

# ASPECTS OF SUBORDINATION IN ENGLISH AND OTHER LANGUAGES<sup>1</sup>

By MARTIN B. HARRIS, M.A., Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF ROMANCE LINGUISTICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD

For those of us trained in the concepts and terminology of traditional grammar, the notion 'subordinate clause' is apparently unproblematical, clear criteria being available on the one hand to distinguish 'clause' from other units of grammatical analysis such as 'phrase' or 'word' and on the other hand unambiguously to separate 'subordinate' from 'main' or 'independent' clauses. While work within the generative framework has frequently made use of modified terminology — 'embedded' and 'matrix' clauses, for instance — the categories themselves have largely remained taken for granted, at least until the last few years. However, recent work, particularly by scholars concerned primarily with the structure of discourse, has suggested that it is a significant oversimplification to see a binary opposition of clause-types in this way, and one purpose of the present paper is to present, illustrate and evaluate arguments to this effect.

At the same time, linguists are increasingly aware that the semantic labels traditionally attached to 'adverbial clauses' — 'causal', 'temporal' and the like — may lead to the erroneous impression that these conceptual categories are in fact discrete. What is, in fact, now quite clear is that while these labels are often wholly appropriate to certain semantic archetypes, which carefully selected examples duly illustrate, the conceptual categories themselves merge one into another in ways that are not at all random and which are independent of the morphology and syntax of a particular language. The second purpose of this paper, then, will be to illustrate this point by reference to certain exemplars of various types of 'adverbial clause' which are conventionally carefully distinguished but are seemingly better viewed in fact as forming a semantic spectrum with no obvious internal boundaries. In effect, these two objectives can both be seen as aspects of one more general task: to demonstrate that at both the grammatical

<sup>1</sup> A lecture delivered in the John Rylands University Library on Wednesday, 12 February 1986.

and the semantic level, human languages make use of categories which are fuzzy rather than discrete, and which are capable of manipulation by speakers, consciously or otherwise, to achieve a variety of communicative effects which would otherwise need a much greater inventory of items and would thus be significantly less economical.

The final part of the paper is concerned with a much more specific task: to examine briefly certain morphosyntactic structures used in various European languages to express the concepts 'condition' and 'concession', both with a view to discerning and if possible explaining recurrent patterns and in order to illustrate more fully the claims made hitherto. This last section relies heavily on two other papers which I have recently written but which have not as yet appeared in print (Harris 1986, forthcoming).

Let us examine first the claim that the time-honoured distinction between 'main' and 'subordinate' clauses may not be quite as clear-cut as has generally been supposed. There is, firstly, the obvious point that there is no correlation in either direction between those clauses which one would wish to view as subordinate in grammatical terms and those which a discourse analyst would see in the same terms. To give just two examples, in a sentence such as "You do that and I'm off", there is no *grammatically* subordinate clause and yet the first clause is clearly at least as subordinate in discourse terms as a conventional 'if'-clause would be. On the other hand, in a sentence such as "Paris, which is the capital of France, is a very beautiful city", the 'subordinate' 'non-restrictive relative' clause has long been recognised as equivalent in virtually every way to a co-ordinate main clause, with the two clauses apparently on a par in discourse terms<sup>2</sup>.

More significantly, perhaps, is that at the grammatical level itself, as recent work by scholars such as Christian Lehmann and Sandra Thompson has shown, there are a number of sentence types which appear to lie between two ends of a spectrum which has two clearly 'independent' clauses at one end and a combination of a 'main' and a clearly 'subordinate' clause at the other. Consider for instance Latin sentences of the type "perutiles

<sup>2</sup> Lehmann (forthcoming) reminds us, for instance, of the observation by Green (1976) that such non-restrictive relative clauses may (unlike most subordinates) have their own illocutionary force: consider for example: "They tell me that Paris, which is where exactly in France (?), is a very beautiful city".

Xenophontis libri sunt; quos legite, quaeso, studiose"<sup>3</sup>, literally "the books of Xenophon are extremely useful, which read, I ask you, carefully" but clearly equivalent to "therefore read them". One function of 'relative' clauses in Latin, particularly favoured in literary prose, is to link together at the grammatical level two propositions which may be seen in discourse terms as equivalent to each other and where the 'relative pronoun' in effect subsumes both reference to the nominal element mentioned in both propositions and also the sense of some co-ordinating particle such as 'and', 'so', 'nevertheless' and the like. Can one really regard "quos legite" in an instance such as this as 'subordinate' from other than the most formalistic perspective?<sup>4</sup> Surely they are better viewed as bi-clausal correlatives of the type "tantus scribe quantum potes" (lit. "so much write as much as you can"), where, again, what we are really dealing with is two clauses which are effectively on a par, a relationship felicitously labelled 'sociation' by Lehmann in recent work.

Let us continue to develop the view that the distinction between main and subordinate clauses is not always as clear-cut as grammatical tradition would have us believe. There has been substantial discussion over the last decade or so of the appropriate analysis of existential sentences such as "there's a man downstairs wants to see you", conventionally viewed (e.g. by Quirk et al., 1972: para. 14.29) as a sequence of a main clause and a relative (i.e. subordinate) clause, with the 'interesting' special feature that the 'subject relative' can be omitted, not only unlike other subject relatives but indeed more generally in contravention of the very strong requirement for finite verbs in English to have an overt grammatical subject even when its lexical content is nil. (Think, for instance, of weather verbs in English, unlike those in Spanish or Italian.) I have myself briefly considered such sentences elsewhere (Harris and Vincent 1980), pointing out not only the problems relating to the putative omission of 'subject relatives' but also to the fact that the initial 'there is' is apparently increasingly invariable for number or tense, at least in the spoken language. (Consider, for instance, sentences such as "there's [ðəz] loads of us

<sup>3</sup> Cic., *C.M.*, 59, cited by Ernout and Thomas 1953, para.423 ("relatif de liaison"). See also Lehmann (forthcoming), example (25).

<sup>4</sup> Woodcock (1959: 189, n.) demonstrates on formal grounds that the treatment of such clauses in indirect speech indicates that they were perceived as main rather than as subordinate clauses.

went to see him last night"). A recent detailed treatment of the question by Mike Hannay within the framework of Functional Grammar (Hannay 1985), noting the views of John Anderson and Richard Hogg<sup>5</sup>, suggests that the whole embedded predication — in our case, "a man downstairs wants to see you" — "constitutes the argument of the existential predicate" (94), noting as "interesting" (202, n. 9) the view of Erdmann 1980 (shared by Harris and Vincent 1980) that "there is" and the like are (perhaps increasingly) to be viewed as predicational (or existential) prefixes rather than as independent clauses into which 'relative clauses' are embedded. What seems generally agreed, *pace* Quirk, by those who have studied such sentences in detail is that we are *not* dealing here with a sequence of a 'main' and a 'relative' clause, but with some form of bi-clausal parataxis, that is, the existential predicate and its argument, a situation which may either be viewed as still operative — essentially Hannay's position — or as having further evolved to — or towards — a unitary main clause (the 'prefix' approach), i.e. [ðəz] "loads of us went to see him last night". In any event, the distinction with which this paper is centrally concerned can be seen once again to be less than wholly clear.

It is worth noting in passing that Hannay refers also (1985: 94) to sentences such as "I have a friend has one" or "I know a woman owns one", which, he says, "cannot really be understood as involving anything other than relative clauses". I think this may be a case of over-caution on his part: the semantic force of "I have" or "I know" in such examples, is surely very little different from the 'existential prefix' *there's* and an analysis suggesting a subjectless relative clause involves at least as many problems at the syntactic level as does the equation of "I have" and "there's" at the semantic level, indeed in my view more. The French data discussed below also seem pertinent to this point, and we return to this question there.

In considering English existential sentences, we have been dealing with a sentence-type which was indisputably once bi-clausal but is today at least arguably not. A development in contemporary spoken French, fully analysed recently by Knud Lambrecht (forthcoming), seems to present the converse process, at least in diachronic terms. Lambrecht demonstrates beyond

<sup>5</sup> Hannay notes (202, n. 7) similar suggestions made in Anderson (1974) and Hogg (1977).

doubt that, in relaxed spoken French, sentences of a classic svo type are almost wholly absent. Put in other terms, there is a very strong preference for verbs, even archetypal finite verbs, to have only a single argument within a given 'clause'. This means that even such an apparently straightforward sentence as "mon frère a fait ça" "my brother did that", which, of course, has two arguments, "mon frère" and "ça", is in the event avoided, either by means of left- or right-dislocated structures ("mon frère, il a fait ça": "il a fait ça, mon frère") which both he and I have discussed at length elsewhere (Harris 1976, 1978, Lambrecht 1981) or, more significantly for the topic at issue here, by structures such as "(Il) y a mon frère qui a fait ça" or "J'ai mon frère qui a fait ça". (Note with reference to Hannay's earlier doubts, both the reduced form "y'a", directly comparable to [ðəz], and also, the apparent equivalence in this example between existential "(il) y a" and "j'ai", literally "I have"). And it is by no means only what would be svo sentences in more formal registers which have alternatives of the type just noted: "y a le téléphone qui sonne" for "le téléphone sonne" (lit. "there's the telephone that's ringing") is a typical and widely cited instance of an originally unitary intransitive sentence being replaced by an apparently bi-clausal sentence.

And the case for regarding structures such as these as bi-clausal does seem, at least on the surface, to be stronger in (popular) French than in English, precisely because the 'relative' *qui* is never omitted, although a 'reduced' form *qu(e)* is attested by Lambrecht as an alternative in a number of instances. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore whether this *qui* is truly a 'relative' — Hannay advances powerful *semantic* arguments (1985: 90-3) against analysing such clauses as relatives in English — or whether it can plausibly be viewed as a variant of the unmarked subordinator (which is, however, normally *que*). If the latter is a tenable view, then bi-clausality is by no means an inescapable conclusion. Consider in this connection, for instance, literary "peut-être qu'il viendra" or more popular "heureusement qu'il viendra" and the like, which by at least one formal criterion — the presence of the subordinator *que* — are to be analysed as bi-clausal but where semantic criteria — not to mention synonymous French sentences such as "il viendra peut-être", translation equivalents in other languages, and so on — might well suggest that we are dealing with a single proposition. It is illuminating to

note that Grevisse (1980: paras. 271, 2594) does, however, present such examples as bi-clausal, the 'main clause' being 'incomplete' (i.e. consisting of *heureusement!*), with the principal proposition being therefore subordinate ("sous la dépendance d'un nom, d'un adjectif ou d'un adverbe"). This is a fascinating demonstration of the interaction between syntactic, semantic and normative criteria for the determination of independent and subordinate clauses, and shows once again the fluidity of the borderline between what have traditionally been viewed as discrete categories.

The final illustration of this general point is due to recent work by Ekkhard König. In German (to present only the data relevant to the point at issue and in a very simplified form), a sentence combining a preposed subordinate clause and a main clause shows the finite verb of that main clause immediately after the conclusion of the subordinate clause, the latter having filled 'slot one' in a language with verb-second order in main clauses but verb-final order in subordinates. This pattern, referred to as 'integrative' word order by König, is typified by sentences such as "obwohl es regnet, geht Paul spazieren", literally "although it is raining, is going Paul for a walk". (This and all following examples are taken from König and v.der Auwera, forthcoming). What König shows is that, under certain circumstances, which are rather hard to define and which seem to vary at least in part depending on the function of the subordinate clause in question, another item, usually the subject, may precede the (finite) verb of the 'main clause'. This 'non-integrative' word order may be exemplified by "obwohl nicht alle unsere Mitglieder gekommen waren, einige waren da", "although not all our members had come, some were there" (i.e. not "were some there"). The question is, is a clause which *in itself* shows features of subordination (in particular the clause-final finite verb characteristic of such clauses) but which in its relationship to the main clause appears sufficiently independent *not* to fill the first slot of that clause to be viewed as subordinate or not? König concludes that "where different parameters, all assumed to be relevant for subordination in Germanic, do not coincide, the resultant structures have properties of independent, paratactically arranged simplex sentences" — in other words, they are more like 'main + main' than 'subordinate + main' combinations — and he lists certain properties which tend at least to permit non-integrative word order, e.g. "separate assertability, independence of truth conditions ... emphasis or, more specifically,

contrastive focussing, and different speech act perspectives of the two clauses". In other words, he shares Lehmann's view and the view advanced throughout this paper that there is no clear distinction between main and subordinate clauses, and successfully suggests certain (semantic) criteria which, because they *tend* to be associated with main rather than subordinate clauses, *may* (but apparently need not) have formal consequences in this area of German syntax.

Let us just take this analysis one step further than König himself, both for its own sake and as a link with the next section of this paper. Of König's two 'concessive' sentences presented earlier, one is in every way archetypal: it presents an antecedent normally unfavourable to the consequent, and then asserts that consequent nevertheless ("Although it is raining, Paul is going for a walk"). (Rain would normally be seen as disavouring walking; despite the assertion of this unfavourable antecedent, the consequent, far from being precluded, is also asserted). This sentence displays all the formal features of a subordinate + main combination. The second example is rather different: "although not all our members had come" is not, in semantic terms, an antecedent normally unfavourable to the consequent "some were there": in fact, the relationship between the two elements of the sentence is not antecedent: consequent at all. As König says, the meaning is similar to that of an adversative sentence involving the conjunction *but* ("Not all our members were there but some had come") — and as one may take König to imply, but as he does not in the event spell out, *but* serves to coordinate two independent clauses rather than to subordinate one clause to another. Consider now an English sentence like "He came, although was he right to do so?", and recall Lehmann's earlier observation (note 2) that non-restrictive relatives may have their own illocutionary force, a characteristic generally limited to main clauses. Surely, the "although" clause above shares this characteristic: it is formally subordinate but semantically independent and, interestingly in view of the German example just discussed and König's comments thereon, is readily paraphrasable with "but". What seems to be happening is that we have here a type of clause, which we may define formally as subordinate, whose core function is concessive, semantically defined, but which has other discourse functions, certain of which are equivalent to those normally marked by main clauses. In such cases, there are no formal manifestations in

English, but, because of certain specific syntactic rules relating to word order in German, it is open to a speaker to mark the sequence formally (in part at least) as two independent clauses, by not treating the first clause as subordinate in that it does not fill 'slot 1' of the matrix clause. That this is not done consistently should occasion no surprise: conflicts between semantic and syntactic consistency are frequent and are rarely tidily resolved (cf. Harris 1975). An interesting discussion of the non-correspondence of formal and functional definitions of subordination is to be found in Matthiessen and Thompson, forthcoming.

Moving on now to the second of our objectives, we shall demonstrate that not only are the formal boundaries between clause-types fuzzy but so, too, are the conceptual boundaries between various of the notionally labelled subordinate clause types so familiar in traditional grammar. Indeed, this point must already be apparent from what has gone before, given the absence of clear distinctions between 'relative' clauses of various types and main clauses, or between 'concessive' (subordinate) and 'adversative' (main) clauses, as just noted. We have demonstrated in earlier work (Harris 1986) that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the formal category '*if*-clause' and the notional category 'antecedent of a hypothetical consequent'. Recall first the obvious fact that there are other constructions which can mark this conceptual relationship (for instance, co-ordinate structures of the type "you do that and ...", mentioned at the start of this paper, and 'interrogative' structures of the "had he come ..." type, cf. Haiman 1978); recall also that the meaning of *if*-clauses themselves can overlap with that of generic temporals, where the epistemic notion of certainty has no relevance and where the distinction between "whenever" and "if" is consequently particularly liable to neutralisation ("if/whenever he comes, we have lunch together"). More significantly within the perspective adopted here, we observe that *if*-clauses can, in context, mark any value from causal via conditional to concessive. In other words, such clauses can be used, firstly, when a causal link between the 'subordinate' and the 'main' clause is asserted "if you will be so stupid, you must pay the price" ("if" = "because"), secondly, when a link is hypothesized as the basis for continued verbal interaction "if you come again, you will find it worthwhile" ("if" = "if"), or thirdly when the link is denied<sup>6</sup> "if we have a

<sup>6</sup> For an expansion of this oversimplified presentation, and in particular for a

right-wing government, nevertheless we have less personal freedom" ("if" = "although"). The evidence of languages such as Classical Latin, where the choice of mood in subordinate clauses was still to a considerable extent semantically rather than mechanically governed, shows clearly that modal usage in *si*-clauses reflects the underlying *semantic* value of that clause rather than being simply that of a 'conditional' clause, willy nilly. Thus a *si*-clause with either a causal or a concessive value can in principle have a verb in any tense of the indicative mood, whereas there are significant constraints on both modal and temporal usage in both clauses of a sentence incorporating a truly conditional *si*-clause<sup>7</sup>. This is further evidence, if any is required, that native speakers frequently find formal and semantic criteria in conflict, and accord precedence to one or the other at different times and/or in different registers<sup>8</sup>.

Once this link between the notional category 'hypothetical antecedent' and the formal category 'clause introduced by *if*' has been broken, then a number of the 'conditional' sentences discussed in König and v. der Auwera (forthcoming) can be more readily assimilated to the tentative general explanatory principles outlined earlier. Consider, for instance, König's "wenn ich schon als Maler schlecht war, als Schneider war ich eine Katastrophe" ("If I was already bad as a painter, as a tailor I was worse"), with

---

fuller analysis of the semantics of concessives and concessive conditionals, see Harris 1986 and forthcoming, and the references cited therein.

<sup>7</sup> Harris (1986) draws attention (n. 49) to the juxtaposition in Lehmann (1974) of two sentences of Ciceronian Latin: "*si peperit, cum viro concubuit*" and "*quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit*", respectively "if/since she has borne a child, she has slept with a man", where the preterite indicative "*peperit*" in the *si*-clause makes it clear that there is no hypothesis proposed here, rather an established fact. The use of the form of a conditional clause to mark causality is generally said to be for 'modal' purposes, i.e. to attenuate or to avoid being too categorical. As far as *si*-clauses with concessive value are concerned, Harris (forthcoming) cites "*si mihi bona re publica frui non licuerit, at carebo mala*", where both the context and the two indicative verb forms impose the interpretation, "if (= even though) I shall not be allowed to enjoy good government, at least I shall be rid of bad", that is, where the antecedent is taken as factual rather than hypothetical.

<sup>8</sup> In *si*-clauses and their direct descendants in Romance, semantic criteria have generally remained dominant, hypothetical clauses patterning one way and causals and concessives introduced by *si/se* in another. In clauses introduced by many of the less frequent conjunctions, however, all kinds of analogical pressures have operated (Harris 1986).

the non-integrative word order reflected in the fact that the first constituent of the 'main' clause is "als Schneider" rather than "war". Whatever the semantic value of the *wenn*-clause, it is not an antecedent on the realization of which the consequent is contingent: rather it is similar to the *obwohl*-clauses we considered earlier, whose discourse function appears to be very close indeed to that of a (co-ordinate) adversative clause marked by "but" and equivalents. Where König speaks of "indicative conditionals with a factual character", I would rather see such a *wenn*-clause as having a *non*-conditional value (as discussed earlier for Romance), with the added property that in German its actual semantic or discourse function, close to that of a main clause, may trigger a particular marked word order. I see no difference in principle between this and the earlier observation that a *si*-clause in Romance will normally show the mood appropriate to its underlying semantic value rather to its superficial formal structure.

It would obviously be easy to push an analysis along these lines too far, and as one reliant entirely on other people's intuitions on what are often fairly marginal judgements in German, I am reluctant to go further. However, one might conclude this section by reporting two more of the examples from König and v. der Auwera (forthcoming), namely the absolutely straightforward example (both semantically and formally) "wenn du mich brauchst, bin ich in fünf Minuten wieder hier" ("if you need me, I'll be back in five minutes", i.e. a genuine condition with the integrative word order appropriate to subordinate + main combinations), as opposed to "wenn du mich brauchst, ich bin in fünf Minuten hier", with non-integrative word order and glossed by König as "in case you need me, I'll be back in five minutes" or rather, it seems to me, "given that you may need me ..." This first clause can then plausibly be interpreted as one of two co-ordinated structures ("you may need me, so I'll be back ..."), with the consequent possibility — or even apparently the requirement in some cases — of non-integrative word order. It seems that this view fully complements the 'speech act qualifier' argument adduced by König, and it has the added advantage of making the link with the "painter/tailor" example even more explicit, that is, we are dealing underlyingly in both cases with two independent factual propositions, one of which happens to surface in a form which is frequently used on other occasions in the language to mark certain adverbial notions in a 'subordinate' form. If nothing

else, this paper has surely demonstrated beyond any doubt that underlying propositional structure and superficial clause structure are inherently independent of one another!<sup>9</sup>.

The final section of this paper will show briefly that, in addition to the synchronic fuzziness of categories of various kinds, both formal and semantic, discussed hitherto, there is no necessary diachronic consistency either. My own most recent work has been on the history of concessive markers in Romance, this topic being taken to include, as the reader would by now expect, not just the evolution of a particular type of subordinate clause but rather the historical development of *any* method of marking the sentence type in question, which consists, as we have seen, of both an antecedent and a consequent and in which both antecedent and consequent are asserted, the former being normally incompatible with the latter. (For elaboration, see Harris, forthcoming: note in particular that this definition posits the factuality of both components of a concessive sentence, with formal consequences in languages where the choice of mood is (truly) semantically governed.) Concessive sentences are used here simply by way of example: many if not all other semantic relationships of the type frequently expressed in Western European languages by sentences of the type 'subordinate adverbial clause + main clause' (in various orders) would have served our purpose equally well.

The most striking fact to emerge from the Romance data is that of the rise and fall of paratactic main clause combinations as the *principal* marker of concessive relationships, as defined above, at least in the records which have come down to us<sup>10</sup>. Another way of putting this is to say that in both Classical Latin and, for instance, Modern French, sentences taking the form 'subordinate clause + main clause' (in either order) are the norm, whereas in

<sup>9</sup> It is worth stressing that the points made here are intended to take further, and perhaps to make more general, certain of the arguments advanced in König and v.der Auwera (forthcoming), a paper with a substantial number of real insights on which I have drawn heavily in the present work. I have also referred throughout exclusively to Ekkehard König, a fellow-participant in the Albany symposium on Clause-combining in Grammar and Discourse: in at least some instances, reference to Johan van der Auwera would clearly also be appropriate!

<sup>10</sup> In saying this, we are — improperly, of course, in the light of what has gone before — setting on one side sentences involving two clauses co-ordinated by conjunctions with the value "but". For a fuller discussion of the semantic relationship between "but" and "although", see König 1985.

Old French the position was quite different. Broadly speaking, Old French simply juxtaposed two clauses, relying on the use of mood — the subjunctive — and on context to provide sufficient clues to the hearer to attribute a concessive meaning to the sentence as a whole. Often and increasingly, however, an adverb from one of a limited set of semantic fields (Harris: forthcoming) was used in what is interpreted in traditional terms as the 'main' clause, in the consequent, to indicate more clearly the semantic value of the sentence as a whole: English sentences such as "Yes, he arrived on time, I *still* wouldn't speak to him" or perhaps rather "He may (indeed) have arrived on time, I *still* wouldn't speak to him" typify this stage in the language's development. The structure as a whole, however, remained paratactic. All the available evidence suggests that sentences of this kind have been available throughout the history of Romance: what varies is the greatly enhanced use made of hypotactic structures in more formal registers and/or in periods of more elaborate formal education, in addition to or at times in place of more popular paratactic or co-ordinate structures.

It is with a brief examination of the process of 're-creation' of a range of classic 'subordinate clauses of concession' — and it really is a re-creation from scratch, as Harris (forthcoming) shows quite clearly — that this paper will conclude. The initial work by Haiman and Thompson (1984) on the non-discreteness of traditional grammatical categories can be illuminatingly developed by such an examination, particularly if use is made of the concept of 'syntagmatic interweaving', as defined in Lehmann (forthcoming). Broadly, one sees a move from simple parataxis, via a stage of 'adjunction' — the 'adjunction' consisting of a semantically appropriate adverb or reinforcing particle — towards an 'interlaced' structure formed when the 'adjoining' element passes from the consequent to the antecedent, where it may either be added to an existing conjunction (with a resulting change in the meaning of that conjunction) or form the basis of a totally new conjunction. (Both processes are illustrated below.) To use the terminology employed in Matthiessen and Thompson (forthcoming), the exponent of the precise semantic relationship to be marked — in this case, concession — passes from the nucleus to the satellite, a process which seems to go hand in hand with the downgrading of the antecedent in formal terms from 'adjoined independent' to 'subordinate' clause. The important point to bear in mind,

however, is that there is no precise stage in this process when one can speak without risk of contradiction of the passage from parataxis to adjunction to hypotaxis; while the archetypes are (by definition) clear, the boundaries between them are blurred and indistinct, both synchronically and diachronically.

One short illustration of each of the two patterns noted above is appropriate. Firstly, consider French *même*, one of whose meanings is "same". In an English paratactic sentence such as "he was late as usual, we managed all the same", the last phrase has a French equivalent *tout de même* or *quand même* (cf. "on a réussi quand même"). In French, however, this same *même*, by virtue of the process of interweaving mentioned above, also passed into the antecedent, where it combined with *si* ("if") to form the principal French concessive conditional conjunction *même si* ("even if"), the resultant complex sentence being of course hypotactic in structure. In truly popular French, one finds *même* also as part of the second process, that is, the creation by the addition of the unmarked subordinator *que* of a wholly new conjunction *même que*, as in "(quand) même qu'il se serait égaré, c'était pas sa faute" ("even though he did get lost, it wasn't his fault") (Guiraud, 1973: 77). This process is perhaps more familiarly illustrated by *bien que* (lit. "well that"), the most frequent French concessive subordinator with cognates in virtually every Romance language, where the element "well" forms the basis of a set of conjunctions quite unknown in Latin; popular *malgré que* (lit. "in spite of that") and literary *encore que* (lit. "still that") are further examples which are still in use. Here, too, all the sentences including clauses introduced by such conjunctions are normally seen as archetypally hypotactic.

Hopefully, this paper has done two things. Firstly I hope to have shown how a whole set of categories, both formal and semantic, are by no means as discrete as traditional description would have us believe, and that there are no constant correspondences, descriptive or historical, between particular categories in the one domain and those in the other. Secondly, I hope that this apparently iconoclastic act has demonstrated that more rather than less insights can be gained by seeing these various categories as synchronically 'fuzzy' and diachronically unstable, thereby enriching our understanding of this enormously complex area where the categories of grammar and those of discourse interact.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, J. M. 1974 "Existential Quantifiers", *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia*, xv. 1-27.
- Erdmann, P. 1980 "On the history of subject contact sentences in English", *Folia Linguistica Historica*, 1.1, 139-170.
- Ernout, A. and 1953<sup>2</sup> *Syntaxe latine*, Paris.  
Thomas, F.
- Green, G. M. 1976 "Main clause phenomena in subordinate clauses", *Language*, lii. 382-397.
- Grevisse, M. 1980<sup>11</sup> *Le Bon Usage*, Paris-Gembloux.
- Guiraud, P. 1973<sup>3</sup> *Le français populaire*, Paris.
- Haiman, J. 1978 "Conditionals are Topics", *Language*, liv. 564-589.
- Haiman, J. and 1984 "'Subordination' in Universal Grammar"; *BLS*, x. 510-523.  
Thompson, S. A.
- , forthcoming (eds.) *Clause-combining in Grammar and Discourse*, Amsterdam.
- Hannay, M. 1985 *English Existentials in Functional Grammar*, Dordrecht.
- Harris, M. B. 1975 "Some problems for a case grammar of Latin and early Romance", *Journal of Linguistics*, xi. 183-194.
- , 1976 (ed.) *Romance Syntax: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectives*, Salford.
- , 1978 *The Evolution of French Syntax: a Comparative Approach*, London.
- , 1986 "The historical development of conditional clauses in Romance", *Romance Philology*, xxxix, 4. 405-436.
- , "Concessive clauses in English and Romance", to appear in Haiman and Thompson (forthcoming).
- Harris, M. B. and 1980 "On zero relatives", *Linguistic Inquiry*, 11/4, 805-807.  
Vincent, N.
- Hogg, R. M. 1977 *English Quantifier Systems*, Amsterdam.
- König, E. 1985 "On the history of concessive connectives in English. Diachronic and Synchronic evidence", *Lingua*, lxvi. 363-381.
- König, E. and "Clause integration in German and Dutch". To appear in Haiman and van der Auwera, J. (forthcoming).

- Lambrecht, K. 1981 *Topic, Antitopic and Verb Agreement in Non-Standard French*, Amsterdam.
- , "Presentational cleft constructions in spoken French". To appear in Haiman and Thompson (forthcoming).
- Lehmann, C. 1974 "A universal about conditional sentences", in M. Romportl et al. (eds.), *Linguistica Generalia I: Studies in Linguistic Typology*, Prague, 231-241.
- , "Towards a typology of clause linkage". To appear in Haiman and Thompson (forthcoming).
- Matthiessen, C. and Thompson, S. A. "The Structure of Discourse and 'Subordination'". To appear in Haiman and Thompson (forthcoming).
- Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S. Leech, G. and Svartvik, J. 1972 *A Grammar of Contemporary English*, London.
- Woodcock, E. C. 1959 *A New Latin Syntax*, London.