ORIENTALISM, NATIONALISM, AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA*

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ABSTRACT. Questioning Edward Said’s controversial perception of European Oriental studies as a facilitator of imperialism, this article analyses the views and policies promoted in late imperial Russia by academics specializing in Oriental studies, as they debated how best to integrate ethnic minorities in the country’s eastern borderlands. The article argues that, themselves influenced by the pervasive impact of nationalism on European scholarship, between the 1870s and the 1917 Revolution these academics proposed policies which are best understood as aimed at nation-building (i.e. fostering a sense of community and unity among the population of a state) rather than at imperial domination of the minorities by the Russians. Identifying the origins of the academics’ support for cultural and linguistic pluralism as fully compatible with pan-Russian nationalism, the article demonstrates that the Bolshevik nationalities policies of the 1920s were strongly influenced by the views of academic Orientalists and the pre-revolutionary Russian intellectual tradition to which the latter belonged.

The turn of the twentieth century was a time when nationalism was a key force in shaping the political and social landscape of Europe. Not just states such as France, Britain, or Spain, but also land-based empires, including the Romanov empire, formed on the dynastic principle, had to take into account the power of nationalism. Since the reign of Aleksandr II (1855–81), among the Russian political and intellectual elites the view became dominant that the government should copy the policies pursued by Britain and France in building national communities

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1 Nationalism is understood here as political and intellectual pursuits aimed at legitimizing and ‘naturalizing’ within particular geographical boundaries a community defined by its leaders as a nation. These pursuits include the production of a particular version of history and the fostering of horizontal ties between members of the community and of a sense of these members’ supreme loyalty to the community.
within the metropole and should take into account the example set by the creation of unified states in Germany and Italy. Thus, many politicians and intellectuals began to hope that Russia could be turned into a nation-state with a particular type of social, political, and, maybe, even cultural cohesion, rooted in a common historical experience of living together. However, the elites never reached an agreement over the means by which this goal was to be achieved. Different policies aimed at integrating Russian and non-Russian into a single nation (edinyi narod) were proposed, of which cultural and administrative Russification was just one form of nation-building, based on an ethnic perception of national community.

Recent research has uncovered a whole variety of views regarding the assimilation of non-Russians, showing, for instance, that opposition towards aggressive cultural Russification, aimed at making the minorities Russian in language and culture, was far more widespread than has hitherto been thought. Many opponents of cultural Russification accepted the possibility of forging a multi-ethnic nation, based on a civic principle of political and social integration, which did not require linguistic and cultural homogeneity. This article will analyse proposals regarding the integration of the Russians and the non-Russians in the eastern and southern borderlands into a single unified community put forward by those who claimed to know these borderlands best – academics specialising in ‘Russia’s own Orient’ – the Caucasus, Central Asia and the inorodtsy (the ‘natives’ or literally ‘aliens’) of Siberia and the middle-Volga region. It will be argued that academic Orientalists (vostokovedy or orientalisty) advocated policies which were significantly different from the ideas of other critics of cultural Russification. Although their proposals were largely neglected by the tsarist government, they nevertheless left a profound legacy. Most of their ideas were finally implemented in the 1920s, as the new Soviet government responded to the power of nationalism by promoting

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6 The words ‘Orient’, ‘Eastern’, and, indeed, ‘European’ are used here in the full knowledge that these are intellectual constructs, whose meaning has changed historically. The word ‘Orientalist’ is used to describe those professionally involved in studying the societies of Asia. It does not have the negative connotation with which this word has often been loaded, following the publication of E. Said’s *Orientalism* (New York, 1978).
the image of the Soviet Union as an anti-imperial state. In designing and implementing their nationalities policies, the Bolsheviks strongly relied on the expertise of the academic Orientalists. The analysis offered here will help explain why the Bolsheviks believed that korenizatsiia (indigenization), which entailed proactive nation-building at the sub-state level on a historically unprecedented scale, could facilitate integration rather than breed separatism. With hindsight, given the role of nationalist elites in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the Bolsheviks’ position is hard to understand. Yet, this article will demonstrate that a belief in the integrationist power of korenizatsiia had strong roots in the pre-revolutionary Russian intellectual tradition, which had its own logic and could look convincing at the time.

This subject raises a broader issue: that of the relationship between European Oriental studies and imperialism. Work in this area inevitably has to engage with the questions raised by Edward Said’s ideas about European Orientalism, particularly with his controversial conclusion that Oriental studies as a discipline facilitated the ideology and practice of imperialism. The article will argue that a primary focus on the relationship between Oriental studies and the colonial policies of imperial governments has prevented Said and other scholars from understanding fully not only the purpose, but also ideological underpinnings and practical implications of the activities of academic Orientalists. Not just in Russia, but elsewhere in Europe, we should fully appreciate the role of nationalism and of the goals of nation-building (i.e. impulses directed inwards, at European nations themselves) in order to understand the ways in which Europe engaged with the ‘Orient’ since the nineteenth century. Thus, John MacKenzie has demonstrated that it is often impossible to find any visible match between different stages of imperial expansion and the rise and fall of interest in the ‘Orient’ among European artists and musicians. Instead, the requirements of nationalism can illuminate the dynamics of Orientalism in this area much better. The impact of nationalism on academic Oriental studies is less well researched, but its importance has been noted by scholars. Not only among the Germans with their limited and belated colonial experience, but also in the case of France and Britain where empire- and nation-building went hand in hand, demands of nationalism could help explain such otherwise puzzling features of Orientalist research as its focus

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7 For a criticism of Said for misunderstanding the purpose of scholarly work in general, see, for instance, B. Lewis, Islam and the West (New York, 1993), ch. 6.
8 In the introduction to his book Orientalism, Said mentioned that the East ‘has helped to define Europe’, being a ‘sort of surrogate and even underground self’ (p. 1), thus implying the importance of the ‘Orient’ for the construction of national identities in Europe. Yet, he failed to follow up this line of argument in his book. In his Culture and imperialism (New York, 1993), Said acknowledged more fully that the ‘Orient’ was not just a passive, silent ‘Other’, but, at times, an active force that shaped the identities of Europeans.
9 J. MacKenzie, Orientalism: history, theory and the arts (Manchester, 1995); see also D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: how the British saw their empire (London, 2002).
on the distant past, which was not particularly relevant from the point of view of imperial administrators.\textsuperscript{10}

It is quite surprising, given Russia’s long-term involvement in the ‘Orient’, that the engagement of Russian specialists with Said has been so limited. One of the few examples of historians discussing the applicability of Said’s ideas to Russia is a debate in \textit{Kritika}, in which Adeeb Khalid, a historian of Central Asia, and Nathaniel Knight, a historian of Russia, offer different answers to the question they pose about the complicity of specialists in Oriental studies in Russian imperialism. Whereas Khalid believes in the full relevance of Said’s arguments to Russia, Knight thinks that Russia’s involvement with the Orient was profoundly different from those of Britain and France, whose experiences are analysed by Said. In particular, Knight doubts that academic Orientalists could be seen as significantly responsible for Russian imperialism, because the tsarist government was very reluctant to use their expertise. Khalid, in contrast, offers an example of an Orientalist who did advise the government on a regular basis, and he observes that, in any event, most scholars were keen to participate in the formation of government policies. This makes them, in Khalid’s view, automatic accomplices of Russian imperialism.\textsuperscript{11}

There are two problems with the approach adopted by Khalid and Knight. The first is the failure to differentiate between various groups of experts.\textsuperscript{12} In talking about European Orientalism, not only should we distinguish between, for instance, literary works or travel guides, usually not claiming to convey an ‘objective’ depiction of the ‘Orient’, and the work of scholars, but we also should distinguish between several different groups of ‘experts’. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, with the increasing specialization in academic Oriental studies, at least three groups of ‘experts’ have been identified – academic Orientalists, Christian missionaries, particularly those involved in anti-Islamic polemics, and government officials. In the period under review in this article, differences in


the approaches to and in the purpose of research between academics and Orientalists with theological and missionary backgrounds were pronounced. Without acknowledging the distinction, Khalid and Knight, in fact, speak about different types of ‘experts’. Nikolai Ostroumov, whom Khalid uses as an example, was an anti-Islamic polemicist educated in the Kazan Theological Academy. Vasilii Grigorev, referred to by Knight, was a university-trained academic. This difference in backgrounds is important in explaining the difference between Ostroumov’s and Grigorev’s attitude towards the ‘natives’ and in their relationship with the government.

Less clear was the distinction between academics and government and military officials engaged in Oriental studies. Many academics, during their professional careers, occupied positions in government structures, while a significant number of government officials as well as military personnel were involved in ethnographic and archaeological work in the East. Proposals concerning the integration of the ‘natives’ analysed in this article were articulated by academic Orientalists (i.e. those people who first became interested in and acquired knowledge of the ‘Orient’ through formal studies at universities and then, in contrast to government officials who were only occasionally engaged in the study of the ‘Orient’, continued to regard academic research as their main preoccupation). The proposals put forward by the academics, the majority of whom were members of the Imperial/Russian Academy of Sciences and professors at St Petersburg and Moscow Universities, were significantly different from those suggested by other types of Orientalists, including the best-known ‘educator’ of the ‘natives’, missionary Nikolai Il’minskii.

The second problem with the discussion of the relationship between Russian Orientalists and the tsarist government initiated by Kritika is that, in line with Said, it focuses primarily on the relationship between Oriental studies and imperial rule, i.e. a type of rule which is necessarily inequitable, and over something different. This article will argue that to pose the question in relation to late imperial Russia in terms of the academics’ complicity in imperial policies brings the danger of extrapolating our current perception to the past. Without denying the importance of the relationship between European Oriental studies and imperialism, in general—if anything, imperial domination offered scholars unprecedented access to the subject of their research and strengthened their belief in the superiority of European culture—this article will focus on the impact of the goals of nation-building (i.e. fostering a sense of community and unity among the population of a state), on the research agendas, the public activities, and a sense of self-identity of academic Orientalists.

As a way of putting the public activities of Russian academics into a broader context, the article starts by demonstrating that if there were political demands that impacted on scholars’ approach to their research, these were the demands of nation-building rather than of colonial domination. Using published works as well as unpublished correspondence, diaries, public speeches, and reports addressed to the government by leading academic
Orientalists, the article will demonstrate that the impact of nationalism on academics went far beyond their desire to increase Russia’s national prestige in Europe through their research, indeed, the very research questions that scholars tended to ask were shaped by their view of themselves as nation-builders. The article will then argue that the goals pursued by academics in their public activities were also determined by their self-perception as nation-builders, as they proposed measures aimed at overcoming the divide between the dominant nationality of the empire – the Russians – and the indigenous, non-Russian population of the eastern and southern borderlands. The article shows that the set of proposals put forward by the academics was unusual in the context of contemporary debate over the integration and assimilation of these minorities. The origins of these proposals will be explained. In conclusion, the article discusses the relationship between the academics’ views and the Bolshevik nationalities policies.

I

From the 1860s onwards, the debate over national homogeneity, over what ‘national’ meant in the context of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, and over how integration of different nationalities could be achieved, dominated domestic policy-making in Russia. The words ‘unity’ (edinstvo) and ‘fusion’ (sliianie) were regularly used in discussing the relationship between Russians and non-Russians. Various policies, including cultural Russification both forced and voluntary, administrative homogenization, and conversion to Orthodoxy were advocated by some and criticized by others. Whereas in the western borderlands cultural assimilation had been practised with some degree of consistency since the 1880s, in the eastern borderlands the policy of grazhdanstvennost’ (civility) had been applied since the 1870s. Grazhdanstvennost’ was aimed at achieving a greater unity among Russia’s different subjects on the basis of the state-derived (Russian) norms, i.e. a situation in which imperial subjects of all ranks would share

13 This article analyses the views of the most influential (academically and, in the 1920s, politically) scholars specializing in Russia’s ‘own Orient’. In the period under review, this was a relatively small community. In 1893, the staff of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in the field of ‘history and cultures of Asian peoples’ included eight ordinary academicians (ordinarnye akademiki), and five extraordinary academicians (extraordinarnye akademiki) and adjuncts (adiunkty). See A. M. Kulikova, Vostokovedenie v rossiiskikh zakonodatels’nykh aktakh (St Petersburg, 1994), p. 27.

14 In his article ‘Grigor’ev in Orenburg’, pp. 80, 82, and in Kritika, 1 (2000), p. 95, Knight acknowledges the importance of nationalism for Grigor’ev, but he does not go far enough in analysing its impact on this scholar’s research and administrative work. Knight only briefly observes that ‘Grigor’ev’s interest in the eastern “other” was part of a broader endeavor of national self-definition and national self-assertion in the face of western cultural domination’ (the quote is on p. 80).

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comparable responsibilities and status without necessarily losing their ethnic and religious identities.  

In intellectual circles, this period was marked by intensified debates over Russian identity. Several definitions of the nation were articulated. Some intellectuals put the main emphasis on the ethnic nature of identity (Russians as eastern Slavs). Racial theories, in which nations were seen as communities bound by common ancestry and existing in a particular hierarchical order with each other, found reflection on the pages of the Russian press and in scholarly work. At the same time, another inclusive definition of Russianness was also increasingly gathering strength, in which the nation was seen as territorially and institutionally framed by the current borders of the state. The state was regarded as crucial in facilitating the process of nation-building. Those advocating such a vision of the nation argued that a sense of historically rooted social, cultural, and political cohesion had been developing among Russia’s different nationalities. The multi-ethnicity of such a nation was recognized. The Pan-Slavists Nikolai Danilevskii and Vladimir Lamanski were the first Russian thinkers to attempt (cautiously) to integrate the peoples of the eastern and southern borderlands in this vision of a state-framed Russian nation. The idea of a multi-ethnic nation was not unique to Russia. In France, for instance, where on the admission of the historian Fustel de Coulanges ‘five languages were spoken’ by its inhabitants in the second half of the nineteenth century, the perception of the nation as multi-ethnic was very popular.

Both definitions of the Russian nation had an impact on scholarship. In fact, broader questions which scholars attempted to address by their research were shaped by nation-building goals, i.e. the desire to demonstrate that the community of a single people was in the process of being formed within the borders of the Russian state. In the period under review, three figures in the Russian academic community were instrumental in promoting the state-framed vision of the nation and in making this vision shape the research agendas of many academics. These were the literary scholar Aleksandr Veselovskii (1838–1906), the art historian


Nikodim Kondakov (1844–1925), and the founding father of modern Russian Oriental Studies, Viktor Rozen (1849–1908). Under the impact of nationalism, which forced scholars across Europe to adapt their research as closely as possible ‘to the frontiers of the present state’, these three Russian academics argued that scholars’ main preoccupation should be the study of historical interaction between and mutual influences of the different nationalities of a state in a joint effort to create what they described as a ‘national culture’. They emphatically rejected the assumption that any culture could have ‘one ethnic root’, mocking as a manifestation of ‘the temptation of narrowly understood patriotism’ the views of the foremost German specialist in prehistory, Gustaf Kossinna, who equated culture with ethnos. Yet, their scholarly approach was also influenced by a particular national vision. The influential edition, *Russian antiquities*, published by Kondakov and another archaeologist, Ivan Tolstoi, began with the scholars’ definition of the Russian nation:

In the course of two and a half thousand years many tribes and nationalities had been living and working for the creation of historical memory within the borders of our fatherland. And the more varied has been the ethnic composition (plemennoi sostav) of the population, and the longer it has taken to create one state with a single nation (edinyi narod), the greater has been the contribution of [these nationalities] to the treasury of Russian antiquities.

The scholars went on to explain that the special Russian architectural style was created by merging together the styles of churches in the north of Russia, Kiev, Novgorod, and Moscow and the historic buildings of Georgia and the Crimea. Russian artistic style was influenced by that of the ancient Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast as well as by Byzantine and Persian traditions penetrating Russia through the Caucasus, Central Asia and the shores of the Danube. It is not surprising that, despite their primary interest in Slavic studies, Veselovskii and Kondakov were also active in the Oriental Commission of the Moscow Archaeological Society, whereas Rozen spared no effort to create a school of Oriental studies in Russia based on these ideas. First, Rozen defined the national boundaries of contemporary Russia as the area where Russian Orientalists should focus their primary attention. He waged a battle to ensure that the Imperial Academy of Sciences made Oriental studies its core research area, simultaneously insisting that Russian scholars should above all study Russia’s ‘own Orient’ – the Caucasus, Central Asia and the non-European peoples of Siberia and the middle-Volga.

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23 N. Platonova, ‘Istoki Sankt-Petersburgskoi shkoly arkhеologii’, in *Arkheolog, detektiv i mysliel’: Sbornik statei v chestr L. S. Kleina*, p. 6 (manuscript). In her otherwise very illuminating discussion of Kondkov’s and Rozen’s views, Platonova mistakenly regards their position as non-nationalist and, therefore, ‘objective’, in contrast to the overtly biased position of scholars who were influenced by ethnic Russian nationalism. The same misunderstanding marks Shnirelman, ‘The faces of nationalist archaeology in Russia’.
25 Ibid., pp. iii–iv.
region. His goal was to unite specialists in Oriental studies (vostochniki) and Slavists (zapadniki) in a ‘friendly community’ which would jointly study their common fatherland, of which he himself was ‘a convinced and passionate patriot’. Rozen’s ideas had a tremendous impact on younger academic Orientalists, with virtually every major figure in the field at the turn of the twentieth century seeing himself as Rozen’s disciple.

Nicholas Riasanovsky suggested that ‘the studies of non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire and of the relationship between these peoples and the Russians’ in the late imperial period directly contributed to the development of the ideology of Eurasianism in the 1920s, which conceived of Russia-Eurasia as a separate world, neither European nor Asian. This is certainly true. But it is difficult to agree with Riasanovsky’s perception of these studies as pure scholarship, which itself was not engaged in contemporary ideological battles over Russian identity. As shown above, these studies emerged out of a particular vision of Russia; and, as, for instance, Kondakov’s *Russian antiquities* indicates, scholars openly acknowledged the impact of this vision on their research. This vision can be regarded as a predecessor of the Eurasian concept. Thus, Eurasianism appears to be less of a break with Russia’s dominant Eurocentric intellectual tradition than Riasanovsky and other scholars have assumed.

This vision of the Russian nation as being state-framed not only shaped the scholars’ research agendas but also determined their public activities. Using current nation-building terminology, they spoke about the ways of achieving unity (edinstvo) and political and spiritual (dukhovnoe) fusion (sliianie) on the basis of common civic norms (grazhdanstvennost’) between Russians and the ‘natives’. Scholars from political conservatives to liberals and overt opponents of the regime, even if they disagreed on some specific aspects of individual policies, identified

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26 Veselovskii, *Baron V. R. Rozen*, pp. 13–14. The initial refusal of the Academy’s leadership to accept Rozen’s plans concerning the future of Oriental studies led to his resignation from the Academy in 1882 (‘Protokol zasedaniia Obshchego Sobraniia, 5 marta 1882 g.’, St Petersburg (SPb) Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN), f. I, op. Ia, d. 130, pp. 12, 26 oborot-27).


31 Ibid., p. 19.

32 A. Pozdneev, ‘Iz istorii razvitia budizma v Zabaikal’skom krae’, *ZVORAO*, 1, 3 (1886), p. 171. See also his ‘Dokladnaia zapiska’ to the minister of public education, Count P. N. Ignatev, SPb Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 800, op. 4, d. 83, p. 16.

33 Aleksei Pozdneev, a political conservative, was much more concerned about the danger of political separatism posed by newly emerging political movements among the minorities that were his more liberally minded academic counterparts. Thus, Pozdneev believed that the fact that, at the time of the 1905 revolution, two Buriat intellectuals designed an alphabet based on the old Mongolian script was a dangerous development (A. Pozdneev, ‘O novom buriat-mongol’skom alfavite’, the Archive of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAN, St Petersburg, f. 44, op. 1, d. 68, pp. 1–4). In contrast,
unity and fusion as Russia’s ‘goals in the East’. As will be demonstrated, their interpretation of unity and fusion was one that was fully compatible with the preservation of ethnic, linguistic, and religious pluralism.

Nikolai Iadrintsev (1842–94), a political exile, an advocate of Siberian regionalism (oblastnichesstvo), and, at the same time, a leading specialist on Siberia’s inorodtsy, argued that fusion had been taking place not just through Russification but because Russians had quite often accepted the traditions and customs of the ‘natives’ (particularly, of the Buriats, Tungus, and Yakuts).34 The liberals Rozen35 and Vasilii Bartol’d (1869–1930) also saw unification and fusion as the future of the Russians and non-Russians. In a graphic description of the nation-building process, Bartol’d looked forward to the day when all the peoples of Russia, including ‘the Tungus, who is wild today, and the Kalmyk, the friend of the steppe’, will be united in paying tribute to the great representative of Russian culture [Pushkin], and will recognize his [genius] above all because ‘during his cruel times he hailed freedom and called for mercy to the fallen’, i.e. because of his service to pan-human ideals.36

It is noteworthy that in seeing unification and fusion as the desirable end of government policies, the majority of academic Orientalists did not make any exception for Turkestan, whose status as a colony (the only real colony of Russia it was argued at the time) was virtually universally accepted. The popular multi-volume edition, Aziataskaia Rossiia, to which academic Orientalists contributed, after stating that Turkestan ‘is our only colony’, claimed that even there, as in all Russia’s eastern borderlands, ‘the same old Rus is emerging’.37 In turn, the first Russian archaeologist of Central Asia, Nikolai Veselovskii, reaffirmed that the desirable goal for Turkestan was ‘fusion with the dominant Russian nationality’ even if, now and for a long time, Russians would be seen as an alien force by the local people.38 The unity of opinion in favour of Turkestan’s fusion with Russia distinguished academic Orientalists from other commentators on this subject. In contrast to academics, popular writers on Central Asia as well as members of the civilian and military administration in Turkestan, could not, until the end of the imperial regime, reach a consensus over whether fusion or much looser association with Russia was the future of that region, with the latter option finding more supporters.39

Dmitrii Klements defended the usefulness of this alphabet (D. Klements, ‘Pessimizm na buriatskoi pochve’, Sibirskie soprosy, 10 (1907), pp. 13 and 23).

34 N. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia (St Petersburg, 1882), pp. 12, 17. The assimilation of Russian settlers by the inorodtsy in Siberia attracted the attention of a number of members of the East Siberian Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (IRGO), of which Iadrintsev was also an active participant. See, T. N. Oglezneva, Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obschestvo: Izuchenie narodov severo-vostoka Azii, 1845–1917 (Novosibirsk, 1994), pp. 96–8.
35 ZVORA, 1, 1 (1886), p. 39.
37 Aziataskaia Rossiia, 1 (St Petersburg, 1914), p. viii.
38 ZVORA, 8, 1/2 (1893), p. 165.
39 For a discussion of the views of popular writers on Central Asia see P. Weisensel, ‘Central Asians in Russian popular travel literature at the end of the empire’, paper presented at the National
It is not surprising that academic Orientalists joined the camp of the opponents of cultural Russification. If minority languages and cultures disappeared, the Orientalists would lose the very subject of their research. Some of their statements, which were typical for European scholars in that time, betray a chilling perception of the ‘natives’ simply as objects of study rather than human beings.\(^40\)

For instance, a leading Turkologist, Vasilii Radlov (Radloff) (1837–1918), and an ethnographer, Lev Shternberg (1861–1927), argued for government measures to preserve the Ostiaks in Siberia above all on the grounds that the fascinating tribe ‘totally isolated among the peoples of Asia’ ‘will completely cease to exist for scholarship’ (vymret dlia nauki). They stressed that scholars had only been able to conduct some linguistic research but had not yet had time to study the Ostiaks from the ethnographic point of view.\(^41\)

At the same time the academic Orientalist approach to the peoples and cultures that they studied was also influenced by their participation in the public debate over nation-building. A set of ideas, articulated by the activists of the ‘native homeland’ movement from the 1870s onwards, of which Siberian regionalists were the best-known representatives, seems to have had a particularly strong impact on the Orientalists.

In the 1870s, the Russian press began to publish articles developing the idea of a ‘native homeland’ (rodina),\(^42\) whose advocates were concerned about how to make a pan-national loyalty, a feeling of common overarching identity, take root in Russia despite its huge size and diversity. Being originally articulated most vocally by intellectuals in Siberia and the provinces of European Russia in relation to the Russian-speaking population rather than the minorities, the concept was based on the assumption that in order to foster a sense of national loyalty to the entire state-framed community one should first develop a thorough knowledge of and love for the history and cultural tradition of one’s place of birth and permanent residence. One could relate to the entire Russian fatherland (otechestvo) only through a strong affiliation with one particular locality (‘native homeland’), it was argued. Russia was so large that it was impossible to know it all well and to love it as a whole, equally, in abstract terms. There was no conflict between a strong local identity and an overarching pan-Russian one, but a complementary fusion of the two identities, it was believed. Local identities and their links with a pan-Russian identity should be fostered by education, creation of local museums, and the involvement of the public in collecting and spreading knowledge about their localities.

\(^{40}\) George Stocking called this attitude ‘salvage ethnology’. See his Victorian anthropology (New York, 1987).

\(^{41}\) ‘Protokol no. 1 zasedaniia Russkogo Komiteta dlia izucheniia Srednei i Vostochnoi Azii, 29 ianvaria 1905’, SPb Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 148, op. 1, d. 12, p. 8.

\(^{42}\) In the discussion of the relationship between local and national identities, authors consistently used the word rodina to refer to a particular locality and otechestvo to describe Russia in its entirety.
Such ideas resembled contemporary debates elsewhere in Europe regarding the relationship between national and regional or local identities. In particular, the German ‘Heimat’ movement that began in the 1890s also aimed to encourage people to value their local and regional culture and history in order to help them better understand the national culture made of a mosaic of local and regional traditions. However, a few ‘native homeland’ activists in Russia believed that there was a difference between the German movement and its Russian counterpart. The former, to a great extent, reflected the existence of already strong regional identities among the Germans. In contrast, most people in Russia failed to acknowledge the importance of strong regional identities, it was argued. The Russian activists believed urgent measures were needed to rectify the situation and presented France as another positive model.

Dmitrii Klements (1848–1914), a revolutionary populist and a leading specialist on Siberia’s indigenous population, urged Russians to learn from the French experience of creating local museums. He stressed that, unfortunately, in contrast to the French who were conscious about their local identities, many provincial communities in Russia were in the state of ‘torpor’ (spiachka). The few educated people, who could have acted as local leaders, ‘despise communities which surround them’, being interested in international affairs instead. Such a situation should change, if a pan-Russian unity were to develop, Klements thought.

According to Nikolai Skalozubov, an agronomist and local activist in the Tobolsk region, schools in Russia were indifferent to the regions where they were located, and it was a ‘very sad and unnatural’ state of affairs. He continued:

Look at the textbooks which are adopted in schools. What can they say to a student about the life which surrounds him, if our Siberian schools use the same textbook for geography by Belokh and Sokolov as is used in European Russia? ... It is clear that such textbooks consistently kill in students any curiosity towards the traditions of life which surround them.

In turn, another Siberian activist, who was also a specialist on its indigenous population, Grigorii Potanin (1835–1920), spoke about reforming Russia’s education system in order to strengthen people’s local roots and foster local

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43 See C. Applegate, A nation of provincials: the German idea of Heimat (Berkeley, 1990), and A. Confino, The nation as a local metaphor (Chapel Hill, 1997).

44 Thus, Nikolai Marr argued that the existence of strong regional identities in Germany was a key factor contributing to the strength of German scholarship in the nineteenth century. All the nationalities of the Russian state should follow the German example, he argued (N. Marr, ‘Doklad v obshchestve izuchenii Azerbaidzhana’, SPB Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 800, op. 1 part 2, d. 1837, pp. 3–4).

45 D. Klements, ‘Mesnye musei. Ih znachenie v provintsial’noi zhizni’, Sibirskii sbornik, ii (Irktusk, 1892), which traces the history of the ‘native homeland’ concept in Russia from the 1870s onwards; the quote is on p. 17. See also V. Iu. Grigor’ev, ‘O znachenii mestnykh museev voobshe i minusinskogo v chastnosti’, Izvestiia Krasnoiarskogo podotdela Vostochno-Sibirskogo odela IRGO, 1, 4 (1902), pp. 3–5; N. Mogil’ianskii, Oblastnoi i mestnyi musei kak tip kul’turnogo uchrezhdeniia (Petrograd, 1917).

46 N. Skalozubov, Organisatsiia obshchestvennykh syl v tseliakh izuchenii Sibiri (St Petersburg, 1912), p. 23.
patriotism, without which national feeling towards the entire ‘fatherland’ were impossible. Potanin argued:

Everywhere abroad schools lay the foundation for grazhdanstvennost'. To study the national homeland has become a priority ... To know all of Russia equally well means to know little about a lot of things. If Siberian schools taught to value and love Siberia, schools in the Urals – [to value and love] the Ural region, and schools on the Volga – the Volga region, while at the same time giving sufficient knowledge of pan-national goals, these schools would have prepared really good workers ... on behalf of the national homeland.47

Academics specializing in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the native population of Siberia and the middle-Volga region took on board these ideas and applied them to their areas. What they were proposing was not the same as the position of those who were in favour of voluntary assimilation in the western borderlands, where it was acknowledged that non-Russian national identities (for instance, among the Poles) were very strong and it was not realistic to de-nationalize the people. The position of academic Orientalists was also different from that of xenophobic Russian nationalists of the early twentieth century who opposed assimilation, because they regarded the minorities as threatening to the very existence of the ethnically defined Russian nation.48 Support for linguistic and cultural pluralism, which marked the views of academic Orientalists, was, in itself, not unique in late imperial Russia. What was distinctive about these Orientalists’ position is that they applied their arguments even to nationalities with weak or no sense of national identity and proposed pro-active measures aimed at forging such identities. It is also noteworthy that in Russian society as a whole support for cultural pluralism was associated with liberal and left-wing views. Among academic Orientalists cultural pluralism was supported by political conservatives as well. How did they justify their position?

In proposing pro-active measures aimed at developing and strengthening the culturally distinct identities of non-Russians, particularly in the cases where those identities were weak, academic Orientalists argued that strong local identities and an awareness of local cultures and histories created the basis for people to partake in the Russian grazhdanstvennost’. For instance, Nikolai Marr (1864–1934) argued that knowledge of and love for their own histories and cultural traditions by Armenians and Georgians should not be seen by the government as an obstacle to the goals of unity and fusion in Russia. Instead, in a programme article on the aims of Armenian studies, Marr, at the time Professor of Armenian Studies at St Petersburg University, stated in 1899:

As for the Armenians and the Georgians, in particular, the state has all the more reason to regard Armenian and Georgian studies as an excellent educational tool, because it is clear that they develop and strengthen enlightened love and respect for the native homeland (rodina). Who can deny the fact, which is axiomatic to me, that one who is indifferent to the

47 G. Potanin, Vozrozhdenie Rossii i Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosveshchения (Krasnoiarsk, 1919), p. 11.
48 These different approaches to minorities are well described in Weinerman, ‘Russification in imperial Russia’.
plight of one’s own region cannot deeply embrace a more abstract and complex feeling for the fatherland (otechestvo).  

Bartol’d stressed, in relation to the Muslim population of Russia, that it would be a mistake not to promote studies of local cultures and not to preserve monuments of Islamic history and art on the grounds that this would ‘strengthen local peculiarities, undermining spiritual fusion (dukhovnoe sliianie)’ with the Russians.  

According to Bartol’d, this mistaken view strongly affected tsarist government policies.

In turn, Klements believed that the development of a modern national identity among the Buriats would help them to integrate themselves into a pan-national Russian community. As Klements attacked ‘educated Russians’ in Siberia for being interested in ‘international affairs’ rather than in the life of their own region, so he criticized those ‘educated Buriats’ who favoured complete Russification of their people. In 1907, Klements engaged in polemics with the Buriat M. Bogdanov, who argued that ‘we [the Buriats] can be saved not by trying to preserve imagined national traits (vydumannye nami natsionalnye osobennosti), but by joining [Russian/European] civilization as quickly and firmly as possible’. Bogdanov argued that linguistic and cultural Russification of minorities was the inevitable consequence of capitalism. Klements vehemently disagreed, accusing Bogdanov of being ‘very similar to the representatives of the Russian nobility in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries who unthinkingly kowtowed before everything European’. He rejected Bodanov’s view of Buriat-Mongol literature as nothing but myths and prejudices, hailing instead its greatness and richness.

Klements saw no reason for the Buriats to renounce their ‘wonderful literary language’ and ‘certain cultural heritage’ in order to be fully integrated into Russia. Moreover, he thought that an awareness of this heritage should be strengthened among the Buriat population at large. In particular, he actively encouraged the establishment of a Buriat language press as a vehicle to achieve the ‘awakening of self-consciousness’ among Buriats.

III

It has been shown, in relation to countries other than Russia, that European Oriental studies had a significant impact on the formation of a modern national consciousness among colonial peoples. For instance, works on the history, cultures, and languages of India by European scholars, as well as the modernizing project

50 Mir Islama, 1 (1912), p. 375.  
of building schools and encouraging a proliferation of media communication by the British, contributed to the creation of ‘a new Indian middle class and assisted in the professionalization of the Bengali intelligentsia’ with a nationalist outlook.\textsuperscript{54} It is agreed by scholars that by engaging in modernizing projects, empires planted the seeds of their own destruction. They helped to create among colonial subjects an intelligentsia, equipped with European nationalist ideas and ready to articulate them on behalf of their local communities. The growth of nationalism (eventually aimed against the empires) within colonial societies was accepted as inevitable by some representatives of the European elites and feared and resisted by others.\textsuperscript{55}

In late imperial Russia, a widespread fear of emerging nationalism of the minorities co-existed with the view that it did not pose any threat (even long-term) to the country’s unity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian government officials sided with the conservative Islamic clergy in suppressing the creation of European-type schools among the Tatar population. Specialists in Islam with a missionary and theological background, such as Il’minskii, Ostroumov, and Vasilii Smirnov, viewed secular schools in Muslim areas as hotbeds of separatism.\textsuperscript{56} In turn, Il’minskii’s schools, which aimed at converting minorities to the Orthodox faith by teaching them church dogmas in their own vernacular languages, were widely perceived by critics as breeding separatism rather than leading to integration. Opposition to the possible development of nationalism among minorities was based on the perception (proved well founded by subsequent developments) that a European-type education and the nationalism it tended to foster would lead to demands by non-European subjects which could not be fulfilled within existing political structures.\textsuperscript{57}

In contrast to these Orientalists, Russian academic specialists in Oriental studies seemed to have had no fear of the possible growth of local nationalisms. On the contrary, they regarded it as beneficial for Russia’s unity. One reason was that, in their view, the development of a ‘European way of thinking’, of which nationalism was one manifestation, would make the worldview of the Russians and peoples of the eastern borderlands more similar. But the academic Orientalists did not stop at that. Secular education, based on a knowledge of, and love for, local histories, languages, and cultures was, of course, an essential part of the ‘native homeland’ concept as a building block for the creation of a pan-Russian identity. Views informed by this concept shaped the academics’ public activities, as they designed alphabets for those peoples without written languages, campaigned for the establishment of local museums, and

\textsuperscript{54} D. Kopf, \textit{British Orientalism and the Bengal renaissance} (Berkeley, 1969), p. 275.\
\textsuperscript{57} See, for instance, Jersild, ‘From savagery to citizenship’, p. 111.
compiled textbooks for the inorodtsy schools, which combined subjects aimed at strengthening both local particularistic and overarching pan-Russian identities.58

A debate over the education of the inorodtsy began in the 1860s in connection with Aleksandr II’s reforms. As with other aspects of the integration of minorities, a great variety of views was expressed and no consensus was ever reached.59 Regulations on schooling for the inorodtsy issued by the Ministry of Public Education in 1870 envisaged primary education in the inorodtsy’s own languages. The main goal of this education was Russification through converting the ‘natives’ to the Orthodox faith. Il’minskii’s schools were presented as a model for the entire empire.60 The majority of academic Orientalists had their own position, which, while supporting education in the minorities’ own languages, differed from that of Il’minskii, as the schools they proposed were largely secular. One of the first public discussions among Orientalists about the education of the ‘natives’ took place at the 4th and the 5th Congresses of Archaeologists in Kazan’ in 1877 and in Tiflis in 1881. At that time, because of the shortage of money as well as concerns that education in the vernacular might undermine the goal of integration, Il’minskii-type schools began to be closed down.

As it was often the case, in the stance adopted by academic Orientalists, narrow professional goals were closely linked with broader public concerns. If the ‘natives’ were educated, they would have been in a better position to assist Russian Orientalists in collecting linguistic and ethnographic material, speakers at the congresses argued. At the same time, the education of the ‘natives’ would benefit Russia as whole. Leonid Zagurskii, a leading specialist on the languages of the mountaineers in the Caucasus, argued that properly devised education would be the main tool for ‘binding [the ‘natives’] with tight moral bonds (tesnymi nравственными узами) to the large fatherland and helping achieve what could not have been achieved with a bayonet and exile’.61

Academic Orientalists argued that the school curriculum should combine a component enhancing pupils’ knowledge of their own cultures and traditions with

59 See, in particular, Sbornik dokumentov i statei po voprosu ob obrazovanii inorodtsev (St Petersburg, 1869); Trudy osobago soveschaniia po voprosam obrazovaniia vostochnykh inorodtsev (St Petersburg, 1905); and Natsional’noe obrazovanie v Rossi: kontseptsi, vozgliady, mnenia, 1905–1938 gg. Sbornik dokumentov, 1 (Moscow, 1999).
60 ‘Postanovleniia Soveta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia’, ZhMNP, 148 (April 1870), p. 55. Schools teaching in the languages of the ‘natives’, which had been set up in the 1860s, began to be closed down in the next decade, because of the lack of money and qualified teachers, as well as worries about their impact. For a good overview, see L. Zagurskii, ‘Kavkazskie alfavit’, Izlechenie iz protokola godovogo sobraniia Kavkazskogo otdela IRGO, 18 June 1888 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 6–14.
information about Russian culture and Orthodox Christianity. Even though
educating the ‘natives’ was supposed to lead to unity on the basis of a European
worldview, in Muslim areas schools should show respect towards Islam and its
traditions, otherwise they would not have any impact, argued the leading
Turkologist Radlov when he served as the Kazan district inspector of Muslim
schools. Collaborating in the 1870s with the future Tatar leaders of the usul jadid
(‘new method’) movement, Radlov showed much greater respect for the cultural
and religious traditions of the Tatars than the majority of officials at the Ministry
of Public Education. He hoped that secular schools for the Tatars would teach the
Tatar language and, therefore, he prepared a textbook which included secular
stories and articles in Tatar. At the same time, he argued that the Russian
language and other subjects taught in schools in European Russia, including the
exact and natural sciences, should also be incorporated in the curriculum.
Commenting on Radlov’s views, Robert Geraci suggested that Radlov ‘was in-
spired by progressive educational ideals rather than by the Russificatory aims of
the state.’ Geraci assumes that the fact that Radlov was a German who only
came to work in Russia upon completion of higher education made him detached
from the government’s goals. In fact, Radlov’s position was typical of that of
academic Orientalists who became involved in developing an education pro-
gramme for Russia’s ‘natives’ under the impact of the ‘native homeland’ idea. In
his own words, the goal of the curriculum he was proposing was ‘unity of the
Muslim inorodtsy and the Russian population.’

Elaborating on views very similar to those of Radlov, Pozdneev promoted the
‘local homeland’ concept when he advised the Ministry of Public Education
regarding schools for the Buriats and the Kalmyks. Pozdneev was very concerned
about the shortage of schools and lack of proper curriculum and suitable text-
books for the Buddhist population of Russia. He pointed out that in 1908 there
was still only one textbook for the Kalmyks which he himself published in 1892
and complained that there were no textbooks at all for the Buriats. According
to Pozdneev, a textbook for the Buriats should combine information about
Buriat history, the Buriat religion, and cultural tradition, excerpts from Buriat
Mongol literature and Buddhist religious texts with general information about
European and Russian culture and excerpts from the New Testament. In turn,
Vsevolod Miller (1848–1913) adopted a similar position in relation to the
Ossetians, to the creation of whose ‘nationally minded’ intelligentsia he actively
and consciously contributed. At the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of

62 For the first time this type of education was proposed in relation to the Kazakh population of the
steppe by Vasilii Grigorev in the early 1860s. See, Knight, ‘Grigor’ev in Orenburg’, p. 95.
63 Geraci, Window on the East, p. 146; L. Shternberg. Iz zhizni i deiatel’nosti Vasiliia Vasilevicha Radlova
(St Petersburg, 1910), pp. xix–xxii.
64 Geraci, Window on the East, p. 144.
66 A. Pozdneev, ‘O neobkhodimosti izdaniia uchebnikov dlia inorodcheskih shkol kalmykov i
buriat’, the Archive of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAN, St Petersburg, f. 44, op. 1, d. 68,
pp. 2 oborot, 3.
Miller’s scholarly work in 1906, a congratulatory letter from ‘the Ossetian intelligentsia’ stated that it was Miller who ‘awakened [in Ossetia] national consciousness (natsionalnoe samosoznanie) and [unleashed] the creative forces of the people’.  

The impact of the ‘native homeland’ idea as a building block for the creation of a pan-Russian identity can also be seen in the scholars’ campaign to achieve the on-site preservation of archaeological excavations and to build museums to exhibit archaeological materials locally. One of the obvious reasons behind the campaign was purely financial. In contrast to their German, British, and French colleagues, Russian Oriental scholars often simply did not have sufficient funding to transport their archaeological discoveries to St Petersburg or Moscow. But they were determined to turn this financial disadvantage into a sign of moral superiority over their West European counterparts. Russian scholars began to argue that their approach to the heritage of Russia’s own ‘Orient’ was in no way to be compared with the treatment by West European scholars and travellers of the antiquities of the East, which ended up far away from the borders of their national homelands. Russian Orientalists graphically depicted the vandalism of Western archaeologists as they damaged the most precious historic monuments in the ‘East’ in order to enrich museums in their own countries. In contrast, the Russians claimed that they pioneered the technique of on-site preservation of archaeological discoveries. But apart from finding a self-serving explanation for financial disadvantage, the persistence of Russian scholars in ensuring that on-site preservation received the backing of the Russian government and was accepted as a model by the international scholarly community had a lot to do with the scholars’ perception of their role as nation-builders. The idea that historical monuments and objects of art should be preserved on site rather than being relocated into national museums in the centre, began to be advocated in the 1870s by those promoting the idea of a ‘native homeland’. In 1889, the Imperial Archaeological Commission proposed to divide the entire state into ‘archaeological districts’ and to create museums in each district to preserve most of the excavated historical treasures locally. The first successful project to turn an archaeological excavation into a museum was undertaken in 1904 by Marr on the

68 See, for instance, Sergei Oldenburg comparing the approaches of West European and Russian scholars to archaeological work in Eastern Turkestan in N. Diakonova et al., eds., Materialy Perui Turkestanskoj ekspeditsii akademika S. F. Oldenburga, 1909–1910 (Moscow, 1995), pp. 9–10. For complaints about the activities of foreign archaeologists on the territory of Russia, see the IIMK Archive of the RAN, St Petersburg, f. 1, d. 1887/69, pp. 297–8, containing a detailed explanation written by the Imperial Archaeological Commission in 1897 of why an Austrian archaeologist should be denied permission to work in the Caucasus.
70 Mogilianskii, Oblastnoi ili mestnyi musei, p. 309.
71 The IIMK Archive, f. 1, d. 1887/69, ‘Ob ustanovlenii neobkhodimogo poriadka v dele sobranii i okhranneniia drevnosti’, p. 150.
site of the ancient Armenian capital Ani. By skilfully conducting negotiations with various officials in St Petersburg and in the Caucasus, the academician overcame the resistance of Russian administrators in the Caucasus who thought that Marr’s activities would contribute to the rise of separatism among the Armenians. As shown earlier, Marr had exactly the opposite view of the impact of his research on Russia’s unity as a multi-ethnic nation.72

IV

In view of the above assumptions and aspirations, it does not come as a surprise that in the debate over the nationalities question, academic Orientalists became critics of the government. There were two main reasons for their criticism. The first one was that government policies undermined rather than facilitated integration. This was the ground on which cultural Russification was attacked.73 For Marr, however well educated people otherwise are, ‘an artificial break with the native cultural past [stemming from forced Russification] inevitably leads the majority of people to spiritual poverty’ and undermines ‘the possibility for developing [among them] a sincere sympathy with the colossal historic tasks of our large fatherland and for involving in these tasks different nationalities’.74 In turn, Pozdneev thought that the use of Russian-language textbooks to educate the Buriats and Kalmyks, as well as the majority of other inorodtsy groups, was useless, as students simply could not relate to them.75 He argued that Russification only fed a growing suspicion among the Buriats regarding the Russian government’s intentions and stimulated separatist tendencies.76 According to Iadrintsev, ‘forced Russification’ only ‘frightened the natives away from borrowing’ Russian customs.77

Secondly, scholars were concerned that imperial administrators enforced Russian norms without sufficient appreciation of the impact on minorities of the destruction of local customs. Radlov insisted that even when the Russian government had ‘humanistic goals’ it tended to ‘inflict more harm than good’. In particular, he thought that attempts to settle the nomads always ‘lead to regress’ and only prevented ‘true progress’, as they resulted in the impoverishment of the people.78 Other leading specialists on Siberia’s ‘natives’, including Klements and

73 Becker, ‘The Muslim East in nineteenth-century Russian popular historiography’, p. 44, argued that in eastern borderlands cultural Russification was not seen as a matter of urgency, as Russians thought that their cultural superiority in this area was so obvious that the peoples of the East would eventually accept Russian culture in any event. While this view was certainly widespread, the examples cited in this article criticized Russification for a different reason.
74 Marr, ‘K voprosu o zadachakh armianovedeniia’, p. 244.
77 Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak kolonista, p. 105.
78 V. Radlov, Iz Sibiri: Stranitsy iz dnevnika (Moscow, 1989), pp. 662, 664.
Iadrintsev, shared this view. In the late 1880s and the 1890s, the East Siberian Branch of the Geographical Society, many of whose members were political exiles, initiated a debate, reflected on the pages of the popular press, regarding the impact of Russian rule on Siberia’s ‘natives’. Overall, their assessment of this rule was negative. The dominant view was that exploitation by administrators and industrialists as well as the imposition of new economic norms were gradually leading to the disappearance of the inorodtsy. Whereas some saw it as a ‘natural process’, others urged the government to take measures to preserve the minorities.

The main reason for poor policies, according to academic Orientalists, was the government’s ignorance of the cultures of minorities, stemming from the authorities’ reluctance to use the expertise of academics appropriately. Indeed, members of the tsarist government and academics often disagreed about possible areas of co-operation. The tsarist government was most inclined to use academic Orientalists for the collection of intelligence data abroad. On a number of occasions, the government made as a condition for funding academics’ fieldwork, for instance in India and Tibet, a request that they collect politically sensitive information for the government. Even though academics complied with the government in this area, there was a certain unease about and suspicion of this type of activity in academia. In turn, the government was reluctant to use academic advice on how to integrate the eastern borderlands. One government official told Bartol’d, who was a leading expert on Central Asia not only in Russia but internationally, that if the government required academic expertise on that area, they would read Western, not Russian scholarship. This is precisely why government policies towards the Muslim population were so often counterproductive, Bartol’d argued in his The East and Russian scholarship. Marr was blunt in his letter to Rozen in June 1904: ‘The [Russian] administration [in the Caucasus] thinks that it knows a lot [about the situation], but in fact it does not have a clue about what is going on and creates more and more discontent.

79 D. Klements,’Zametki o kochevom byte’, Sibirskie voprosy’, 49/52 (1908), pp. 7–57 (this article was first published in 1903 in Sankt-Petersburgskie vedomosti); Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak kolonia, pp. 117–19.
80 Oglezneva, Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo, pp. 95–6 and 119. For a broader survey of the work on Siberia’s inorodtsy in this period, see Y. Slezkine, Arctic mirrors: Russia and the small peoples of the North (Ithaca, 1994), pp. 113–20, 123–9.
81 See, for instance, A. Vigasin, ‘I. P. Minaev i russkaia politika na Vostoike v 80-e gody XIX v.’, Vostok, 3 (1993), pp. 108–23. Aleksei Pozdneev, for instance, was suspected by fellow Orientalists of performing secret tasks on behalf of the government during his fieldwork in Mongolia. This damaged his reputation in the academic community. See comments in the letter from Klements to Radlov, 11 Jan. 1892, SPB Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 177, op. 2, d. 128, p. 17.
82 A. A. Vigasin, A. N. Khokhlov, and P. M. Shastitko, eds., Istoria otechestvennogo vostokovedения s serediny XIX veka do 1917 goda (Moscow, 1997), p. 261. See also Ia. Vasil’kov, ‘Vstrecha Vostoka i Zapada v nauchnoi deiatel’nosti F. I. Shcherbatskogo’, in Vostok-Zapad: issledovaniia, Perevozy, publikatsii, IV (Moscow, 1989), p. 190, on the Russian Foreign Ministry refusing to use Fedor Shcherbatskoi’s expertise and contacts in Mongolia in 1905. The tsarist government’s disinterest in academic Oriental Studies was one of the main issues about which Russian specialists used to complain.
through its policies. Pozdneev, Radlov, Zagurskii, and other scholars who advised the government on educational policies were constantly frustrated witnessing the failure of their proposals to be implemented by ill-informed and indifferent administrators.

Yet, the above views of Russian Orientalists did not remain in the area of intellectual debate and rare successes, for instance, in the creation of local museums. Their ideas began to be shared by the Soviet government. The position which academic Orientalists started to advocate in the late 1870s was in many ways similar to korenizatsiia, the policy of promoting indigenous cultures and elites, pursued by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. The long-term goal of korenizatsiia was the situation in which ‘distinct national identities would co-exist peacefully with an emerging all-union socialist culture’, exactly as academic Orientalists envisaged the relationship between the ‘native homeland’ and pan-Russian identities.

As was the case with the approach of the pre-revolutionary ‘native homeland’ activists, korenizatsiia entailed not just the toleration of the existing particularist identities, but also pro-active measures aimed at fostering such identities where they had hitherto been weak. The Russian academic community was largely critical of the new regime, but Orientalists made an exception for the Bolshevik nationalities policies. Even though academics disagreed with the government on some specific issues, their overall assessment of korenizatsiia was positive and they became actively involved in shaping and implementing it. Bartol’d observed in 1920 that thankfully there were no longer fears among the authorities that ‘the study of the history and [cultural] heritage of Turkestan will lead to

84 SPb Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 777, op. 2, d. 269, p. 6 oborot.
87 I. Kreindler, ‘A neglected source of Lenin’s nationalities policy’, Slavic Review, 36, 1, (1977), pp. 86–100, argued that Lenin’s nationalities policy was influenced by the missionary Nikolai Il’minskii’s views on the education of the inorodtsy in their own languages. She admits that there is ‘no evidence of direct contact between Lenin and Il’minskii, nor is there any reference to Il’minskii in Lenin’s writings’ (p. 88). In fact, the view that in a culturally and ethnically diverse state such as Russia education should be in the minorities’ vernacular languages was also promoted by academic Orientalists, whose impact in this and other areas on the Bolshevik nationalities policies is widely reflected in sources. So it is these academics, rather than Il’minskii, who were ‘a neglected source of Lenin’s nationalities policy’.
89 For instance, in 1924, Bartol’d argued that the creation of administrative units entirely along ethnic lines in Central Asia was an artificial imposition on the region of the European concept of ethnic nation which was completely alien to the local historical traditions. See his ‘Zapiska po pravitel’stvennomu zaprosu v sviazi s national’nym razmezhivaniiem’, SPB Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 68, op. 1, d. 85, 4 p.
the strengthening of separatism'; he was also glad that ‘short-sighted forced Russification (obrusitel'skaiia politika) was no longer pursued’.90

Academic Orientalists acted as advisers to the Bolshevik government; in particular, they were closely involved in developing educational and scholarly institutions in the newly created Union republics, in the preservation of historic monuments, the creation of local museums, and in the designing of alphabets for non-literate peoples.91 They regularly emphasized the relevance of what they were doing to the construction of strong national identities among non-Russians. The creation of the Turkestan Institute of Oriental Studies (Turkestanskii Vostochnyi Institut) in Tashkent in 1918, in which academic Orientalists actively participated, was the realization of an idea put forward by academician Sergei Ol’denburg (1863–1934) in 1902.92 The Institute was intended not only to offer ‘a base in the East’ to European scholars, but also to start training national leaders from among the indigenous population. In 1923, the so-called Department of Practical Work (prakticheskii otdel) was established at the Institute in order to prepare school teachers in local languages, histories, and cultures from among the indigenous population.93

The creation of administrative units along ethnic lines to act as ‘embryonic homelands’ for the nationalities was not advocated by the academics before the revolution, but they assisted the Bolsheviks in the creation of ethnic republics and regions by providing expertise on how to distinguish different ethnic groups from each other and where to draw boundaries between them.94 Occasional disagreement between academics and the government over specific issues, for instance, regarding the division of Turkestan into ethnic autonomies, do not seem to have disrupted the general pattern of consultation and collaboration between the two.95 The academics clearly saw the link between the creation of the republics and the strengthening of culturally distinct identities at sub-state level,

93 Biulleten’ Sredne-Aziatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 7 (1924), p. 45. See also S. Sirazhadinov et al., eds., Tashkentskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet im. V. I. Lenina: Ocherki (Tashkent, 1970), pp. 34–5, 44, 310–12. In 1924, the Institute merged with the University in Tashkent becoming its Faculty of Oriental Studies.
94 See documents of the Commission for the Study of the National Composition of Russia and Neighboring States, SPb Branch of the RAN Archive, f. 135, op. 1.
95 See n. 89.
which they regarded as a positive feature rather than a threat to the unity of the entire state. In 1920, Bartol’d observed that ‘Now, with the establishment of the Turkestan republic, the basis exists for a wide-ranging national revival.’ In relation to the ‘national revival’ in the Caucasus, the scholar expressed concern over the fact that the Muslim population in the region had much less interest in their own past than the Christian population. He, therefore, hoped that the creation of the republic of Azerbaijan would rectify the situation by providing the Azeris with a clear framework to develop their ‘national consciousness’.

Scholars have noted that the Bolsheviks never fully explained why policies which clearly strengthened minorities’ own particularistic identities at sub-state level should contribute to the unity of the Soviet Union and eventual disappearance of separate identities. As this article demonstrates, the Bolsheviks’ assumptions were part of a tradition dating back to the 1870s which rested on the view that the sense of belonging and loyalty to the entire fatherland in a country of Russia’s size and diversity could only be based on strongly developed local identities which could be culturally distinct. This concept was part of the Russian intellectuals’ response to nationalism within the framework of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society dominated by the state. The fact that an overarching identity, rather than being ethnically Russian, was so closely linked to the state lent feasibility to the argument that in effect, loyalty to one’s own cultural homeland was a solid building block in the creation of a pan-Russian identity. It is important to remember that academic Orientalists themselves constituted an ethnically heterogeneous group whose own overarching identity was state-framed Russian. In order to feel themselves to be Russian scholars and Russian patriots they did not need to forget their mother tongue, be it German or Georgian. In effect, they extrapolated their own experience to the peoples whom they studied. It is understandable that the academics’ views looked realistic to the Bolshevik leadership, similarly multi-ethnic in origin and united in their belief in the supremacy of the state, as they began to build a new society within the borders closely resembling those of the Russian empire.

We can arrive at a more nuanced answer to the question about the relationship between Russian academics and government policies if we apply categories and concepts meaningful to the people whose views we are assessing. The analysis of people’s views and positions within the political, cultural, and social context in which they are produced is also likely to lead to a better understanding of the

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96 This remark was made in the second edition of V. Bartol’d, ‘Istoriiia izucheniiia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossi’, in his Sochinenia, IX, p. 448. However, the subsequent division of Turkestan into smaller republics along ethnic lines was criticized by Bartol’d. See n. 82.

97 Ibid., p. 481.

encounter between peoples of different cultures in different historical periods than the assessment of these views and positions from our own standpoint, as has been done by Said and his followers. The Russian elites’ views in the period under review were to a significant extent influenced by nation-state building in Europe and we should keep this fact in mind when we assess the position of Oriental scholars.

The following argument by Mark Beissinger is particularly relevant to an assessment of the Russian empire: ‘empires and states are inherently subjective constructs rather than simply objective entities’. Beissinger stresses that it is in fact often post factum, depending on whether a nation-building project succeeded or failed, that the final judgement is reached over the imperial or nation-state nature of a polity.99 The fact that the Russian project of integration failed should not cast doubt on the sincerity of the participants’ claims and motivations. Whereas some intellectuals searched for ways of modernizing Russia while avoiding the horrors of capitalist industrialization, others hoped to forge a pan-national loyalty within the borders of the existing state without wiping out local cultures and traditions, as they saw occurring in the process of national homogenization in Europe.100 If Russia could achieve such an ideal, it could demonstrate its superiority over Europe. Bartol’d voiced the conviction of his immediate colleagues when he argued that ‘the larger state frameworks provide better conditions for cultural rapprochement between peoples of different racial origin’ than smaller states with one overwhelmingly dominant nationality.101 This was not an unthinking defence of the Russian empire, but a belief that Russia was in the process of finding a particularly successful response to the demands of nationalism.

Even though the view of scholarship as being little else but a servant of political power is unfounded, academic research often reflects current political and ideological perceptions. For many scholars in late imperial Russia, the primary goal was to forge an overarching identity for all subjects of Russia and the main underpinning ideology was that of nationalism. In line with the Russian elites’ perceptions of the period, many academic Orientalists hoped to facilitate through their research and public activities the integration and fusion of Russia’s different nationalities into a single nation (единый наррод) within the current state borders, united above all by a common history of living together. The academics’ views about how to achieve integration and unity in a multi-ethnic state in the age of nationalism, first articulated in the 1870s, continued to resonate in the Soviet period. Even though the unified state eventually disintegrated, ‘the native homeland’ idea probably contributed to sustaining it longer than would otherwise have been the case.

100 One of the intellectuals who was particularly concerned with this subject was K. Leontev, ‘Восток, Россия и славянство’, in his Sobranie sochinenii, v (Moscow, 1912), pp. 148, 154, 158, 162, 380, 385, 387–8, and 390.
101 V. Bartol’d, in his Sochinenia, nI/1 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 13, 164–6, 345–50.