

Mobile money and Somali social networks: Cultivating monetary alternatives in a volatile world.

Abstract

In recent years, a discussion on how to harness information and communication technologies (ICTs) for “banking the unbanked” has emerged within the broader field of study and practice on the ICT for development (ICT4D). Framed as a critical technology to “financially include the poor”, mobile telephony is increasingly used to deliver financial services through mobile money platforms, such as Kenya’s M-Pesa, the most successful experience to date. The purpose of this paper is to examine the usage of M-Pesa among urban Somali refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. In particular, it endeavours to understand how this innovation is integrated within the Somali repertoire of financial institutions, engaging with the way actors navigate across different monetary circuits. Based on an ethnography conducted in the mostly Somali inhabited estate of Eastleigh, Nairobi, it argues that the interplay of M-Pesa and Somali financial arrangements occurs in accordance with culturally oriented ideas of finance and money and problematizes the assumptions behind the design and the implementation of services, borne out of partnerships between the humanitarian and the business sector, to financially include the poor. Illustrating the strategies deployed by the actors to cultivate multiplicity and preserve financial alternatives in a volatile environment, it aims to contribute to the reflection on the mutual shaping of ICT4D and pre-existing institutions.

Introduction

In recent years, a discussion on how to harness information and communication technologies (ICTs) for “banking the unbanked” has emerged within the broader field of study and practice on the ICT for development (ICT4D). Engaging development, academic and business communities, this debate builds up on a paradigm which stresses the critical role of the access to credit and the provision of financial services to the poor (Servet 2010). This approach to poverty alleviation has become mainstream among development practitioners and revolves around the concept of “financial inclusion” (Schwittay 2011; Rahman 2009; Sarma and Pais 2011; EIU 2010). Within this scholarship, mobile telephony is framed as a critical technology to “financially include” the 2.7 billion people in the world who have no access to financial services (CGAP 2010). The leapfrogging opportunity offered by the mobile phone in contexts lacking fixed telecommunication infrastructures is thus replicated

by branchless banking in regions where financial institutions are poorly developed and out of reach for large swathes of the population. Defined as “a network infrastructure for storing and moving money that facilitates the exchange of cash and electronic value between various actors” (Kendall et al. 2012), mobile money is considered a strategic innovation to cut the cost and enhance the reach of financial services (Porteous 2007; Kumar, McKay and Rotman 2010). The concept of money underpinning the discussion on mobile banking (m-banking) is well summarized in a World Bank report on mobile money and microcredit, according to which “money, after all, is “just” information about who owes what to whom” (Klein and Mayer 2011). This approach echoes the emphasis on information for development permeating the broader field of ICT4D in which mobile money initiatives are inscribed. Moreover, this financial inclusion narrative is fostered by the interest of mobile networks operators (MNOs), payments processors and remittance services in reaping unprecedented profits at the “bottom of the pyramid.” The successful experience of M-Pesa, launched in Kenya by Safaricom in 2006 initially to allow airtime trade and heralded as one of the most illustrative examples of the transformational potential of mobile technologies, has boosted a widespread interest towards mobile platforms for storing and transferring money. This discussion unfolds in a space created by a constellation of institutions¹, and, drawing lessons from the growing number of m-banking deployments around the world, it tackles opportunities and challenges of the implementation of mobile money initiatives for maximizing producers’ efficiency and consumers’ saving capacity. Nevertheless, while this conversation is interdisciplinary, featuring contributions from scholars of information systems in developing countries (ISDC), development practitioners focusing on the portfolios of the poor and financial anthropologists, the approach to its very object of study betrays a normative bias which frames the global neoliberal market economy as the final destination of an including, “transformational” (the other key word often associated to mobile money) process which does not leave room to alternative ideas of money and finance. Little explored, in the burgeoning literature on experiences of m-banking in developing countries, is therefore the co-existence of mobile money and ‘indigenous’ financial institutions.

What innovations and tensions emerge from the encounters of financial rationalities embedded in multiple socio-technical arrangements? How do the actors navigate across different monetary circuits? To what extent the creative interweaving of long-established

¹ It is worth mentioning the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Gates Foundation, the Mobile Money for the Unbanked (MMU) unit at the GSMA (the MNO industry association) and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC).

financial practices and mobile money calls into question the very nature of the neoliberal project underlying the financial inclusion discourse?

This paper seeks to answer to these questions examining the usage of the m-banking platform M-Pesa among urban Somali refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. In particular, it endeavours to understand how this innovation is integrated within the Somali repertoire of financial institutions. Based on an ethnography conducted in the mostly Somali inhabited estate of Eastleigh, Nairobi, it argues that the interplay of M-Pesa and Somali financial arrangements occurs in accordance with culturally oriented ideas of finance and money and problematizes the assumptions behind the design and the implementation of services, borne out of partnerships between the humanitarian and the business sector, to financially include the poor. Its analytical focus is on the repercussion of the integration of M-Pesa in two widespread Somali financial institutions: *hawala*, a trust-based money wire system, and *hagbed*, a rotating saving and credit association (Rosca), particularly popular among female entrepreneurs. Illustrating how users' agency reverberates on the creative combination of different financial arrangements, this paper aims to contribute to the discussion on limits and the potential of the financial inclusion discourse, particularly when it is translated in the empirical realm, and on monetary practices reflecting ingrained ideas of social life and contingency. The study of the integration of mobile money within the Somali monetary ecosystem in Kenya is relevant to the broader discussion on mobile money and culturally rooted financial institutions for three main reasons. First, Kenya is the epicentre of the so-called mobile money revolution and the place where M-Pesa is having the most pervasive and visible impact. Despite the large number of articles devoted to the implication of this phenomenon for livelihood activities, still many shadow areas remain, especially on its usage by marginalized groups. The second reason is that in over twenty years of statelessness, the Somali diaspora has developed a transnational financial network which counters marginalization in the resettlement countries and large exclusion from formal financial institutions. Thirdly, the main Somali financial institution, *hawala*, is far from being an indigenous arrangement, but it is in fact the outcome of a negotiation of rationalities grounded in the Somali customary law, in Islamic banking and in the discontinuous frequentation of Western finance.

This paper is structured as follows.

The first part introduces the empirical field of research, Eastleigh, and explains the reason of its centrality for the transnational Somali diaspora. The second part describes what *hawala* and *hagbed* are and how they work. After summarizing the studies which analyze the success

of M-Pesa in Kenya, it discusses the impact of mobile money on an “exchange house” – a shop which provides *hawala*, M-Pesa and currency exchange services – and a *hagbed* of single mothers. Eventually, it challenges the assumptions of the financial inclusion discourse in the light of strategies that actors navigating a volatile environment deploy to preserve multiple alternatives.

Locating Eastleigh

Eastleigh is a bustling commercial district which enjoys a shady reputation. Echoing a widespread opinion across Kenya, an article on the Financial Times describes this area located east of Nairobi’s business district as “built on trade, tax evasion, smuggling and regional connections” (Manson 2012). Abdulsamed (2011) provides a more nuanced picture, pointing out that “Eastleigh is at the centre of a network of trade that connects the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, Kenya and East and Central Africa, with the Somali business community as the common thread”. At a first sight, it is hard to believe that this agglomerate of concrete buildings facing onto litter-filled, bumpy roads, dusty in the dry season and flooded in the rainy one, is at the core of the national and regional commerce. An Indian dominated suburb until mid-1990s, Eastleigh experienced a rapid growth of its Somali population after the collapse of the Somali state. Yet, prior to that, the Kenyan Somalis from the North-Eastern Province who worked as truckers for Indians traders (Kantai 2012) maintained strong ties with clan members in Somalia. During the 1980s, as Siad Barre’s regime was inexorably unravelling, they were helping affluent relatives who had liquidated their businesses in Somalia to relocate to this part of Nairobi. After a civil war erupted in 1991, thousands of refugees poured into Kenya, leaving behind a country factionalized along clan lines and ravaged by militias, fighting for the control of land and strategic resources such as trade hubs (like the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo) and humanitarian aid. Unlike businesspeople and Somalis who headed to Eastleigh, most refugees sought assistance at the humanitarian shelters set by the UNHCR in the borderland, in particular the complex of Dadaab, in the Garissa district. Throughout the following years, a large number of refugees fleeing Somalia settled in Daadab (and, to a lesser extent, Kakuma, up north in the Turkana district) and then in Eastleigh, thus establishing a recurrent pattern where staying in the humanitarian facilities was preliminary to the arrival to the city, unless one could rely on other resources (money or relatives who could provide assistance) to bypass the refugee camp. For many Somalis, Eastleigh was initially a transit point to the West or a place where to wait for the end of

turmoil before returning to Somalia. As the conflict endured and the influx of refugees increased, though, new opportunities arose. Hotel rooms were turned into market stalls where different items were on sale, especially *khat* (a stimulant plant whose leaves are very popular among Somalis), textiles and leather goods. Somalis who had previously migrated to Europe or to the Gulf States invested in hospitality, shops and services for the ones who planned to move overseas, such as travel agencies, money-wire offices and communication centres, where it was possible to use phones and, later, the internet to communicate with relatives abroad. Shopping malls sprouted in the area as testaments of successful Somali entrepreneurs. The Garissa lodge was the first one to open in 1995: more were to follow, and today there are over 40 multifunctional centres which include lodges, restaurants and mosques, along with exhibitions spaces where textiles, leather, electronics and clothes imported from the Gulf and South-East Asia are on display. Boasting names which refer to the sources of the traded goods (Bangkok, Hong Kong, Dubai) or to the Kenyan Somali geography (Garissa, Issiolo) or to Islam (Madina) or simply evoke opulence (Royal Plaza, Grand Royal), these malls have become a landmark of the neighbourhood, redubbed Mogadishu Kidogo, Little Mogadishu. In fact, this suburb looks much more distant from the rest of Nairobi than the 30-minute *matatu* ride from the city centre: full face-veiled women populate the streets, punctuated by Somali restaurants and sellers of camel milk and *khat*. Somali connections straddling across the region facilitate inflows of goods, which are carried to Kenya after being shipped to Mombasa but also at the Somali port of Kismayo, where there is no functioning state to levy customs. This trade mostly includes manufactured items, while soft commodities are often skimmed from humanitarian aid in the borderland and, according to a widespread belief, it is made possible only by partnerships between businessmen and armed militias. Changes of power balances in Somalia and events affecting the Somali diaspora locally and globally resonate in Eastleigh, from where buses regularly commute with the refugee camps of Dadaab and Kakuma. The recent Kenyan military operation against strongholds of Al-Shabaad, an Al-Qaida affiliated group based in Southern Somalia, has exacerbated a climate of suspicion towards Eastleigh and the entire Somali community. Although regularly shopping here, most Kenyans consider Eastleigh an outpost of Al-Shabaab and a haven for piracy profits laundering. The opinion, widespread among Kenyans, that ‘Somalis have money’ is coupled with assumptions on the illicit provenance of these capitals. Not only refugees but also Kenyan Somalis, historically perceived as foreigners, have increasingly been regarded as a threat to national security. Advocacy organizations (HRW 2010) claim that the largely advertised (but scarcely effective) crackdown against illegal immigration

from Somalia has had the only effect of increasing the vulnerability and the exposition of Somalis to police's harassments. This volatility reached its peak in the months immediately preceding my fieldwork, from November 2012 to January 2013, when Eastleigh was hit by a spate of terror attacks blamed by Kenyan authorities on Al-Shabaab (allegedly in retaliation for Kenyan military operation against Islamists in Southern Somalia). As direct consequence of these attacks, the pressure on the Somali community increased: police intensified profiling and harassments, which could often be avoided in exchange for cash, and the Kenyan government ordered Somali refugees in urban sites to report to the camps in the east and the north of the country. Several hundred families started leaving either to Mogadishu, where the stabilization efforts of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and AMISOM are yielding a temporary and fragile success, or to neighbouring Uganda (Reinl 2013). In fact, such situation highlighted the importance of resources which are critical to define contingency routes: above all, financial assets, whose access is dependent upon trust-based networks. Before tackling the way such assets are accessed, it is worth devoting a section to the source of social capital upon which Somalis build their livelihoods.

Connections in and around Eastleigh are mainly rooted in clanship. The centrality of the clan system in Somali society has been widely discussed, running as a thread across the literature which examines both the causes of the Somali conflagration (Elmi 2010) and the regulatory mechanisms underlying communication and exchange in the diaspora (Lewis 1994; Menkhaus 2005). Genealogy is, at the same time, a differentiating and a unifying principle which guarantees contiguity to Somali communities scattered across the world: it is the key to explain the resilience of Somali networks despite dispersion and it defines individual rights and obligations before the Somali society at large. Lewis (1994) has significantly contributed to shed light on the crucial role of clanship as the bedrock of Somali politics and society, whose dynamics inform both alliances and rivalries. Based on bonds of mutual support, these social structures have their roots in sets of *diya*-paying groups, corporate units "whose members are united in joint responsibility toward outsiders" (ibid.). The significance of these groups in the Somali context is regulated by customary law (*xeer*) and revolves around the payment of blood-compensations in case of killing or wounding of members by external entities. Managing sharing and contributing to a common blood-wealth (*diya*), these segmentary lineage structures provide a framework for conflict resolutions, negotiations and especially support in case of need. They act as a source of trust in a context where no other institutions (with the limited but significant exception of the religious

authorities) can fulfil governance activities (ICG 2011; Hoehne et al. 2010; Menkhaus 2005, 2007b; Marchal 2004).

Remitting trust

Major Kenyan banks have branches in Eastleigh: Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Cooperative Bank and Barclay's. The neighbourhood also hosts one of the few Gulf Bank branches in Nairobi. Barclay's and Gulf Bank in particular meet the favour of some conservative Somali businesspeople since they offer Shariah compliant financial products. In general, though, banks serve mostly Somalis living in the West and travelling to Eastleigh for business or family reasons. In fact, these branches have been opened up in recent years following the economic boom of the district, fostered by the diaspora's remittances and lubricated by the trust which emanates from kinship networks. The centre of the Somali financial system is still in Somalia, especially in the breakaway Somaliland region, where the main Somali money transfer company Daabshil is based, but Nairobi is by far more accessible than the Somaliland capital Hargeisa (not to speak of Mogadishu). The very origin of the *hawala*, the financial institution which funnels Somali transnational flows of capital, reflects that familiarity with insecurity, considered by scholars on Somali studies a major feature of Somali culture, derived from pastoralist livelihoods and today projected on a global scale (Healy and Sheik 2009; Kusow and Bjork 2007). Nomadism encapsulates a sense of agency which is expressed through mobility and the constant adaptation to displacement. This displacement is the result of several, intersecting causes: persecution, loss of livelihoods and inability to access humanitarian aid (Lindley and Haslie 2011). In a changing and often unpredictable environment, kinship ties represent a stable safety net which provides assistance and solidarity to individuals in times of need. Although remittances are a lifeline for Somalis in Somalia and in humanitarian spaces, they should not be seen through a mere dependency prism: money transferring is a social practice, embedded within traditional networks of mutual obligations, upon which other livelihoods are based. An Arabic word meaning 'transfer', the *hawala* originated among Somali workers in the Gulf States during the 1970s Oil boom. Back then, it consisted of purchases of high-value goods which were shipped from the host countries and sold in Somalia (Omer 2002). Later, the transfers became immaterial: there were no longer commodities to back up the value of the transactions, but exclusively agreements between the *hawala* agents at both ends of the transfer. The system increasingly relied on trust as the glue which binds, on the one hand, the customers to the agents; on the other, the agents to each other. An agent collects the money from a customer

and communicate the value to another, who corresponds the amount (minus a fee) to the recipient. Because of difficulties to produce a valid ID, the recipient of the money often identify himself answering to the agent's questions, mostly on the his/her relation with the sender. Genealogy thus appears as a recurrent issue in remittance patterns: it helps chose a trustable agent (often a member of the sender's own clan), it forges partnership among agents and it is crucial to identify the beneficiary of the remittance. Not only, therefore, *hawala* is based on trust but it also contributes to strengthen trust relations.

This point highlights an aspect of remittance which is often eclipsed by functionalist approaches. Studies on remittance flows, in fact, are generally based on the assumption that remitting practices are intrinsic to the concept of diaspora seen mainly as a rational actor, made by 'decision-makers' and 'option-setters', whose reasons to remit are examined in terms of 'how' and 'why' (Page and Mercer 2012). Page and Mercer (2012) suggest instead an alternative approach to remitting, interpreted not only as an individual's choice but also as a collective obligation. Remittances are not 'just money' but are expressions of a rich social texture and encapsulate social relations which are produced by an intense 'relational work' (Lindley 2009a; 2007). By transferring money, *hawala* allows diaspora members to cultivate their social capital, catering to the clan's welfare. Remittances are lifeblood to the 'blood wealth' of the clan as long as they have both a material and symbolic impact: *hawala* reflects the Quranic appeal to make money circulate in form of alms (*zakat*) for the needy. The Prophet's prohibition of any kind of loan resembling usury (*riba*) informs investment practices, which are considered *halal* as long as they have a positive impact on the community. In such a conservative society as the Somali one, using *hawala* is thus widely perceived as carrying out a Muslim duty, with benefits in terms of trustworthiness. Deeply rooted in clan relations, *hawala* plays a crucial role in livestock trade, a livelihood activity which is at the core of Somali social relations (Devereux 2010; Nunow 2000). As Little (2003) explains in his seminal study on livestock trade in the Kenya-Somalia borderland, Eastleigh is at the centre of the transactions performed in Kenya's main livestock markets in the North-east of the country, in particular Garissa. Through *hawala* agents, cattle, goats and camels are traded at distance, avoiding the risk to carry large sums of cash. Due to the predominance of interpersonal relations over state regulations, the *hawala* system is usually labelled as informal, a definition which stands in opposition to Western regulated money transfer companies such as Western Union or MoneyGram. *Hawala* companies win the favour of the diaspora in virtue of the trust toward the agents, which are often fellow clan members, but also because of their lower costs. Most Somalis have current accounts in

hawala companies due to limited access to the mainstream banking system. (Lindley, Pieke and Van Hear 2007). Nowadays, the biggest *hawala* companies, Daabshil, and Amal, are regularly registered in Dubai, used by international agencies to transfer funds to local partners in Somalia and scrutinized in all the countries in which they are present with their branches (Hesse 2010; Harper 2012). Nevertheless, the post 9/11 anti-terror rhetoric still affects the activity of these enterprises: it is still vivid among Somali the memory of the campaign of criminalization of Islamic financial institutions which, in 2001, led to the closure of the then largest Somali operator in the US, Al Barakaat, and to the freeze of all its clients' assets following accusations of money-laundering and affiliation to Al Qaeda, with disastrous repercussions on the livelihoods of many families in the Horn of Africa (Cockayne and Shetret 2012).

Money-go-round Somali style

Operating on a transnational scale, *hawala* allows injections of cash in local communities, where is then managed through different monetary practices. The most popular financial arrangement in Eastleigh and in other Somali communities around the world is the so-called *hagbed*. Called also *ayuuto* or *shalongo*, it is a typical rotating credit and saving association (Rosca), made of 20/30 members, often women, pooling together money in a common fund (Hesse 2010; Horst 2006). The money is borrowed by each member in turn and typically used for a broad range of purposes, like setting up small businesses (such as camel milk commerce, which is an exclusively female activity) or paying for school and health fees or for social payments (weddings or funerals). The initiator, usually a person with a clear business plan in mind or an urgent need for money, builds a group starting with the people she is more familiar with and gradually expanding the network. Reputation is the main feature driving the choice of the members to involve in the network: *hagbed* network members are called to contribute with a certain amount each week for an established period of time and reliability and trustworthiness of each individual are the pillars of the entire system, since a single member's default could unravel the entire association. The *hagbed* is a form of social lending in which the money borrowed from the group is re-paid in fixed instalments without any interest. This is related to the Muslim prohibition of *riba* (interest), which permeates financial practices in deeply Islamic Somali society but is also consistent with a recurrent pattern widely explored in the literature focusing on informal groups which provide financial support to members in need. The repertoire of these institutions, particularly

significant where the banking system fails to reach large swathes of the population, is extremely diverse (Johnson and Zarazua 2011; Okurut and Botlhole 2009; Ardener and Burman 1995; O'Reilly 1996; Ghatak 1999; Van Bastelaer and Leathers 2006; Etang et al. 2011). Although the names vary according to the place, these associations present similar characteristics. Roscas feature a high degree of flexibility, in terms of amount to collect, number of the members, periodicity of the contributions, rotation criteria and possible usages of the loans (Malkamaki 2009; Khan and Lightfoot *n.d.*; Aryeetey and Steel 1995). As cultural products to cope with the unforeseen, Roscas captured initially the interest of anthropologists (Geertz 1962; Ardener 1964). In his pioneering study, Geertz (1962) focuses on the Roscas' capacity "to organize traditional relationships in such a way that they are slowly but steadily transformed into non-traditional ones." In his view, these structures are vectors of social transformation, finalized to accommodate traditional ties to an increasingly integrated global economy, but bound to give way to formal financial institutions. So far, further studies have contradicted this prediction, demonstrating that in fact the resilience of Roscas and other informal monetary practices in most of the Developing world is due to the failure of Western economic models. Moreover, Roscas have increasingly emerged as multilayered structures which cannot be reduced to the dimension of coping. Peebles (2010) underlines the fact that the indissoluble debt/credit dyad is entangled in the broader moral debate on the ties of an individual with his own group and is the expression of social obligations projected in time and space. This aspect is also stressed by the development economists who have tackled these intermediate institutions to understand how they work, what needs they fulfil and whether, and to what extent, they are more efficient compared to formal financial institutions (Besley, Coate and Loury 1992, 1993; Platteau 1997; Ambec and Treich 2007). Similarly to the case of *hawala*, also *hagbed* is based on interpersonal trust, as the cornerstone on which the group is built but also as the ultimate goal of money-go-round associations, where sociality is reinforced by the constant reproduction of mutual obligations. The importance of 'face-to-face meetings', though, brings to the fore the materiality of money, a dimension that the discussion on mobile money seems to have sidelined and whose relevance stands up as we look at how these networks of people trusting each other (or willing to do so) interweave with socio-technical networks.

M-Pesa in Eastleigh

Trust is a recurrent concept in the burgeoning literature on M-Pesa and one of the lens to observe its relentless growth. Many studies explain its success in Kenya with a high level of institutional trust (Morawczynski and Miscione 2010), pointing out that it is the system itself, rather than the network of agents in charge with activating M-Pesa accounts of Safaricom customers and performing cash-in and cash-out operations, which is deemed reliable by the users. Largely considered as one of the most successful mobile applications for financial inclusion developed so far, since its launch in 2006 it has steadily grown in diffusion at home and popularity abroad, boosting the enthusiasm over mobile money and paving the way to other cash transfer initiatives across Africa. Today, M-Pesa has reached over 15 million users and has an average daily transaction volume of over 1,800,000,000 KES (13,692,857 GBP) (Safaricom 2012). These figures have galvanised academics, development practitioners and business analysts interested to assess the transformational impact of mobile money and the possibility to escalate such a profitable experience to other African contexts (Hughes and Lonie 2007; Morawczynski 2009; Mas and Morawczynski 2009; Mas and Ng'weno 2009; Mas and Radcliff 2010; Eijkman, Kendall and Mas 2009). Nevertheless, excessive generalization of M-Pesa successful trajectory in Kenya would be misleading, since this platform has been widely appropriated to amplify and improve “existing transactional relationships rather than creating new ones” (Duncombe 2012). Kenya's multifaceted reality reverberates in the wide range of usage patterns associated with different social groups, among which the Somali community stands up as one of the most interesting (and under-studied) cases.

The significance of mobile money for Somalis should be examined within the broader picture of the diffusion of mobile telephony in Eastleigh. The green colour of Safaricom and the red of Celltel/Zain, Kenya's biggest mobile operators, dot the landscape, appearing on the walls of massive multi-storey buildings. Scratch cards are among the most traded item in the entire neighbourhood. Each mall hosts several phone shops selling brand new and second hand devices and offering services of repair and unlocking. Unlocking is one of the most sought-after service: cell phones purchased somewhere else in the world and bound to local contracts are freed, ‘cannibalized’ and reanimated with an ‘indigenous’ soul concentrated in a new SIM card (Bar et al. 2007). Phone shops have mushroomed in the last six years to cater to a skyrocketing demand, not only from Somalis: customers arrive from all across Kenya and even from Tanzania and Uganda to buy cell phones (on sale at a cheaper price than anywhere else) in bulk. Somalis claim that in Eastleigh mobile phones spread earlier than in

the rest of Nairobi. The first models were brought to Eastleigh by Somalis living overseas. Some were given to family members while others were put on sale. Some returnees purchased several second hand devices in their resettlement countries and re-sold them in Eastleigh either in the streets or at home, when the news circulated that they were in town, or in the shops of their relatives. This first generation of phone dealers had learn to repair and unlock phones through word-to-mouth and, later, videos on Youtube. Trading in mobile phones, accessories and services became thus a source of income for many who could rely on family members overseas and were able to intercept the growing demand. The decreasing prices of both cell phones and services, with the emphasis on pay-as-you-go schemes, have been a major driver in the mass uptake of cell phones, particularly in a context characterized by poor communication infrastructures. Yet, the decision to invest money in a mobile device is based on a cost/benefit assessment which takes into account not only the market price of a cell phone but also the social implications of integrating a novel mode of communication into a pre-existing communicative environment. The need to communicate with relatives in Somalia is the most recurrent argument behind the decision to purchase a phone. Tight knit social networks have usually facilitated the transmission of information. Cell phones have further accelerated this process, granting a level of flexibility which was not previously possible, with repercussions on mobility trajectories and livelihood strategies. In the past, refugees relied mainly on the *taar* for communication, a two-way radio system used in camps, urban centres and Somalia (Horst 2006). Prior to 2004, when the first mobile phone repeater was installed, refugees in Dadaab used to queue for hours outside *taar* shacks to communicate with family members resettled or still in Somalia. Refugees in Eastleigh still remember the inefficiency of this form of communication. Beside the long queues, an often mentioned problem of the *taar* was the lack of privacy in the conversation, which was a serious hindrance when refugees needed to ask for a financial contribution via *hawala* to relatives overseas: this could affect the security of the requester, exposing him to the risk of thefts by other eavesdroppers. *Taar* posts were widespread in Eastleigh, where they lingered in a juridical limbo, officially illegal but tolerated by the police in exchange for bribes (ibid., 141). In the last five years, the radio equipment has been replaced by VoIP adapters which allow to connect landline phones to the internet. *Taar* posts have gradually been turned into communication centres, or ‘branches’, how they are colloquially called², where a system made of several telephone VoIP adapters (TVA) allows to make calls at a very low cost.

² The name ‘branch’ derives probably from ‘private branch exchange’ (PBX), a telephone exchange which

The introduction of mobile money has reshaped the relation between Eastleigh and the refugee camps. For many Somalis, the transfer from the refugee complex of Dadaab or Kakuma to Nairobi is the outcome a collective decision in which are taken into account both potential costs and expected benefits for a larger group of kin. Often, the choice to move to Eastleigh falls on the better educated member of the group, which is likelier to find a job and provide to the welfare of the others. UNHCR facilities, while are rent-free and distribute food staples and other basic items, are also overcrowded and highly insecure: the Dadaab complex, which is often referred to as ‘the city that should not exist’ (Goodwin 2011), hosts over 400,000 refugees, exposed to the risk of robberies and, in the case of women, sexual assaults. The diffusion of mobile telephony has both opened a constant channel of communication between Eastleigh and the camps, bypassing *taar*, and changed modes of remittances, providing with M-Pesa an alternative to *hawala*. Remittances are often sent for the relatives in the refugee camps to set businesses like small convenience stores selling items not provided by the UNHCR and delivered from Eastleigh on the daily buses to Dadaab and Kakuma. Mobile phones are used to place orders and transfer payments between the city and the camp. Money flows in both ways: encamped refugees running little businesses can send money to their relatives in the city to pay for school or medical fees. Using a mobile phone as an electronic wallet fulfils safety needs in insecure territories, avoiding the risk to carry piles of cash. For this same reason, the impact of the diffusion of mobile telephony and mobile money is felt also on the cultivation of the relationship between urban Somalis (both refugees and Kenyan nationals) and pastoralists in the NEP. The mobile phone has become a fixture in the light equipment of herders conducting a semi-nomadic life-style, whose routes are affected by seasonal pastures as well as by networks coverage (Mahmoud 2009). Abdi, a hotel worker with family connections in the Kenya-Somalia borderland, sketches a vivid vignette of this growing population of “wireless pastoralists”:

They always carry solar battery chargers. When they have to call or request money, they move close to tarmac roads and villages, they go on top of the hills or climb electricity poles. They follow the networks. If there is a drought, or bandits along the way, my brothers warn each other so they can be safe. I need to be reachable, because I am the one that can send them airtime or money through M-Pesa in case of need. In Garissa and other cities with livestock markets they can collect the money and use it to buy livestock or to purchase foodstuff or whatever they need.” (excerpt of an interview with Abdi)

creates a network of several devices and connects them to a public telephone network.

Along with other fellows from the same *diya*, each month Abdi sends via M-Pesa a fixed amount to a relative in Garissa to purchase livestock. The contributions of the members of the group are thus pooled into a common fund managed by a trustworthy kinsman. Profits are not periodically redistributed and, although Abdi claims that contributing members can draw from this shared asset whenever they are in need, he admits that this is seldom the case. In fact, the size of the herd stands less for the material wealth of the *diya* than as a testimony of the cohesion of the group. Consistently with the extensive literature which explores the role of livestock as status indicator in Africa (Ferguson 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1990; Hutchinson 1996; Mahmoud 2008), this specific form of investment seems aimed at reproducing social relations within the group and at locating one's *diya* in a shifting scenario of alliances and rivalries in politics and business. Moreover, it raises issues of convertibility which are recurrent across the above mentioned scholarship. Since livestock is used as both a currency (goats and cattle, but never camels, are used to pay for labour) and as a storage of value, this practice casts a light on issues related, on the one hand, to modes of valuation; on the other, to discrepancies between transferring and storing value, two functions of monetary media which are mostly lumped together by the normative approach of the financial inclusion discourse but whose distinction underscores the moral dimension underpinning local concepts and usages of money.

In the next sections, I will discuss the way these aspects emerge from the observation of two specifically Somali institutions in which M-Pesa has been widely adopted.

Welcome to the exchange house

Sitting behind a metallic grid, Omar attends his customer, a young Somali man named Mohammed who is set to leave to Mozambique to scout for business opportunities. On the counter lie a small calculator and a mobile phone. Omar asks some questions to verify whether the man is the legitimate recipient of a 2000 USD transfer authorized by an *hawala* office from his same remittance company in Galqayo, Somalia. Omar also checks the alien card of Mohammed, although he is aware of the large number of forged document around, and he rings (“flashes”) his mobile phone to be sure that the number matches the one mentioned by the sender of the payment. Once completed successfully the vetting procedure, he invites Mohammed in for handing him the cash with a receipt. Mohammed withdraws just a part of the money and keeps the rest in an account that he opens with the *hawala* company.

Once in Maputo, Mozambique, he will be able to pick the deposited amount in another branch of the same company without the hassle to carry all the cash on himself. Moreover, he asks Omar's colleague, Abdulaziz, to transfer 100 USD via M-Pesa to a friend in Mombasa. Therefore, Omar calculates the amount in KSh (the only currency working on M-Pesa) and shares the result with Abdulaziz, who transfers the money from his to Mohammed's phone. Omar and Abdulaziz work in a so-called "exchange house", a shop which provides mainly money exchange and *hawala* services. It is located on the top floor of one of the busiest malls of Eastleigh, surrounded by shops which sell perfumes and textiles. Two years ago, it has become also an M-Pesa branch. For the moment, this is an exception: most exchange houses have a privileged relation with some specific M-Pesa agent but keep separate spaces. Omar's decision to partner with Abdulaziz in the M-Pesa business was not just a matter of survival: as an increasing number of people were turning to M-Pesa for money transfers in Kenya, this was eroding the profits of the *hawala* agencies. Omar realized that being an established *hawala* agent granted him two main perks: the trust which he already enjoys among his long-time customers; but, especially, a greater availability of cash float compared to other M-Pesa agents, who are often constrained by the lack of liquidity and cannot always meet the requests of large withdrawals (Mas and Morawczynski 2009). As for the former point, *hawala* is still the system of choice for elders or refugees recently arrived from Somalia, where money transfer and currency exchange shops often coincide, being the country a *de facto* dollarized economy. Many of them are also familiar with mobile money, since in the last years platforms similar to M-Pesa have proliferated across Somalia. Nevertheless, M-Pesa is largely perceived as an institution strongly associated to Kenya, a framing which periodically spurs fear of account freezing or monitoring by Kenyan authorities. Moreover, while identity screening for M-Pesa is done through official documents (ID, alien card or UNHCR mandate), in the case of *hawala* is often done through a guarantor. For what concerns cash float, Omar and Abdulaziz can rely on liquidity from the *hawala* and money exchange, buying and selling mainly USD and KSh, but also GBP and Euros. Moreover, the exchange house gives the possibility to withdraw money in currencies other than KSh, so catering to a crucial need of the highly mobile Somali diaspora. Omar's exchange house allows accounts in different currencies, offering account holders the possibility to reap profits out of floating exchange rates. Maurer (2013) provides a useful framework to look at exchange house agents as he discusses the way "human ATMs", as mobile money operators are sometimes dubbed, deploy their agency to "move money from A to B". Among others, he picks up on actor-network theory suggestions and in particular on Latour's dichotomy between 'intermediaries'

and ‘mediators’: whilst the formers are ‘black boxes’ which simply replicate their inputs, the latter transform the inputs into something different. Operating at the intersection of multiple monetary networks (including the Kenyan banking system, which buttresses M-Pesa agents’ accounts), exchange house agents swing between these two roles, bridging not only *hawala* and M-Pesa but also arrangements which produce value through the circulation of money.

“You only trust a person by her face”

As the other main financial arrangement in the Eastleigh’s Somali community, *hagbed* is an institution which is undergoing a transformation following the diffusion of M-Pesa. Nonetheless, the negotiation of mobile money within the pre-existing monetary space is useful to bring to the fore mechanisms of valuation which escape neoliberal logics and are finalized to the accrue of social capital. The relevance of the material dimension of money emerges from the interviews with the members of a 27 single mothers *hagbed* which has been active for one year. They have different businesses, mainly as hawkers, but also as shops owners. They mainly deal in clothes, honey, tea, porridge, camel milk. They meet weekly in a room in the Saint Therese church in Eastleigh to pool their regular contributions. The initiator of the *hagbed*, Saba, says that, since the beginning, the arrangement has had a highly beneficial impact, providing members with the opportunity to purchase items for their commercial activities but also easing the burden of medical or school fees for their kids. When she started, she was familiar with only two women. The group snowballed through referrals and the regular practice of pooling money has gradually strengthened trust relations. The treasurer changes periodically and is in charge with collecting the established amount, storing the money and keeping track of the transfers. If one has not liquidity one week, the following week pays double. The contributions are collected in cash during the weekly meeting, a much-awaited moment of socialization. In fact, the gathering revolves around the handling of the money but it does not end with it. The room where they meet every Thursday is a social space where they discuss current events and share life stories. The *hagbed* is also a locus in which members advertise their commercial activities and forge exclusive business partnerships. Saba acknowledges that almost all the members have an M-Pesa account, but she points out that transferring mobile money to the treasurer is usually considered a backup measure which members resort to only when they are not able to attend the meeting. Showing

up is a central aspect of the *hagbed*, because, as she says, “you only trust a person by her face.” Moreover, M-Pesa is used to transfer money but seldom to store it. For some members of the group who rely on long-distance trade (for instance, camel milk sellers shipping their jerry cans as far as Uganda or textile traders receiving the goods to the port of Mombasa), M-Pesa has successfully replaced previous methods of payment such as handing the money to truck drivers (for small businesses, this system was much cheaper than *hawala*), but the general trend is to withdraw as soon as a payment reach one’s account. Behind this behaviour lies a limited institutional trust towards M-Pesa, trust which ebbs and flows in coincidence with Kenyan political turbulences and periodical targeting of the Somali population. In this context, the issue of “saving”, one of the main concerns of the financial inclusion discourse, is less related to the money balance in the mobile account than to the membership in a group bound by mutual trust. The *hagbed* itself is a form of saving, where financial and social capitals are constantly turned into each other. Since Muslim jurisprudence labels as *haram* (opposed to the Islamic doctrine) any insurance policies on the basis that, sterilizing the risk intrinsic to the human existence, they challenge the will of God, which is by definition unpredictable, by strengthening and expanding social networks, *hagbed* facilitate the emergence of safety nets. The public display of cash during the weekly collection, the handling of the notes and the attribution of the payout are phases of a ritual through which the members of the *hagbed* stress the ultimate purpose of money, the reproduction of sociality. While mobile money is perceived as a surrogate which enables transactions, cash is the reification of the trust upon which the club is build, a testimony of commitment for the present and the future.

Preserving multiplicity, cultivating alternatives

Despite the widespread belief that M-Pesa in Kenya has almost totally taken over the remittance sector (Jack and Suri 2011) and concerns on the impact of a unique standard on freedom of choice (Donovan 2012), the examples sketched above suggest a more complex landscape. The diffusion of M-Pesa as the dominant standard in Kenya does not entail a homogeneous process of adoption among the population. This applies particularly to such a large minority as the Somalis, whose financial ecosystem is shaped by a multitude of practices. Far from being displaced, alternative standards remain in place, highlighting, through their interactions, the multilayered significance of financial arrangements. This consideration seems at odds with Grewal’s structuration theory which revolves around the concept of “network power” (2008) and which has been used to examine the diffusion of M-

Pesa in Kenya (see in particular Donovan 2012). Network power is the combined result of network effect and obliteration of alternatives. In the first stage, the adoption of a standard derives from the joint effect of *reason* (related to the features of the standard and to the size of the network), *force* (sanctions and indirect costs for non-members of the networks) and *chance* (or ‘accidental convergence’ on a standard). In the second stage, alternative standards are gradually sidelined and eventually dismissed.

The examples of the exchange house and *hagbed*, though, illustrate how hybrid arrangements emerge from the intertwining of multiple networks. The debate between a hegemonic and a pluralistic view of monetary standards has a long history in African studies and traces back to Bohannan’s (1958) pioneering study on the impact of Western multi-purpose money on African traditional institutions. Focusing on Tiv society in Nigeria, he anticipated the disruption of a system based of spheres of exchange, whose regulation was a guarantee of social stability. This model was subsequently criticized and modified, permeating the discussion on the viability of Western financial institutions for post-colonial settings. Doing research in West Africa in the aftermath of the implementation of the Financial adjustment programmes, Jane Guyer challenges Bohannan’s model, describing a complex repertoire of financial practices (1995a, 2004). By navigating through different monetary regimes, people seek to absorb the uncertainty intrinsic to volatile economic situations. Guyer adopts an historical perspective on African financial institutions, framed as of a constant negotiation between external and indigenous concepts of money (Stiansen and Guyer 1999). This negotiation takes place not only in the realm of the market but also in the one of the biosocial reproduction, as in the case of the remittances sent to fulfil kinship duties and group solidarity. Guyer’s attention to modes of conversion and practices of commensuration helps unpack the dynamics governing what she defines “the cultivation of the multiplicity” and “the protection of the alternative” (1995a). These dynamics regulate the coexistence of cash in multiple currencies, mobile money, *hawala* and *hagbed* in a world which Somalis experience as shifting and unpredictable. The ‘informal interoperability’ of *hawala*, M-Pesa, *hagbed* allows value to circulate and to accrue ‘wealth-in-people’, a recurrent concept in African studies intended “as accumulation of social relations or (...) as kinship, religious clientelism or political prebendalism” (Guyer 1995b). Concerned about relying on a unique access to this wealth, Somalis cultivate multiplicity in different domains: financial instruments, currencies, documents (Somalis are often proud of the number of passports and IDs they are able to obtain, either legally or illegally). The rationale is that “you

never know what is going to happen tomorrow”, a sentence that I often heard and that accompanied the showing of passports of different countries as contingency plans in case of need; but also when discussing the usage of *hawala* and M-Pesa, or the decision to keep accounts in different currencies. The freezing of thousands accounts of the *hawala* company Barakat in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks is still a vivid memory and a warning that even the most trusted Somali financial infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions. At the peak of the violence in Eastleigh and during the Kenyan pre-electoral tensions, between November 2012 and March 2013, many Somalis, fearing the devaluation of the KSh, frantically purchased USD (whose value skyrocketed) and, consequently, used mainly *hawala*. The “protection of the alternatives” driving Somali financial strategies is therefore finalized to the preservation of “contingency routes” which allow not only to cope with insecurity and manage risk, but also to keep feeding social networks. Face-to-face interactions remain prominent in *hagbed*, where interpersonal trust is built through the regular compliance to the rules of the group. Cash acts as the token of a shared affiliation and can be replaced only under specific circumstances by mobile money. Nonetheless, M-Pesa is welcomed as an innovation which broadens the range of available choices, without replacing them. The Somali reluctance towards any form of central authority reverberates on the rejection of a system revolving around a totalizing standard.

Conclusions

The assumptions of the financial inclusion discourse, starting with the very notion of “including the poor”, overlook the multiple strategies deployed by the actors to creatively combine diverse practices and access forms of credit based on relations. The idea of money as information, therefore, should be integrated by the awareness that “recognizing that money is only information, mere words or sign, allows us to seize it and make it in our own image, to do good and re-create community and trust” (Maurer 2005). Mobile money is another network to accrue the wealth-in-people which remains the ultimate safety net, but it is hardly bound to replace long-established institutions or, at least, to become the only available standard. Discussing the volatile environment which Somalis in Kenya inhabit, the importance of social networks and particularly two crucial institutions upon which they rely to face the unpredictable, *hawala* and *hagbed*, I have sought to highlight the way they reshape M-Pesa and are reshaped in return, with implications on ideas of credit, saving and insurance encapsulated in the financial inclusion paradigm. Further research is required to

explore how arrangements emerging at the local level from the encounter of new and old financial institution change the way money is used and thought of.

References

Abdulsamed, F. 2011. *Somali Investment in Kenya*. Africa Programme Briefing paper, Chatham House. <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bp0311_abdulsamed.pdf>, accessed 02 May 2013.

Ambec, S. and Treich, N. 2007. 'Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems' *Journal of Development Economics* 82,1.

Ardener, S. and Burman, S. 1995. *Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations for Women*. Oxford: Berg.

Aryeetey, E. and Steel, W.F. 1995. "Savings Collectors and Financial Intermediation in Ghana," *Savings and Development* 19,2: 191-211.

Bar, F., F. Pisani and M. Weber. 2007. 'Mobile technology appropriation in a distant mirror: baroque infiltration, creolization and cannibalism', paper to the Seminario sobre Desarrollo Económico, Desarrollo Social y Comunicaciones Móviles en América Latina.

Besley, T. Coate, S. Loury, G. 1992. 'On the allocative performance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations.' Research Program in Development Studies at Princeton University Discussion Paper No. 163.

Besley, T. Coate, S. Loury, G., 1993. 'The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations.' *The American Economic Review* 83, 792-810.

Besley, T. Coate, S. and Loury, G. 1994. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit markets and efficiency. *Review of Economic Studies* 61, 701-719.

Carrier, N. and E. Lochery. 2013. 'Missing states? Somali trade networks and the Eastleigh transformation'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7.

CGAP. 2010. Boost for Mobile Banking for the Unbanked as CGAP, DFID Announce New Partnership. <<http://www.cgap.org/news/boost-mobile-banking-unbanked-cgap-dfid-announce-new-partnership>>, accessed 20 October 2012.

Cockayne, J. and L. Shetret. 2012. 'Capitalizing onTrust Harnessing Somali Remittances for Counterterrorism, Human Rights and State Building.' Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. 1990. 'Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods: cattle in Tswana economy and society'. *American Ethnologist*, 17,2:195-216.

Devereux, S. 2010. 'Better Marginalised than Incorporated? Pastoralist Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia'. *European Journal of Development Research* 22:678–695.

Donovan, K. 2012. 'Mobile Money, More Freedom? The Impact of M-PESA's Network Power on Development as Freedom.' *International Journal of Communication* 6: 2647–2669.

Duncombe, R. 2012. *Understanding Mobile Phone Impact on Livelihoods in Developing Countries: A New Research Framework*. Centre for Development Informatics, Working Paper 48
<http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/di/documents/di_wp48.pdf>, accessed 08 May 2012.

EIU. 2010. "Global microscope on the microfinance business environment 2010. An index and study by the Economist Intelligence Unit." EIU: London New York, Hong Kong, Geneva.

Elmi, A. 2010. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Etang, A., Fielding, D. and Knowles, S. 2011. 'Trust and ROSCA membership in rural Cameroon.' *Journal of International Development* 23,4.

Ghatak, M. 1999. 'Group lending, local information and peer selection.' *Journal of Development Economics*, 60,1: 27-50.

Geertz, C. 1962. The Rotating Credit association: A 'middle rung' in development. *Economic Development and Cultural change* 10, 241-263.

Goodwin, D. 2011. 'Dadaab is a city that shouldn't exist.' *Globe and Mail*. 20 June.

Grewal, D. S. 2008. *Network power: The social dynamics of globalization*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Guyer J. 1995. Introduction: the currency interface and its dynamics. In Guyer, J. (ed.) *Money Matters: Instability, Values and Social Payments in the Modern History of West African Communities*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Guyer, J. 2004. *Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Guyer, J. and Peters P. 1987. 'Introduction. Conceptualizing the Household: Issues of Theory and Policy in Africa', *Development and Change* (Special Issue) 18,2: 197–214.

Harper, M. 2012. *Getting Somalia Wrong?: Faith and War in a Shattered State*. London: Zed Books

Hesse, B. 2010. 'Where Somalia works'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 28, 3

Hoehne, Markus V., Feyissa, D., Abdile, M. and Schmitz-Pranghe, C. 2010. Differentiating the Diaspora: Reflections on diasporic engagement 'for peace' in the Horn of Africa. Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper.

Horst, C. 2006. *Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

HRW. 2010. *"Welcome to Kenya": Police Abuse of Somali Refugees*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Hughes, N. and Lonie, S. 2007. 'M-PESA: Mobile Money for the Unbanked.' *Innovations* Winter/Spring.

Hutchinson, S. 1996. 'The Cattle of Money and the Cattle of Girls among the Nuer, 1930-83.' *American Ethnologist* 19, 2.

Johnson, S., and Zarazua, M.N. 2011. 'Financial access and exclusion in Kenya and Uganda.' *Journal of Development Studies*, 47, 3: 475–496.

Kantai, P. 2012. 'Eastleigh and the Rise of Somali Diaspora Capital.' 12 June. <<http://pesatalk.com/2012/06/eastleigh-and-the-rise-of-somali-diaspora-capital/>>, accessed 20 June 2012.

Kendall, J., Maurer B., Machoka P., and Veniard C. 2012. An Emerging Platform: From Money Transfer System to Mobile Money Ecosystem. *Innovations*, 6, 4.

Khan, M. and Lightfoot, J. *n.d.* ROSCAs: Alternative Funding for Sustainable Enterprise
<http://www.uclan.ac.uk/lbs/research/research_institutes/files/ROSCAs_Alternative_Funding_for_Sustainable_Enterprise.pdf>, accessed 10 December 2012.

Klein, M., Mayer, C. 2011. 'Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion: The Regulatory Lessons.' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series.

Kumar, K., McKay, C. and S. Rotman. 2010. 'Microfinance and Mobile Banking: The Story So Far.' Focus Note 62. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, <http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.45546/FN62_rev2.pdf>, accessed 10 December 2012.

Kusow, A. and S. Bjork. 2007. *From Mogadishu to Dixon: the Somali diaspora in a global context*. Trenton: Red Sea Press.

Leishman, P. 2009. 'Understanding the Unbanked Customer and Sizing the Mobile Money Opportunity'. In *Mobile Money for the Unbanked*, Annual Report 2009.

Lewis, I. M. 1994. *Blood and Bone: the call for kinship in Somali society*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.

Lindley, A., F. Pieke and N. Van Hear, 2007. 'Beyond control? The mechanics and dynamics of 'informal' remittances between Europe and Africa.' *Global networks: a journal of transnational affairs*, 7, 3: 348-366.

Lindley, A. and A. Haslie. 2011. 'Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Somali Case Study', Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper No. 79, University of Oxford.

Lindley, A. 2009a. 'Crisis and Displacement in Somalia', *Forced Migration Review* 33

Lindley, A. 2009b. 'Between Dirty Money and Development Capital: Somali Money Transfer Infrastructure under Global Scrutiny'. *African Affairs* 108, 433: 519-539

Little, P. 2003. *Somalia: economy without state*. Oxford and Bloomington IN: James Currey and Indiana University Press.

Mahmoud, H.A. 2008. 'Risky Trade, Resilient Traders: Trust and Livestock Marketing in Northern Kenya.' *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 78, 4: 561-581.

Mahmoud, H.A. 2009. 'Breaking the communication barrier using mobile phones in pastoral livestock marketing.' *Haramata* 54.

Malkamaki, M. 2009. 'Informality and market development in Kenya's financial sector.' <http://fsdkenya.org/publications/finaccess_analysis.php>, accessed 10 December 2012.

Manson, K. 2012. Big money in little Mogadishu. Financial Times. 29 June. <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4979b30-bf98-11e1-bb88-00144feabdc0.html>>, accessed 30 June 2012.

Marchal R.. 2004. 'Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War', in Alex de Waal, ed. *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*. London: Hurst.

Mas, I. and Ng'weno, A. 2009. 'Three keys to M-Pesa's success: Branding, channel management and pricing.' Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Mas, I. and Radcliffe D. 2011. 'Mobile Payments Go Viral: M-PESA in Kenya'. Capco Institute's Journal of Financial Transformation 32.

Mas, I. and Radcliffe D. 2010. 'Scaling Mobile Money'. *Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems* 5,3.

Mas, I. 2009. 'The economics of branchless banking.' *Innovations*, 4,2: 57-76, MIT Press.

Mas, I. and Kumar, K. 2008. 'Banking on Mobiles: Why, How, for Whom?' Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Focus Note 48, Washington DC.

Mas, I. and Morawczynski, O. 2009. 'Designing Mobile Money Services: Lessons from M-PESA.' *Innovations*, 4,2: 77-92,.

Mas, I. and Rotman, S. 2008. 'Going Cashless at the Point of Sale: Hits and Misses in Developed Countries.' Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Focus Note 51, Washington DC.

Maurer, B. 2005. *Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral Reason*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.

Menkhaus, K. 2005. Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis. USAID/Development Alternatives Inc.

Menkhaus, K. 2007a. 'Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping'. *International Security*. 31, 3: 74-106

Morawczynski, O. and Miscione, G. 2010. 'Trustworthy mobile transactions: a longitudinal study on M - PESA in Kenya', in D. Latusek and A. Gerbasi, eds. *Trust and technology in a ubiquitous modern environment: theoretical and methodological perspectives*. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Nunow, A. A. 2000. Pastoralists and markets. Research Report 61/2000 African Studies Centre, Leiden.

Okurut, F. and Botlhole, T. 2009. 'Informal financial markets in Botswana: a case study of Gaborone City.' *Development Southern Africa* 26,2: 255 – 270.

O'Reilly, C. 1996. 'Urban Women's Informal Savings and Credit Systems in Zambia.' *Development in Practice* 6, 2.

Page, B. and C. Mercer, 2012. 'Why do people do stuff? Reconceptualizing remittance behaviour in diaspora-development research and policy.' *Progress in Development Studies* 12: 1-18.

Parry, J. and Bloch, M. (Eds.). 1989. *Money and the Morality of Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peebles, G. 2010. 'The Anthropology of Credit and Debt.' *Annual Review of Anthropology*.

Platteau, Jean-Phillippe. 1997. 'Mutual Insurance as an Elusive Concept in Traditional Rural Communities.' *Journal of Development Studies*. 33,6: 764-796.

Porteous, D. 2007. Just how transformational is m-banking? <http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/accessfrontier/Documents/transformational_mbanking.pdf>. Accessed 10 September 2012.

Rahman, A. 2009. 'Financial inclusion as tools for combating poverty; Joesph Mubiru Lecture.' *Bangladesh Bank Quarterly* VII, 2.

Sarma, M., and Pais, J. 2011. 'Financing inclusion and development.' *Journal of International Development*. 23: 613-628.

Schwittay, A.F. 2011. 'The financial inclusion assemblage: Subjects, techniques, rationalities'. *Critique of Anthropology* 31: 381-401.

Seele, P. 2011. Trust, Faith and Calculativeness: A Theoretical Extension of O. Williamson's 'Institutional Trust', in L. Obadia, D. C. Wood (eds.) *The Economics of Religion: Anthropological Approaches* (Research in Economic Anthropology, Volume 31), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.3-21

Servet, J. M. 2010. 'Microcredit' In: Hart, K. Laville J.L. and Cattani, A.D. (eds). *The Human Economy* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Sheikh H. and S. Healy 2009. 'Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development', UNDP <http://www.qaranimo.com/2009/nov/undp_report_onSomali_Diaspora.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2012.

Van Bastelaer, T. and Leathers, H. 2006, 'Trust in lending: social capital and joint liability seed loans in southern Zambia'. *World Development*, 34,10: 1788-1807.