Rethinking Russian–Ukrainian relations: a new trend in nation-building in post-communist Russia?*

VERA TOLZ

Department of Politics and Contemporary History, University of Salford,
Salford M5 4WT

ABSTRACT. This article analyses new trends in the assessment of Russian–Ukrainian relations by representatives of the Russian elites in the late 1990s. It sees a discussion of the historic roots of Ukrainian separatism in the Russian media and attempts to identify the origins of the ‘Russian national homeland’ outside Kyiv Rus as the first steps towards a revision of traditional Russian perceptions of Russian–Ukrainian relations. The article argues that the new trends have become particularly visible following the signing of the Russian–Ukrainian inter-state treaty in May 1997, which it regards as an important landmark in Russia’s acceptance of the independence of Ukraine.

The disintegration of the USSR severely challenged, if not altogether destroyed, many of Russia’s long-lasting and powerful national myths. Since 1992, Russian elites have been trying to invent a new national tradition. From the eighteenth century to the late 1980s a number of myths, crucial for the formation of Russian identity, were constructed and widely disseminated by the joint efforts of intellectuals and the powerful Russian state. Among these myths, the most prominent were: the view that the entire tsarist empire/USSR was the Russian nation-state; the perception of the huge size of the state and its constantly expanding boundaries as formative elements of Russian national character; the identification of Kyiv Rus as the first Russian state; and the belief that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians shared common origins in the old Russian nationality of Rus. An immediate consequence of these ideas was that in the early 1990s the new Russian state (the Russian Federation) seemed to many people unusually ‘small’ and its new borders historically illegitimate. A second consequence was that Ukraine’s independence

* I would like to thank Yoram Gorlizki, Taras Kuzio, Kataryna Wolczuk and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful insights. Thanks are also due to Katya Young for her help in collecting Russian press reports on Ukraine.
in 1991 took Russian elites and the public by surprise. (Belarussian separatism had traditionally been much weaker and therefore less challenging to the self-perception of the Russians.)

Confronted with the task of building a new nation-state after the demise of the USSR, Russians face problems somewhat different from those of the other newly independent states of Eurasia. The latter, in many instances, can make use of concepts from their national histories, which intellectuals began to produce in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The use of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy’s (1898–1937) *History of Ukraine-Rus* to write history textbooks in post-1991 independent Ukraine is a good case in point (Kohut 1994: 123–46; Kuzio 2001; Plokhy 2001; Wolczuk 2000). In Russia, it is precisely the assumptions of this early era of nationalism that were shattered in 1991. Although nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian thinkers have been frequently quoted by members of the intellectual and political elites in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, their views hardly fit post-imperial reality, because they were often shaped by the perception that the Russian empire was the Russian nation-state.

Thus, nation-building in contemporary Russia is not simply a process all nations continuously go through, in which each generation refashions ‘national institutions and stratification systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the “past”, which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and institutions’ (Smith 1986: 206). Because in the past Russians arguably failed to distinguish between national and imperial, it is only today that they are starting the process of inventing a truly national tradition. This is something which most other European nations have been successfully doing since the nineteenth century.

It seems that today, inventing a national tradition is fraught with new complications, absent in the era when nationalism first became a prominent political force in Europe. Today, political and economic globalisation weakens the very concept of a nation-state. Moreover, it is now much more difficult to produce a ‘national history’ as a narrative of ‘a single, unified past’ – an essential building-block in the construction of a nation – than it had been in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Nation-builders among intellectuals in any country familiar with the trends and approaches of current Western scholarship have to contend with the fact that rather than writing ‘national histories’, the Western scholarly community now deconstructs national myths, symbols and legends. Its approach is based on the acceptance of ‘multiple pasts’, produced by various groups in society who read differently the same historical events and phenomena. The view of a dominant ethnic or political group in a community is no longer seen as offering the most legitimate interpretation. Not surprisingly, this approach has been developed by scholars in countries in which identities are more stable and less threatened than those that one finds in countries recently affected by major social and political upheavals, such as, for instance, in post-communist Eastern Europe. An increasing number of those Russian scholars who have been participating
in the invention of new Russian traditions since 1991, accept the need to look critically at the schemata of history elaborated by earlier generations of Russian scholars. For a scholar in contemporary Russia, it is impossible to remain unaware of the fact that non-Russian nationalities have produced alternative visions of the history of the Russian empire/USSR, which challenge traditional Russian perceptions. It is no longer tenable to dismiss alternative historical interpretations as a reflection of marginal views of a few disgruntled intellectuals among ethnic minorities, as Russian thinkers tended to do in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. How can Russian elites today deal with the construction of a new Russian national identity in the face of these challenges?

This article seeks to answer this question by analysing some of the ways in which Russian elites have been rethinking the history of Russian–Ukrainian relations. Given the persistence of the belief among many Russians that they and the Ukrainians shared common historical origins and in effect belonged to one pan-Russian nationality, this reconsideration of the past and present of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is arguably the most problematic part of the construction of a new national identity in post-communist Russia. Analysing the Russian reaction to Ukraine’s independence five years after the December 1991 referendum in Ukraine, the Russian historian Aleksei Miller observed that ‘Starting from 1991, the Ukrainian theme not only was constantly raised on the pages of the Russian press, but the number of publications was equivalent to the total number of reports devoted to all other republics of the former USSR.’ However, Miller considered that the majority of Russians continued to view their country’s relations with Ukraine through the prism of old myths and stereotypes, treating Ukraine’s independence as a temporary and ‘unnatural’ phenomenon. Therefore he concluded that ‘the Ukrainian theme failed to become . . . a tool for dealing with problems of Russia’s post-imperial development’ (Miller 1996: 135).

This article argues that since Miller made his observation in the mid-1990s, a new trend has become visible in the way Russian elites regard Russian–Ukrainian relations. Increasingly, scholars and some other figures have been trying to revise the traditional Russian views of the historical origins of their state and their relations with non-Russians in the empire, including Ukrainians. This tendency has become particularly marked in the period since the spring of 1997. The signing in May 1997 by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma of the Russian–Ukrainian inter-state treaty on friendship, co-operation and partnership, which stipulated the recognition of the state borders of Russia and Ukraine by both sides, seems to have given an important stimulus to the Russian elites to speed up the process of nation-building within the borders of the Russian Federation.

The article starts by describing the initial reaction of the Russian elites and the public to Ukraine’s independence in 1991, focusing on the period until the mid-1990s. It then depicts the signing of the Russian–Ukrainian bilateral treaty in May 1997 as an event that made a crucial contribution to the
legitimisation of the borders of the Russian Federation as the boundaries of the new Russian national homeland. The final part of the article analyses the attempts, particularly on the part of the Russian intellectual elite, to stimulate the process of nation-building within the current borders of the Russian Federation by rethinking the past and present of Russian–Ukrainian relations.

Early post-communist period (1992 to the mid-1990s): old perceptions dominate

The proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991 provoked a more hostile reaction in Moscow than similar declarations of independence by other Union republics. Following the adoption of the declaration of independence (subject to referendum) by the Ukrainian government in August 1991, not only the communist and nationalist press, which had been assessing the situation in Ukraine critically since 1990, but even such liberal newspapers as Izvestia and Komsomolskaia pravda began to depict the developments in Ukraine as a threat to Russian national interests and security. Significantly, in 1990 and early 1991, those same liberal papers had taken a favourable view of the activities of the Ukrainian People’s Front, Rukh, seeing it as an ally in the struggle against communism. The Ukrainian declaration of independence provoked a dramatic reaction from President Yeltsin’s press office, which issued a statement that Russia reserved the right to raise the border questions with any republics, apart from the Baltic states, which declared independence. The Russian government was therefore backtracking on the provisions of the Russian–Ukrainian agreement signed by Yeltsin in Kyiv in November 1990, which stipulated that the two republics recognise each other’s sovereignty and the inviolability of borders. Such liberal Russian politicians as Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov and his St Petersburg counterpart Anatolii Sobchak also attacked the declaration. Following the December 1991 referendum on the question of Ukrainian independence, Sobchak went so far as to argue that independent Ukraine would be a major security risk for the international community and that Russian–Ukrainian border conflicts might result in a nuclear clash.

Such a sharp reaction to Ukraine’s independence did not stem only from the fact that it sealed the fate of the Union, given that Ukraine was the second most populous and economically powerful republic. The Russians’ belief that they and the Ukrainians were ethnically, historically and culturally so close that the two peoples in effect belonged to one pan-Russian nation, was no less important. Thus, to use Roman Szporluk’s words, the ‘making’ of independent Ukraine was the ‘unmaking’ of the Russian nation (Szporluk 1997: 92).

The attitude of the majority of Russian politicians as well as the media to an independent Ukraine following the demise of the USSR was strongly influenced by the perception that Russians and Ukrainians shared a 1000-year-old common history, were culturally extremely close and that their
relations, until 1991, had been largely harmonious. Such views had been promoted in nineteenth-century Russian historiography and in Soviet scholarly literature and textbooks since the mid-1930s. Consequently, Ukrainian independence was regarded as a temporary phenomenon, an anomaly. In the first half of the 1990s, even liberal and centrist newspapers as Segodnia and Nezavisimaiia gazeta depicted Ukrainian independence as a ploy by Ukrainian political elites, acting against the interests of the majority of people of Ukraine. In the pre-independence period (1990 to early 1991), this position was to be found only in communist and nationalist periodicals. After the demise of the USSR, even moderate intellectuals and periodicals began to create a highly alarmist picture of the situation of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. The political symbols of independent Ukraine were usually treated with derision and constituted a prominent feature of political cartoons in periodicals of all political orientation. In the first half of the 1990s, history textbooks in Russian schools still spoke about Kyiv as ‘the first Russian capital’ and Kyiv Rus as ‘the first Russian state’.

As for the Russian nationalist and communist press, in 1992–3 it was dominated by calls to recreate the USSR. By late 1993, as the hope started to fade that the Union could be re-established quickly, nationalist and communist intellectuals began to limit their territorial claims to the east Slavic core of the Soviet Union. They employed the pre-revolutionary terminology of the ‘triune orthodox Russian nation’ (triedinaia pravoslavnaia russkaia narodnost) of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. (The Soviet formula – the ‘three brotherly Slavic people’ (tri bratskikh slavianskikh naroda) – acknowledged a greater degree of separateness between Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians.) The writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn exercised a key role in formulating this attitude towards Ukraine’s independence in the post-communist period. In the course of the 1990s, his rejection of Ukraine’s right to independence became more militant than it had been in 1990. In his 1990 essay ‘How are we to reconstruct Russia?’, the author only expressed the hope that the three Slavic republics would form a new structure to be called the ‘Russian Union’. His criticism of pro-independence forces in Ukraine was cautious. But after Ukraine’s independence had become a reality, Solzhenitsyn began to allege that Ukrainian politicians were striving to recreate Kyiv Rus to include all European Russia ‘to the Urals’. He also began to see independent Ukraine as existing largely as a result of support from ‘the West’, especially the United States: ‘An anti-Russian position of Ukraine – this is what the United States needs. The Ukrainian leadership under Kravchuk and Kuchma, subserviently have been playing into the hands of the Americans, whose aim is to weaken Russia’ (Solzhenitsyn 1998: 75–82).

The Russian political elites also found it difficult to come to terms with independent Ukraine. From 1992 onwards, the Russian parliament adopted a very hostile position towards Ukrainian independence. As early as January 1992, it issued the first in a series of resolutions making territorial claims on Ukraine. The leaders of the largest factions in the 1993 and 1995 parliaments,
Gennadii Ziuganov of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party, unequivocally included Ukrainians in the Russian nation. The position of the executive branch under President Yeltsin was more moderate. None the less, it displayed a preference for a closer union with Ukraine, similar to the one established with Belarus in April 1996. Following the signing of the treaty on the creation of the Union of Sovereign States with Belarus, Yeltsin postponed his visit to Kyiv, where he been due to sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine. This treaty could have established relations between Russia and Ukraine as two equal subjects of international law and legally recognised the state border between Russia and Ukraine. At the time of the 1996 presidential elections, in an annual report on national security at the State Duma, Yeltsin called for a close union between Russia, Ukrainian, Belarus and Kazakhstan. (The latter has a large Russian and Russian-speaking population, and the communist-nationalist opposition calls for the incorporation of northern Kazakhstan into Russia as part of the creation of an East Slavic state.)

Yeltsin’s influential advisers, some with the reputation of political liberals, also argued in favour of a close union between Russia and Ukraine, similar to the Russian-Belarussian Union. In May 1996, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, a consultative body staffed by moderate reformers, including members of the Presidential Council Oleg Kiselev and Sergei Karaganov, maintained that Ukraine, together with Belarus, were the countries with the greatest importance for the construction of the post-communist Russian national homeland. In this connection Russia should try to get ‘an unlimited access to Ukraine’s market of goods, services and capital and to create an effective military-political alliance’. Another member of the Presidential Council, Andranik Migranian, argued that ‘Ukraine is a fragile, artificial, heterogeneous ethno-political entity, which lacks any real chance to form its own statehood’.

It is significant that the history of Russian–Ukrainian relations was hardly discussed in the Russian media in the first half of the 1990s. This meant that old stereotypes and perceptions were not questioned, perpetuating the ignorance among Russians about the origins of Ukraine’s independence. This was in striking contrast to the situation in Ukraine, where a bold revision of the history of Russian–Ukrainian relations was underway. It is therefore not surprising that the broader Russian public also tended to view Ukrainian independence as an anomaly. Despite the overall nostalgia often expressed by Russians about the Soviet Union, opinion polls of the late 1990s indicated that the majority of respondents were not in favour of Russia’s unification with the newly independent states of the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Baltics. The attitude towards Ukraine was different. In 1992–5, polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in Moscow (currently the Institute of Sociological Analysis) indicated that the majority of Russians thought Russians and Ukrainians belonged to the same nation (Kliamkin 1994: 111–12; Zimmerman 1998).
**Importance of the 1997 Russian–Ukrainian inter-state treaty**

Despite the initial perception on the part of many Russians that Ukraine’s independence was temporary and ‘unnatural’, it was inevitable that, with time, Russians would gradually become accustomed to the new situation and that the centrifugal tendencies in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine would start to prevail. It seems that the signing of the bilateral Russian–Ukrainian inter-state treaty on 31 May 1997, which recognised the inviolability of the countries’ existing borders, and the treaty’s subsequent ratification by the upper chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly played a key role in facilitating a major psychological change in Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine. Therefore the treaty has had a major impact on both countries’ nation-building projects. Although there remains strong opposition to the treaty in Russia and, at the time of writing, the demarcation of borders has not yet been finalised, the treaty has undoubtedly contributed to an increasing perception that the borders of the Russian Federation are the legitimate boundaries of the Russian national homeland. The treaty therefore challenged the view popular among the elites and the public that the best alternative to the USSR was not an independent Russian Federation but an East Slavic Union.

Russians have traditionally had a peculiar attitude towards state borders. In the nineteenth century, the trend in Western Europe was towards seeing clearly delineated borders (as opposed to earlier zone frontiers) as strictly defining the limits of national communities. In the same period in Russia, confusion over nation and state boundaries prevailed. First, it was unclear where the Russian metropolis ended and its colonies began. Secondly, Russian intellectuals pondered over the evasiveness of Russian frontiers, due to the constant expansion of the state, and presented this evasiveness as a formative element of the Russian national character. One of the most powerful passages in Nikolai Gogol’s *Dead Souls*, to cite just one very famous example, created an image of Russia without clear boundaries: ‘Thought grows numb confronted with your vast expanse. What do those immense, wide, far-flung open spaces hold in store? Is it not here, is it not in you that some boundless thought will be born, since you are yourself without end?’ (Gogol 1961: 232). In the Soviet period, when classical Russian literature of the nineteenth century was incorporated into the school curriculum, this and other passages, hailing Russia ‘without end’, were memorised by school children. Although, once Stalin was in power, Soviet propaganda began creating an image of tightly sealed state borders (*granitsa na zamke*), a countervailing image of moving frontiers was also evoked at times. This was, for instance, the case in 1939–41, when the Soviet Union was incorporating new areas: western Ukraine, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and the Baltic republics. In describing this incorporation, the media utilised the traditional image of Russia’s evasive and constantly expanding frontiers. They argued that ‘the borders began to move’ (*granitsa nachala dvigatsia*) and
‘widen’ (*rasshirenie granitsy*). The war with Finland in 1939 was also described as aiming ‘to move the borders’ (*peredvizhenie granitsy*) (Sakharov 1999: 225–7).

It seems that this traditional perception of borders constantly in flux contributed to the fact that, after 1991, many representatives of the Russian political and intellectual elites, including liberal reformers, found it very difficult to accept the borders of the independent Russian Federation as firmly fixed and legitimate. It is within this framework that one should see the insistence of the Russian political leadership, including the former foreign and prime minister, Evgenii Primakov, that borders between the CIS member states should be transparent (Tolz 1998: 283). Significantly, in response to Ukraine’s insistence that Russia recognise its borders, the periodical of the Russian border guards services, *Granitsa Rossii*, inquired: ‘Really, do we need a border with Ukraine? . . . We believe that many Russians pose the question in just this way’ (Kuzio 1997: 40). The final signing of the inter-state Russian-Ukrainian treaty, which accepted Ukraine’s insistence on having the countries’ borders legally codified, was thus a major challenge not only to the Russian traditional attitude towards Ukraine, but also to the traditional perception of Russian national and state boundaries as transparent and constantly moving.

The border question dominated the debate among members of the Russian political elites and in the media over the signing and ratification of the treaty. Dramatic language was used by both supporters and opponents of the accord. In the words of *Kommersant-daily*, ‘The complete loss [sic] of Ukraine] will drastically change the geopolitical alignment on Russia’s western borders.’ Both sides raised the stakes high when they justified their own position on the treaty and rejected that of their opponents. President Yeltsin’s spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, argued that those politicians who were continuing to make territorial claims on Ukraine, ‘in effect, were calling for a second Chechen war’. When the treaty was finally ratified on 17 February 1999 by the Federation Council, its supporter, the speaker of the parliament’s lower chamber, Gennadii Seleznev, called the ratification ‘a great victory for Russia’. In contrast, the opponents saw the signing of the treaty and its subsequent ratification as Russia’s ‘defeat’ and ‘humiliation’. They argued that the treaty with Ukraine was ‘not an accord of friendship and co-operation, but a treaty of borders’. In the words of the then chairman of the Duma’s Committee on Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Georgii Tikhonov, ‘Russia’s renunciation of territorial claims against Ukraine opens the door to NATO for Kyiv’. The most dramatic reaction against the treaty and its ratification came from the Moscow mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov, who portrayed it as a betrayal of Russia by the country’s political elites. On the eve of the ratification, Luzhkov and his supporters organised a rally in Moscow against the accord, which was symbolically held near the monument to Marshal Zhukov – the organiser of the defence of Moscow against the Germans in 1941. On the eve of the Federation Council’s
vote on the treaty, Luzhkov issued a statement to the effect that he would ‘make public the names of all who voted to betray Russia’s interests’.15

The supporters of the treaty in particular strove to present it as one of the key events of the post-communist period and as a marker of a new stage in Russian history. Yastrzhembsky described Yeltsin’s visit to Kyiv in May 1997 as ‘the most difficult’ but also ‘the most important foreign-policy action Russia will take in 1997’. The then foreign minister, Primakov, argued that the accord indicated that ‘relations with Ukraine are perhaps our most important priority’.16 In Primakov’s words, ‘the treaty will serve as a point of departure that will tell us where to go next’.17 A leading foreign affairs commentator, Stanislav Kondrashev, argued that the accord ‘completes . . . the “settling” of the new world of Russia and its environs’.18

Russians begin to rethink their relations with Ukraine?

A survey of Russian popular magazines as well as historical and political periodicals indicates that since the signing of the Russian–Ukrainian treaty in 1997, there have been increasing attempts on the part of Russian nation-builders to understand the historic origins of Ukrainian separatism and thereby to come to terms with Ukraine’s independence. There is now a tendency towards revising the history, and rethinking the present, of Russian–Ukrainian relations. Moreover, there have been more attempts to ‘nationalise’ the territory of the Russian Federation by looking at the origins of the ‘Russian national homeland’ outside Kyiv Rus.

Analysing the origins of Ukraine’s independence

As mentioned earlier, following the demise of the USSR, the Russian press initially tended to treat Ukraine’s independence as a ploy of the Ukrainian elites, acting against the wishes of the majority of the people of Ukraine. However, in the mid-1990s some authors began to question this approach. One of the first serious attempts at revising the Russian view of Ukraine’s independence was an article in Svobodnaia mysl by Dmitrii Furman, a scholar from the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Furman argued that modern Ukrainian nationalism dated back to the nineteenth century and was largely a response to the policies of the autocratic Russian state, which in the eighteenth century had destroyed the autonomies of the Cossack Hetmanate and later continued to suppress a separate Ukrainian identity (Furman 1995).

Furman’s article challenged the myth of traditional harmony in Russian–Ukrainian relations and outlined differences between Russian and Ukrainian interpretations of history. They include the assessment of the reign of Peter the Great, of the policies of Catherine the Great and Aleksandr II, of the significance of Ukraine’s independence in 1918 and of the activities of the
Ukrainian insurgent army during and after World War II. Indeed, for the Russians, the victory in the battle of Poltava against the Swedish army in 1709 signified the elevation of Russia to the status of an important European power. For the Ukrainians, the Russian victory signalled Hetman Mazepa’s failure to secure the autonomy of the Cossack Hetmanate. To the Russians, Mazepa has been largely known through Aleksandr Pushkin’s poem ‘Poltava’ (1828–9), where the two main epithets used to describe him are ‘Judah’ and ‘snake’. Pushkin’s Mazepa ‘spills blood, as if it were water, he despises freedom and the fatherland does not exist for him’, whereas those Cossacks who sided with him ‘have forgotten the enslavement of the past . . . and the glory of the times of their ancestors’ (that is, common Kyiv Rus heritage) (Pushkin 1992: 75, 76). The appearance of Mazepa on the currency of independent Ukraine (hryvna) therefore came as a surprise to today’s Russians. Few Russians knew why the reign of Catherine the Great, whose policies gave a great boost to the development of Russian culture, was assessed so negatively by Mykola Kostomarov and other founding fathers of modern Ukrainian nationalism. They also were unaware about draconian restrictions against the Ukrainian language and culture introduced under the most liberal of all Russian tsars, Aleksandr II. Symon Petliura, a leader of an anti-Bolshevik army in 1918–20, and Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian insurgent army, which fought against both the Soviets and the Germans during World War II, have been seen exclusively in a negative light by the Russians.

The above-mentioned historian Miller, in his critical review of the Russian media coverage of Ukraine published in 1996, also pointed out that the majority of Russians were still looking at Ukraine through the prism of the pre-revolutionary perception of Ukrainians as part of the pan-Russian nationality. He argued that as early as the nineteenth century these stereotypes were in conflict with the reality of the growing Ukrainian nationalist movement (Miller 1996: 130).

Since May 1997, such observations have become more common. The writings by the philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko are very indicative in this regard, as they have undergone a significant transformation in the past decade. In 1990, he presented a very traditional view of Russian–Ukrainian relations when he was criticising the Democratic Russia movement for juxtaposing the Russian Federation and the USSR. He stated: ‘Many Russians have forgotten not only that they are Russians, but that they are Slavs, that they are bound by one common fate to the Ukrainians and Belarussians, that they carry the main responsibility for the Slavs of Kyiv Rus.’

Even in March 1997, at an international seminar on Russian–Ukrainian relations organised in Moscow by the leading Russian politics journal *Polis*, Tsipko depicted Russia and Ukraine as new formations ‘without any historical legitimacy’ and as two parts of ‘the same metropolis’, whose joint efforts created the Russian state. Three years later, at another Moscow conference on Russian–Ukrainian relations, held in June 2000, Tsipko significantly revised his original view of independent Ukraine as an unnatural and
illegitimate formation, now seeing Ukrainian independence as a logical result of particular historical developments. According to Tsipko’s new position, only an ‘ignorant’ person, without any knowledge of the history of Russian–Ukrainian relations, could have imagined that Russian–Ukrainian relations post-1991 would be problem free. In fact, Ukraine’s turn to Europe and away from Russia was inevitable. He called on the Russians to ‘bravely look in the face of the Ukrainian idea’ and observed:

In its essence, the Ukrainian idea from the very start had been anti-Russian. Its origins were in the protest of the Little Russian intelligentsia against the Russian culture of the upper classes. [The Ukrainian national movement] emerged out of the desire to contrast South Russian peasant language, which later started to be known as Ukrainian, to the Russian literary language . . . The Ukrainian idea was also a protest against the Russian political regime of serfdom.

A similar argument was outlined by a Moscow political scientist, K. M. Kantor, at another Russian–Ukrainian seminar in Moscow in 1997. He observed that although in 1991, Ukraine received independence largely because of the ‘revolution from above’, it had been moving towards this independence for centuries ‘from below’. According to Kantor, ‘the separation from the empire’ was the central element of the Ukrainian national thought, whereas in Russia ‘the emphasis had been on the gathering and unity’. He was convinced that knowledge of the history of Russian–Ukrainian relations was necessary for ‘regulating current conflicts’ between the two states, and he observed in this connection:

Ukrainians know Russia, but Russians do not know Ukraine, or know it badly from falsified accounts in Soviet textbooks. In the past, even democratically minded Russian intellectuals could not understand Ukrainians’ desire for self-determination. The goal of contemporary intelligentsia is to help the public understand and deepen the knowledge of Ukrainian history and culture.

In the past few years, Russian scholars have also begun to assess critically the views of those pre-revolutionary thinkers who shaped the dominant Russian attitude to a separate Ukrainian identity. These pre-revolutionary Russian intellectuals depicted the emerging Ukrainian nationalism as a reactionary force, running counter to Russia’s Europeanisation. For the leading Westerniser of the 1840s, the literary critic Vissarion Belinskii, a separate Ukrainian tradition was rooted in pre-Petrine medieval Rus, hence it was non-European and backward. He therefore described the Ukrainians as ‘some sort of strange commune in the Asiatic manner’ and argued that ‘Ukraine could never have developed ... while it lay beyond the pale of Western European culture. It could get access to that culture only by subordinating itself to Russia’, which began to Europeanise thanks to Peter the Great (Belinskii 1958: 60–5). Subsequently, even Russian liberals in the early twentieth century continued to argue that Ukrainian nationalism was an artificial construct of a small group of disgruntled intellectuals, whereas the majority of people in Little Russia were being drawn into the realm of
Russian culture. That was, for instance, the position of a leading member of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadet), Peter Struve.

In 1997, the Moscow historian Igor Torbakov analysed Belinskii’s and Struve’s views on emerging Ukrainian nationalism and on Ukrainian history and culture as a reflection of these intellectuals’ perception of the Russian national identity and of a threat that Ukrainian nationalism posed to it. He concluded:

The problem was that in contrast to Belinskii’s and Struve’s belief, Russia was not a Russian nation-state . . . and the Ukrainian culture did not need to be artificially constructed, because it had been in existence long before the two Russian liberals first began to think about it. Their argument about the ‘pan-Russian culture’ [which Russians and Ukrainians shared – VT] turned out to be a major methodological error. (Torbakov 1997: 239)

Separating Russian and Ukrainian histories?

It was inevitable that the emergence of independent Ukraine would be a challenge to one of the key myths of Russian national consciousness – the myth of Russian–Ukrainian historical and cultural unity dating back to the Kyiv Rus period. The first cautious attempts to deconstruct this myth were made by those intellectuals who as early as 1992 were trying to redefine the Russian nation as a community of Russian-speakers, rather than seeing Russian identity as inseparable from the entire USSR or as part of an East Slavic Union. Those advocating the idea of the Russian nation as a community of Russian-speakers did not claim the entire Ukraine or Belarus, let alone other former Union republics, as part of the Russian national homeland. In the process of constructing this new vision of the Russian nation, some intellectuals, such as the journalist Kseniia Mialo, stressed the need to speak about Russia’s historical past separate from the Kyiv Rus heritage. Thus, in a series of articles published in Literaturnaia Rossiia in 1992, Mialo argued that in thinking about their national history, Russians should focus not on Kyiv, but on the Novgorod Republic with its tradition of Veche (a popular assembly that decided upon the most important issues of Novgorod’s political life), which existed from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. However, at the time few nationalist intellectuals or politicians were ready to accept the separation of Russian and Ukrainian histories. Instead, between 1993 and the late 1990s, a vision of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as inseparable parts of an East Slavic Union was dominant.

More consistent attempts at separating Russian and Ukrainian histories began in the mid-1990s (Furman 1995), and intensified after the signing of the 1997 bilateral treaty between the two countries. These attempts have been reflected in scholarly literature, the popular press and, most importantly, history textbooks for secondary schools. Thus, in 1997, the Moscow historian Lev Pushkarev, in effect, questioned the traditional approach of Russian historiography since the eighteenth century that 1654, when Moscow and the
Cossack Hetmanate signed a treaty in Pereiaslav, was the year of the re-
union, after a temporary separation, of Russians and Ukrainians, who in the
Kyiv period had belonged to one nationality (*narodnost*). Instead, Pushkarev
demonstrated, albeit cautiously, that in the seventeenth century the differ-
ence between the people of Muscovy and the Cossack Hetmanate was very
strongly felt by both peoples as well as by foreign travellers to Moscow. In
the second half of the seventeenth century Moscow rulers and foreign visitors
saw Muscovy and the Hetmanate as two different lands with different lan-
guages, cultures, customs and political traditions. Russians called Ukrainians
‘foreigners’ (*inozemtsy*) or ‘foreigners from the Lithuanian lands’ (*inozemtsy
Litovskoi zemli*), due to the fact that the lands of the Hetmanate had been
part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth since the fourteenth century
(Pushkarev 2000).26

Pushkarev also demonstrated that the myth of Russian–Ukrainian histor-
ical unity was in fact constructed in the second half of the seventeenth century
by intellectuals from Kyiv, such as Feodosii Safonovich and Innokentii
Giezel. It is they who elaborated the idea that east Slavic unity dated back to
Kyiv Rus and constructed the image of Kyiv as ‘the mother of Russian cities’
(Pushkarev 2000). (Although Western scholars have made this point much
earlier, this is a new approach for Russian scholarship (Keenan 1994: 21–5;
Torke 1992: 40–52).) It was the ideas of these Kyivan intellectuals that the
historian Nikolai Karamzin turned into an integral part of the Russian
national myth in his *History of the Russian State* (1818–29). In this work, to
use Aleksandr Pushkin’s words, the historian discovered old Rus for the
Russians, as ‘Columbus had discovered America’. Yet, in the seventeenth
century, Safonovich and Giezel had constructed this vision of a common
Russian–Ukrainian history in pursuit of their own political goals, as they
sought integration into the emerging Russian imperial elite. Previously, very
few Russian scholars had challenged the argument about the Russian–
Ukrainian unity rooted in the medieval period. One such rare exception was
the philologist Aleksandr Pypin. In an article published in the journal
*Sovremennik* in 1864, Pypin questioned the ancient roots of the east Slavic
unity, seeing this idea as a more recent (particularly eighteenth-century)
invention of Russian nation-builders. Lately, Pypin’s views have also begun
to be analysed by Russian historians.27

This questioning of the perception of a Russian–Ukrainian unity rooted in
Kyiv Rus is accompanied by a search for alternative visions of Russian his-
tory. In these attempts at rewriting Russian history, paramount importance
is placed upon Novgorod and other ancient towns (particularly Ladoga),
located within the current borders of the Russian Federation.

In 1999, the mass-circulation magazine *Ogonek* popularised the discoveries
of the St Petersburg archaeologist, Evgenii Riabinin, who argued that his
excavations proved that Kyiv was only the third ‘capital’ of Rus. According
to Riabinin, the first ‘capital’ was Ladoga in north Russia and the second was
Novgorod. He argued that the main historical source on the medieval history
of the eastern Slavs, *Primary Chronicle*, included deliberate falsifications by the chronicler Nestor, who as a resident of Kyiv exaggerated the historical importance of that city.\(^{28}\) Riabinin first advanced his theory in the 1970s, but because it questioned officially accepted orthodoxies, it did not receive any publicity. Emphasising the significance of Riabinin’s discoveries, the liberal journalist Andrei Chernov concluded that ‘Ladoga and Novgorod constituted an alternative path for Russia’s development, its European [sic] path’ (Chernov 1999: 26).

The depiction of Russia’s historical origins in school textbooks is of major importance for the acceptance of the separateness of Russia and Ukraine by the broader Russian public. Since the mid-1990s some revision of the traditional approach, however cautious, has been visible. Thus, the current main school textbook by A. N. Sakharov and V. I. Buganov, *History of Russia from Ancient Times till the End of the Seventeenth Century*, does not reproduce the traditional argument that Kyiv Rus was the first Russian state and Kyiv the first Russian capital. Instead, it argues that Rus was formed around two centres – Novgorod in the north and Kyiv in the south (Sakharov and Buganov 1995: 37–42). This approach is becoming fashionable among professional historians as well.\(^{29}\)

**New assessment of contemporary Ukraine**

Certain changes in the analyses of current developments in Ukraine have also been discernible since the late 1990s. On the one hand, there is an increasing tendency among scholars to accept the linguistic, educational and other policies associated with nation-building in post-communist Ukraine as inevitable and even necessary. They offer a comparative analysis of the post-communist transitions of Russia and Ukraine, which takes into account the differences in historical experiences and national identities of the two peoples. On the other hand, there is an overall decrease in the coverage of political developments in Ukraine in the mass media. Some changes in the attitude of the Russian public towards independent Ukraine are also visible.

Since the late 1990s, the journal *Polis*, in particular, has been publishing articles regularly which compare and contrast the post-communist transitions in Russia and Ukraine (Pakhomov 1998; Ilin 1998).\(^{30}\) The conclusions often challenge stereotypical assumptions of the early 1990s. Thus an article by a Ukrainian political scientist, Aleksandr Dergachev, argued that ‘Ukraine is destined to become a fully-fledged European state’. Its chances for integrating into European structures are greater than those of Russia, whose identity is not European but Eurasian (Dergachev 1998). Alan Kasaev, the editor of the monthly supplement to *Nezavisimaja gazeta, Sodruzhestvo*, went even further, arguing that Ukraine’s independence was the most significant factor in ‘marginalisation of Russia, in pushing it to the kerb [obochina] of Europe’. Moreover, a Russia which pays no attention to developments in Ukraine ‘is virtually an Asian country with no interests in Europe’.\(^ {31}\) This runs counter to
the position of many Russian intellectuals discussed above who, since the 1840s, have seen Russia as a European country and Ukrainian nationalism as a rejection of Russia’s Europeanisation project. In turn, Vladimir Kolosov, in another article in Polis, argued that the construction of a new national identity in contemporary Ukraine, in opposition to the Russian identity, was an inevitable development, particularly given the complexity of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the past (Kolosov 1998). Similarly Tsipko, at the above-mentioned conference in June 2000, observed that what the Russian elites often labelled as ‘the violation of the rights of the Russian population’ could be seen as legitimate language policies ‘much needed for the building of the independent Ukrainian state’.32

Recent articles on public opinion in Ukraine challenge earlier assertions by the media that Ukraine’s independence is a ploy of the Ukrainian elites, acting against the wishes of the ordinary citizens of Ukraine. Thus, in April 1998, Polis published the results of a sociological survey conducted in all regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv and the Crimea, in November–December 1997, on questions related to the nation-state building in Ukraine. According to the survey, only 15.5 per cent of those polled in the western regions of the country and 26.5 per cent in the eastern parts supported the idea of the creation of a joint Slavic state with Russia (Beletskii and Tolpygo 1998).

The increase in the number of balanced analyses of developments in post-communist Ukraine in the academic community is accompanied by a decrease in the number of publications about Ukraine in the popular media. This trend was particularly visible during the 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine, the coverage of which in the Russian media was limited and even sporadic. That was in sharp contrast to the Russian media coverage of the Ukrainian elections in 1994, when Russia clearly backed Kuchma’s candidacy (Moshes 1999). This new trend has become more pronounced since Vladimir Putin’s accession to power in December 1999, as CIS integration and Russia’s relations with Ukraine have ceased to be an electoral issue in Russia. President Yeltsin had put CIS integration and Russia’s relations with the two other east Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union at the top of his agenda during the 1996 presidential election campaign. He wanted to counter the charges made by the opposition that his policies were responsible for the demise of the USSR. In contrast, Putin is not held responsible by the Russian public for the events of 1991 and therefore he can allow his policies towards the newly independent states to be determined largely by economic rather than ideological considerations.

The main issue discussed by the Russian media under Putin is Ukraine’s energy debts to Russia and this has an impact on public opinion. According to Arkady Moshes from the Institute of Europe in Moscow, in the past two years, ‘the policy of no more “free lunches” for Ukraine is much more popular [among the Russian public] than former brotherly attitudes’. According to him, this new popular view contributes to the trend of Russia and Ukraine ‘drifting apart’ (Moshes 2000).
Meanwhile, even those periodicals that are not particularly sympathetic towards Ukrainian independence, such as Nezavisimaia gazeta, have now begun to argue that the aim of Russia’s foreign policy should be not the recreation of a Slavic Union, but the establishment of a relationship with Ukraine on the ‘USA–Canada’ model.33

Conclusions

Attempts to reconsider the past and present of Russian–Ukrainian relations, and to ‘nationalise’ the territory of the Russian Federation by looking at the origins of the Russian state within its current borders, mark only the first step for Russia coming to terms with Ukraine’s independence. At the moment only individual members of the Russian intellectual elite make explicitly revisionist statements on this issue. The new school history textbooks are only starting to separate Ukrainian and Russian histories, by focusing on Novgorod in addition to Kyiv as one of the two centres around which Rus developed. No university in Russia yet offers a degree in Ukrainian studies, which could have facilitated the perception of Ukraine as a separate nation among younger Russians. Among the political elites, the trend under President Putin is to be more pragmatic in dealing with Ukraine, particularly in the sphere of economic relations, rather than to question explicitly traditional assumptions about the nature of Russian–Ukrainian relations. There is also no sign that the communist or nationalist opposition in Russia is even beginning to revise its view that Ukraine is an inseparable part of the pan-Russian nation.

It is clear that it will take decades to redefine post-imperial Russian–Ukrainian relations on the basis of Russia’s full acceptance of an independent Ukraine as an equal partner in the international arena. Yet even the first steps in this direction, discernible from the second half of the 1990s, are of immense importance, as a re-examination of Russian–Ukrainian relations is essential for the construction of a nation-state within the borders of the Russian Federation. The fact that Russian elites are starting to revise Russian–Ukrainian relations is marked by an acceptance that different peoples can legitimately have different interpretations of the same historical events and phenomena. This understanding is not only important for Russia’s relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union but for the country’s internal stability and cohesion. The ability to understand the point of view of other nationalities will be invaluable in working out Russia’s policies towards the non-Russian nationalities of the Russian Federation, particularly those with strong identities and traditions separate from the Russian one.
Rethinking Russian–Ukrainian relations

Notes

1 Komsomolskaia pravda, 30 August 1991.
2 Popov made his statements on Ukraine’s independence in an interview with Central Soviet Television on 27 August 1991.
3 See an interview with Sobchak in Le Figaro, 4 December 1991.
4 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 January 1994 on the Ukrainian independence as a ploy of the political elites; M. Leontev in Segodnia, 30 April 1994, using the Ukrainian words samostiinost and nezalezhnost with sarcasm.
5 This view of Ukrainian separatism as a ploy of foreign powers aiming to weaken Russia has marked Russian nationalist thought since the second half of the nineteenth century.
6 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 May 1996.
7 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 January 1994.
8 Argumenty i fakty, no. 27 (July), 1997.
10 Ibid.
11 Boris Volkhonsky in Kommersant-daily, 18 February 1999: 3.
12 Novaia gazeta 22, 2–8 June 1997: 3.
13 See Anna Ostapchuk in Moskovskie novosti 7, 21–8 February 1999: 10.
15 Kommersant-daily, 18 February 1999: 3.
17 Kommersant-daily, 18 February 1999: 3.
18 Izvestiia, 3 June 1997: 2.
19 Izvestiia, 26 May 1990.
21 The conference brought together leading social scientists, parliamentary deputies and diplomats from both countries.
23 See n. 20, above: 180–1.
24 Literaturnaia Rossiiia, 14 February and 7 August 1992. It should be noted that Mialo claims the Crimea as ‘Russian’.
25 Furman reminded his readers that the idea of Russian–Ukrainian unity in the medieval period was a myth. In particular, the western areas of today’s Ukraine, which were parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Austria-Hungary, were incorporated in Russia only in 1939–44 and had enjoyed entirely different historical traditions and political culture from those of the Russians.
26 Other scholars have pointed out that the Pereiaslav treaty recognised an extensive autonomy for the Hetmanate, which the Russian tsars soon started unilaterally to infringe, with the last freedoms being revoked by Catherine the Great. The new approach of Russian scholars also includes a recognition that in 1654 Moscow’s control extended only to parts of today’s Ukraine. Until the Second World War, large territories, populated by people who in the nineteenth century started to be called Ukrainians, continued to be Polish. The difference between political culture and historical tradition of Galicia and Volhynia and those of Russia were extremely significant. See, for instance, ‘Rossiiai Ukraina – dialog kultur’, Druzhba narodov 9 (1997): 168 and Savchenko 1996.
27 Otechestvennaia istoriia 3, 1995: 174–85, quoting Pypin, where the historian argued that in the medieval period there were significant political and cultural differences between east Slavs, due to the influence upon them of different neighbouring peoples.
28 In 1998, a film about Riabinin was broadcast on the ‘Culture’ channel of Russian television.
30 It should be noted that authors of some of these publications are scholars from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
References


