Autonomous Production?
On Negri’s ‘New Synthesis’

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ITALIAN MARXISM has been known to Anglo-American Cultural Studies almost exclusively through Gramsci. This is no doubt partly an effect of the central role neo-Gramscian thought played in the development of the discipline away from Marxism in general. Neo-Gramscian work on ‘hegemony’ marked the passage from apparently orthodox concerns with class, capital and the economy, into a post-Marxist concern with the possibilities of agency, popular practices and new social movements, in a struggle for inclusion in the ‘chain of equivalences’ of social democratic political space. Here was a politics adequate to the fluidity of postmodern culture which could exorcize determinist Marxism, and indeed much of Marx, ‘without apologies’ (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1987). The historical support for this development was not unrelated to the Italian Communist Party’s (PCI) formation of its own version of post-Marxism – ‘eurocommunism’ – where neo-Gramscian thought played a central role. As A bse (1985) has suggested, eurocommunism seemed for many on the British left (most notably around the influential Marxism Today) to mark the possibility of a popular radical social democracy which could overcome Marxian orthodoxy and the limits of labourism; the PCI was, after all, the biggest Communist Party in Europe, and was rapidly approaching a place in government.

Behind this formidable post-Marxist trajectory another current in Italian Marxism – known in the 1960s as operaismo and in the 1970s as autonomia – remained obscured. Given its critique of the PCI and the neo-Gramscian politics of hegemony,¹ as well as its apparently orthodox and sometimes arcane focus on work, class and capital, and incessant reinterpretations of Marx, it is perhaps no surprise that this current has remained largely outside of the Cultural Studies tradition.² Times, however, change, and with the return to prominence of questions of globalization and
commodification, the post-Marxist trajectory looks a little less secure. In this context, the recent publication of Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) is something of an intellectual event. As Kraniauskas (2000: 29, 38) has noted, Empire is well placed in an emerging field of transnational cultural theory (as its themes and concerns are relayed through prominent figures in the left US academy, such as Jameson, Said and Appadurai). This has no doubt aided its positive reception. But Empire also draws on Marx and on the insights of operaismo and autonomia - movements with which Negri was heavily involved, and of which Hardt is one of the foremost authorities. The meeting of these hitherto rather distinct fields must be a key element of Jameson’s diagnosis on the dust-jacket that Empire is ‘The first great new theoretical synthesis of the new millennium’.

A central theme of Empire’s ‘new synthesis’ - and one which runs throughout operaismo and autonomia - is that of production, or labour (through the categories of ‘affective’ and ‘immaterial’ labour) and capital (as it is linked to Foucault’s ‘biopower’ and Deleuze’s ‘control’). Indeed, for Žižek (as the dust-jacket declares) it is this focus which gives Empire its import, as a book which ‘rings the death-bell not only for the complacent liberal advocates of the “end of history”, but also for pseudo-radical Cultural Studies which avoid the full confrontation with today’s capitalism’. I would suggest that Negri’s concerns with contemporary capitalist production and control – through his figure of the global modulating regimes of post-imperialist ‘Empire’ – could indeed encourage some interesting developments in Cultural Studies, opening up new lines of research and alternate ways for reading the development of contemporary culture. But to this end there is a danger in treating Empire as a ‘new synthesis’, as an autonomous work outside, or at the summit of its points of emergence; for – its incisive insights notwithstanding – Empire develops a problematic understanding of production which actually skirts over, and breaks with some of the more important insights and methodological emphasis of that which it apparently synthesizes.

This article explores the question of production in Negri. It does this by opening up and problematizing Negri’s apparent synthesis in relation to something of its milieu of emergence: operaismo, Marx and Deleuze. In particular the article focuses on Negri’s interpretation of Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’. It shows how this rather arcane text, which is central to Negri’s work, has two different readings; readings which Negri has not resolved, and that can be seen to lead to problems in his work. The article begins by discussing operaismo’s understanding of ‘real subsumption’ and the ‘social factory’. Through this I show how operaismo developed a very different position to both orthodox and neo-Gramscian Marxism, in that technical forces and social democracy were seen not as enabling lines of political mobility, but as creating a complex productive socius which left no room for an autonomous self-defined ‘People’ or even Subject of politics. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of ‘minor literature’ I suggest that it was the recognition of this very cramped condition and the refusal to designate a coherent
and autonomous People that was one of the core strengths of operaismo, as its cramped position compelled an intricate analysis of the new arrangements of production. After exploring the ‘Fragment on Machines’ I then consider Negri’s understanding of communicative and affective labour, and Deleuze’s figure of ‘control society’. In this I argue that, while Negri in some ways expands and develops operaismo’s figure of the social factory, in others – and this follows his interpretation of the ‘Fragment’ – he does not so much synthesize their position, as break with it, as he makes a certain return to an orthodox labour/capital dichotomy and maps the emergence of an autonomy-in-production, in a kind of mirror image of neo-Gramscian thought. The article concludes with a note about the optimistic sentiment of Negri’s work.

The Social Factory

Surrounded by the disabling culture of orthodox, and then eurocommunist Marxism that permeated the Italian left with its strong Communist Party, operaismo (‘workerism’) chose not to break with, but to return to Marx. A central concern of Panzieri, Tronti, Alquati, Bologna and Negri in the journals Quaderni Rossi (‘Red Notebooks’ 1961–4), Classe Operaia (‘Working Class’ 1964–6), and later Potere Operaio (‘Workers’ Power’ 1969–73), was with the question of technology and social relations in what in the ‘missing sixth chapter’ to Capital Marx had called ‘real subsumption’. In ‘formal subsumption’ capitalist forms of valorization engage with the labour process as it finds it; capital grafts itself onto ‘non-capitalist’ processes. This form of production has its problems, due both to the limited technical principle of handicraft, and the insubordination of workers, and hence, over time, labour becomes increasingly subdivided and mechanized, and concomitantly ‘cooperative’ (necessitating a form of overarching management and social plan) (cf. Marx, 1976: Ch. 13; Panzieri, 1976: 6–7). This develops into what Marx called the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’ or ‘real subsumption’ where labour and social life itself become enmeshed or ‘subsumed’, and hence transformed, in the intricate processes of machinery in large-scale industry. Here the unity of the labourer, already broken down in simple cooperation in manufacture, is radically disrupted and absorbed in a system driven by an ‘automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages’ (Marx, 1973: 692). In this ‘automaton’ – which Deleuze and Guattari would call a ‘machinic’ relation insofar as technical, human and social relations function as an integrated or machinic whole – the governing power or unity ceases to be the rhythms of labour, but becomes the rhythm of capital itself, under the temporality of the machine (which technically embodies the cooperation and socialization of labour and thus ‘constitutes the power of the “master” ‘ [Marx, 1976: 549]).

The result of operaismo’s return to the Marx of real subsumption – particularly in the work of Panzieri and Tronti – was a very different understanding of the contemporary socius and resultant politics to both orthodox (‘objectivist’) Marxist understandings of a self-moving development of the
forces of production’ (which could be ‘planned’ by a socialist state) and to neo-Gramscian understandings of the relative autonomy of the social (where a leftist democratic movement struggles over ‘hegemony’). As Panzieri argued, against the objectivists, technical forces developed not in a logic of neutral scientific development, but as a means of consolidating a particular form of the extraction of value. The forces of production thus had capitalist relations immanent to them in a ‘unity of “technical” and “despotic” moments’ (1980: 57). At the same time, quite contrary to neo-Gramscian conceptions of the relative autonomy of the social democratic political, the real subsumption thesis proposed that the social was becoming increasingly subordinated to capitalist regimes of production. Through analysis of the socialization of ownership in volumes 2 and 3 of Capital (the emergence of the capitalist-as-functionary of total ‘social capital’, rather than owner of individual capital; cf. Tronti, 1973; Marx, 1974: 388), Tronti perceived the development of a vast plane of capitalized social activity — what he called the ‘Social Factory’. As Tronti put it in 1962:

The more capitalist development advances, that is to say the more the production of relative surplus value penetrates everywhere, the more the circuit production–distribution–exchange–consumption inevitably develops; that is to say that the relationship between capitalist production and bourgeois society, between the factory and society, between society and the state, become more and more organic . . . [S]ocial relations become moments of the relations of production, and the whole society becomes an articulation of production. In short, all of society lives as a function of the factory and the factory extends its exclusive domination over all of society. (in Quaderni Rossi no. 2, cited in Cleaver, 1992: 137)

This thesis, as Bologna (n.d.: n.p.) suggests, ‘eliminate[d] the very bases of the concept of hegemony’ since, as Tronti argues, ‘The process of composition of capitalist society as a unified whole . . . no longer tolerates the existence of a political terrain which is even formally independent of the network of social relations’ (cited in Bologna, n.d.: n.p.). Indeed, for operaismo one of the functions of social democracy, and specifically of socialism, was to naturalize the infusion of productive relations throughout the social; ‘representing’ — or even, affirming — an unproblematized labour in the social democratic political. For Negri (in Hardt and Negri, 1994), writing in 1964, the socialist dreams of a ‘society of labour’ and a ‘general social interest’ (1994: 67) were seen to be actualized — as the very basis of domination. Negri thus describes the centrality of labour to the post-war Italian Constitution not as a capitalist ruse, but as the penetration of the ‘fundamental ideological principles of socialism . . . [in] the heart of the Constitution’ (1994: 56–7):

. . . capitalist social interest, which has already eliminated the privatistic and egotistic expressions of single capitalists, attempts to configure itself as a comprehensive, objective social interest. . . . The models of humanitarian
This analysis of real subsumption left operaismo in a rather ‘cramped’ position, for neither technological and productive forces (and the politics of orthodox Marxism), nor the development of social democracy (and the politics of ‘hegemony’) offered coherent lines of political mobility. This cramped position was not, however, unproductive. It is instructive to use Deleuze and Guattari’s presentation of ‘minor literature’ to understand operaismo’s position. In their work on Kafka and minor literature, Deleuze and Guattari (1986, 1988) propose a model of politics which emerges not in a space of plenitude, coherence and social mobility – in a People or an identity – but in ‘cramped spaces’ and ‘impossible’ positions – in ‘minorities’ and ‘small peoples’. Small peoples find themselves traversed by determining social forces that cramp their movement; they have no possibility of settling into coherent and autonomous self-determined identity. But this recognition that, as Deleuze (1989: 216) puts it, ‘the people are missing’, is not the announcement of a political dead-end. Deleuze and Guattari argue that cramped, impossible conditions compel politics, for if the most personal individual intrigue is always traversed by a wealth of determining social relations, then these social relations must be engaged with, disrupted, politicized, if anything is to be lived. The milieu of such an engagement is never able to settle, or soar on to the self-actualizing grandeur of a People, or its representatives, master authors. Instead, it is an ‘incessant bustle’ charged with a vitality, with polemic and with constant reinterpretation, where the often dry and obsessive work of intimate interrogation and particular intrigue – what may be called the ‘cellar’ of major literature – becomes itself the site of a collectively produced ‘minor’ literature.

In commentary on operaismo the dry, terse, and obsessive nature of their work is often remarked upon; indeed, for Moulier (1989: 5), ‘the aridity or the obscurity of this form of Marxism . . . is like no other manifestation we have known’. The incessant engagement with, and reworking of Marx – a little of which I have shown in relation to the real subsumption thesis – was driven less by a sense of an autonomous tradition, a ‘revolutionary history’, than by a need to put his work to use, to rework it in particular circumstances in an engagement with determining social relations. The Marx on which they focused – Capital volumes 2 and 3, and the Grundrisse – was often obscure and difficult; for its cramped complexity Guido Baldi (1985: 33) describes the Grundrisse as Marx’s Finnegans Wake. It also produced unusual reinterpretations; Moulier (1989: 35) reports that operaismo’s Marx was heretical enough to be said by its opponents to be a fabrication, and that indeed there was a joke that Enzo Grillo’s translation of the Grundrisse was better than the original. Most importantly, operaismo’s lack or refusal of a People can be seen as compelling its political innovation. Its project was to break with any conception of the ‘general interest’ of the
People and affirm a working class ‘partiality’ against political and economic integration in a ‘society of work’ and its emissary, socialism. This was to be done through an ‘autonomy’ from any form of political or trade unionist body that would seek to tie workers’ practices to the development of capital (cf. Tronti, 1973: 118–19). Such partiality was located in the productive function of the worker, but not in terms of any substantial identity. The politics of ‘the refusal of work’ was simultaneously a refusal of their own identities as workers. As Tronti put it (and it is noteworthy that Deleuze and Guattari [1988: 571] cite the passage in discussion of minor processes): ‘To struggle against capital, the working class must fight against itself insofar as it is capital.’

The intensive minor engagement of operaismo was based around what they called the ‘mass worker’ (essentially the workers of the large industrial plants of the Italian North, notably FIAT, and including a large proportion of Southern migrant workers whose precarious conditions left them excluded from the Communist unions). But though the mass worker always stretched beyond the walls of the factory to include the community (in as much as Fordism was a social system), it is arguably not until the 1970s and the development of work and politics around the figure of the ‘socialized worker’ that the worker of the social factory proper is theorized. The term ‘socialized worker’ was coined by Alquati in 1974, but it is closely associated with Antonio Negri (from Proletari e Stato in 1975 onwards) (cf. Wright, 1988: 306). In Negri’s development of this figure, one 20-page text – Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’ – took on central importance. Through the ‘Fragment’ one can discern both a radical enhancement of the social factory thesis, and the basis of a number of problems in Negri’s later work. It needs to be considered in some detail.

The ‘Fragment on Machines’

Since its first publication in Italian in the same issue of Quaderni Rossi (no. 4, 1964) as Panzieri’s (1976) essay ‘Surplus Value and Planning’, the interpretation of the ‘Fragment on Machines’, as Paolo Virno (1996) suggests, has been akin to biblical exegesis. Such exegesis has not been a replication of authorial truth, but an iteration of the text in different socio-historical contexts as part of the composition of varying political forms:

We have referred back many times to these pages – written in 1858 in a moment of intense concentration – in order to make some sense out of the unprecedented quality of workers’ strikes, of the introduction of robots into the assembly lines and computers into the offices, and of certain kinds of youth behavior. The history of the ‘Fragment’s’ successive interpretations is a history of crises and of new beginnings. (Virno, 1996: 265)

The ‘Fragment’ itself is a particularly complex and provocative text that raises a number of possibilities for understanding the trajectories of capitalist production – projecting an information capital from the heart of
manufacture - and the possible processes and forms of communism that are rarely, if ever, so evident in Marx's work. The difficulty of the text, and its varied deployment make a general presentation of the thesis of the 'Fragment' difficult. I will start with the general argument, and then show two variations that it takes.

The complex reconfiguration of labour and machines in the machinism of real subsumption (the point made so far) is made especially clear in this famous passage from the 'Fragment':

The production process has ceased to be a labour process in the sense of a process dominated by labour as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the individual living workers at numerous points in the mechanical system; subsumed under the total process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose unity exists not in the living workers, but rather in the living (active) machinery, which confronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism. (Marx, 1973: 693)

The radical thesis of the 'Fragment' is that in this machinic 'automaton' or 'organism' it is no longer the distinct individual entities of the productive workers that are useful for capitalist production, nor even their 'work' in a conventional sense of the word, but the whole ensemble of sciences, languages, knowledges, activities, skills that circulate through society that Marx seeks to describe with the terms general intellect (1973: 706), social brain (1973: 694) and social individual (1973: 705). This is a Marx that points to a very different understanding of productive labour than Marxian orthodoxy, and indeed the thesis is challenging enough that Virno (1996: 265) suggests that it is 'not at all very “marxist”'. There are, however, two different ways of reading the thesis, that, if they are not wholly at variance in Marx's text, can certainly lead to very different interpretations. The following discussion of these two interpretations is based around two very similar citations (which I have noted [A] and [B] to help references to these passages throughout the article):

[A]

But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose 'powerful effectiveness' is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production. (Marx, 1973: 704–5; emphasis added)

[B]

[The worker] steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour [the
Both these citations make the ‘Fragment’s’ general argument that labour time and direct labour diminish in importance in relation to a new force, but they offer slightly different inflections on this force. The first, [A], emphasizes the productive power of ‘science’ and ‘technology’, whilst the second, [B], proposes the ‘social individual’ as the new productive force. The resultant arguments need pursuing through Marx’s text.


As we know, Marx sees a narrative in the development of work toward ever-greater simplification and abstraction where the dissection of the division of labour ‘gradually transforms the workers’ operations into more and more mechanical ones, so that at a certain point a mechanism can step into their places’ (1973: 704). In the ‘Fragment’ this leads him to introduce something of a dichotomy between the worker on one side, and general intellect and the machine on the other. The dichotomy is signalled in [A], but he also puts it more firmly: ‘The accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain, is thus absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute of capital, and more specifically of fixed capital . . . ’ (1973: 694). As the ‘social brain’ or ‘general intellect’ is absorbed into machines, ‘the human being comes to relate more as a watchman and regulator to the production process itself’ (1973: 705). Contrary to what we might think, this relegation to ‘watchman’ function is less important as a sign that work has become tedious and alienated, than as a manifestation of a new and fatal contradiction for capital, and an indication of the possibilities for a communism without work. In as much as the productive force comes from general intellect embodied in machines and not workers, productivity seems to by-pass work, and hence the capitalist valuation of life in terms of work done becomes increasingly anachronistic: ‘The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself’ (1973: 705). An explosive ‘contradiction’ arises (1973: 705–6) because capitalism continues to measure these forces in terms of (increasingly unproductive) labour and labour time, and the possibility emerges for the valuation and creation of life based on the needs of the ‘social individual’ and ‘free time’. Thus we see in the forces of capital the potential for a communism where:

... on one side, necessary labour time will be measured by the needs of the social individual, and, on the other, the development of the power of social
production will grow so rapidly that, even though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all. (1973: 708)

The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them. (1973: 706, emphasis added)

This ‘contradiction’ thesis has been common in interpretations of the ‘Fragment’. Leaving Negri until later, it is worth mentioning a few examples. Montano cites these sections of the ‘Fragment’ to argue that ‘we are witnessing . . . the abolition of productive work within the capitalist mode of production itself’ (1975: 54) such that labour is no longer a form of production but of control (1975: 58). Most famously, André Gorz similarly (though without a class struggle perspective) uses the ‘fragment’ to argue that the majority of the population belong to a ‘post-industrial neo-proletariat’ whose precarious work ‘will [in the not too distant future] be largely eliminated by automation’ (1982: 69), that the ‘micro-electronic revolution heralds the abolition of work’ (1985: 32), and that already ‘the amount of time spent working and the relatively high level of employment have been artificially maintained’ (1982: 72) in a capital that has moved from production to domination (1985: 39). Even Jeremy Rifkin (1995: 16–17) uses the ‘Fragment’ – if rather superficially – to make his version of Gorz’s ‘end of work’ thesis. Finally, Virno (1996), whose interpretation of the realization of the ‘Fragment’s’ emancipatory projections within capitalism is similar to the argument of this article, still writes of the ‘vanishing of labour society’.

The contradiction thesis is in many ways a crucial moment in understanding Marx’s politics, for it posits communism not on a militarization of work, or an unalienated work, but on the destruction of the category of work enabled through complex mechanical processes, and a life of expansive creativity, art and science beyond the drudgery of repetitive manual labour, or, indeed, work at all. But, in as much as Marx presents it as a ‘contradiction’ it is problematic.

[B] The Social Individual in Real Subsumption

Marx’s potential communism of general intellect-rich production outside work has not materialized, even with a massive expansion in the use of machines and the proliferation to a now axiomatic position of third-generation information machines.¹³ We can point to other parts of the ‘Fragment’ which, in conjunction with the real subsumption thesis, explain why. As we have seen, the contradiction is based on a disjunction between work and general intellect/machines, with an increasing diminution of the productive force of the former (both quantitatively and qualitatively [Marx, 1973: 700] – shrunk to mere ‘watchman’) vis-a-vis the latter. The contradiction only holds insofar as this disjunction holds; insofar as the new
productive potential of general intellect lies outside work in some kind of 'pure science'. Given the movement toward ever-greater simplification of factory work that Marx was witnessing, the presentation of this disjunction is understandable. But it goes against the logic of the real subsumption thesis. As we have seen, the essence of real subsumption is that technical and social relations become enmeshed or subsumed within a machinic 'automaton'. As Panzieri and Tronti emphasized, this leaves no autonomous sphere of the technical or the social; everything is infused with capitalist relations. Rather than think of science or general intellect as an autonomous sphere of pure invention, the real subsumption thesis should thus encourage us to think of it as a product of human activity conditioned within this social machinic system, something 'called forth' by the automaton of capital.

The possibilities for thinking the interrelation of general intellect and work are more apparent when Marx writes of the 'social individual'. In section [B] Marx says not that science embodied in machinery is the productive force, but that 'the social individual appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth'. Marx uses general intellect and the social individual largely interchangeably, but when he talks of the social individual we see a much richer idea of social rather than scientific technological productivity. The social individual still seems to free-float outside of work, but if we follow the real subsumption thesis we could imagine that the automaton that subsumes the manual worker would also subsume the social individual. Thus the productivity of the social individual – which could include a wealth of knowledge-based and affective relations – would emerge always already in a work relation. When Marx writes in the 'Fragment' that the worker is 'regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery' (1973: 693) such that 'The most developed machinery thus forces the worker to work longer than the savage does, or than he himself did with the simplest, crudest tools' (1973: 708–9) what we need to add is that this is not just because general intellect invents machines that are used to make more manual work, but that general intellect and the practices of the social individual emerge as work – as forces immanent to a social machinic system. The individual worker is still increasingly irrelevant (in her particularity as against the social whole she contributes to), but this time it is because general intellect signifies the extraction of surplus value not from repetitive manual labour, but from all sorts of different, more complex forces in the social individual's 'combination of social activity' across society (not just within, but including work time). It is not, then, that a pure science becomes productive, but that a whole series of capacities and knowledges are productive and exploitable; work is not emptied of content, but filled with different content.

The productivity of general intellect, then, signifies a process not toward an increased unproductivity and irrelevance of work, but to the greater expansion of the content of life that can count as work. We can thus understand Marx's (1976: 532) other, rather tragic conclusion concerning the 'paradox that the most powerful instrument for reducing labour-time suffers
a dialectical inversion and becomes the most unfailing means for turning the whole lifetime of the worker and his family into labour-time at capital’s disposal for its own valorization’.

**Negri’s Socialized Worker**

Both of these readings of the ‘Fragment’ – as well as a strange involution of the two – are evident in Negri’s writings on the socialized worker (a term itself derived from the ‘Fragment’s’ ‘social individual’). I will trace his argument through two interrelated points: first, that the content of socialized work has a tendency to become increasingly ‘communicational’ and ‘immaterial’, and, second, that this form of work tends toward autonomy, becoming almost a majoritarian communist collectivity. In this discussion I am combining Negri’s later sole authored work with his work with Michael Hardt (1994, 2000). There is no doubt that *Empire* stretches to overcome the conceptual problems I will identify, but it does not fully manage it.15

Communication and Affective Labour

The core of Negri’s thesis follows the essence of the ‘Fragment’s’ projections, that socialized work is extremely rich in techno-scientific knowledge, becoming the living collective of general intellect. Thus in *The Politics of Subversion* Negri (1989: 116) writes that the ‘raw material on which the very high level of productivity of the socialized worker is based . . . is science, communication and the communication of knowledge’. Communication becomes central because it is the form of cooperation of the vast social whole: ‘intellectual work reveals the mechanism of interaction for all social labour . . . it produces a specific social constitution – that of cooperation, or rather, that of intellectual cooperation, i.e. communication – a basis without which society is no longer conceivable’ (Negri, 1989: 51). Negri (1989: 117) thus employs Habermas’s theory of ‘communicative action’ to say that ‘It is on the basis of the interaction of communicative acts that the horizon of reality comes to be constituted.’ Two contradictory arguments seem to develop from this, as is no more apparent than in *Empire*.

On one side Negri recognizes that this communicative labour is not just a ‘linguistic’, but also a ‘subjective’, and later (Hardt and Negri, 2000), a ‘biopolitical’ and ‘affective’ interrelation, which, following Haraway, Hardt and Negri (1994, 2000) describe as a ‘cyborg’ condition of a complex assemblage of technical, organic, material and immaterial processes. Hardt and Negri (2000: 29) even pose a critique of the post-autonomia immaterial labour theorists (such as those collected in Virno and Hardt, 1996), for presenting the forces of production I have been considering ‘almost exclusively on the horizon of language and communication’. *Empire* suggests that this immaterial labour is not a distinct plane of production (though there are new forms of labour which involve the manipulation of information, code and sign), but is immanent to the various regimes of production as a whole. Manufacture, for example, does not vanish, but is ‘informationalized’, as it is increasingly orchestrated through information technologies (Hardt and
Negri, 2000: 293). Further, largely following my argument in the discussion of section [B] above, as Hardt and Negri’s emphasis on biopower and the cyborg would necessitate, communicative and affective labour is seen as enmeshed in capitalist regimes of control, such that ‘constant capital tends to be constituted and represented within variable capital, in the brains, bodies, and cooperation of productive subjects’ (2000: 385).

This updating of the social factory thesis to explore the capitalization of affective production and general intellect is one of the most important aspects of Negri’s work. But it does not emerge unproblematically; there is another side to the argument. At one level, he continues to conflate affective biopolitical processes with communication; suggesting, for example, that ‘communication has increasingly become the fabric of production’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 404). But, more radically, Negri suggests that affective and immaterial labour tends toward increasing autonomy outside capitalist relations.

Autonomous Production and the Communist Multitude

Apparently ignoring the radical divergence between Foucauldian frameworks (where language is always enmeshed in power/knowledge regimes, and is hence never ‘autonomous’) and Habermassian autonomous communicative action, Negri seems to equate a tendency toward the productivity of communication with an emerging freedom – as if the more fluid and immaterial production becomes, the more it escapes control – and perceives a rather pure linguistic ‘activity’ coming to the fore in ‘communicational society’ (1992: 105). Even when, in Empire, a more biopolitical slant is offered, biopolitical and immaterial labour still tends toward autonomy. Thus, in direct opposition to the passage about variable capital cited above, Hardt and Negri (2000: 294) make a strange return to the orthodox dichotomy between labour and capital, and write – in the same work – that biopolitical labour:

. . . calls into question the old notion . . . by which labour power is conceived as ‘variable capital’, that is, a force that is activated and made coherent only by capital, because the cooperative powers of labour power (particularly immaterial labour power) afford labour the possibility of valorizing itself.

The reasons Negri tends to see an emerging autonomy of immaterial labour, even as he uses Foucauldian and Deleuzian conceptions of the immanence of power to all social relations, are not unrelated to Marx’s desire in the ‘Fragment’ to witness an emerging contradiction and the basis for communist sociality. Just as Marx proposed that the new content of productive activity (general intellect) would emerge outside work, and hence tends toward communism and the abolition of work, Negri similarly sees this increasingly autonomous plane of immaterial, communicative and affective labour – what Empire calls the ‘multitude’ – as a communist essence. Thus, in one reading of the ‘Fragment’ (Negri, 1988: 115–16), he uses the section
noted [A] above to argue that the quantitative contradiction (mass socialized production measured in individual terms) is ‘brought to a head’ as labour-time is indeed a ‘dissolving factor’, and science is ‘immediately incorporated into production’. However, unlike Montano’s and Gorz’s interpretations of the ‘Fragment’, Negri does not follow Marx in seeing this going on outside work, in a pure productive science (which would lead to the crisis of work-society). Rather, as the last comment about variable capital suggests, he sees socialized work itself as tending toward autonomy; increasingly operating not in terms dominated by numeration, equivalence and the value-form (‘work’ determined by capital), but in terms of ‘free individualities’ labouring in a self-determined fashion and driven by their own needs (‘activities’). Negri writes that:

The exchange of labour-power is no longer something that occurs, in determine quantity and specific quality, within the process of capital; rather, an interchange of activities determined by social needs and goals is now the pre-condition, the premise of social production. . . . Work is now an immediate participation in the world of social wealth. (1988: 117–18, emphasis added)

This ‘interchange of activities’ of the ‘multitude’ tends to autonomous self-organization where ‘cooperation is posed prior to the capitalist machine, as a condition independent of industry’ (Negri, 1992: 78), such that ‘the entrepreneurial power of productive labour is henceforth completely in the hands of the post-Fordist proletariat’ (Negri, 1996: 216), and ‘The socialized worker is a kind of actualization of communism, its developed condition. The boss, by contrast, is no longer even a necessary condition for capitalism’ (Negri, 1989: 81; cf. also Hardt and Negri, 2000: 294).

We can see now how Negri at once continues, and radically departs from operaismo’s project. Panzieri and Tronti removed the possibility of thinking the relative autonomy of technical, social or political spheres, and instead described a universal plane of capitalized production throughout the social factory. Negri continues operaismo’s concern with a universal plane of production, and is not shy in showing his disdain for the neo-Gramscian thesis of the relative autonomy of the socio-political (cf. Hardt and Negri, 2000: 451). At the same time, however, the essence of the social factory thesis – the immanence of capital to all social relations – seems to vanish, as Negri both reintroduces the orthodox separation between forces and relations of production which Panzieri had been so keen to undermine, and begins to produce a strange inversion of the neo-Gramscian thesis whereby it is the realm of production which becomes autonomous. Thus, though Negri oscillates between seeing the communist multitude in forms of work and in forms of resistance, essentially the resistance becomes not so much a refusal of work (for ‘work’ has in a sense been overcome), but an affirmation of the collective embodiment of immaterial and affective labour: ‘In effect, by working, the multitude produces itself as singularity’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 395, emphasis added). At his extremes Negri (1989: 79) even favours
labour-market deregulation (as if 'deregulation' was not always a process of intricate regulation) to enable the development of this potential, and turns away from the refusal of work in a variant of the old council communist theme of 'self-management', as a 'reappropriation of the social essence of production . . . to ensure an ever richer reproduction of accumulated immaterial labour' (1996: 221).17

This is not to say that Negri dismisses the category of exploitation. He writes that this socialized work is 'inextricably and emotionally linked to the principal characteristics (exclusion, selection, hierarchy) of the labour market' (1989: 47), and that this 'does not mean mocking the reality of exploitation' (1994: 235). But insofar as the multitude tends toward autonomy, exploitation becomes increasingly 'external' and 'empty' (1994: 238): 'capitalist power dramatically controls the new configurations of living labour, but it can only control them from the outside because it is not allowed to invade them in a disciplinary way' (1994: 235). It thus becomes increasingly unclear what exactly exploitation is.

The Multitude, Control and the Minor

Negri's position is marked most clearly in his reading of Deleuze and Guattari's figures of 'control' and the minor. In the context of what we could call Deleuze and Guattari's version of the social factory thesis, the 'Fragment' can be seen as Marx's engagement with a coming shift from a model of production fitting with what Foucault calls 'discipline' (with fixed spaces of enclosure and repetitive practices), to a much more fluid model of what Deleuze (1995) calls 'control'. Indeed, the great energy of the text – as well as the reasons for its ambiguity – can be seen in the fact that Marx is pointing to a coming control society at the time of, or even before the apogee of discipline.

Deleuze suggests that Marx's great innovation was his understanding of capital as something which – unlike all previous social systems – is founded on a continual overcoming of its limitations, contradictions, or 'lines of flight', that which escapes its regimes. With the emergence of control, capital increasingly comes to operate directly on its lines of flight. That is, it seeks less to maintain fixed disciplinary moulds - which are not always so quick to capture that which escapes - but operates through increasingly flexible and varying modulations of social activity. Control societies thus move away from the thermodynamic model of the ordered dispensation of energy in discrete spaces of enclosure – family, school, army, factory – to a more general cybernetic model of what Massumi (1998: 56) calls 'unleashed production', with a varying overlay of each disciplinary technique across social space. The disciplinary discrete 'individual' which passes through each enclosure is thus replaced by a 'dividual' which is in a superposition, subject simultaneously and in varying ways to a multiplicity of controlling and productive mechanisms. Control is still oriented to production. Indeed, the essence of control is its ability to discern and capitalize a multiplicity of activities. The lines of flight which might be experienced as entropy in
disciplinary space, here become the driving force of production; capital is thus dependent on an increasing degree of differentiation, innovation and variation in social practice.

Negri uses Deleuze’s model of control – it is a central theme of Empire – but rather than talk of control in terms of a tendency to an increasing cybernetic or modulating capitalization of activity, he reads it in the context of a tendency to the productive autonomy of the multitude, and ties this to minor processes. Negri (1998: n.p.) suggests that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the minor was a recognition of the new socialized worker, but that, in a manoeuvre which clears a space for his own work, ‘from the point of view of phenomenological analysis’ the ‘sociopolitical definition in A Thousand Plateaus does not really go much further than this’ (cf. also Hardt and Negri, 2000: 28). However, whilst the minor is premised on cramped impossible minority positions where social forces constrain movement (as I showed in relation to operaismo), Negri (1998: n.p.) suggests that the minoritarian contributed to a ‘new concept of the majority’ of the autonomous multitude. In one essay Negri even links it to Deleuze’s (and Foucault’s) typologies of abstract machines and diagrams as an inevitable mode of communist democracy arising out of control society:

According to Foucault and Deleuze, around this final paradigm [control/communication] there is determined a qualitative leap which allows thinking a new, radically new, order of possibility: communism. If in the society of sovereignty democracy is republican, if in the disciplinary society democracy is socialist, then in the society of communication democracy cannot but be communist. Historically, the passage which is determined between disciplinary society and the society of communication is the final possible dialectical passage. Afterwards, the ontological constitution cannot but be the product of the multitude of free individuals . . . (Negri, 1992: 105)

That Deleuze’s position is actually rather different to this is evident in an instructive conversation between the two (in Deleuze, 1995: 169–76). Negri asks Deleuze if in ‘communication society’ the communism of the ‘Fragment’ as the ‘transversal organization of free individuals built on a technology that makes it possible’ is ‘less utopian than it used to be’. He also raises the possibility that, though domination becomes more perfect, perhaps ‘any man, any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom’ (in Deleuze, 1995: 174). Though posed as a question, this is clearly a presentation of Negri’s general argument. Deleuze responds, however, by making a very different point. He suggests that instant communication is less concomitant with communism than with the intricate feedback mechanisms of the open spaces of control, saying that speech and communication are ‘thoroughly permeated by money – and not by accident but by their very nature’, such that ‘The quest for “universals of communication” ought to make us shudder’ (1995: 175).
Conclusion
This article has presented a current in European Marxism which has been rather obscured by the prominence of neo-Gramscian thought in Cultural Studies. I argued that, against orthodox Marxist understanding of a neutral force of production and the neo-Gramscian presentation of the relative autonomy of the socio-political, operaismo developed a rather cramped, minor knowledge and politics insofar as it produced no coherent and autonomous People, but compelled an intensive investigation of the productive force of the social factory. I then explored Marx's 'Fragment on Machines' and showed how it stretched to understand the development of production into the realm of general intellect and the social individual. At one level this is a Marx who points to an increasingly complex machinic form of production that extends the social factory thesis to include general intellect-rich production, and, to use Foucault's and Deleuze's figures, seems - in the midst of disciplinary society - to discern the coming diabolical powers of the society of control. On the other hand, perhaps evidencing some of the constraints of thinking beyond one's own social regime, Marx suggests - in a fashion which actually goes against his analysis of the tendencies of real subsumption - that the powers of general intellect may emerge outside work in a productive autonomy that would prove fatal for capital. In Negri's analysis of the 'Fragment' and his development of the socialized worker thesis this tension remains. On one side there is a concern with the intricacies of a capitalized affective and immaterial labour, such that the politics of hegemony is still dismissed as a misrecognition of capitalist regimes of control. But, on the other, Negri breaks with operaismo's, Marx's and Deleuze's understanding of the immanence of controlling regimes to productive forces, to discern a tendency to increased autonomy-in-production. In this 'self-determined production' Negri is careful to elaborate a potential multitude rather than a present People, and he insists that this is an historical other to the social democratic subject. But this does not prevent him from discerning an emerging communist subject that has overcome the law of value, and seems to produce its singularity through its work, in an almost inevitable process which 'cannot help revealing' a telos, a material affirmation of liberation' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 395).

The emergence of interest in Negri's work at a time of a certain sense of the inadequacies of the post-Marxist paradigm (evidenced, for example, in Žižek's and Butler's movement away from Laclau's thesis in Butler et al., 2000) should be seen as an event charged with possibility. If Empire is going to instigate a challenge to Cultural Studies, as Žižek proposed, I would suggest that it is indeed through its concern with contemporary capitalist production. Negri's work provides a great opportunity to think new forms of work, affect and social activity in the context of new global regimes of capitalist accumulation and control. For Cultural Studies - where the focus on the politics of hegemony and new social movements has for a long time largely left production (or capital and labour) to Economics - there is a lot of productive work that can be done here. However, as part of this work a
more nuanced understanding of capitalist production is needed; one which avoids Negri's tendency to produce a mirror-image of neo-Gramscian thought by replacing the relative autonomy of the social with that of production. To this end, this article has sought less to treat Empire as an autonomous work which synthesizes previous positions, than show - through an emphasis on some of the points of emergence, disjunction and instability in his work - how, in Negri's understanding of production, some of the core concerns of operaismo, Marx and Deleuze are actually broken with. In this break the very real possibilities for reorienting Cultural Studies toward a concern with the intricate flows and breaks of contemporary production are in danger of being lost in a new version of autonomous popular practices and self-directing subjects - only this time they would not be new social movements in the social democratic sphere, but immaterial labourers at work.

As a concluding note I want to turn to the unusual sentiment of Negri's work. Part of Negri's announcement of a coming communism of the multitude is no doubt an attempt to bring some optimism and possibility for affirmation to the left; and indeed, as Balakrishnan (2000: 142) notes, Empire offers an optimism that seems to surpass even that of the neo-liberal diagnosticians of the end of history (whose works usually conclude with a note of caution). This does reverse the conventional position of the left of, as Balakrishnan (2000: 142) puts it, 'at best' a 'clear-eyed pessimism', and in this Empire is largely unique. It is difficult not to welcome a little affirmation, to feel at one with the cutting edge of change. But I wonder whether this is a necessary, or even appropriate sentiment for left political thought. In tracing the emergence of Negri's thought, this article has touched on a different political sensibility, one that resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's figure of minor literature. The founding condition of this minor sensibility - or what we could call a 'minor politics' - is not a sense of an emerging autonomy, but of cramped, complex relations that offer no easy or inevitable way out. As I suggested with regard to operaismo, this minor politics is certainly less optimistic, but it is not less productive; for it is in the recognition of, and the engagement with the cramped conditions of life that the incessant bustle, polemic and innovation of politics emerge.

Notes

1. Contrary to the dominant leftist interpretation of the PCI found in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s, for operaismo and autonomia the PCI was not only an efficient mechanism for curtailing radical energies and disrupting progressive political development, but was also, through its austerity measures, the agent of pernicious cuts in the standards of living of the Italian working class. In what may now appear as dark humour, the PCI's leader, Enrico Berlinguer, even went so far as to forward austerity as a communist moral ideal (cf. Abse, 1985: 27).

2. There are, of course, exceptions. It is notable that Meaghan Morris, who is generally critical of Cultural Studies' tendency to populism and the neo-Gramscian
politics of hegemony, wrote an excellent account of autonomia and its relations with the PCI as early as 1978.

3. For the purposes of this article, Negri’s work with Michael Hardt is discussed as part of Negri’s oeuvre.

4. The translation of operaismo as ‘workerism’ is, as Hardt (1990: 249) points out, problematic: ‘The English usage of “workerism” and the French “ouvriérisme” correspond to the Italian “fabrichismo” in that they are used pejoratively to designate those who cannot or will not recognize the power of social struggles outside the factory. The characteristic of “operaismo” is that it has been able to transform itself in step with the changing nature of work.’

5. ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’ (often known as ‘the missing sixth chapter’) was first published in 1933 in German and Russian, but took on particular importance – especially for the Italian and French extraparliamentary communists – when it was republished in other European languages in the late sixties (1976 in English).

6. This conjunction of objectivist and planning positions is amply evident in Lenin’s 1919 speech entitled ‘Scientific Management and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’: ‘The possibility of socialism will be determined by our success in combining Soviet rule and Soviet organization or management with the latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and its systematic trial and adoption’ (Lenin, cited in Bell, 1956: 41).

7. ‘The capitalist objectivity of the productive mechanism with respect to the workers finds its optimal basis in the technical principle of the machine: the technically given speed, the coordination of the various phases and the uninterrupted flow of production are imposed on the will of the workers as a “scientific necessity” . . . . The capitalist social relationship is concealed within the technical demands of machinery and the division of labour seems to be totally independent of the capitalist’s will. Rather, it seems to be the simple and necessary results of the means of labour’s “nature”’ (Panzieri, 1976: 9).

8. The first article of the 1948 Italian Constitution reads: ‘Italy is a democratic republic founded on labour’ (cited in Hardt and Negri, 1994: 55).

9. Tronti (1973: 115–16) writes: ‘The real generalization of the workers’ conditions can introduce the appearance of its formal extinction. It is on this basis that the specific concept of labour’s power is immediately absorbed in the generic concept of popular sovereignty: the political mediation here serves to allow the explosive content of labour’s productive force to function peacefully within the beautiful forms of the modern relation of capitalist production. Because of this, at this level, when the working class politically refuses to become people, it does not close, but opens the most direct way to the socialist revolution.’

10. ‘Socialized worker’ is a translation of operaio sociale, sometimes also translated as ‘diffuse worker’ and ‘social worker’.

11. Passages from the ‘Fragment’ return throughout Negri’s work from his essays in Potere Operaio up until Empire. The importance he attributes to the ‘Fragment’ is clear when he writes that it is ‘without doubt, the highest example of the use of the antagonistic and constituting dialectic that we can find, certainly in the Grundrisse, but perhaps also in the whole of Marx’s work’ (Negri, 1991: 139).

12. The ‘Fragment on Machines’ covers the end of Notebook VI and the beginning of VII of the Grundrisse, but the exact page references vary a little between

13. Caffentzis (1997: 30) cites a range of sources to show that in the US the work day, the work year, and the number of waged workers have all significantly increased since the 1973–4 energy crisis (and that OECD figures show similar for the ‘advanced capitalist world’).

14. There are, thus, sections in the ‘Fragment’, notably at the point where Marx uses the expression ‘general intellect’ (p. 706), which seem to present technology more as a generic human creation, an almost pure knowledge – the product of the ‘human hand’ and the ‘human brain’ – than as a functional product of specific (and, in capital, exploitative) social relations.

15. That Negri himself does not seem to see the account of the socialized workers of Empire as a break from his previous work is marked by his declining to include this work in his critique of the post-autonomia ‘immaterial labour’ theorists (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 29).

16. Negri sees this process as an overcoming of the law of value, interpreted as a quantitative relation between labour-time and price, and its replacement with a ‘law of command’ (Negri, 1991: 172; cf. also Hardt and Negri, 2000: 357–8, 401). This is a reductive interpretation of the law of value, which, as Elson (1979) argues, should not be seen as a question of the price of a commodity, but of the form labour takes in capital (hence she calls it a ‘value theory of labour’). However, insofar as Negri suggests that production becomes determined by social needs (rather than the capitalist need for productive work) he seems to have dropped both a limited and a full concept of the law of value.

17. Hardt (1994: 227) makes this point about self-management, and it is also stated rather clearly in Hardt and Negri (2000: 411). For Tronti (1979), the self-management thesis - which had considerable prominence in the 20th-century far left, including Socialisme ou Barbarie and the Situationist International - is simply another version of the socialist affirmation of work. The thesis assumes that there is an autonomous labour that the workers could manage for themselves, extracted from capital, as if classes in capitalism are simply two separate groups, one of which is already communist in content. For Tronti - following the real subsumption thesis - this perspective mistakes the problem of ‘work’ for that of ‘management’, and hence fails to take into account the way that work is always already capital; work is not an autonomous activity sold to capital, but human activity called forth and immanently structured by capital.

18. In this essay Negri prefers to call Deleuze’s figure of control society ‘communication society’.

19. Haraway, who Hardt and Negri (1994: 281) also draw on to make their case about contemporary control, makes a similar point that the common language of communication sciences is not a freed-up space of communicating cyborgs so much as ‘the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange’ (Haraway, 1991: 164).

20. That said, the following comparison made by Mark Leonard (director of the Foreign Policy Centre) between ‘Italian Marxism’ (which, by implication, includes Negri) and the British new Labour Party in his (disconcertingly) glowing account of
Negri and Empire is clearly not the product of close reading: ‘Unlike the British and German left, Italian Marxism has always placed great emphasis on individual emancipation. It echoes some of new Labour’s thinking – for example, John Prescott’s “quality of life indicators”, measuring everything from pollution to childcare and working hours’ (Leonard, 2001: 37).

References

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