bardia-Capuzzo-Sidi Omar with a view to joining up with the Germans in

Halfaya, Ritchie's plan to hold the Capuzzo-Sollum-Sidi Omar line, the healthy state of tank numbers, and on the harassment of enemy forces by the RAF. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**517** 4 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, expressing concern about the motor-transport situation in the ME and the delay in establishing policy regarding the employment of the Free French in Tunisia, and satisfaction that South African transport has been cut down. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript and pencilled note by Auchinleck.

**518** 4 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, describing a difficult interview with Lt.-Gen. Cunningham. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**519** 5 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, suggesting that reports on Tobruk should be sent directly to GHQ; describing Koenig's pleasure at the news that the offer of a Free French Brigade had been accepted; and giving details of the tanks dispatched to the 8th Army, the movement of units and the parade of prisoners through Cairo. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph marginal comments.

**520** 5 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting on the renewal of the offensive on the front from Bardia to El Adem, Tobruk's repulse of the attack on the salient, the success of 'Jock' columns, and on the sense of confidence engendered by a definite offensive plan. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**521** 5 December. Cipher message no. G09580 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, replying to 513, above, accepting as a temporary measure the reduction in the numbers of vehicles assigned to the South African divisions. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**522** 6 December. Cipher message no. CS/304 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 514, above, describing in detail the present state of reinforcements; and declaring that it is not yet necessary to bring the 50th Division back from Iraq, although the arrival of the 18th Division will be welcome to strengthen reserves. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**523** 6 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, expressing confidence in the success of the day's tank battle around Bir el Gubi, threatening El Adem. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**524** 6 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, on the handling of armoured formations, the organization of motor transport, the urgency of receiving FO opinion on the use of Free French forces in Libya, the position of Alan Cunningham, and on the importance of the 'Jock' columns in the control of no-man's land. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**525** 6 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, reporting on his annoyance at De Gaulle's attitude towards the war and France, on longer hours of work for GHQ staff, on whether British units should be named in communiqués to prove that UK forces take their share of the fighting, on the propaganda value of the visit of the British football team to Turkey, and on the duplication of information in telegrams sent by Auchinleck to the PM and the CIGS. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph additions.

**526** 6 December. Extract relating to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham from 524, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**527** 7 December. Cipher message no. 142 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, announcing that he will inform De Gaulle that the Free French Brigade will be used in the ME; asking for estimated losses of South African and New Zealand troops; stating that the USA will declare war on Japan if the Japanese invade Siam, Malaya, Burma or the East Indies; reporting good news from Russia; and expressing his own view of the form in which the change in command of the 8th Army should be announced. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph comments by Lt.-Gen. Smith.

**528** 7 December. Extract relating to Lt.-Gen. Sir A.G. Cunningham from 527, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**529** 7 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, announcing that the enemy has withdrawn from the east of Tobruk, that the situation on the southern flank, the El Adem-Bir el Gubi line, is still uncertain, that he does not wish to announce the relief of Tobruk until El Adem has been taken, and that New Zealand wounded have been recovered at Sidi Rezegh. With postscript announcing that the enemy is on the defensive, west of Bir el Gubi. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**530** 7 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, announcing his intention of using Maj.-Gen. 'Strafer' Gott, to profit from his experience in handling armoured formations; reporting on the dispatch of a telegram by the Minister of State to the FO concerning the employment of the Free French in Libya, on current stocks of American tanks, on shipping losses en route to Tobruk, and on the shipment of vital oil to Malta. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**531** 7 December. Cipher message no. CS/310 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, concerning the removal of Lt.-Gen. Cunningham from command of the 8th Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**532** 8 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, describing rapid Allied progress in the desert. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**533** 8 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to

Auchinleck, announcing that the Egyptian Minister of Defence has agreed to send Egyptian troops to assist in the defence of the line of communication, that the Singapore cable has been cut as a result of the Japanese war, imposing new constraints on communication with London, and that the Minister of State intends to visit Advanced HQ, 8th Army. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript and comments.

**534** 8 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, expressing his concern about the 'strained relations' between C-in-C, Mediterranean and AOC, ME. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**535** 8 December. Cipher message no. G09672 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, suggesting that he should strengthen his forward forces to cut off Rommel's retreat westward, and that the Allied force in the frontier area appears to be unnecessarily strong. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, stating that, for maintenance reasons, it has not been possible so far to sustain more troops in the forward area, and that the only troops in the frontier area now are the South African 2nd Division. 1 leaf. Typescript and holograph.

**536** 9 December. Cipher message no. 144 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, informing him that the Australian press has already announced Cunningham's supersession, and that he intends to make a statement on the subject in the form suggested in 527, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**537** 9 December. Cipher message no. CS/324 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, expressing his agreement that the announcement of the change in command can now be made in the terms of 527, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**538** 10 December. Cipher message no. CS/334 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, the formal reply to 535, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**539** 10 December. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, to Auchinleck, noting the possible repercussion of events in the Far East on supplies for the ME; asking for a complete picture of the state of armoured forces; expressing his own view that MEC should include Iraq and Western Iran; and commenting on Auchinleck's private telegrams to the PM which, in his opinion, should not affect normal channels of communication with the WO. With an autograph postscript dated 12 December, referring to the withdrawal of 18th Division for India and the possibility of Pownall replacing Arthur Smith. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**540** 10 December. Cipher message no. CS/347 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, stating that it is because the PM sends him private telegrams that he sends back private replies, that the solution would be for the PM to allow private telegrams dealing with operations

to be repeated to the CIGS, and offering to send personal telegrams daily if required. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**541** *10 December.* Special Order of the Day by Auchinleck, announcing the success of the present operation, the retreat of the enemy, the relief of Tobruk, and congratulating officers and men. To Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, commanding 8th Army. 1 leaf. Printed.

**542** *11 December.* Cipher message no. CS/339 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, giving a detailed explanation of why he relieved Cunningham of his command. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**543** *11 December.* Letter from Auchinleck in Cairo to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying forecasts concerning future dispositions of troops; and containing the news that Ritchie has moved his Advanced HQ some 90 miles forward. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**544** *11 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, CAS, in reply to 460, above, expressing his high regard for Air Vice-Marshal Tedder and his opinion that it would be unwise to change commanders at the present time. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**545** *11 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the enemy's withdrawal, the 8th Army's exploitation westwards from Tobruk and the south, the occupation of Acroma by the Tobruk garrison, the enemy's resistance about ten miles south of Gazala, his own decision to abandon temporarily any move to capture Benghazi, and renewed enemy activity in the air. With holograph postscript, confirming the report that the enemy is holding a position covering Gazala from the east. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**546** *11 December.* Axis forces between Benghazi and El Agheila, as believed on 11 December. Approximate figures of men and equipment. From GSI. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**547** *12 December.* Cipher message no. G09961 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, inviting Lt.-Gen. Cunningham to spend a recuperative holiday in South Africa. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, stating that Cunningham has already left for England. 1 leaf. Typescript and holograph.

**548** *12 December.* Cipher message no. CS/348 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, containing the formal version of the reply in 547, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**549** *12 December.* Cipher message no. 146 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reminding him that the Japanese War involves certain changes, including the diversion of the ship carrying 18th Division to Bombay instead of the ME; suggesting that he uses 50th Division from Baghdad or 5th Indian Division from Cyprus; proposing that MEC

should be extended to cover Iraq and Iran; stating that Wavell now needs extra support to protect India; and expressing his concern about Hong Kong. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**550** *12 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, querying the decision (545, above) to abandon the Benghazi enterprise; pointing out that Benghazi is the key to the German position in Cyrenaica; and recommending that an advance to Benghazi should be considered even if it delays the coastal advance to Derna. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**551** *13 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the enemy is fighting a strong rearguard action south of Gazala; and describing the measures he has taken to equip the force for the Benghazi enterprise which he intends to pursue, although he doubts whether, if Benghazi were captured, it could be held against a serious enemy concentration. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**552** *14 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the 8th Army has succeeded in nearly clearing the Gazala area despite enemy counter-attacks, and that Marriott's brigade has been instructed to go straight to Benghazi and to occupy it. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript concerning awards to RAF personnel.

**553** *15 December.* Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, stating that news of the battle is proving a great tonic to the British people. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**554** *15 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, explaining his view that the principal GS Officer on an Army HQ should be a Major-General in rank, not a Brigadier. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**555** *15 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, concerning the reorganization of the IA, the recruitment of suitable personnel, the progress of the Libyan offensive, the reluctance, until a few months ago, to entrust India with any operational responsibility, and the repercussions of the Japanese War on supplies of men and material for the ME. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**556** *15 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, concerning the move of Marriott's brigade on Benghazi which, in the communiqués, he will describe at first as a 'raid', avoiding reference to any attempt to 'capture' Benghazi. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**557** *15 December.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing his hope that the enemy can be destroyed in his present position, his pleasure that the armoured units have been active, and his concern over reports of a successful counter-attack by

the enemy against the Support Group of the Armoured Division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**558** *15 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, giving estimates of the strength of the Allied and Axis fighting formations facing each other near Gazala, which appear to confirm Allied superiority; and reporting on the disposition of 30th Corps, the enemy's attack on the 4th Indian Division, the movement of the 7th Armoured Division around his right flank, activities in the frontier area, and the preparations for the offensive by Marriott's force in the Benghazi area. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph notes.

**559** *15 December.* Comments on DMI/Crusader of 15 December, containing comments and corrections relating to military intelligence concerning German and Italian strength in men and equipment in Libya, with a final report that the enemy's withdrawal to Mechili is out of hand, and troops are continuing to move west towards Benghazi. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**560** *16 December.* Cipher message no. SD/38891 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, expressing his approval of the policy of forming Indian divisions with a proportion of British troops in MEC. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**561** *16 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the enemy's tactical success against part of the 4th Indian Division, the heavy counter-attack by German armour on the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, the hope that in the frontier area Bardia will fall to the Allies in the near future. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**562** *17 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the movement of the 4th Armoured Brigade; giving further details of the attack on the 5th Infantry Brigade; and describing the steps taken to prevent the enemy taking serious hold of Derna. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**563** *18 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the rapid advance on the 13th Corps front, on the enemy's retreat through Mechili and Derna, and on his own plan to seize Mechili at once. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**564** *18 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the 8th Army is now in the outskirts of Derna, that the Armoured Division is active in the neighbourhood of Mechili, and that the enemy is steadily withdrawing westwards but is holding on stubbornly to Bardia in the frontier area. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**565** *20 December.* Cipher message no. 149 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his victorious pursuit of the

enemy; and asking him when and where the 2nd Armoured Brigade will strike. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**566** 20 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that he is pushing the mobile part of the 7th Armoured Division west of Mechili towards Benghazi, which he hopes to capture, that the 4th Indian Division have captured Derna, that he has given instructions for Bardia to be reduced and has told Marriott that his aim must be to prevent the enemy escaping southward from Benghazi towards Agedabia. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**567** 20 December. Letter from Sir John Dill, on board ship to the USA, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his success in battle; indicating that his new task in America (Head of the British Military Mission in Washington) is to co-ordinate effort with the Americans in tackling the Far Eastern problem; and expressing his sadness at his retirement from the WO and his continuing interest in Auchinleck's activities. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**568** 21 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing agreement with the decision to disregard the northern advance for the time being and to concentrate on the southern thrust; speculating that the enemy has probably managed to get a good part of his troops back to Agedabia; and proposing to visit Advanced HQ, 8th Army shortly. 2 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies. The first copy has a manuscript note added, probably in the hand of Maj. A.B. Phillpotts, Auchinleck's secretary.

**569** 21 December. Cipher message no. CS/404 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, announcing that the 2nd Armoured Brigade is to be used in the advance into Tripolitania but is at hand in reserve if needed earlier, that other units are at Mechili, and that Brig. Marriott's force has set out, aiming for Agedabia which the enemy is holding and which, being 200 miles from Tobruk and 300 miles from the railhead, presents a logistical problem for the Allied forces. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**570** 22 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, announcing that his main aim is still to destroy everything of the German forces before they can escape into Tripolitania, that the Allies have occupied Apollonia and Cirene, and that he is planning the advance into Tripolitania. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**571** 22 [23?] December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that he is still trying to block the enemy's retreat and thinks that he may be succeeding, that air attacks are being launched from Msus, and that plans for the advance into Tripolitania hinge on Benghazi. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**572** 23 December. Cipher message no. CS/420 from Auchinleck to

Winston Churchill, in reply to 423, above, reporting that the two Churchill tanks have arrived but suffered serious corrosion and rust from being shipped on deck unsheeted and exposed to bad weather, whereas the American tanks are dispatched with adequate protection against moisture. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**573** 24 December. Cipher message no. CS/424 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, announcing the capture of Benghazi and sending Christmas greetings from the Army of the Nile. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**574** 24 December. Cipher message no. 60193 from Gen. Sir Walter Venning, QMG to the Forces, to Auchinleck, stating that he has seen the cable to the PM concerning Churchill tanks (572, above), and that he has arranged that, in future, all tanks stowed on deck are sealed against bad weather. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**575** 24 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the battle in the area from Benghazi to Agedabia, the capture of Regima and Benima, and on the possibility of setting up his new HQ south of Benghazi. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**576** 24 December. Pencilled letter from Lt.-Gen. T.S. Riddell-Webster to Auchinleck, stating that Ritchie has not yet moved his HQ, but when he does so it will be some distance away, so it would be advisable for Auchinleck to visit him the next day. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**577** 24 December. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, in reply to 554, above, declaring that he is not yet ready to reconsider the status of the principal GS Officer on the HQ of an Army. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**578** 24 December. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, congratulating him on success in battle; indicating that the Japanese threat to Burma and Malaya may deprive him of some of his resources; and speculating on the choice of a successor to McLeod as GOC, Burma and on the possibility of a German attack by air and sea on Egypt while the Allies are pushing on to Tripoli. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**579** 24 December. Cipher message no. G10603 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the success of his brilliant Libyan campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**580** 25 December. Cipher message no. CS/435 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 549, above, stating that when he was C-in-C, India he thought that Iraq and Iran should be part of his Command, as Wavell thinks now, but the emergence of a definite threat of a German offensive through the Caucasus has made him certain that MEC should take responsibility for Iraq and Iran, despite opposition from India. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**581** 25 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke,

expressing his opinion concerning the possibility of carrying the war into Germany from Africa; asking for an early decision on responsibility for Iraq and Iran; reporting that he has asked for 50th Division to be released by IC to serve in the Syrian defensive area; and describing Martel's visit to the Libyan front and his own conviction that armoured units, infantry and artillery should work closely together. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**582** 25 *December*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, describing the capture of Benghazi and Barce. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**583** 25 *December*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, thanking him for a bottle of rum, turkey and lettuce; and reporting a disappointing day because the 22nd Armoured Brigade failed to outflank the enemy in the Agedabia area. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**584** 25 *December*. Cipher message no. CS/438 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, thanking him for his Christmas message (579, above); and declaring that he has reason to be proud of the part played by the South Africans in the North African campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**585** 26 *December*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that it is now obvious that Rommel is to make a stand in the Agedabia area and is maintaining his troops in the frontier area; and announcing that plans for the attack on Bardia are complete. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**586** 26 *December*. Message no. 110593 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, declaring that he wants to publish in booklet form, for the purpose of the local recruiting campaign, a full account of the stand made by the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and needs the co-operation of intelligence officers. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**587** 27 *December*. Cipher message no. I/42883 from Auchinleck to the WO, repeating the message from FM Smuts (586, above); and asking for WO approval. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**588** 27 *December*. Cipher message no. I/42884 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, stating that he is arranging for all assistance to be given to the South African officers preparing the booklet on the South African contribution to the Libyan campaign, and he is seeking WO approval. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**589** 27 *December*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the shortage of petrol in the Tobruk area, on the danger to sea-borne supplies from attacks by enemy submarines, on the stand made by the enemy to the north-east and south of Agedabia, and on the need for the Navy to knock out enemy

submarines operating in the eastern Mediterranean. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**590** 27 December. Cipher message no. 151 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, announcing important decisions involving the dispatch of four American divisions to Northern Ireland, freeing two fully trained British divisions for overseas, the use of American bomber squadrons to attack Germany from the British Isles, and the willingness of the Americans to collaborate in the plan to seize French North Africa. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**591** 27 December. Another cipher message no. 151 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the capture of Benghazi; asking him to spare for Malaya and Singapore a force of American tanks and four squadrons of Hurricanes; and suggesting that damaged tanks could be sent to India for repair. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**592** 27 December. Cipher message no. CS/458 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, informing him that the main German forces are in position around Agedabia where Ritchie hopes to destroy them. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**593** 28 December. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on the planned move to his new HQ in the Benghazi neighbourhood, on an attack by the enemy south of Agedabia, on his concern about the paucity of Allied troops in the Agedabia area, and on the measures he is taking to bring up reinforcements. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**594** 28 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, stating that he will send a proper letter by the next fast mail. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**595** 29 December. Appreciation of the situation in the Agedabia area, by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, at 1200 hrs, 29 December. 2 leaves. Typescript, initialled.

**596** 29 December. Copy of a letter from Brig. J. Scott-Cockburn, from HQ, 22nd Armoured Brigade, to Commander, 13th Corps (Godwin-Austen), describing the enemy's attack on the Brigade in the Agedabia area. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**597** 29 December. Cipher message no. G10752 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing satisfaction that Rommel is making a stand at Agedabia on the grounds that it would be better to dispose of him there than to pursue him westwards. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, expressing agreement. 1 leaf. Typescript and holograph.

**598** 30 December. Cipher message no. CS/488 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, the official reply to 597, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**599** *30 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, referring to the attack on the 22nd Armoured Brigade south of Agedabia which left the enemy in possession of the battlefield (596, above); and admitting some disquiet at the outcome, due probably to the fact that the British were out-gunned in tanks and that the British Cruiser tanks are not robust enough to withstand the rigours of campaigning in the desert. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**600** *31 December.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the German force is advancing north from Agedabia, that the 22nd Armoured Brigade is severely depleted, that he intends to build up a striking force to the south-west of Msus, that the main line of maintenance for the enemy is through sea-borne coastwise traffic, and that heavy bombers from the RAF are needed to interrupt supplies. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**601** *31 December.* Report by L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to the Defence Committee, on the transfer of the control of Iraq and Iran from IC to MEC, recommending postponement of any decision. 3 leaves. Typescript.

1942

**602** *1 January.* Cipher message no. CS/501 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, reporting that the 2nd South African Division has stormed the southern defences of Bardia, capturing 600 Italians. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**603** *1 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing serious concern that the Germans appear to be able to outwit and outmanoeuvre the 8th Army; asking for a full explanation of the causes for the failure of the 22nd Armoured Brigade to hold the enemy; agreeing with Ritchie's decision not to move HQ yet; and congratulating him on the success of the attack on Bardia. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**604** *1 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that it will take time before sufficient troops can be maintained in the Msus neighbourhood to put the enemy out of his present position in the Agedabia area, and that the attack on Bardia is still going well despite an enemy counter-attack. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**605** *1 January.* Letter from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Auchinleck, announcing that the Defence Committee has decided to include Iraq and Iran in MEC against his advice; and expressing a wish to see Auchinleck back in India, from where it

would be possible to command both Burma and the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**606** 2 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that there has been a pause in activity at Bardia until the night attack, that Godwin-Austen thinks that the 1st Armoured Division needs more training before a sustained attempt is made to push the enemy out of Agedabia and to pursue him, and that the 2nd South African Division has taken more prisoners. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**607** 2 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/520 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, announcing completion of the capture of Bardia and the release of 1,000 British prisoners of war. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**608** 2 *January*. Cipher message no. G/10950 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, agreeing that, if the enemy intends to make a stand between Agedabia and El Agheila, it would be better for the 8th Army to delay action in order to build up a strong force; and expressing his suspicion that the Allied tanks are not as good as the German tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**609** 3 *January*. Cipher message no. G/10998 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the capture of Bardia. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, expressing his pleasure that the South Africans played such a prominent part in the capture. 1 leaf. Typescript and holograph.

**610** 4 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/543 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting on small engagements between enemy forward troops and the 8th Army in the Agedabia area, on the heavy losses suffered by the 22nd Armoured Brigade which is to be relieved by the 2nd Armoured Brigade as soon as possible, on the numbers of prisoners captured in Bardia (7,000 altogether, including 1,000 Germans), and on severe storms in Palestine and Syria. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**611** 4 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, concerning the recent operations of the 22nd Armoured Brigade, his suspicion that the Brigade was badly handled, his reluctance to sanction an attempt to push the enemy out of Agedabia until the forces are available to keep him on the run, his awareness of the possibility of Rommel staging a counter-offensive, and his desire to see an attack made on Halfaya at the earliest possible moment. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**612** 4 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that he is building up reserves in the Agedabia area, preparing to attack Halfaya, and planning the advance into Tripolitania after the Agedabia battle. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**613** 4 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, nominating Gen. Wilson as his successor, should he become a casualty, in preference to Gen. Blamey, the Deputy C-in-C. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**614** 4 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/550 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, announcing that experience in battle has proved that the tanks used by the 8th Army are inferior in hitting power and in mechanical reliability to the German Mark III and Mark IV; and recommending that measures should be taken immediately to remedy some of the known defects. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**615** 5 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/555 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, the official version of the reply described in 609, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**616** 5 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/557 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, asserting that he is correct in his theories (608, above) relating to the armament of the 8th Army tanks, and that the armour itself appears to be satisfactory, although it is under investigation. With manuscript note (in the hand of Alexander Galloway?), indicating that the armour was not under criticism unlike the gunpower and other technical aspects of the tank. With a second copy of the cipher message (608, above) from Smuts. 3 leaves. Typescript and holograph.

**617** 7 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, reporting on preparations for the assault on Halfaya, on the stalemate on the Agedabia front, on the suspicion that the enemy may be planning to slip away and commence fortifying positions in the rear, on the losses of tanks in the 22nd Armoured Brigade's disastrous engagement with the enemy, on the lack of tactical ability in the RAC commanders, on defects in the design and armament of tanks, on the possibility that Rommel may stage an ambitious counter-attack from Agedabia, and on his views concerning a replacement for Wavell as C-in-C, India. 7 leaves. Typescript. With a table showing the tank position, British versus Axis. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**618** 8 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/564 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting that units of the 8th Army are pursuing the enemy retreating from Agedabia but progress is hampered by mines and booby-traps, that bad weather is preventing bombardment of Halfaya, and that he expects the enemy to stand on the line El Agheila-Marada. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**619** 8 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the enemy appears to be drawing back on to the line El Agheila-Marada, that his withdrawal is frustrating for the 8th Army because of the problems of maintenance associated with another 60 miles of stretched communications, that the Allied forces are closing in around Halfaya, and that preparations are still proceeding for an

advance into Tripolitania. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with a holograph note.

**620** 9 *January*. Notes on the present military situation, comprising a review of available information as to the positions the enemy may hold at the end of his withdrawal and a survey of his probable dispositions, with the conclusion that he is severely short of troops. From GSA (a), Advanced HQ, 8th Army. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**621** 9 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/572 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, declaring that he has no objection to Free French troops from Syria going to Russia provided that the strategic situation in MEC permits this reduction in strength, but he would welcome an assurance that De Gaulle has not the power to move Free French troops either into or out of his Command without prior approval of the WO and of himself. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**622** 10 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that operations in Western Cyrenaica are still chiefly confined to offensive patrol activities, that he is considering the possibility of an outflanking movement via the south, with the intention of establishing a position at Marada, and that the operation to reduce Halfaya is planned for later in the month. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**623** 11 *January*. Cipher message no. 155 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his disappointment that the enemy has been able to retreat with  $7\frac{1}{2}$  divisions intact, that 9 enemy ships have reached Tripoli safely, and that Rommel's Italian infantry has escaped to safety. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**624** 11 *January*. Cipher message no. 0/48413 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke and Gen. W. Dobbie (C-in-C, Malta), concerning the difficulties in sending adequate reinforcements from the ME to Malta. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**625** 11 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, asking for information concerning available resources; and suggesting that the South Africans, who are not allowed to operate outside Africa, should now be fit to take over from the 4th Indian Division, that the 7th Armoured Division Support Group should be withdrawn from the desert as soon as possible, that the 38th Brigade should be released, and that an attack on Halfaya should not be delayed until the last week of the month. 3 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**626** 12 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/586 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting that the enemy has completed his withdrawal to the Mersa Brega-El Agheila area, that his formations appear to be numerically weak, and that the unloading of ships at Benghazi has been hampered by bad weather. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**627** *12 January.* Cipher message no. CS/587 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in answer to 623, above, pointing out that the enemy's divisions are seriously under strength, that only one third of Rommel's Italian infantry escaped to a safe position, that only 6 enemy ships reached Tripoli, and that it is still his intention to advance into Tripolitania. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**628** *12 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, describing some of the lessons learned from the offensive campaign in Libya, including the realization that our armoured forces are not equal in equipment to the Germans, lacking adequate armament, and that, for a successful operation, close, continuous association of the tanks, the infantry and the artillery is essential; and indicating that the next objective of the 8th Army is to secure El Agheila and, possibly, Marada. 6 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**629** *12 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, containing proposals for the reorganization of the units in his command, based on his belief that there should be much closer co-operation in battle between the armoured corps, the artillery and the infantry, and that the basic tactical unit of the army in the desert should be the self-contained brigade group. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**630** *12 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, concerning the timing of the planned advance into Tripolitania in February, the slow progress towards El Agheila, and the start of the attempt by the 2nd South African Division to reduce the garrison at Sollum. 2 leaves. Typescript. Incomplete: wanting a 3rd leaf. With autograph comments by Auchinleck.

**631** *12 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, in reply to 625, above, reporting that the plan to defeat the enemy in the El Agheila position is complete, but may not be put into operation until mid-February; that he does not consider that all the South Africans are fit to take over from the 4th Indian Division at present; that he has made arrangements for the relief of the 7th Armoured Division Support Group; that he hopes to be able to release the 38th Infantry Brigade by the end of the month; that he will do what he can to bring forward the date for the attack on Halfaya; and that the enemy garrison at Sollum has capitulated. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**632** *13 January.* Cipher message no. 156 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his appreciation of Auchinleck's message (627, above) and of his willingness to push on for a decisive battle on the El Agheila-Marada front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**633** *13 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Willoughby Norrie (Commander, 30th Corps), thanking him for his report on Maj.-Gen. Brink (1st South African Division); congratulating him on

the capture of Sollum; and urging him to launch the attack on Halfaya as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**634** *13 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, on behalf of Auchinleck, to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, thanking him for his confidential report of 8 January concerning the action of the 22nd Armoured Brigade on 30 December 1941; expressing Auchinleck's conviction that Brig. Scott-Cockburn's dispositions were sound, that his withdrawal of his brigade was effected with skill, and that his conduct deserved credit; and warning Ritchie of the misunderstandings created by inaccurate and carelessly-worded reports of subordinate commanders. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**635** *13 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying a paper (not included) on the technique required to ensure the best co-operation between tanks, infantry and artillery. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**636** *14 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that, owing to problems of maintenance, it would not be safe to launch an offensive against the enemy's present positions around El Agheila until 11–15 February, and that the attack on Halfaya is now due to start on 20 January. With enclosure: Notes on the possible date for resumption of offensive into Tripolitania. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**637** *14 January.* Letter from Gen. Frank Theron (South African Admin. HQ, ME) to Maj. A.B. Phillpotts, Auchinleck's Private Secretary, enclosing a copy of a confidential telegram, no. G/11249, from Gen. Van Ryneveld to Theron dated 9 January and of the reply of Theron dated 17 January, both concerning Maj.-Gen. Brink and the question of maintaining South African formations in the ME. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**638** *15 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, stating that he is glad that the date of the attack on Halfaya has been brought forward; suggesting that the sooner the South Africans begin to move into Cyrenaica the better; offering the services of the 150th Infantry Brigade; and expressing no surprise at the deferment of the next offensive because he expected it. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**639** *15 January.* Letter from the Minister of State's Private Secretary to Maj. A.B. Phillpotts, Auchinleck's Private Secretary, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Minister of State to the PM, protesting on Auchinleck's behalf at the slowness of the official mail service between Cairo and London, and suggesting that the air services should be increased. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**640** *15 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, giving the reasons why he wants a Major-General as DMT to train the three arms (tanks, artillery and infantry) to work closely together, in

preference to a Major-General concerned solely with AFV; why he does not share Martel's view of the RAC as a 'super-body'; why he is reluctant to send further reinforcements to Malta; and why he believes that Blamey's position as Deputy C-in-C needs to be reviewed. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**641** *17 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, disclosing further details of his plan to defeat the enemy in the El Agheila area, and rejoicing in the capitulation of the Halfaya garrison. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**642** *17 January.* Cipher message no. 157 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the surrender of the Halfaya garrison. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**643** *18 January.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on a visit to 13th Corps, on the desirability of Frank Messervy retaining command of the 1st Armoured Division, on the disposition of troops, and on the suitability of John Marriott as a divisional commander. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**644** *18 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Willoughby Norrie (Commander, 30th Corps), expressing his opinion of Maj.-Gen. Pienaar; and asking Norrie to visit him to discuss the organization of the Sollum – Maddalena – Jarabub line as a rear line of defence. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**645** *19 January.* Cipher message from FM Smuts to Maj.-Gen. I.P. de Villiers (Commander, 2nd South African Division), congratulating him and his men on the surrender of Halfaya and the earlier successes at Bardia and Sollum. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**646** *19 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying a copy of an instruction (not included) defining the policy to be adopted in the event of an enemy offensive against the northern front. With appendices on the organization of an armoured division, and on the order of battle for armoured divisions, infantry divisions and unallotted brigades in his command. 1 leaf and 4 sheets. Typescript.

**647** *21 January.* Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, concerning 'Jumbo' Wilson; whether he should take command of the 9th Army based in Syria; and whether he should be nominated as successor to Auchinleck in the event of the latter becoming a casualty; with a sentence at the end expressing the hope that Rommel's counter-attack has been stopped. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**648** *21 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying Operation Instruction no. 110 (not included), outlining his policy on the western front should circumstances make it necessary to withdraw from Cyrenaica, a precautionary measure which he

regards as a form of insurance. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**649** *21 January.* Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, expressing the view that North Africa would provide an excellent base of attack on Italy; speculating whether the proposed invasion of Tripolitania will be possible in the present circumstances given the failure to destroy Rommel's force, the unavoidable delays in bringing up supplies, the reduced strength of the naval force in the eastern Mediterranean, and the diversion of resources to the Far East; and agreeing with Auchinleck's opinion (640, above) of Martel's efforts to make the RAC into a separate, private army, while at the same time insisting that Auchinleck should have on his staff a specialist in armoured warfare of equal rank to the chief artillery representative. With a table showing the suggested layout of HQ staff, with Major-Generals for artillery, AA and armoured vehicles. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**650** *24 January.* Cipher message no. CS/649 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, welcoming the possibility of using US troops in his command, but suggesting that, if they are used, they should be employed in the western section of the ME theatre, not in the east. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**651** *24 January.* Cipher message no. CS/652 from the C-in-Cs, ME theatre to Winston Churchill, giving statistics of comparative army strengths at the beginning of the Crusader campaign, losses inflicted on the enemy by the Navy and the Fleet Air Arm and their own casualties, estimates of enemy losses in men and equipment, and Allied army losses in men. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**652** *24 January.* Pencilled draft of a letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, in reply to 567, above, expressing his gratitude for all that Dill has done for him in the past, his sense of loss arising from Dill's departure from the WO, and his hope that he will be able to hit back successfully at Rommel after the counter-attack staged by the enemy against the forward troops around Agedabia. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**653** *25 January.* Cipher message no. 161 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, voicing concern at reports of subordinate officers in the 8th Army who appear to envisage the evacuation of Benghazi and Derna; asking whether the 8th Army has suffered a heavy defeat in the Antelat area; and expressing astonishment that such a serious crisis should develop so unexpectedly. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**654** *26 January.* Letter from Auchinleck, at Advanced HQ, 8th Army, to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, expressing dissatisfaction with the situation, especially with the performance of the 1st Armoured Division which has been pushed out of Msus; reporting that steps have been taken to evacuate Benghazi although he is reluctant to abandon it, that efforts are being made to protect Mechili, that

Ritchie has taken the 4th Indian Division under his direct command, and that it is vital to recover the initiative as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**655** 26 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, pointing out that there are discrepancies between the information in his telegram and the latest situation report from the 8th Army, so HQ staff are making sure that their report to the WO agrees with Auchinleck's message to the PM. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**656** 27 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, expressing his concern about the condition of the 1st Armoured Division which, according to the 13th Corps commander, can no longer be counted upon as a fighting force; and reporting that orders have been issued to the 4th Indian Division to hold Benghazi and to undertake an offensive operation against the enemy's western flank from Msus to Antelat. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**657** 27 *January*. Letter at 1300 hrs from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting that the 1st Armoured Division has been ordered to hold Charruba and attack the enemy. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**658** 27 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, concerning the appointment of a DMT, the possibility of considering Gatehouse for the office of Brigadier, AFV, the political crisis in Egypt, and the readiness of the 1st New Zealand Division to go to the forward area if required. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**659** 27 *January*. Testimonial concerning Brig. Gatehouse, written by Maj.-Gen. W.H.E. Gott (Commander, 7th Armoured Division), recommending that he should not be given command of a Division but should be considered for command of a School or as a Director, AFV. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**660** 27 *January*. Cipher message no. G12161 from FM Smuts to Gen. Frank Theron, expressing his shock at developments in Cyrenaica and his anxiety lest confidence should be lost politically if the North African situation were to deteriorate. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**661** 27 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/666 from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to FM Smuts, in reply to 660, above, informing him that Auchinleck is at Advanced HQ, and that there is a lull in battle and the Allies have been able to re-concentrate for offensive action. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**662** 28 *January*. Cipher message no. 161 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, assuring him of his complete confidence; asking whether he has received the information about Rommel's presumed intention to clear up the triangle Benghazi – Msus – Mechili and then hold the line at El Agheila; and enquiring about the reason for the defeat of

British armour by inferior enemy numbers. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**663** 28 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting the bold stroke of the enemy in dividing his forces in diametrically opposite directions, his confidence that Ritchie has the situation in hand, the news that the 1st Armoured Division has been reorganized and is ready for action, and the need for the reformed 4th Armoured Brigade to be brought up to the desert as soon as possible. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**664** 28 *January*. Letter, written a.m., from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, concerning reinforcement and command of the 4th Armoured Brigade Group; and recommending Gatehouse for the Directorate, AFV. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**665** 28 *January*. Letter, at c. 1300 hrs, from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, containing further suggestions of possible candidates for the command of the 4th Armoured Brigade Group. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**666** 28 *January*. Letter, at c. 1900 hrs, from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, expressing disappointment at the PM's speech; reporting that the Egyptian crisis appears to be over, and that a message has arrived through naval channels announcing the evacuation of Benghazi. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**667** 29 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, declaring that he would like Maj.-Gen. Scobie as his DAG; that he does not want Gatehouse to be appointed Brigadier, AFV; that the situation in the desert is not good, the enemy having outmanoeuvred the 8th Army, and withdrawal from Benghazi being under way; and describing Ritchie's plans for reorganization in order to stabilize the front. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**668** 29 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, commenting on Ritchie's plans for reorganization (667, above), on the importance of artillery as an anti-tank weapon in the present circumstances, and on the necessity for the demolitions at Benghazi, although they were carried out prematurely. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**669** 30 *January*. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, following 647, above, suggesting alternatives to Gen. 'Jumbo' Wilson for command of the 9th Army. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**670** 30 *January*. Cipher message no. CS/678 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 662, above, expressing the hope that the loss of Benghazi is only temporary; attributing the defeat of the 1st Armoured Division to the inferiority of the 8th Army's guns and tanks compared with the Germans', and to the lack of quality in tactical leadership of armoured units; and announcing his plan to re-form the 1st Armoured Division behind Mechili and to include it in a striking

force to be established under the command of 30th Corps HQ. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**671** 30 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting on the move of 8th Army Advanced HQ from Tmimi to Sidi Daud; on the need for positive superiority in numbers of men and equipment to compensate for inferiority in tactical skills and in the quality of arms and armour, especially of tanks; and on the heavy losses suffered by the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade at Benghazi and the weakness of the 4th Indian Division. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**672** 30 *January*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, concerning reinforcements from the Sudan, the difficult political position of FM Smuts in South Africa, the news from the DMO that Auchinleck's proposals are receiving consideration, and the renewed crisis in Egypt. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**673** 30 *January*. Cipher message no. G12374 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, commiserating with him in the setback; and urging him to build up rapidly an adequate force to take the offensive and to make sure that Rommel does not retreat beyond Benghazi. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**674** 30 *January*. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton, acting Minister of State, to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, containing a draft of a message he suggests Auchinleck should send to FM Smuts, explaining why the Allies stopped short of El Agheila and the circumstances in which the enemy counter-attacked; and expressing the hope that by the summer Rommel will be routed. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**675** 30 *January*. Draft of a cipher message from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, explaining that the loss to Rommel of two thirds of his original army must have upset Axis plans and that, although the present campaign is bound to ebb and flow, the Allies are confident of ultimate success, and the morale of the troops remains as high as ever. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**676** 31 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, reporting the slow withdrawal from Barce of part of the 4th Indian Division and the withdrawal of the 1st Armoured Division behind Mechili. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**677** 31 *January*. Note from Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, reporting that he has dispatched Auchinleck's cable to the PM (670, above). 1 leaf. Holograph.

**678** *n.d., February*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, referring to his Operation Instruction no. 9 and the minutes of a meeting held at Haifa between himself and the GOCs of the 9th and 10th Armies. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**679** 1 *February*. Letter from Lord Ismay, at Chequers, to

Auchinleck, apologizing for not writing sooner; expressing his conviction that, although the tide in the ME has temporarily turned in the enemy's favour, Auchinleck will get his own back before long; disclosing that the PM, despite his impatience, also has complete confidence in him; and commenting on the comparatively light casualties in Malaya, the sinking of HMS *Repulse*, the ability of Sir Alan Brooke, America's entry into the war, and the fall of Hong Kong. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**680** 1 February. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Alan Hartley to Auchinleck, referring to his appointment as C-in-C, India early in January, to the effects of the war in the Far East on supplies for India and the ME, to the precarious state of Singapore, to problems in Burma, and to his admiration for the Viceroy. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**681** 4 February. Message no. MS/57640 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, announcing that Godwin-Austen has asked to be relieved of command of 13th Corps and has been replaced by Gott, and that J.C. Campbell has been placed in command of 7th Armoured Division, now re-forming in the Delta. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**682** 5 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying a note (not included) on the policy to be pursued on the Libyan front, approved by the local Defence Committee. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph note.

**683** 6 February. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, back in Cairo, describing the present, intermediate and final dispositions of the 8th Army in preparation for a battle on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line; his suspicion that the enemy's force south of Derna is weak and that a minor offensive may be possible; and his concern about the withdrawal of the 4th Indian Division and the ability of its commander. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**684** c. 6 February. Statistics relating to the composition and present holding of 13th Corps and 30th Corps. 8 leaves. Typescript.

**685** 6 February. Table showing the present composition, state and future dispositions of the 8th Army. 1 sheet. Typescript.

**686** 6 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, declaring that any minor success in battle would be invaluable at present, and that, although it is planned to return some troops to the Delta, nothing must be done to endanger the 8th Army's hold on the present line or the security of Tobruk. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**687** 6 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, explaining that, in his statement on the possibility of resuming the offensive at an early date, he has deliberately omitted detailed calculations of prospective tank strength because he has learned from experience the impossibility of reconciling such figures with those

issued at home, particularly by the Minister of Defence, but he is sending detailed calculations to the CIGS for his own personal information. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**688** 6 February. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, indicating that he attributes Rommel's recent success in part to over-optimistic intelligence reports received by Auchinleck, and wondering whether he would be advised to change his DMI; commenting on Auchinleck's proposals for military reorganization which he has approved within the ME theatre of operations but which he thinks are particularly useful only in certain areas, the need remaining for large-scale attacks with large forces in other areas of warfare; expressing the view that Auchinleck needs a Major-General, AFV, because the handling of armoured forces at the time of Rommel's counter-attack revealed weaknesses in leadership and organization; promising to do what he can to remedy the lack of gun power of British tanks; appreciating the deprivation suffered by MEC in Syria, Iraq and Persia by the withdrawal of Australian divisions and the interception of other divisions to meet Far East threats; and explaining that shipping constitutes the real bottle-neck in the supply of reinforcements. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**689** 8 February. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, announcing that he is starting two minor offensive enterprises, one in the neighbourhood of Tmimi, the second in the area of Mechili; describing the location of sections of the 1st South African Division, the main force being concentrated in the Gazala position, and the future disposition of the 4th Indian Division; stating that he has not yet completed his investigation of the circumstances of the withdrawal of the 4th Indian Division; and proposing to use a brigade group to occupy the area between Siwa and Jarabub which will eventually operate westwards towards Jalo. With autograph note by Auchinleck. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**690** 8 February. Notes on draft Operation Instruction no. CRME/1775/G(O) (mentioned in 682 and 687, above) by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, stating that, on the figures given, he does not consider that the 8th Army can resume the offensive on a large scale until 1 May at the earliest, recognizing at the same time that the real danger lies in the possibility that the enemy may be able to stage an attack with the majority of his armour within the next few weeks, before the 8th Army has built up an adequate armoured force. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**691** 8 February. The holding state of the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade Group on 7 February. Signed by Capt. Roe, Brigade Commander. 1 sheet. Typescript.

**692** 8 February. Cipher message no. CS/715 from Auchinleck to FM

Smuts, being the fair copy of the draft recorded in 675, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**693** 9 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying a copy of a report (not included), written by Maj.-Gen. Freyberg, on the part played by the New Zealand Division in the first phase of the Cyrenaican campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**694** 9 February. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, thanking him for recent copies of Operation Instructions; warning him that he cannot now count on the presence of all the formations mentioned in his Order of Battle of 19 January; and expressing the view that he is unnecessarily pessimistic in expecting a threat to his northern front as early as 1 April or even in the middle of May. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**695** 9 February. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, concerning the location of the enemy's armoured strength and a reassuring report received from Maj.-Gen. Gott of the relatively high fighting efficiency of the 4th Indian Division which should still be relieved as soon as possible. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**696** 10 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, agreeing with Ritchie's view that the 8th Army cannot be expected to hold Derna unless it can be quite sure of keeping the enemy out of Mechili; expressing concern that reports continue to come in of heavy losses in men and material during the withdrawal from Western Cyrenaica; and announcing that the 50th Division is being sent up to the front, and that he has written to Smuts once again indicating the impossibility of maintaining two three-brigade South African divisions in the field. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**697** 10 February. Cipher message no. 612929 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, in answer to 675 and 692, above, indicating that he does not share Auchinleck's optimism, that the 8th Army's failure to hold Cyrenaica is a serious matter, and that the gravity of the situation should not be concealed from the Government and the public. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**698** 10 February. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, explaining that it is not possible to maintain in the field more than two brigades in each South African Division, the third brigade being required as a pool for reinforcements; and proposing to form the personnel of the third brigade of each of the two divisions into a South African Base Depot at Mersa Matruh. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**699** 11 February. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that it seems clear that the enemy intends to resume offensive operations at the earliest possible moment when he

anticipates that the 8th Army will not be strong enough to counter-attack. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph notes. With Appendix A: Infantry Brigade Groups needed for the defence of the Gazala-Hacheim position. Appendix B: Disposal of Infantry Brigade Groups, 8th Army. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**700** *11 February*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, describing his suspicion that the enemy is about to launch a renewed attack; speculating on the direction of his offensive, which he thinks is most likely to be directly turned on to the Tobruk-El Adem-Acroma area; and expressing his own view of the measures to be taken to surprise the enemy, to avoid being misled by his feints and movements, and to keep track of his main tank concentrations. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**701** *12 February*. Cipher message no. 163 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing complete confidence in the ultimate success of his campaign. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**702** *12 February*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, in reply to 700, above, agreeing that the enemy's offensive will almost certainly take the form of a sudden, sharp attack, and that the main battle is likely to be in the Tobruk area; reporting that the enemy's action will probably take place about 15 February, that it is now impossible to carry out minor offensive operations, and that the South African Divisional Commanders still do not accept the concept of a two-brigade division. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**703** *12 February*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, declaring that he has heard rumours of 'tired troops'; pointing out that no one has time to be tired at such a critical time; and agreeing with Ritchie that, to ensure the safety of Tobruk from a 'blitz' raid, it is necessary to make Acroma and El Adem secure as back-stops. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**704** *13 February*. Cipher message no. CS/729 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, sympathizing with his difficulties, not made easier by the Allied failure in Cyrenaica, but expressing confidence in the 8th Army's ability to hold Egypt and reluctance to expose too readily to the public the potential weaknesses of the Allied force. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**705** *13 February*. Letter from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Auchinleck, expressing concern about the quality of the officers sent from Britain to augment the IA; and suggesting that more suitable officers could be found perhaps in MEC, either among men worthy of promotion from the ranks or among those already commissioned with war experience. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**706** *14 February*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke,

indicating that there has been a misunderstanding about the appointment of a Major-General, AFV because Auchinleck had been under the impression that he would not be allowed to have two more Major-Generals, and he wanted priority for the DMT appointment, but he is delighted to be able to have a Major-General, AFV as well; announcing that he is sending the 50th Division, instead of the New Zealand Division, to reinforce the 8th Army; and questioning whether intelligence reports in the ME have been over-optimistic, but admitting that he prefers optimism to heavy pessimism. With a postscript containing the news that the enemy is on the move as expected. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with a holograph note.

**707** *14 February.* Cipher message GJP/61448 from the C-in-Cs, ME, to the Chiefs of Staff, London, suggesting that their task would be easier if they received earlier and fuller information concerning future strategic policy, and that the problem could be solved by means of a regular series of telegrams carrying such information at the preliminary stage, before plans were fully accepted by the Chiefs of Staff and the Government. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**708** *14 February.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, agreeing with his theory concerning the enemy's most likely course of action and the probability that the main battle will be in the north; stressing the importance of Martuba and Derna from the Navy's point of view; and expressing the opinion that the Desert Army cannot afford to take the 1st Armoured Division out of the battle to give it time to settle down. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**709** *14 February.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that columns from the 1st South African Division have pushed as far north as the Tmimi – Mechili track, and that defences are being prepared on the Sollum – Maddalena line; and giving details of gun and motor transport losses during the withdrawal. With a holograph note, describing reports of enemy activity, but indicating that there is no clear information on the purpose and extent of the movements. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**710** *14 February.* Notes by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie on the defence of the Gazala – Bir Hacheim position, the object of which is to secure Tobruk, giving details of the enemy's possible employment of his armour and of comparative strengths of armour. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**711** *15 February.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that the enemy is closing in after earlier attempts to draw out the 8th Army from its prepared defensive positions, and that it is vitally important to hold the Gazala position as a secure base from which to operate; and declaring that he had not intended to remove the 1st Armoured Division from the front altogether, but that he would

prefer to substitute the 7th Armoured Division for the forward role. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**712** *16 February.* Cipher message no. CS/737 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, declaring that he appreciates the situation following the fall of Singapore, and that he will do what he can to contribute towards victory. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**713** *16 February.* Letter from E. Dorman-Smith ('Chink'), in Heliopolis, to Auchinleck, conveying the opinion of Maj.-Gen. de Villiers (Commander, 2nd South African Division) concerning the concept of the two-brigade division, which he rejects in favour of the amalgamation of both South African divisions into one division composed of four brigades and one independent brigade group. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**714** *16 February.* Notes of an interview between Auchinleck and Maj.-Gen. I.P. de Villiers (with the CGS present) to discuss the future organization of the South African forces in the ME; in which agreement was reached that the future organization could be either one division of three brigade groups plus one independent brigade group, or two divisions each of two brigades. The first alternative is preferred by the South African commanders and is acceptable to Auchinleck. Signed by Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith, CGS. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**715** *c. 16 February.* Extract from a signal from Air Vice-Marshal Tedder, AOC-in-C, to Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, asking him to administer a sharp rebuke to those ill-informed newspaper leader-writers who attribute the reverse in the Western Desert, and the failure to reach Tripoli, to lack of air support and to an inability on the part of the RAF to exploit air superiority to the best advantage. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**716** *16 February.* Message no. AX.883 from Sir Archibald Sinclair to Air Vice-Marshal Tedder in reply to 715, above, agreeing with Tedder, but suggesting that it would be better if Auchinleck sent a signal to the Secretary of State for War, deprecating the newspaper campaign and stressing the value of army-air co-operation. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**717** *17 February.* Cipher message no. CS/741 from Auchinleck to H.D.R. Margesson, Secretary of State for War, stating firmly that the recent reverse in Cyrenaica was not due to lack of air support or failure by the RAF to exploit air superiority, but to the 8th Army's attempt to bluff the enemy with weak forces in the forward area; the enemy was not deceived and gained a tactical success which then made it strategically impossible for the 8th Army to stay in Benghazi, and Gazala was chosen as the position for stabilization. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**718** *17 February.* Telegram no. MS/62668 from Auchinleck to

Lt.-Gen. A.N. Floyer-Acland, Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, stating that he has decided that Maj.-Gen. Godwin-Austen should return to the UK without delay. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**719** *17 February*. Cipher message no. 71381 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, warning him that the present growing threat to India and Ceylon will involve the dispatch of the 70th Division to Ceylon and Burma, the diversion of the 9th Australian Division to a destination not yet fixed, and the possible return to India of one division of the 10th Army, thereby making Auchinleck's task in the ME more difficult, and possibly affecting his plans to regain Cyrenaica, restricting his activity to the defence of the Egyptian frontier and internal security on the northern front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**720** *17 February*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, concerning the lack of confidence experienced by commanders in the field in recent intelligence reports and in the DMI himself. 2 leaves. Holograph, with autograph comment by Auchinleck.

**721** *18 February*. Cipher message no. 71421 from H.D.R. Margesson, Secretary of State for War, to Auchinleck, in reply to 717, above, reporting that there is no sign of a newspaper campaign to discredit the RAF in the ME, and that he is delighted to hear of the close and harmonious co-operation between land and air forces. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**722** *18 February*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the enemy is probably playing for time until he can get Benghazi open, that the 13th Corps is establishing columns on the line Tmimi – Mechili to attempt to push the enemy out of both places, that he has drastically reduced the number of non-combatant personnel in Tobruk, and that the 1st Armoured Division is undergoing training and reorganization. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**723** *19 February*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Ronald Adam, the AG, concerning a proposal to limit the occasions and circumstances which require the saluting of officers by other ranks, expressing the unanimous opinion of the army commanders in the ME that there should be no change in present regulations. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**724** *21 February*. Telegram no. 72174 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, announcing that he has received a note from the PM suggesting that Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith should be relieved from the office of CGS, MEC, and offering the names of possible successors. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**725** *23 February*. Cipher message no. CS/755 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 724, above, agreeing that Lt.-Gen. Smith is due for a change; asking that he should be recalled to a definite appointment to avoid misconceptions; and announcing that he

would like Lt.-Gen. Corbett to be his new CGS, and that he has decided that Brig. Shearer should be relieved from the office of DMI. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**726** *23 February.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying Operation Instructions 111 and 112 (not included), dealing respectively with future policy and plans for the northern and western fronts. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**727** *24 February.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, accompanying a report (not included) by Maj.-Gen. Messervy, Commander, on the recent operations by the 1st Armoured Division in Western Cyrenaica. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**728** *27 February.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that he would like to employ the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade at Hacheim; that the 1st South African Division has organized its defences efficiently; that he has come to the conclusion that a fixed battle array is not necessary for a whole armoured division, only for brigade groups; that he will be ready to move the 2nd South African Division into the Tobruk area by the middle of March; and lamenting the death in a road accident of Maj.-Gen. J.C. Campbell, Commander, 7th Armoured Division. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with autograph marginal comments by Auchinleck.

**729** *27 February.* Cipher message no. CS/753 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, containing a detailed review of the situation; announcing that the 8th Army holds strong positions in the areas Gazala – Tobruk – Bir Hacheim, Sollum – Maddalena and Jarabub – Siwa; describing his own deductions of enemy dispositions and relative tank strengths, and his intention to stage, as soon as possible, a limited offensive to regain landing grounds in the Derna – Mechili area; but estimating that the 8th Army will not have reasonable numerical superiority in tanks before 1 June and that it is not feasible to launch a major offensive before that date. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**730** *27 February.* Cipher message no. 73286 from the Chiefs of Staff to Auchinleck, stressing the overriding importance of Malta, the impossibility of getting convoys to the island from the west, and the urgent need to begin an advance in Cyrenaica before the beginning of May to enable a substantial convoy to get through to Malta from the east. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**731** *1 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, declaring that he does not now think that the enemy will attack on the northern front before 1 August, although this may be an optimistic view; and pointing out the serious consequences in the ME theatre of the reductions in personnel and equipment. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**732** *2 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir James Grigg, newly-

appointed Secretary of State for War, congratulating him; then bringing to his attention the problems of IA officers being transferred to 'British' formations and dropping pay, the unwillingness of the WO to give adequate rank to officers bearing certain responsibilities, the ban by the Military Secretary on the publication in the local press of lists of immediate awards until the King has approved them, and the need for flexibility in the organization of the Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**733** 2 March. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, suggesting that it might promote understanding between the Union of South Africa and the UK if parties of young officers and men from his Command were sent as 'tourists' on visits to the Union. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**734** 4 March. Cipher telegram no. CS/789 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, expressing doubt whether the signal COS/241 could have had the approval of the CIGS in view of the fact that it ignores local difficulties and is inconsistent with the understanding message sent on 17 February (719, above); and stating that the C-in-Cs are fully aware of the importance of Malta and are trying to face realities; that tank strengths, as given by the WO, include vehicles under repair or awaiting repair; and that many other factors besides the mere issue of tanks to units govern the readiness of formations for battle, including changes in tactical procedures when new types of tank are received. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**735** 4 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, asking for a Major-General as the principal GS officer on the HQ of the 8th Army, although he is quite prepared to accept the principle that such a senior officer may not always be needed at every HQ of an Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**736** 4 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, concerning Lt.-Gen. Godwin-Austen, accompanying his account (not included) of his conduct of the operations of the 13th Corps in Cyrenaica between 21 January and 5 February. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**737** 5 March. The organization of GSI, ME Forces. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**738** 5 March. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on a defensive exercise by 13th Corps, on the need to relieve the Polish Brigade Group, on the possibility of a sea-borne attack on Mersa Matruh, on the position of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, on his reluctance to send the Yugoslavian Battalion to Tobruk, on the successful defensive system established by the 1st South African Division, and on his calculations of enemy dispositions. With marginal comments in the hand of Auchinleck. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**739** 6 March. Cipher message no. 74605 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke

to Auchinleck, in answer to 734, above, explaining that Auchinleck's appreciation of the situation (729, above) met with considerable disapproval from the Defence Minister (Churchill), a disapproval forcefully expressed in a telegram which he planned to send and which would have hurt Auchinleck's feelings much more than the message substituted by the Chiefs of Staff, which they persuaded the Defence Minister to approve; stating that the situation had changed considerably since the telegram of 17 February (719, above), that the full gravity of the state of Malta was not apparent then, that the decisions not to withdraw further forces from the ME and to leave the Indian Division there had not been taken; and expressing continued difficulty in reconciling Auchinleck's figures of tank strengths. 1 leaf. Typescript. With autograph comment by Auchinleck.

**740** 6 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, concerning his plans for reorganization of the Army in the ME to bring the three arms much closer together by use of the armoured brigade group. With a table showing the organization of a new model infantry battalion. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**741** 6 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, concerning Brig. Shearer. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**742** 7 March. Cipher message no. CS/799 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, reporting on the need for systematic and continuous instruction in peace-time for brigade and divisional leaders to improve the standard of leadership in war; and advocating the establishment in the ME of a higher war course organized on scientific lines, possibly located in the Union of South Africa. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**743** 7 March. Cipher message no. 165 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, declaring that his appreciation of 27 February (729, above) and the subsequent correspondence between Auchinleck and the Chiefs of Staff have disclosed a very serious situation, and that he should be glad if Auchinleck would come home for consultation at his earliest convenience, bringing with him any officers he may need, particularly a specialist in tanks and their maintenance. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**744** 7 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, enclosing a précis of his appreciation (729, above) sent to the PM, entitled 'Review of the situation in Libya, 26 February 1942'. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**745** 7 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 669, above, expressing a desire to leave Gen. 'Jumbo' Wilson in his present command; and thanking him for allowing Lt.-Gen. T. Corbett to succeed Lt.-Gen. Arthur Smith as his CGS, and for appointing Col. F. de Guingand as successor to Brig. Shearer. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**746** 7 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, stating that he is under pressure to take action which, in his opinion, would be dangerous at present, but emphasizing at the same time that he is anxious to resume the offensive at the earliest possible date; commenting on the advisability of mobile base organization for brigade groups and on Ritchie's need for a more experienced Chief of Staff, nominating Brig. J. Whiteley for this task; declaring that he is most anxious to get the Poles and the New Zealanders out of Libya, proposing to send the 5th Indian Division in their place; and praising the performance of the Grant tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**747** 8 March. Cipher message no. Camp 2 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, from 10th Army HQ, concerning the PM's telegram (743, above), asking him to use his influence against the idea, which cannot do any good; and stating that he is unwilling at present to leave his command for even a short period and still remain responsible for it. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**748** 9 March. Cipher message no. CS/812 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, declaring that he cannot leave the ME at present because the strategical situation is so fluid and liable to rapid change; that he cannot give any more information about the tank situation; and that a visit to London is not going to make it more possible to launch an earlier offensive. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**749** 9 March. Cipher message no. 75223 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, pointing out that many important matters are at present under consideration, including the state of Malta, the Levant – Caspian front, the Far Eastern situation, the allotment of forces between the ME and India, and armoured strengths in Cyrenaica, all issues demanding consultation between Auchinleck and the Chiefs of Staff; and that, therefore, there is an urgent need for Auchinleck to visit London, even if this involves Gen. Wilson taking over his command for a few days. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**750** 12 March. Cipher message no. Camp 5 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, from 10th Army HQ, in reply to 749, above, declaring that he cannot leave his command because of reorganization, redistribution and the possibility of active operations, but suggesting instead that the CIGS and the CAS should visit Cairo or Baghdad for a conference with Wavell, Peirse and himself. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**751** 12 March. Cipher message no. 167 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that he has proposed to President Roosevelt that he should send an extra division to Australia and another to New Zealand on condition that the New Zealand Division and the 9th Australian Division remain in the ME; that the President has agreed to provide American shipping to carry two British divisions to the ME or India, as circumstances require; and that three further British

divisions are to be moved in British shipping from the UK. With autograph comments by Auchinleck and a draft message of thanks in reply. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies, only the first bearing Auchinleck's comments and reply.

**752** *12 March.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that he is working hard on the composition and layout of the mobile armoured base; and reporting the movement of brigade groups from the 2nd South African Division, thus releasing other formations for return to the Delta, with the possibility that the 4th Indian Division will replace the 2nd South African Division in the Sollum area. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**753** *15 March.* Cipher message no. 168 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that his appreciation of 27 February (729, above) continues to cause deep anxiety to the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee, and expressing bitter regret that he is unable to come home for consultation; challenging the need for delay in attacking on the grounds that the 8th Army's losses were far less than those of the enemy, who nonetheless continued to fight, and that the enemy has fewer tanks than Auchinleck estimated; and proposing, in order to maintain mutual understanding, to send Sir Stafford Cripps and Lt.-Gen. Nye to Cairo to present the opinions of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff. 2 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**754** *15 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, in reply to 705, above, reporting that he is reorganizing formations and units in the light of experience of the Libyan desert; that he agrees with Amery on the need to produce good officers for the IA; that he himself has had to spare resources for other fronts; that the failure to hold Singapore remains a mystery to him; that he cannot resume the offensive in the desert while the 8th Army's armoured forces are weaker in quantity and in quality than those of the enemy; and that he is maintaining a strong position in the Gazala – Tobruk area and also on the line Sollum – Maddalena to provide for the possibility, however remote, that it may become necessary to stand on the defensive. 2 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**755** *15 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, suggesting that IA medals and decorations should be brought into line with those of the British Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**756** *15 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, declaring that he is not satisfied with the standard of leadership of the unit commanders of the RAC, especially of some of the cavalry officers who have not a reasonable mechanical knowledge, and suggesting that any highly recommended officer should be eligible for appointment to command an armoured regiment, whether he is RAC (Cavalry) or RAC (RTR) or Infantry. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**757** *15 March.* C-in-Cs' directive: the demolition of Tobruk and Bardia – instructions issued in the event of a withdrawal. Addressed to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, Air Vice-Marshal A. Coningham and SNOIS. Signed by Admiral A.B. Cunningham, Auchinleck and Air Chief-Marshal A.W. Tedder. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**758** *16 March.* Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, announcing that he has been directed by the PM to take charge of the Office of the Minister of State, ME until a new Minister has been appointed. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**759** *17 March.* Cipher message no. 169 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, warning him that if, after all discussions, it is decided to remain on the defensive in the desert until July, then it will be necessary to consider the immediate removal of at least 15 Air Squadrons from Libya to sustain the Russians in the Caucasus. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**760** *19 March.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, on the disposition of troops within the Gazala position, suggesting that the 1st Armoured Division should move to the El Adem area, and that the Free French Brigade should take over the defences at Tobruk. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**761** *20 March.* Cipher message no. TNG/75130 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, stating that he is asking permission from the WO to sanction the formation of a higher war course to prepare officers for senior posts in the ME in the near future, and suggesting that the course should be located in the Union of South Africa. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**762** *20 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, concerning the formation of a war course for senior officers of MEC, and its location in the Union. With draft of a note on the curriculum entitled 'Middle East Higher Commanders' Course'. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**763** *20/21 March.* Cipher message no. CC/4 from Sir Stafford Cripps to Winston Churchill, stating that, as a result of his talks with Auchinleck, Cunningham and Tedder, and in consultation with Nye, he has reached the conclusion that, because of inferior strength in tanks and in air-power, a successful offensive could not be launched at the present time; and expressing agreement with Auchinleck that to attempt to attack before mid-May would be to take an unwarrantable risk, and that an offensive, even then, would depend on the fulfilment of certain urgent requirements, namely, the dispatch to Malta of the Spitfires remaining in Gibraltar, the immediate dispatch of heavy bombers capable of reaching Tripoli, the receipt of light bombers from the USA, the dispatch to the ME of fitters to build up the reserve of tanks, and the cessation of further demands on the ME to send aircraft to India or elsewhere. The

initial attack would be an advance to Derna, then to El Adem and on to Benghazi. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**764** *21 March.* Report signed by Auchinleck entitled 'Libya, March 1942', in which he describes the object of military operations; the factors affecting the achievement of the object; the phases of the offensive operations which he expects to commence in mid-May or early June; and his conclusion that the first objective is to secure Cyrenaica, that in securing Cyrenaica his forces must destroy as much as possible of the enemy's army, that to secure Cyrenaica he must be able to maintain sufficient forces in the El Agheila neighbourhood to hold it against heavy enemy attack, and that the sooner an offensive can be launched the better. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**765** *22 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, in reply to 760, above, suggesting that the Free French Brigade should not be used as a 'guards and duty' formation; informing him that the Russians want the British to take 70,000 Poles from Russian Turkestan, and that he would be glad to keep 40,000 as reinforcements, provided that the equipment for them is made available; asking Ritchie why he thinks that Acroma, El Adem and the entrances to Tobruk are not yet adequately defended, and warning him that it might be advisable to expedite any readjustments he intends to make. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**766** *24 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, on the work of the 'deception' staff officers, the success of the 8th Army's excursion to Martuba and Tmimi, the dangers of misinformation acquired through over-optimistic reports about prisoners and guns, and the need to hold enquiries when the Army's own heavy guns are lost in battle. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**767** *25 March.* Cipher message no. TRG/77338 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, giving numbers of staff and students for the proposed ME Higher Commanders' Course. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**768** *26 March.* Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, expressing his approval of the appointment of Richard Casey as the new Minister of State in the ME; commenting on the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps to India to discuss British proposals for the solution of India's constitutional problem, and on the difficulties concerning the command of Yugoslav troops in Egypt. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**769** *26 March.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, in reply to 765 and 766, above, concerning the use of armoured car regiments and the rearrangement of dispositions of 13th Corps; explaining that he was not worried about the security of Tobruk, but about the arrangements for the evacuation of personnel and the ordering of demolitions; reporting that he is keeping the Free French

Brigade fully occupied, and that he is using the 'deception' staff to the best advantage; admitting that some of the reports received of the Martuba – Tmimi operation were inaccurate, and giving correct details of captured guns and of losses in personnel and equipment of 50th Division. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**770** 26 March. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, acknowledging receipt of a directive concerning the importance of hygiene in preventing avoidable losses through disease. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**771** 31 March. Cipher message no. 79661 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, stating that he is sure that Auchinleck appreciates the importance of starting his offensive as near to the accepted date as possible, that it has not been easy to convince the PM and the Defence Committee of the necessity for delay, and that further delays would be unacceptable unless the reasons for them were overwhelming. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**772** 31 March. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, expressing sympathy with him in the difficult time he has had recently; informing him that some of the telegrams which he disliked were much milder than the ones which were not sent, and that the PM has now accepted his dates and arguments under protest; presenting his own view that it would have assisted matters if Auchinleck had agreed to visit London; and promising to do all he can for him in the future. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**773** 2 April. Newspaper cutting sent by Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron to Auchinleck, with the heading: 'Vital importance of Middle East stressed in Smuts broadcast'. From *Springbok*, 2 April. 1 leaf. Printed.

**774** 3 April. Letter from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, explaining that, although the PM is at present at cross purposes with him, this is a purely temporary phase of the relationship because Churchill has a variable temperament which is either highly laudatory or bitterly condemnatory; and that the differences could be resolved if Auchinleck would come home to talk face-to-face with the PM. 4 leaves. Holograph. With autograph note by Auchinleck: 'Recd 19/4, and 20/4. Refused.'

**775** 4 April. Letter from Lt.-Gen. H.M. Wilson, Commander, 9th Army, to Auchinleck, concerning the problems which have arisen between Gen. Catroux of the Free French, C-in-C, Levant, and Sir Edward Spears, UK Minister to Syria and the Lebanon. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**776** 6 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron, senior South African liaison officer in Cairo, concerning the exchange

of staff officers between British and South African formations. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**777** 6 April. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton, the acting Minister of State, ME, to Auchinleck, concerning the relationship between Gen. Catroux and Sir Edward Spears, and the complaint made by the latter that he was not present or represented at a meeting between Auchinleck, Wilson and Catroux. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**778** 6 April. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, concerning Col. Rakitch and the command of Yugoslav troops, stating that, until there is a change in the composition and policy of the Yugoslav Government in London, he must consent to the experiment proposed by Rakitch, subject to Auchinleck's acquiescence. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with a note in the hand of Auchinleck expressing agreement.

**779** 6 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, expressing strong objection to the tone of a telegram (no. 1045 of 4 April), sent by the Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, referring to recent operations in Libya in disparaging terms; and stating that he intends to bring the contents of the telegram to the notice of the ME Defence Committee. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**780** 7 April. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, in reply to 779, above, blaming the melancholy disposition of the British Ambassador to Spain for the gloomy tone of the Foreign Secretary's telegram, sympathizing with Auchinleck's indignation, but suggesting that any referral of the matter to the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet would indicate a hypersensitive reaction to the document. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**781** 7 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, in reply to 777, above, declaring that his meeting with Catroux at Damascus was the result of an informal invitation from Catroux; that he does not accept the implication that he cannot talk to Catroux unless Spears is present; and that he reserves the right to visit French troops and commanders whenever he considers it advisable to do so. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**782** 7 April. Note from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, expressing agreement with the contents of the draft letter to be sent to Col. Rakitch. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**783** 7 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing some concern that Ritchie's plans for the use of armoured divisions, in the event of a serious enemy attack on the positions held by 13th Corps, involve dual or treble control, and suggesting that the armoured reserve should be under his command for operations and

under 30th Corps for training; and criticizing Ritchie's plan to use the two armoured divisions in succession, stating his own preference for both divisions to be available from the outset for use together or separately, if circumstances favour this course. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**784** 7 April. Cipher message no. A5/82812 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, CGS, Pretoria, announcing that 2,000 German prisoners of war are to be embarked for Durban, with 800 service personnel as guards; and asking whether a further 2,000 Germans can be held in the Union of South Africa pending transfer, taking the place of those being transferred from the Union to Canada in the *Queen Elizabeth*. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**785** 8 April. Cipher message no. G.16000 from Gen. P. Van Ryneveld to Auchinleck, in reply to 784, above, expressing willingness to accept 2,000 German prisoners when the present number in the Union have embarked; asking MEC to arrange that future consignments of prisoners do not include officers; and offering 350 guards on a temporary basis for transferring prisoners from the Union to Canada, from mid-April to the end of June. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**786** 9 April. Message no. SD/83480 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff, stating that an early decision should be taken as to whether the 9th Australian Division is to remain in the ME or not, because the uncertainty is affecting its work. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**787** 9 April. Letter from A. Greenwood, Sir Walter Monckton's Private Secretary, to Maj. A. MacKinnon, Auchinleck's Personal Assistant, replying to Auchinleck's letter, 781, above, stating that Sir Walter is absent for a few days but intends to discuss the situation with Sir Edward Spears when he visits Cairo next week. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**788** 9 April. Letter from Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality and his broad-minded and sympathetic attitude in their discussions; declaring that he himself has learned a great deal, and that he has told the PM that Auchinleck personally has the complete confidence of all his subordinate commanders; describing Churchill's explosive first reaction to the news that the date of the proposed offensive is not absolutely firm; and suggesting that a letter from Auchinleck, showing appreciation of the need for early action, would be helpful. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**789** 9 April. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that he is not sure whether the enemy intends to withdraw or to stay on the line he has now reached, but he is inclined to think that he will remain where he is; and indicating reluctance to push him out of his forward positions, a task he identifies as a major operation, because he does not regard his retention of such positions as a material hindrance to the 8th Army's future plans for offensive operations.

With autograph comments by Auchinleck which indicate that he is not in agreement with Ritchie. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with autograph postscript.

**790** 9 April. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of a minute (no. P26/42) sent by him to the PM concerning the delays in getting any decision on the provision of training machines or pilots for the proposed Indian airborne force; and suggesting that the root cause of delays in establishing priorities is the system of control by three equal Chiefs of Staff who really need a Super Chief of Staff to co-ordinate matters. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**791** 10 April. Cipher message no. A5/84080 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, the South African CGS, thanking him for his co-operation and his offer to assist with guards up to the end of June; and announcing that 2,000 German prisoners will embark on 12 and 13 April for transfer to the *Queen Elizabeth*, that a further 2,000 will embark on 18 and 21 April, and that no German officers will be included. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**792** 10 April. Cipher message no. G16126 from Gen. P. Van Ryneveld to Auchinleck, referring to his message, 785, above, and announcing that he has now succeeded in raising 650 guards for German prisoners, available from mid-April to the end of June. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**793** 10 April. Note from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, the Minister of State, ME, forwarding copies of correspondence (not included) concerning the move of the Sudan Defence Force outside the Sudan, for the information of the British Ambassador to Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**794** 10 April. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, in reply to 783, above, explaining how the position concerning the employment of armour is complicated at the moment by the fact that the armoured divisions are still in the process of re-fitting and training, and that, as soon as this has been completed, the arrangements for command will be simplified. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**795** 11 April. Cipher message no. CS/905 from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, stating that his letter of 1 January (605, above) has only just arrived, and that he will reply later. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**796** 11 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, in reply to 794, above, reiterating his conviction that the two armoured divisions should be held as an army reserve under the command of a corps commander, preferably Lt.-Gen. Norrie, the 30th Corps Commander, who has been in charge of their training. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**797** 11 April. Letter from A. Greenwood, Private Secretary to the Acting Minister of State in Cairo, to Maj. A. MacKinnon, Auchinleck's

Personal Assistant, expressing thanks for the copies of correspondence concerning the move of the Sudan Defence Force which have now been passed to the Ambassador. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**798** *11 April.* Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, reporting a message from the King of Greece expressing the view that there are objections to the attachment of the Greek forces to the New Zealanders. With Auchinleck's autograph reply, written on the same leaf, stating that the proposal is not to attach the Greeks to the New Zealanders but to make the New Zealanders, under Gen. Freyberg, responsible for supervising their training. With a typescript copy of the same letter, dated 13 April, and a copy of Sir Walter's reply of 16 April, declaring that he has received more information on the same subject, and asking Auchinleck not to show his original letter to Gen. Freyberg. 3 leaves. Mainly typescript.

**799** *12 April.* Cipher message no. 186 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, referring to Auchinleck's telegram to the Chiefs of Staff (786, above), expressing the view that, despite the disadvantages of uncertainty, it would be unwise to press now for a clear-cut decision as to whether the 9th Australian Division is to remain in the ME or not. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**800** *12 April.* Cipher message no. A5/84700 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, the South African CGS, stating that, because one of the ships to be used for the transfer of prisoners to the Union has been damaged, it will only be possible to send 555 of the 800 guards required to escort 4,000 German prisoners on the *Queen Elizabeth*; and asking if the South Africans can supply the deficiency of 245 guards to travel with the prisoners from Capetown to Canada. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**801** *12 April.* Cipher message no. G.16230 from Gen. P. Van Ryneveld to Auchinleck, promising to supply 245 guards to escort the German prisoners to Canada. With autograph note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**802** *13 April.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that there are signs of some regrouping of enemy forces opposite the Gazala position; that the enemy's ultimate intention appears to be offensive, although he is showing some nervousness about the possibility of the 8th Army undertaking an operation through Tengeder; and that there are indications that the enemy may attempt his main thrust astride the main road to Tobruk from Tmimi. With autograph comments by Auchinleck. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**803** *13 April.* Letter from Brig. J. Whiteley, 8th Army's BGS, in reply to 796, above, in the absence of Lt.-Gen. Ritchie, giving reasons for the past and present disposition of troops and future plans to place

the two armoured divisions under the command of 30th Corps near Sidi Rezegh. With a diagram entitled 'Redistribution of troops, Eighth Army'. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript, dated 14 April, giving the latest news of preparations for an attack on Segnali.

**804** *13 April.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, accompanying a note on the Libyan front (not included). 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript, declaring that there are only 3 copies of the note, which is personal to Ritchie and which he does not need to show to anyone else unless he wants to.

**805** *14 April.* Cipher message no. A5/85476 from Auchinleck to Gen. P. Van Ryneveld, thanking him for his co-operation, and stating that he requires only 5 officers, 10 NCOs and 230 other ranks to complete the escort for 4,000 German prisoners to Canada. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**806** *14 April.* Cipher message no. 187 from Winston Churchill to Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal, in Cairo, stating that he and others are still deeply concerned about the prolonged inaction of the 8th Army; that the delay gives Rommel a chance to gain strength; that the diversion of a submarine flotilla from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and the impossibility of stationing bombers on Malta have made the route from Italy to Tripoli more readily negotiable; and affirming his opinion and that of the WO that, although a general should not be pressed beyond his better judgement, an early offensive is still necessary in the Western Desert. 1 leaf. Typescript, with a note in the hand of Auchinleck, declaring that the message was given to him by Cripps.

**807** *14 April.* Cipher message no. 188 from Winston Churchill to Sir Stafford Cripps, in Cairo, concerning the dispatch of heavy bombers and crews to reinforce India, the main problem being to find the right type of machine for tropical service. 1 leaf. Typescript, with a note in the hand of Auchinleck, declaring that the message was given to him by Cripps.

**808** *16 April.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, referring to Auchinleck's note on the Libyan front mentioned in 804, above; indicating the details in which his own plan differs from Auchinleck's, the most important point being that he envisages the development of a stalemate before the 8th Army reaches Western Cyrenaica, unless a railway is constructed to maintain supplies, because he does not think that Benghazi can be developed as a supply head unless it is secure, and the force required to secure it would exhaust the supplies, and he suspects that the Navy cannot guarantee the safety of shipping to Benghazi. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**809** *16 April.* Comments on Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie's letter, 808,

above, concerning brigade areas, the size and location of dumps, the dangers of manoeuvring too far south, and other tactical problems. Initialled by Lt.-Gen. T. Corbett, Auchinleck's CGS. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**810** *17 April.* Letter from Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador to Egypt, to Sir Walter Monckton, thanking him for sending copies of the correspondence concerning the move of the Sudan Defence Force to the Western Desert for active operations; suggesting that such action is likely to provoke local criticism, to stimulate Axis propaganda that Britain is trying to drag Egypt into the war, and to undermine the position of Nahas Pasha, the pro-British Military Governor of Egypt; and proposing, therefore, that, if it is really necessary to use the Sudanese troops out of the Sudan, their deployment in Libya must appear to be in defence of the Sudan, in the southern part of the Allied front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**811** *17 April.* Cipher message no. 82722 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, stating that he is uneasy about the present strength of the Cyprus garrison in view of the fact that naval and air forces in the area are greatly reduced, and the possibility of a successful German operation poses a serious threat; and asking Auchinleck to be alert for any indications that the reinforcements that he has ready for such an emergency are needed, and to prepare estimates of the time required for dispatch and the shipping available. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**812** *17 April.* Cipher message no. CS/917 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 811, above, expressing his own unease about Cyprus, but stating that he is desperately short of infantry and has considered the possibility of weakening the 10th Army, but fears the possible consequences upon internal security. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**813** *21 April.* Letter from Sir Walter Monckton's Private Secretary to Maj. A. MacKinnon, Auchinleck's Personal Assistant, forwarding a copy (not included) of a letter from the British Ambassador (Sir Miles Lampson) concerning the move of the Sudan Defence Force. A copy of the same letter had already been sent to Auchinleck by the Embassy (see 810, above). 1 leaf. Typescript.

**814** *21 April.* Message from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, stating that he has received news from Angora that Emin is not to go to Berlin, but is to be Military Attaché in Egypt. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**815** *21 April.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, forwarding a revised version (not included) of his paper outlining the conduct of a possible offensive in the Libyan desert, mentioned in 804, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**816** *22 April.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, expressing his conviction that, in planning an offensive, no reliance

should be placed on the use of Benghazi as a port until the enemy has been cleared out of Cyrenaica; and describing reports he has received that the Commando personnel are neither hard nor fit, and that their discipline is poor. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**817** 22 April. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, reporting that he has reviewed his request for upgrading of the BGS, 8th Army to Major-General and remains unconvinced that such promotion is essential. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**818** 22 April. Cipher message no. T 16871 from FM Smuts to Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron, thanking him for his suggested programme which is, however, too long for his intended visit to the ME in May, and stressing that he is anxious to see the two South African Divisions and leave Cairo on the 20th. With tentative programme for Smuts' visit and a note in the hand of Auchinleck, stating that it may not be possible to call in the divisional commanders to meet Smuts if operations are in progress. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**819** 23 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, the Acting Minister of State, drawing attention to references to India in a FO telegram which do not do justice to the part India is playing in the war effort and to the great role of Indian troops in the ME theatre. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**820** 23 April. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, agreeing with the observations made in 819, above, stating that he is sending a telegram on the subject to the Minister of Information, and that there are special features on India's effort in two pictorial magazines in the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**821** 24 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, thanking him for his message, 820 above; and suggesting that the question of India should be presented at a higher level, to the PM himself or to the Lord Privy Seal. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**822** 24 April. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, enclosing a map illustrating plans for future operations, starting with consolidation of armoured forces in the Hacheim – Tengeder area, then a move to the Gania area, with subsequent operations including the capture of Mechili, the occupation of the general line Derna – Mechili, and the advance to Agedabia – El Agheila and/or Benghazi. 1 leaf and 1 sheet. Typescript.

**823** c. 24 April. Draft telegram from the C-in-Cs to the Chiefs of Staff, compiled by Auchinleck, referring to the telegram mentioned in 819, above, expressing grave anxiety at the assumption that the ME could be retained if India was lost, because India supplies manpower, raw materials and manufactured goods to the ME, and six of the

fourteen divisions in this theatre of war are Indian; and stating that, if the danger to India is so imminent and grave, it would be better to sacrifice the prospect of a Libyan offensive this summer to support India, and that the success of an offensive in Libya depends on building up an adequate superiority in tanks over the enemy and on not having to divert air forces from Libya to any other theatre. Copy no. 1. With note in the hand of Auchinleck: 'Not sent'. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**824** 27 April. Paraphrase of a telegram from Sir Reader Bullard, British Minister at Tehran, to the FO, concerning the policy to be adopted regarding Soviet infiltration into Central and Southern Persia; stating that, although there are dangers in this penetration, the Russians are allies of the British and must be allowed to use the supply route to the Gulf and be helped in other ways; and that it is important to establish friendly local relations. With a letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton, expressing his agreement with the policy outlined in the telegram. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**825** 27 April. For the (ME) Defence Committee. Note on an offensive in Libya, 1942, signed by Auchinleck, in response to the gloomy situation review of the Chiefs of Staff of 23 April, stating that a complete reconsideration of present policy appears to be necessary in view of the weakness of our sea forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, the inability of the British air forces to achieve air superiority on the northern and western fronts of the ME theatre, the serious situation of Malta, the inadequacy of our land forces simultaneously to withstand a heavy enemy attack against Syria or Iraq and to hold the western front against a renewed enemy offensive, and the probable diversion of all available reinforcements, originally intended for the ME, to the defence of India; and declaring that he has come to the conclusion that MEC cannot afford to take the offensive in Libya and must concentrate on strengthening defensive arrangements throughout the Command and, at the same time, devote every possible resource to the reinforcement of India. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**826** 27 April. Cipher message no. I/91201 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, concerning a WO intelligence report on the number of serviceable Axis tanks in the forward area, querying the context of the message, and suggesting that, because special information of this kind is not repeated to the Army verbatim, its value is reduced owing to the difficulty of separating original information from comment. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**827** 29 April. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, concerning the question of bringing IA medals and decorations into line with those of the British Army, and the possibility of establishing a unified staff. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**828** 29 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, forwarding a copy (not included) of Operation Instruction no. 117, defining the policy to be followed if the enemy attacks Syria and Iraq through Anatolia. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**829** 29 April. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, asking permission to affiliate the 1st Armoured Brigade with the 7th Armoured Division. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, agreeing to the proposal with the proviso that the Brigade is not under command of the Division, and that 30th Corps is not responsible for supervision of training. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**830** 1 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, forwarding a copy (not included) of MEC's latest pamphlet on the handling of the armoured division. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**831** 1 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting that the enemy's immediate policy appears to be to stand on the defensive, that he himself is convinced that it is important to conserve armoured resources at present, and that the enemy's recent activity in the Tengeder area was defensive in character; and expressing concern over the diminishing number of armoured cars, over poor reserves of tanks, over the difficulties experienced by tank transporters in desert terrain, over the need to make changes in armoured car regimental organization, and over the danger involved in the proposed visit of FM Smuts to the front. With autograph comments by Auchinleck. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**832** 1 May. 'Policy governing the employment of our armour': a statement made by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, in which he declares that, in order to resume the offensive, the object must be to build up an armoured force superior in strength, fighting qualities and leadership to that of the enemy; and he concludes that armour must be conserved for this ultimate purpose and must not be used to prevent the establishment by the enemy of defended localities, unless his action definitely endangers the security of the Gazala – Bir Hacheim position. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with autograph comments by Auchinleck.

**833** 2 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, in reply to 831, above, agreeing that the enemy's policy appears to be defensive at present, but stating that it is still necessary to prepare for the contingency that he is planning a major offensive, and for this reason it is important to improve the main defensive areas, Gazala – Tobruk – Bir El Gubi – Bir Hacheim and the Sollum – El Hamra position; also agreeing that it is important to conserve armour, although some surprise attacks on the enemy to make him waste his armour would be desirable; and promising to try and arrange for FM Smuts to meet

South African divisional representatives at HQ, 8th Army. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**834** 3 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, announcing that he is seriously perturbed by the Japanese threat to India and wonders whether the Chiefs of Staff fully realize the dependence of the ME on India, strategically and materially; stating that, if he had to choose between losing India and giving up the ME, he would not hesitate to choose to save India; and reaffirming his belief that an offensive cannot be launched until there is at least a 3:2 superiority in tank numbers over the Germans, and that this situation will not be reached until the middle of June. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**835** 3 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, thanking him for approving the ME Higher Commanders' Course (see 761 and 762, above), but expressing disappointment that the chosen location is Palestine, not South Africa, and that the CIGS has decided not to appoint Dorman-Smith as its leader; raising the problem of higher command on the northern front, and suggesting three possible solutions; and asking him to reconsider his decision not to promote Freyberg and Morshead to be Lieutenant-Generals. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**836** 4 May. Letter from the office of the Minister of State (R.G. Casey) to Auchinleck, with copies of three telegrams from the Minister to the PM, sent from Malta. In the first telegram, dated 3 May, the Minister expresses his conviction that Sir William Dobbie should be replaced as Governor and C-in-C, Malta by Lord Gort. In the second telegram, also dated 3 May, Casey deals with the strategic and supply position of Malta, emphasizing that Malta's ability to hold out is dependent on substantial and continuous air reinforcement, with locally-based fighters and bombers from the ME; that only when air superiority has been re-established can a convoy be successfully unloaded; and that the June convoy is essential to the survival of Malta, both for food and ammunition. In the third telegram, dated 4 May, Casey suggests that it might soften the blow for Dobbie (and the Maltese) if the PM made him chairman of a small advisory committee set up to deal with problems and proposals concerning Malta. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**837** 5 May. Cipher message no. OZ 149 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that the gloomy situation review of the Chiefs of Staff of 23 April (referred to in 825, above) was prepared on the British principle of facing the worst, that the situation has improved in the fortnight since the review was written, that there are no special grounds for assuming that a heavy invasion of India is imminent or certain, that Ceylon is now in a better state than earlier in the spring, that two British divisions are proceeding to India in May and June, that the crisis of the air attack on Malta has passed for the time being,

although the island is still in grave peril owing to shortage of supplies, and that the most certain method of helping Malta would be a successful offensive in Libya; and thanking Auchinleck for his offer to denude the ME for the sake of India, whilst assuring him that the greatest help he can give to the war effort at present is to engage and defeat the enemy in the Western Desert. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**838** 5 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, in reply to 833, above, stating that, if the 8th Army wins the armoured battle, at worst it will be possible to hold the Gazala – Bir Hacheim position, and at best an offensive can be launched, so the problem of the line Tobruk – Acroma – El Adem – Bir El Gubi will not arise; and he thinks that it would be dangerous to stand on this line if the armoured battle is lost and the enemy is materially superior in armour. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**839** 7 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 772, above, declaring how difficult it is to do his job when the plainest statements are removed from their context and are made to mean the exact opposite of what was intended, pointing out that ‘forecasts’ are not, and cannot be, firm dates; sympathizing with Brooke in his difficult task, and asking him not to try to make him visit London, because he feels that he cannot leave his command for long at present, and he cannot add anything more to what he has said already. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**840** 8 May. Letter from R.G. Casey, the Minister of State, to Auchinleck, concerning the question of responsibility in Syria for decisions relating to the security of British troops; and enclosing a copy of telegram no. 834 of 29 April from the FO to the Minister, stating that such decisions must rest with Army commanders, but that any decision concerned with the removal of any particular French official should be made jointly by the GOC and Sir Edward Spears (UK Minister to Syria and the Lebanon). 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**841** 10 May. Cipher message no. OZ 192 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet have reconsidered the whole position and are determined that Malta shall not be allowed to fall without a battle being fought by the 8th Army for its retention; and that the very latest date for engaging the enemy which they could approve is one which provides a distraction in time to help the passage of the June convoy in the dark period. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**842** 11 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, praising the drive and organizational power of Brig. Shearer, the former DMI in the ME, and expressing the conviction that these qualities should not be lost to the nation at a time of crisis. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**843** 11 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck,

expressing concern about the need to establish a fourth defended locality because he fears that he would have to reduce the strength of the Gazala position in order to do so; and proposing, therefore, not to establish a fourth defended locality unless the enemy has attacked and suffered a severe defeat to his armour or, without having first seriously fought, has moved the main portion of his armour west of a north-and-south line through Mechili. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note, and annotations by Auchinleck.

**844** *12 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, stating that there is strong evidence that the enemy intends to carry out offensive operations in the near future, either by launching his main attack against the 1st South African Brigade and then assaulting Tobruk, or by aiming for the capture of the Hacheim area to make a base for an attack on Tobruk; and stressing the need for precautions to be taken in meeting the attack. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**845** *12 May*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, in reply to 843, above, assuring him that he will not press him to take any premature action in establishing a fourth defended locality; and apologizing for his long, grandmotherly letter (844, above) about possible enemy action. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**846** *12 May*. Letter from R.G. Casey, the Minister of State, to Auchinleck, agreeing with Auchinleck's unease about the PM's decision to place the AOC, ME (Tedder) under Auchinleck's general direction for the purposes of major operations. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**847** *13 May*. Cipher message no. OZ/209 from Winston Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff to R.G. Casey, announcing that it has been decided that American heavy bomber units should be concentrated in the UK, and that no approach can be made to the President on an issue which would only be regarded as a departure from agreed plans for offensive action in Western Europe. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**848** *13 May*. Cipher message no. CS/991 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, referring to the proposal that he should visit Palestine to meet the Duke of Gloucester, and suggesting that he could fly to Haifa on 17 May to spend the night at the Staff School in the company of the Duke. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**849** *13 May*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that he now feels in a position to defeat the enemy's armour forward of the frontier position, provided that water points can be safeguarded, that aerodromes can be secured, and that Tobruk is not attacked by sea or air; and that he does not think there is any real danger of getting confined within Tobruk, but he wants to employ the 5th Indian Division to strengthen defences of the aerodrome areas, Tobruk and El Adem, and appreciates that this involves a major change of policy because it means that he must be released from the

obligation to secure the frontier positions while fighting the battle forward. With note in the hand of Auchinleck. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**850** *14 May.* Cipher message no. U/849 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, thanking him for his invitation (848, above), but stating that he will not have time to proceed to Palestine to see the Duke of Gloucester. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**851** *16 May.* Teleprinter message no. GOC/3/1 from the Duke of Gloucester to FM Smuts, expressing regret that he will not be able to meet him. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**852** *16 May.* Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, in reply to 835, above, announcing that Gairdner has been chosen to run the ME Higher Commanders' Course; giving his reasons for locating the Course in Palestine and not South Africa; agreeing with Auchinleck's proposal to re-form the forces guarding the northern front into one Army; expressing the opinion that, if rewards are required for Freyberg and Morshead, it would be better to give them decorations than to promote them to Lieutenant-Generals, of which there are already too many; assuring him that the danger to India has not been neglected but that it seems unlikely now that Japan will attempt to carry out a direct invasion of either India or Australia; stating that he is more concerned about the northern front of MEC and the protection of the oilfields; expressing the hope that Auchinleck did not think that he did not appreciate the difficulties surrounding his recent decisions involving his western front, assuring him that he has done his best to ensure that his situation was understood by the Cabinet, but pointing out that some of his arguments have made it difficult to support his case and that the PM especially did not take kindly to arguments based on mathematical calculations of ratios of tank strengths; advising him to send telegrams in his own capacity and not under the aegis of the ME Defence Committee, a habit which annoys the PM; and expressing a wish to visit the ME theatre when Churchill allows him to do so. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**853** *16 May.* Notes by Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett on the CIGS's letter (852, above), with comments on Sir Alan Brooke's lack of knowledge of their plans for the Persian Gulf, on the exceptional status of the Dominions warranting the promotion of Freyberg and Morshead, and on the grossly unfair impression that Auchinleck is taking cover behind the cloak of the ME Defence Committee. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**854** *16 May.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, approving of his preparations and plans for action; predicting that the enemy intends to forestall the 8th Army's attack by launching an offensive of his own within the next ten days or so; stating that his attack is likely to be determined and heavy, with the object of

capturing Tobruk as a prelude to a further advance against Egypt; and arguing that it is, therefore, of the utmost importance for Ritchie to be able to turn from the defensive to the offensive as soon as the opportunity offers. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**855** 17 May. Cipher message no. 89118 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, conveying a message from King George VI to the Duke of Gloucester, expressing his pleasure at the idea of the Duke paying a visit to India. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**856** 17 May. Cipher message no. OZ 244 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that it is necessary for him to have some account of Auchinleck's general intentions in the light of recent telegrams. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**857** 19 May. Cipher message no. CS/1010 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 841 and 856, above, stating that it is his intention to carry out the instructions to engage the enemy, at the very latest, in the dark (night) period of June, but that he is assuming that the attack is not designed solely to provide a distraction to help the Malta convoy but is intended to be a major offensive with the aim of destroying the enemy forces and occupying Cyrenaica; warning that there are strong signs that the enemy intends to attack in the immediate future, and that, owing to the narrowness of Allied superiority over the enemy, the success of a major offensive cannot be regarded as certain; and asking, therefore, for no publicity to be given to the offensive, even after it has been launched. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**858** 19 May. Letter from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of 20 April which he has only just received; expressing understanding of the reasons why Auchinleck did not come home six or eight weeks ago and sympathy with his difficulties, but still maintaining that it would have been the right course; stressing that Auchinleck enjoys the complete confidence of all who matter as a clear-headed, resolute and inspiring commander; and conveying his distress that Auchinleck should ever have given a thought to the possibility of 'fading out quietly'. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**859** 19 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, reporting on photographic air reconnaissance which reveals concentrations of enemy tanks and motor transport, on planning for defence of the Gazala – Bir Hacheim position and the intention to turn to the offensive in the course of battle, on enemy preparations for attack, and on the indications that Tobruk is to be the main objective. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**860** 20 May. Cipher message no. OZ 261 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, in reply to 857, above, stating that Auchinleck's interpretation of his instructions is correct; promising that the greatest care will be taken to prevent newspaper speculation in London about

attacks either way in Cyrenaica; agreeing that there are no safe battles and that success cannot be guaranteed; but expressing full confidence in Auchinleck and the 8th Army, and suggesting that he personally should feel even greater confidence if Auchinleck would take direct command himself, as he did at Sidi Rezegh. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**861** 20 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing his own opinion of the main courses of attack likely to be chosen by the enemy, namely, to envelop the southern flank seizing or masking Bir Hacheim en route and then to attack Tobruk, or to launch a very heavy offensive on a narrow front in the centre with the object of driving straight on Tobruk, including a feint against Bir Hacheim and an attack from the sea round about Gazala; and urging Ritchie to place both armoured divisions astride the Trigh Capuzzo to cover the second eventuality. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**862** 20 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, warning him that the enemy may attack at any time now, and informing him that he is sending to the front as many reinforcements as he can spare. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**863** 20 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, forwarding a copy of his Operation Instruction entitled 'Operations in Persia' (not included), pointing out that he has gambled on the hope that there is no threat to Syria and Iraq through Anatolia, and, therefore, that he has left that front very thinly held. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**864** 21 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, pointing out that the topography of the battle area makes it advantageous to fight from south to north; indicating the reasons why he is loath to make minor modifications in the disposition of formations; expressing gratitude for reinforcements; describing the location of minefields; and explaining why it is impracticable to have all the static troops under a single command, thus releasing 30th Corps to command only the armoured divisions. 6 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**865** 22 May. Cipher message no. 02148 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, thanking him for his message of 20 May (860, above); expressing his view that, although he would like to take command personally in Libya, he feels that it would not be the right course to pursue, because it would be most difficult for him to keep a right sense of proportion if he became immersed in tactical problems in Libya; and announcing that he does not feel the need at present to bring the New Zealand Division out of Syria into Egypt. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**866** 22 May. Letter from Sir Walter Monckton to Auchinleck, bidding him farewell; declaring that when he gets home Auchinleck will have one more friend in London, a loyal and fearless one, he hopes; and stating that making friends with Auchinleck has been the most pleasant part of his sojourn in Cairo. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**867** 23 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, speculating on the possible modes of attack by the enemy, and on the strong possibility that he will try to go round the southern flank; expressing confidence that the 8th Army's armoured forces are prepared to operate either to the south or to the north-west, and that any sea-landing by the enemy will be limited to the portion of the coastline between Tobruk and Gazala; and describing the defensive measures taken in the Acroma – El Adem area. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**868** 23 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, expressing his approval of the decisions to establish a pivot at Bir el Gubi and to give tanks to the Free French at Bir Hacheim; and suggesting that it might be most valuable to mount a diversionary operation threatening Tmimi and Martuba before the enemy launches his attack, and to raid the Temrad – Breghisc area where the enemy must already be collecting a considerable quantity of heavy and medium artillery. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**869** 23 May. Letter from Sir John Dill, from the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his weekly telegrams; informing him that the CIGS has now assumed responsibility for keeping him in the picture, that his Bombay appointment (as Governor) has been postponed for six months, and that he sometimes becomes oppressed in his present task by a sense of frustration, because it is so difficult to reach Anglo-American harmony in the implementation of an agreed war policy, especially, at the moment, in the allocation of aircraft; commenting with approval on the appointment of Casey as Minister of State, ME, and of Gort as Governor of Malta; and suggesting that, if the issue appears doubtful in the forthcoming battle in the Western Desert, Auchinleck should take command himself, as he did so brilliantly in the last big offensive. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**870** 24 May. Cipher message no. 14945 from Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, to L.S. Amery, concerning the proposals made by Auchinleck to introduce some conformity between the decorations conferred on members of the British and Indian Armies, rejecting suggestions that some Indian decorations should be abolished, but approving the idea that Indian troops should be eligible for the MM. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**871** 24 May. Message no. 0/02829 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, wishing him many happy returns on his birthday. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**872** 25 May. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, announcing that the advance party of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade has gone forward to report to 30th Corps, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade has moved to Bir el Gubi for the establishment of a defended

locality, and that mines previously earmarked for the defences in the frontier area have had to be used to strengthen the Gazala – Gir Hacheim position; describing arrangements for water supplies in the frontier defences; and explaining why he cannot afford to carry out either of Auchinleck's two suggestions (made in 868, above), namely, to mount a diversionary operation threatening Tmimi and Martuba or to make a raid in the Temrad – Breghisc area. 5 leaves. Typescript. Signed in Ritchie's absence, with autograph note, by Brig. J. Whiteley.

**873** 25 May. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, thanking him for sending a copy of his Operation Instruction entitled 'Operations in Persia'; suggesting that a further instruction on the steps necessary to meet an attack through Persia from the Caucasus may be difficult to frame while Russia continues to refuse facilities for reconnaissance or co-ordination of plans; and expressing the hope that no threat will develop on the northern front, at least before the beginning of August, and that, if it does develop then, the Turks will be able to put up some sort of resistance and the RAF will have sufficient squadrons available to carry out the plan for sending assistance to Turkey. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**874** 26 May. Cipher message no. G18802 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, thanking him for his birthday wishes and for the efficiency of the arrangements made for his visit to the ME, and expressing confidence in his men and in the future. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**875** 26 May. Cipher message no. 90985 MO 5 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, asking him whether, in view of the present trend of enemy movement towards the Eastern Mediterranean, he is satisfied with the strength of the garrison of Cyprus and whether he is contemplating the dispatch of further reinforcements. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**876** 26 May. Rommel's Order of the Day: capture of the version issued to the Italians, dated 26 May. English translation, announcing the beginning of a decisive attack by Italian and German soldiers, equipped with superior armament and aided by a powerful air force, against the British mobile forces in Libya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**877** 26 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, reiterating his conviction that, although he has never discarded the possibility of the enemy making his main thrust round the southern flank, evidence points to the likelihood of a very heavy attack on a narrow front in the northern sector; advising Ritchie that, if the enemy does attack in this way, it is absolutely necessary to prevent him from establishing defensive flanks and that, if he does come by the south, there should be ample warning of the assault and an offensive should soon expose his supply lines to Allied attack; expressing concern that

the change from the defensive to the offensive should be made at the first opportunity; and indicating that when he wrote earlier (868, above) of the advisability of making a heavy raid on enemy forward areas, he was thinking of a fast-moving, bold affair at night, not an exercise involving tanks. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**878** 26 May. Letter from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing his enjoyment of his visit to Egypt; informing him that he has sent to the PM, at his own request, an account of his impressions of the situation in the ME, and enclosing a copy (879, below) for Auchinleck; emphasizing that he is not certain that the importance of the ME in relation to other theatres of war is fully appreciated in London. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**879** 26 May. Copy of a report from FM Smuts, sent through Lord Harlech, UK High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa, to Winston Churchill, describing his visit to the ME; confirming his belief in Allied success in Libya and in the need for conclusive operations to drive the enemy out; expressing his high opinion of Auchinleck and his satisfaction with facilities, communications and services in the rear; stressing the importance of holding the ME, including Iran and Iraq, as well as India and Ceylon, together with the Indian Ocean; suggesting, therefore, that there should be a powerful Anglo-American naval reinforcement in the Indian Ocean to prevent the Japanese threat, and that it is a strategical mistake for the USA to send naval and land forces to Australia on the assumption that a major Japanese attack can be expected there, when the Indian Ocean, not the Pacific, needs all available defences. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**880** 27 May. Cipher message MS/5 from R.G. Casey, Minister of State, ME, to Winston Churchill, stating that he is convinced that heavy bombers could make a vital contribution to the safety of the next convoy to Malta, against the interference of the Italian fleet; and asking for such bombers to be made available, if possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**881** 28 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, commenting on the successful course of battle so far, and stressing the importance of changing over to the offensive at the earliest possible moment. With a memorandum entitled 'Libya, 1942: III. Counter-Offensive', presenting estimates of the existing resources of the enemy and the Allies; stating that the immediate aim must be to destroy the enemy's army as soon as possible to prevent it from slipping away to the west; suggesting how this can be achieved by attacking the enemy's south flank at Segnali, with a secondary assault on Temrad and light mobile forces striking hard at Mechili, and even at Benghazi; and offering alternative plans for vigorous action if the enemy makes the attempt to escape south or west. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**882** 28 May. Letter from L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, to Auchinleck, wishing him success in the new battle; thanking him for suggesting that the Duke of Gloucester should visit India; and commenting on the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India and on the proposals to bring awards for Indian troops into line with those of the British Army. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**883** 30 May. Cipher message no. CS/1147 from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, commenting on the fact that Indian troops are once again fighting hard in Libya, and that the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade has already played a great part; and asking whether it is possible to make an immediate announcement regarding the award of the MM to Indian troops. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**884** 31 May. Cipher message no. CS/1153 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, greeting him on Union Day, and stating that South Africa has reason to be proud of her men, who are behaving magnificently. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**885** 31 May. Message from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. D. Pienaar and Maj.-Gen. D. Klopper (1st and 2nd South African Divisions), sending greetings to them, their officers and men on Union Day; declaring that they are playing a great part in the fighting and will surely play an even greater part soon. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**886** 31 May. Cipher message no. OZ/316 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his thankfulness at the way in which the battle has gone so far; stating that his confidence is based partly on Auchinleck's reports, partly on the Special Intelligence he has received and will send to Auchinleck; announcing that, in the very near future, he will be asked to make some statement about the fighting, and asking Auchinleck to let him have any news that may be publishable. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**887** 31 May. Cipher message no. OZ/318 from Winston Churchill to R.G. Casey, in reply to 880, above, declaring that the value of heavy bombers in the Mediterranean is fully appreciated in London, but no reinforcements of Halifax or Liberator bombers can be made available for the ME in time for the June convoy to Malta; and that it remains for the AOC in the ME to give what support he can with his Wellington aircraft. With covering note addressed to Auchinleck from the Office of the Minister of State, dated 1 June. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**888** 1 June. Cipher message no. CS/1169 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, suggesting some additions to the public announcement that battle has been resumed in the ME: a tribute to the skill, determination and pertinacity shown by Lt.-Gen. Ritchie and his Corps Commanders, Lt.-Gen. Norrie and Lt.-Gen. Gott, a mention, if security allows, of the excellent performance of the Grant tanks, and

an account of Gen. Messervy's capture and his escape from the enemy. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**889** 1 June. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, in reply to 878 and 879, above, expressing agreement with his views; reporting that the battle appears to be going well, that the South African soldiers are doing splendidly, and that there is much hard fighting to be done. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**890** 1 June. Cipher message no. G 19169 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing satisfaction with the way in which the Libyan battle has been handled so far, and stating that there now appears to be an opportunity to cut off Rommel's retreat. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**891** 2 June. Cipher message no. G 19223 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing his thanks for his message of greetings on Union Day, a message which he has now released to the press because it will be much appreciated by South Africa and will encourage recruitment. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**892** 2 June. Cipher message no. CS/1171 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, in reply to 890, above, expressing thanks for good wishes, stating that the 8th Army is doing all it can to bring about a victory, that the enemy armoured units are still fighting hard, and that their tank strengths are about equal to those of the Allies at present. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**893** 2 June. Cipher message no. 92402 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, conveying a message to Auchinleck from King George VI, stating that, in the first phase of the new battle in Libya, the 8th Army has achieved a resounding success; and asking Auchinleck to convey his warmest congratulations to Lt.-Gen. Ritchie and all ranks of the three services who have taken part. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**894** 2 June. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, enclosing a copy of the ME Training Centre Instruction No.1 (not included); and describing how MEC has succeeded in centralizing training for war by concentrating all the various schools in one area of Palestine. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**895** 3 June. Cipher message no. MS/10 from R.G. Casey to Winston Churchill, in reply to 887, above, expressing disappointment that the ME is not to receive the air forces considered by the C-in-Cs to be essential for the protection of the convoys, and stating that fighter protection will be dangerously thin; and proposing, with Tedder's agreement, that the Liberators intended for India should be held in the ME for use in assisting the convoys, and that a request should be made to the US President to use the American Liberator squadron, intended for attacks on the Rumanian petroleum centre of Ploesti, to support the convoys. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**896** 3 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, stating that he is glad that Ritchie thinks that the situation is still favourable to the 8th Army, whilst expressing his own misgivings over the destruction of 150th Brigade, over the consolidation by the enemy of a broad and deep wedge in the middle of the Allied position, over the consequent threat to the Gazala – Bir Hacheim line, and over the possibility that the enemy may be able rapidly to regain the initiative; and suggesting measures to be taken to improve the situation, emphasizing that the 8th Army must strike hard and at once in order to avoid a stalemate. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with autograph note.

**897** 3 *June*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, stating that he is aware of the need to resume the offensive as soon as possible, but that replacements in armour are not coming through as quickly as they should; recognizing the importance of wresting from the enemy the initiative he is now starting to exercise; and reporting that he has decided first to crush the enemy in the ‘Cauldron’ (the area between the Sidra and Aslagh Ridges), and that he is also investigating the possibility of using a raiding force to threaten the Martuba and Derna landing grounds. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**898** 3 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, declaring that the start of the new offensive must not be held back in order to synchronize with the sailing of the Malta convoy, because a successful offensive, by driving the enemy further back, lessens his chances of attacking the convoy in any case; and expressing the hope that Ritchie can press forward and keep the enemy out of Bir Hacheim. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**899** 4 *June*. From the Office of the Minister of State. Directive defining the duties of the Minister of State, ME, as the representative of the War Cabinet in that area; stating that his principal task is to ensure a successful conduct of the operations in the ME by relieving the C-in-Cs, as far as possible, of extraneous responsibilities, by giving them political guidance, by settling promptly matters within the policy of the Government, and by keeping the War Cabinet and Ministers generally informed of what is happening in his sphere. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**900** 4 *June*. Report by Maj.-Gen. P.S. Tomlinson, DMS, of a medical bulletin issued by Brig. Small, Consulting Physician at Alexandria, on the condition of Capt. Randolph Churchill. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**901** 4 *June*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of a paper entitled ‘The Object of the Eighth Army is to secure Cyrenaica’, in which he states that the first step in the advance towards this goal is to break through the enemy defences in the coastal sector, to seize and hold the line Tmimi – Mechili and so to

isolate the enemy force in the desert, away from his water and forward dumps in the eastern Jebel; gives reasons why it would be impracticable to mount a final attack to secure Cyrenaica until, probably, the end of September; stresses that the immediate objective is to secure the use of the Benghazi air bases in conjunction with the Derna – Martuba landing grounds to protect the vital convoys to Malta; and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of either an advance through the Jebel or an advance across the desert, judging that a double-axis movement would offer the best chance of success. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph note, and autograph comments by Auchinleck.

**902** 5 *June*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, concerning the shortage of rifles in India, asking for supplies from the ME if a surplus of Italian rifles were to arise; and describing the battle in Cyrenaica as a complete tangle, a big check to German plans but not yet a big victory for the 8th Army. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**903** 5 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1195 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, reporting that, according to the Consulting Physician, his son Capt. Randolph Churchill continues to make satisfactory progress. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**904** 5 *June*. Cipher message no. 93011 (MO5) from the Chiefs of Staff to Auchinleck, concerning a report to the FO that a British reconnaissance party entered the Russian-occupied zone of Persia on 30 May and that some difficulties arose with the Russians, deploring such uninvited visits which worsen relations with the Russians, and asking for an immediate inquiry. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**905** 6 *June*. Cipher message no. 10119 from the Chiefs of Staff to Lord Linlithgow, transmitted also to Auchinleck in reply to 870, above, stating that the Awards Committee is examining proposals to make the MM available to Indian troops; that the view of the Committee is that the MM should not constitute an extra decoration but should replace some of the Indian awards; and that the Committee is opposed to the idea of opening Indian awards to Imperial troops in India because of the avoidable multiplication of honours. 1 leaf. Typescript, with annotations by Auchinleck.

**906** 6 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to R.G. Casey, Air Chief-Marshal A.W. Tedder and Commodore H.G. Norman, enclosing a copy of cipher message no. CS/1206 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 852 and 904, above; assuring him that he is aware of the dangers on his northern front and of the need to protect the oilfields, and that, for these reasons, he feels it is necessary to have full facilities for reconnaissance in Northern and Western Persia; and stating that, if these facilities are not made available before the end of June, he must ask the CIGS for an immediate redefinition of his task concerning Persia. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**907** 7 *June*. Cipher message no. MS/12 from R.G. Casey, Minister of State, to Winston Churchill, suggesting that, as a new arrival, his impression of the situation concerning equipment in the ME may be of some use to those in London; and indicating the main areas in which a steady flow of supplies is necessary and in which additional provision, over and above the planned programmes, is desirable, namely, in the supply of aircraft, aircraft spares, incendiary ammunition, transport, AA artillery, signal resources, tank ammunition, and spares for American tanks. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**908** 8 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1215 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, continuing his message 906, above; stating that he has received a report from the Commander, 10th Army, pointing out that, in the light of future operations, it was essential to carry out a reconnaissance from Rawanduz in Iraq to Kermanshah in Persia; that the reconnaissance party had to make a slight detour via Miandow Ab where contact was made with a local Russian Commander in a cordial atmosphere; and that the assumption was made that there was no objection to the passage of the small party to Kermanshah. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**909** 9 *June*. Cipher message no. MS/14 from R.G. Casey, Minister of State, to Winston Churchill, concerning the need for co-ordination of plans with the Russians against the possibility of a German attack through the Caucasus in the autumn; stating that in the ME nothing is known of Russian intentions, that the C-in-Cs are compelled to make unilateral plans, and that the defence of Northern Persia is imperilled by the refusal of the Russians to allow British forces to reconnoitre in their zone of occupation; and asking the PM to do what he can to remove the political obstacles to co-operation with the Russians. 2½ leaves. Typescript.

**910** 9 *June*. Cipher message no. OZ/420 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, announcing that the 8th Armoured Division, now at the Cape, and the 44th Division, nearing Freetown, are to be sent to the ME, unless Australia is threatened with serious invasion within the next few days; and that, after their arrival at Suez (by the end of June for the 8th Armoured Division, by mid-July for the 44th Division), Auchinleck should be prepared to send to India one of the Indian divisions and the 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**911** 9 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, referring to his report (901, above), stating that he does not agree with Ritchie's plan to make a deliberate advance through the Jebel, driving the enemy before him; nor with his object 'to secure Cyrenaica', because he thinks that the true object of the 8th Army is to destroy the enemy forces in Cyrenaica as far to the eastwards as may be possible, so as to enable the British forces to occupy Cyrenaica rapidly and thereafter hold it securely. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**912** *10 June.* Cipher message no. CS/1230 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, thanking him for the offer of the 8th Armoured Division and the 44th Division, which he plans to put to good use; noting that he may be required to send an Indian armoured brigade and an Indian infantry division to India later; emphasizing the difficulties he is facing in providing troops for the defence of Persia and to meet a possible German attack through Anatolia; and reminding the PM that the chances of a successful defence in areas such as Persia, Iraq and Syria are small, unless the ME receives substantial reinforcements before the enemy has penetrated too deeply. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**913** *10 June.* Cipher message no. CS/1232 from Auchinleck and Air Vice-Marshal A.W. Tedder to Winston Churchill, reporting on the casualties sustained by both sides since 26 May, pointing out the difficulty of getting details of Army losses while the battle still rages, but offering the following estimates of losses: 10,000 Allied personnel of whom 8,000 may be prisoners, 3,993 Axis prisoners, 350 Allied tanks, 400 Axis tanks, 345 Allied guns, 120 Axis guns, 176 Allied aircraft, 165 Axis aircraft; and noting that the following reinforcements to the 8th Army have been sent to the battlefield since the fighting was renewed: 24,911 personnel, 78 field guns, 220 anti-tank guns and 353 tanks. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**914** *11 June.* Cipher message no. 94314 M.O.5 from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, concerning difficulties with the Russians in Persia and the dangers to the northern front of MEC; endorsing Auchinleck's attitude expressed in 906 and 908, above, and stating that the Chiefs of Staff have impressed the urgency of the whole question on the FO where the opinion is held that the Russians will not agree to co-operate, but, in view of Auchinleck's representations, further action will be taken in the hope of receiving a more satisfactory reply. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**915** *11 June.* Cipher message no. OZ/436 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, thanking him for his estimates of casualties and losses; stating that, although it is always good to hope for success by manoeuvre or counterstroke, there is no reason to fear a campaign of attrition, which will wear Rommel down worse than Ritchie because of the 8th Army's superior communications; reminding Auchinleck that reinforcements are on their way by sea; congratulating him on the splendid recovery work that has been done; and asking him to pass on to Ritchie his compliments on his dogged and resolute fighting. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**916** *11 June.* Letter from Brig. J. Whiteley to Auchinleck, enclosing some notes dictated by Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie before making a visit to the front. In these notes, entitled 'Appreciation of Situation by Comd. Eighth Army, 0900 hrs, 11 June 1942', Ritchie estimates Rommel's

strength and his own, deciding that they are very evenly balanced; gives a detailed account of the 8th Army's maintenance arrangements; analyzes the enemy's probable courses of action, concluding that he appears to be strengthening his position in the Cauldron with a view to passing to the offensive as soon as possible; and identifies the two main courses of action open to the 8th Army, either to attack the enemy in the Cauldron or to attack his weakest spot along the line of communication, the latter being the best plan of action. Followed by 'Notes on points raised in C.-in-C.'s telegrams CS/1229 of 10/6 and CS/10263 of 11/6 which have not been covered already by the Appreciation', comprising an account of the divisional control exercised over the 8th Army forces who are harassing the enemy east and west of the minefield, a report on the steps taken to improve the Knightsbridge locality, and a defence of his decision to withdraw the Free French from Bir Hacheim. 5 leaves. Typescript, with copious comments by Auchinleck.

**917** *11 June.* Letter from Auchinleck to R.G. Casey in Cairo, protesting about a telegram sent by the FO to Tehran; stating that the FO must be made to realize that the troops in Persia are part of the ME forces under his command, and that they must not be regarded as at the beck and call of the representative in Tehran or any other member of the FO; that the FO does not appear to appreciate that Persia may become a very active theatre of operations in the next few months, and that the troops are now fully occupied in preparing to resist a German invasion from the Caucasus; and expressing further indignation that the FO addressed the Commander of the 10th Army directly, ignoring the fact that the Commander takes his orders from Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**918** *11 June.* Cipher message no. CS/1238 from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, referring to 905, above, and the award of the MM to Indian soldiers; expressing his view that the Awards Committee is splitting hairs, that no British soldier in his theatre would consider that the MM had been devalued because Indians were also eligible for the Indian Order of Merit, and that it seems more important to the Committee to insure against some vague risk of devaluing a medal than to retain the goodwill of India's Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**919** *12 June.* Telegram no. 10882 from HQ, ME to the C-in-C's camp at the front, conveying cipher message OZ/452 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, asking what has happened about the Hurricanes with 40 mm. guns and about the puff-balls, and whether they have been used against enemy tanks. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**920** *12 June.* Cipher message no. G20037 from FM Smuts to Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron, expressing concern about the loss of Bir Hacheim because it involves loss of face and loss of the Allied left

flank; stating that it is difficult to understand why, during the enemy's concentrated attack against the French, the 8th Army did not counter-attack against the main enemy position in the centre; and asking that this feeling of concern should be expressed to Auchinleck, and that his admiration should be conveyed to Gen. Koenig for the heroic stand of the Free French at Bir Hacheim. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**921** *13 June.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, on his return to Cairo from HQ, 8th Army, announcing that the GS has been considering 'the worst possible case', that is, the defeat of Ritchie's army and the consequent need to hold the frontier as a rallying point, it being the duty of GS to plan for all possible contingencies; and that consequently he is proposing to place 10th Corps HQ in charge of the area Sollum – Matruh – Maddalena, ready to make plans for the defence of the area should the need arise, and wondering whether Ritchie would wish to retain command of the frontier area or whether he would like GHQ to relieve him of it, to leave him freer to control the forward battle. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**922** *13 June.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 852, above, declaring that he is quite happy with the location of the ME Higher Commanders' Course in Palestine; that he is proposing to reorganize command of the northern front by making 9th Army responsible for Syria and Northern Iraq and 10th Army responsible for Persia; reiterating that it is impossible to organize the defence of Northern Persia without full facilities for reconnaissance and preparation in the Russian sphere as well as the British zone; referring to his earlier arguments for delay of the Libyan offensive based on mathematical calculations of tank strengths, stating that his past experience has indicated that the mathematical argument is the only one that gives a safe basis for discussion with the Defence Minister; arguing that he has not taken cover behind the ME Defence Committee but has used the Committee to secure maximum co-operation of the three services in this theatre of war, scrupulously observing the rule that, before action is taken on any privately-received signal, there should be consultation with Tedder and the Admiral; and reporting heavy losses in Libya, his return from the 8th Army HQ, the unsuccessful course of the previous day's fighting, and the determination of himself and Ritchie to hang on and fight it out. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed with holograph note. 2 copies.

**923** *14 June.* Cipher message no. OZ/479 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, cordially endorsing his decision to fight it out to the end, and promising to sustain him whatever the result. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**924** *14 June.* Cipher message no. CS/1255 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, referring to 920, above; explaining that, during the heavy

offensive on the French at Bir Hacheim, a strong counter-attack was made against the enemy on 5/6 June, but that this was counter-attacked in its turn by strong enemy forces and driven back with heavy loss; declaring that, in his opinion, Bir Hacheim had largely fulfilled its purpose, and that Ritchie was right to evacuate it when he did; and reporting that the situation in Libya is grave but not irretrievable, that the superior enemy anti-tank gun gives him a great advantage, and that Allied tank losses are serious. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**925** 15 June. Cipher message no. CS/1259 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, stating that he has ordered Ritchie to deny to the enemy the general line Acroma – El Adem – Bir el Gubi; that, although he does not intend that the 8th Army should be besieged in Tobruk, he has no intention whatever of giving up Tobruk; and proposing, in the meantime, to build up a strong reserve in the Sollum – Maddalena area with the object of launching a counter-offensive as soon as possible. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**926** 15 June. Cipher message no. CS/1260 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, announcing that, as a result of the enemy threat to the rear, and to effect greater concentration of force, the 1st South African Division and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade have been withdrawn from the Gazala sector and are now moving east towards the frontier area. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**927** 15 June. Cipher message no. OZ/494 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that he is glad to have the assurance that there is no intention of giving up Tobruk, and that the War Cabinet interprets his message (925, above) to mean that, if the need arises, Ritchie would leave as many troops in Tobruk as are necessary to hold the place for certain. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**928** 16 June. Cipher message no. CS/1268 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, announcing that the 1st South African Division has completed withdrawal to the frontier area, and that this withdrawal, though undesirable from the viewpoint of concern for public morale, has tactical advantages for the 8th Army; and reporting that the enemy has succeeded in achieving a numerical superiority which somewhat hampers Allied action. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**929** 16 June. Cipher message no. CS/1270 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 927, above, stating that the War Cabinet's interpretation of his intention is correct; that Ritchie is putting into Tobruk what he considers to be an adequate force to hold it, even in circumstances in which it would be isolated temporarily by the enemy; and that the basis of immediate future action by the 8th Army is to hold the El Adem area as a pivot of manoeuvre, and to use all available mobile forces to prevent the enemy from establishing himself east of El Adem or Tobruk. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**930** 16 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1271 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 919, above, reporting that the Hurricanes with 40 mm. guns have destroyed at least two tanks, but that there has been no suitable opportunity to use the puffballs; and pointing out that, for effective use of either weapon, the aircraft must fly very low, a course not feasible when hostile AA fire is very powerful, as it is at present. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**931** 16 *June*. Cipher message no. MS/18 from R.G. Casey to Winston Churchill, putting forward again the case for a force of modern high-speed heavy bombers in the ME theatre, events over the past few days having made clear the potential value of such a force in ensuring the safety of seaborne supplies to Malta and North Africa. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**932** 16 *June*. Cipher message no. OZ/500 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, expressing his satisfaction that the 8th Army has succeeded in re-forming on the new front, close to reinforcements; asking whether many supplies fell into enemy hands; and suggesting that an advantage would be gained if the whole force was engaged together at one time if the initiative could be recovered, and that the new situation may provide this opportunity, especially if the enemy, who is obviously hard-pressed, is given no breathing space. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**933** 17 *June*. Cipher message no. G20292 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, stating that he is pleased to hear that the two divisions (the 1st South African and the 50th) have been successfully extricated from the Gazala front, and that he hopes the opportunity will still be sought to strike a decisive blow at the enemy from the new positions in the frontier area; and suggesting that a solution to the problem of the enemy's numerical superiority may be found by strongly reinforcing the 8th Army with personnel from the 9th Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**934** 17 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, enclosing a copy of an extract from the PM's telegram (932, above), stating that Churchill's opinion coincides with his and Ritchie's, and that, for this reason, he is most anxious there should be no delay in getting the 1st South African Division and the 50th Division back into action in the forward area; and stressing that the enemy must be kept under the heaviest pressure, and that the task of the 8th Army now is not to receive blows but to give them. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**935** 18 *June*. Cipher message no. G20460 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, declaring that, according to reports received, Tobruk is isolated once more, and urging the necessity of holding on firmly to the Tobruk area in order to save Tobruk and to bring the enemy to decisive battle. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**936** 18 June. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, enclosing notes on a meeting held at GHQ, ME to discuss changes in the system of command and administration in the 9th and 10th Army areas, including the formation of a Persia/Iraq base with 10th Army HQ in Persia, and the transfer of Northern Iraq to the command of the 9th Army. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**937** 19 June. Cipher message no. CS/1284 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, declaring that he has no intention of giving up Tobruk, which he hopes is only temporarily isolated; stating that Ritchie will defend Tobruk and the strong Sollum – Maddalena position which has been prepared for a long time against such a contingency; and that Maj.-Gen. Klopper (2nd South African Division), who is in overall charge in Tobruk, has his full confidence and that of Ritchie. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**938** 19 June. Letter from Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of cipher message no. UDF/Z/0110 from Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron to Gen. P. van Ryneveld concerning the delay in the Union of South Africa in replacing the men of the South African force who have been returned to the Union on home exchange, expressing dismay that such replacements have not been sanctioned and the fear that Maj.-Gen. Pienaar (1st South African Division) is assuming, in all his calculations, that the men sent home will be replaced. 2 leaves. Typescript, initialled.

**939** 20 June. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie, announcing that he has decided to make changes in 8th Army Corps Commanders, and that he proposes to relieve Lt.-Gen. Norrie of command of 30th Corps and to replace him by Maj.-Gen. Gott, and to appoint Maj.-Gen. Ramsden as Commander, 13th Corps. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**940** 20 June. Cipher message no. CS/1289 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, stating that he is alarmed by reports from London of a press campaign attributing the deterioration of the situation in Libya to the failure of the RAF to provide adequate support for the Army and for the recent Malta convoy; declaring that nothing could be further from the truth, that air support has been continuous and most effective, and that such lying campaigns may easily prejudice the efficiency of the Army and the RAF at a critical time. With manuscript notes in the hand of Auchinleck, and a separate holograph note by Maj. A. MacKinnon. 2 leaves. Typescript and holograph.

**941** 20 June. Cipher message no. CS/1297 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, amending slightly the text of his message 940, above. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**942** 20 June. Cipher message no. OZ/538 from C.R. Attlee, Deputy PM, acting on behalf of the PM, to Auchinleck, in reply to 940, above,

declaring that he can find no evidence of a press campaign attributing the deterioration of the situation in Libya to the failure of the RAF to provide adequate support for the Army, but that just recently there have been one or two newspaper articles which may have given rise to the impression that criticism of the RAF is widespread; asking Auchinleck to send details of the source and substance of the reports from London which he has received, and informing him that the Press has now been warned against any further criticisms of this kind. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**943** 21 June. Cipher message no. CC/68 from the ME Defence Committee to Winston Churchill and the Defence Committee, containing an appreciation of the situation consequent upon the impending fall of Tobruk; indicating the reasons why the decision has been taken to withdraw the main body of the 8th Army to the Mersa Matruh defences; and examining the consequences of this decision, namely, the increased vulnerability to air attack of Alexandria harbour, shipping in the Red Sea, Suez and the Canal zone, the impossibility now of running a convoy to Malta from the east, the severe restriction on the movement of single-engined fighters between Malta and Egypt, and the advantages to the enemy of greater naval freedom in the Eastern Mediterranean and of easier access to supplies for North Africa. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**944** 21 June. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to FM Smuts, expressing his grief at the loss of the major portion of the 2nd South African Division, together with certain units of the 1st South African Division, in the fall of Tobruk; asserting his own conviction that Maj.-Gen. Klopper did all he could in difficult circumstances to get out as many as possible of the garrison, but was foiled at the last moment by the shortage of MT vehicles due to capture by the enemy; and attributing the fall of Tobruk to the superiority of the enemy's armoured forces which were able to separate the 8th Army's main force from Tobruk, thus depriving Klopper of the support he needed. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**945** c. 21 June. 'Some aspects of the battle in the Libyan Desert, 27 May to 19 June '42 from the personal point of view of the Commander, 7th Armoured Division, Major-General Frank Messervy'; being an account of the preparations for battle, the first main enemy thrust, the first armoured battle, the staunch defence made by the 1st Free French Brigade in the Bir Hacheim area, and its withdrawal, the harassing action of the 7th Motor Brigade, the counter-attack on the enemy and the battle in the Cauldron, armoured operations to the south and south-east of Knightsbridge, the holding of the El Adem box and eventual evacuation, and operations by the 4th Armoured Brigade in the Sidi Rezegh area. 15 leaves. Typescript.

**946** 22 June. Cipher message GOOGLY No. 13 from Winston

Churchill (in Washington) to Auchinleck, expressing the earnest hope that stern resistance will be made to the enemy on the Sollum frontier line; informing him that important reinforcements are on the way, including the 8th Armoured and the 44th Divisions; agreeing with Smuts that Auchinleck should also draw freely from the 9th and 10th Armies; announcing that the Americans are sending the 2nd US Armoured Division to the ME to arrive in August; and exhorting Auchinleck to inspire all his forces with an intense will to resist and not to accept the freak decisions produced by Rommel's handful of heavy armour. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**947** 22 *June*. Cipher message no. OZ 544 from C.R. Attlee, Deputy PM to R.G. Casey and the C-in-Cs, ME, in reply to 943, above, approving the general policy of developing the Mersa Matruh position, but expressing the view that sufficient emphasis has not been placed on the difficulties which confront the enemy in staging a successful attack on the frontier defences; and stating that, if a resolute and determined defence is offered by the troops detailed for frontier defence, it may be possible to arrest the enemy's advance altogether or, at the worst, to gain time to build up an armoured striking force to operate offensively from Mersa Matruh. With a copy of the same message, no. 0/14693, sent to 8th Army HQ. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**948** 22 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1306 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, reporting that he has received further news from Ritchie concerning the fall of Tobruk; describing how the enemy assault on 20 June developed with great speed, how Maj.-Gen. Klopper announced that all his tanks were out of action and half his guns were lost, how only a small proportion of the garrison was able to fight a way out because almost all the MT had been captured by the enemy, and how capitulation was considered to be the only possible course. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**949** 23 *June*. Cipher message no. CC/69 from the ME Defence Committee to C.R. Attlee, in reply to 947, above, agreeing that it is highly desirable to hold the enemy on the frontier position, but stating that it is difficult to provide adequate mobile reserves of armoured troops to protect the two main defended areas on the frontier and the Matruh position, and that the 8th Army needs time to reorganize an armoured striking force; and reporting that it has been decided to make full use of the frontier defences and minefields by means of mobile covering troops, strong in artillery and fully supported by the air force, to build up an armoured reserve and prepare for an 'offensive defensive' battle in the Matruh area, and to be prepared to close up again on the frontier as soon as the 8th Army is fit for mobile offensive operations. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**950** 23 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1316 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, declaring that the unfavourable course of the recent

battle in Cyrenaica, culminating in the disastrous fall of Tobruk, impels him to ask Brooke to consider seriously the advisability of retaining him in MEC and the possibility that fresh blood and new ideas at the top may make all the difference between success and stalemate; stating that he personally feels fit to carry on and is reasonably confident of being able to turn the tables on the enemy in time, but he is aware that any soldier in high command can become stale and lose originality; and suggesting that he may want to use Gen. Alexander as his successor. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**951** 23 *June*. Cipher message MS/15328 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, announcing that he has relieved Maj.-Gen. Messervy of command of the 7th Armoured Division and placed Brig. J.M.L. Renton in command, and asking for confirmation of the change. With cipher message no. 96928/MO/5 from Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, asking why Messervy has been replaced. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**952** 24 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1318 from Auchinleck to Sir Archibald Nye, in reply to 951, above, stating that Messervy was removed from command because Ritchie had lost confidence in his ability to handle his division without suffering excessive casualties. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**953** 24 *June*. Cipher message no. CS/1319 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, in reply to 946, above, stating that he deeply regrets that Churchill should have received such a severe blow at a critical time as a result of the heavy defeat suffered by the forces under his command; reporting that the frontier positions at Sollum and to the south of it are no longer tenable against determined enemy attack because of the weakness in armoured support; announcing accordingly that he has agreed to the evacuation of these frontier positions, except for some mobile forces, and to a concentration of strength at Matruh where a new armoured reserve is being organized; describing the disposition of forces in detail, including the secondment of troops from 9th and 10th Armies; and reiterating his belief that infantry cannot win battles in the desert so long as the enemy has superiority in armour. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**954** 24 *June*. Cipher message GOOGLY 27 from Winston Churchill (in Washington) to Auchinleck, in reply to 953, above, assuring him that, whatever his views on the way the battle was fought or on whether it should have been fought earlier, he has entire confidence in Auchinleck and shares his responsibilities; stating that the US President is most anxious to assist by sending the American Armoured Division, some anti-tank rocket guns and air reinforcements; expressing concern about reports of undue despondency and alarm in Alexandria; reporting on the President's information from Rome that Rommel expects to be delayed about 3 or 4 weeks before he can mount a heavy attack on the Mersa Matruh position; and reminding

Auchinleck that he has over 700,000 men on his ration strength in the ME, and that there is no reason why units defending the Matruh position should not be reinforced by several thousands of officers and administrative personnel, ordered to swell the battalions or working parties, ready to fight or die for victory. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**955** 24 June. Letter from Maj. H.C. Lodge of the 1st American Tank Detachment, writing from the Office of the Military Attaché, US Legation, Cairo, to Auchinleck, reporting the departure of the Detachment for the USA, its mission accomplished; expressing thanks for the valuable combat experience which was the purpose of the visit, and admiration for the patience, tenacity and courage of the British soldier. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**956** 24 June. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, expressing confidence that he is not discouraged by recent reverses; informing him of the concern expressed in the House of Commons and of the suspicion held by some members that the British central planning organization is defective, especially on the technical side; describing his own attempts, in Churchill's absence, to alert C.R. Attlee, the Deputy PM, to the lack of any real, clear-cut policy in connection with airborne forces; and extolling the virtues of a special Army news service, already apparently in use in the ME, for sending back information by wireless straight to HQ from every part of the field of operations, so avoiding the delay involved in the ordinary channel of communications through overworked staff officers. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**957** 25 June. Cipher message no. CS/1326 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, stating that he is taking over command of the 8th Army from Ritchie because he regards him as slow, although sound and resolute, and the Army appears to have lost confidence in him; and announcing that he has appointed Dorman-Smith as his Chief of Staff. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**958** 25 June. Cipher message no. OZ/576 from C.R. Attlee, Deputy PM, to Auchinleck, declaring that the War Cabinet is pleased to hear that he has taken command of the 8th Army; and that the members of the Cabinet have every confidence in him and his troops, and in his ability to stop the enemy at Matruh and to drive him back in due course. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**959** 26 June. Message no. U/46 from Auchinleck, at 8th Army HQ, to Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett, the CGS in Cairo, for onward transmission to the PM, in reply to 954, above; expressing pleasure at the heartening news of the American determination to give help; reporting that it is impossible to gauge the enemy's intentions at present, but that it seems likely he will try to exploit his success by an early resumption of attack; and that the PM's instructions concerning

fighting manpower have been carried out, and working parties on the El Alamein position are being reinforced from base depots in the Delta. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**960** 27 *June*. Cipher telegram no. 7968 from HQ, ME to HQ, 8th Army, reporting a message to Auchinleck from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, in reply to 950, above, pointing out that the PM had expressed his entire confidence in him (954, above) before he received the telegram offering resignation, and that this confidence had been reaffirmed and was shared by Brooke. 2 leaves. Manuscript.

**961** 28 *June*. Cipher message no. 0/17585 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, reporting on the situation concerning the defence of Egypt; stating that the enemy is still markedly superior to the 8th Army in tanks, and that armour still remains the dominant factor governing the retention of the initiative; that he is aware that the occupation of Egypt would greatly ease the enemy's supply problem; that the 8th Army's object must be to prevent, at all costs, the enemy stopping the supply of men and material through the Red Sea ports before an adequate armoured force has been rebuilt to resume the offensive; declaring his intention to keep the 8th Army in being as a mobile field force, and to resist any further attempt by the enemy to advance eastwards by delaying his encroachment on the Fuka line and then the El Alamein position, and by drawing up contingency plans to oppose the enemy if he tries to advance directly on Cairo or if he moves along the coast to attack Alexandria; and disclosing his resolution to assume direct control of both the 8th Army and the Delta Force if the British forces are driven from the El Alamein position. 3 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies. 2nd copy signed.

**962** 29 *June*. Paper entitled 'Some lessons from the battle in Libya, 27 May to 19 June '42, as seen by Comd., 7 Armd. Div.' (Maj.-Gen. Frank Messervy), emphasizing the importance of the initiative in determining the course of battle, the need to maintain the concentration of armoured formations with mobility and without territorial responsibility, the superiority of positive attack by mobile forces over the maintenance of battle positions, the uselessness of the static box and the advantages of the mobile screen in warfare, the failure of the Brigade Group organization, the inadequacy of piecemeal reorganization of armoured units during and after battle, the improvements to be made to equipment, and the knowledge of German methods gleaned from the writer's brief experience of captivity. With marginal, pencilled comments by Auchinleck. 7 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**963** *c. 1 July*. Rough pencilled notes in the hand of Auchinleck entitled 'My draft for counter-offensive', noting that the enemy has concentrated opposite the 1st South African Division with the obvious intention of attacking early with the bulk of his forces; stating that his intention is to defeat and destroy the enemy, and describing his

method, namely, by 30th Corps stopping the enemy advancing eastwards and 13th Corps, with the 1st Armoured Division and the New Zealand Division, attacking northwards against the enemy's right flank and rear. (The rest of the description of projected further action has been crossed out.) 2 leaves. Holograph.

**964** 1 *July*. Cipher message no. T/35 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, declaring that he is proud to be in direct command of the 1st South African Division as Commander, 8th Army, on the eve of what may prove to be the turning point in the campaign in the Western Desert; and stating that the Division is holding an important sector of the El Alamein front. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**965** 2 *July*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, assuring him of his complete trust in his ability to cope with the present crucial situation, whether he succeeds in fighting Rommel to a standstill and in pushing him back, or whether he has to wage the war in Egypt itself. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**966** 3 *July*. Letter from Maj.-Gen. W.H.E. Gott, Commander, 13th Corps, to Auchinleck, reporting on the position of the 5th Indian Division, on his decision to keep his HQ near his divisions, on the thinning-out of the New Zealand Division from the Bab el Qattara box, on the capture by the New Zealanders of a sector of the Italian Ariete Division, on his intention that the 5th Indian Division should take over from the New Zealanders to make the whole New Zealand Division available for a move north and north-west, on the attacks and counter-attacks which have slowed down the withdrawal, and on the difficulties in maintaining communications. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**967** 3 *July*. Cipher message no. OZ/633 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, reminding him that he was sent special information on 1 July that the enemy, after feinting at his southern flank, intended to attack the centre of his position and thereafter turn northwards to cut off the El Alamein strong point, and that Rommel appears to be trying to do this; asking Auchinleck whether he is receiving these special messages as promptly as possible, how the 8th Armoured Division is progressing, what is the present state and position of the 9th Australian Division, how Rommel's tanks would fare among the canals and irrigation of the Delta, and whether inundations have been made; emphasizing that Egypt should be defended just as stoutly as if it were Kent or Sussex; and announcing an overwhelming vote of confidence by the House of Commons in the Government and the 8th Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**968** 3 *July*. Cipher message no. CS/377 from Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett to Winston Churchill, in reply to 967, above, writing on behalf of Auchinleck to avoid delay, reporting that the special information on German movements goes directly to the 8th Army and

some, but not all, arrives in time to be useful in operations; that the personnel of the 8th Armoured Division start landing on 4 July; that the 9th Australian Division will have completed arrival in the Alexandria area by 4 July, and that steps are being taken to put the whole division on a mobile basis; that tank movement among the waterways and irrigation channels of the Delta is very restricted, equally for the enemy as for the 8th Army; and that complete inundation of the Alexandria area is not yet possible while it is essential to retain use of the aerodrome, and completion of the inundation of the Cairo area is still under negotiation with the Egyptian Government. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**969** 3 *July*. Cipher message no. G/21443 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing appreciation of Auchinleck's message of 1 July (964, above) and confidence in his leadership and in the final result of the battle, although he is aware that it may take some time to wear down the enemy for the ultimate blow. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**970** 6 *July*. Cipher message no. G/21584 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, expressing immense relief that the enemy has been stopped at El Alamein, which he thinks may become one of the decisive turns in the war, admiration for Auchinleck's courage and unflinching tenacity, and pride that the 1st South African Division and the South African Air Force have played their part in the crisis; and pledging his fullest support until Africa is cleared of the enemy. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies. The first copy bears the pencilled draft of a reply in the hand of Auchinleck.

**971** 6 *July*. Cipher message no. 99606 from Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, to Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett, expressing disquiet about the fall of Tobruk after such a very short resistance, involving the capture of so many prisoners and the loss of so much material; and referring to Axis reports that the General in command surrendered and to the considerable criticism of Allied commanders generated in the UK by the whole incident, to the extent that the Cabinet has asked the DAG to report as soon as possible on the circumstances in which the capitulation took place and on the conduct of the General in command. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**972** 7 *July*. Cipher message no. CS/1385 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, thanking him for his good wishes (970, above), and stating that the battle is not yet over but the 8th Army is holding the enemy and hopes to conquer him. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**973** 8 *July*. Cipher message no. CS/1388 from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, referring to 971, above, expressing outrage and disbelief that the Cabinet has ordered his DAG to report independently on an operation carried out under his command; declaring that, if the Cabinet wishes to send out a Committee of Enquiry from home,

it is at liberty to do so, but it is intolerable for them to depute a staff officer of his command to undertake such an investigation without the sanction of the C-in-C; and stating that he has already instituted his own enquiry under Gen. Wilson. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**974** 9 *July*. Letter from Sir John Dill, writing from the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, to Auchinleck, sympathizing with him in his defeats and losses, especially in the fall of Tobruk; comparing the present depressing state of the ME operation with the disasters of March 1918, and declaring that, just as the Army in those days did not lose faith in Douglas Haig, so the 8th Army will not have lost confidence in Auchinleck, whose achievements, despite some setbacks, must have created great trust; describing the visit of the PM and Alan Brooke to Washington, their relief that Auchinleck himself has taken command of the 8th Army, and their regret that he did not do so earlier; and exhorting him to keep in himself the confidence that others have in him, and to restrain the sensitiveness which makes him vulnerable to the knocks and bumps inflicted by defeat in desperate battles. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**975** 12 *July*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. N.M. Ritchie to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of 26 June which has been a great help to him, and bidding him 'au revoir' in the hope that he may serve him again some day. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**976** 12 *July*. Cipher message no. OZ/710 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, declaring that he is well aware that the Japanese threat to India and the defeats in the Western Desert have stripped the northern fronts bare, and that the only way in which a sufficient army can be gathered in the northern theatre is by Auchinleck defeating Rommel and driving him at least to a safe distance; and that, if this were accomplished before the middle of September, the Australian and New Zealand divisions could return to their stations in Palestine and Syria and the 51st Division could be sent to the northern theatre direct. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**977** 13 *July*. Letter from William Rawson, DCM, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his gallant stand at El Alamein; reminding him that he was one of his signal sergeants when he was Brigade Major of the 52nd Indian Infantry Brigade of the 17th Indian Division; and stating that he would like to serve under him again. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**978** 14 *July*. Cipher message no. 23285 from HQ, ME to Tac.HQ, 8th Army, conveying a message from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, referring to 973, above, assuring him that there was no intention of any independent enquiry being held by one of Auchinleck's staff officers into the fall of Tobruk, and that the procedure proposed represented a genuine desire not to bother him

with a post-mortem when he was so heavily burdened with responsibilities; and suggesting that the best solution is his own, namely the appointment of Gen. Wilson to conduct the investigation. 3 leaves. Manuscript.

**979** *14 July*. Cipher message no. CST/44 from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett, conveying a message to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, thanking him for his signal (978, above) and for the motives prompting the original wire, and apologizing for the misunderstanding. 1 leaf. Manuscript.

**980** *14 July*. Cipher message no. OS/23716 from Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, describing the condition of the tanks received from the UK; reporting that they are better than those received earlier in the year but that the performance of the engines was below standard, and some of the tank fittings were missing; and stating that tanks transported by road, rail and sea under varying climatic conditions cannot be battleworthy after such a voyage without considerable attention in the workshops. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**981** *15 July*. Cipher message no. G/22246 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, stating that the enemy appears to be repeating his successful Gazala tactics by attacking in two places well apart in order to secure points for further advance and to confuse the Allies; and urging Auchinleck to prevent any move by the southern flank. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**982** *16 July*. Cipher message no. CST/59 from Auchinleck to FM Smuts, in reply to 981, above, thanking him for his advice; and assuring him that he is fighting this battle on quite different lines from the Gazala action, that the enemy is now conforming to Allied moves and not vice versa, and that El Alamein is a bastion on which the Allied flank rests. With autograph postscript announcing that the Allies have retaken Qaret el Himeimat. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**983** *16 July*. Letter from John Shearer, formerly DMI, ME, now Managing Director of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation Ltd., to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the confidence he has inspired in the public and the press; and describing the gratitude shown towards him for restoring what appeared to be a desperate situation. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**984** *17 July*. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, declaring that it is a joy to see him gradually regaining mastery over the enemy; stating that he did not answer his telegram of 23 June (950, above) more fully because he had seen the PM's wire to him expressing full confidence in him; and reporting on the arrangements he is making to help Auchinleck on his northern front, on the difficulties he has encountered with the FO and the Cabinet in connection with Auchinleck's request for reconnaissance facilities in

Northern Persia, on his visit to America which has secured additional equipment for MEC, and on his plan to visit Auchinleck shortly. With autograph note wishing him the very best of luck in his trying and difficult task. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**985** 22 *July*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, declaring that the first part of his forecast (965, above), that Auchinleck would hold the line, has come true, and it only remains now for him to fulfil the second part, to put an end to the menace of Rommel; and suggesting that in press reports the names of individual Indian units should be mentioned by correspondents, in the same way as British units. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**986** 24 *July*. Cipher message no. G/22821 from FM Smuts to Auchinleck, congratulating him on the opening of his offensive; stating that, although he has not gained all he aimed at, he has given the enemy a heavy knock; and that, if he continues to attack at his weak points, the whole line may crack, and a general retreat may start. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**987** 25 *July*. Special Order of the Day, to all ranks of the 8th Army from Auchinleck, behind El Alamein: conveying the message that the 8th Army has done well by turning a retreat into a firm stand and by stopping the enemy on the threshold of Egypt; stating that the Army has wrenched the initiative from Rommel by sheer guts and has put him on the defensive in the last few weeks; and exhorting the men not to slacken now and to stick to it. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**988** 25 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, thanking him for his confidence and encouragement; expressing disappointment that the offensive of 21–22 July did not succeed; declaring that he has virtually no reserve with which to stage new attacks or to maintain the momentum of an attack once started; reporting on the lack of flexibility of Dominion troops, due to their insistence that they should fight only under their own direct command; commenting on the proposed organization of the northern front, on the future need for a new Commander of the 8th Army, although he proposes to stay in personal charge until the present battle is over, on the possibility of Gott taking over eventually, and on his decision to replace Jock Whiteley by F. de Guingand as BGS, 8th Army; and announcing that he may yet have to face withdrawal from the present forward positions, although he hopes that this will not be necessary. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**989** 27 *July*. Cipher message no. OZ/828 from Winston Churchill to Auchinleck, stating that he has not troubled him with messages while he has been so fearfully engaged, and that he now appears to have the advantage over Rommel in the air, in communications and in the reinforcements that have been sent; asking when the 44th Division will

be able to go into action; and announcing that Sir Alan Brooke is coming out to see him early next week. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**990** 8 August. Letter from Winston Churchill, writing from Cairo, to Auchinleck, reminding him of his telegram of 23 June (950, above) in which he raised the question of being relieved of his Command and mentioned the name of Gen. Alexander as a possible successor; recalling that, at that time of crisis, the Government did not wish to avail itself of his high-minded offer, and that, having taken over the effective command of the battle, he stemmed the adverse tide with the result that the front is at present stabilized; stating that the War Cabinet has now decided, for the reasons which Auchinleck himself used, that the time has come for a change; and proposing to offer Auchinleck a new Command comprising Iran and Iraq, and to appoint Gen. Alexander as C-in-C, ME and Gen. Montgomery as Commander of the 8th Army. With an autograph postscript, expressing his sympathy in the sudden loss of Gen. Gott. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed. With envelope, addressed in holograph.

**991** 8 August. Letter from F. de Guingand, BGS, 8th Army, to Auchinleck, expressing his sense of shock at the news, his conviction that this is a victory for the old and privileged school, his opinion on the offer of a new command, his own reliance upon Auchinleck's help in his present post, and his gratitude for his kindness. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**992** 10 August. Letter from Winston Churchill, from the British Embassy, Cairo, to Auchinleck, stating that, on his return journey, he is proposing to hold a conference in Baghdad on 14 or 15 August in order to discuss, *inter alia*, the machinery of an independent Command for Iraq and Iran; and that by that time he would like to know whether Auchinleck feels able to undertake the very difficult and serious task which has been offered to him. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**993** 13 August. Letter from Maj.-Gen. L.J. Morshead, Commander, 9th Australian Division, to Auchinleck, expressing sorrow and surprise that Auchinleck is leaving MEC and gratitude for his consideration and encouragement, both while in Tobruk and ever since; and declaring that it would be a great privilege to serve under him again. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**994** 14 August. Letter from Lt.-Gen. T.W. Corbett to Auchinleck, stating that he is very proud of having had the privilege of serving under him in war as his CGS; and assuring him that he retains the implicit confidence of his troops, and that his achievement in stopping the rot in a beaten army and in wresting the initiative from a triumphant enemy will be recognized one day. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**995** *19 August.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. Zajac, C-in-C, Polish Forces, ME, to Auchinleck, expressing deep regret that he is leaving MEC, and appreciation of the understanding he has shown to the Polish officers and men under his command; and complimenting him on his courageous decision to withdraw voluntarily to the El Alamein line, a decision which not only enabled him to check Rommel's offensive but also made it possible to abolish the threat to the security of the Nile valley. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**996** *21 August.* Telegram no. 6820 from Gen. G. Catroux, C-in-C, Free French Forces, Levant, to Auchinleck, thanking him for the confidence he has placed in him and his troops; and stating that the Free French Forces are proud to have fought under his orders, and that he himself deeply regrets his departure and has great respect for him both as a man and as a commander. With an English translation. 4 leaves. Manuscript and typescript.

**997** *24 August.* Copy of a personal letter from Auchinleck, writing from Nathia Gali, India, to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, asking whether the PM has informed him of his reasons for stipulating that no publicity should be given to his return to India on leave; giving a full account of the PM's visit to Cairo and to 8th Army HQ, his letter replacing Auchinleck by Alexander, his decision to make Iraq and Iran into a separate, independent Command, his offer to Auchinleck, the reasons for Auchinleck's refusal, the latter's reaction to the news of Gen. Wilson's appointment to the new Command, and his concern that there is a danger of overstretching inadequate resources in the ME; and expressing his feeling that the PM and the CIGS have lost confidence in his general military judgement and are disinclined to seek his opinion on matters of strategy and policy, a feeling which engenders a grave lack of confidence in himself. 5 leaves. Holograph. With 3 other copies, typewritten.

**998** *25 August.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. A.G.O.M. Mayne, Commander, 21st Indian Corps, to Auchinleck, describing his sorrow and anger at Auchinleck's departure, and declaring that the IA feels lost and fatherless without him. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**999** *29 August.* Letter from Maj.-Gen. Frank Theron, senior South African liaison officer in the ME, to Auchinleck, thanking him for the consideration which he has always shown to the South Africans and for the patience he has exercised in dealing with their problems; and stating that the South African forces are proud to have served under him in the ME. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1000** *31 August.* Letter from Maj.-Gen. Alexander Galloway, Director of Staff Duties, WO, to Auchinleck, expressing the hope that he is now enjoying a well-earned rest, and that it will not be long before he is on the war-path again; reporting that he has received news that the

new regime in the ME involves an organization in which the RAC will predominate, bringing to nought Auchinleck's attempts to make the Corps fight as part of an army; revealing his own preference for active soldiering over staff work and his distrust of political influence on military operations; and recalling the recent battles in the ME, and describing his failure to understand why Ritchie ordered the Free French to withdraw from Bir Hacheim and why the 8th Army lost Tobruk. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1001** 2 *September*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, expressing his distress at the news of his supersession; stating that both the PM and Sir Alan Brooke are well disposed towards him and do not regard him as out of the picture for the rest of the war; and exhorting him not to lose confidence in himself or in his power to do great things. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1002** 5 *September*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. E.P. Quinan, HQ, 10th Army, Iran, to Auchinleck, declaring that he refrained from writing immediately after he heard the news to give Auchinleck time to recover from the hurt recently inflicted in such a scandalous way; and expressing his sorrow that he has been so shamefully treated so soon after his success in restoring a lost situation. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1003** 6 *September*. Letter from Lord Birdwood to Auchinleck, stating how sorry he is that he is no longer commanding the Allied forces in the ME, and telling him this in his role of 'father of the Army'; and declaring that it is to his great credit that he established a fine defence line after Ritchie had experienced so many disasters, and that, as a result, Rommel has suffered a very hard blow in his recent attack. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1004** 11 *September*. Letter from C.N. Ryan (a student with Auchinleck at the Imperial Defence College in 1927, and now of the War Damage Commission) to Auchinleck, expressing pride in the fact that he was an associate of Auchinleck who recognized many years ago that he was destined for 'early and accelerated promotion'; and rejoicing in the apt phrasing of the public tribute paid to him by Churchill. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1005** 11 *September*. Letter from R.G. Casey, Minister of State, ME, to Auchinleck, reporting on the battle of Alam Halfa, the lack of success achieved by the enemy and his heavy losses, his present difficulties with De Gaulle in Syria, the visit of Wendell Willkie to Cairo, and his belief that Willkie will be the next President of the USA. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1006** 13 *September*. Letter from Gen. Sir Maitland Wilson to Auchinleck, accompanying a copy of the 'Report of the Enquiry into the fall of Tobruk' (not included); declaring that it has been difficult to find out what really happened owing to lack of evidence, and that he

was distinctly shaken by the handling of the Cauldron action by 30th Corps; and reporting that he has been busy building up the GHQ of his new Iran – Iraq Command. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1007** 23 *September*. Letter of sympathy from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, declaring that he intended to write immediately after the PM's trip to the ME, but he had a temporary breakdown; assuring Auchinleck that he has been constantly in his thoughts since the fall of Tobruk, and that he is deeply disappointed that things have gone badly for him, because he deserved victory; stating that he was dumbfounded on receiving the telegram proposing a change in command in the ME; and asserting that Auchinleck's stock is high in the UK, that there is a general feeling of gratitude to him for his achievements in the past, and confidence in him for the future, and that he himself prays that he may soon see his sword flashing again in the struggle. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1008** 27 *September*. Draft of a letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, thanking him for his letter of sympathy (1001, above); declaring that, if the members of the War Cabinet considered a change of commander in the ME was necessary in the interests of the nation, they had no option except to make it, but admitting that there were attendant circumstances which hurt him a great deal at the time; giving the reasons why he felt unable to accept the new Iran – Iraq Command, principally because of the present tactical and strategical dependence of Iran and Iraq on the ME; and admitting that his removal from command dealt a heavy blow at his confidence in himself as a leader of men. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1009** 28 *September*. Draft of a letter from Auchinleck to R.G. Casey, Minister of State for the ME, in reply to 1005, above, declaring that he was glad to hear that the enemy's attack on the El Alamein position had failed; expressing the hope that Gen. Wilson can make the new Iran – Iraq Command work; and commenting on the raids carried out by the Allies on Tobruk and Jalo, on the difficult personality of De Gaulle, on the visit of Wendell Willkie to Cairo, and on his own uncertainty regarding his future as an army commander. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1010** 1 *October*. Draft of a letter from Auchinleck to Sir John Dill, stating that he does not suppose that the news of his supersession came as a surprise but that, curiously enough, it did come as a surprise to Auchinleck at the time, because he felt that the tide was turning, and that he might soon have the pleasure of getting his own back on Rommel; explaining why he refused the Iran – Iraq Command, because he would not wish Dill to think that he had rejected the offer out of pique or false pride; and describing his present, unemployed, state, which, according to IA rules, can obtain for three months on reduced pay, after which time he is due to retire on pension. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1011** 9 November. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, stating that he will always have the satisfaction of knowing that the victory of today was only made possible by his own efforts in withdrawing to El Alamein and holding the position there, and that there would be no champagne today if Auchinleck had not put the cork in the bottle in July. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1012** 14 November. Letter from Lt.-Gen. E.P. Quinan to Auchinleck, expressing anger at the PM's speech in which no mention was made of the fact that Montgomery followed Auchinleck's plan almost exactly, and that Auchinleck effectively stopped Rommel's advance by his personal influence on the battlefield. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1013** 18 November. Letter from Lt.-Col. G.L. Betham, the British Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of Nepal, to Col. C.G. Toogood, Military Secretary to the Viceroy, conveying a message from the Maharajah of Nepal to Auchinleck and the Viceroy, expressing the admiration of the Maharajah and the Gurkhas for Auchinleck and for his achievement in stopping Rommel from reaching the gates of Alexandria, and for holding him at El Alamein while armour, guns and aircraft were poured into North-East Africa and while the preparations were being made for the joint British and American landings in North-West Africa; and stating that he paved the way for the victories of other generals. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1014** 24 November. Letter from Col. Victor Cazalet, MP for Chippenham and British liaison officer with Gen. Sikorski, to Auchinleck, stating that he and many others have been thinking of Auchinleck's achievements recently; and that he ventured to remind members of the House of Commons of the debt the nation owed to him, his remarks being met with warm approval. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1015** 16 December. Letter from W. Richards, of the Maintenance Services, ME Forces, to Auchinleck, describing how sorry he and his colleagues were to see him go, and how pleased they were to keep his forces adequately equipped; expressing admiration for his tactics in withdrawing to the best position at El Alamein, instead of trying to stem the tide at the unsuitably located Mersa Matruh; and stating that subsequent victories were entirely due to the success of Auchinleck's resistance and to the copious supplies of excellent equipment which have arrived in the ME since his departure. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1016** 25 December. Letter from Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, stating that he will be very interested to read his dispatch when it is finished; reporting on the difficulty in co-ordinating British and American policy, and in reconciling Pacific and European outlooks;

and declaring his delight that Auchinleck shares his view that none of the events of last August should impair their friendship in any way. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1017** 31 December. Letter from Gen. H.R.L.G. Alexander, C-in-C, ME, to Auchinleck, wishing him luck and happiness in 1943. 1 leaf. Holograph.

### 1943

**1018** 5 January. Letter from Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, declaring that he hates to think of him sitting at Delhi doing nothing useful to win the war, and that sometimes he wishes that he had taken the Iran – Iraq Command; but that he is also sure that he badly needed a rest when the offer was made, and he understands fully that his decision to reject the Command was not based on false pride or pique. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1019** 22 February. Letter from Gen. W. Anders, C-in-C, Polish Army in the East, to Auchinleck, expressing his appreciation of the way in which Auchinleck, through his energy and military authority, succeeded in stopping Rommel at the very gates of Cairo and Alexandria, making possible the subsequent great advance through North Africa; and asserting his own willingness, and that of his troops, to serve under him again. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1020** 9 March. Letter (in French) from Gen. A.E. Béthouart, French Military Mission, Washington, to Auchinleck, declaring that his thoughts often turn to the days when, under the command of Auchinleck, their combined forces succeeded in capturing Narvik to save Allied honour, and to facilitate the evacuation which so quickly followed victory; describing his subsequent retirement to Morocco and his eventual mission to the USA, at the command of Gen. Giraud; and expressing his wish to serve under Auchinleck again. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1021** 15 March [?1943]. Letter from ‘Taffy’ to Auchinleck, thanking him for his kindness at a time when he was suffering such a sense of frustration and loss of self confidence that he felt useless to the war effort. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1022** 27 March. Letter from Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, writing from the ME, to Auchinleck, declaring that he will always be very proud that he served under Auchinleck and will always be grateful for the way in which Auchinleck welcomed him. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1023** 19 May. Letter from J.J. Lawson, MP, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his kindness to him when he was in India. 2 leaves. Holograph.

*India 1943*

**1024** 19 *June*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his new appointment; expressing his opinion that no man could efficiently combine the preparation and conduct of operations in South-East Asia with the duties of C-in-C, India, and that it should not be a disappointment to him that he himself will not have operational control of the war in South-East Asia; and stating his conviction that the new Viceroy (Wavell) will give him support and confidence. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1025** 20 *June*. Telegram no. 1737-S from L.S. Amery to Lord Linlithgow, conveying a message to Auchinleck from Sir Stafford Cripps, expressing his delight at the news of his new appointment. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1026** 21 *June*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur Smith to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his new appointment; and declaring that justice has not been done to him for what he succeeded in achieving at El Alamein. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1027** 21 *June*. Letter from Albert W. Brown, of Grindlay & Co. Ltd., London, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his reappointment to the supreme command of India's armies. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1028** 24 *June*. Letter from Gen. Sir Brian Robertson to Auchinleck, writing as someone who served under him in the ME and admired his work there, congratulating him on his new appointment. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1029** 25 *June*. Letter from Gen. G.E. Brink, formerly Commander of the 1st South African Division, to Auchinleck, expressing his own pleasure, and that of many South Africans who served under him in the ME, at the news of his new appointment. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1030** 27 *June*. Letter from Freya Stark, writing from the British Embassy, Baghdad, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his appointment, and describing her excitement at the prospect of a four-month visit to America. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1031** 30 *June*. Letter from Rai Bahadur, P.D. Varma, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his reappointment to the command of the IA; offering his services and those of his four grown-up sons; and reminding him that he knew him as Capt. Auchinleck and played football with him over 30 years ago. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1032** 26 *July*. Letter from Lord Linlithgow, retiring Viceroy, to Auchinleck, suggesting that their joint endeavour in meeting the danger in Iraq in 1941 should be fully recorded in some document of a permanent character. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1033** *16 August.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, stating that he does not agree with the Secretary of State's opinion that India should not advance a claim to membership of the proposed United Nations Commission for Europe, even if membership of this body is dependent on a contribution to the policing of Europe; and asserting his belief that, from his own experience, Indian troops are likely to perform this duty as well as, if not better than, British conscript troops, eager for speedy demobilization. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1034** *c. 31 August.* 'A note on the size and composition of the Indian Army, August, 1943': a paper written by Auchinleck for the information of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. 8 leaves. Typescript.

**1035** *2 September.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his reassuring message; describing his delight at the decision to appoint Auchinleck as C-in-C, India, and the shock of finding himself picked to take over the difficult role of Supreme Commander, South-East Asia; indicating his approval of Orde Wingate, and his willingness to prosecute the decision made by the Chiefs of Staff to implement the Long Range Penetration Group policy on a large scale; recognizing with some sympathy that this cuts across Auchinleck's plans for the Army in India; and expressing his dislike of large, swollen staffs and his wish to use the existing staffs of the three C-in-Cs to avoid duplication and irresponsible planning. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1036** *9 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, asking for consideration to be given to the release of the Indian formations now in the ME, with a view to their return to India, and for shipping to be provided to enable regular leave to be given to the Indian troops in the ME and the Iran – Iraq Commands. With a second copy of Auchinleck's paper (1034, above) on the size and composition of the IA. 10 leaves. Typescript.

**1037** *18 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, referring to a report by Gen. N.M.S. Irwin (formerly Commander, Eastern Army) on the reasons for the failure of the campaign in Burma in the previous year, attributing it to lack of training and readiness for jungle warfare of troops and commanders, to administrative problems arising from difficulties in communication and transport, to inadequate resources of both trained personnel and material, aggravated by the high incidence of malaria, and to the dislocation caused by Congress disturbances in the autumn; stating that improvements have been effected in the training of troops, and that, as the result of experience, changes have been made in the administrative organization; and expressing his own conviction that, provided that the difficulties imposed by great distances, poor communications and natural obstacles of climate and terrain are appreciated, and plans are

laid accordingly on a realistic basis, the troops will not fail their leaders, and that they will do all that is asked of them; and that the leaders also are of high calibre and are not likely to fail their troops. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1038** *15 October.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, South-East Asia, to Auchinleck, thanking him for arranging two valuable and interesting series of lectures and discussions on the naval, military, air and economic situation in India and South-East Asia; and asking him to convey his thanks to the senior officers involved in the programmes. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1039** *2 November.* Letter from Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, stating that he has telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India the information about the action taken by the IA to assist Bengal; and expressing his thanks and his belief that the Army can be as efficient an agent in civil emergencies as in military affairs. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1040** *7 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, in reply to a letter from Wavell of 6 November, stating that there had not been, as far as he knew, any official suggestion that India might again become militarily responsible for Iraq and Iran; but that, in his opinion, it would be sensible for India to take over this responsibility if the situation in Iran deteriorated seriously, in view of the possibility of Afghan involvement and its effects on the tribal situation on the North-West Frontier. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1041** *11 November.* Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, expressing his appreciation of the help given by the Army in India to famine-stricken Bengal, his awareness of the need to secure good supplies for India despite shipping problems, his desire to see some of the burden of supplying theatres of war shifted from India to the ME, and his respect for the fine co-operative spirit shown by Auchinleck in his acceptance of the new working arrangements of the SEAC. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1042** *15 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, expressing concern about the possible use of Indian troops for the restoration of order in the Lebanon on the grounds that, if there were any question of lending support to the French in Syria, there would be serious trouble, because the French are universally detested by the whole Arab world for their general maladministration in the Levant; predicting that the Moslem League would make capital out of the use of Hindu troops, and that the whole Moslem community might be upset by the use of Moslem troops; and recommending that Indian troops should not be used in any situation involving assistance to the French. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1043** 2 *December*. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, stating his opinion that it would be dangerous to use Indian troops, Moslem or Hindu, to enforce Allied wishes on Turkish nationals on account of the political issues which might be raised in India itself by the Moslem League; and drawing a distinction between the perfectly safe use of Indian soldiers for the ordinary watch and ward duties of internal security, such as guarding airfields, and the quite different use of such troops for the task of suppressing one class or race to benefit another, involving, for instance, the use of Hindu soldiers in the repression of Moslems who are not declared enemies. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1044** 12 *December*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, on the morale of the IA, the effects of two major reorganizations within 40 years, the shift of loyalty from battalion to regiment, and the impossibility of reverting to the old system. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1045** 22 *December*. Copy of a letter from Sir Ronald Adam, AG, to Lt.-Gen. Sir Wilfred Lindsell, PAO, India, describing the measures he proposes to take to relieve some of the problems faced by the British Army in India. With a copy of his report on India, intended for the Army Council, on the administrative link-up between SEAC and GHQ, India; the need for the AG, India to adopt the methods of the British Army; the difficulties encountered by British troops in India, and the obstacles in the way of building up a healthy morale, notably, delays in the transmission of supplies, the incidence of sabotage on the Bengal railways, the plight of the indigenous population suffering from starvation and cholera, the over-manning of AA guns, the lack of air ambulances on the Burma front, the general feeling in the British Army in India that GHQ, India does not know, and does not care about, the British troops and that they are forgotten in the UK, the muddle over the return of long-service men, and the need to improve leave camps and to provide the men with some of the facilities made available in other theatres of war through NAAFI. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1046** 23 *December*. Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, in reply to 1041, above, expressing thanks for appreciation of his efforts in Bengal and in the development of SEAC; describing the immediate problem of shortage of coal; and welcoming the news that it has at last been agreed to award the MM to the IA. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1047** 24 *December*. Letter from Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, conveying good wishes for Christmas and 1944, and stating that it is a great comfort to him to have Auchinleck's help and advice. 1 leaf. Holograph.

1944

**1048** 5 January. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, congratulating him on his elevation to the rank of FM; and requesting that the privilege of wearing an Arabic '8' on the ribbon of the Africa Star should be extended to all who served with the 8th Army from the date of its formation, and should not be reserved for those who fought after the final advance from El Alamein, pointing out that the men who fought and broke Rommel in November and December 1941 prevented his advance into Egypt, and that soldiers who held the Germans at El Alamein laid the foundations for the final victory of the 8th Army. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1049** 15 January. *His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's address to the National Defence Council, India, on 15th January, 1944*, containing a review of the current situation in various theatres of war, notably, Italy, Russia, Germany, the Balkans, the South-West Pacific and Burma; and concluding with an account of the disposition and state of the IA in India itself. 3 leaves. Printed.

**1050** 20 January. Letter from Auchinleck to FM Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, referring to Sir Ronald Adam's report on India (1045, above); stating that the IA is already implementing the arrangements whereby officer postings and allied questions are co-ordinated under the AG, India; that the supplies to the 14th Army, although short of requirements, are not as meagre as was implied in the report; that any delays in delivery have arisen from transportation difficulties; that sabotage and theft on the line-of-communication in Assam are appreciably less than in the ME; that the situation in the famine areas of Bengal has substantially improved; that a review of India's AA commitments was carried out, and, as a result, the number of guns has been substantially reduced, and the WO has been asked to disband some AA batteries; expressing his agreement with Sir Ronald's reference to the need for air ambulances in Burma, but pointing out that there are few places in northern Burma where aircraft can land; recognizing also the need for more leave camps, but indicating that at present India cannot keep pace with essential operational priorities; suggesting that the only way to counter the feeling of neglect experienced by British troops in India is to send GHQ officers on constant visits to the men, but the distance from Delhi to N.W. Assam is the same as from London to Leningrad, and the cause of England's neglect of India may lie in operational considerations which are India's misfortune, not her fault; and denying that there was any muddle over the return of long-service men, only a lack of shipping, stressing the point that aircraft for mail, for leave and for ENSA parties must take a lower priority than airlifting supplies of fresh meat to fighting troops. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1051** 9 March. Letter from FM Sir Alan Brooke to Auchinleck, concerning the extension of the emblem '8' to the ribbons of those who served in the 8th Army before the battle of El Alamein (1048, above); stating that he wrote to the PM supporting Auchinleck's request; that the submission was then forwarded to the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals in Time of War; that the application was rejected on the grounds that, if Auchinleck's submission was accepted, other claims of various kinds to similar privileges would make the whole problem insoluble; and that, therefore, it was necessary to stand firm on the original, if arbitrary, distinction and to resist extensions. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note.

**1052** 11 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, on the future of the Madras Guards and the AFI, pointing out that, historically, the AFI was designed to be an armed force obedient to the British Government of India, which could supplement the regular British troops in India in the event of rebellion or mutiny in the IA; that such a force must now be considered to be moribund; that Anglo-Indians may continue to serve in the Indian armed forces in future, but they will do so as statutory natives of India, not as British soldiers; and expressing the belief that the AFI cannot survive in its present form. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1053** 13 March. Letter from Lord Mountbatten, from SEAC HQ, to Auchinleck, quoting an extract from a letter from Gen. Christison, Commander of 15th Corps in the Arakan, applauding the successful efforts made by IC to maintain supplies of men, animals, stores and ammunition to enable the troops in Arakan to take the offensive again. With autograph draft of Auchinleck's reply, thanking him for the message, and telling him that he will pass it on to those concerned. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1054** 21 March. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for sending a copy of his proposed statement to the Council of State; and inviting him to send for any information he may require to SEAC HQ, and to offer his views or advice at any time, because they would be greatly valued. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1055** c. 1 April. Newspaper cutting recording a statement made by Auchinleck in the Indian Assembly on operations in Burma, the Japanese plan to seize the Imphal-Kohima area, and the measures taken to defend both Imphal and Kohima. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1056** 16 May. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, enclosing a report on Anglo-American relations in India in which he declares that India lies on the dividing-line between American Pacific policy and British Western policy; that the conflict between detailed instructions received from the USA by Gen. Stilwell (Deputy Commander, SEAC) and from the UK by Lord Mountbatten suggests that no integration of policy has yet been achieved; that the Americans

have antagonized Indians by their behaviour and attitude; that American officers and soldiers are discouraged from establishing close contact with the British in India; that there exists, nonetheless, evidence of good relations in those spheres in which there is some degree of co-operation, as in intelligence, for example; and concluding that the real remedy is for Great Britain and the USA to agree upon a settled policy for operations in SEAC. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1057** *16 May.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, agreeing that the press campaign concerning discord between himself and Mountbatten was very mischievous and provided excellent propaganda for the Japanese; declaring that these unfounded and unjust attacks do not offend him personally, but they do have an adverse effect on the efficiency of his organization, on the credit and reputation of IC in the eyes of the public and, worst of all, on the opinions of the soldiers serving in this Command; and stressing the fact that the IA is at present bearing the brunt of the fighting in Italy and in Burma. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1058** *22 June.* Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter, and describing his son's condition after amputation of a hand following injury on the battlefield. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1059** *8 July.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, expressing his warm approval of the Combined Training Centre at Cocanada, and inviting him to visit SEAC HQ at Kandy. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1060** *25 July.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, attributing slow progress in South-East Asia to the decision to concentrate resources in the battle areas of the west, and to the consequent inability of the highest command to lay down a definite policy for SEAC; and expressing the wish that Mountbatten has a successful visit to England and receives the reinforcements he needs. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1061** *29 August.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, on the subject of Anglo-American relations in India, reporting that business relations with the Americans are definitely cordial, and that any setbacks are usually temporary, although the influence of Stilwell is always on the side of non-co-operation; but suggesting that there is little association between British and American soldiers or between junior officers, and that matters could be improved by the creation of an informal meeting-place for junior officers of both nations. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1062** *29 August.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, proposing to visit Delhi on 6 September to give an account of his meetings in London, and to return to Delhi on 8 September after visiting the Viceroy at Simla; praising the magnificent way in which

Auchinleck and his staff have risen to the situation created by the increased forces being made available; and expressing admiration for the splendid spirit prevailing in GHQ, India, which makes it possible to overcome difficulties which a year ago might have seemed insurmountable. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1063** 3 *September*. Copy of a letter from Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, to L.S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, reporting that he has received Auchinleck's assessment of Anglo-American relations in India; stating that the friction does not concern individual business transactions but is created largely by the attitude of the American press and by the tone set by Stilwell; affirming that the appointment of a committee would not solve the problem because committees can only deal with tangible complaints and grievances, not with the hostility of many Americans to the British in India; and offering Auchinleck's suggestion that a club for junior British and American officers might foster better social relations in that sphere, but maintaining that the deep-rooted causes of Anglo-American difficulties in India lie in the American disapproval of the British in India and professional disagreement concerning the conduct of the war in the East. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1064** 14 *September*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, expressing concern about the operation of censorship of incoming messages in cases which require the decision of the Viceroy, and the extent to which the C-in-C's Director of Public Relations should be involved in expressing the views of IC; indicating the problems that can arise if there is not adequate consultation, as in the case of the Drew Pearson-Phillips allegations, when the opportunity of exercising controlled censorship and of preparing counter-propaganda was vitiated by the way in which the disclosures were handled; and asking Wavell to ensure in future that the military Director of Public Relations is kept fully informed about matters involving censorship, stating that there should be consultation at the highest level in the event of disagreement between the military censors and any civil department. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1065** 5 *October*. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, reporting on his visit to Italy to see the Indian divisions there, on the need for all serving men in these divisions to have leave on their return, on the inferior welfare centres provided for the IA, on the arrangements made to send woollen clothing to the Indian soldiers facing a winter in Italy, on the keenness and high morale of the Indian troops, on the calibre of the officers, on his talk to the press after his return, on the success of the story of the Indian divisions in the North African campaign (*The Tiger Kills*, by W.G. Hingston and G.R. Stevens), on the possibility of a small token force of the IA taking part in the future march into Germany and Berlin, and on the anxiety expressed in

Britain concerning the welfare conditions of British troops in India. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1066** *11 October.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for the invitation to visit the new hospitals at Secunderabad, and for agreeing to his visit to Madras, Bombay, and the 19th Indian Division; reporting on the reconstruction of the Princes' Dock at Bombay, his meeting with Sir Godfrey Armstrong at Madras, his refusal to address the men at Colaba Transit Camp because they were in Auchinleck's Command, not his, and his satisfaction with the first-class state of the hospitals at Secunderabad; and offering to apply to his wife Edwina (Superintendent-in-Chief, Nursing Corps and Divisions, St. John Ambulance Brigade) in England for more VADs to relieve the acute shortage of nurses. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1067** *18 October.* Note on Lord Mountbatten's letter of 11 October (1066, above) by Lt.-Gen. Sir Wilfred Lindsell, PAO, giving credit to Col. Tydeman for the reconstruction of the Princes' Dock at Bombay; and stating that Sir Godfrey Armstrong is leaving under normal retirement rules, and that the acquisition of more VADs would indeed help to relieve the acute shortage of nurses in hospitals in India. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. With separate autograph note by Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1068** *20 October.* Letter of farewell to Auchinleck from Gen. J.W. Stilwell (Commanding General, US Army Forces, China, Burma, India, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC), on his recall to America, stating that the sheriff has caught up with him, and that he has been yanked out; but that, whatever glaring deficiencies he has revealed as a diplomat, he hopes that Auchinleck will remember him, as he will remember Auchinleck, as a friend. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1069** *27 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to L.S. Amery, in reply to 1065, above, reporting on his visit to Kandy for a conference with Mountbatten; commenting on Amery's successful visit to Italy, on the high professional standards of the IA, on the problems involved in the reconstitution and retraining of the Indian divisions, now in Italy, for the war against Japan, on the fact that the IA regular officer has always accepted the position that the IA came second to the British Army, and that the IA has always suffered in comparison with Dominion forces which have been backed by autonomous governments; voicing his own suspicion that Stilwell was the source of misinformation in the Phillips controversy, and that Phillips himself would not wilfully have disseminated the slanders against the IA; and emphasizing the ill effects on the morale of hard-working IA officers of scurrilous attacks by public men and the press at home, attacks based on complete misconception of the situation. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1070** 28 October. Draft letter from Auchinleck to Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, CAS, explaining the present complicated system of control of air forces in India, with the C-in-C, India being the head of the air and naval forces maintained by the Government of India, and the Commander, South-East Asia having his own operational Air Command to control, administer and train the British, Indian and American airforces engaged against the Japanese; envisaging the future of the airforces after India has acquired an autonomous or semi-autonomous government, when it is certain, in his opinion, that the Indian authorities will insist that any British armed forces that are maintained in India at her own expense for her defence and security should be administered, controlled and commanded by commanders and HQs chosen by India and responsible to her; stating that he personally cannot see any future government of India agreeing to the existence of an independent command HQ in India to control British land or air forces which it has agreed to maintain for its own purposes; emphasizing that it is a waste of time to consider seriously the possibility of setting up in India two separate Air HQs – one to control RAF units and the other to control IAF units – but that an Imperial or Commonwealth reserve of the RAF, financed by Britain and stationed in India with the consent of the government there, could be counted as a possibility; and stressing that these views do not represent what he personally wishes to see occur, but are a purely objective statement of what he considers must inevitably happen in view of the present trend of thoughts and events in India. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**1071** 30 October. Copy of a letter from Air Vice-Marshal M. Thomas, AOC, India, to Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, VCAS, explaining the circumstances in which he recommended that the Air Ministry should be asked to provide an officer to serve on the committees set up by Auchinleck to study the post-war problems of allocation, organization and composition of the AFI, and also the future defence organization of the North-West Frontier; and describing how the question of that officer being free to consult the Air Ministry directly has been settled. With a copy of a letter from Evill to Thomas, dated 19 October, containing the announcement that Air Commodore E.J. Kingston-McCloughry has been selected to serve on the committees, with authority to consult the staff of the Air Ministry whenever he needs direction on any point of policy, and to consult Air Command, South-East Asia on operational problems of which they have experience. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1072** 31 October. Letter from Air Vice-Marshal M. Thomas, AOC, India, to Auchinleck, commenting on Auchinleck's draft letter to the CAS (1070, above), expressing his own assumption that, after the war, India would receive Dominion status or similar standing, that she would pay for the forces required to meet her own needs, and that she

would agree to contribute in cash or kind to the defence of the Commonwealth; stating that India is certain to want to copy the other Dominions in that her armed services would have their own political and professional heads which, for many years, would be imported until the Indians themselves were ready to assume responsibility for local defence and, possibly, for defence against minor aggression; envisaging that, after the constitutional structure had been changed, one Air HQ would exercise operational and administrative control for local defence, and could also exercise control of the static administration of the airforces for Empire defence; and suggesting some amendments to Auchinleck's draft letter. 6 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1073** 5 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Air Vice-Marshal M. Thomas, AOC, India, thanking him for his comments on his draft letter (1070, above) and for his suggested improvements, all of which have been adopted; stating that, in view of the complications inherent in the Imperial reserve proposals, he has omitted those paragraphs relating to the possibility of an Imperial or Commonwealth reserve of the RAF being stationed in India with the consent of the Government of India but at the expense of the British; and adding his thanks for copies of the correspondence with Sir Douglas Evill (1071, above) and for a thoroughly co-operative attitude. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1074** 8 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, complaining of the constant difficulties encountered in the attempt to publish in the UK and the USA the 'tiger' series of books (see 1065, above) on India's part in the war; and reporting that it proved impossible to get *The Tiger Strikes* published in the UK, and that *The Tiger Kills* was only accepted by HM Stationery Office after the Government of India provided a financial guarantee. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1075** 27 November. Letter from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, thanking him for birthday wishes, and enclosing an extract from a letter from Lt.-Gen. Sir Richard McCreery, now commanding the 8th Army, praising the performance in the field of the 10th Indian Division; and expressing his sympathy with Auchinleck and Wavell over the way in which decisions are sometimes taken by the Government after insufficient consultation with those directly affected. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1076** 6 December. Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, thanking him for a copy of the book by W.G. Hingston and G.R. Stevens, *The Tiger Kills*. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1077** 7 December. Letter from Air Vice-Marshal M. Thomas, AOC, India, to Auchinleck, noting that eight Acting Air Vice-Marshals, junior to him, have been promoted to the rank of Air Vice-Marshal (Temporary), leaving him on the Air Commodore list; that, as his

previous record has been entirely satisfactory, only one of two conclusions can be drawn, namely, either that he has not satisfactorily fulfilled his present appointment, or that the Air Council regard this appointment as comparatively unimportant; and stating that in either case he would be grateful for Auchinleck's advice. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1078** 8 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, enclosing a suggested draft telegram (not included) to be sent to the Secretary of State, objecting strongly to the attitude of the Secretary of State for War and of the AG towards IC, and accusing them of placing the responsibility and blame for any unpleasant or awkward situations, especially concerning manpower, on India; indicating that it is his responsibility to keep the Army in both SEAC and IC up to strength so that it can function with the requisite efficiency to defeat the enemy; stating that, if it is necessary for this purpose to retain officers and men beyond the period fixed by the WO for their repatriation, then this must be done, and the Government must accept the necessity or acquiesce in the retardation of operations against the enemy and the probable prolongation of the war; emphasizing the fact that, in all these matters, he works hand in glove with the senior officers of SEAC, a fact which appears to be ignored by those who attach all blame to India; and protesting against lack of consultation by Whitehall and erroneous statements made by the Secretary of State for War. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

1945

**1079** 8 January. Letter from FM Sir B.L. Montgomery, at Tac.HQ, 21st Army Group, to Auchinleck, thanking him for copies of *The Tiger Strikes* and *The Tiger Kills*, and presenting him with three pamphlets which he has issued to his armies and which may be of value to Auchinleck in showing him how the armies are fighting in Western Europe. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1080** 11 January. Letter from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to Auchinleck, thanking him for copies of *The Tiger Strikes* and *The Tiger Kills*; declaring that the fame of the two Indian divisions is known to all, and that it was a great honour to have Indian troops under his command in the Mediterranean. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1081** 17 February. Letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir A.W. Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to Auchinleck, thanking him for copies of *The Tiger Strikes* and *The Tiger Kills*, and stating that he is glad to have the IA record of the war in the ME; and describing his homesickness for the Desert and his conviction that the war in the ME was in many ways a cleaner and 'better' war than the present European racket. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1082** *1 March.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. D.I. Sultan, Commanding General, US Forces, India and Burma, to Auchinleck, thanking him for the fine co-operation and assistance rendered by the British and Indian Armies to the US Army military railway units at work on the Assam line of communication; and stating that nowhere else in the world is there a better example of what can be accomplished by Allied forces on a given task. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1083** *16 March.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his kindness and hospitality in Delhi and for the opportunity of addressing the senior officers of the three Services in GHQ, India; and stressing that his praise of IC was sincere and had already been conveyed to the PM, the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Information, and that he felt it was time that the same praise should be expressed to those most concerned. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1084** *25 March.* Letter from the Boys' Company of the 1st Punjab Regiment to Auchinleck, thanking him for sending the letter from the King Emperor, and expressing pride in the fact that this is the first occasion on which a letter has been sent by the King to any Boys' Company. 1 leaf. Manuscript.

**1085** *28 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, with a note on deliberations by the Reorganization Committee (India) on the future of the Gurkha units of the IA; explaining that it appears unlikely that all the Gurkha battalions will be needed in the future IA, although Nepalese manpower might be available for the Empire as a whole; that the first step to be taken is to find out whether the Government is prepared to employ Gurkha soldiers under the Crown in their post-war forces, and then to discover whether the Nepalese religious authorities will allow their men to serve overseas in peacetime; and that, finally, there is the problem of providing officers for any Gurkha battalions remaining in the post-war IA, because the Indians would certainly expect to employ their own officers for Gurkha battalions, and Nepal would resent this unless, perhaps, alternative training and employment were found for Nepalese officers within the IA as a whole. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1086** *13 April.* Letter from the Indian CO of the 1st Bihar Regiment, Lushai Brigade, to Auchinleck, welcoming the news that a special war pay is to be granted to Indian commissioned officers to equate their basic pay with that of British officers in the IA; and attributing the achievement of this equality to the efforts of Auchinleck who has always championed the rights of Indian officers and cared for their welfare. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1087** *14 April.* Letter from Gen. G.C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his kind message of sympathy on the death of President Roosevelt. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1088** 22 May. 'Three great commanders: General Eisenhower, Field-Marshal Montgomery, General Sir Claude Auchinleck'. By Brig. J.G. Smyth. Newspaper article in *The Daily Sketch*, Tuesday, 22 May. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1089** c. 10 June. C-in-C's Victory broadcast, in which Auchinleck celebrates the fact that the war in the West has been won and expresses his gratitude to the armed forces of IC for their superb efforts and achievements in the last five years; but in which he reminds his listeners that the war in the East is not yet over, and that Japan is India's most immediate and formidable enemy. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**1090** 27 June. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, reporting on the response of the CIGS to his request for advice on the question of replacing Sir Oliver Leese (C-in-C, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia); stating that the CIGS has agreed that replacement is absolutely necessary in the circumstances and has suggested that Slim should be considered as a possible replacement, and that command of the 14th Army should be given to Stopford and command of the 12th Army to Dempsey; quoting his own reply to these suggestions, agreeing with the choice of Slim as C-in-C, but proposing that Dempsey should be given command of the 14th Army in Burma; and asking Auchinleck for support in the decision concerning Leese and Slim, and for permission to use his name because of his rank and his seniority to Leese, since Mountbatten himself is a relatively young and substantively junior naval officer. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1091** 30 June. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of the letter he has written to Leese, dated 1 July, relieving him of his command; asking him not to tell Leese that he has seen the letter, but to tell him that he knows what decision was taken; and adding that it would be helpful if he informed Leese that he agreed with the decision. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1092** 6 July. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Francis Mudie, Home Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, referring to an incident reported to have occurred at Delhi Junction involving ex-prisoners of war, and to the persistence of loyalty to the ideals of the INA mentioned in the Weekly Security Intelligence Summary of 15 June; stating that incidents of this kind, however deplorable, should not encourage extremist views and a fear of the development of nationalist inclinations in the IA, because the truth is that the great majority of Indian officers are 'nationalist' and would not earn his respect if they were not; and declaring that his aim in the present situation is to build up an Army in which these officers can serve as nationals of a nation which forms part of the British Commonwealth. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1093** 12 July. Comments by Sir George Cunningham, Governor of

the North-West Frontier Province, on the Frontier Committee's Report, 1945. With autograph marginal comments by Auchinleck, sometimes caustic and impatient. 12 leaves. Typescript.

**1094** 14 July. Letter from Sir Francis Mudie to Auchinleck, in reply to 1092, above, expressing fundamental agreement with the view that it would be unrealistic to treat members of the INA in the same way as British soldiers who had joined the Germans or Japanese would be treated, but pointing out that it is still necessary to make a distinction between those prisoners of war who joined the enemy and those who did not; and expressing his own view that Indian nationalism should be able to prevail without including anti-British attitudes. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1095** 19 July. Note by Auchinleck on the future of Gurkha units of the IA, addressed to Commandants of all Gurkha Rifle Training Centres; dealing with speculation concerning the status of Gurkha soldiers in the IA after the Government of India has become semi- or wholly autonomous; stating that, in the future, the supply of recruits for Gurkha units will have to be negotiated between the Government of Nepal and the Government of India, without reference to the UK; and that, in view of the fact that neither party may wish to negotiate such arrangements, it is possible that the UK may use the Gurkha units as part of its Imperial strategic reserve, given the agreement of the Government of Nepal. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1096** 19 July. 'Britain meets, and likes "The Auk"': newspaper article by Walter Bouverie. From *Contact*, 19 July. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1097** 26 July. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, expressing his concern about the problems which may arise when Indian soldiers return to their villages after becoming accustomed to a higher standard of living and to higher standards of administrative efficiency; suggesting that, if these men are frustrated in their efforts to improve conditions in their villages by passive obstruction on the part of minor officials, they might prove a real source of danger; and stating that the solution lies in a radical change of heart and a great increase in the tempo and standards of the civil administration. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1098** 10 August. Letter from Lt.-Gen. D.I. Sultan, Inspector General, US War Department, to Auchinleck, stating that he has now taken up his new post in Washington, and thanking Auchinleck for the impressive ceremony at the airport on his departure. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1099** 22 August. Note by Auchinleck on the future of the British garrison in India, addressed to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, stating that the question is bound to arise why it is necessary to keep a British garrison in India at all, when it is the Government's avowed intention

to give India self-government; and concluding that the only sound and logical reason which can be advanced for the retention of British units in India in the future is that the continued association of British and Indian troops in the same formations or in proximity to each other will ensure co-operation and understanding between the two armies in a future war. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1100** *19 September.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. R.A. Wheeler, OC, US Forces, India – Burma Theater, to Auchinleck, expressing his appreciation of the magnificent work done by the Indian Pioneer Companies who for the last three years have laboured side by side with American troops on the construction of the Stilwell Road, under the direction of the Commanding General at Ledo. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1101** *25 September.* Letter from Lt.-Gen. R.A. Wheeler to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality and mementos; recalling happy memories of a friendship of four years' standing; and describing his pleasure when he knew Auchinleck was to assume command in India, and his respect for him as a distinguished military leader with a magnificent record which is a source of lasting pride, not only to his own countrymen, but to all the Americans who have shared the privilege of knowing him. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1102** *30 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Alanbrooke, the CIGS, concerning the future of Gurkha units in the IA; urging him to find use for all the 20 pre-war battalions of Gurkha Rifles in the Imperial strategic reserve, on the grounds that there will be enough pre-war Indian infantry battalions to meet all the IA's requirements, and that the Gurkhas are among the best soldiers in the world, and their talents should not be wasted; suggesting that the Gurkha units could be located in the ME and in other places in the East, including Iraq; and warning him that it will be necessary to obtain the specific agreement of the Nepalese Government to the continued employment of Gurkha units overseas because of certain religious scruples. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1103** *13 October.* Report of an address by Auchinleck to the National Defence Council on the future of India's armed forces, issued by the Public Relations Directorate, GHQ, India: in which Auchinleck states that he and his advisers have tried to look at the problem from the strictly Indian standpoint and have assumed that India will remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; asserts that he is wholly in agreement with the natural desire of all Indians that the Indian armed forces should be officered by Indians alone, and suggests that this policy should be implemented progressively and systematically, but not too rapidly; and affirms his belief that co-operation and tolerance are possible even between the very numerous and varied races and creeds among the four hundred and more millions who form the peoples of India, and that these differences cannot be recognized in

national armed forces where unity of thought and purpose is essential. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**1104** *14 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, describing the gratitude expressed by the recovered prisoners of war for their treatment in Malaya and elsewhere and on the voyage to India; the complications ensuing from the difficulty of getting shipping to bring French and Dutch forces to deal with post-war French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies; his reluctance to delay the dispatch from India of British troops due for leave or release, and the consequent extra onus on the IA to provide troops for French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies; his awareness of strong political feeling in India concerning the use of Indian troops to restore the French and Dutch regimes in the face of nationalist opposition; stating that he has been told by the Chiefs of Staff that the Commander sent to Japan as head of the Commonwealth Forces would be an Australian with an Australian staff, although he himself agrees with Mountbatten that the Commander should be appointed from SEAC, and that Messervy would be a suitable candidate; and suggesting that there should be more IA officers in the higher commands of Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1105** *15 October.* Letter from Lord Alanbrooke, CIGS, to Auchinleck, in reply to 1102, above, agreeing with Auchinleck that it would be most undesirable to lose the services of Gurkha units, but warning him that the Chiefs of Staff are under considerable political pressure to reduce the post-war forces below what they regard as a reasonable level, and that there are also weighty financial considerations which will affect the size of British garrisons overseas; assuring him that he does not intend to go back on his promise to try to make use of Gurkha units in post-war Imperial garrisons, but that there is a good deal of detail to be settled before he can give a definite undertaking on the number of such units that the British Army is able to accept; and stating that he appreciates the need for an early decision. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1106** *17 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, concerning the dispatch of a second Indian division to Java; expressing his strong feeling that more Indian troops should not be sent to French Indo-China or to the Netherlands East Indies to be used, inevitably, against the local nationalist forces; declaring that he cannot ignore the possibility of political agitation in India which would influence the troops themselves; and asking for the support of the Viceroy in suggesting to the Government that the 2nd (British) Division should be sent to the Netherlands East Indies in place of the 25th Indian Division, which has only one British battalion in the whole division, and which could remain in Malaya. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1107** *18 October.* Note by Auchinleck on the employment of Indian troops in Burma, addressed to Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, referring to a directive issued by the C-in-C, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia, requiring troops of the 12th Army to be placed at the disposal of the Governor of Burma for use in aid of the civil power; declaring that this would involve the use of Indian troops in conditions which might prove extremely embarrassing to the Government of India because, although there can be no objection to the use of Indian troops against dacoits or bandits, whether Japanese or Burman, difficulties would arise if they were used to quell any political disturbances involving Burman aspirations for independence; suggesting that an amendment should be made to the directive to make sure that he, as C-in-C, India, is kept fully informed of any situation which may involve the use of Indian troops in aid of the civil power; and adding a recommendation that in future there should be more senior IA officers on the GS of the 12th Army to contribute their knowledge and experience of Indian troops to the management of the existing difficult political circumstances. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1108** *20 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, referring to an application by the INA Defence Committee to defer the trial of three INA officers until after the elections in some six months' time; and recommending the rejection of the application on the grounds that the impartial administration of justice is of the very essence of government and must continue from day to day under the law, and that the practical objections to holding up the consideration of thousands of cases are obvious. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1109** *5 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, on the subject of the use of air power in connection with internal defence; describing how he leaves it to his army commanders to decide which airfields they are likely to require in the event of disturbance, but stressing the fact that aircraft are not used offensively in aid of the civil power because of their indiscriminate aim, and that only an armed rebellion, in conditions similar to those obtaining in a war, would warrant the offensive use of aircraft in support of the army, and permission to use aircraft in this way can only be given by the C-in-C; and concluding with an account of the air forces available in India, and of the control and use of air personnel still in India, under the command of British Air Forces, South-East Asia. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1110** *6 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, reporting on a visit to Nepal and on a discussion with the Maharajah on the future of the Gurkha units of the IA, in which he presented the alternatives available to Nepal, either to retain the Gurkha units in a

new national IA or accept employment of the units by the British Government as part of an Imperial strategic reserve; and describing how the Maharajah made it quite clear that he would prefer the latter to the former. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1111** *10 November.* Letter from Lord Alanbrooke, the CIGS, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality and help during his visit to Delhi; expressing his deepest admiration for the wonderful way he is doing his job under very difficult circumstances; and describing the gratitude of Lord Mountbatten for all his assistance and loyal co-operation. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1112** *13 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, on the employment of Indian troops in Java and Burma; expressing his anger at the total inability of the British Government, the Chiefs of Staff, the authorities in Burma and the commanders in various areas to appreciate the seriousness of the political situation in India or the strength of the political feeling regarding the use of Indian troops to suppress 'freedom movements' at the behest of the British Government; reminding the Viceroy that the course of action proposed to deal with the INA is also likely to cause some unrest and instability in the IA; maintaining that, if the British Government continues to use Indian troops in Java for the purpose of reinstating Dutch rule in the Netherlands East Indies, there is no defence whatever against accusations that these troops are mercenary troops who are acting at the bidding of the British Government against the wishes of the Indian people; suggesting that the British Government would be well-advised to make an immediate and unequivocal declaration that the question of Indonesian independence should be referred to arbitration, and that, until the result of arbitration is known, Dutch forces will not be permitted to enter, under cover of British forces; and concluding with the warning that, if present policies persist, he has grave doubts about his ability to continue to answer for the stability of the IA. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1113** *19 November.* Letter from Col. K.S. Himatsinhji to Auchinleck, informing him of a meeting with Bhulabhai Desai, a prominent member of the INA Defence Committee, at the Chemsford Club on 15 November. With a report of the gist of the conversation which took place on that occasion, in the course of which Desai declared that the INA trials have provided Indian nationalists with a most powerful weapon; that, if any of those who are being tried are subsequently executed, they will become India's greatest martyrs; that an armed revolution could ensue; that the formation and operation of the INA proved to the country that Indians were capable of training and commanding their own army; that the officers imprisoned in the Red Fort were treated at the level of Indian sergeants, not officers; and that, according to some reliable authorities, the C-in-C was respon-

sible for insisting that the trials should take place, despite pressure on the Government to stop them. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1114** *19 November.* Letter enclosed in 1113, above, from Maj. C.M. Cockin to Col. K.S. Himatsinhji, repeating a proposal that the problem of the INA should be put into cold storage until a national government has been formed in India, and the Indians are able to solve their own problems; suggesting that the present policy is causing a widening breach between Britain and India at a time when it is vitally necessary that there should be confidence and goodwill on both sides; stating the case that it is morally wrong for the British to judge the INA because Britain must bear her share of the blame for its formation, in that she was a foreign ruler in India and did not treat her Indian officers as well as her British officers, in terms of promotion, pay and conditions of service; and recommending that the Viceroy or the C-in-C should call a meeting to announce that the Government has decided to leave the final solution to the new Indian government. With a copy of a paper by Maj. Cockin, dated 23 July 1945, concerning the disposal of certain INA officers including Capt. P.K. Sehgal; expressing dismay at the possibility that officers of the calibre of Sehgal who have frankly declared their loyalty to the INA and to the cause of Free India, and who possess all the qualities of fine officers, except that they have served the wrong cause, should be tried by court-martial on capital charges and executed, if found guilty; maintaining that Indian prisoners of war, after the fall of Singapore, may naturally have felt that the British had let them down, and may have resented the preferential treatment of British officers in captivity and of British women and children in the evacuation; declaring that, if he were an Indian, it would seem right to him to feel a stronger and higher loyalty to his own motherland than to the British crown; stating that the Indians were strongly influenced by S.C. Bose who had the reputation for being a disinterested patriot; suggesting that the solution is to keep the INA officers in detention until a national government is formed in India and to allow that government to decide on their disposal; and excusing his involvement in such matters, as a junior British officer, on the grounds that he spent five years in India at a mission college where he was able to live with Indian colleagues and students on terms of complete equality. 9 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1115** *20 November.* Letter from Auchinleck to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, concerning requests made by governors of provinces to the Viceroy for the allocation of small parties or units of British troops; stating that, in the past, the IA has had to deal mainly with local disturbances, and troops for internal defence have been distributed in small packets at likely centres of disturbance, but that now the IA is confronted with the possibility of widespread risings against the Government, and the available troops must be located

where they can best deal with serious risings wherever they may occur; stressing that it is the task of the provincial police to deal with trouble in the early stages, and these are at the disposal of the governors of provinces, but all naval, military and air forces must remain at the disposal of their military commanders; suggesting that, when the governors of provinces need help and advice, they should approach the appropriate GOC-in-C, not the Viceroy, on matters of detail which must of necessity be the responsibility of army commanders; and expressing his own conviction that local police must be strong enough to deal firmly at the outset with local troubles, and his willingness to help them with military equipment to strengthen their power. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1116** 20 November. Letter from Auchinleck to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, concerning the redrafting of the directive of Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia to the GOC-in-C, 12th Army, on the question of the use of Indian troops in Burma; declaring that it is important to insist that the Government of India should be consulted, and that Indian troops should not be used for purposes of which Indian public opinion and the Government of India would not approve. With a proposed re-draft of paragraph 4 of the directive, clarifying the point that the civil government is responsible for the security of all Burma except for those areas assigned to the 12th Army for military administration, and that close contact should be maintained with the C-in-C, India, to keep him informed of the growth of any situation which appears to involve the use of Indian troops for the suppression of any organized political movement or in any internal political dissension of a widespread nature. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1117** 24 November. Letter from Maj.-Gen. Geoffry Scoones, HQ, Central Command, India, to Auchinleck, on the subject of the INA trials; stating that he has no reason to suspect, from the information available to him, that the INA issue is a really serious matter yet in the Army, but affirming his belief that the flood of propaganda must be stopped before it becomes effective; recalling that the trials of the INA were restricted to certain categories, because the trial of all of them was not practicable, yet the dictates of justice demanded that the worst cases should be tried because of the loyal men who had suffered at the hands of the INA, and because it was vital to show loyal soldiers that allegiance to their oath was an obligation; describing his concern that the trials have now become a political issue involving a campaign to stop them or reduce their number; and expressing his own view that any leniency shown to the offenders will not attain the immediate object of stemming the propaganda. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1118** 24 November. Letter from Gen. Sir Richard O'Connor, GOC-in-C, North-Western Army, India, to Auchinleck, expressing the opinion that the men of the IA regarded members of the INA as

traitors; that even the members themselves knew what they were doing, and it is hypocritical for them to pretend now to be patriots; posing the question whether it is possible to expect to keep loyalty if disloyalty is not condemned; but stating that the most important task is to keep the Army in a state of equilibrium and that, accordingly, if Auchinleck feels that some further proof of leniency is essential, although he himself does not agree that it is, he is willing to accept the validity of Auchinleck's judgement in the light of his tremendous experience, and to back him fully. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1119** 26 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, referring to the proposal to take a more lenient course of action in regard to the INA trials; mentioning the opinions received from Gen. O'Connor and Maj.-Gen. Scoones, supported by Lt.-Gen. Lockhart and Gen. Deedes, all of whom expressed the view that further leniency was undesirable and dangerous to the continued reliability of the IA; and stating that, in spite of this advice, he is still convinced that the more relaxed approach which he has proposed is the safest and best in the circumstances. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1120** 26 November. Letter from Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, to Auchinleck, on the extent to which Gurkha units could be employed in post-war Imperial garrisons; suggesting that they could be used in Malaya, perhaps as part of a British/Gurkha division, in Burma, Hong Kong, the ME and Iraq in the short term; but emphasizing that these suggestions are purely tentative, depending on future plans for the size and shape of British post-war forces and on the financial limitations imposed on the Army. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1121** 27 November. The internal situation in India: an appreciation by Auchinleck, in which he examines the political situation, the scale of possible disturbances before, during and after the elections, the effect of the political situation on the AFI, the position of the Gurkhas in the event of unrest in the Army, possible military commitments in the immediate future, the forces available to meet such commitments and the possibility of a general armed rebellion; concluding with the recommendations that the Government should state firmly that any armed insurrection will be put down, that the AFI should not be given cause to suspect that there is a lack of confidence in them, that, if there is such a deterioration in the situation that reliance cannot be placed on the Indian troops, British formations should be made available for India at very short notice, that any preparations for such moves should be made under the guise of a plan to replace Indian formations in SEAC by British formations, using India as a staging base in order to complete their organization and equipment. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**1122** 11 December. Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Archibald Nye, in reply to 1120, above, expressing his own view that, because of the growing shortage of British manpower, the uncertainty concerning the

future availability of Indian troops for meeting Imperial commitments, the great desirability of retaining the services of such excellent soldiers as the Gurkhas, the strong desire of the Nepalese Government to have their Gurkha subjects serving under the British (not the Indian) Government, and the great uncertainty whether an autonomous Indian government would wish, in any event, to keep Gurkhas in the IA, it is essential to decide now to include as many Gurkha units as possible in the Imperial reserve; presenting his own recommendations, namely, that the British Army should now decide to employ Gurkha units permanently in its Asiatic garrisons, and that the British Government should then take over the 20 pre-war Gurkha rifle battalions and use them as required in the Near, Middle and Far East; declaring that the Gurkha units in the IA consist only of rifle battalions and two parachute battalions, and that, if these units were employed to make up formations, it would be necessary to find artillery, engineer, signal and administrative units from the British Army; and stressing that short-term proposals for the use of Gurkha units are of no value, but giving his strong support to Nye's idea of forming one or more British/Gurkha divisions in the Middle or Far East, and suggesting that over 20 Gurkha battalions should be adopted for this purpose as a permanent measure, with artillery and other arms and services provided from the British Army. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed. 2 copies.

**1123** *19 December.* Letter from Sardar Sir Jogendra Singh, Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck, wishing him a happy New Year, and assuring him that he has earned the great peace and contentment which come to those who make the service of humanity their creed. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1124** *29 December.* Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Auchinleck, thanking him for his card of greetings for the season, and wishing him a happy New Year. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1125** *29 December.* Letter from Sir Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab, to Auchinleck, on the subject of the INA; indicating that enquiries made in the Punjab seem to suggest the existence of a very considerable degree of sympathy in the IA for the INA; but that information derived from various sources also reveals that recovered prisoners of war who are now on leave are most anxious that the Government should keep them on in the Army, and give them a chance of gaining the promotion of which their enforced absence has deprived them. With enclosure: 'Brief summary of typical military reactions to the INA recorded in the Punjab', describing the views of various officers and men serving in the IA, most of which, especially among Hindus, disclosed sympathy with the INA, although the Muslims generally regarded the INA as, fundamentally, a Hindu army. With autograph comments by Auchinleck. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

1946

**1126** *1 January.* Memorandum by Auchinleck addressed to all COs of the RIN, the IA and the IAF, stating that the time ahead, in which the promises made to the Indian people by the British Government are being translated into accomplished facts, will inevitably be a period of strain and upheaval; and outlining five salient points which should be made clear by every CO to the men under his command, namely, the importance of co-operation in the relationship between a self-governing nation and the rest of the British Empire, the need for a gradual approach to the change to self-government, for goodwill, tolerance and for what is known in military language as 'the firm base', the ability to remain unaffected by anything which does not make for the good of India and its people. English text, with Urdu translation. 2 leaves. Printed.

**1127** *1 January.* Report by Auchinleck on the first INA trial of Seghal, Dhillon and Shah Nawaz, stating that all three were found guilty of waging war against the King, Shah Nawaz also being found guilty on the charge of abetment of murder, and that all three were sentenced to transportation for life, cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowances while with the Japanese; making his own observations on these sentences, declaring that, as far as the sentence for 'waging war' is concerned, it is the object of the British authorities to establish in law that those who joined the INA committed a crime against the State which it is not possible for the present or any future Government of India to ignore; pointing out, at the same time, that it is of no use to try to judge the unfortunate Indian officers who defected after the fall of Singapore and British defeats in Burma by the standards applied to British officers and men captured by the enemy; that many of them, especially the leaders, believed that S.C. Bose was a genuine patriot, and that the accused officers may have acted in good faith; expressing the view that to confirm the sentence of transportation on these officers would have the effect of making them into martyrs and of intensifying the political campaign of bitterness and racial antipathy now being waged by Congress in connection with the INA trials; and proposing, therefore, to confirm the findings of the Court in all three cases and to remit the sentences of transportation for life, while confirming the sentences of cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowances. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1128** *3 January.* Letter from Dr M.C. Davar, Secretary-General of the United Party of India, to Auchinleck, expressing, on behalf of humanity, the people of India and members of his party, profuse thanks for the release of Capt. Shah Nawaz, Capt. Seghal and Lt. Dhillon. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1129** *4 January.* Letter from Professor Sir Shanti Swarupa Bhatnagar, Director of Scientific and Industrial Research to the Government

of India, to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his action concerning the accused INA officers; declaring that this has contributed more to peace than any other single act in India during the last few years; and announcing his intention of sending details of his career and record to members of the Nobel Committee in the UK, USA, Denmark and France, with a view to submitting his name for the Nobel Prize for Peace. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1130** 4 *January*. Letter from Air Vice-Marshal M. Thomas, AOC India, on his departure from India, to Auchinleck, thanking him for the guidance, support, friendship and consideration which he has enjoyed while serving under his command; stating that he learned much from his official conferences, and that he appreciated Auchinleck's deep interest in the well-being of the Air Forces and his tolerance concerning them, which have done everything possible to obliterate prejudice and to create the right conditions for true co-operation. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1131** 16 *January*. Letter from Sir Archibald Nye to Auchinleck, in reply to 1122, above; noting Auchinleck's views on the future employment of the Gurkhas; stating that he has decided to wait until he has had an opportunity of examining the official views of the Government of India before taking further action; and warning Auchinleck that the shape of the post-war British Army is dependent on a number of factors, including the continuance or abandonment of conscription, political attitudes and financial considerations, and that no firm proposals about the use of the Gurkhas are possible in the immediate future. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1132** 22 *January*. Letter from T.W. Corbett, of the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India, to Auchinleck, announcing that a gentleman's agreement has been arranged with Compton Mackenzie (to write an account of the part played by the IA in the Second World War, subsequently published in 1951 under the title *Eastern Epic*); stating that the study of the strategic situation in Iraq in 1941 and of India's initiative (see 1339, below) is nearly complete, and that the narrative on Malaya is undergoing its first revision; and complaining of the difficulties encountered in his efforts, so far unsuccessful, to secure permission to examine correspondence in the possession of the Viceroy, vital to the background of Malaya and Burma. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1133** 22 *January*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, reminding him that, in the first INA trial, the three accused were convicted on the charge of waging war against the King, although the sentence was reduced from one of transportation for life to cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowances; that three other trials are in progress, all including the charge of waging war against the King as well as various charges of brutality and murder; and

proposing that the charge of waging war against the King should be dropped in future trials because the lesson has been driven home that there can be no condonation of a soldier's crime in failing in his allegiance, and because, under the court martial system, charges cannot be divided or split up as can be done in civil courts, with the result that political leaders and the press are likely to place more emphasis on the charge of waging war against the King, in order to conceal the other proven charges of brutality and murder. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1134** 23 January. Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter, 1133, above, and agreeing with him that the charge of waging war against the King should be dropped in future INA trials. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1135** 25 January. *The High Command in India: Report of a Committee set up by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in India, 1946.* By the Reorganization Committee (India), comprising Lt.-Gen. H.B.D. Willcox (Chairman), Commander A.B. Goord, RIN, Brig. W.G.S. Thompson, IA, Brig. P.N. Thapar, IA, Air Commodore E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, RAF. The recommendations are based on Auchinleck's proposal that the best future organization of the Higher Command of the three Services in India would be provided by a Supreme Command and integrated staff, and by the constitution of three separate Service HQs, each commanded by an independent C-in-C but working under the command of the Supreme Commander. Implicit in the report are the assumptions that India remains part of the British Commonwealth, and that she remains united, at least as far as defence is concerned. With autograph marginal comments by Auchinleck. iv + 28 pages. 1 folding diagram. Printed.

**1136** 9 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Alanbrooke, the CIGS, reporting on his conception of the future army in India; recognizing the possibility that an autonomous Indian Government may decline to maintain any British troops at all in India, but expressing his own opinion that this is an unlikely contingency; and proposing to remove the British units altogether from IA formations, and to form them into independent infantry brigade groups, which would make it easier to locate British troops where they are most likely to be needed and which would satisfy the Indian officers' natural desire to have completely Indian formations in the IA. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**1137** 12 February. Letter addressed by Auchinleck to Army Commanders on the effects of the first INA trials on the general Indian public, on the Indian officers of the IA, and on British officers of the IA; stating that commutation of the sentences imposed on Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and Sehgal has given rise to pleasure and relief on the part of the Indians and to dismay among some British officers who

have criticized the clemency shown to the Indian defectors; stressing that the Indian reaction springs from a conviction that members of the INA were patriots and nationalists, even if they were misled, and that the British attitude is based on ignorance of the plight of Indian soldiers after the fall of Singapore; emphasizing the fact that no Indian officer must be regarded as suspect and disloyal merely because he is a 'nationalist'; explaining the commutation from transportation for life to cashiering on the grounds that a sterner sentence would have created widespread disaffection among Indian officers in the army and violent outbreaks among the civil population of India; reporting that the charge of waging war against the King is to be dropped after the fourth trial, that future trials will be concerned only with the punishment of those who have been found guilty of brutal acts towards their former comrades, and that Courts of Inquiry are now examining the records of the rank and file of the INA in order to classify them as 'white', 'grey' or 'black'; and countering criticisms that the accused should have been dealt with summarily in forward areas, and that publicity should have been avoided, by pointing out how impossible it was to deal with 45,000 INA men in forward areas, and how important it was to hold the trials publicly to avoid accusations of injustice. 6 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**1138** 17 February. Letter from Col. K.S. Himatsinhji to Auchinleck, describing current reactions in India to the INA; indicating that the entire country is in a very hostile mood towards the British Government; that the vast majority of Indians regarded the INA as, potentially, an army of liberation, and that this is the only issue upon which there is agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League; reminding Auchinleck of the problems facing the Government in the near future, namely, a food crisis, the impending parliamentary statement concerning the constitutional reforms proposed for India, and the agitation for a new state of Pakistan; and suggesting that, in these circumstances, although the law must be satisfied and sentences must be imposed in forthcoming INA trials, a general political amnesty involving all such prisoners should be sanctioned to coincide with the announcement of the new constitutional reforms. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1139** 19 February. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, reporting on the findings of the court martial on Burhanuddin of the INA; stating that the Court found him guilty of causing grievous hurt but made a recommendation for mercy; and announcing his own decision to sentence Burhanuddin to the seven years' imprisonment required by civil law for such an offence, despite this recommendation; expressing concern for the possible effects of such a course of action, whether the sentence may lead to further riots as happened in Calcutta, or whether it may inflame Indian public opinion, which is in favour of calling off the trials and announcing a

general amnesty; and declaring his intention to proceed on judicial lines with the policy which has already been announced, but suggesting that, if the Viceroy and Government of India consider that it would be advisable in the light of the general political background to drop the remaining trials, the best approach would be to reaffirm that the line taken by the Government is both logical and in accordance with humanity, but to add that, in view of the wave of sentiment sweeping over India and the forthcoming political talks, it has been decided to grant a general amnesty. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1140** *20 February.* Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, in reply to 1139, above, expressing his full agreement with the sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment imposed on Burhanuddin; and suggesting that, when the announcement is made in the Press, there should be an account of what Burhanuddin did: it should be stated that, under his orders, Teja Singh was beaten by 120 men in succession until he lost consciousness, with the result that he subsequently died. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1141** *25 February.* 'Forces' discipline and well-being': text of a broadcast made from New Delhi over the All India radio network by Auchinleck. In the broadcast Auchinleck refers to unrest among some of the AFI, condemning use of the word 'strike' in place of 'mutiny' as an attempt to whitewash collective disobedience in the Services; promises that individuals involved in mutiny who are tried and found guilty will be punished, because to refrain from awarding punishment where it is due is to place a premium on insubordination; acknowledges that grievances may exist in the Services as in any large organization employing thousands of men, and that some of these cannot easily be rectified, such as the question of inequality of pay between the RN and the RIN, although inter-services committees are at present investigating the conditions, pay and accommodation of the three Indian Services; maintains that he himself tours constantly and seeks to ensure good treatment and due consideration for the men serving under his command, and that in his position as C-in-C he has nothing to do with politics and will not countenance political intrigue in the AFI; and concludes with the reminder that, in these difficult and emotional times, self-restraint and cool heads are essential. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1142** *8 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, expressing his strong disapproval of the interference by Sir Henry Twynam, the Governor of the Central Provinces, in matters connected with the discipline and morale of the Army; suggesting that, if the Governor is worried about the situation in his province, the proper course for him to take is to ask the advice of the army commander concerned, in this case Lt.-Gen. Sir Geoffry Scoones, GOC-in-C, Central Command; condemning any attempt by

any governor to address troops in IC on matters of discipline and morale unless he had been requested to do so by the C-in-C or, on his behalf, by a subordinate commander; stating his total disagreement with the views of the Governor of the Central Provinces on the action to be taken in dealing with those men who have been guilty of collective indiscipline in the Central Provinces; expounding his own policy, which is to bring to trial or to punish summarily any ringleader guilty of having misled others and incited them to mutiny or collective indiscipline, although the punishment itself will not be vindictive and will only be inflicted for the deterrent effect; and concluding that this policy is vital for the maintenance of the stability and reliability of the AFI. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1143** 9 March. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, concerning the contents of a letter enclosed, stating that Indian opinion is extremely sensitive on the question of defence, and that the subject needs to be handled with the greatest possible tact. With the enclosure, extracts from a letter addressed by Gen. A.G.O.M. Mayne (Principal Staff Officer, IO) to Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur Smith, CGS, reporting on a meeting at Chequers between the PM, Pethick-Lawrence, A.V. Alexander and Cripps, at which it was decided to make the granting of Dominion status or independence to India conditional on her willingness to undertake to provide defence forces sufficient for her own local defence and to assist, in the interests of the Commonwealth or the United Nations, in the defence of the South-East Asia area, including Burma, Malaya and Aden; and posing the questions to be answered by the Chiefs of Staff on the implications of this decision in relation to the use of British forces loaned to the Government of India and to British strategic reserves located in India. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1144** 28 March. Text of a directive issued by Auchinleck, and addressed to every officer of the IA, stating that, in the present critical period, the IA requires clear and positive guidance; summing up the duties of an army, which are to repel an aggressor and to help keep peace within its own boundaries; declaring that the IA has fulfilled the first of these duties magnificently, but is now required, if the police cannot cope, to deal with certain disruptive forces in its own country; urging all officers, whether Indian or British, to remain disciplined, efficient and loyal to whatever government may be in power; exhorting Indian soldiers to follow the Indian proverb 'Do not cut your own foot with your own mattock'; and admonishing British officers to serve the new India as loyally as, in the past, their Indian comrades have served the present India. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1145** April. Recommendations by No.1 Selection Board on the most senior appointments in the new IA. To be GOC-in-C, IA: opinion was divided between Brig. K.M. Cariappa and Brig. Maharaj Shri Rajen-

drasinghji. To be Army Commanders: Brig. K.M. Cariappa or Brig. Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinghji, Brig. Mohammad Akbar Khan, Brig. Thakur Nathu Singh. To be CGS: Brig. S.M. Srinagesh. To be AG: Brig. A.A. Rudra. To be QMG: Brig. Sirdar B.S. Chimne. Signed by the members of the Board:- Auchinleck (President), Lt.-Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, Lt.-Gen. Frank Messervy, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Taker, Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur Smith, Lt.-Gen. R. Savory, Lt.-Gen. E. Wood. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1146** 5 April. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, expressing his disquiet at the tendency among certain civil officials, notably the Governor of the Central Provinces, to compare recent cases of mutiny and indiscipline in the AFI, and the measures to be taken to restore discipline in these cases, with the formation and treatment of the so-called INA; indicating that the circumstances are totally different, the INA being created under the auspices of an enemy at a time when all the usual machinery of discipline and control, to which the men concerned were accustomed, had been removed, and when those who formed the INA pretended to be freeing India from a so-called foreign oppressor; stating that acts of indiscipline committed by sailors, soldiers and airmen serving in units and establishments in India at the present time cannot in any way be justified by the circumstances surrounding the formation and operation of the INA; and maintaining his right to punish indiscipline in order to maintain the morale of the AFI, and to deter others from taking similar indisciplined action in the future. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1147** 8 April. The text of a speech made by Auchinleck, in reply to a resolution moved in the Council of State by Pandit Kunzru, that a time limit be laid down for the nationalization of the IA: in which Auchinleck states that his aim is to create a completely national army, that is, an army officered and manned throughout by Indians, in the shortest possible space of time without lowering the very high standard of efficiency which already obtains in the IA; explains that the main problem is the nationalization of the officer cadre of the IA, pointing out that it does not follow that, because an officer has proved himself a good junior leader in war, he must of necessity be a good officer in peace; stresses that it is much harder to be a good officer in peace than it is in war, and that the IA needs the very best regular officers to maintain the essential minimum of efficiency in peace, officers with the power to judge men and events soberly and with a deep knowledge of men and things, which can only come from long experience; presents members of the Council with statistics proving that, of the 9,000 regular officers needed for the IA of the future, only 5,100 can be found within the next year without recourse to some temporary expedients, namely, the secondment of British officers from the British Army to fill part of the gap, the retention of

emergency commissioned officers, British and Indian, who may be willing to extend their service for a year or two, and the conferment of a number of short-service commissions on Indians already serving in the Army; and assures the Council that no more British officers will be appointed in the IA. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1148** *14 April.* Letter from Boy Bhairun Ram of the Boys' Company, Indian Grenadiers RC, stationed at Nasirabad, Rajputana, to Auchinleck, sending him a small memento, and thanking him for the lovely time the Boys spent in Delhi as Auchinleck's guests. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1149** *4 May.* Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Auchinleck, thanking him for his decision to withdraw all trials of INA personnel; stating that Indians are proud of the courage and capacity of the IA, although inevitably, in the past, its members have been regarded as agents of foreign authority, and that the final barrier will remain until the IA is a real national army; declaring that the basic motive for many members of the INA was patriotic, and that he himself felt kinship and sympathy with them; but admitting that he was amazed at the enormous public reaction in India to the trials and at the strength of the widespread popular belief that the activities of the INA represented just another aspect of India's struggle for independence. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1150** *11 May.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Wavell, drawing attention to a newspaper report that the PM has declared that the question of Auchinleck's replacement as War Member in the Viceroy's Executive Council does not arise at the moment; and expressing his own opinion that, if an interim Government takes office with an Executive Council composed of political leaders, it will be very difficult for him to act as War Member in such a Government, and that it would be better to appoint an Indian civilian as War Member and to confine the duties of the C-in-C to purely military affairs. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1151** *c. 11 May.* Rough draft in the hand of Auchinleck entitled: 'A note on the strategic implications of Pakistan as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. Auchinleck bases his considerations on the following assumptions: that India leaves the Commonwealth of Nations in the near future but that Pakistan signifies her wish to remain in the Commonwealth; and that the British Government wishes to maintain close and friendly relations with India without accepting any liability for her defences beyond that inherent in mutual membership of the United Nations. He then declares that his object in the note is to try to define the implications of Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth with a potentially unfriendly India outside it, and he analyzes the primary Commonwealth strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, namely, the oil resources of Iran and Iraq, the air routes

across Arabia, Iraq, India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya, the use of Ceylon as a naval and air base, the control of the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean (Singapore), and the control of the western approaches to the Indian Ocean (the Red Sea). 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1152** 11 May. 'A note on the strategic implications of the inclusion of Pakistan in the British Commonwealth': a memorandum by Auchinleck, in which assumptions are made that India will be divided into two independent autonomous states – Hindustan and Pakistan; that Pakistan may consist of two parts, a western zone and an eastern zone, or of a western zone only; that Hindustan will not be part of the Commonwealth and will be responsible for her own defences; and that Pakistan will be part of the Commonwealth and therefore will be able to draw on British sea, land and air forces and British personnel to aid in her administration and defence. Mindful of Commonwealth strategic interests in the Indian Ocean area, Auchinleck is doubtful whether Pakistan is strong enough or rich enough in resources to provide the means by which the Commonwealth can hope to influence or coerce an independent Hindustan and keep it free of hostile foreign influences so as to ensure the security of British communications through the Indian Ocean area. He describes the problems involved in the defence of Pakistan and concludes that, if Britain wishes to maintain her power to move freely in the Indian Ocean area, which may be considered essential to the continued existence of the Commonwealth, she can only do so by keeping in being a united India which will be a willing member of the Commonwealth, ready to share in its defence to the limit of her resources. Copy no.4. 6 leaves. Typescript, signed. With a coloured map of India showing possible new boundaries.

**1153** ? May. C-in-C's Secretariat, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS (46)750, revised JPC (46)8: 'The strategic implications of incorporating Pakistan in the British Commonwealth'. In the introduction, the possibilities are outlined: India may divide into two independent states, Hindustan and Pakistan; the British Government may decide to leave Hindustan to its own devices and accept no responsibility for its defence; the Government may also agree to include Pakistan in the Commonwealth; and Afghanistan may stay in close and friendly relations with Britain. The strategic implications of this situation involve several factors: firstly, Commonwealth strategic interest in the Indian Ocean area, which makes it essential to ensure that no hostile power can dominate India; and, secondly, geographical factors, which make it vital for Britain to possess bases in Western Pakistan, because Pakistan lies as a buffer between Hindustan and any potential aggressor. Another factor to be considered in relation to the status of Pakistan is the effect on the Muslim world: if Pakistan should become part of the Commonwealth, this would probably have the effect of strengthening Britain's bonds with the remainder of the Muslim

world, and it might be possible to form a strong Muslim block. As far as the defence of Pakistan is concerned, it would be necessary to station Imperial strategic reserves in Pakistan because the Pakistan defence forces would not be able, unaided, to withstand the first shock of war. There are also economic factors involved: Pakistan is not self-supporting and, for that reason, would be a considerable liability to the Empire. The partition of India, whether viewed short-term or long-term, will entail increased expenditure and an increased allotment of British manpower; but it is important that Pakistan should remain part of the Commonwealth in order to hinder any hostile power from dominating Hindustan, to maintain British influence over the Muslim world, and to preserve a base from which to attack Russia and from which to prevent Russia infiltrating into the Indian Ocean area. Copy no.9. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1154** *17 May.* The official English translation of the text of a broadcast to India's Armed Forces, given in Hindustani by Auchinleck, in which he refers to the proposal of the British Government to give independence to India, stating that no agreement has been reached on a form of government for India acceptable to both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, because the latter considers that there must be two independent and separate states in India, Pakistan for the Muslims and Hindustan for the Hindus, whereas Congress would prefer one central government with greater power and control over internal matters given to the provinces. The British Government, according to Auchinleck, has not approved either the setting up of completely separate governments or the retention of all power at the centre; but it has decided that it is the task of the Indians themselves to work out details of their new system of government, and, in the interim, the Viceroy proposes to form a temporary administration composed of himself and of leaders of Indian political opinion who have the confidence of the people. In this interim government, the post of War Member which is at present held by Auchinleck as C-in-C will be held by a civilian who will be an Indian. Three assemblies comprising representatives of all parties, creeds and classes, and elected by the provincial legislatures, will be given the task of deciding how India will be governed in the future. While these discussions and meetings are taking place, it is the duty of the Navy, Army and Air Force to continue to serve the Government and to carry out its orders. Auchinleck reminds the Armed Forces that they have learned to live together, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian, to respect each other, and to work together in the service of their country; and he promises them that, as long as he is with them, he will safeguard their interests in the future as in the past. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1155** *20 May.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, India, thanking him for his

report on Tibet and Nepal; agreeing with him about the necessity to pay more attention in future to the potential of the Central Asian plateau as a base for military operations; querying the validity of some of his statements, suggesting that it is erroneous to speak of the Mongol Frontier as being of immense power because it seems impossible for a frontier, in itself, to have any power, although it can be valuable for defensive purposes; stating that he has no idea what Toker means when he speaks of the mountains of the Himalayas dominating the plains of India, and that he would be very interested to hear how mountains in themselves can dominate anything, the tangled mass of mountains lying along India's northern frontier being, to him, from the military point of view, merely an obstacle; and questioning whether the Gurkhas can be described as the most powerful of all the races on the Mongol Frontier, although they may aptly be described as the most martial, expressing his own conviction that the future of Nepal and the Gurkhas is inevitably bound up with that of India, and that the idea of a British Protectorate over so-called Mongol territory from Nepal to Bhutan is not a practical proposition from any aspect, economic or military. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1156** *21 May.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality; declaring that he finds it hard to believe that 31 May will mark his last visit to Delhi; stating that he has done his best to let the British Government know that the successes in South-East Asia could not have occurred without the participation and co-operation of IC, especially of Auchinleck himself; announcing that he has suggested that Auchinleck's name should be at the top of any list of honours offered to South-East Asia in the final victory list; and expressing his own deep gratitude to Auchinleck for the tremendous support he has given to him from the beginning, under circumstances which only a truly great man could surmount. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1157** *24 May.* Letter from Lt. McLure, of RA Mess, Ambala, Punjab, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality in Delhi and his kindness to the 8th Boys' Battery, MATC, Ambala. With a manuscript letter of thanks from Govind of the 8th Boys' Battery. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1158** *31 May.* Letter from George Merrell, US Commissioner, to Auchinleck, congratulating him warmly on his promotion to FM; declaring that it is the most gratifying news he has received in years. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1159** *1 June.* Letter of congratulations from L.S. Amery to Auchinleck, pointing out that, although he has had bitter disappointments during the war, he has every right to think that, as things have turned out, he has possibly rendered even greater service to India and the Empire than he might have done if he had marched all the way

from El Alamein to the Alps. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1160** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Sir Stafford Cripps, Member of the Cabinet Mission, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1161** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Sir Edward Benthall, Member of War Transport, Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1162** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Rear-Admiral A.R. Rattray, Flag Officer, Bombay, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1163** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from S.S. Heng, Secretary-in-Charge, Office of the Commissioner of the Republic of China, New Delhi, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1164** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, India, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1165** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from the Hon. G.S. Motilal, of Bombay, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1166** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Flight Lt. Rup Chand, Council of State, of Lahore, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1167** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Ian Stephens, editor of *The Statesman* newspaper, Calcutta, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1168** 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Dr Narayan Bhaskar Khare, Member for Commonwealth Relations, Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1169** 1 *June*. Letter from Sir Akbar Hydari, Member for Planning and Development, Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1170** 1 *June*. Newspaper cutting from *The Times* containing the announcement of Auchinleck's promotion. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1171** c. 1 *June*. Letter of congratulations from the Boys' Company of the 1st Punjab Regiment to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Manuscript.

**1172** 2 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab and formerly Private Secretary to the Viceroy, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1173** 3 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India and Member of the Cabinet Mission, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1174** 3 *June*. Letter of congratulations from J.D. Deshmukh, of Nagpur, Central Provinces, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1175** 3 *June*. Leading article, entitled 'New Field Marshal', in commendation of Auchinleck: cutting from the Indian newspaper *The Daily Post*. 1 leaf. Printed. 2 copies.

**1176** 3 *June*. Cutting from *The Daily Mail* of an article by Douglas Kay entitled: 'The rock in jungle green'. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1177** c. 3 *June*. Cutting from the *Transatlantic Daily Mail* of an article by Douglas Kay entitled: 'The man who will hold India together'. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1178** 4 *June*. Letter from Lord Beaverbrook to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his promotion, and declaring that he knows well, from some personal experience when he was a member of the Government, that the honour is certainly no more than his due. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1179** 4 *June*. Letter of congratulations from K. Chengappa, Chief Commissioner, Coorg, Mercara, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1180** 4 *June*. Letter from FM Lord Chetwode to Auchinleck, congratulating him on his promotion 'to the Sixth Form in the Army'; and declaring that he has deserved it for all his magnificent work in the war, especially his efforts in Egypt which enabled other people to win crucial battles for which they received the credit when it ought to have been Auchinleck's. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1181** 4 *June*. Letter of congratulations from A.A. Waugh, Member for Industries and Supplies, Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1182** 7 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Sir Arthur Lothian, resident in Hyderabad, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1183** 7 *June*. Letter from Capt. R.H. McBean, RN to Auchinleck, conveying congratulations from Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Palliser, C-in-C, East Indies Station. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1184** 8 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Shri Sir Bahadursinhji Mansinhji, Thakore Saheb of Palitana, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1185** 11 *June*. Letter of congratulations from the Hon. Sirdar Sir Jogendra Singh, Member for Education, Health and Agriculture, Viceroy's Executive Council, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1186** 12 *June*. Letter of congratulations from Gen. Syed Ahmud El-Edroos to Auchinleck. With a poem addressed to Auchinleck: 'To a Great Soldier and Friend'. 3 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**1187** 17 *June*. Letter from Auchinleck to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, asking for an early opportunity to discuss

with the Viceroy the courts martial of members of the RIN accused of collective indiscipline and mutiny; wishing to put forward the opinion, backed by senior naval personnel, that those charged with very serious offences should be brought to trial and punished; adding that, within the last few months, a number of cases of collective indiscipline and mutiny have occurred in the IA, which have been dealt with in the normal way, with sentences of two or three years' rigorous imprisonment, and that it would be invidious to treat members of the RIN in a different way from their counterparts in the IA. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1188** 5 *July*. Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(46)765(JPC(46)11): 'Appreciation on the strategic value of India to the British Commonwealth of Nations', final paper, to be submitted to the C-in-C for approval. The objects of the paper are to appreciate the value of India to the British Empire, and to set out the strategic advantages and disadvantages should India become an independent sovereign state outside the Commonwealth. The disadvantages of an independent India are listed as follows: the possibility of interference with the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf if India was dominated by Russia; the difficulty of maintaining air communications between Arabia and Africa on the one side, and Burma, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand on the other, without the use of bases in India; and the reduction in the value of Ceylon as a base if India were hostile. There are also the positive advantages dependent upon India's membership of the Commonwealth: the importance of India as a base for successful operations in South-East Asia; the enormous asset to the Commonwealth armed forces of Indian manpower; and the increasing usefulness of India's natural resources and industrial capacity. The only advantage to be seen in the existence of an independent India is that it would relieve British manpower commitments. The Committee concludes that it is impossible to guarantee that an independent India would not be unfriendly or would not be influenced by a power such as Russia, China or Japan, hostile to the Commonwealth; and if such a situation arose, it would be impossible to move freely by sea and air in the northern part of the Indian Ocean area, which is of supreme importance to the Commonwealth. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**1189** 30 *July*. C-in-C Policy Note no. 16 on COS Paper (46)753(JCP(46)9. Second revision) on the 'Future strength of the Indian Armed Forces'. In the note Auchinleck states that he is not satisfied that the present conception of the future army of India is sound or likely to be adequate to provide for the defence of India in five or ten years' time, and that the future IA, as it is envisaged at present, is an army of the last war, composed, organized and equipped to meet the conditions obtaining in the closing years of that war. He is personally convinced that it is necessary to review plans in the light of coming developments which seem certain to affect the size, organi-

zation and maintenance of armies in the near future, namely, nuclear energy, bacteriological warfare, guided projectiles, and an increase in the range, power and speed of aircraft. In the future he envisages a decrease in the size and complication of land forces so as to simplify their maintenance and a consequent reduction in the size of armies which will necessitate an increase in their mobility and striking power. Such an increase will depend on greater use of aircraft for the transmission of supplies, possibly by means of an army air transport service distinct from the Air Force, and on a reorganization of the IA involving the formation of an airborne division, a number of armoured and motorized divisions, a number of 'Fortress groups' and a number of 'Frontier groups'. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed. 2 copies. The second copy, unsigned, has annotations by a member of the C-in-C's staff, stressing the need for inter-service consideration of these matters, and for some idea of monetary cost and of the limits of expenditure.

**1190** 2 August. Letter from K.A. Gai, writing to Auchinleck from Claude House, Peshawar, North-West Frontier Province, thanking him for a photograph; attributing the comforts of Claude House and its garden to the benevolence of Auchinleck; praising his innate love of the Indian; and congratulating him on his elevation to the rank of FM, a full vindication of his courageous stand at El Alamein. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1191** 2 August. Address by Auchinleck to the students of the Staff College at Quetta, dealing with the future of the AFI, assuming that India remains within the Commonwealth as a fully autonomous Dominion. In the address Auchinleck points out that financial considerations have rigidly limited planning, but his aim is to ensure that plans are adequate for the defence of the country, whatever form of government or constitution may eventually be set up in India. He envisages the RIN of the future as small and well-balanced, with three cruisers as its nucleus. As to the IAF, he sees a need to build up Indian repair and maintenance units, with the necessary skilled technicians and artificers, because, during the war, the 10 Indian fighter squadrons were largely dependent on the RAF for repair and maintenance. As far as the IA is concerned, plans include the composition of one armoured and one airborne division as well as several infantry divisions. There is an acute shortage of Indian officers in artillery, engineers and signals which must be remedied. It is Auchinleck's intention to create Frontier Brigade Groups to help the civil authorities to maintain order on the western frontier, but it is also his aim to reduce as far as possible the number of regular troops employed in frontier defence duties. The troops at present serving overseas in the ME, Burma, Malaya and Japan will eventually return to India, some to serve in the post-war IA, others to be disbanded. If the future Government of India wishes to retain British troops in India, and if the British Government agrees to their retention, these troops will be

organized in independent Brigade Groups. Auchinleck then describes plans for a National War Academy, an Indian 'West Point' to train officers for all three Services. He also expresses the opinion that, for some time, the new IA will need the services of British officers in the senior and middle ranks, until Indian officers have acquired the necessary experience to take their place; and as long as there are British officers seconded to Indian units, it will be necessary to relate the pay of Indian officers to that of the British officers, and there must be a common basic rate of pay for both. An Inter-Services Pay Committee is sitting in Delhi to prepare proposals for the future pay and terms of service for the AFI, but the big problem is the pay of the other ranks. Whatever changes may be made in the pay of officers, up or down, the position of existing holders of appointments will be protected. Auchinleck then describes the new uniform of the IA in detail and warns the students that the shape of the IA will have to change in the future to adapt to the use of new weapons, becoming smaller, highly protected, extremely mobile, very hard-hitting and self-contained. He ends his address with an admonition that an officer may hold whatever political opinions he likes, but, so long as he is serving as a sailor, soldier or airman, he must not allow politics to affect his loyalty to his Service or to the Government in power. 14 leaves. Typescript.

**1192** 17 August. C-in-C Policy Note no. 17 on 'Provision of personal weapons', addressed to Lt.-Gen. J.R. Reynolds, CGS. Auchinleck demands that immediate attention should be given to the fact that many units are using obsolete personal weapons; declares that motor transport and field companies do not need rifles and bayonets, but a few light machine guns for fire-power, sten guns for personal defence weapons, a mortar or two, and, in the future, perhaps, recoilless anti-tank weapons; states his view that the army as a whole is clinging to the rifle, which is the most difficult of all weapons, simply because it is useful on the parade ground; and suggests that both the rifle and the bayonet are ready for the museum, that a new hand-to-hand weapon is needed, and that a questionnaire on the subject should be sent to army commanders. With a memorandum from the CGS on 'Provision of personal weapons – future policy', formulating the questionnaire. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1193** 12 September. Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru, Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in the Interim Government of India, to Auchinleck, enclosing a statement concerning the future of the IA, in which emphasis is placed on the urgent need to transform the whole background of the IA, to make it feel that it is the national army of India, to remove it from communal associations and narrowly racist interests, and to man it with Indians from top to bottom as soon as possible; in which it is suggested also that the Indian public should feel that the Army is theirs and not some

kind of hostile force imposed upon them; that the Army should not be used, therefore, to quell domestic disorder unless this is essential; that a stronger police force or a special peace preservation corps should be used for this purpose to relieve the Army from a distasteful duty; that this policy applies especially to the North-West Frontier, where the bombing of recalcitrant tribesmen is abhorrent to public opinion and must not be tolerated by a national government except in cases of extreme crisis and danger; that India must make her own arrangements for defence, including frontier defence; that the British Army should leave India as rapidly as possible; in which concern is expressed that the IA should keep abreast of rapid developments in the science of warfare and should not be used to police Japan, Hong Kong, Malaya, Siam, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma, Borneo, Ceylon, Iraq, the ME and Italy: and in which particular resentment is exhibited against the employment of Indian troops in the Netherlands East Indies, where Indian sympathy lies with the Indonesian Republic, and in Iraq where Indian troops have been sent for possible use in Iran. 5 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1194** 17 September. Comments by Auchinleck on 1193, above, in which he states that it has been his policy for some months to propagate the idea that the IA is now a national army, although this concept should not be made a reason for any slackening of discipline or obedience to properly constituted authority; and he adds that he has always insisted on the non-political and non-communal character of the AFI and has endeavoured to maintain a fair representation in the AFI of the different races and communities which exist in India, although an exact proportional representation is not practical owing to administrative and organizational factors which cannot be disregarded unless efficiency is to suffer. He affirms that it has also been his policy to spread recruiting as widely and as evenly as possible over the whole country, and he agrees with Nehru that the leaders of public opinion in the country should make the Army feel that it is a national force, indicating that he himself has tried to emphasize this aspect by eliminating British units from Indian divisions and brigades, thus furnishing practical proof that the IA now stands by itself on its own feet. He reports that the process of nationalization of the officer cadres of the RIN and of the IA is progressing with reasonable speed, in so far as the higher ranks are concerned, but the dearth of suitable candidates for regular commissions is causing grave anxiety, and drastic measures are in hand to improve the situation. He expresses his agreement with Nehru on the principle that the quelling of domestic disorder is the duty of the police, not of the army, and he points out that the War Department and the IA have consistently urged the Government of India to strengthen the police force by better training, better conditions of service and the issue of better arms and equipment. He declares that the same applies to control of the North-West

Frontier and recalls that the War Department has recently succeeded in persuading the Indian External Affairs Department to expand the Civil Armed Forces in tribal areas so that these forces may assume responsibility for the control of the tribesmen. He hopes that the tribes can be gradually taught to control themselves, but, in the meantime, however distasteful it may be, he sees no present alternative but to use the Air Force and the Army to prevent the spread of lawlessness and unrest, should the need arise. He comments on Nehru's desire to get rid of the British Army in India, stating his opinion that the retention of units of the British Army and of the RAF is a matter for the Government to decide, and that, for this reason, the Government should be kept fully and constantly informed about the present position concerning the maintenance of law and order in the country, emphasizing that, when the new constitution is firmly established, the defence of India will be entrusted solely to her own Armed Forces. He points out that the defence of the North-West Frontier is now entirely in the hands of IA units. Finally, he refers to the withdrawal of Indian troops from overseas, declaring that this is a matter for decision by the Government of India in consultation with the British Government, and that the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Netherlands East Indies is proceeding steadily and rapidly and should be complete by the end of November. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1195** 3 October. Letter from Brig. Nathu Singh to Auchinleck, thanking him for kindness and hospitality; expressing admiration for his sincere and tenacious wish to serve India and for his efforts to solve the officer problem in the IA on which the success of nationalization depends; and describing his own appreciation of promotion in rank and his determination to justify the trust placed in him. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1196** 20 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, Poona, Lt.-Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Rawalpindi, Lt.-Gen. F.R.R. Bucher, GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, Calcutta, Lt.-Gen. D.D. Gracey, Commander, 1st Indian Corps, Karachi, and Brig. E.W.D. Vaughan, Commander, Delhi District, asking them all to express his thanks and appreciation to the British officers of the IA and the commanding officers of British units for the excellent work they have done in difficult circumstances and for their devotion to duty and their service. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1197** 21 October. Memorandum from Auchinleck on the future of the Gurkha Rifle battalions, addressed to Gen. Sir William Slim, Lt.-Gen. Sir Geoffry Scoones, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Taker, Lt.-Gen. D.D. Gracey, Lt.-Gen. F.R.R. Bucher and Maj.-Gen. J.G. Bruce, stating that there are four possible alternatives: (1) that there should be no Gurkha units at all either in the IA or employed directly under the

WO; (2) that all pre-war battalions of Gurkha Rifles should be kept in the IA; (3) that as many as possible of the pre-war battalions should be transferred to service directly under the WO and employed outside India; (4) that some of the pre-war battalions should be kept on in the IA and the rest, or as many of them as possible, should be taken over by the WO for service outside India. Auchinleck expresses his wish to avoid the first alternative at all costs, his opinion that the second course of action is impracticable, his awareness that the third alternative is a possibility (because the WO has expressed willingness to take eight battalions immediately and, possibly, the remaining twelve at a later date), and his conviction that the fourth alternative would raise all kinds of problems. He asks for advice and comment on the following questions:- How should allotment of battalions be made, (a) to India and (b) to the WO? Will it be necessary to have one training centre for the battalions in the IA and another for those serving outside India under the WO? What special conditions of service should be obtained from the WO for those Gurkhas serving directly under them outside India, to make such service attractive? What are the possibilities of procuring Gurkha commissioned officers for the IA, and how can this be achieved? And would it be desirable, if possible, to retain the present nomenclature of regiments, whether these are serving in the IA or under the WO? An early reply to these questions is invited. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1198** *October*. List of INA personnel in prison in October 1946, giving details of their Army numbers, ranks, names, units, the charges on which they were convicted and their prison sentences. 2 sheets. Typescript.

**1199** *22 November*. Memorandum from Auchinleck on the policy of appointing Indian officers to high appointments in the Army, addressed to Lt.-Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, Lt.-Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, Lt.-Gen. F.R.R. Bucher, and Brig. E.W.D. Vaughan, asking them to ensure that the policy is made known to all senior British officers; emphasizing the importance that they give freely and fully of their knowledge and experience to those who are to replace them, and who must be given the opportunity to train in the art of command leadership and to acquire the widest possible experience in the various duties which an officer may have to perform when he reaches the highest ranks of the Army; and indicating that, in order to give this experience, it may well happen that Indian officers may be given posts which, in the normal course of events, might have been reserved for officers of greater seniority. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1200** *10 December*. Letter from Lt.-Gen. A.R. Godwin-Austen (QMG, IC, New Delhi, 1945 – 46) to Auchinleck, on his departure from India, praising him for being a great leader and an inspired

commander, and expressing the desire to keep in touch in the future. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1201** *19 December.* List of Auchinleck's official appointments, patronages and memberships, mainly relating to India and Indian affairs. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1202** *26 December.* Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Auchinleck, thanking him for Christmas greetings, and wishing him a happy New Year; adding that it is going to be a difficult year, and expressing the hope that they will pull through. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1203** *28 December.* Letter of thanks for hospitality from Henry S. Southam to Auchinleck. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1204** *30 December.* Letter from Baldev Singh, Member for Defence in the Interim Government, to Auchinleck, urging the need to release INA prisoners; expressing the opinion that the effect of such a release on the AFI would not be adverse at this stage; and stating that there is no suggestion that INA personnel should be reinstated in the Army. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. With the enclosure of a letter, dated 25 December, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Baldev Singh, declaring that it is difficult to ignore the widespread public sentiment in favour of the release of the INA personnel, although there is no wish to go against any decision made by the C-in-C; and asking Baldev Singh to intercede with Auchinleck to release the prisoners himself, stating that it would be far better if the initiative were taken by him in this matter than that the Interim Government should be hustled into action by public agitation. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. With covering letter from Ian Scott, assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, returning the correspondence, together with Auchinleck's draft reply (not included). 1 leaf. Holograph.

*1947*

**1205** *6 January.* Letter from Auchinleck to Baldev Singh, in reply to 1204, above, expressing understanding of the difficult position in which the Interim Government may find itself as a result of the pressure which a certain section of public opinion may exert in order to secure the release from prison of INA personnel; affirming his conviction that the effect of this proposed condonation of crimes of brutality and violence on the officers of the Army and of the other two Services might be serious, making the Indian officers uneasy, and impairing the morale of the British officers; stating that, of the fifteen INA men imprisoned, two were found guilty of murder, one of attempting to commit murder, one of abetment of murder, and six of offences of a cruel kind, all ten being convicted, not of political offences against the government of the day, but of crimes against humanity involving their own former comrades in arms; adding that

the remaining five prisoners were properly tried and convicted of desertion in the face of the enemy and of waging war against the King; explaining that he cannot agree to use his authority as C-in-C to remit the sentences on those two men found guilty of murder of their own countrymen and former comrades, and that, as far as the remainder are concerned, to remit their sentences would lead to a series of demands for the remission of other sentences quite unconnected with the INA; and that, although he accepts that the final decision rests with the Governor General in Council, he is certain of the importance of a firm stand against any agitation for the release of INA convicts. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1206** 9 *January*. Notice from the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee, appointed by the Government of India to report on the means of nationalizing the AFI in the shortest possible time. Addressed to Lt.-Col. S.S. Hamid, Private Secretary to the C-in-C. With the second half of a questionnaire on the nationalization of the AFI. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1207** c. 9 *January*. Paper submitted by Lt.-Col. S.S. Hamid, in reply to 1206, above, to the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee, accepting as the object of the exercise the nationalization of the AFI, both officers and men, within the shortest possible time, with due regard to Indian national interest and concern for reasonable efficiency; indicating that it is difficult to answer the questionnaire without knowing the post-war strength of the Army and the finances to be allocated to the defence services; and expressing the hope that the Committee has been set up to find ways and means of nationalizing the AFI in the true interest of India and not just to get rid of British officers, a policy which is not at present in the best interest of the country and which would endanger the standards of a highly efficient army. With answers to the questionnaire, expressing in general the view that it should be possible to nationalize appointments up to Grade 1 immediately, or as soon as the officers become available; that senior appointments should be filled gradually, as the Indian officers acquire more experience; and that as many officers as possible should be trained abroad in the use of technical arms, bearing in mind the fact that, if India becomes a republic, Great Britain may not extend the same concessions as are now available for the training of officers in the UK. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**1208** 9 *January*. Letter from Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, reporting that Baldev Singh, Member for Defence in the Interim Government, has informed him that a resolution is likely to be moved in the Assembly, early in February, demanding the release of the INA men still in prison, a resolution supported by both Congress and the Muslim League; that further demands were likely to be made for the restoration of payment to the INA men, and also for their

reinstatement in the Army; that the INA would put forward these demands at a meeting held by Subhas Chandra Bose on 23 January; that Baldev Singh is inclined to give way to most of the demands to relieve political pressure, but he himself has warned him that even the release of the prisoners would be fatal for the IA and that it would be impossible for him to accept responsibility for the security of India if the confidence of the Army were to be shaken in this way; and asking Auchinleck to stand firm, and to maintain absolutely that he cannot consent in any circumstances to any further concessions to the INA. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed, with holograph note by Auchinleck, recording that verbal assurance has been given to the Viceroy.

**1209** *14 January.* Note by the Assistant AG on the classification of members of the INA and the financial penalties inflicted upon them in the way of loss of pay, pension or gratuity. With an appendix showing the pay to which an Indian Commissioned Officer of the rank of Captain would have been entitled if no forfeiture had been made, and a statement setting out the pay and allowances of havildars and sepoy from the date of their war imprisonment to the date of their recovery. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1210** *16 January.* Letter from J. McGarrity, RSM, Irish Guards, Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his kind letter and for the autographed photograph. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1211** *17 January.* Statement by Baldev Singh (Member for Defence in the Interim Government), noting that, in the last session of the Central Legislative Assembly, a resolution was put forward recommending the immediate release of imprisoned INA personnel and the retrospective payment of the emoluments forfeited by them for the time they were in enemy service; announcing that these recommendations, which had the support of both Congress and the Muslim League, had not been accepted by the Interim Government because the C-in-C was strongly opposed to their implementation; and expressing the firm conviction that, to avoid further disturbance in the whole of India, it would be advisable to accept these recommendations, although there should be no question of reinstatement of INA personnel in the defence services. With an appendix containing a copy of Auchinleck's letter to Baldev Singh of 6 January (1205, above). 6 leaves. Typescript.

**1212** *23 January.* Letter from G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, enclosing copies of telegrams exchanged between the Viceroy and Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, asking him whether, by the financial agreement already made, the back-pay proposed to be given to the INA men would be a liability for the British Exchequer. With a copy of telegram no. 140-S, dated 21 January, from Lord Wavell to Lord Pethick-

Lawrence, describing the paper sent out by Baldev Singh (1211, above); stating that the Defence Member's case is that, unless the concessions are made to the INA, the recalcitrant left wing of the Congress and the forward bloc will make this a major issue; that Baldev Singh is anxious to defeat the political advantage of Sarat Chandra Bose, who is holding a conference of INA men at Calcutta on 23 January; expressing his own view that Baldev Singh does not hold these opinions himself but is dominated by Nehru, and that Auchinleck is right to be strongly opposed to the recommendations; disclosing that he has refused to bring the case to the Cabinet without further consideration, and that he has suggested holding a discussion between Baldev Singh, Nehru, Liaquat, Auchinleck and himself in an effort to reach agreement; and asking for the support of the British Government in resisting these demands, which would precipitate the disintegration of the IA. With the reply from Lord Pethick-Lawrence, telegram no. 1052, dated 23 January, agreeing with Wavell's proposal to hold a discussion outside the Cabinet; expressing the hope that Wavell and Auchinleck can convince Baldev Singh, Nehru and Liaquat of the very serious damage to the IA which could result from the proposed concessions to the INA; and granting him the power to overrule his colleagues, in the interests of British India, if the case has to be brought to the Cabinet. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1213** *30 January.* Letter from Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, the CIGS, to Auchinleck, refusing to relax the rule that attendance at an exercise at Camberley should be restricted to officers of the rank of Major-General and above; declaring that there is concern in London about Nehru's latest resolution in favour of an Indian republic and the fact that this has been passed in the Assembly; pointing out that, as a result, the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College will want to bar Indian officers from certain highly secret lectures; and informing Auchinleck that he is not sending to India the *top secret* papers in connection with the Camberley exercise, because they are not really necessary for any preliminary study Auchinleck may wish to make before his visit to England. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1214** *15 February.* Letter from Gen. Sir Montagu Stopford (C-in-C, Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies) to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality and friendship; expressing sadness at leaving the East and admiration for the sterling quality of the IA. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1215** *2 March.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir Geoffry Scoones, Principal Staff Officer to the Secretary of State for India, expressing agreement with his views concerning the attendance of Indian officers at the Imperial Defence College and pleasure that the Chiefs of Staff accepted these views, but general uncertainty about the future because of the possibility that India may leave the Common-

wealth, although even in these circumstances there may be a need felt by the Indian Government to retain the services of selected British officers; admitting that, although undesirable, it would be logical to ban Indian officers from the Defence College until the future constitutional status of India is more clearly defined; raising questions concerning the future of those British officers in the IA who will be of no use to either the Indian or the British Army; referring to the British Government's announcement that the transfer of power from Britain to India would take place at a date not later than June 1948; disclosing that the statement has shocked many people, who expected the process to be more gradual, and has caused great uneasiness because of the brevity of the period of preparation and the lack of unanimity among the Indian peoples; describing a general feeling that the Viceroy (Wavell) has been shabbily treated and that his successor (Mountbatten), despite his great record, is not really known to India or the Indians; reiterating his conviction that the whole process of nationalization of the IA should proceed gradually to be successful; and stressing the urgency of making arrangements with the Nepalese Government for the replacement of British officers by Indian or Gurkha officers in those Gurkha units to be retained in the IA. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1216** 6 March. Army Commanders' Conference, 25–29 March, 1947: agenda and timetable, including the announcement of Maj.-Gen. L.G. Whistler's appointment to the new role of Major-General, British Troops in India, with a description of his duties. 11 leaves. Typescript.

**1217** 8 March. Memorandum from Auchinleck to Baldev Singh, Member for Defence in the Interim Government, offering statistics bearing upon the problem of the nationalization of the officer cadre of the IA; stating that the estimated future peace strength of the IA is, roughly, 8,500 officers and 220,000 men, and that, on paper, without taking into account the essential matter of experience and qualification, these numbers should be sufficient to supply enough Indian officers to fill the officer cadre of a completely nationalized Army; stressing the other factors that have to be taken into consideration, namely, the speed with which the IA can be reduced to 220,000 men, the suitability and fitness of the available Indian officers for the various posts from the highest to the lowest (given that, out of the 8,500 officers likely to be available, only about 500 would have experience as pre-war regular officers of more than eight years' service), and the acute shortage of Indian technical officers; concluding by an expression of his conviction that to attempt to achieve complete nationalization of the AFI, and especially of the IA, by June 1948, is to run a very grave risk of their disintegration and disruption. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1218** *14 March.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, declaring that he did everything in his power to be allowed to go back to sea, but, since the King overruled him and he is to be the new Viceroy, he takes comfort from the knowledge that he has a true and wise friend in Auchinleck, and he hopes that they will see a lot of each other. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1219** *22 March.* Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, expressing his thanks for the excellent work done by the Army in re-establishing control in the Punjab. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1220** *3 April.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, reporting that Sir Patrick Spens (Chief Justice of India) came to the Viceroy's House an hour before the INA resolution (demanding the release of INA men still in prison) was due to be discussed in the Assembly. Spens expressed the doubts of himself and his colleagues about the wording of the formula to be presented as an amendment to the resolution, and suggested that the formula should not give the impression that the judges of the Federal Court were requested to advise by the C-in-C or to report to him, but that their position required that the reference should be from the Viceroy, and that their report should go to him. Mountbatten states that, in accordance with this suggestion from the Federal Court and with the knowledge that Auchinleck himself had agreed that the request to advise might come from the Government, he made modifications to the formula at very short notice; but assures Auchinleck that he would have been consulted personally if he had not been absent from Delhi; describes Nehru's excellent speech in the Assembly, in which the latter backed the C-in-C very strongly and announced that the Government would resign if the amendment (the formula) to the resolution was not accepted; and concludes with an account of the happy outcome in which the mover of the resolution ultimately withdrew the motion. With a copy of the revised text of the formula in which it is stated that, although the Government does not question that the C-in-C has acted in this matter in good faith and in what he perceived to be the best interests of India and the AFI, they are prepared, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to request that the available judges of the Federal Court should be called in as advisers, in this matter only; and that, before any further consideration is given to the problem by the C-in-C, these advisers should examine the proceedings of the various courts martial, give their opinion as to the desirability of reviewing the findings and sentences in each case, and report whether, in their opinion, the findings and sentences should be altered or modified. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1221** *8 April.* Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of 7 April and for writing in such a friendly way;

admitting that he was a little distressed by Auchinleck's apparent lack of faith in his adherence to his word; and confessing to a sense of weariness at having to discuss the same thing over and over again, acknowledging that he is too indifferent a politician to enjoy prolonged talks which end vaguely and without producing results, although circumstances have conspired to make him play a politician's role and to indulge in these very arguments. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1222** *14 April.* Letter from Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, referring to a letter sent by C.R. Attlee, the PM, to Mountbatten before he left England for India. With a copy of the letter which sets out the salient points which Mountbatten should bear in mind in dealing with Indian affairs, namely, that it is the definite objective of HM Government to obtain a unitary government for British India and the Indian States, within the Commonwealth, if possible, through the medium of a Constituent Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission's plan; and that, if by 1 October there appears to be no prospect of reaching a settlement on the basis of a unitary government for British India, either with or without the co-operation of the Indian States, Mountbatten should report to the British Government on the steps which he considers should be taken for the handing-over of power on the due date, that date being flexible to within one month, with 1 June 1948 as the effective date for the transfer of power. Attlee stresses in the letter that it is important that the Indian States should adjust their relations with the authorities to whom it is intended to hand over power in British India; but the British Government does not intend to hand over its powers and obligations under paramountcy to any successor government, and it is not its policy to bring paramountcy as a system to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power. As far as the Viceroy's relations with the Interim Government are concerned, Attlee states that, although the Interim Government does not have the same powers as a Dominion Government, the British Government is willing to treat it with the same consultation and consideration as a Dominion Government and to give it the greatest possible freedom in the day-to-day exercise of the administration of the country. Attlee emphasizes the need for the closest co-operation with the Indian leaders and the importance of ensuring that the transfer of power is effected with full regard to the defence requirements of India by avoiding any breach in the continuity of the IA, by maintaining the organization of defence on an all-Indian basis, and by continuing collaboration in the security of the Indian Ocean area for which provision may be made in the future in an agreement between the two countries. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1223** *20 April.* Memorandum by Auchinleck on the implications of the proposals made by Liaquat Ali Khan for the partition of the AFI. In his paper Auchinleck indicates that the AFI cannot be split up

neatly into two parts because many essential components do not at present exist in duplicate and are not located suitably to serve two separate sovereign states. Two new Armed Forces would have to be rebuilt, and the combined total of these forces must be greater than that of the defence forces designed to serve a united India: the proposed state of Pakistan includes all the important land frontiers of India, and the forces needed to defend Pakistan from external aggression would be virtually the same as those now required to defend India as a whole. Auchinleck estimates that it would take more than ten years to build up two separate navies, and it would be inordinately expensive to duplicate the necessary administrative, repair and training establishments. In the case of the IA, he envisages that the main problems would arise from the mixed-class composition of the various units: there are, for example, 70 infantry battalions of mixed-class composition, made up of companies each of which is composed of one class. Separating these battalions into Pakistani and Hindustani units would be a complicated and lengthy business; and the issue is made even more difficult by the fact that many of the Muslims enlisted in the Muslim companies of the mixed battalions are recruited from outside the areas which are likely to constitute Pakistan. The problem of mixed-class composition also applies to the IAC. In Auchinleck's view, the disposal or sharing out of the Indian officers of the Army presents an even more complex and thorny problem than that associated with the 'other ranks': the appointment and posting of Indian officers have been carried out with total disregard for communal considerations, with the result that any separation must entail a complete reshuffle of all officers and the radical reorganization of HQs and training establishments. Moreover, the siting of the ordnance factories of India has been determined by strategical usefulness, not by political or religious issues: duplication of resources would involve an addition of expenditure altogether unjustifiable from a purely military standpoint. Auchinleck then turns his attention to the IAF, which contains no units manned solely by Hindus or Muslims: all work together in a single Service, regardless of religion, caste or creed. Any attempt to divide the IAF into two separate forces would lead, in Auchinleck's opinion, to its disintegration, and this would leave India virtually defenceless against air attack for a period of years which cannot be estimated. In conclusion, Auchinleck reiterates the point that the proposed partition of the IA is a matter of the greatest complexity and difficulty, not only in the preliminary planning stages but also in the practical means of bringing any such plan into being; and he affirms that it has not been possible to suspend the planning of the future of the AFI based on the assumption that the British Government will hand over a unified force. At the end of his memorandum he adds an urgent request that the proposed partition should only be discussed at the highest level, because any rumour concerning the proposal would have an immediate unsettling

effect on the morale of the Muslim soldiers, ratings and airmen. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**1224** *24 April.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, enclosing a paper by Auchinleck on the military implications of the establishment of an independent Pakistan, in which the conclusion is drawn that, from the purely military and strategical aspect, the provision of adequate insurance in the shape of reasonably good defensive arrangements for Pakistan would be a most difficult and expensive business, and that no guarantee of success could be given. Followed by a note by the C-in-C's DCGS on the same subject, from the point of view of Pakistan, in which the opinion is expressed that the advocates of an independent Pakistan would be satisfied with an army equal to the armies of Afghanistan, Iran or Burma; that they would refuse to consider the situation in terms of any threat from a first-class power, involving armoured forces or air offensives; and that they would regard their defence problems in terms of some local third-class war, to be settled with infantry and artillery. 2 copies of both papers, the first with manuscript corrections in Auchinleck's hand. 15 leaves. Typescript.

**1225** *25 April.* Cabinet Secretariat: 'Papers concerning the meeting of the Defence Committee, India, April 25, 1947'. The papers include a copy of the proposals made by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Member for Finance, for the partition of the AFI (see 1223, above). Liaquat complains that the reorganization and nationalization of the AFI are proceeding on the assumption that they are to continue as a single entity, and that the fundamental constitutional issue of a united or divided India is thus being prejudged on a most vital point, to the grave detriment of Muslims. He is concerned that, as another serious consequence of treating the AFI as a single entity, no regard is paid either to the organization of Muslim units or to the representation of Muslims in suitable numbers and ranks in all the arms and services. He suggests that, in order to avoid prejudgement of the constitutional issue, the AFI should be reorganized in such a way that they can be split up when a decision on the partition of India is taken. He concludes his proposals by recommending that the C-in-C should be asked to prepare a plan for the partition of the AFI, and that action on the present plans for the reorganization and nationalization of the AFI, on the basis of a united India, should be suspended until the constitutional issue has been settled. With comments on these proposals by Baldev Singh, the Member for Defence, who maintains that both the reorganization and nationalization of the AFI could only proceed on an all-India basis: the major issue of the defence of India could not be prejudged in any way until the political issue of division is finally settled. He states firmly that neither in the process of reorganization nor in that of nationalization has any discrimination been made against Muslims or any other community: the AFI, as a

whole, have been built up on a non-communal basis, and, until now, they have remained free from communal complications. He does not believe that the time is opportune to discuss Liaquat's proposals in the Defence Committee; and he does not accept the idea of suspending the present plans for the reorganization and nationalization of the AFI. With Auchinleck's reply to Liaquat's proposals, textually identical with 1223, above. 9 leaves. Typescript.

**1226** *c. 26 April.* Cabinet Secretariat: Defence Committee, India. Third (47) Meeting. Minutes of item v only. Record of the discussion concerning the paper by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Member for Finance, on the preparation of a plan for the partition of the AFI. It is recorded in the minutes that Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, in his introduction to the discussion, expressed his regret that he had to override the advice of Baldev Singh, the Member for Defence, and of the C-in-C in bringing the paper before the Committee. He was aware that Baldev Singh and Auchinleck were unwilling to discuss the matter at all lest information concerning the possibility of partition was disclosed to members of the AFI who would be seriously disturbed by the news. The Viceroy, while agreeing with the necessity for complete secrecy, was nonetheless convinced that the issue of Pakistan must be faced, and that the views of the Defence Committee must be sought before he could make a report to the British Government on the form of government he recommended for India. Baldev Singh reiterated his belief that any plans for division of the AFI could only be made after a political decision in favour of Pakistan; but the Member for Finance, although accepting that the decision to act was dependent on political intent, still maintained that there must be a plan in readiness to go ahead with separation if the notion of Pakistan was accepted. Other points in the discussion included recognition that the difficulties of separation were enormous, but appreciation that they would have to be overcome if such a division became politically necessary, and that it would be desirable to start thinking about the problems immediately. If it was decided to create a separate state of Pakistan, each of the two states would require its own forces for internal security, but it was expected that there would be a treaty to provide for defence against aggression by a common enemy. If such a treaty were made, training establishments and ordnance factories could be shared by mutual agreement. In fact, however, no clear terms of reference had been given as to the relations between the two states, and this ambiguity had led the C-in-C to envisage more practical difficulties in the process of separation than might actually ensue in the future. It was urged, at the meeting, that the larger military HQs and staffs, and major units, should be reorganized while British officers were still present, and, in consequence, it was essential to delay nationalization until such reorganization was complete. Preparatory measures, such as the training of Indian officers to take over, could still proceed, but the

complicated process of cross-posting officers, consequent on the withdrawal of the British element, should be delayed. In his summing-up the Viceroy suggested that the issue should not be put before the Cabinet until the political decision had been taken, and that the utmost secrecy should be maintained. He also expressed his opinion that the AFI could probably complete nationalization by 1 June 1948, without reducing standards to an unacceptably low level. As an alternative, he thought that the AFI might complete separation by 1 June 1948, without undue risk: he did not think that they could achieve both by the due date. A solution could be found if Hindustan and Pakistan were prepared to pool their forces in a federal GHQ for general and external control, until such time as separation could be completed without damage to their mutual interests. He felt that it was essential to have some kind of plan ready, if and when an announcement was made about Pakistan, because the AFI needed to be reassured, and he suggested that the C-in-C should make a personal broadcast at that time, to indicate how he intended to proceed. Auchinleck declared that there was no real foundation on which he could plan the separation because so many factors were uncertain, but he agreed to look into the problems which would have to be tackled and to calculate the staff that would be required to undertake the work. The Committee then decided that the issue should not be put to the Cabinet until the political decision had been made. It directed the C-in-C to consider the personnel of a small, high-level committee to look into the problems, and to indicate the broad outline of their tasks; and it authorized him to delay nationalization at his discretion until the political decision was reached. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1227** *29 April.* Letter from Lady Edwina Mountbatten to Auchinleck, describing her enjoyment of the gathering on the previous evening; praising the Boys (of the IA), declaring that Auchinleck must feel proud of what he has made of them and of their obvious admiration and affection for him; and expressing her gratitude and that of Lord Mountbatten for Auchinleck's understanding and friendship, particularly at the present difficult time. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1228** *1 June.* Letter from Lord Birdwood to Auchinleck, regretting that they were unable to meet each other during Auchinleck's hectic visit to England; expressing his good wishes for the tasks still awaiting Auchinleck in India; and praising his record of great and faithful service. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1229** *11 June.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Ismay, accompanying copies of proposals (not included) for the setting up of an Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee; stressing his conviction that the success of any plan for the division of the AFI depends on the willing co-operation of the British officers now serving with them; and suggesting that the goodwill of British officers is more likely to be

secured if the Partition Committee states that the services of British officers are essential to the success of reconstitution and invites them to remain in positions of command during the reconstitution. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1230** 5 *July*. (1) 'Terms of reference of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee.' It was decided that the Committee should work on the assumption that the terms and conditions of service would remain the same for existing members of the Forces serving either in the Union of India or in Pakistan, but that, if new terms were introduced and were not acceptable to the personnel concerned, they would be allowed to terminate their contracts and would receive proportionate benefits where applicable. It was also assumed that any Indian officers or other ranks engaged for service between the present and the date of the transfer of power would be appointed under the existing terms of service, with the option of resigning if they did not wish to serve under any new terms or conditions which would be imposed by the two new states. It was stated that liability for payment of pensions, gratuities and annuities earned by servicemen before the transfer of power should be undertaken by the two Dominion governments and should be publicly announced; that there should be no changes in the basic organization and nomenclature of formations, units, establishments and installations except as demanded by the processes of reconstitution; that the services of some British officers would be required for the successful partition of the AFI; and that, as a consequence, the implementation of the plan for complete nationalization might take longer than was anticipated. (2) 'Partition of the Armed Forces.' It is envisaged that this process will be complicated and difficult, and it is seen to be essential to maintain a single administrative control until the AFI have been finally divided into two distinct entities, and the two Dominions are able to administer their own forces. However, because British troops commence withdrawal from India on 15 August, it is also considered necessary by that date for United India and for Pakistan to have forces under their own operational control, predominantly non-Muslim on one side and Muslim on the other, and to be ready for reconstitution on a territorial basis as soon as possible after that date. The first stage would be a rough and ready division of the existing forces on a communal basis. The second stage would be a combing-out of the individual units on the basis of voluntary transfers, such transfers to be subject to the proviso that non-Muslim personnel do not join Pakistan units and Muslims do not volunteer for United India units. The serving personnel should be allowed the option of resigning if they do not wish to serve in the Armed Forces of either Dominion. It should be possible to dispense with central administrative control by 1 April 1948, by which time it is hoped that each Dominion will have its own administrative and maintenance services. In view of the fact that both governments are to have operational

control over their respective Armed Forces by 15 August, they must each appoint heads for the three Services forthwith. As far as central administration is concerned, it is intended that the AFI as a whole will remain under the administrative control of the present C-in-C in India who, in turn, will be responsible to the Joint Defence Council: he will have no responsibility for law and order, and he will have no power to move troops within the borders of either Dominion. It is proposed, in order to avoid confusion, that the present C-in-C in India might be entitled Supreme Commander from 15 August until his work is completed. Followed by Annexure I: 'Outline plan for control of Armed Forces during their reconstruction', giving details of the proposed control by HQs and regions. 6 leaves. Typescript.

**1231** 8 July. Letter from Lady Edwina Mountbatten to Auchinleck, asking his advice about a letter she has received from Singapore from the wife of a former member of the INA; reporting that she has consulted the Viceroy who has referred her to the C-in-C; and expressing her conviction that she must reply to Mrs Kiani, without becoming involved in controversy, because a personal appeal from one wife to another cannot be disregarded or dismissed with a bare official reply. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1232** 9 July. Letter from Auchinleck to Lady Mountbatten, in reply to 1231, above, stating that his opinion remains unchanged, that it would be dangerous to the morale and reliability of the IA to reinstate former members of the INA; recalling that the whole question was reviewed a few months ago by the Indian Government, which recommended the release of the twelve INA men still in prison but made no suggestion that these men should be reinstated in the IA; asserting that, in present circumstances and for political reasons, it would be improper for the present Government of India to reinstate the men and thus bequeath to the Dominion Governments a *fait accompli* of which they may or may not approve; expressing his sympathy with Mrs Kiani, but suggesting that she should be told that it is now too late for a moribund Government of India to take any action and that, if she wishes to pursue her case, she should appeal to one or both of the new Dominion Governments when they take up office in a month's time; and apprising Lady Mountbatten that, if either of the new Governments were to ask for his advice on this matter, he would reiterate the same opinion, that it would be dangerous and disruptive of discipline in the Army or Armies to take them back. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1233** 10 July. Letter from Henry, Duke of Gloucester, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of 30 June informing the Duke that he expects to retire from active employment in the Army within the next twelve months and feels obliged to resign from his appointment as Colonel of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of which

the Duke is Colonel-in-Chief; and expressing his gratitude for the help and advice that Auchinleck has given in regimental matters during his period as Colonel. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1234** *11 July*. Letter from Lady Edwina Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his note and for the little book on the training of youth in the IA; praising the system which is largely Auchinleck's own creation; expressing the hope that it will continue in the future, although she feels that it can never be the same without Auchinleck's incentive and leadership; and concluding by chiding him for addressing her so formally, when he is writing informally, declaring that she will set him a good example. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1235** *20 July*. Letter from Capt. R.V. Brockman, Personal Secretary to the Viceroy, to Auchinleck, enclosing a copy of a letter (not included) which he has sent on the instruction of the Viceroy to the Chief Justice. With a holograph note by Auchinleck, declaring that he has agreed to abide by the recommendation of the Chief Justice. Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to the Viceroy, reminding him that the case of the INA prisoners was referred to the Judges of the Federal Court, and that there is still no report on their recommendations; stating that it is essential, because of the political situation, for the INA prisoners to be released on or before 15 August, pointing out that, if the new Pakistan Government were to release the prisoners in its charge, it would be difficult for the Government of United India to retain its INA men in prison; and suggesting that it would be preferable to keep the initiative and to release the prisoners before the partition is in operation than to be compelled to take action by circumstances. With holograph comments by Auchinleck to the effect that the INA men are not political prisoners, and that the Pakistan Government cannot take any action before 15 August. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1236** *21 July*. Letter from Auchinleck to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, concerning 1235, above, noting that the Chief Justice has been asked to expedite the report of the Federal Judges' Committee on the INA prisoners; declaring that he does not agree with all the statements made by Pandit Nehru in his letter, and that the political changes which can create an entirely new situation have not yet taken place; asserting that the INA prisoners were convicted of crimes such as murder and brutal conduct, not of political offences; declaring his intention to put into effect any recommendations that the Judges' Committee may make, but refusing to agree to take independent action for the immediate release of these men on grounds of purely political expediency; and concluding by stating that on 15 August either or both of the new Dominion Governments will be free to make their own decisions about this matter. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. 2 copies.

**1237** 22 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lady Edwina Mountbatten, recounting how he recommended Miss Jean Begg (Director, YWCA Welfare, India) for the CBE in March, the recommendation being made in response to a letter from Maj.-Gen. Sir Kenneth Buchanan, Council of Voluntary War Workers; and expressing his conviction that the CBE is the only appropriate award for her. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1238** 24 *July*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, thanking him for his letter concerning the appointment of the commanders of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions; expressing approval of the proposed appointment of Air Marshal Elmhirst to command the Air Forces of the new India and of Air Vice-Marshal Perry-Keene to command the Air Forces of Pakistan; making no comment on the rough draft of Mountbatten's letter to Jinnah, but agreeing with his emphasis on the urgency of making the appointments of commanders as soon as possible, to give these officers time to organize their HQs; and suggesting that the announcement of the selected commanders should be made by the end of the week. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1239** 3 *August*. Letter from Muchu Chaudhuri to Auchinleck, thanking him for his hospitality and kindness; expressing special appreciation of the honour, as a comparatively junior officer, of being entertained by the C-in-C; explaining that such kindness and sympathy more than compensate for the feeling of frustration felt by him and other members of the IA, engendered by the things that are being done and said by some of the present Indian political party leaders; and assuring Auchinleck of his complete loyalty, both to himself as a leader, and to the goal which he is trying to achieve for the IA in the future. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1240** 4 *August*. Letter from Auchinleck to Lt.-Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, Lt.-Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, Commodore J.W. Jefford, Capt. J.T.S. Hall, Air Marshal T. Elmhirst and Air Vice-Marshal A.L.A. Perry-Keene, offering his warmest congratulations on their appointments as Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two new Dominions, and wishing them every success in their vital and difficult task; urging the necessity for the closest co-operation and the strongest spirit of friendliness between the Armed Forces' HQs; assuring them that they will receive all the help possible from him, as Supreme Commander; defining his own responsibilities for the command and general administration of all British Forces staying in India after 15 August, which include the general control and protection of all British officers, ratings and other ranks attached to or serving with the Forces of the two Dominions; pointing out that all British officers serving at present in the IA and RIN will be transferred automatically after 15 August to the British Army and the RN; emphasizing that British

personnel who volunteer to serve cannot claim to be posted to a particular Dominion, but will be posted in accordance with the needs of the Service and will be transferred, under the direction of the Supreme Commander, from one Dominion to another only when strictly necessary, and only after consultation with the Dominion Commanders; and concluding with a renewed assurance that a harmonious and close co-operation between all parties involved will ensure the success of their common objective which is to reconstitute the AFI with the minimum of disturbance and delay and the maximum of efficiency, in the equal interests of both Dominions. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. 2 copies.

**1241** 4 August. Letter from Sir William Hamilton Fyfe, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Aberdeen, to Auchinleck, reporting that Earl Wavell is to be installed as Chancellor of the University at a ceremony in October; and that it is his wish and that of the Senatus Academicus that Auchinleck should be present on that occasion and should receive from the Chancellor the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws, the highest distinction the University can award. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1242** 8 August. Letter from Air Marshal T. Elmhirst, C-in-C, IAF, to Auchinleck, thanking him for his congratulations; asserting that the common task of the British officers remaining in India is to set up, as quickly as possible and on a firm foundation, the new Armed Forces of the two Dominions; expressing his awareness that he must serve two masters, namely, Auchinleck, to be approached through Air Vice-Marshal Walmsley (AOC-in-C, India) and the Head of the State of the Dominion of India; stating his need for more British RAF officers, noting that he can apply to Walmsley for these after he has obtained the agreement of the Defence Minister (India) who will first ascertain that there are no suitable Indian officers to fill the posts; and declaring his determination to serve both masters to the best of his ability. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1243** 9 August. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, describing how, in the past, punitive action on the North-West Frontier has been carefully controlled to ensure that military action is executed with due regard to the principles expected in a civilized country; expressing the fear that, in the future, the Government of Pakistan may wish to employ more drastic methods, especially with regard to the bombing of villages; and suggesting that it would be advisable to inform the Pakistan Government that the loan of British personnel to the Armed Forces of Pakistan is dependent on the assumption that safeguards observed in the past to ensure humane standards are also observed in the future. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1244** 9 August. Instructions regarding the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and of the Commanders of the Sea, Land and

Air Forces of the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Forwarded by Col. H.V.S. Muller of the C-in-C's Secretariat to all the Commanders. The instructions contain a detailed analysis of the scope and role of the Supreme Commander, who is responsible to the Joint Defence Council and whose duties include the general administration of Army and Air Force law, the maintenance of discipline, the general supervision of British officers, ratings and other ranks, the general administration and maintenance of the navies, armies and air forces and the control of joint establishments. As far as operational control is concerned, the Supreme Commander's scope will be confined to the transit of units from one Dominion to another, and he will have no power to move troops within the borders of either Dominion, except for the purpose of reconstituting units. The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander will be progressively devolved on to the Armed Forces HQs of the two Dominions as the sea, land and air forces of both states become self-sufficient. There follows a brief outline of the responsibilities of the Commanders of the sea, land and air forces of India and Pakistan to the Supreme Commander and to their respective Defence Ministers. With appendices on the duties of the Deputy Supreme Commander (Navy) and of the Dominion naval Commanders from 15 August, in respect of discipline, and on the British Army and RAF units in India and Pakistan. 10 leaves. Typescript. 2 copies.

**1245** 11 August. 'Secretariat of the Governor General (Reforms) Notifications', *Gazette of India*, Monday, 11 August 1947. Contains the text of the Joint Defence Council Order, 1947, subscribed by Lord Mountbatten. 1 leaf. Printed. 2 copies.

**1246** 14 August. Special IA Order 79/S/47 by Auchinleck, on the discontinuance of IA Orders (this is the last one). Subscribed by Lt.-Gen. R.A. Savory, AG in India. 2 leaves. Printed sheet.

**1247** 17 August. Letter from Maj.-Gen. T.W. Rees, Commander, Punjab Boundary Force, to Auchinleck, expressing his gratitude for Auchinleck's confidence and support; his conviction that the slaughter and terror in recent disturbances in the Punjab would have been completely out of control without the neutral IA and the Punjab Boundary Force; and the hope that the Force will not be withdrawn until the unrest has completely subsided and both Governments are firmly established. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1248** 21 August. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter enclosing the letter from Maj.-Gen. Rees (1247, above), and stating that he has taken a copy for his private files. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1249** 27 August. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, reporting that he has already spoken to the Indian PM (Nehru) who was sympathetic and authorized Mountbatten to send for Devadas

Gandhi and Sahney, representing *The Hindustan Times* and the *Indian News Chronicle*, to put the views of the Government that officers should not be attacked in the press, and that such attacks should not be made on the British officers who have volunteered to remain in India; and commenting on the future of the Boundary Force, declaring that Baldev Singh has put forward a scheme for separation, that both Nehru and Chundrigar are anxious for separation, and that he himself is greatly relieved that Auchinleck shares this view. With a holograph postscript suggesting a meeting between himself, Auchinleck, Messervy (C-in-C, Pakistan Army) and Lockhart (C-in-C, IA). 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1250** 27 August. Cartoon caricaturing Auchinleck, entitled 'Ways and Means', in which it is inferred that the GHQs of the armies of India and Pakistan are being deprived of proper supplies and services by the Supreme Commander in order to preserve his role in Indian military affairs. From *The Hindustan Times*, 27 August. 1 leaf. Printed.

**1251** 30 August. Report by Maj.-Gen. J.B. Dalison on the attack by Sikhs on the 3 UP Frontier Mail at Maur at about 0950 hours on Sunday, 24 August: in which Dalison states that he was on the train and was an eye-witness to the attack, in which his bearer was savagely killed; that the assault appeared to him to be well-planned, involving some Sikhs of a fanatical sect wearing distinctive dress; that the train was systematically searched, identifiable Muslims were murdered, and the brake vans were completely looted; that the British were not harmed, and the luggage in their compartments was left intact; and that the total number of casualties was estimated at 30. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1252** 6 September. Record of tour mileages of Auchinleck as C-in-C, India, 21 June 1943 to 15 August 1947: the total is 162,609 miles. 9 leaves. Typescript, with manuscript note by Auchinleck.

**1253** 8 September. Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Auchinleck, expressing his regret that certain incidents have occurred in Delhi in the past few days, incidents which involved the interference by self-constituted groups with the liberty of officers and men on duty; accepting that there is a normal right to resist such interference when it is unauthorized and objectionable; and declaring that he has no objection to armed guards of British troops or RAF personnel being posted, when necessary, for the protection of British officers' messes and the quarters of British forces. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1254** 13 September. Supreme Commander's Secretariat: record of a meeting of the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions and the Supreme Commander, Wednesday, 10 September. The Supreme Commander began the meeting by clarifying the position of the British officer, his responsibilities and loyalties: such officers had a

dual loyalty, to the British Government as their master and to the Dominion concerned as their employer on contract. Auchinleck's role as Supreme Commander was to ensure that their efforts should be applied primarily towards the speedy accomplishment of reconstitution, and to undertake responsibility for their welfare. On the termination of his office as Supreme Commander, he envisaged that their conditions of service would change because there would no longer be a central controlling authority to look after them. The target date set for the termination of his office was 1 April 1948; but it was possible that reconstitution would have advanced so far as to permit him to leave before that date. Certain joint organizations – ordnance factories, for example, serving both Dominions – could not be split by 1 April 1948, and he would recommend to the Joint Defence Council that these should be run under some joint inter-governmental committee after the Supreme Commander's HQ had closed down. The officers who wished to continue in the services of either Dominion after the departure of the Supreme Commander would be obliged to negotiate a fresh contract with the Government concerned; and Auchinleck felt that it was important that terms and conditions should be published as soon as possible, to allow officers to enter their new contracts with effect from the date of expiry of their present contracts. He himself, although not directly involved, was willing to act as publicity agent to ensure that all British officers serving in India were aware of the new contracts and conditions of service. The Supreme Commander then explained the position of Supreme HQ, and the use and misuse of its officers, in face of some criticism in the Indian press: he stressed that the sole object of his HQ was to effect a rapid and efficient reconstitution of the Armed Forces of the late Empire of India. As far as nationalization was concerned, Auchinleck pointed out that it had been accepted by the political leaders of both Dominions that reconstitution required the assistance of British officers and other ranks and therefore must tend to retard, to some extent, the progress of nationalization. He then turned his attention to the safety of British families in India and expressed his opinion that it was most undesirable that any further British families should be brought out to India; and the QMG announced his intention to evacuate the greater part of the families at present in India during the period October – December 1947. The question of the employment of British forces in India arose at the meeting, and Auchinleck emphasized that, with effect from 15 August 1947, units of the British forces remaining in India would in no way be responsible for the maintenance of law and order: they were merely sojourners awaiting passage. He exempted two transport squadrons and the communication flight of the RAF from this ruling; to assist in reconstitution, they could be used for the transport of nationals, for the movement of troops in relief (not for operational purposes) or for the distribution of supplies and stores in the cause of humanity. With regard to combined training establishments, he stated

that he had hoped, in order to maintain continuity of training, that these could remain in joint use until both Dominions were able to set up and run their own establishments; but now he considered that immediate steps should be taken to withdraw any students and staff of the non-landlord Dominion in order to avoid trouble. The QMG commented on the withdrawal programme of British units: the British Government had reduced the amount of transport available for the evacuation of British and other personnel, and, in consequence, the evacuation would be prolonged. In addition, the disturbed state of the country had necessitated a review of priorities and of the claims of British families and of Polish refugees. The QMG also explained the problems of distributing supplies consequent upon the disturbances and the movement of refugees, and he described the methods employed to solve these problems. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**1255** *13 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, expressing his fears about the present situation, in the light of the news that the ban on the 'kirpan', the sacred dagger of the Sikhs, has been virtually withdrawn; suggesting that the Indian Government is too anxious to appease the Sikhs on religious grounds when it is accepted unanimously that they were the physical users of force against the defenceless in Delhi; asserting his conviction that not one single Muslim in Delhi has any confidence in the good faith or the intentions of the Government; drawing Mountbatten's attention to the fact that no food had reached the Muslim refugees in the Purana Qila when he visited the place on the previous day, apart from that supplied by his own QMG and by various humane people, Indian and European; and proffering the warning of his DMS against indiscriminate and uncontrolled inoculation against cholera, on the grounds that supplies of the vaccine are not unlimited, that it is only effective for two or three months, and that it should be reserved for circumstances in which the risk is real and not remote. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1256** *13 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Maj.-Gen. T.W. Rees, formerly in command of the Punjab Boundary Force, commenting on the break-up of the Force and on Rees' temporary appointment as Operations Staff Officer for the Governor-General; expressing his appreciation of the excellent work done by Rees in the Punjab Boundary Force; recalling the purpose of the Force and the reasons why it failed to keep the peace in the boundary dispute; stating that the massacres, arson and disorder started in Amritsar before the Boundary Commission had made its award, leading to inevitable repercussions in the West Punjab, and that the Punjab Boundary Force was faced with a complete breakdown of the civil administration on both sides of the border and with total failure of the police; commending him for the achievements of the Force and voicing the hope that, some day, India will acknowledge its debt to the Force. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1257** *15 September.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, acknowledging his letter no. 80/G-1/12 of 12 September; declaring that he does not disagree with its contents in principle; but stating that he does not think it the appropriate time for raising the subject, and that he is doubtful whether the Governments of India and Pakistan could spare the time, at this juncture, to look into questions of this sort (to which Auchinleck has added an autograph note: 'But they had to and did!!'); and expressing the view that it would be sufficient to raise the matter within the next month. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1258** *15 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, thanking him for his letter of 15 September, in reply to Auchinleck's note on the future of British officers; suggesting that the matter is more urgent than he, perhaps, supposes, and urging the need for an early discussion of the problem. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1259** *15 September.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Principal Staff Officer, Commonwealth Relations Office, thanking him for his letter, and commenting on conditions in India and Pakistan; declaring that the partition and the grant of Dominion autonomy have not assuaged the bitterness existing between rival communities, and that there is no real likelihood of positive co-operation between the two Dominions in the present climate; describing the work of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and his own staff who have worked hard to make progress; stating that the task of trying to partition the Armed Forces to the equal advantage of both Dominions is not an easy one; admitting that his original idea of maintaining joint training establishments, used by both armies, has failed because of the dissensions between Indian and Pakistan groups; estimating that no more than 3,000 British officers out of 9,000 are likely to remain during reconstitution; and indicating that it will be difficult for both Governments to find sufficient officers of the requisite experience and knowledge to fill the high command and staff appointments. He suggests that these facts have made little impression on some Indian politicians who are determined to nationalize the officer cadres as quickly as possible, but he thinks that the Pakistan authorities appear to be more reasonable, because they do not intend to promote Dominion officers too soon or too quickly. In his opinion, they are certain to ask for the services of quite a number of British officers, even after reconstitution has been completed, whereas India may not ask for any, apart from a few technicians who may be required to adopt Dominion nationality. He emphasizes that it is now urgently necessary, in view of the fact that reconstitution may be completed by the end of January, for both Dominions to specify whether or not they wish to have the services of British officers after that date, and, if so, under what conditions and on what terms they want to keep the officers; and he proposes to present a paper on the subject to the Joint Defence Council. He notes Scoones' remarks in his letter on the

payment of compensation, expressing concern lest any hitches should occur which would jeopardize the whole process of reconstitution through deleterious effects upon the morale and discipline of the British officers who have remained in India and Pakistan. He refers, in conclusion, to the issue of whether Gurkhas wished to serve with the British Government or with the Government of India, noting that this was bound to cause consternation among some retired officers of Gurkhas; urges the adoption of a more realistic view, in face of the facts that not all Gurkhas wished to remain under British command and that a high percentage among the battalions were anxious to stay in India and were willing to serve in the army of India; and announces that the details of the transfer of battalions of Gurkhas to the British Government would be settled at the Tripartite Conference at Khatmandu. 3 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1260** *26 September.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, which he describes as the most difficult letter that he has ever had to write in his life; reaffirming his conviction that it was vital to the interests both of India and of England for Auchinleck to remain at the military helm, not only until the transfer of power had been effected, but also until the reconstitution of the AFI had been substantially completed; and admitting that it was his own proposal that Auchinleck should be Supreme Commander, a position which he had considered to be protected from criticism because it involved no operational control and, in its administrative function, was subject to the approval of the Joint Defence Council. His hopes of acceptance, however, have been dashed: there has been loud and persistent criticism, even in the Cabinet itself, with the accusation made that Auchinleck's role as Supreme Commander is impeding the autonomous development of the separate Armed Forces and is detracting from the sovereignty of the two Dominions. This antagonism is not only directed towards the title but also towards the person himself: there is considerable resentment among Indian Ministers that the head of Supreme HQ is a man of very high rank and of great personal reputation. One Minister has complained that Auchinleck regards himself as the champion of Pakistan's interests, although Pandit Nehru himself has no personal bias in this matter and sympathizes with Auchinleck's difficulties. Mountbatten declares that, despite all his efforts, he has failed to convince the Indian leaders of the importance of the retention of a Supreme Commander, and he is unable to prevent them from submitting an official proposal to the Joint Defence Council that the Supreme HQ should be abolished; and, although it is possible that the Pakistan representatives would oppose the proposal, they would do so out of perversity, not out of a genuine desire to support Auchinleck. Mountbatten is anxious to avoid the discussion of such a proposal in the Joint Defence Council with the possible consequence of a bitter controversy in which Auchinleck's name might be implicated, with

possible slurs on his reputation and prestige; and he reminds Auchinleck that he has often said that he would willingly fade out of the picture if this would help Mountbatten personally or improve the general situation in India. He is now convinced that this time has arrived; and he accordingly suggests to Auchinleck that he should write an official letter proposing the closure of Supreme HQ and its replacement by a humbler organization. He diffidently encloses a rough draft of such a letter and informs Auchinleck that, as he had seen the present circumstances developing for some time, he warned Lord Listowel (the Secretary of State for India and Burma) of the potential crisis during his visit to India and asked him to obtain from Attlee, the PM, his contingent permission for Mountbatten to take action when the time was ripe; and the PM had now given his consent. Mountbatten apologizes for not taking Auchinleck into his confidence earlier but assures him that he hoped in the past that the contention would dissipate of its own accord. He also tells Auchinleck that he has put his name forward for a peerage, and that, if Auchinleck accepts, he would like to have the peerage announced at the same time as his resignation. With an autograph postscript conveying the news that Lord Ismay also wishes to be released within the next month or so because he feels that he too will be subjected to similar criticism shortly. With a draft letter of resignation proposing that, on a date in October, Supreme HQ should be closed down and that the remaining work of reconstitution should be carried out at a lower level until February, or early March, 1948. 8 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1261** *26 September.* Letter from Lord Ismay to Auchinleck, informing him that Lord Mountbatten has shown him the letter he is sending to Auchinleck. He expresses his regret at the outcome, but asserts that Mountbatten's proposal is the best solution to an impossible situation. Ismay recalls a similar set of circumstances when Lord Chatfield was asked by Neville Chamberlain to resign from his office as Minister for Co-ordination of Defence in April 1940, and his own response to the news had been, on reflection, one of relief that Chatfield was relinquishing his office before any major disaster had occurred: he had enormous responsibilities, but no power to discharge them. He stated his view in a letter to Chatfield and thinks that the same applies to Auchinleck in India and, to a lesser extent, to himself. He declares that he could not tolerate the thought that mud could be cast upon one who is in the last few months of a glorious career. He confesses that he has foreseen the possibility of the present situation for some time, and he has known that Auchinleck has been aware of things, too, from various remarks he has made; he has been tempted to speak of it, but refrained, assuming that Auchinleck would raise the subject if he wished. He hopes that Auchinleck feels as he does and suggests that they should leave India at the same time. He does not entirely approve

of Mountbatten's suggested draft letter of resignation, but he admits that it was only intended to be a rough guide. He does not expect Auchinleck to be unduly excited at the prospect of a peerage, but he hopes that he will accept it, and he envisages a future in which they will both be in the House of Lords together. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1262** 28 *September*. Report on the situation in India and Pakistan by Auchinleck:

### PART I

For the information of the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff in the UK.

1. The Transfer of Power: Auchinleck describes the remarkable scenes of enthusiasm and joy which surrounded the transfer of power to the two new Dominions on 15 August and the acclaim given to Lord and Lady Mountbatten which testified to their popularity and influence. But there were already signs of trouble ahead: the Pakistan Government immediately removed itself from Delhi to Karachi, presenting a barrier of distance which could only have been overcome if it had been possible for Mountbatten to become joint Governor-General of both Dominions.
2. Plans for the Partition of the Armed Forces: Auchinleck describes the machinery set up to effect this division or 'reconstitution'. Two organizations were established: the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and the Joint Defence Council.
3. The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee: Auchinleck describes the constitution of the Committee and its sub-committees and declares that the system has worked, on the whole, with commendable smoothness and remarkable efficiency, but he mentions a fundamental difference of opinion between the two Dominions on the question of the ratio in which the movable assets of the former AFI are to be divided: the actual proportion for the Army, based on estimated strengths after reconstitution, works out at 64% to India and 36% to Pakistan, figures which are bitterly contested by the Government of India.
4. The Joint Defence Council: Auchinleck describes the scope of the Council, its supervisory role over the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, and its constitution. He draws attention to the fact that Pakistan's representation on the Council has suffered from the fact that her Government is at Karachi, some 700 miles from Delhi, and this has resulted in Auchinleck himself, on several occasions, having to present the case for Pakistan, a fact which has undoubtedly fostered the conviction of members of the India Cabinet that he is biased in favour of Pakistan. Attempts are now being made to remedy this false situation by holding alternate meetings of the Council in Karachi. In cases of severe disagreement between members of the Joint Defence Council, the

contentious issue is referred either to the Partition Council or to an Arbitral Tribunal, presided over by Sir Patrick Spens, the former Chief Justice of India. The ratio in which the movable assets of the AFI are to be divided is at present a matter for such arbitration.

5. **Progress of Reconstitution of the Armed Forces:** Auchinleck reports that the division of the RIN and the IAF is now virtually complete, as far as the actual transfer of personnel is concerned; inner reorganization will take more time. The partition of the IA is a more complex and delicate process because of its greater size and the complexity of its composition. It involves the allocation of major units, the exchange of individual officers and men of the administrative services of the old Army, and the provision of the necessary training establishments for the two new armies; and, because of the rigid refusal of either India or Pakistan to share joint training establishments, the only solution to the latter problem is their duplication, highlighting the acute shortage of specialist staff to cater for Pakistan as well as for India. The final phase of reconstitution will be the division of the movable assets of the AFI, pending the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal. Auchinleck records that the responsibilities of Supreme HQ are gradually being transferred to the Armed Forces of the two Dominions. The overall feeding and supply of both Dominion Armies is still the Supreme Commander's responsibility, as is the control of movement by rail between the two Dominions. He states firmly that, so long as any central and executive control remains at Supreme HQ, it is essential that this control is exercised by an officer holding rank not less than that of the C-in-C of the Dominion Armies, in order to safeguard the interests of the British officers still serving in India and Pakistan.
6. **Future of Gurkha Units:** Auchinleck reports that the progress made in the transfer of Gurkha rifle battalions of the former IA to the service of the UK has been disappointingly slow, although the Governments of India and Nepal have accepted the proposal in principle and the battalions for transfer have been selected, in agreement with the WO. He attributes the delay partly to the reluctance of the Government of India to part with any Gurkhas, through fear that these troops will still be regarded as 'Indian', even though employed by the British Government, and that, consequently, India would be liable to share the moral responsibility involved if they were used for 'imperialistic' purposes. The other reason for the reluctance of the Government of India to dispense with some of the Gurkhas lies in the fierce desire to maintain a strong standing army in case present tension between India and Pakistan erupts into open conflict. He notes, in passing, that the referendum to ascertain the wishes of Gurkha soldiers has upset any pre-conceived British idea that Gurkhas would opt to serve Britain rather than India; it is even possible that the

required number of volunteers to fill the eight allotted battalions may not be forthcoming. He accuses the Government of India of dilatoriness in effecting the replacement of British officers by Indian officers in those Gurkha battalions which are to be retained in the new IA; he foresees that the problem will become acute in the early part of 1948, and he does not think that British officers will volunteer to serve under the Government of India once central control by Supreme HQ has disappeared.

7. **Position of British Officers:** Auchinleck describes how one third of the officers serving with the old IA volunteered to remain, after the transfer of power, to carry through the reconstitution programme. They were optimistic and willing to devote their energies to ensuring a just and amicable division of the Services for which they had genuine affection and respect. These volunteers, serving either in the Armed Forces of the two new Dominions or at Supreme HQ, were enlisted for a one-year maximum period of service from 15 August 1947, with provision for a break of contract of three months' notice by the State or by the officer himself. Actual notice of termination of contract can only be served on the officers by the Supreme Commander, who also has the right to transfer them from one Dominion to the other or to and from Supreme HQ in the interests of efficiency or of the officers themselves. The Government of India, however, would prefer officers to be allotted to a Dominion, and not to be transferable. Auchinleck asserts that the principle of the impartiality and general availability of British officers is of paramount importance and must be upheld at all costs. He is also concerned with their well-being in the event of direct armed conflict between India and Pakistan; if such a conflict does arise, the British officers of the units involved should be withdrawn at once. He is prepared to withdraw all British officers from the Armed Forces of both Dominions in the case of open war. Auchinleck admits that he is disturbed by a recent considerable increase in the number of British officer volunteers handing in their three months' notice, which he attributes to a disillusionment following the terrible occurrences in the Punjab; to a growing realization that the Government of India does not wish to have British officers in its Armed Forces, not, at any rate, in positions of high command and responsibility; and to an uncomfortable awareness of the hostility and jealousy of some Dominion officers.
8. **The Position of British Army and RAF Units:** Auchinleck reports that the evacuation of units of the British Army, scheduled to be completed by the end of December, will not now be brought to an end until March or April 1948, owing to the shortage of shipping. These troops are merely awaiting shipping and are forbidden to take any part in the maintenance of law and order in either Dominion, although they can be used, in the last resort, to protect

British lives and property. The RAF units in India are on a different basis, in that they have been formally lent to the two Dominions by the British Government to assist in the process of reconstitution of the Armed Forces. The Government of India has attempted to obtain agreement to the principle that one transport squadron should be allotted to each Dominion and should be controlled by it, but in Auchinleck's view it is essential in the interests of economy and efficiency that these squadrons should be centrally controlled and used for the benefit of both Dominions. They cannot be used, in any case, for operational purposes or for offensive action in the maintenance of law and order.

Annexures III-V: Tables showing the division of major units between India and Pakistan, an analysis of staff serving at the Supreme Commander's HQ, and the locations of British troops in India and Pakistan as at 27 September 1947. Annexures I and II, containing the charters and terms of reference of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and of the Joint Defence Council, are wanting in this copy.

## PART II

For the personal information of the PM, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the CIGS and the CAS only. Auchinleck describes the first part of his report as an account of the progress made in the reconstitution of the AFI and of the situation concerning British personnel and units in India and Pakistan. In this second part of the report, he intends to give a more personal and intimate appraisal of the state of affairs in India and Pakistan, with opinions based on his own observation, on reports received from his subordinate commanders and officers, and on discussions and conversations with Indians of varying status and opinions. He is now certain that the communal feeling and tension between the two Dominions is so great that there is a grave risk of open war breaking out between them at any time. If such an event were to take place, he thinks that it would be necessary to withdraw all British officers and other ranks from the Dominion Armed Forces and to concentrate them and their families under the protection of such British troops as remain in the country, until they can be evacuated. He is quite certain that members of the present Cabinet of India are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. He declares that since 15 August and the transfer of power, the situation has steadily deteriorated and the Indian leaders, ministers, civil officials and others have persistently tried to obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces. They have accused Auchinleck and his officers, repeatedly and virulently, of being partial to Pakistan when, in truth, they were trying to do their duty without fear, favour or prejudice. He states that Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, has been subjected to strong and unceasing pressure to abolish Supreme HQ, so that the one impartial body remaining in India can be removed. The opposition to the work of Supreme HQ in ensuring a just distribution

of assets is so great that it is becoming increasingly impossible for Auchinleck and his officers to continue with their task; but, if they are removed, there is no hope at all of any equitable division of the movable stores belonging to the former IA. Moreover, the officers who volunteered to continue to serve with the two new Dominions during the period of reconstitution are rapidly becoming disgusted and disheartened; and the morale of British officers serving in the Punjab is very low because of their revulsion from the appalling scenes that they have witnessed, their sense of frustration deriving from the lack of support by the civilian authorities, their conviction that the exercise of impartiality is no longer possible, or even desired, by those in authority, and their feeling that their efforts are wholly unrecognized by either Dominion Government. Auchinleck states that the main perpetrators of murder, loot and rape are the Sikhs, and their campaign appears to have been deliberately conceived, planned and executed under some central direction. It is the common opinion that the Government of India is unable to control the Sikhs. There is, Auchinleck declares, an organized system of information and control which enables Muslim refugee trains to be attacked with impunity, although military trains carrying troops and stores in the furtherance of reconstitution are unmolested. On the other side, there have been equally horrible occurrences in Pakistan, but these appear to be more spontaneous and less organized than those in East Punjab. So far, he reports, there is no evidence of any general anti-British feeling or of immediate danger to British lives and property. He maintains, however, that, in the existing circumstances, he has had to consider very seriously whether the time is not approaching, if it has not already arrived, for the complete withdrawal of the British officers from the Armed Forces of both Dominions and the termination of the present conditions under which they are serving. He asserts that he alone, in this matter, is responsible to the Chiefs of Staff and to the Government in the UK, and he feels the responsibility deeply, having no intention whatever of asking British officers to carry on serving in impossible and degrading conditions. The withdrawal of British forces would automatically entail the dissolution of the Supreme Commander's organization and the end of reconstitution as originally planned. In the meantime, in the event of open hostilities between the Armed Forces of the two Dominions, it would be essential to order all British officers, and other ranks serving with them, to desist at once from any form of activity connected with their command and administration. 21 leaves. Typescript.

**1263** 5 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Principal Staff Officer, Commonwealth Relations Office, enclosing a copy of a note to be submitted to the Joint Defence Council on the winding-up of his HQ (see 1266, below). Auchinleck describes the violent animosity on the part of the Indian leaders towards Supreme

HQ, the Joint Defence Council, and any other form of joint activity which could conceivably benefit Pakistan at the expense of India; and he knows that the Indian Government is pressing Mountbatten to close down Supreme HQ at once, but he is unwilling to leave the British officers without a head or without an organization to look after them and their families. In careful consultation with his staff and colleagues, he has chosen 31 December as the date for closure of his HQ: he is aware that the Indian leaders may oppose the date on the grounds that it is not soon enough, but he is sure that he is right to stick to this date. He declares that Pakistan is not anxious to see the British go because through them lies their only hope of wringing any concessions from India. He asks Scoones to impress the needs of the situation on the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet, bearing in mind that Montgomery, the CIGS, is particularly ill-informed about the position in India. He states that the Government of India is now at last seriously considering the question of the future employment of British officers, but he is sure that it does not want to have any British officers in positions of high command or responsibility after 31 December. The Pakistan Government, on the other hand, wants to retain British officers for some time, but this view is opposed by some Dominion officers and by ultra-nationalist politicians. He reports that Army HQ, India has now arrived at a fairly satisfactory temporary solution to the problem of providing officers for Gurkha units, and he hopes that all will go well with the replacement of British officers by Indians. He gives information on massacres and riots: the situation appears to be easier, partly because the catastrophic floods have halted the movement of troops and of refugees. Appended to the letter is a postscript marked 'Top Secret and Personal' and 'Destroy when read', concerning Sikh intentions: in this, Auchinleck alleges that an informant whom he regards as reliable has told him that the Sikhs intend to make Simla the capital of a Sikh state; there are signs that Muslims are not welcome in the area, and the Sikhs are sure that they can get their own way with the Delhi Government; there are rumours of a coming Sikh invasion of Lahore, with a concentration of Sikh power in the Eastern Punjab; and there are fears in Pakistan that Sikh efforts at dominance would eventually lead to the destruction of Pakistan and the substitution of a Brahmin 'raj' for the whole of India, including Pakistan. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1264** 6 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, enclosing the draft of the note he has prepared for the Joint Defence Council on the premature closure of Supreme HQ (see 1266, below); emphasizing that the note has been drawn up after the most careful consideration of all the factors involved, and in close consultation with his deputies; expressing his conviction that it would not be safe to close down his HQ before 31 December; declaring that he is aware of the pressure on Mountbatten to abolish his office and administration, just as he is aware of the reasons for this pressure, but stressing that his

HQ serve Pakistan as well as India, and that Pakistan should be consulted in the matter; and reminding Mountbatten of his responsibility, as Supreme Commander, to the British Government for the British officers and other ranks still in India, a responsibility of increasing importance in view of the deteriorating situation in the Indian sub-continent. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1265** 7 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, concerning his powers as Supreme Commander over the postings of British officers attached to the Forces of the two Dominions; declaring that he would never use the powers, which he has been given by charter, to move a senior officer without the fullest prior consultation with the Defence Minister and the C-in-C concerned; stating that it has been, and will continue to be, necessary to move a few junior officers to make the best use of their abilities; asserting that he was given these wide powers on his appointment to ensure that officers who are all on one list would not suffer by being passed over and thereby lose promotion, and to make certain that an officer could be moved, if he proved to be unsuitable or unacceptable in his original post; assuring him that the powers have only been used in one or two cases relating to junior officers, and that the issue is not worth undue concern, because after 31 December all officers will cease to be attached to Dominion Forces under the existing terms. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1266** 13 October. Note for Joint Defence Council by Auchinleck on the closing-down of Supreme Commander's HQ. Auchinleck announces that, with the approval of the Joint Defence Council, and in view of the conditions now prevailing in India and Pakistan, all British officers and other ranks serving with the Armed Forces of the two Dominions or in Supreme HQ have been given three months' notice to quit, dating from 1 October. He reports that the Joint Defence Council and the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, the two bodies charged with the task of making an equable and efficient division of the former AFI, are finding it increasingly hard to carry out their duties owing to the differences of opinion between the two Governments which make it difficult for them to find common ground. Nonetheless, remarkable progress has been made in the reconstitution of the AFI, except for the division of movable assets, which has hardly begun, and which will take many months to complete. Auchinleck states that he has come to the conclusion that Supreme Commander's HQ should be closed at the earliest possible date, preferably by 30 November, but in his consideration of this matter he has had to examine four main factors: the progress made in reconstitution; the ability of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions to take over and control the administration and maintenance of their own Services; the control and maintenance of the units of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions which are still overseas, in Malaya,

Singapore, Burma, Japan and Iraq; and the repatriation of the British officers and other ranks who have been serving at Supreme HQ and with the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan. As far as the first factor is concerned, Supreme HQ can be prematurely closed down on 30 November without serious detriment to the completion of its primary task of reconstitution of the AFI. The second process – the development of the capacity of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions to take over the maintenance and administration of their own Forces – will take longer to accomplish because it involves a difficult and complicated reshuffling of officers so as to obtain the best result from the resources remaining available after Supreme HQ disappears: this reorganization is unlikely to be completed before the end of December. The third essential, the reconstitution of the units of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions still serving overseas, should be completed by 30 November through the process of repatriation and cross-posting. Fourthly, there is the responsibility of Supreme HQ for the control of British officers and other ranks who have volunteered to serve on during reconstitution, and of the British Forces still remaining in India and Pakistan: notice has been given to the volunteers that their contracts will come to an end on 31 December. There are, in addition, 2,600 Poles at Kholapur, awaiting repatriation. It would not be logical or justifiable, Auchinleck maintains, to keep the Supreme Commander and his present HQ in existence solely to perform the task of looking after the volunteer officers and men and the British Forces in India and Pakistan: this function could be fulfilled by a smaller and simpler organization controlled by officers of less senior status. To solve the problems and to expedite the closure of Supreme HQ, Auchinleck makes the following recommendations: (a) that the Supreme Commander and his HQ should disappear on 30 November, being replaced by a Commander, British Forces, India and Pakistan, who would be responsible only for the control and repatriation of the British Forces, excluding such officers and other ranks who may remain in the services of the two Dominions; (b) that the existing Military Movement Control Directorate should remain as part of the HQ of the Commander, British Forces in India and Pakistan, until it closes down; (c) that the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee should be dissolved on 30 November; (d) that the HQ of the British Forces in India and Pakistan should cease to exist on 31 December; (e) that, as soon as possible after 31 December, all British Forces due for repatriation should be concentrated at Deolali and Kalyan in India, or at Karachi in Pakistan, under the control of two British Commanders responsible for their welfare and embarkation in accordance with a pre-arranged programme; and (f) that, if it has not been possible to repatriate the Polish evacuees before 31 December, this task should then become the responsibility of the Government of India, in direct communication with the British Government. 8 leaves. Typescript.

**1267** *16 October.* Minute from the 12th Meeting of the Joint Defence Council, held at Lahore on 16 October. Item 17: the closing down of Supreme Commander's HQ. The main recommendation of the paper before the meeting was that the Supreme Commander's HQ should close down on 30 November. Liaquat Ali Khan, the PM of Pakistan, announced that he did not agree with this proposal on the grounds that Supreme HQ had not yet completed the task assigned to it and would not have completed that task by 30 November. Lord Mountbatten (the Chairman) disagreed, declaring that the task had been completed to a very large extent, with the exception of the division of stores; and that the remaining problems of reconstitution and redistribution could be resolved by a smaller HQ and by the appointment of the senior Dominion C-in-Cs to the Joint Defence Council, with powers to set up inter-Dominion committees of their own representatives to implement their instructions. The Chairman stressed that the proposals made in the Supreme Commander's paper in no way envisaged the early closing-down of the Joint Defence Council. The PM of Pakistan protested that the two C-in-Cs would continue to be responsible to their own Governments and to receive instructions from their own Defence Ministers, and that some sort of neutral machinery was essential. The Chairman replied that neutral intervention was a thankless task and cited the efforts made by Maj.-Gen. Rees and his fellow officers of the Punjab Boundary Force who, because of their very impartiality, had been accused of partiality by both sides: in the end, the Pakistan representatives had readily urged the disbandment of the Force and its replacement by two separate Dominion forces. The case of Supreme HQ was, he declared, analogous. The PM of Pakistan denied that there was an analogy: the Punjab Boundary Force, he insisted, was compelled to come into contact with the people of the two communities whereas the Supreme Commander's HQ was not closely involved with India or with Pakistan. The Supreme Commander explained that his reasons for recommending closure were stated, as mildly as possible, in his paper; in the present atmosphere, continual innuendoes and accusations were levelled against his HQ, and it was apparent that he and his officers could not continue, in these circumstances, to carry out a task for which co-operation was necessary. He maintained that he was not making the proposal from a desire to run away from his responsibilities, but from an awareness that he would not be able to discharge them much longer on account of the situation. The PM of Pakistan expressed the view that the remedy lay in the full co-operation of the two Governments with Supreme Commander's HQ, rather than in the disbandment of the HQ. There had been, he asserted, little difficulty in passing resolutions brought before the Joint Defence Council, except for issues concerning ordnance factories and the division of certain types of store. In his view, Supreme Commander's HQ should continue to function until or unless concrete evidence was available to prove that

the Supreme Commander had given instructions in contravention of a decision made by the Joint Defence Council and had thereby shown himself to be unfit to maintain a neutral position. The Chairman commended the work done by Supreme Commander's HQ in partitioning and reconstituting an army of 400,000 with such speed, in the midst of unprecedented riots; but the task of partitioning would be virtually finished by the end of November, except for the movement of stores, and it would be unfair to ask the Supreme Commander to carry on in such a difficult position. Baldev Singh (the Defence Minister of India) agreed with this view and expressed his appreciation of the difficulties experienced by the Supreme Commander and his support of the idea of an alternative organization to complete the task of reconstitution. His colleagues in the India Cabinet fully agreed with the proposal made in the Supreme Commander's paper. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (Minister without Portfolio in the Government of India, with special responsibility for East Punjab) declared that, on the grounds that the assigned task was virtually completed, he could find no justification for the continuance of Supreme Commander's HQ after 30 November, and he was strongly in favour of accepting the recommendations made in the Supreme Commander's paper. He was of the opinion that any difficulties arising between two Governments should be discussed and dealt with by the representatives of the two Governments concerned. The Supreme Commander made it clear that he did not consider that he had completed the task which he had set out to do. He emphasized that he had nothing to add to what he had already stated in his paper. He confirmed that he had informed M.A. Jinnah (the Governor-General of Pakistan) of his intention to present this paper to the Joint Defence Council. The Chairman declared that he believed that it would have been possible for the Supreme Commander's HQ to have carried on if the recent riots and massacres had not produced an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility. He pointed out that there had been few incidents in Karachi, but in Delhi there had been almost complete dislocation. The PM of Pakistan stated that he could not understand how the killings could have affected the British officers in the Supreme Commander's HQ, and that the logical conclusion was for the HQ to move to Karachi. Gopalaswami Ayyangar pointed out that this would not improve the Delhi atmosphere. The PM of Pakistan then expressed the view that reconstitution had not yet been completed to such an extent as to make the present organization unnecessary. The question of the division of stores was, in his opinion, a major matter, not a minor one: an army without equipment was as much use as tin soldiers; and administrative units had still to be reconstituted. He proposed that Supreme Commander's HQ should continue until its assigned task was completed. The Chairman repeated his statement that it would have been feasible for the Supreme Commander's HQ to continue if there had not been the present atmosphere between the two Dominions. The division of

stores would take many months to complete and would not be finished by 31 March 1948, the previously decided date for the closure of Supreme Commander's HQ. There had been many attacks on the HQ, and, for such an organization to work satisfactorily, it was essential to have the active and willing co-operation of both Governments. The PM of Pakistan asserted that, to the best of his knowledge, Pakistan had shown whole-hearted co-operation with Supreme Commander's HQ and was certainly willing to do so in future. He assumed that the Government of India was not prepared to show such co-operation. He pointed out, moreover, that the stores to be divided were in the charge of the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander explained that these stores would be handed over to the care of the Armed Forces of the Dominion in which they were situated, after the dissolution of his HQ. The Defence Minister of India solemnly promised, on behalf of his Government, to be responsible for the delivery to Pakistan of her share of stores in accordance with the decisions of the Joint Defence Council and the Arbitral Tribunal. Gopalaswami Ayyangar associated himself with this statement, expressing his view that it would be endorsed by the Government of India. The Chairman announced that he had not envisaged such an impasse, before coming to the meeting, since the Governor-General of Pakistan had accepted the Supreme Commander's statement so philosophically. He believed now that the question should be referred back to the Cabinets of the two Dominions for a decision, and to the British Government. He suggested that, if the Supreme Commander's recommendation was accepted, a necessary corollary would be the inclusion of the senior C-in-Cs of each Dominion in the membership of the Joint Defence Council and the setting-up of an inter-Dominion military organization to complete division and reconstitution. The only alternative to this, he indicated, was the continuation of the Supreme Commander's HQ until 1 April, an arrangement which could not work without the agreement of both Governments. The PM of Pakistan supported the view that any agreement made between the two Governments should not be broken by one of the participants. The Council then formally invited the Governments of India and Pakistan to give further consideration to the future of the Supreme Commander's HQ in the light of the discussion at the meeting. The Council also noted that the British Government would have to be consulted as well. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**1268** 18 October. Extract from a letter received by the C-in-C from Lt.-Col. J.C. Bell, OC, 3rd Royal Battalion (Sikhs), 12th Frontier Force Regiment, Jullundur Cantonment, reporting that his men had escorted 250 trains without major incident, and that they were now escorting Muslim foot kafilas towards Pakistan; and describing the transformation of his battalion into a Muslim force through the arrival of two Muslim companies and the departure of the Sikhs and Dogras,

the latter occasion being marked by some sadness, although all appreciated that it was time to part because the compulsion of outside events was too great for the individual to withstand. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1269** *18 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, thanking him for his letter enclosing a copy of the minutes of the Joint Defence Council on item 17 of the last meeting (1267, above); suggesting that it is premature to record agreement as to the wording of the communiqué; and stating that he has not yet made up his mind on the other matter mentioned in Mountbatten's letter. With a manuscript note, not in Auchinleck's hand, recording the fact that he had a minor amendment to make to the minute in which he was quoted. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1270** *18 October.* Telegram no. 348 from Jawaharlal Nehru, the PM of India, to Liaquat Ali Khan, the PM of Pakistan, reporting that the Chairman of the Joint Defence Council has informed him of the complete impasse reached at the meeting held on 16 October when the Supreme Commander's paper, recommending the closure of his HQ on 30 November, was presented. The Chairman has also notified him of the invitation given to the Cabinet of India to examine the situation; and, accordingly, the Cabinet has met to consider the matter. From the discussions at this meeting he has deduced that the Pakistan Government's objections are twofold: firstly, that a system which had been agreed by the two Governments before the transfer of power was being unilaterally abandoned before the completion of the task; and, secondly, that, because of this abandonment, neither Government could be sure of obtaining their fair share of stores held in the other Dominion. The Cabinet of India was of the opinion that the Supreme Commander must be the best judge of the right time for closing down his HQ and fully supported his proposal to do so as soon as the movement of all major units had been completed, thus avoiding the anomalous position of having more senior officers to look after the stores of the two Dominions and the interests of British officers than there would be in the HQ of the Armed Forces of the two Dominions combined. As for the division of stores, the Cabinet of India did not consider that it should be impossible to devise a system which would ensure that both Dominions would receive the full quota of stores allotted by the Joint Defence Council; and the two Ministers of the Government of India who were present at the meeting on 16 October had given the assurance that Pakistan's due share of stores held in India would be handed over, a pledge endorsed by the Cabinet of India. Nehru does not doubt that a similar assurance would be given by the Cabinet of Pakistan. It was suggested, moreover, in the India Cabinet that the Supreme Commander should be asked to supply duplicate lists of all stores at present held by him in both Dominions, one copy being given to each Dominion before his HQ closed down; and the Cabinet approved the proposal of the Chairman of the Joint

Defence Council that the senior C-in-Cs of each Dominion should become full members of the Joint Defence Council, and that they should set up an Inter-Dominion Committee to take the place of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee to complete partition and reconstitution of the Armed Forces and to arrange for the transfer of stores. The Government of India, therefore, intends to inform the Supreme Commander that his recommendations are acceptable and will be implemented, provided that the UK Government agrees to the proposed arrangements for looking after British personnel. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1271** *21 October.* Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Principal Staff Officer, Commonwealth Relations Office, reporting that the matter of closing down his HQ on 30 November is now under the consideration of the two Cabinets, but that the decision must stand, whatever Pakistan may say, because, if one Government chooses to be unco-operative and obstructive, the whole reconstitution machinery must cease to function; expressing his determination to close down his HQ at the end of November, thereby avoiding for himself and his officers a situation in which they are asked to carry a responsibility which it is impossible for them to discharge; referring to his wish to be succeeded by a Commander, British Forces in India and Pakistan; proposing to recommend Arthur Smith for this post, believing that there are only two possible candidates, Smith and Reg Savory; regarding Smith as the better of the two for this particular position, although he anticipates that the appointment will be unpopular with the Government of India because they resent his impartiality and outspokenness; and announcing his intention to recommend Smith, and asking for Scoones' support if he agrees with this decision. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1272** *21 October.* Letter to Auchinleck from an officer who has served under him. The officer is writing from Gandai, India, and describes hill-climbing there as a pleasant change from the office in the Embassy of Washington, DC. He reports that the troops are in good heart and are very fit. He expresses deep sympathy with Auchinleck in the present circumstances, declaring that it must be heart-breaking to have given 43 years of life to a great organization and brotherhood – the IA – and then to see it disintegrate. He expresses the hope that he can do some good on this side and on the other, for he could never really belong to one side completely; he has too many dear and precious associations. When he feels that he can no longer do any good, or that his stay may be misused, he will go. He wonders how long he will be able to stay: he suspects that he will go on as long as he can, because he does not wish to be labelled a 'deserter'; and he would like to follow in Auchinleck's footsteps for as long and as far as he can. He notes, however, that people with ideas are often viewed with suspicion, and he has decided that, if his youth proves to be against

him in his career in the Army, then he will go, much against his wish, somewhere where it will be an advantage. He is aware, nonetheless, that he has been fortunate to know Auchinleck, but he fears that he cannot be replaced. He looks forward to seeing Auchinleck again and expresses his thanks for all that he has done for him. In a postscript he asks for a photograph. Signature illegible, possibly Shen. 3 leaves. Holograph.

**1273** *24 October.* Telegram no. 351-G from Liaquat Ali Khan, the PM of Pakistan, to Jawaharlal Nehru, the PM of India, in answer to telegram no. 348 (1270, above), declaring that this message gives an incorrect and misleading impression of the reasons why the Supreme Commander recommended the closure of his HQ. The Supreme Commander has indicated in his note for the Joint Defence Council and, more emphatically, in his personal statement to the meeting of the Council on 16 October that his proposal to close down his HQ was not made because he had completed his task, but because the hostile atmosphere in Delhi made it impossible for him and his officers to discharge their responsibilities; and he had made it clear that, if he could be assured of co-operation, his recommendation would be to maintain his HQ until the whole operation was virtually finished. Lord Mountbatten, the Chairman of the Joint Defence Council, had also blamed the atmosphere in Delhi for the difficulties which had confronted the Supreme Commander. Liaquat Ali Khan had given an assurance of full co-operation, but no such guarantee had been forthcoming from the Government of India; he maintains, therefore, that the sole reason for the recommendation by the Supreme Commander that his HQ should be dissolved is the lack of co-operation by the Government of India. Moreover, he asserts that the representatives of the Government of India could not quote a single instance of the Supreme Commander's failure to give effect to decisions of the Joint Defence Council or of his bias towards one Dominion at the expense of the other: the inference can only be that he has been carrying out his duties properly and impartially. The Government of Pakistan envisages that, although the movement of major units will be accomplished by 30 November, the reconstitution of administrative units and the division and transfer of equipment and stores will take considerably longer to complete. Although assurances have been given by the Government of India that Pakistan's allotted share of stores held in India would be sent over to Pakistan after the Supreme Commander's departure, and although it can be assumed that the Government of Pakistan will hand over to India her share of the small categories of stores which are held in Pakistan, the necessity for the continuance of the Supreme Commander's HQ, with its impartial and neutral authority, remains until the whole task has been completed. The PM of Pakistan refers to remarks made by the PM of India concerning the number of senior officers in the Supreme Commander's organization

and declares that this is an entirely separate matter which should be considered on its merits. He then turns his attention to the proposal made by the Chairman of the Joint Defence Council that, after the closure of the Supreme Commander's HQ, the senior C-in-Cs of both Dominions should become members of the Joint Defence Council and should set up an Inter-Dominion Committee to take the place of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee. He questions whether this arrangement would be an adequate substitute for the Supreme Commander's HQ, which has taken orders from the Joint Defence Council collectively and which is not under the control of either Government, whereas the two C-in-Cs of the Dominions would be under the orders of their respective Governments, and their Inter-Dominion Committee might well be involved in undesirable conflict. The Government of Pakistan has therefore reached the conclusion that it is absolutely essential that the Supreme Commander's HQ should be maintained until 1 April 1948, by which time it is hoped that reconstitution would be completed, that the British officers and other ranks would have been repatriated, and that the division of stores and equipment would have been substantially effected. 5 leaves. Typescript.

**1274** 27 October. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, on the legal aspects of the present situation, following the refusal of the Government of Pakistan to accept the proposal to close down the Supreme Commander's HQ; drawing his attention to the terms of the establishment of the Joint Defence Council, pointing out that it was constituted until 1 April 1948 but could be dissolved before that date by order of both Governors-General acting jointly; stating that, according to the constitution, if the Supreme Commander ceases to be a member of the Council, it cannot meet until a successor is appointed, nor can it give effect to its decisions since the Supreme Commander is the instrument by which such effect is given; reasoning, therefore, that, if the Joint Defence Council cannot legally function without the Supreme Commander, it must automatically cease to exist on 31 December when Auchinleck's service terminates, or even earlier, by reason of the abolition of his appointment; and recommending that the legal position should be brought to the attention of the Joint Defence Council as soon as possible. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1275** 28 October. Telegram no.270018 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff, through the Commonwealth Relations Office, informing them of a serious report from Gen. Gracey, officiating as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, relating to orders given to him by Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, to send troops to Kashmir, an action which, if obeyed, would entail the issue of the 'stand-down' order, i.e. the withdrawal of all British officers; describing how he flew to Lahore on receiving the news and met Jinnah, at which meeting he explained the situation concerning British officers and warned of the grave consequences of any threatened military violation of territory which is now

part of the Indian Union, after Kashmir's sudden accession to India; and recording that Jinnah withdrew the orders but remained angry at what he regarded as India's sharp practice in securing Kashmir's accession, but that he agreed to Auchinleck's suggestion that an arrangement should be made for Jinnah and his PM to meet Mountbatten, Nehru, and the Maharaja of Kashmir with his PM, in order to seek a peaceful settlement. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1276** 30 October. Telegram no.270021 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet, through the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stating that his proposals for closing down the Supreme Commander's HQ by the end of November were accepted by the Government of India and rejected by the Government of Pakistan; that this impasse led him to investigate the legal position of the Joint Defence Council and to come to the conclusion that, if the Supreme Commander's HQ is dissolved, the Joint Defence Council, as at present constituted by law, must also be automatically dissolved and must be replaced by some new joint body, if this is agreed by both Dominion Governments; recommending that, to resolve the present deadlock, the British Government should formally notify the Governments of India and Pakistan of their decision to withdraw on 30 November all British personnel of all three British Services now serving in the Supreme Commander's HQ, including the Supreme Commander himself, and should offer the explanation that it has become impossible for the officers and men involved to discharge their duties in the absence of harmony and goodwill between the two Dominion Governments; and suggesting that there should be a simultaneous announcement of approval from the British Government for his proposals concerning the appointment of a Commander, British Forces in India and Pakistan, to cover the period 1-31 December, he being convinced that this appointment is necessary to safeguard the interests of British personnel and being determined to resist any suggestion that these powers should be vested in the Commanders of the Dominion Forces who are under the direct control of their respective Governments. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1277** 31 October. Telegram no.270022 from Auchinleck to the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet, through the Commonwealth Relations Office, containing a suggested draft telegram in the name of the British Government addressed to the Indian and Pakistan Governments, on the question of the dissolution of the HQ of the Supreme Commander. In the draft telegram it is stated that Auchinleck recommends the closing-down of his HQ on 30 November and cites as his reason for coming to this decision the impossibility of discharging the tasks of reconstitution without harmony and co-operation between the principal parties concerned; that the British Government has reluctantly come to the conclusion that it has no option but to withdraw the Supreme Commander and his staff and to dissolve his HQ from 30

November, and that, after that date, it will be the responsibility of the two Dominions to make their own arrangements to ensure the completion of reconstitution; that a Commander, British Forces in India and Pakistan, should be given the powers and responsibility at present vested in the Supreme Commander in respect of units of the British Army and the RAF and of the British officers and other ranks serving in his own HQ or with the Armed Forces of the two Dominions; that this officer would have no responsibility whatever for the completion of reconstitution, and he would have no concern with the Armed Forces of the two Dominions except in relation to the British personnel serving with them; that this post would disappear on 31 December when the present contracts of British officers and other ranks serving with the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan come to an end; and that, as there will still be a need for some organization to control and administer the British Forces after that date (because of the delay in repatriating British units due to the shortage of shipping), it is suggested that this control be provided in the form of two small, independent British HQs located at Deolali and Karachi. 4 leaves. Typescript.

**1278** 3 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Gen. Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Principal Staff Officer, Commonwealth Relations Office, informing him that he is sending to him a portfolio containing more than 20 coloured drawings of the flags presented by him to the Boys' regiments, battalions and companies of the old IA; believing that it is possible that the Indian section of the Imperial War Museum may like to have them and that, if not, the Army Historical Research Society or the United Service Institution may be willing to take them. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1279** 6 November. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, commenting on the Indian Government's desire to receive all the records of the INA which are supposed to be at Supreme HQ, and asking for Auchinleck's opinion of this proposal. With enclosure of a copy of a letter, dated 24 October, written by Mountbatten to Baldev Singh, the Indian Minister of Defence, drawing his attention to a minute of the Cabinet meeting held on 15 October in which it was proposed that ex-INA officers should be considered for appointments in the Foreign Service as military attachés and should be given commissions in other fields, such as the Railway Auxiliary Force. Mountbatten is aware that such decisions are the responsibility of the Cabinet, but he expresses the hope that, as ex-Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, he should be allowed to comment. He points out that he has always maintained the view that those members of the INA who have not committed atrocities should not be penalized for their conduct, except by loss of pay for the period when they were fighting with the Japanese against the regular Army of India, adding that the INA formations fighting against the Allies in Burma were

regarded as probably the least efficient units in the field; but that, to give these men prominent positions now, through commissions in the regular army or through appointments as military attachés in any country (except, of course, Japan), would bring the whole of India into disrepute and would alienate loyal officers of the IA who normally regard appointments in the Foreign Service as rewards for good records. With a copy of the reply of Baldev Singh, dated 2 November, in which he declares that no final decision has been taken on the question of granting ex-INA men commissions in the Army, and that he is aware of the many difficulties in the way, but is grateful for Mountbatten's opinion. At the end of his letter, he refers to an enclosure, a copy of a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru, PM of India, dated 1 November, referring to the testimony of C.J. Stracey, Joint General Secretary of the INA Enquiry and Relief Committee, who mentions the existence, in the former GHQ, India, of diaries, photographs and other papers of the INA which, in the opinion of Nehru, should be preserved and should be transferred by the Supreme Commander to Army HQ, India. 4 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1280** 7 November. Cipher message from P.J. Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, to Auchinleck, in reply to a telegram, expressing sympathy with Auchinleck's anxiety concerning the present spirit of distrust and animosity in the relations between India and Pakistan, and agreement with his judgement that the situation in Kashmir is full of political dynamite; noting that the British Government also concurs with Auchinleck's theory that an agreement to partition Jammu and Kashmir would afford the best hope of peace, but that the UK Government cannot put this plan forward now, just when the Indian Government has undertaken to withdraw her troops after the restoration of law and order, and to hold a consultation of the will of the people under international auspices, and when the Government of Pakistan has made virtually the same proposal; and arguing that it is not practicable at present for the suggestion of partition to emanate from the UK, but that, if the two Dominions themselves began to consider such a solution, then the British Government would not stand in their way. 1 leaf. Typescript. 2 copies.

**1281** 8 November. Letter from Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Walmsley, AOC-in-C, Air Forces in India, to Auchinleck, thanking him, on behalf of the RAF, for the consideration and appreciation which he has always shown towards the work of the Junior Service; stating that it has been a privilege and an honour to have served under such a Supreme Commander during a very difficult period; expressing his awareness of Auchinleck's personal suffering in witnessing the gradual erosion by politicians and others of all that he has built up in India; and declaring his own reluctance to leave the country in such an unsatisfactory state, but realizing, on the other hand, that it is his duty to do what he can to help in the crisis in Europe. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1282** 9 November. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of 8 November; declaring that his decision (to refuse honours) is typical, and that, although it saddens him, he respects Auchinleck for it; asserting that nobody could have done more for India than Auchinleck has done over his whole career, and that no one has worked harder to find a peaceful solution to present problems; warning him against the assumption that, because impartiality is no longer respected by many Indians, he has somehow failed in his task, and declaring that history will reveal that the reverse is true; stating his conviction that Auchinleck has never had due recognition of his worth, despite the many honours he has received, making it clear that it was his declared wish for him to receive a peerage, this recommendation being accepted by the Government, with Auchinleck's name also being put forward for the honour of Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India (but this will now be withdrawn); expressing gratitude that Auchinleck agrees that his subordinate commanders should receive the honours intended for them and his understanding of Auchinleck's unwillingness to be the guest at a large farewell dinner, although he hopes that he will permit a smaller, informal celebration; reiterating his thanks for Auchinleck's friendship, loyalty and help throughout this difficult time; and reaffirming his high regard for him and his pride in having worked with him. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1283** 11 November. Letter from Maj.-Gen. Treffry Thompson, DMS, Supreme Commander's HQ, to Auchinleck, declaring how much he has appreciated serving under him, and recalling three distinct episodes in which Auchinleck behaved characteristically and which illustrate why men enjoy serving under him. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1284** 15 November. Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Mountbatten, thanking him for his letter of 6 November concerning INA records (1279, above); informing him that the Home Department of the Government of India has a complete set of the records, but that the copy held in the Historical Section of the Supreme Commander's HQ is the joint property of the Governments of India and Pakistan and that its future disposal is dependent upon an agreement between the two Governments; and pointing out that, when the Supreme Commander's HQ closes down, the Historical Section will be under the direct control of whatever body succeeds the Joint Defence Council. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1285** 15 November. Letter to Auchinleck from a Gurkha officer who has served under him, describing his mixed feelings when he read the news of the closing-down of the Supreme Commander's HQ and his sense of gratitude for Auchinleck's care of the troops under his command and for the great personal interest he took in all their affairs;

regarding his departure as a deep personal loss, but feeling that he must congratulate Auchinleck on his escape from the intolerable situation in India and from a thankless job; expressing his appreciation of Auchinleck's frank and soldierly statement of the position; and wishing him every success in the future, pledging his warm regards, and hoping, in return, for a place in Auchinleck's affections. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed Bahadur Sh—? Signature partly illegible.

**1286** 17 November. Letter from Amaranatha Jha, Chairman, Public Service Commission, United Provinces, Allahabad, to Auchinleck, expressing regret at his departure at a time when India as a whole is in real need of his wisdom and experience; praising his past leadership of the IA which, under his command, exerted a cementing influence and became a great force for good; recalling that, for the last two and a half years, he has been intimately associated with Auchinleck in the War Academy project, maintaining that, if this materializes, it will be a lasting memorial to his great work; describing his gratitude for Auchinleck's kindness and generous hospitality; and offering him his best wishes for future happiness. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1287** 20 November. Letter from Lord Wavell to Auchinleck, conveying sympathy and good wishes for the future; indicating his awareness of the effect on Auchinleck of the recent tragic events in India, the disruption of the IA and the apparent destruction of a life's work; assuring him that no man could possibly have done more than he did, that the IA during his command in the war reached its highest point of fame and efficiency, and that those who served under him and with him are alive to his achievement and regard him with deep admiration and affection; maintaining that, although the IA may never be the same again, the work that Auchinleck and his officers did will live both in the past and future history of India; and expressing his personal gratitude for all that Auchinleck did for him. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1288** 21 November. Letter from the Begum of Bhopal to Auchinleck, regretting that there seems no chance of seeing him before he leaves India, but expressing her sympathy with him at this heart-breaking time; declaring her sadness for him because she knows that he has served India with all his heart and might, unaware of the disappointments to follow; apologizing for her frankness and informality; and assuring him of her loyal friendship. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1289** c. 21 November. Auchinleck's formal address to the British Forces in India on their impending departure, recalling that it is 200 years since British soldiers first came to India, that these soldiers helped to build up the Empire of India, that the Empire of India has now come to an end, and that there is no longer any need for units of the British Army or of the RAF to form part of the Armed Forces of the two new States of India and Pakistan; expressing the hope that the partnership formed between members of the British Forces in India

and their comrades in the IA and IAF, which reached its zenith in the last war, will not be forgotten in the future; and declaring that the British Forces in India have deserved well of India and its peoples, and wishing them Godspeed. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed. 2 copies.

**1290** 22 November. Farewell message from Maj.-Gen. L.G. Whistler, on behalf of the British troops in India and Pakistan, to Auchinleck, conveying their gratitude for all he has done for them. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1291** c. 22 November. Telegram from Lt.-Col. Budh Singh and the officers and men of the 2nd Indian Grenadiers to Auchinleck, as their most beloved Colonel-in-Chief, conveying their best wishes for the future and heartfelt thanks for the past. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1292** 25 November. Letter from R. Learmonth to Auchinleck, thanking him for his parting gift, and expressing gratitude for the many kindnesses Auchinleck has bestowed on him throughout the time he has served him. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1293** 27 November. Compliment slip from the late Deputy Director-General, Indian Medical Service, with an article in typescript, from the *British Medical Journal* for Saturday, 23 August 1947, on the Indian Medical Service. 3 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**1294** c. 27 November. List in the hand of Auchinleck of gifts – tiger skins, swords, portraits – to be presented by him to various Indian regiments and military establishments. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1295** c. 27 November. Calculations concerning the capacity of a Dakota K.G.723, with regard to weight of fuel, crew, passengers and luggage. 1 leaf. Typescript, with holograph note by Auchinleck.

**1296** c. 27 November. List of British substantive Generals, Lieutenant-Generals and Major-Generals serving in India and Pakistan. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1297** c. 27 November. List of British Colonels serving in India and Pakistan. 3 leaves. Typescript.

**1298** c. 27 November. List of British IAOC, IEME and RIASC officers serving in India and Pakistan. 2 leaves. Typescript.

**1299** 28 November. Letter from Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, C-in-C, Pakistan Army, to Auchinleck, writing on behalf of all ranks of the Pakistan Army, expressing sincere regrets at his departure and best wishes for the future; recalling that the IA reached its peak during the period of his command; and predicting that his vision in establishing Boys' Training Units will bear fruit for the good of the whole country and will be a fitting memorial to his achievement for all time. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1300** *1 December.* Supreme Commander's Secretariat: press communiqué containing the announcement of Auchinleck's departure from India and an account of his career. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1301** *2 December.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, stating that the Indians appear to have recovered their sense of proportion about him, and that he has heard nothing but expressions of regret at his departure and admiration of the work he has done; adding that he has secured the approval of the British Government to use Auchinleck's house for the High Commissioner, but he has not yet succeeded in persuading the Government of India to allocate the house for this purpose (Nehru having shown a willingness to help but meeting resistance from his colleagues); expressing renewed thanks to Auchinleck for his support, loyalty and personal friendship and his gratitude to Fate for having given him the opportunity to know such a great man; and reiterating his regret that Auchinleck would not accept the honours which were offered to him, and which were richly deserved, and informing him that he is discreetly letting it be known that it is by Auchinleck's own request that his name will not appear in the next Honours List. With a holograph postscript, announcing the arrival of Auchinleck's letter to Lady Mountbatten and its deeply touching effect upon them both. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed, with holograph postscript.

**1302** *5 December.* Letter from 'Bill' of the Railway Executive, London, to Auchinleck, describing his sadness on reading the news that Auchinleck's long service with the IA has come to an end; recalling the kindness and consideration he received from him when he was C-in-C, India, and the support he lent him in the field, in the form of well-trained reinforcements; and wishing him well for the future. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1303** *12 December.* Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter of farewell; referring to the meeting of the Joint Defence Council on 8 December at which the grant of four months' paid leave to Auchinleck was approved on condition that the legal difficulties, involved in the fact that a FM never technically retires and that the Viceroy and the C-in-C are required to take their leave before the termination of their office, can be resolved; and informing Auchinleck that the two Dominions are beginning to get together on the question of defence, and that friendly compromise solutions have been found for other problems. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1304** *18 December.* Letter from M.A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, to Auchinleck, apologizing for not being able to see him before his departure, owing to ill-health; and wishing him a well-earned rest. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1305** 30 *December*. Letter from C.R. Attlee, the PM, to Auchinleck, regretting that it has been impossible to see him since his return from India because of his sojourn in Italy; declaring that he must convey in writing what he would have liked to express in person, namely, the sincere gratitude of the Government and of informed opinion throughout the country for the courageous way in which he has accomplished a thankless task as Supreme Commander; stressing the incalculable weight and value of Auchinleck's influence in Indian affairs during the last twelve months, not only on the military side, but also in the wider political sphere into which he was so often dragged; stating that, although he may feel that his job ended in frustration, the fact that the Army held together as well as it did, that reconstruction went through so smoothly, and that both India and Pakistan have disciplined Armed Forces at their command is all proof of the real and lasting success of his work; and concluding that this is only the latest of the many services rendered by Auchinleck to his country, services which will not be forgotten. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

1948

**1306** 9 *January*. Letter from Toby Low, MP, to Auchinleck, expressing the hope that he is beginning to recover from the disappointment, worry and exhaustion of those last months in India, and that he will eventually be able to take some comfort from the knowledge that to be impartial in those days was to incur the displeasure of all sides; stating that the IA, under Auchinleck's leadership, did so much, particularly in the last two years, to keep sanity for India, and that Auchinleck will be missed by the politicians who learned to rely on him and by those, like himself, who came to India to find their best host and friend in the house of the C-in-C (which, he adds, is now to be occupied by the Russian Ambassador to India); offering any help that he can give to Auchinleck in his arrangements for settling down in England; speculating upon the political future of Britain, declaring that too many people assume that a crisis is inevitable over the food position, and that the Socialist Government will fall on that or a related crisis, his own opinion being that the Conservatives have not yet managed to persuade the ordinary working man that a Conservative Government would look after his interests better than the Socialists; commenting on the Marshall Plan for Europe, suggesting that the extent to which it benefits Europe depends on the Russians; and sending New Year greetings. 2 leaves. Holograph.

**1307** 6 *February*. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Auchinleck, informing him that a room in Government House has been named after him. 1 leaf. Typescript.

**1308** 6 *February*. Letter from Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart to

Auchinleck, concerning his dispatch on *Operations in the Middle East, 1st November 1941–15th August 1942*, published on 13 January 1948 (1350, below); stating that he was impressed by Auchinleck's 'Appreciation of the Situation' made on 27 July 1942 and printed as an appendix, finding in it the most decisive refutation of the prevalent idea that Auchinleck was still contemplating further retreat when Montgomery took over (an idea which Montgomery himself has fostered), and a manifestation of confidence and a willingness to take the offensive. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1309** 20 February. Letter from Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart to Auchinleck, thanking him for his letter; referring to the description of the Alam Halfa battle plan in Montgomery's book *El Alamein to the River Sangro* which, he declares, was the same as Auchinleck's own plan in all its basic features, namely, concentration of the main defences on the northern part of the front, the concentration of artillery for greater flexibility, the concentration of armour in a reserve corps, and the location of this armour on the rear flank of the main defensive position; pointing out that the main difference between the two plans was that Montgomery brought up the 44th Division to hold the Alam Halfa Ridge, a precaution which turned out to be superfluous; noting that Montgomery missed the opportunity of trapping Rommel which these dispositions offered; and expressing the hope that, in this case, truth will prevail by catching up with legend. 2 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1310** 25 February. Letter from Lord Birdwood to Auchinleck, welcoming him home; congratulating him on the wonderful work he has done as Chief during the last few years in the face of extremely difficult circumstances; and announcing the death of his wife. 1 leaf. Holograph.

**1311** 15 March. Letter from Auchinleck to the editor of *The Fighting Forces*, published in the issue for April 1948, refuting the statement, made by the Indian correspondent in his letter of 17 November 1947, that the Supreme Commander's HQ in India had proved almost completely ineffective. 2 leaves. Printed.

**1312** 4 May. Copy of a manuscript letter from Auchinleck in Italy to Lord Wavell, apologizing for not answering his letter of December last; expressing the hope that he is now comfortably settled in London; thanking him for persuading the University of Aberdeen to confer on him the degree of LL.D. in July; stating that he has now decided not to settle down permanently in Italy, complaining that, although the climate is good, there is an almost entire absence of congenial companionship and a general air of purposelessness which makes him feel restless and uneasy; declaring that, if he is to live in England, he must get something definite to do because his brain is still active, and he needs to augment his income; and reporting that he has heard on

the wireless that Rajagopalachari is to succeed Mountbatten as Governor-General of India, and that Liaquat Ali Khan has announced that Pakistan would stay in the Commonwealth just as long as it suited her to do so and would get out as soon as it was apparent that there were no further advantages to be gained from the connection. 2 leaves. Typescript.

*Undated Papers by Auchinleck*

**1332** 'Armies of India'. 21 leaves. Typescript.

**1333** 'British-African Army'. 2 leaves. Typescript.

*Dispatches and Official Accounts of Military Operations Prepared by, or Under the Supervision of, Auchinleck*

**1334** *Norway Campaign, 1940*. Dispatch by Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrery, with reports by Maj.-Gen. P.J. Mackesy and Auchinleck. Supplement to the *London Gazette* of Tuesday, 8 July 1947. 30 pages. Printed. Proof copy (final revise) and published copy. With three loose maps: (a) Finmark; (b) Narvik-Harstad area and Mo-Bodo area; (c) Harstad.

**1339** *The Occupation of Iraq, 1941*. Edited by T.W. Corbett, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India, January 1946. 67 leaves. Typescript, with extensive and radical corrections in the hand of Auchinleck, and a few holograph notes by John Connell. With two loose maps: (a) German aggression, September '39 to May '41; (b) Iraq and the Mideast.

**1342** *Operations in the Middle East, 5 July 1941 – 31 October 1941*. Dispatch by Auchinleck, published as a supplement to the *London Gazette* of Wednesday, 21 August 1946. 16 pages. Printed.

**1343** *Operations in the Middle East, 1st November 1941 – 15th August 1942*. Dispatch by Auchinleck. New Delhi: printed by the Manager, Government of India Press, 1943. [iv] + 185 pages. 8 maps. Printed. This is Auchinleck's own, unabridged dispatch, without the later emendations.

**1344** Letter, dated 6 December 1945, from G.W. Lambert, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, to Auchinleck, enclosing Appendix A (Gen. Klopper's comments on Auchinleck's account of the fall of Tobruk) and Appendix B (a summary of Gen. Klopper's comments) to 1343, above. 7 leaves. Typescript.

**1345** Letter from Brig. T.W. Corbett, dated 27 December 1945, enclosing an analysis by Foucar (E.C.V. Foucar?) of Gen. Klopper's

comments on Auchinleck's account of the fall of Tobruk in 1343, above. 4 leaves. Holograph and typescript.

**1346** Letter, dated 25 February 1946, from G.W. Lambert to Auchinleck, concerning 1343, above. With 2 copies of Auchinleck's reply, dated 19 March 1946. 7 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1347** Letter, dated 16 August 1947, from G.W. Lambert to Auchinleck, enclosing Appendix B, a proposed revised extract from 1343, above, referring to the fall of Tobruk. With a copy of telegram no. 061217/C, Auchinleck's reply to Lambert. 7 leaves. Typescript, signed.

**1348** Proof copy of 1343, above, dated 1947, issued as a supplement to the *London Gazette*. 94 leaves. Printed.

**1349** Letter, dated 1 January 1948, from G.W. Lambert to Auchinleck, proposing one more change in the text of 1343, above. 1 leaf. Typescript, signed.

**1350** Letter, dated 10 January 1948, from G.W. Lambert to Auchinleck. With an advance copy (final revise) of 1343, above, published as a supplement to the *London Gazette* of Tuesday, 13 January 1948. 1 leaf + 92 pages. Typescript, signed, and printed text.

**1351** *Operations in the Indo-Burma Theatre based on India, June 21 1943 – November 15, 1943*. Dispatch by Auchinleck. Proof copy, with corrections, to be published as a supplement to the *London Gazette*, dated 1947. With covering letter, dated 23 June 1947, from Sir Thomas Cash, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for War, to Auchinleck. 32 leaves. Typescript, signed, and printed text.

**1352** Final revise copy of 1351, above, to be published as a supplement to the *London Gazette* of Tuesday, 27 April 1948. With covering letter, dated 16 April 1948, from G.W. Lambert, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, to Auchinleck. 1 leaf + 34 pages. Typescript, signed, and printed text.

**1353** Final version of 1351, above, published as a second supplement to the *London Gazette* of Tuesday, 27 April 1948. Signed by Auchinleck, with a note in his hand. 34 pages. Printed.

## APPENDIX 1: NOTES ON AUCHINLECK'S PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENTS

These notes are confined to the fifteen individuals with whom Auchinleck was most frequently in correspondence or who are otherwise often mentioned in his papers. They cover (a) positions held during the years 1940–48 (note: the *Dictionary of National Biography* and *Who Was Who* should be consulted for details of the remainder of their careers), (b) the principal location of their unpublished papers, (c) their published memoirs or papers, and (d) the major biographies and other secondary works.

**ALANBROOKE**, FM Sir Alan Francis Brooke 1st Viscount (1883–1963)

(a) GOC-in-C, Southern Command, 1939 and 1940; Commander, 2nd Corps, British Expeditionary Force, 1939–40; C-in-C, Home Forces, 1940–41; CIGS, 1941–46.

(b) Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London; Public Record Office, London.

(c) *The Turn of the Tide, 1939–1943: A Study based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke*, [compiled by] Arthur Wynne Morgan Bryant (London: Collins, 1957); *Triumph in the West, 1943–1946: Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke*, [compiled by] Arthur Wynne Morgan Bryant (London: Collins, 1959).

(d) David Fraser: *Alanbrooke* (London: Collins, 1982).

**AMERY**, Rt. Hon. Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett (1873–1955)

(a) Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1940–45.

(c) *My Political Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1953–55, 3 vol.)

**CHANDOS**, Oliver Lyttelton 1st Viscount (1893–1972)

(a) President of the Board of Trade, 1940–41; Minister of State in the ME and Member of the War Cabinet, 1941–42; Minister of Production and Member of the War Cabinet, 1942–45; President of the Board of Trade and Minister of Production, 1945.

(c) *The Memoirs of Lord Chandos* (London: Bodley Head, 1962).

**CHURCHILL**, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (1874–1965)

(a) First Lord of the Admiralty, 1939–40; Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister of Defence, 1940–45; Leader of the Opposition, 1945–51.

(b) Churchill College, Cambridge; Public Record Office, London.

(c) *The Second World War* (London: Cassell & Co., 1948–54, 6 vol.); 13 'Companion' volumes of documents in the biography by Randolph Churchill and Martin Gilbert in (d), below.

(d) Charlie Lewis Broad: *Winston Churchill: A Biography* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1963–64, 2 vol.); Randolph Frederick Edward Spencer Churchill & Martin John Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill* (London: Heinemann, 1966–88, 8 vol. [in 21]); Robert Brian Gardner: *Churchill in his Time: A Study in a Reputation, 1939–1945* (London: Methuen & Co., 1968); David Irving: *Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power* (Bullsbrook: Veritas Publishing Company, 1987); Ronald Lewin: *Churchill as Warlord* (London: Batsford, 1973); Henry Mathison Pelling: *Winston Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

**CUNNINGHAM**, Gen. Sir Alan Gordon (1887–1983)

(a) Commander, 66th, 9th and 51st Divisions, 1940; GOC, East Africa Forces,

1940–41; GOC-in-C, 8th Army, 1941; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1942; GOC, Northern Ireland, 1943–44; GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, 1944–45; High Commissioner and C-in-C, Palestine, 1945–48.

(b) Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford.

(d) Correlli Barnett: *The Desert Generals* (London: William Kimber, 1960).

**DILL**, FM Sir John Greer (1881–1944)

(a) Commander, 1st Corps, 1939–40; VCIGS, 1940; CIGS, 1940–41; Head of British Joint Staff Mission, United States, 1941–44.

(d) Alex Danchev: *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986).

**LAITHWAITE**, Sir John Gilbert (1894–1986)

(a) Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India, 1936–43; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, 1943; Under-Secretary (Civil), War Cabinet, 1944–45; Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Burma, 1945–47; Deputy Under-Secretary of State for India, 1947; Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1948–49.

(b) India Office Library and India Office Records, London.

**LINLITHGOW**, Victor Alexander John Hope 2nd Marquess (1887–1952)

(a) Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1936–43.

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**MESSERVY**, Gen. Sir Frank Walter (1893–1974)

(a) GS Officer, 1st Grade, 5th Indian Infantry Division, 1939–40; Commander, Gazelle Force, Sudan and Eritrea, 1940–41; Commander, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, 1941; Commander, 4th Indian Division, 1941–42; Commander, 1st Armoured Division, 1942; Commander, 7th Armoured Division, 1942; DCGS, GHQ, ME Forces, 1942; Commander, 43rd Indian Armoured Division, 1942–43; Director, AFV, GHQ, IC, 1943; Commander, 7th Indian Infantry Division, 1943–44; Commander, 4th Corps, 1944–45; GOC-in-C, Malaya Command, 1945–46; GOC-in-C, Northern Command, India, 1946–47; C-in-C, Pakistan Army, 1947.

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(d) Henry Ramsay Maule: *Spearhead General: The Epic Story of General Sir Frank Messervy and his Men at Eritrea, North Africa and Burma* (London: Odhams Press, 1961).

**MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA**, Admiral of the Fleet Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas 1st Earl (1900–79)

(a) Captain, HMS *Kelly* and 5th Destroyer Flotilla, 1939–41; Captain, HMS *Illustrious*, 1941; Chief Advisor on Combined Operations, 1941–42; Chief of Combined Operations, 1942–43; Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–46; Viceroy of India, 1947; Governor-General of India, 1947–48.

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(c) *The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten: An illustrated Biography based on the Television History*, [edited by] John Terraine (London: Hutchinson, 1968); *Mountbatten and the Partition of India*, [interviews and personal documents edited by] Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982); *Mountbatten and Independent India, 16 August 1947–18 June 1948*, [interviews and personal documents edited by] Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984).

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**NORRIE**, *Lt.-Gen. Sir Charles Willoughby Moke Norrie 1st Baron* (1893–1977)

(a) Commander, 1st Armoured Brigade, 1938–40; Inspector, RAC, 1940; GOC, 1st Armoured Division, 1940–41; GOC, 30th Corps, 1941–42; Commander, RAC, 1943; Governor of South Australia, 1944–52.

**RITCHIE**, *Gen. Sir Neil Methuen* (1897–1983)

(a) Commander, 51st Highland Division, 1940–41; DCGS, ME, 1941; Commander, 8th Army, 1941–42; Commander, 52nd Lowland Division, 1942–43; Commander, 12th Corps, British Liberation Army, 1944–45; GOC-in-C, Scottish Command and Governor of Edinburgh Castle, 1945–47; C-in-C, Far East Asia Land Forces, 1947–49.

(b) Imperial War Museum, London.

(d) Correlli Barnett: *The Desert Generals* (London: William Kimber, 1960).

**SMITH**, *Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur* (1890–1977)

(a) CGS, ME, 1940–42; GOC, London District, 1942–44; GOC-in-C, Persia and Iraq Command, 1944–45; GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, India, 1945–46; CGS, India, 1946; Deputy C-in-C, India, 1947; Commander, British Forces in India and Pakistan, 1947.

**SMUTS**, *FM Rt. Hon. Jan Christiaan* (1870–1950)

(a) Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and C-in-C, Union of South Africa, 1939–48.

(b) Government Archives Service, Pretoria.

(c) *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, edited by William Keith Hancock & Jean van der Poel (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966–73, 7 vol.)

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**WAVELL**, *FM Sir Archibald Percival Wavell 1st Earl* (1883–1950)

(a) C-in-C, ME, 1939–41; C-in-C, India, 1941–43; Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, 1942; Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1943–47.

(c) *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, edited by Penderel Moon (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

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## APPENDIX 2: INDEX

- ABADAN: 852, 906.
- ABELL (*Sir G.*): 1115, 1116, 1142, 1187, 1212, 1220, 1236.
- ACROBAT: 403, 415, 427, 428, 437, 503, 522, 549, 569, 590, 591, 612, 623, 627, 630, 649, 653, 841, 976.
- ACROBAT MINIMUS: 625, 630, 653.
- ACROMA: 513, 545, 700, 703, 708, 752, 765, 833, 838, 844, 861, 864, 867, 868, 881, 925, 926.
- ADAM (*Sir R.*): 723, 1045, 1050.
- ADEM, El: 516, 520, 523, 529, 700, 703, 708, 729, 738, 760, 763, 765, 833, 838, 867, 881, 896, 916, 925, 929, 945.
- AFGHANISTAN: 287, 1153.
- AFRICA, *South* & SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES: 311, 328, 329, 333, 336, 341, 344, 345, 373, 384, 385, 391, 395, 398, 409, 410, 419, 426, 428, 429, 471, 479, 480, 511, 512, 513, 535, 555, 570, 579, 602, 625, 631, 655, 697, 698, 702, 708, 713, 714, 761, 762, 773, 784, 785, 791, 792, 800, 801, 805, 835, 884, 885, 891, 892, 988, 999, 1029, 1344–1349.
- AGEDABIA: 566, 568, 569, 570, 571, 575, 581, 582, 585, 589, 593, 595, 596, 598, 599, 600, 604, 608, 610, 611, 612, 617, 618, 619, 620, 625, 636, 652, 822.
- AGHEILA, El: 352, 545, 606, 617, 618, 619, 620, 625, 626, 628, 630, 631, 632, 636, 641, 662, 674, 744, 764, 822, 834, 901.
- AIRBORNE FORCES: 365, 429.
- ALAMEIN, El: 959, 961, 964, 967, 970, 974, 977, 982, 988, 995, 1009, 1011, 1013, 1015, 1026, 1048, 1051, 1190.
- ALAM el HALFA: 1005, 1309.
- ALANBROOKE (A.F.B.) *1st Viscount*:  
*Letters from Alanbrooke*: 104, 539, 553, 577, 647, 669, 688, 694, 719, 724, 739, 749, 771, 772, 811, 817, 852, 855, 873, 875, 893, 914, 960, 978, 984, 1016, 1051, 1105, 1111.  
*Letters to Alanbrooke*: 93, 100, 540, 542, 543, 554, 560, 580, 581, 594, 613, 614, 617, 621, 624, 629, 635, 640, 648, 678, 681, 682, 687, 693, 706, 725, 726, 727, 731, 734, 735, 736, 740, 741, 742, 744, 745, 747, 750, 756, 812, 828, 830, 834, 835, 839, 863, 894, 906, 908, 922, 936, 950, 957, 961, 973, 979, 988, 1036, 1037, 1048, 1050, 1102, 1136.  
*References to Alanbrooke*: 504, 525, 679, 853, 869, 974, 989, 997, 1001, 1090, 1091.
- ALDINGTON (T.L.) *1st Baron*: 1306.
- ALEXANDER (A.V.): 1143.
- ALEXANDER OF TUNIS (H.R.L.G.A.) *1st Earl*: 115, 950, 990, 1013, 1017, 1065.
- ALEXANDRIA: 961, 968, 969, 988, 997.
- AMBALA: 1157.
- AMERY (J.): 421, 429, 555, 578, 605, 768, 1046.
- AMERY (L.S.):  
*Letters from Amery*: 125, 134, 144, 145, 155, 202, 224, 252, 268, 271, 273, 285, 291, 293, 308, 348, 363, 365, 383, 421, 578, 601, 605, 705, 768, 790, 827, 882, 902, 956, 965, 1001, 1011, 1024, 1065, 1075, 1159.  
*Letters to Amery*: 132, 140, 173, 185, 196, 197, 203, 206, 214, 231, 233, 249, 253,

261, 269, 270, 272, 290, 296, 340, 429, 555, 754, 795, 870, 883, 918, 1008, 1046, 1057, 1063, 1069.

*References to Amery:* 137, 139, 1033, 1039, 1043.

AMRITSAR: 1256.

ANATOLIA: 361, 374, 377, 385, 404, 417, 427, 447, 522, 580, 581, 828, 863, 912, 985.

ANTELAT: 653, 656.

APOLLONIA: 570.

ARAKAN: 1053.

ARCHDALE (A.Q.): 95, 99.

ARMIES, *British, Commonwealth & Allied:*

ARMIES:

8th: 454, 475, 509, 515, 516, 541, 620, 685, 803, 808, 809, 817, 890, 893, 901, 907, 911, 928, 933, 957, 958, 961, 968, 975, 987, 988, 1048, 1051, 1065, 1075.

9th: 647, 669, 775, 907, 922, 933, 934, 936, 946.

10th: 812, 907, 917, 922, 936, 946, 990, 997.

12th: 1090, 1107, 1116, 1216.

14th: 1045, 1050, 1090.

CORPS:

*Royal Armoured:* 1000.

5th: 72, 73, 78, 79, 83, 85, 118.

10th: 640, 719, 921.

13th: 494, 501, 545, 552, 563, 566, 570, 571, 581, 593, 595, 596, 612, 643, 671, 681, 684, 686, 702, 709, 722, 728, 736, 738, 769, 783, 794, 796, 939, 963.

15th: 1053.

21st Indian: 998.

30th: 450, 516, 520, 530, 545, 552, 558, 561, 564, 581, 636, 643, 670, 684, 685, 728, 729, 783, 803, 829, 864, 939, 963, 1006.

DIVISIONS:

1st Armoured: 337, 455, 462, 508, 514, 522, 562, 566, 589, 593, 595, 606, 612, 617, 631, 643, 654, 656, 657, 659, 663, 667, 670, 676, 708, 709, 711, 722, 727, 729, 760, 789, 794, 796, 802, 803, 849, 865, 945, 963.

1st South African: 309, 311, 328, 333, 351, 370, 427, 428, 509, 510, 516, 519, 633, 643, 686, 689, 696, 698, 702, 709, 713, 714, 722, 728, 738, 760, 776, 831, 885, 926, 928, 944, 961, 963, 964, 969, 970.

2nd: 1045, 1106.

2nd South African: 311, 328, 333, 351, 370, 418, 511, 512, 513, 516, 519, 522, 535, 538, 558, 585, 599, 602, 606, 630, 631, 643, 645, 696, 698, 702, 709, 713, 714, 728, 729, 752, 760, 803, 831, 885, 937, 944.

4th Indian: 427, 474, 475, 488, 502, 503, 509, 516, 520, 522, 551, 558, 561, 564, 566, 585, 593, 600, 603, 625, 631, 638, 643, 653, 654, 656, 657, 670, 671, 676, 683, 684, 686, 689, 695, 696, 729, 746, 752, 861, 865.

5th Indian: 326, 549, 625, 722, 765, 849, 861, 864, 896, 897, 945, 966.

7th Armoured: 292, 444, 557, 558, 566, 570, 575, 589, 593, 600, 625, 631, 681, 708, 711, 728, 753, 794, 796, 802, 803, 829, 945, 988.

8th Armoured: 910, 912, 946, 967, 968.

9th Australian: 312, 313, 320, 322, 330, 331, 719, 786, 799, 967, 968, 976, 993.

10th Armoured: 943.

10th Indian: 861, 865, 913, 1075, 1121.

18th: 514, 522, 549.

25th Indian: 1106.

36th: 1045.

44th: 910, 912, 946, 989, 1309.

50th: 80, 83, 514, 522, 549, 581, 696, 702, 706, 709, 744, 760, 769, 803.

51st: 976.

56th: 976.

70th: 628, 719.

New Zealand: 502, 503, 509, 510, 516, 522, 568, 575, 693, 706, 751, 865, 922, 925, 943, 946, 963, 966, 976.

BRIGADES:

1st Armoured: 829, 913.

1st South African: 844.

2nd Armoured: 508, 509, 516, 558, 565, 566, 569, 631, 710, 831, 877.

3rd Indian Motor: 475, 654, 689, 696, 728, 867, 872, 881, 883, 913, 945.

4th Armoured: 444, 503, 511, 520, 561, 562, 569, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 702, 746, 945.

5th Indian Infantry: 561, 562.

5th New Zealand: 738, 744.

5th South African: 450, 480, 586, 587.

7th Armoured: 450, 655, 657, 658, 754.

7th Indian Infantry: 667, 670, 671, 676, 689, 691, 746.

22nd Armoured: 415, 478, 582, 583, 585, 589, 592, 593, 595, 596, 599, 600, 603, 604, 606, 610, 611, 612, 617, 630, 634, 831, 833, 838, 988.

22nd Guards: 557, 558, 561, 589, 618, 631, 641, 831.

29th Indian Infantry: 708, 872, 945.

38th Indian Infantry: 625, 631, 638.

150th Infantry: 625, 638, 654, 656, 657, 896.

Free French: 760, 765, 868, 916, 945.

Indian Armoured: 910.

Polish: 583, 643, 654, 656, 670, 699, 738.

REGIMENTS:

1st Bihar: 1086.

1st Punjab: 1084, 1171, 1294.

2nd Indian Grenadiers: 1291.

ARMSTRONG (Sir G.): 1066, 1067.

ARNOLD (H.H.): 869.

ARTILLERY, Royal: 349, 350.

ASLAGH RIDGE: 897, 945.

ASSAM: 1082.

ATTLEE (C.R.A.) 1st Earl: 942, 947, 949, 958, 1143, 1222, 1260, 1305.

AUSTRALIA: 343, 354, 357, 359, 361, 371, 372, 374, 377, 378, 379, 388, 403, 415, 514, 751, 837, 910, 988.

AVON (R.A.E.) 1st Earl: 432.

AYYANGAR (Sir G.): 1217, 1267, 1303.

BAB el QATTARA: *see* QATTARA.

BAGHDAD: 191, 194, 196, 197, 205, 246, 247, 249.

BAHREIN: 254.

BALDEV SINGH: 1204, 1205, 1206, 1211, 1212, 1217, 1225, 1226, 1249, 1267, 1279, 1303.

BARCE: 582, 676.

BARDIA: 494, 502, 516, 520, 529, 558, 561, 563, 564, 566, 575, 585, 589, 600, 603, 604, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 616, 617, 757, 849.

BARNES (Sir J.S.): 74, 75.

BASRA: 125, 128, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 156, 163, 164, 169, 170, 176, 191, 196, 197, 198, 205, 211, 216, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 228, 229, 233, 234, 240, 242, 248, 259, 906, 1008.

BATTLEAXE: 408.

BEAVERBROOK (W.M.A.) 1st Baron: 408, 1178.

BEGG (J.): 1237.

BELL (J.C.): 1268.

BENCOL: 558, 561, 566, 568, 569, 570, 571.

BENGAL: 1039, 1041, 1045, 1046.

BENGHAZI: 520, 545, 546, 550, 551, 552, 556, 558, 559, 563, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570, 571, 573, 575, 582, 585, 589, 591, 593, 595, 599, 600, 612, 617, 618, 619, 622, 626, 636, 653, 654, 657, 658, 662, 663, 666, 667, 668, 670, 671, 676, 683, 690, 695, 717, 722, 763, 808, 816, 854, 859, 881, 901, 943.

BENNETT (H.G.): 1132.

BENTHALL (*Sir E.*): 1161.

BERESFORD-PEIRSE (*Sir N.*): 288, 294, 299, 307, 672, 724, 725, 950, 988, 1066, 1067.

BETHAM (G.L.): 1013.

BETHOUART (A.E.): 24, 27, 28, 57, 61, 65, 66, 81, 1020.

BEWOOR: 285.

BHATNAGAR (*Sir S.S.*): 1129.

BHOPAL: 1288.

BHUTAN: 1155.

BIRDWOOD (W.R.B.) *1st Baron*: 106, 1003, 1228, 1310.

BIR el GUBI: 523, 529, 833, 838, 868, 872, 925.

BIR HACHEIM: 683, 699, 700, 703, 709, 710, 722, 728, 729, 738, 744, 760, 764, 802, 803, 808, 809, 822, 831, 832, 833, 838, 843, 844, 859, 861, 864, 868, 872, 877, 881, 896, 898, 901, 916, 920, 924, 945, 1000.

BIR TENGEDER: 802, 822, 831.

BIZERTA: 415, 428, 437, 448.

BJØRNEFJELL: 54.

BLAMEY (*Sir T.*): 343, 435, 440, 451, 613, 617, 629, 640, 688, 745.

BODO: 25, 38, 41, 46, 47, 51, 1334.

BORNEO: 1193.

BOSE (S.C.): 1114, 1125, 1127, 1137, 1208, 1211, 1212.

BOUCHER (*Sir C.H.*): 199.

BOUNDARY FORCE: 1247, 1249, 1256, 1267.

BREGHISC: 868.

BRIGGS (*Sir H.R.*): 859, 945.

BRINK (G.E.): 427, 428, 430, 570, 633, 637, 728, 733, 738, 1029.

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION: 235, 404.

BROCKMAN (R.V.): 1235.

BROOKE (*Sir A.F.*): *see* ALANBROOKE (A.F.B.) *1st Viscount*.

BROWN (A.W.): 1027.

BROWN (*Sir S.K.*): 105.

BROWNING (F.A.M.): 1083.

BRUCE (J.G.): 1197.

BRYANT (*Sir A.W.M.*): 1023.

BUCHANAN (*Sir K.*): 1237.

BUCHER (*Sir R.*): 1196, 1197, 1199.

BUCKSHOT: 831, 838, 843, 845, 859, 901.

BUDH SING: 1291.

BULLARD (*Sir R.W.*): 244, 824.

BURCH (F.W.): 1065, 1069.

BURHANUDDIN: 1139, 1140.

BURMA: 549, 555, 578, 601, 605, 680, 705, 719, 754, 852, 1026, 1037, 1045, 1055, 1107, 1112, 1116, 1132, 1151, 1193, 1215, 1351, 1352, 1353.

BUTLER (*Sir J.R.M.*): 1316, 1317, 1318.

CAIRO: 961.

CAMPBELL (J.C.): 612, 617, 663, 665, 681, 728.

CAMPBELL-JOHNSON (A.): 1249.

CAPUZZO: 516.

CARIAPPA (K.M.): 1145.

- CAROE (*Sir O.K.*): 209, 210, 213, 1013, 1085.  
 CARY (*R.T.O.*): 61.  
 CASABLANCA: 382, 383.  
 CASEY (*R.G.*): 768, 836, 839, 840, 846, 847, 852, 869, 880, 887, 895, 899, 906, 907, 909, 917, 922, 931, 947, 984, 992, 1005, 1009, 1018.  
 CASH (*Sir T.J.*): 1351.  
 CATROUX (*G.*): 374, 775, 777, 781, 924, 996, 1009.  
 CAUCASIA: 408, 410, 414, 417, 426, 429, 430, 580, 601, 605, 759, 873, 878, 906, 909, 917, 984, 988, 997.  
 CAULDRON: 897, 916, 945, 1006.  
 CAZALET (*V.A.*): 1014.  
 CENTRAL PROVINCES, INDIA: 1142.  
 CEYLON: 1151, 1193.  
 CHAND (*R.*): 1166.  
 CHANDOS (*O.L.*) *1st Viscount*: 277, 278, 283, 290, 310, 316, 317, 322, 324, 340, 348, 355, 363, 374, 377, 408, 428, 432, 433, 444, 464, 510, 517, 524, 525, 530, 533, 628, 639, 641, 655, 658, 666, 731, 772, 839, 879.  
 CHARRUBA: 657.  
 CHAUDHURI (*M.*): 1239.  
 CHENGAPPA (*K.*): 1179.  
 CHETWODE (*P.W.C.*) *1st Baron*: 1180.  
 CHIMNE (*B.S.*): 1145.  
 CHINA: 837.  
 CHRISTISON (*Sir P.*): 1053, 1090, 1091, 1312.  
 CHUNDRIGAR (*I.M.*): 1249.  
 CHURCHILL (*R.*): 900, 903.  
 CHURCHILL (*Sir W.L.S.*):  
     *Letters from Churchill*: 146, 152, 202, 211, 266, 268, 275, 281, 288, 304, 305, 312, 313, 331, 339, 343, 354, 371, 378, 380, 382, 388, 390, 400, 407, 415, 423, 436, 437, 439, 445, 446, 448, 449, 455, 462, 469, 477, 489, 501, 507, 514, 527, 528, 536, 549, 565, 590, 591, 623, 632, 642, 653, 662, 701, 743, 751, 759, 799, 806, 807, 837, 841, 847, 856, 860, 886, 887, 915, 919, 923, 927, 932, 934, 946, 954, 967, 976, 989, 990, 992.  
     *Letters to Churchill*: 212, 267, 269, 280, 282, 308, 320, 322, 337, 341, 346, 357, 359, 372, 374, 379, 381, 387, 389, 391, 396, 399, 403, 428, 442, 464, 465, 466, 475, 482, 490, 502, 505, 522, 531, 537, 569, 572, 573, 592, 610, 618, 626, 627, 628, 639, 650, 651, 670, 712, 729, 748, 763, 790, 826, 842, 857, 865, 879, 880, 888, 895, 903, 907, 909, 912, 913, 925, 929, 930, 931, 940, 941, 953, 959, 968, 980.  
     *References to Churchill*: 224, 226, 289, 295, 302, 303, 330, 347, 349, 350, 377, 408, 412, 413, 523, 524, 539, 540, 666, 679, 724, 739, 771, 772, 774, 788, 827, 846, 852, 878, 942, 960, 974, 984, 997, 1001, 1004, 1005, 1012, 1024, 1051.  
 CHURCHILL TANKS: 423, 572, 574, 649.  
 CIRENE: 570.  
 CIVIL DEFENCE: 109, 112.  
 COCKIN (*C.M.*): 1113, 1114.  
 COLERIDGE (*Sir J.*): 101.  
 COLLIER (*A.L.*): 361.  
 CONGRESS, INDIAN NATIONAL: *see* INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.  
 CONINGHAM (*A.*): 337, 436, 478, 488, 529, 532, 542, 552, 564, 568, 569, 571, 581, 628, 656, 663, 667, 671, 696, 699, 867, 887, 901, 921, 934.  
 CONNELL (*J.*) *pseud.* [*i.e.* J.H. Robertson]: 1339.  
 CORBETT (*T.W.*): 327, 725, 745, 746, 752, 809, 839, 853, 861, 867, 938, 957, 959, 961, 968, 971, 973, 979, 988, 994, 1009, 1132, 1339, 1345.  
 CORK & ORRERY (*W.H.D.B.*) *13th Earl*: 11, 12, 13, 23, 27, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 74, 75, 76, 77, 108, 1020, 1334.  
 CORNWALLIS (*Sir K.*): 133, 134, 139, 142, 148, 171, 255, 1334.

COWAN (*Sir W.H.*): 1022.

CREAGH (*Sir M.O'M.*): 292, 299, 356, 404, 950.

CRIPPS (*Sir S.*): 753, 763, 768, 774, 806, 807, 882, 1025, 1143, 1160.

CRUSADER: 326, 371, 379, 382, 388, 389, 390, 391, 394, 396, 397, 400, 403, 415, 428, 436, 437, 449, 456 et seq.

CUNNINGHAM (A.B.) *Viscount*: 318, 324, 374, 377, 470, 487, 492, 508, 534, 757, 763.

CUNNINGHAM (*Sir A.G.*): 294, 295, 307, 366, 391, 403, 427, 428, 450, 454, 456, 458, 459, 463, 464, 470, 476, 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 487, 491, 492, 493, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 505, 506, 507, 508, 518, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 531, 536, 542, 547, 549.

CUNNINGHAM (*Sir G.*): 1093.

CURREY (H.P.): 61.

CYPRUS: 281, 282, 288, 339, 346, 522, 581, 811, 812, 875.

CYRENAICA: 374, 382, 391, 396, 417, 435, 456, 478, 522, 564, 575, 628, 629, 648, 660, 674, 680, 683, 690, 696, 700, 704, 711, 717, 719, 729, 730, 749, 764, 816, 823, 826, 843, 859, 860, 901, 911, 950, 953.

DALISON (J.B.): 1251.

DAVAR (M.C.): 1128.

DAVIDSON (E.R.): 118.

DAVIES (H.L.): 102, 103.

DAVY (G.M.O.): 517, 519, 524, 530, 532, 664, 665.

DEEDES (*Sir R.B.*): 1119.

DEEDES (*Sir W.*): 1139.

DE GAURY ( ): 246, 247.

DELHI: 1255, 1267.

DEMPSEY (*Sir M.*): 1090, 1091.

DEOLALI: 1277.

DERNA: 550, 562, 563, 564, 566, 654, 690, 696, 702, 708, 722, 729, 744, 753, 763, 764, 822, 867, 897, 898, 901.

DESAI (B.): 1113.

DESHMUKH (J.D.): 1174.

DE WAAL (P.): 311, 314, 328, 329.

DEWING (R.H.): 53, 70.

DHILLON (G.S.): 1127, 1128, 1129, 1137.

DILL (*Sir J.G.*):

*Letters from Dill*: 9, 70, 131, 143, 205, 223, 226, 242, 265, 274, 276, 277, 283, 297, 302, 321, 323, 330, 352, 355, 401, 402, 404, 408, 411, 412, 420, 422, 438, 443, 453, 457, 461, 467, 468, 473, 481, 483, 504, 567, 869, 974, 1018.

*Letters to Dill*: 14, 20, 29, 61, 124, 126, 127, 164, 166, 190, 191, 204, 217, 230, 238, 242, 245, 258, 278, 279, 284, 286, 287, 289, 292, 294, 295, 298, 299, 300, 301, 306, 315, 325, 326, 338, 347, 353, 356, 358, 360, 361, 362, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 375, 376, 377, 386, 392, 393, 394, 397, 398, 406, 416, 417, 425, 427, 431, 435, 440, 441, 447, 451, 452, 463, 472, 476, 484, 652, 1010.

*References to Dill*: 6, 946, 1008, 1016.

DOBBIE (*Sir W.*): 624, 640, 649, 730, 836, 852.

DORMAN-SMITH *afterwards* DORMAN O'GOWAN (E.): 416, 533, 578, 696, 702, 713, 722, 761, 762, 835, 957, 988, 1000, 1309.

DORMER (*Sir C.F.J.*): 96.

DOWLER (A.A.B.): 30, 38, 43, 51, 61, 62.

DUDA, El: 478.

DUNBAR-NASMITH (*Sir M.E.*): 111.

DUNCAN-SANDYS (D.E.) *Baron*: 76.

DUNDAS (*Sir A.*): 1139, 1142.

EDEN (A.): *see* AVON (R.A.E.) *1st Earl*.

EDROOS, EL- (S.A.): 1186.

- EFFINGHAM, *HMS*: 12, 14.  
EGYPT: 194, 357, 401, 402, 417, 439, 442, 456, 508, 522, 533, 658, 704, 793, 810, 814, 841, 887, 938, 949, 961, 965, 967, 987, 1008.  
EISENHOWER (D.D.): 1080, 1088.  
EL ADEM: *see* ADEM, El.  
EL AGHEILA: *see* AGHEILA, El.  
EL ALAMEIN: *see* ALAMEIN, El.  
EL HAMRA: *see* HAMRA, El.  
ELMHIRST (*Sir T.*): 1238, 1240, 1242.  
ELPHINSTONE ( ): 221.  
EMIN: 814.  
ERITREA: 658.  
ERSKINE (C.): 107.  
ERSKINE (I.D.): 525.  
EVETTS (*Sir J.F.*): 360, 361, 366, 367, 408, 416.  
EVILL (*Sir D.C.S.*): 1071.
- FADDEN (*Sir A.W.*): 312, 313, 330, 331, 332, 338.  
FALLUJAH: 222.  
FILOSE (A.E.): 696.  
FINMARK: 31, 1334.  
FLEISCHER (C.G.): 65, 66, 81.  
FLOYER-ACLAND (A.N.): 718, 732.  
FOUCAR (E.C.V.): 1345.  
FRANKLYN (H.E.): 88, 113, 669, 745.  
FRASER (H.C.P.J.): 956.  
FRASER (P.): 297, 301, 380, 387, 407, 428, 509.  
FRASER (W.): 16, 17.  
FRASER (W.A.K.): 156, 199.  
FREE FRENCH: 517, 519, 520, 522, 524, 527, 530, 612, 617, 621, 622, 663, 670, 709, 728, 765, 769, 775, 899, 920, 924, 945, 966, 1000, 1005, 1042.  
FREEMAN (*Sir W.R.*): 380, 382, 387, 388, 403, 407, 460.  
FRENCH INDO-CHINA: 1104, 1106.  
FREYBERG (*Sir B.C.*): 297, 298, 301, 302, 306, 427, 428, 509, 516, 525, 530, 533, 617, 619, 630, 641, 658, 688, 693, 706, 798, 835, 852, 853, 922, 984, 988.  
FUKA: 961.  
FULLER (C.): 444.  
FYFE (*Sir W.H.*): 1241.
- GAI (K.A.): 1190.  
GAIRDNER (*Sir C.H.*): 302, 338, 362, 386, 852, 922.  
GALLOWAY (*Sir A.*): 454, 554, 585, 616, 636, 658, 725, 869, 949, 1000, 1026.  
GALLWEY (A.): 121.  
GAMBUT: 509, 708, 916, 921, 929.  
GAMMELL (J.A.H.): 10, 16, 17, 36, 47, 61, 63, 64, 67, 88, 745, 772, 988.  
GANDHI (D.): 1249.  
GANDHI (M.K.): 1204.  
GANIA: 822, 843.  
GARMENT: 908.  
GATEHOUSE (A.H.): 377, 386, 523, 558, 658, 659, 663, 664, 665, 667, 708.  
GAULLE (C.de): 279, 357, 525, 527, 621, 1005, 1006, 1009.  
GAZALA: 545, 552, 558, 559, 562, 683, 689, 699, 709, 710, 711, 717, 729, 738, 744, 754, 760, 764, 769, 802, 803, 808, 832, 833, 838, 843, 859, 861, 864, 867, 872, 881, 896, 897, 901, 916, 925, 926, 928, 933, 981, 982, 1000.  
GEORGE VI *King*: 436, 441, 772, 855, 893, 1084.  
GIFFARD (*Sir G.*): 621, 1037, 1078.

GLANCY (*Sir B.*): 1125.

GLOUCESTER (*H.*), *Duke of*: 831, 848, 850, 851, 855, 882, 1233.

GOBI: 535, 838.

GODWIN-AUSTEN (*A.R.*): 299, 307, 366, 374, 427, 478, 494, 501, 503, 509, 532, 541, 545, 551, 552, 558, 561, 562, 564, 581, 585, 589, 593, 599, 600, 604, 606, 611, 612, 617, 619, 625, 630, 631, 634, 636, 640, 643, 654, 656, 663, 671, 681, 683, 702, 706, 718, 736, 753, 1000, 1200.

GOORD (*A.B.*): 1135.

GORT (*J.S.S.P.V.*) *6th Viscount*: 117, 836, 852, 869.

GOTT (*W.H.E.*): 299, 356, 427, 428, 478, 494, 503, 509, 517, 519, 524, 530, 558, 593, 599, 617, 659, 664, 665, 667, 672, 677, 681, 683, 686, 688, 689, 695, 699, 702, 709, 711, 720, 722, 728, 738, 789, 861, 888, 934, 939, 966, 988, 990.

GRACEY (*Sir D.D.*): 1196, 1197, 1214, 1275.

GRAHAM (*H.L.*): 52, 63.

GREECE: 798.

GRIGG (*Sir J.*): 732, 754, 827, 1078.

GRIMSHAW (*T.*): 107.

GUBBINS (*Sir C.McV.*): 25, 30, 41, 45, 51, 58, 61.

GUINGAND (*Sir F.de*): 745, 897, 898, 988, 991.

GURKHAS: 1085, 1095, 1102, 1105, 1110, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1125, 1131, 1155, 1197, 1215, 1259, 1262, 1263, 1285.

GYMNAST: 527, 549, 590, 623, 841.

HAAKON VII *King of Norway*: 96.

HABBANIYA: 141, 148, 149, 150, 153, 180, 181, 183, 184, 205, 228.

HABFORCE: 205, 217, 238.

HACHEIM: *see* BIR HACHEIM.

HAINING (*Sir R.H.*): 73, 86, 136, 276, 277, 278, 283, 289, 354, 355, 359, 361, 377, 432, 433.

HALFAYA: 488, 494, 502, 503, 509, 516, 529, 558, 581, 603, 611, 612, 617, 618, 619, 622, 625, 630, 631, 633, 636, 638, 641, 642, 644, 645, 868, 872, 945.

HALL (*J.T.S.*): 1240.

HAMID (*S.S.*): 1206, 1207.

HAMILTON (*W.H.*): 135.

HAMRA, *El*: 833, 943.

HARDING (*J.*): 664, 709, 835, 988, 1000.

HARLECH (*W.G.A.O.-G.*) *4th Baron*: 457.

HARSTAD: 13, 1334.

HARTLEY (*Sir A.*): 680.

HARWOOD (*Sir H.*): 954, 959.

HEATH (*L.*): 1132.

HENG (*S.S.*): 1163.

HIMATSINHJI (*K.S.*): 1113, 1114, 1138.

HIMEIMAT: 981, 982.

HINDUSTAN: 1152, 1153, 1154, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1229.

HINDUSTAN TIMES: 1250, 1263.

HINGSTON (*W.G.*): 1065, 1074.

HIRSCH (*C.E.R.*): 3, 18.

HOARE (*Sir S.*): 779, 780.

HOBART (*Sir P.C.S.*): 688.

HOGG (*Q.*): 421, 555.

HOLMES (*Sir W.G.*): 294, 295, 307, 361, 425, 427, 508, 510, 581, 617, 649, 658, 745, 772, 1006.

HOME GUARD: 87, 89, 90, 91, 101, 120.

HONG KONG: 549, 567, 651, 679, 1193.

HORE-BELISHA OF DEVONPORT (*L.*) *1st Baron*: 869, 991, 1023.

HORROCKS (*Sir B.G.*): 852.

HUBBOCK (*A.G.V.*): 61.

HUTTON (*Sir T.*): 578, 581, 680.

HYDARI (*Sir A.*): 1169.

IMPHAL: 1055.

INDIA: 123, 125, 126, 127, 130, 132, 159, 161, 164, 173, 190, 219, 223, 224, 227, 230, 260, 261, 262, 263, 327, 340, 348, 363, 365, 405, 414, 417, 421, 429, 443, 447, 549, 555, 560, 580, 581, 591, 601, 605, 617, 680, 705, 719, 732, 742, 754, 763, 768, 772, 790, 806, 807, 819, 821, 823, 825, 827, 834, 837, 841, 852, 870, 879, 882, 883, 895, 902, 905, 910, 912, 918, 922, 976, 985, 990, 997, 1000, 1008, 1024 et seq.

INDIAN ARMY & ARMED FORCES: 1034, 1036, 1044, 1045, 1049, 1050, 1052, 1057, 1065, 1066, 1069, 1074, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1085, 1086, 1092, 1093, 1095, 1097, 1099, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1112, 1116, 1117, 1119, 1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1141, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1154, 1157, 1164, 1187, 1189, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1197, 1199, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1212, 1214, 1215, 1217, 1222, 1223, 1225, 1226, 1229, 1230, 1234, 1240, 1246, 1247, 1261, 1266, 1271, 1278, 1285, 1332.

INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE: 1293.

INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY: 1092, 1094, 1108, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1121, 1125, 1127, 1129, 1133, 1134, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1146, 1149, 1198, 1204, 1205, 1209, 1211, 1212, 1220, 1231, 1232, 1235, 1236, 1279, 1284.

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: 1127, 1154.

INDONESIA: 1193.

INGLIS (*J.*): 227.

IRAN: 284, 287, 290, 302, 305, 308, 338, 405, 414, 417, 429, 447, 539, 549, 580, 581, 601, 605, 617, 812, 824, 825, 853, 863, 873, 904, 906, 908, 909, 912, 917, 922, 936, 953, 976, 984, 988, 990, 992, 997, 1008, 1010, 1018, 1040, 1151, 1193.

IRAQ: 123, 126, 129, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 222, 223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 252, 253, 254, 255, 259, 263, 264, 308, 327, 342, 405, 414, 417, 429, 447, 475, 510, 522, 539, 549, 580, 581, 601, 617, 650, 828, 853, 863, 906, 922, 936, 953, 990, 992, 997, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1018, 1032, 1040, 1120, 1132, 1151, 1193, 1215, 1339.

IRWIN (*N.M.S.*): 1037.

ISMAY OF WORMINGTON (*H.L.I.*) *1st Baron*: 303, 413, 679, 774, 858, 1007, 1143, 1215, 1222, 1229, 1260, 1261, 1274.

ITALY: 876, 1193.

JALO: 689, 1009.

JAMES (*Sir W.M.*): 114

JAMMU & KASHMIR: *see* KASHMIR.

JAPAN: 527, 533, 549, 837, 852, 879, 910, 922, 1057, 1108, 1193.

JARABUB: 644, 689.

JAVA: 1106, 1112.

JEBEL: 671, 683, 695, 700, 722, 754, 802, 901, 911.

JEFFORD (*J.W.*): 1240.

JENKINS (*Sir E.M.*): 1042, 1043, 1106, 1108, 1172, 1247.

JHA (*A.*): 1286.

JINNAH (*M.A.*): 1238, 1263, 1267, 1275, 1304.

JOGENDRA SINGH: 1123, 1185.

JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL (INDIA & PAKISTAN): 1245, 1266, 1267, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1273, 1274, 1276, 1277.

- KANDY: 1059, 1069.  
 KARACHI: 1262, 1277.  
 KASHMIR: 1275, 1280, 1303.  
 KAY (D.): 1176, 1177.  
 KENNEDY (*Sir J.*): 672.  
 KERR (H.R.): 61.  
 KHAN (M.A.): 1145.  
 KHARE (N.B.): 1168.  
 KHARTOUM: 294.  
 KHOLAPUR: 1266.  
 KILLEARN (M.W.L.) *1st Baron*: 658, 666, 810.  
 KINGSTON-McCLOUGHRY (E.J.): 1070, 1071, 1072, 1135.  
 KISCH (F.): 480, 516.  
 KLOPPER (D.): 885, 937, 944, 948, 971, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350.  
 KNIGHTSBRIDGE: 916, 945.  
 KOENIG (J.P.F.): 519, 524, 920, 945.  
 KOHIMA: 1055.  
 KREFT (J.): 384.  
 KUNZRU (P.H.N.): 1147.  
 KUWAIT: 243.  
  
 LAITHWAITE (*Sir J.G.*): 139, 140, 141, 167, 172, 175, 178, 179, 183, 192, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 209, 210, 212, 213, 217, 218, 221, 225, 233, 240, 241, 251, 253, 257, 263, 264, 266, 1033.  
 LAMBERT (G.W.): 1344, 1346, 1347, 1349, 1350, 1352.  
 LAMPSON (*Sir M.*): *see* KILLEARN (M.W.L.) *1st Baron*.  
 LAWSON (J.J.): 1023.  
 LAYCOCK (R.): 334, 335, 337, 519, 524.  
 LEARMONTH (R.): 1292.  
 LEBANON: 777, 1042.  
 LEDO: 1100.  
 LEESE (*Sir O.*): 1065, 1069, 1078, 1090, 1091.  
 LIAQUAT ALI KHAN: 1212, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1263, 1267, 1270, 1273, 1303, 1312.  
 LIBYA: 374, 387, 429, 458, 475, 505, 514, 532, 555, 579, 627, 742, 744, 764, 779, 804, 806, 815, 823, 825, 834, 837, 857, 865, 879, 881, 883, 890, 893, 940, 942, 945, 961, 962.  
 LIDDELL HART (*Sir B.H.*): 1308, 1309.  
 LIMERICK: 901.  
 LINDSELL (*Sir W.*): 1045, 1050, 1053, 1061, 1062, 1067.  
 LINLITHGOW (V.A.J.H.) *2nd Marquess*: 137, 140, 141, 144, 145, 154, 160, 161, 167, 168, 169, 178, 179, 183, 185, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 224, 231, 233, 240, 241, 249, 251, 252, 253, 255, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 348, 680, 755, 768, 790, 870, 882, 905, 997, 1008, 1013, 1025, 1032.  
 LISTOWEL (W.F.H.) *5th Earl*: 1260.  
 LLOYD: 296, 308.  
 LOCKHART (*Sir R.*): 296, 1119, 1145, 1196, 1199, 1240, 1242, 1249, 1263.  
 LODGE (H.C.): 955.  
 LOTHIAN (*Sir A.*): 1182.  
 LOW (T.): *see* ALDINGTON (T.L.) *1st Baron*.  
 LUMSDEN (H.): 386, 508, 516, 517, 524, 530, 558, 566, 568, 575, 589, 593, 603, 617, 696, 728, 738, 746, 831, 945.  
 LYMINGTON (G.V.W.) *Viscount*: *see* PORTSMOUTH (G.V.W.) *9th Earl*.  
 LYONS (A.M.): 1065.  
 LYTTTELTON (O.): *see* CHANDOS (O.L.) *1st Viscount*.

- McBEAN (R.H.): 1183.  
 McCREERY (*Sir R.L.*): 292, 294, 859, 867, 1069, 1075.  
 McGARRITY (J.): 1210.  
 MACKENZIE (*Sir C.*): 1132.  
 MACKESY (P.J.): 11, 20, 21, 22, 70, 1334.  
 MACKINNON (A.): 221, 787, 797, 940.  
 McLEOD (*Sir D.K.*): 578.  
 MADDALENA: 644, 709, 754, 921, 925.  
 MALAYA: 527, 666, 679, 1114, 1120, 1132, 1151, 1193.  
 MALLABY (A.W.S.): 338, 362, 1035.  
 MALTA: 415, 428, 462, 470, 530, 583, 624, 640, 647, 729, 730, 734, 739, 749, 753, 763, 806, 836, 837, 841, 857, 860, 869, 880, 901, 907, 931, 940, 943, 961.  
 MANSINJHI (*Sir B.*): 1184.  
 MARADA: 622, 628, 632.  
 MARGESSON (H.D.R.) *1st Viscount*: 718, 721.  
 MARRIOTT (*Sir J.*): 503, 545, 550, 551, 552, 556, 558, 564, 566, 569, 611, 643.  
 MARSHALL (G.C.): 847, 1087.  
 MARSHALL-CORNWALL (*Sir J.H.*): 361, 401, 416, 427.  
 MARTEL (G.Le Q.): 80, 539, 581, 599, 611, 614, 617, 640, 649, 1000.  
 MARTUBA: 708, 728, 729, 744, 764, 766, 769, 833, 868, 872, 897, 898, 901, 945.  
 MARY, *Queen, Consort of King George V*: 84, 94.  
 MASON (P.): 1139.  
 MASTORE: 279.  
 MATRUH: 475, 519, 522, 689, 690, 696, 698, 738, 754, 769, 844, 849, 921, 943, 947, 949, 953, 954, 958, 1015.  
 MAXWELL (A.H.): 350, 361.  
 MAYNE (*Sir M.*): 578, 998, 1143.  
 MECHILI: 464, 545, 558, 559, 563, 564, 566, 569, 570, 571, 654, 656, 657, 662, 663, 667, 670, 671, 676, 689, 696, 699, 700, 702, 703, 708, 709, 722, 728, 729, 738, 744, 754, 764, 802, 822, 833, 843, 854, 859, 881, 901.  
 MERRELL (G.): 1158.  
 MERSA BREGA: 626.  
 MERSA MATRUH: *see* MATRUH.  
 MESSERVY (*Sir F.*): 427, 474, 478, 488, 494, 562, 568, 570, 571, 575, 599, 603, 604, 612, 617, 643, 663, 696, 702, 708, 727, 728, 746, 835, 888, 897, 945, 951, 952, 962, 988, 1104, 1145, 1196, 1199, 1240, 1249, 1259, 1299.  
 MILLER (C.H.): 575.  
 MITCHENER (P.H.): 61.  
 MO: 16, 20, 21, 25.  
 MONCKTON (W.T.M.) *1st Viscount*: 655, 672, 674, 758, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 787, 797, 798, 810, 813, 814, 819, 820, 821, 824, 840, 866.  
 MONGOL FRONTIER: 1155.  
 MONTEATH (*Sir D.*): 1143.  
 MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN (B.L.M.) *1st Viscount*: 83, 85, 88, 97, 98, 990, 1012, 1013, 1079, 1088, 1213, 1263, 1308, 1309.  
 MOORE (M.): 44, 56, 61, 64.  
 MORRIS (*Sir E.*): 1000.  
 MORSHEAD (*Sir L.J.*): 337, 338, 360, 403, 835, 852, 853, 922, 993.  
 MOSUL: 249, 405.  
 MOTILAL (G.S.): 1165.  
 MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA (E.M.) *Countess*: 1066, 1215, 1227, 1231, 1232, 1234, 1301.  
 MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA (L.M.) *1st Earl*: 1035, 1038, 1041, 1046, 1053, 1054, 1056, 1057, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1066, 1067, 1078, 1083, 1090, 1091, 1104, 1106, 1107, 1111, 1156, 1215, 1218, 1220, 1222, 1224, 1235, 1237, 1238, 1243,

- 1248, 1249, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1267, 1269, 1274, 1275, 1279, 1282, 1284, 1301, 1303, 1307.  
 MSUS: 571, 600, 654, 656, 662.  
 MUDIE (*Sir F.*): 1092, 1094.  
 MURMANSK: 408.  
 MUSLIM LEAGUE: 1154.  
 MUSPRATT (*Sir S.*): 102, 103.
- NAHAS PASHA: 810.  
 NARVIK: 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 21, 22, 29, 37, 41, 43, 44, 48, 50, 55, 57, 77, 1020, 1334.  
 NASMITH (*Sir M.E.Dunbar-*): *see* DUNBAR-NASMITH (*Sir M.E.*).  
 NATHU SINGH: 1195.  
 NAWAZ (*S.*): 1125, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1137.  
 NEHRU (*J.*): 1124, 1149, 1193, 1194, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1212, 1213, 1220, 1221, 1235, 1236, 1238, 1249, 1253, 1260, 1270, 1273, 1275, 1279, 1301, 1303.  
 NEPAL: 1013, 1085, 1095, 1102, 1110, 1122, 1131, 1155, 1197, 1259.  
 NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES: 1104, 1106, 1193, 1194.  
 NEW ZEALAND: 297, 301, 380, 387, 407, 427, 428, 429, 502, 509, 510, 525, 527, 529, 617, 751, 798, 988.  
 NOEL-BAKER (*P.J.*): 1276, 1280.  
 NORMAN (*H.G.*): 324, 906.  
 NORRIE (*C.W.M.N.*) *1st Baron*: 361, 369, 374, 377, 386, 427, 428, 509, 524, 533, 541, 545, 552, 566, 575, 581, 585, 593, 603, 604, 606, 612, 622, 625, 631, 633, 644, 703, 711, 713, 729, 794, 796, 802, 816, 831, 838, 859, 861, 867, 868, 888, 939.  
 NORTH WESTERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, NORWAY: 3, 16, 17, 34, 56, 62, 67.  
 NORTH WEST FRONTIER, INDIA: 1040, 1093, 1109, 1121, 1193, 1194, 1243, 1244.  
 NORWAY: 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 31, 35, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74, 75, 82, 96, 1334.  
 NOSWORTHY (*Sir F.P.*): 295, 422, 425.  
 NYE (*Sir A.E.*): 679, 753, 763, 765, 769, 771, 774, 788, 839, 906, 951, 952, 971, 973, 1120, 1122, 1131.
- O'CONNOR (*Sir R.*): 1118, 1119.
- PAGET (*B.C.T.*): 90.  
 PAKENHAM-WALSH (*R.P.*): 422, 425.  
 PAKISTAN: 1138, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1229, 1230, 1235, 1244, 1259, 1260, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1266, 1270, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1299.  
 PALESTINE: 166, 188, 191, 194, 198, 223, 285, 346, 348, 363, 374, 377, 429, 835, 850, 852, 894, 922.  
 PALLISER (*Sir A.*): 1183.  
 PEARSON (*D.A.R.*): 1064.  
 PEIRSE (*Sir R.E.C.*): 460, 544, 750, 992.  
 PERRY-KEENE (*A.L.A.*): 1238, 1240, 1242.  
 PERSIA: *see* IRAN.  
 PETHICK-LAWRENCE (*F.W.P.-L.*) *1st Baron*: 1116, 1143, 1173, 1212.  
 PHILLIPS (*W.*): 1064, 1069.  
 PHILLPOTTS (*A.B.*): 167, 174, 175, 433, 434, 568, 639, 1041.  
 PIENAAR (*D.*): 633, 644, 885, 938, 964, 969.  
 PLATT (*Sir W.*): 294, 299.  
 PLAYFAIR (*Sir P.H.L.*): 256.  
 PLOESTI: 895.  
 POLLOCK (*A.J.C.*): 349, 361.

- POPE (V.V.): 292, 361, 366, 368, 374, 375, 377, 404.  
 PORTAL OF HUNGERFORD (C.F.A.P.) *1st Viscount*: 460, 544, 869, 1070.  
 PORTSMOUTH: 110, 114.  
 PORTSMOUTH (G.V.W.) *9th Earl*: 95, 99.  
 POWNALL (*Sir H.R.*): 365, 539, 549.  
 PUCKLE (F.H.): 140.  
 PUNJAB: 1125, 1219, 1247, 1249, 1256, 1259, 1260, 1262, 1263.  
 PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE: *see* BOUNDARY FORCE.  
 PYNE (H.G.): 61.
- QATTARA: 966.  
 QUICK (A.E.): 118.  
 QUINAN (*Sir E.P.*): 129, 130, 156, 160, 161, 199, 220, 222, 223, 228, 229, 236, 238, 239, 248, 255, 257, 259, 357, 745, 754, 852, 922, 984, 988, 997, 998, 1002, 1012.
- RAIKES (R.S.): 227.  
 RAJAGOPALACHARI (C.): 1312.  
 RAJENDRASINGHI (M.S.): 1145.  
 RAKITCH ( ): 778, 782.  
 RAMSDEN (W.H.C.): 510, 722, 939, 988.  
 RASHID AALI: 133, 142, 184, 187, 244.  
 RATRAY (A.R.): 1162.  
 RAVENSTEIN (Gen. von): 509, 510.  
 REES (T.W.): 1000, 1247, 1248, 1256, 1267.  
 REID (D.): 552, 558, 566, 575, 582, 583, 711, 945.  
 RENTON (J.M.L.): 945, 951.  
 REYNOLDS (J.R.): 1192.  
 RICHARDS (G.W.): 945.  
 RICHARDS (W.): 1015.  
 RIDDELL-WEBSTER (*Sir T.S.*): 354, 355, 358, 359, 361, 377, 394, 401, 416, 422, 425, 427, 533, 576, 625, 835, 922.  
 RIDGWAY (W.R.P.): 64.  
 RITCHIE (*Sir N.M.*):  
     *Letters from Ritchie*: 369, 478, 488, 494, 503, 545, 551, 552, 558, 561, 562, 563, 564, 566, 570, 571, 575, 582, 583, 585, 589, 593, 595, 599, 600, 606, 612, 619, 622, 630, 631, 636, 641, 643, 683, 689, 690, 695, 699, 702, 709, 710, 711, 720, 722, 728, 738, 752, 760, 769, 770, 789, 794, 802, 808, 816, 822, 829, 831, 832, 838, 843, 849, 859, 864, 867, 872, 897, 901, 916, 944, 975.  
     *Letters to Ritchie*: 550, 556, 557, 568, 603, 611, 634, 638, 686, 696, 700, 703, 708, 746, 765, 766, 783, 796, 804, 815, 833, 844, 845, 854, 861, 862, 868, 877, 881, 896, 898, 911, 921, 934, 939.  
     *References to Ritchie*: 458, 463, 482, 489, 490, 501, 502, 505, 508, 509, 516, 517, 519, 520, 522, 523, 524, 529, 532, 538, 541, 543, 569, 576, 581, 591, 592, 607, 617, 626, 627, 628, 644, 654, 656, 663, 667, 668, 670, 671, 681, 706, 713, 724, 725, 809, 888, 893, 915, 922, 924, 927, 928, 929, 937, 948, 952, 956, 957, 984, 1000, 1026.
- ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE (B.H.R.) *1st Baron*: 1028.  
 ROMMEL (E.): 305, 502, 514, 523, 525, 535, 559, 581, 585, 597, 598, 611, 617, 620, 623, 627, 628, 647, 652, 662, 670, 673, 675, 688, 700, 706, 806, 831, 876, 890, 915, 916, 954, 967, 968, 974, 976, 984, 1012, 1013.  
 ROOSEVELT (F.D.): 303, 382, 390, 400, 445, 448, 449, 527, 565, 751, 869, 879, 895, 946, 953, 954, 1087.  
 ROSSITER (E.N.C.): 61.  
 ROWLANDS (*Sir A.*): 1061, 1063.  
 RUDRA (A.A.): 1145.  
 RUGE (O.): 19.

RUPERTFORCE: 11, 21.

RUSSIA: 407, 408, 410, 413, 430, 514, 527, 549, 580, 621, 668, 765, 824, 852, 873, 904, 906, 908, 909, 914, 984, 988, 997, 1152, 1153.

RUTBA: 165, 429.

RYAN (C.N.): 1004.

RYCROFT (H.): 55.

RYNEVELD (*Sir P.van*): *see* VAN RYNEVELD (*Sir P.*).

SABINE FORCE: 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131.

SAGHAL (P.K.): *see* SEGHAL (P.K.).

SAHNI: 1249.

ST. CLAIR (G.J.): 95, 99.

SALISBURY: 116.

SALUM: *see* SOLLUM.

SANDYS (D.E.): *see* DUNCAN-SANDYS (D.E.) *Baron*.

SAVORY (*Sir R.*): 1145, 1215, 1246, 1271.

SCOBIE (*Sir R.*): 366, 367, 403, 541, 667, 672, 676, 708, 835.

SCOONES (*Sir G.A.P.*): 209, 210, 1117, 1119, 1142, 1197, 1215, 1259, 1263, 1271, 1278.

SCOTT (I.): 1204.

SCOTT-COCKBURN (J.): 377, 386, 585, 596, 599, 612, 630, 634, 665, 672.

SEGHAL (P.K.): 1114, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1137.

SEGNALI: 722, 789, 802, 803, 808, 838, 854, 872, 881, 896, 945.

SHAH NAWAZ: 1127, 1137.

SHEARER (E.J.): 302, 303, 305, 388, 429, 508, 516, 518, 556, 585, 636, 649, 688, 699, 700, 706, 720, 725, 737, 741, 745, 842, 983.

SHEN ( ): 1272.

SIAM: 1193.

SICILY: 382, 406.

SIDI BREGHISC: 881.

SIDI DAUD: 671.

SIDI OMAR: 474, 516.

SIDI REZEGH: 502, 505, 509, 516, 520, 522, 529, 586, 587, 803, 860, 945.

SIDRA RIDGE: 897.

SIKKIM: 1155.

SIKORSKI (W.): 427, 428, 429, 1014.

SIMLA: 1263.

SINCLAIR (*Sir A.*): *see* THURSO (A.H.M.S.) *1st Viscount*.

SINGAPORE: 533, 590, 591, 680, 712, 754, 1114, 1137.

SINGH (B.): *see* BALDEV SINGH.

SINGH (*Sir J.*): *see* JOGENDRA SINGH.

SINGH (N.): *see* NATHU SINGH.

SINGH (T.N.): 1145.

SIWA: 689, 989.

SKAANLAND: 12.

SLIM (W.J.S.) *1st Viscount*: 129, 130, 199, 1045, 1050, 1090, 1091, 1104, 1197.

SMALL (W.D.D.): 497, 518, 900.

SMITH (*Sir A.F.*): 121, 357, 368, 500, 506, 508, 509, 510, 512, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 539, 542, 549, 634, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 661, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 671, 672, 674, 676, 677, 688, 713, 714, 724, 725, 746, 772, 852, 1026, 1143, 1145, 1247, 1263, 1271.

SMUTS (J.C.):

*Letters from Smuts*: 311, 333, 341, 373, 384, 385, 419, 426, 471, 495, 511, 521, 535, 547, 579, 586, 587, 597, 608, 609, 645, 660, 673, 697, 818, 850, 874, 878, 879, 890, 891, 920, 933, 935, 969, 970, 981, 986.

*Letters to Smuts*: 309, 328, 336, 342, 395, 398, 409, 410, 418, 430, 479, 480, 496,

512, 513, 538, 548, 584, 588, 598, 607, 615, 616, 661, 675, 692, 698, 704, 733, 761, 762, 767, 848, 851, 871, 884, 889, 924, 926, 928, 937, 944, 948, 964, 972, 982.

*References to Smuts*: 303, 345, 420, 457, 637, 672, 674, 696, 713, 714, 742, 773, 831, 833, 946.

SMYTH (*Sir J.G.*): 1088.

SOLLUM: 288, 327, 516, 628, 630, 631, 633, 644, 699, 703, 709, 729, 744, 752, 754, 764, 833, 844, 861, 868, 872, 921, 925, 934, 937, 943, 945, 946, 953.

SOUTH AFRICA: *see* AFRICA, *South*.

SOUTHAM (H.S.): 1203.

SPEARS (*Sir E.L.*): 377, 432, 775, 777, 781, 787, 840.

SPENS (*Sir P.*): 1220, 1262.

SRINAGESH (S.M.): 1145.

STALIN (J.): 408.

STARK (F.M.): 1030.

STEPHENS (I.M.): 1167.

STEPHENS (*Sir R.B.*): 87.

STEPSISTER: 666.

STEVENS (G.R.): 1065, 1074.

STILWELL (J.W.): 1056, 1061, 1063, 1068, 1069.

STIRLING (D.): 606, 816, 898.

STOPFORD (*Sir M.*): 1090, 1214.

SUDAN: 793, 797, 810, 813.

SUEZ: 357, 824.

SUGDEN (R.): 3, 50.

SULTAN (D.I.): 1082, 1098.

SYBIL FORCE: 123.

SYRIA: 279, 280, 281, 285, 332, 342, 346, 357, 363, 374, 377, 403, 417, 522, 533, 580, 581, 617, 621, 647, 706, 775, 828, 840, 865, 922, 936, 1006, 1042.

'TAFFY': 1021.

TEDDER OF GLENGUIN (A.W.T.) *1st Baron*: 317, 380, 382, 399, 403, 407, 429, 460, 462, 524, 542, 544, 591, 628, 715, 716, 717, 757, 763, 846, 895, 906, 907, 909, 913, 922, 931, 953, 959, 1009, 1081.

TEMRAD: 868, 881.

TENGEDER: *see* BIR TENGEDER.

THAPAR (P.N.): 1135.

THERON (F.H.): 373, 395, 410, 426, 430, 521, 633, 637, 655, 657, 658, 660, 661, 773, 776, 818, 920, 924, 938, 986, 999.

THOMAS (M.): 1071, 1072, 1073, 1077, 1130.

THOMPSON (*Sir T.*): 1283.

THOMPSON (W.G.S.): 1135.

THORNTON (G.G.): 116.

THURSO (A.H.M.S.) *1st Viscount*: 715, 716.

TIBET: 1155.

TIDWORTH: 72, 73, 78, 79.

TMIMI: 671, 689, 709, 722, 766, 769, 802, 868, 872, 901.

TOBRUK: 136, 281, 282, 312, 313, 320, 322, 330, 331, 332, 337, 338, 339, 342, 346, 354, 357, 359, 360, 366, 367, 374, 377, 378, 389, 403, 415, 427, 429, 456, 464, 475, 478, 485, 488, 494, 498, 501, 502, 503, 509, 510, 516, 517, 519, 520, 522, 524, 529, 530, 532, 538, 541, 545, 551, 558, 561, 562, 564, 568, 569, 581, 583, 589, 599, 600, 625, 628, 636, 651, 676, 683, 686, 689, 699, 700, 702, 708, 709, 710, 717, 722, 728, 729, 738, 744, 754, 757, 760, 765, 769, 789, 794, 802, 803, 808, 816, 833, 838, 844, 849, 854, 859, 861, 864, 867, 877, 881, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 932, 934, 935, 937, 943, 944, 945, 948, 950, 953, 962, 970, 971, 973, 974, 978, 997, 1000, 1006, 1009, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350.

TOMLINSON (P.S.): 900.

TRAPPES-LOMAX (T.P.): 30, 47, 51.

TRIGH CAPUZZO: 861.

TRIPOLI: 310, 316, 382, 407, 417, 456, 623, 636, 649, 763, 806.

TRIVEDI (*Sir C.M.*): 1113, 1133.

TROMSO: 31, 32, 39, 40, 63.

TRONDHJEM: 408.

TUKER (*Sir F.*): 599, 625, 631, 654, 656, 663, 666, 667, 683, 696, 699, 703, 720, 746, 752, 877, 1104, 1145, 1155, 1164, 1197.

TUNIS: 590.

TURKEY: 346, 354, 357, 361, 374, 377, 382, 402, 404, 429, 431, 525, 581, 601, 605, 814, 865, 873, 907, 943, 1043.

TURNER (C.E.): 87, 89, 90.

TWYNAM (*Sir H.*): 1142.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 567, 590, 652, 668, 679, 751, 847, 869, 879, 909, 946, 953, 954, 955, 959, 974, 985, 1016, 1056, 1061, 1063.

UN QASR: 236, 263, 264.

VAN RYNEVELD (*Sir P.*): 329, 344, 345, 351, 370, 637, 784, 785, 791, 792, 800, 801, 805, 938.

VARMA (P.D.): 1031.

VAUGHAN (E.W.D.): 1196, 1199.

VENNING (*Sir W.K.*): 574.

VICHY FRANCE: 445, 448, 449, 590.

VIGOROUS: 915, 931.

VILLIERS (I.P.de): 370, 418, 513, 535, 538, 551, 561, 563, 564, 566, 637, 645, 713, 714.

WALMSLEY (*Sir H.S.P.*): 1242, 1281.

WARD (*Sir J.C.*): 233.

WATNEY (E.A.W.): 3, 54, 61.

WATSON (*Sir D.*): 404, 411, 427, 554.

WAUGH (*Sir A.A.*): 1181.

WAVELL (A.P.W.) *1st Earl*:

*Letters from Wavell*: 121, 136, 138, 165, 166, 177, 188, 194, 198, 204, 208, 230, 236, 237, 245, 284, 298, 301, 405, 414, 435, 447, 1039, 1047, 1058, 1063, 1076, 1134, 1140, 1208, 1212, 1219, 1287.

*Letters to Wavell*: 122, 123, 128, 130, 137, 150, 162, 174, 184, 187, 205, 208, 222, 250, 297, 443, 1040, 1044, 1052, 1056, 1061, 1064, 1074, 1078, 1085, 1097, 1099, 1109, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1119, 1133, 1139, 1143, 1146, 1150, 1212, 1312.

*References to Wavell*: 163, 197, 200, 202, 206, 209, 210, 211, 214, 217, 221, 226, 238, 240, 242, 266, 268, 269, 270, 272, 274, 285, 302, 348, 357, 361, 377, 408, 410, 417, 421, 429, 442, 524, 539, 549, 555, 578, 580, 591, 601, 605, 617, 680, 750, 768, 774, 869, 870, 910, 967, 992, 997, 1018, 1024, 1026, 1030, 1041, 1051, 1075, 1106, 1108, 1132, 1142, 1187, 1241.

WEBSTER (*Sir T.S.Riddell*): *see* RIDDELL-WEBSTER (*Sir T.S.*).

WEMYSS (H.C.B.): 98.

WETHERALL (*Sir H.E.de R.*): 307.

WEYGAND (M.): 382, 437, 445, 527.

WHEELER (R.A.): 1053, 1100, 1101.

WHIPCORD: 390, 403, 406, 407, 408, 415, 428.

WHISTLER (*Sir L.G.*): 1216, 1290.

WHITELEY (*Sir J.*): 389, 390, 391, 394, 407, 415, 427, 502, 658, 746, 765, 769, 803, 816, 872, 916, 988.

WICKHAM (J.L.): 84, 94.

WILLCOX (*Sir* H.B.D.): 1135.

WILLKIE (W.): 1005, 1009.

WILSON OF LIBYA (H.M.W.) *1st Baron*: 288, 295, 357, 377, 408, 416, 533, 539, 613, 647, 649, 745, 749, 772, 775, 777, 781, 835, 839, 950, 973, 978, 988, 997, 1005, 1006, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1065.

WINGATE (O.): 1035.

WOOD (*Sir* E.): 1145.

WOOTTEN (R.M.): 13, 39, 61.

YUGOSLAVIA: 421, 555, 768, 778.

ZAAFRAN: 516.

ZAJAC ( ): 995.