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Part I

The Nature of Transatlantic Disagreements: Duration and Progress
Introduction: Rupture and Continuity in Transatlantic Relations

Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras

1. Analysing transatlantic relations: the fundamental questions

The answer to the question ‘how to understand the nature and evolution of US–EU relations’ is a key to interpreting the flowing situation of the contemporary world (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996:34). The relations between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean (the United Kingdom having an intermediate role – see Black, 2003, and in more detail Gamble, 2003) remain significant in world affairs, even after the end of the Cold War. They also remain significant in the context of the ‘survival’ of the West, whether these questions are real or only rhetorical.

In the era of globalization, transatlantic relations are undergoing a process of transformation. They retain elements of the past. However, continuity is increasingly accompanied by discontinuity. The certainties of yesterday become today’s fundamental questions. Uncertainty about the future of EU–US relations leads to wildly divergent assessments. ‘Pessimists maintain that differences in power, threat perceptions, and values, are forcing an inexorable divergence in European and American interests’, while ‘optimists see recent troubles as the product of rigid ideologies, domestic politics, and missed diplomatic opportunities’ (Moravcsik, 2003:75).

All the contributors to the present volume agree that the analysis of transatlantic relations is of paramount political significance, and that such analyses must revolve around the following critical questions: What is to be done about transatlantic relations? Should the two sides seek to compete with each other, or should they seek interdependence? Should such interdependence be equal or hierarchical? Could competition result in conflict, which would be costly for both
sides and others? Even if a policy of interdependence is pursued, is it certain that an equal balance between the two sides can be restored? It is possible that the side that enjoys superiority in one field \([a+]\) (such as defence) will determine the manner in which the other side uses and applies its strong points in another field \([n+]\).

Until now, relations between the US and the EU were typified by a clear division of labour and mutually complementary activities. This division developed, to a degree only, spontaneously (Keens-Soper, 1999). In this context, until recently the US first identified the opposition/enemy/target, and then invited its European allies to join its assessment. This kind of division has made many Europeans feel uncomfortable. To that end, some of the allies of the United States intensely demand that the ‘aims of the West’ should jointly be determined. From his point of view, Robert Kagan (2003) interprets this kind of demand as a claim that the foreign policy of the USA should be formed by others. To paraphrase, the Lilliputians (EU), wish to dictate how Gulliver (the USA) employs its power. Kagan speaks for that segment of the US administration which believes that there exist issues of global security, and of US security only, that need to be dealt with directly, even unilaterally, if that is deemed necessary. Or otherwise, as formulated by the current president of the USA himself, ‘the course’ of the USA, ‘can not depend on the decisions of others’ (George W. Bush, 2003). On the other side, the Europeans cannot admit that the definition of global security and how to frame it should solely depend on the national interests of the USA (Bahr, 2003).

2. Prioritizing the stages – differentiation in structures

Currently, the more powerful side in transatlantic relations (the USA) is not willing to subject its power to the consent of the less powerful side (the EU). Such behaviour, however, may well prevent the stronger party from applying the full extent of its power, through failure to exploit alliances that would increase the power it already enjoys, through missed chances in complementing its own power with that of friends and allies, and through overstretching its capabilities and capacity (regarding the USA, Ferguson and Kotlikoff, 2003; for a more general view with a historical perspective, even though it contains certain absolute statements, see Kennedy, 1987). The weaker side, on the other hand, runs the risk of overestimating its capabilities and perhaps becoming involved in a sterile confrontation with the stronger party. If it chooses not to take matters to breaking point, it may be
forced to retreat from its positions. Playing with fire is dangerous. If the fire is alive, you can get burned. If it has been extinguished, you can get dirty from the ashes.

In the case of fighting terrorism and the war in Iraq, considerable differences between the US and Europe emerged. These differences assumed the form of the ‘reasoning’ described above. The US evaluated global terrorism as a much more acute problem than did the EU. From the beginning, the Americans indicated their intention to lead an international campaign against terrorism and against whomever they considered, fairly or arbitrarily, a supporter or protector of terrorists. It was considered more important to be imminently occupied with the problem itself than to form an alliance that would ‘lose time’ by discussing the lawfulness (or not) of the actions to be undertaken in order to suppress terrorism (Rivkin and Casey, 2003). The European allies of the USA, on the other hand, worried that this campaign aimed at determining the internal structures of the West by invoking a common enemy, as had occurred during the Cold War, in order to establish American hegemony.

In the case of Afghanistan, the US was able to form an alliance on its own terms. In this, it was aided by the fact that the terrorist strikes of 11 September 2001 were a sufficiently convincing argument to provoke its European allies to follow along without much discussion. Later, during the war in Iraq, where there emerged a divergence of interests with the EU, the Americans considered that there was no need to ‘wait’ for the Europeans and lose time in discussions. The US, at Britain’s behest, did ‘wait’ for the Europeans. The US reportedly was ready to invade six months earlier but was convinced by Britain to hold off. The US and Britain then worked hard to get the Europeans and the UN onboard. But France made it clear that they would veto any UN resolution explicitly sanctioning an invasion. They also thought that even if their campaign against Baghdad was for the most part a unilateral action, so was the French veto in the UN Security Council. But they considered the former unilateral action ‘necessary’, and the latter ‘hostile’.

An important issue in EU–US relations is whether the world can and must be uni-polar or bi-polar. This is a fundamental question in politics, which is also addressed by many of the contributions in this volume. It is an issue that emerges in every decision-making process, and it has tangible practical repercussions. It arises in institutions, especially political parties, and can be a cause of their fragmentation. It arises especially in the process of globalization. The dilemma of
whether one wishes to control 100 per cent of the actions to be taken (uni-polarity), even if the chances of success are reduced by 50 per cent, or control at most 50 per cent of such actions (multi-polarity) and increase the chances of success up to 100 per cent, is fundamental to every decision-making process. Naturally, if one party considers that having 100 per cent control ensures an 80 per cent chance of success, while giving away 50 per cent of control would increase the chance of success by only 5 per cent, it is likely they would choose the former strategy, as the US did in the case of Iraq.

A second supposition is that the US thought it would combine a uni-polar course (100 per cent +n) in the war, with the participation of Western allies under conditions (a multi-polar approach) in the ‘second stage of the war’, the stage of building peace. In this second stage, however, the participation of the potential multi-polar allies would require an acceptance on their part of the faits accomplis and the fears (Barber, 2003) created in the first stage. In the name of multipolarity in the second stage, the Europeans demanded its application in the first. In other words, the US wanted the structure of the first stage to predetermine the manner of applying multi-polarity in the second, while some Europeans sought, by invoking multi-polarity in the second stage, to prevent the sway of uni-polarity of the first stage.

3. The Cold War and current structures: three interpretative approaches

During the Cold War era, in the context of the transatlantic alliance, a community of ideas, values, and aims was formulated, which for the most part remains current. In our opinion, the process of formulating joint values and aims was accompanied by the undoubted development of a hierarchy of dominance in relations between the USA and Western Europe, which has remained in force to this day. These relations were institutionalized as normative and structural power in several international organizations and regimes (Krasner, 1983) and by extension in the shaping of the global governance system (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Rosenau, 1997; Rhodes, 1996; Pierre, 2000; Brandt et al., 2000). It is not coincidental that certain contributors to this volume consider that the current divergence of views and pronounced disagreements between the US and the EU run deep and are long-term, while others consider them transient and defined by the specific historic juncture. Often, these differing assessments are linked to the authors’ evaluation of the nature of the Cold War and the signific-
The first approach considers that the Cold War was exclusively about the conflict of the Western world with applied socialism, and especially its conflict with the USSR. The realistic school interprets the essence and the outcome of the Cold War as a power struggle between the US and the former USSR (Cox, 1990; Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995; Lebow, 1999). Others, mostly from the liberalists’ camp, believe that the conflict was limited to the purely ideological level (Fukuyama, 1992; Peterson, 1992). Even more typically, H. Kissinger (1999) describes the entire post-war foreign policy of the US as an effort to contain the USSR. In the context of the same one-dimensional approach, L. Gaddis (1993:7–9), while referring to ten factors that in his opinion led to and sustained the Cold War, does not record even one concerning the internal structure of the Western system. In general, this first approach considers that while ‘the Cold War is over, there is no consensus on what has replaced it’ (Dunne, Cox and Booth, 1999: xiii).

According to the second approach regarding the Cold War, which is closely linked to the first in its methodology, it is argued that after 1989 appeared conditions for universal ‘dramatic changes in world affairs’. These changes were considered by some as being so dramatic as to mark the end of any necessity for wide-ranging interpretative systems (Richardson, 2000; George, 2000).

The third approach provides a different viewpoint: During the Cold War there were noted developments not only in the conflict between the two systems, but also within the internal structures of each. In this framework, it is argued either that the current situation represents a continuity without breaks, since ‘the American policy had not changed since Vietnam’ (Pilger, 2001:13–14), or – a view that in our opinion is more accurate – that there exists a dialectic of relative continuity (retention of several pre-Cold War structures) and discontinuity (emergence of new factors). Several contributions to this volume adopt this third view, though they differ as to the significance they lend to one or the other (continuity or discontinuity) and their specific factors.

4. Today’s power structure: a product of the Cold War

During the Cold War, the US continued to manage its dominance over its Western allies in a manner that would safeguard both the security and the stability of the Western camp (Walter, 1993), as this was
understood by the US, and its economic growth (Webb and Krasner, 1989:195; Wyatt-Walter, 1999:127). The US contributed decisively to the establishment of international law and international institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NATO, and, to a degree, the UN). Its policy during the Cold War allowed the countries of Western Europe to participate in this system and obtain benefits, but also created a framework ensuring the ongoing primacy of the US. The US, in the role of a stabilizer, accepted that there are rules of the game, though it considered acceptable only those rules which had been determined to a large extent by the US itself, through the policies it applied. The US knew that attempts to co-operate with third parties might entail difficulties, but that such difficulties were contained within the strict limits of consent and the context of American hegemony. In particular, during the Cold War, the US dismissed the idea of a dominant role that would be imposed within the West by direct, unmediated military power (Halliday, 2001), as it tends to do today, according to the findings of most contributions to this volume.

The structure and framework of the Euro-Atlantic alliance prior to 1989 was mainly determined by the conditions and necessities of the Cold War, but – in our opinion – not by them alone. As noted by G.J. Ikenberry, ‘the basic logic of order among the Western world was set in place before the Cold War and it was a logic that addressed problems internal to Western capitalism’. It is not a coincidence that since the ‘absolute’ dominance of capitalism after 1989, this state of affairs ‘has become more firmly embedded in the wider structures of politics and society’. In other words, ‘the Cold War bi-polarity gave the US added hegemonic leverage at critical moments in the management of Western order’ forcing even friendly powers to consent to the ‘grand Strategy’ of the US ‘for building order within the Western World’. The result is that, even today, ‘overall, American hegemony is reluctant, penetrated, and highly institutionalised’ (Ikenberry, 1999:124–7, 135–9; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:283–7; see also Brand et al., 2000, 89 et seq., and similarly Brzezinski, 1997: chapter 1). Seen from a certain point of view, it could be considered that a ‘fundamental aspiration’ of the US after the Second World War was to attach Japan and Germany ‘by invoking the spectre of the risk posed by the Soviet Union, to a system of complex agreements and financial/military commitments, in which the role played by the US was decisive’ (Volger, 1994:923).

Therefore the invocation of the threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War also aimed at subjecting the Western allies of the
US to the latter’s leadership ambitions. To a degree, the powerful in continental Europe realized this state of affairs. Thus, during the Cold War relations in the Western world regarding a common, solid foreign policy were sometimes directed or strained by mild or even rupture-threatening rifts, even regarding policy towards the Soviet Union. Typical examples are the French policy of defence autonomy vis-à-vis NATO, and later the Ost-Politik of the German government and the overall policy of appeasement against the USSR on the question of armaments.

As regards the evolution of transatlantic relations after the Cold War and in the current era, our position is that both continuity and discontinuity are present, with breaks in the historical continuity. The unification of Germany, the fall of the USSR and the collapse of Russia, changes in Eastern Europe and in parts of Asia, are all developments that have created a new, post-Cold War environment in which the relations between the US and (Western) Europe are now played out (Brandon, 1992; Cox, 1995). These changes were significant because they eliminated the common enemy of the West, i.e. those countries that belonged to the socialist camp. In addition, they speeded up and reinforced the globalization process, and in particular in the political process. Thus, the context within which the power of Western leading actors could be measured had changed, as had their respective positions and their interdependence. In light of the above, we may reach the conclusion that after 1989 there appears a very significant break in transatlantic relations – which also affects internal developments – while concurrently there also exists a continuity, based on the system of capitalist relations and on the political structures and institutions that had developed in the Western world during the Cold War ‘within the system’.¹

Today, the two main protagonists in the Western world are revisionary in their trends. The secondary disagreements regarding relations with the USSR have evolved into acute disagreements regarding policy to deal with global problems and new actors. Concurrently, each side seeks to restructure transatlantic relations in its own favour. Thus, most analysts consider that the USA and Europe are in a process of redetermining their relations in the wake of the Cold War (Keens-Soper, 1999). This redetermination is occurring despite the progress being made in developing and establishing a community of values, objectives and strategic choices between the socially dominant groups on the two sides of the Atlantic, and despite the fact that to a degree, their common action had increased before the second Gulf War in Iraq.²
It may be noted that contrary to the position maintained by some Western powers towards the war in Vietnam, in both the Yugoslav and Afghan campaigns the European states stood by US choices and policy orientations (Nye, 2000). This alignment occurred even though the US sought through these wars to influence even more the internal evolution of the EU (Gnesotto and Roper, 1992) by highlighting contradictions and certain impasses in the EU. By contrast, in the 2003 war in Iraq, the US and the powers within the EU indicated their strong desire to review the internal structures of the Western world in the post-Cold War era (Watrin, 2003), which resulted in a change of their attitudes towards each other.

5. Competition, conflict, or cooperation?

This tendency to review transatlantic relations is to a large degree due to the new state of affairs that evolved after the Cold War – a proposition that reflects our position. From the angle of our analysis of the issue, the new reality is comprised of three main components (regarding the most important bibliography on transatlantic relations and developments in the US, see Spiegel Special, 2003).

The first component is the effort to restructure relations in the Western world. In particular, we refer here to the emergence of strong opposition internally, to the elimination of the old enemy and the ‘necessity’ of having a new one, and to the emergence of acute political clashes within the Western world.

The second component concerns the intensification of the process of European integration, but also the fact that this process has in many ways been more difficult than initially expected. The new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe have acceded to the EU, while addressing their strategic security concerns against ‘old enemies’ by cooperating with the US (Viksnins, 2003).

The third component is the ‘non-decline’ of the US – a decline that many had predicted, and still expect, today. For example, E. Todd (2002), who considered that the American system was already on its last legs, has been proved wrong. He even claimed that ‘the collapse of the American system might occur before the attack on Iraq’ (Todd, 2003:10).4

If the US has to face the fundamental question of uni-polarity or multi-polarity, Europe has to decide whether it will take the course of close co-operation with the US or, on the contrary, whether it will seek a balance of political power. Currently, the former choice appears to
have prevailed. But there are others in Europe who think the time has come to adopt the second course. They claim that since the US is not acting in accordance with the principles of international law and institutions, and is refusing to consult in a binding manner with its allies, the EU must speed up the process of integration in the military-defence field (Hoyer and Kaldrack, 2002; Reiter, Rummel and Schmidt, 2002).

Another view would posit that it is doubtful whether the EU can ultimately impose on the US respect for international law and global institutions by applying a conventional balance-of-power policy. It even claims that if the EU seeks to become unilaterally active in fields where the US prevails, it will be creating future problems in transatlantic relations, since such an aspiration would be driven by the spirit of competition. According to this view, such reasoning can distort the system itself. When the Athenians decided they wanted to have a power structure similar to Sparta’s (Buckler, 2003; Schulz, 2003), they ended up by distorting their own system, which had several advantages as against Sparta. In other words, the Europeans certainly need to reinforce their defence structures, as noted in many of the contributions here, so that the US will take them more into account. If, however, they attempt to become a US in the place of the US, then this effort will not succeed. Its failure will be due to two main reasons: Firstly, the US knows better than anyone how to be itself; and secondly, in such a situation, the EU risks losing all the advantages it enjoys and which make it so successful in the current world, capable of attracting scores of other countries. In addition, by adopting such a course, the EU would lose its own orientation – an orientation that provides the capability to instil even in the US elements of the European social model. Otherwise, the EU will be ‘forced’ to choose between conflict and deference as against the US; both these alternatives are unacceptable.

Assuming that Europe selected a course of conflict with the US, it would have to structure its internal architecture correspondingly. In particular, it would have to reinforce its institutional system so as to allow centralization of authority in a single axis, such as the Paris–Berlin axis. It would also have to reinforce its defence capabilities and impose recognition and application of international law wherever it holds power. In this framework, there would develop a directory of powers supporting the advancement of the EU in a way that would strengthen it as fast as possible in the fields in which the US is superior. In such a scenario, the EU would not seek to attract other countries on the basis of its cultural and democratic advantages, but primarily by its power. In our opinion, however, such a course would neutralize the
EU’s comparative advantages and would position Europe in a playing field in which the US is admittedly superior in know-how and skills.

If the EU made the choice to subject itself to the will of the US, the outcome would again be negative. In this case, too, many of the EU’s advantages, such as its political and cultural resources, would remain unexploited. In following such a direction, the EU would inevitably be led to undertake several internal changes and, most significantly, abandon its efforts to contribute to the resolution of global problems of long-term significance that are not linked one-dimensionally nor limited to military security. A mutation of the EU into a small, illegitimate sibling of the US would undermine its internal cohesion. It would arrest the process of integration and unification, limiting its aspirations to pursue geographical expansion and a stronger presence in the global market.

A thoughtless adoption on the part of the Europeans of any and every position held by the US would not indicate friendship toward the Americans. And this is because friends speak the truth to one another and do not just say whatever will please the other. In other words, we would posit that the US should not consider any criticism of one or other of the US government’s actions as anti-Americanism (Judt, 2003). On the other hand, it is clear that not all ‘anti-Americanism’ is democratic. Criticism generated on both sides of the Atlantic and which is typified by lack of civility, dialogue and tolerance, such as criticism originating from fundamentalist quarters, cannot be seen as a component of a democratic approach to transatlantic relations, nor as a component of a relationship aiming at resolving current world problems and dealing with current world risks. The former Greek Foreign Minister, George A. Papandreou, addresses such problems and risks in his Foreword to the present volume.

In the context of the future of transatlantic relations there is also a third course: that of co-operation between equal partners. Here, the end objective is that both sides contribute to building bridges between their institutions and peoples. Such an approach requires that both sides develop their respective advantages, but also respect each other and each other’s advantages. In this framework, the Europeans would be called upon to respect the fears generated among Americans after 11 September. The Americans, on their part, must understand the European position and a fundamental element of EU culture, regarding respect for international law and international institutions, international rules and status quo. Concurrently, transatlantic relations, being a bridge between two capitalist sub-systems, must not exclude the rest of the planet from growth, prosperity, democracy and freedom.
In the framework of this third alternative, the EU can pursue increased democracy in transatlantic relations. At the same time, it can pursue a development of European affairs in a manner that will not end up subjecting the smaller EU member states to the will of their stronger partners. Undoubtedly, any context of subordination would create an internal problem within the EU and generate centrifugal forces within it. In addition, the two sides of the Atlantic must contribute to a rethinking of the global institutional system and the respect it must be shown. This is not an issue of how much power the US or the EU enjoys, but of how to exploit all available opportunities to bring stability to the global system and promote democratic governance worldwide. Such governance would not only normalize relations between the US and the EU, but would also enhance the role of other states in resolving the global problems faced by the world today, as outlined in many contributions to this compendium.

6. Preventive war and pre-emptive self-defence: politics and law

A major cause of transatlantic conflict is the development by the US of a new strategic security doctrine in response to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and to Iraq’s stance in early 2002. In the current American administration’s view, contemporary threats require types of reaction proportional to the imminence of the threat or the anticipated armed attack – swifter and more flexible than before. As the US administration claims, this development could not have been foreseen when the UN Charter was adopted. In one of the most fundamental provisions of peremptory character of this Charter, the use of force and coercion in international relations is forbidden. However, the UN Charter equally provides for self-defence. This right of self-defence is of the same legal weight, and is an inherent right of any state which is under an unauthorized armed attack. This right has been extensively claimed in cases in which a state is under the threat or preparation of an armed attack, which has not yet developed. The US broadens and enshrines this claim of self-defence to include the recent types of terrorist threats, which could not have been predicted at the drafting stage of the UN Charter, in which the right of self-defence was prescribed and thus could not fall within the ambit of this right’s scope. These threats come from the possible employment of weapons of mass destruction by the so-called failed states or other illicit organized groups and networks. The US is seeking to extend the meaning and application of self-defence, on the basis and within the framework of its new strategic doctrine, to
include in its ambit pre-emptive reactions to acts that include or presage violence and destruction, even if these have not as yet occurred.

Currently, the US includes terrorism in the category of immediate and existing threats to its security. In this context, it demands a campaign against terrorism before it can account for new victims. For this purpose, the US also demands the ‘timely’ disarmament of terrorist pockets (whether states or supra-national networks) and pre-emptive strikes in the form of combating terrorism against them. It was exactly this new American doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence – as applied in Iraq and by the US’s interventionist policy in general, which bypasses the UN – that met with strong international opposition in early 2003, by France primarily, but also by Russia, China, and Germany.

The recent US military intervention in Iraq led to an enrichment of the terminology in the field of international law. Formerly, we had become accustomed to the use of the term ‘anticipatory self-defence’ as a claimed right against imminent threats. It was first used in the Cuban Quarantine incident in 1962 to justify the blockade of part of the high seas by invoking the need to protect US national security against the upcoming, developing Soviet missile threat (McDougal, 1963; Shlei, 1962/2003). Justifying anticipatory self-defence, as invoked in practice up to now, depends more on demonstrating the existence of threat, whether imminent or prospectively destructive, and less on a constrained framework of principles. In other words, an imminent, tangible threat may be perceived as being equivalent to an attack, which would justify the recourse to defensive measures, including forceful means, by the state which claims to be a definite target or a prospective victim. Anticipatory self-defence was also claimed by Israel during the two wars in 1967 and 1973. It was then considered that the threat encountered was so imminent that no measures other than pre-emptive defence would be of any avail.

International practice has shown that anticipatory self-defence initially meets with strong opposition and disapproval, but is often justified with hindsight, when it emerges that the threat was indeed imminent, and that its non-anticipation would have resulted in casualties and heavier and much wider-ranging losses as well as innumerable human victims. A case in point is Israel’s anticipatory air strike that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Initially, most states condemned the Israeli action in the UN; but later many countries that now subscribe to the new American doctrine have invoked that action as a positive example. They consider that had Iraq been allowed to complete its nuclear programme and develop weapons of mass destruction, the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty after the invasion of
2 August 1990 would have been attained at a much higher cost in human lives and other damages. Generally, the common denominator in demands for anticipatory self-defence is national security and territorial integrity and the possible prevention of ensuing casualties. We would like, however, to note here that according to the practice adhered to in the framework of bi-polarity, for such an invocation to be justified the state claiming it will be a prospective and potential victim of an armed aggression or other violent attack, and must first seek to persuade the competent UN-instituted organs, which are authorized to manage and have overall control of any reactive measures including the use of force, about the necessity, proportionality and discriminating kind of the anticipatory self-defence it is contemplating. As has been widely asserted, the UN-authorized organs that have been occupied with the international security preservation reserve the final and controlling authority and responsibility to determine whether any such anticipatory self-defence is lawfully claimed (Franck, 2002:107).

Lawyers and other analysts mainly from the US employ the new term of ‘pre-emptive self-defence’. This term implies a dominant element of imminent, rapid action, and is wider in scope than the term ‘anticipatory self-defence’. Pre-emptive self-defence is unilateral, without any prior authorization, and has the objective of arresting an incipient attack that is not yet operational. This is a strategy that suppresses the attack ‘at birth’ (Lippman, 2003). According to the definition given by the American Professor W.M. Reisman, pre-emptive self-defence is the unilateral use of force without prior international authorization aiming at alienating the means and weapons which are the components for the preparation of an aggressive action and effectively neutralizing the aggressive enemy. The logic behind this kind of rapid reaction is to prevent an aggressive act from developing, because if allowed to develop it would lead to a higher cost of reaction and definitely would most probably lead to accounting for innocent human victims and material damages. Pre-emptive self-defence aims at eliminating the potential threat or the occurrence of unforeseen events, contrary to anticipatory self-defence, which responds to a tangible, immediate threat (Reisman, 2003:87). Thus, the former is, in its historical practice, the extension of the latter. However, because the former requires power of a certain weight and has been advanced by the US since the end of the Cold War era, it is interpreted by those, who oppose the US, as an effort to achieve a targeted role of world hegemony. Thus, the Europeans are increasingly distrustful of the new US strategic security doctrine, and they increasingly and more systematically invoke the rules of international law.
Disputes on interpreting international law, particularly as to how older rules may be applied to new (assumed or real) threats, suggests a lively future for the interrelations among the Western countries. In contrast to this prospect, those who advance the need for mutually complementary policy and co-operation between the US and the EU suggest that the protagonists of the transatlantic relationship should seek to create a modern working framework of collective security, which would respond to any kind of contemporary threats. This kind of collective security implies that both sides would interrogate into the usefulness or even the necessity of military action or any other mode of proportional reaction in clearly delineated, extreme cases (Daalder, 2002:11). Such cases should constitute real and tangible threats, and any action to be taken should meet with as broad as possible consent of the main actors and obtain a clear signal of legitimacy through a UN resolution.

7. The contributions to this volume

7.1. A paradox

One of the paradoxes of the Cold War was the comparatively limited bibliography on transatlantic relations. Many publications could be found on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the internal structures and features of each side, but the number of references to the relations between them, particularly as regards their foreign policy toward each other, was much smaller. It should be mentioned that during the 1980s, only one noteworthy book concerning the European Union’s foreign policy was published in the US. Most works published in the US about the EU discussed economic relations and security. The bibliography about foreign policy in transatlantic relations only started growing in the 1990s.

In contrast to the years before 1989, the main subject in the early 1990s was the competition for primacy in the post-Cold War world between the two Western centres. By the late 1990s, the bibliography was increasingly concerned with globalization and the stance maintained by the two centres as towards that process. A common trend throughout the 1990s was, and still is, research into the prospects of American hegemony (Rudolf and Wilzewski, 2000) and the extent to which it will continue in the twenty-first century.

The low productivity of the two sides, both on academic and on political research about the transatlantic relations during the Cold War era, probably indicates that some considered them self-evident and
therefore not worthy of further study or research, while others (the majority) seemed reluctant to touch upon the real but thorny problems which they viewed as extremely sensitive. As has been shown in recent years, the truth is that problems in transatlantic relations have long been greater than those that are shown up, while the waves that could, and still can arise are varied in scope and intensity, as shown in detail in the contributions to this volume.

7.2. The nature of transatlantic disagreements: duration and progress

The present volume contains a Foreword and 34 contributions, of which two are studies and 32 are short essays by internationally renowned features of academia and politics. For the sake of presentation, we start with the essays and end up with the two lengthy studies. All contributions contain the views requested by the then Greek Foreign Minister, George A. Papandreou, in the context of preparing for the Kastellorizo informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in the first week of May 2003. These contributions constituted the informal input to the discussions among foreign ministers. This is the first concerted effort since 1989 with the objective of formulating a far-reaching, long-term European policy on transatlantic relations. The contributions include widely differing views on the future of such relations, encompassing both optimistic and pessimistic outlooks. Some consider the difficulties that have arisen as a long-term, others as transient. Some of the analyses and proposals consider that the EU is developing in competition with the US, others that it is following a complementary course. Some contributors suggest that relations should be reinforced, while others do not think that is necessary. All, however, agree that the EU must be strengthened, and its role and responsibility in transatlantic relations enhanced. Several courses are suggested on this subject, which is of particular interest to academics and politicians. The division of the contributions into categories (see sub-headings from 7.2.3 to 7.2.5.) is made on the basis of grouping articles emphasizing specific proposals rather than more general analysis, and vice versa. It is not an actual division, in the sense that all contributions contain proposals for the future of transatlantic relations.

7.2.1. The long-term character of EU–US disagreements

Several of the authors claim that the differences between the EU and the US are of a long-term character. They date from before the 2003 war in Iraq and will endure longer than the war’s repercussions. They
are therefore pessimistic regarding the future of transatlantic relations unless appropriate measures are taken, for which they submit several suggestions. Such suggestions often coincide with those of the optimists, who believe that the problem is short-term and will be short-lived.

The internationally acclaimed journalist William Pfaff considers that the differences between the US and Europe have historical depth and will not be easily overcome. He suggests that the Europeans should adopt a more systematic approach in influencing the US political-institutional system and US society to bring about a change in their current positions. In the same context, Christoph Bertram, director of the leading German Institute for International Relations and Security (SWP) in Berlin, believes that the break between Europe and the US is not a result of present circumstances alone, but of the fundamental differences between the two sides. He claims that the cause of such differences lies in the existence of differing interests and different views regarding history and the state of the contemporary world and its prospects. He considers that what is needed in order to restore relations is a systematic dialogue between the two sides. In this context, he suggests a stabilization of relations in fields where the two sides already co-operate, and stronger efforts on the part of the EU to influence US public opinion.

In the same spirit, Scott Barrett, professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, considers that the tensions created because of the war in Iraq prove that the transatlantic and other supranational institutions developed up to now are unfit in the new global environment. For some European states, institutions such as the United Nations serve as a means to constrain American power. By contrast, for the US such institutions are noxious, especially when they are used to curb US dominance. According to S. Barrett’s views, the way to restore the transatlantic relationship at the present juncture is to attain minor objectives in specific fields of common interest.

A similar pessimistic outlook, though differing from the above, is also given by the historian and former foreign minister of Poland, Bronislaw Geremek. In his view, a fundamental cause of current transatlantic problems is the fact that for the first time in decades, American policy is not reflecting sufficient positive interest in the process of European unification. He believes that the main objective should be to strengthen the EU, so as to convince the US that it is a powerful, reliable ally in global governance.
7.2.2. Differences and mutual completion

Some of the contributors who maintain the long-term nature of transatlantic differences point out, with some force, that despite their differences, each side can act in a manner complementing the other. Gilles Andréani, then Head of Policy planning staff, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and Advisor to the Foreign Minister, sees the differences in overall political culture at the root of transatlantic disagreements. He notes that the EU is more familiarized with negotiation and compromise processes as well as policies aimed at reaching consensus with other actors. The US, on the contrary, is more likely to resort to more coercive means. The author further notes, however, that such differences are not necessarily a cause of conflict. He expresses his hope that at the end of the road such differences may serve as mutually complementary attributes.

In the same vein as Gilles Andréani, but offering a different perspective, Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the Noble Prize winner in economics, considers co-operation between the US and the EU not as a possibility, but as a necessity. He believes that today’s conflict between the US and the EU is due to the fact that the former currently tends to uni-polarity, while the latter to views of a multi-polar world. He notes, however, that despite their differences, their co-operation is necessary in the context of globalization and in the joint resolution of global problems. He further suggests that despite the difficulties, such co-operation might be developed by reinforcing non-governmental transatlantic relations, by shared action on issues of common concern to both sides, and by incorporating the EU–US relationship into a wider, international framework. The same issue of uni-polarity versus multi-polarity is addressed by Dimitri Constas, professor of international relations and head of the International and European Studies Department of the Panteion University of Athens. D. Constas considers that the Americans tend to uni-polarity, and that there are many indications that this trend will become even more pronounced, even when it is unnecessary. In order to prevent the establishment of uni-polarity, he suggests that the EU should regain Washington’s respect as a collective international actor. He further notes that the EU is able to take care of its own backyard. European attention should also focus on America and its foreign policy elites, with the aim of expanding the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’.

The world-famous analyst F. Stephen Larrabee, senior fellow at the leading American research institute Rand, expresses his belief that, after the end of US military involvement in Iraq, there will be
opportunities to restore transatlantic relations. He holds the view that if the EU aspires to ‘put itself on the US radar screen’, it must first identify the wider security problems that concern the US. He suggests that in order to improve relations there should be a dialogue process similar to that of the Transatlantic Agenda of 1995. Issues to be addressed may include a discussion of Turkey’s future course and the reinforcement of co-operation with that country, the reconstruction of Iraq, peace in the Middle East, and suggestions about a resolution of the problems both the US and the EU countries face regarding North Korea, Iraq and Iran. He suggests further issues of international concern, such as addressing the problem of terrorism through multilateral co-operation in fields such as control of bank deposits and transfers, cross border control, as well as gathering and exchange of information and intelligence. This dialogue over these issues must be supported through closer relations with the American Congress. The author stresses the necessity of a ‘division of labour’ between the two sides. He believes, though, that security is indivisible, and considers disastrous a global division of security, with Europe under the auspices of the EU, and security of the remaining world under the auspices of the US.

Former Dutch foreign minister Dirk Benschop also believes relations between the two sides are not healthy because of choices made by the US. Even so, he believes that the EU should avoid defining itself as being in conflict with America. He stresses that the EU should further develop its positive attributes in a manner that will ultimately benefit transatlantic relations. As discussed in the same spirit by Christopher Hill, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, the real issue confronting the EU is not whether it will maintain relations with the US, nor whether it will choose a course of conflict or subjection, but rather the terms of the relationship between the two. Regarding such terms, he notes that there are three possible courses, of which the most preferable is that of the European ‘citizens’ path’ and the further evolution of the EU as a civilian superpower.

Timothy Garton Ash, director of the European Studies Centre of St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, widely known for his comprehensive studies on Europe, believes that if the former Soviet Union contributed to the unity of the West, it is undisputable that the Middle East now divides that unity. He therefore suggests that the EU and the US should embark on a (non-public) dialogue regarding the future of that region. He also says the EU must not define itself through a negative stance towards the US, and that the EU and US should instead pull together again. On the other hand, as he notes, the US must realize
that the strengthening of the EU is in its interest. On this point it is worth repeating a similar view expressed by Tom Bentley, director of the United Kingdom’s Demos Institute. T. Bentley suggests that the EU undertakes a division of competencies with the US, with the EU assuming a controlling role on issues such as cross-border crime, immigration, humanitarian assistance and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Overall, he suggests that the EU should promote the image of a moderate (soft) power, tackling issues in which the US is not interested. Nevertheless, he adds that the Europeans should not develop a defensive identity opposing American power.

Joseph Nye, dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, considers Robert Kagan’s view of an ‘old Europe descended from Venus fighting a unilateral America descended from Mars’ a short-sighted myth. Like Garton Ash, he notes that uni-polarity does not apply on all levels. Regarding military power, the world is indeed uni-polar and will remain so unless the Europeans decide to increase their defence expenditure. He claims, though, that regarding economic power, the international system may be seen as multi-polar, with the EU enjoying power that is absolutely necessary to the US in the context of international trade agreements. Regarding supranational issues, such as illegal immigration, contagious diseases, climate change and terrorism, he insists that international co-operation is necessary. Nye’s proposals are in the same spirit as those of most authors in this volume. He suggests that the EU should develop its strengths so as to ‘balance’ US power, but also to exert influence on it.

Sherle Schwenninger, senior fellow of the World Policy Institute, in his note holds the opinion that Europe is currently a more important factor in international affairs than it used to be because it offers the world an alternative approach in its policy by championing a multi-lateral, global policy, serving the interests of all, even those of the US. In particular, the EU has much to offer by exporting democracy and economic restructuring, and in nation-building. According to Schwenninger, division of labour and allocation of competencies must form the basis of transatlantic co-operation. Jan Dirk Blaauw, president of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), considers that there is no alternative to transatlantic co-operation. The EU can reinforce its defence and foreign policy in general, but this would make no sense and have no objective if undertaken in confrontation with the US. In order to reinforce US–NATO ties, Europeans must demonstrate a spirit of understanding concerning the security problem the US contends it faces, and convince US officials that it would be in
their country’s interests if they acted jointly through long established international institutions (such as the UN and NATO). The President of the WEU suggests that the EU must increase its defence expenditure and assume military actions in the context of a division of labour with the US. The US, on its side, needs to admit and give credit to the international role of the EU and show their confidence in Europeans. Such a course would be facilitated to the degree that co-operation between the national institutions of the two sides increases, especially through the establishment of a joint parliamentary committee on global security policy.

Kalypso Nicolaidis, lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford, strikes a note of realism, suggesting that the US and the EU must learn to live with their differences. In her view, both the American approach of stressing military force exclusively, and the French approach that still sees the current world in a balance of power context, must be left behind. The EU, says Kalypso Nicolaidis, must evolve into a civilian power with military assets in pursuit of peace-making efforts, overcome its internal differences and splits, and take advantage of its internal diversities as a factor of strength. In this way, she concludes, the EU will be able to act as more of an equal with the United States, with greater flexibility as a complementary but independent power.

7.2.3. Short-term causes

Some of the analysts included in this category of views suggest that the current deterioration of transatlantic relations can be attributed to the particular circumstances of a specific period, rather than to any long-term, insurmountable factors. Stanley Hoffman, the eminent professor of international relations at Harvard, submits the position that the tensions in transatlantic relations are due to recent changes in US foreign policy, rather than to pre-existing differences. The EU is worried about the US pursuit of pre-emptive war, its emphasis on fighting terrorism and the diminishing of the role it is willing to give to international institutions and international law.

Theodore Couloumbis, professor of international relations at the University of Athens and formerly at the American University considers that the US is indeed acting in a uni-polar manner at the present juncture, but that the elements of its system are more complex; he therefore calls that system ‘uni-multi-polar’. He suggests that the USA’s current behaviour indicates the characteristics of a declining power, and reminds us of history’s lessons, according to which the great
powers have every interest to conserve a state of affairs that perpetuates their position of prominence. The EU, however, must demonstrate that it is able to contribute to rebuilding a system of global order that is both equitable and economically sufficient and sustainable.

Argyris Fatouros, a professor of international law at the University of Athens and formerly at the University of Indiana, proposes a strategy aimed at transforming the EU into a leading actor in global affairs, promoting international law and institutions. He believes that the current crisis in EU-US relations does not derive from the distant past. Rather, it is due to current factors, such as the present US administration and the still present situation of increasing European integration.

Georgios Papastamkos, professor of the University of Piraeus, considers that the framework of transatlantic relations should undergo political and institutional restructuring. Such a restructuring can be realized on the basis of three different scenarios concerning the future orientation of the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and transatlantic co-operation. According to the first, static scenario, the new global challenges must be dealt with via a shared allocation of responsibilities. According to the second, dynamic scenario, the establishment of an independent ESDP is required. As regards the third scenario, that of a fragmented ESDP, there would be enhanced co-operation with certain EU member states only. G. Papastamkos also outlines a range of suggestions concerning the advancement of global governance, the incorporation of the EU’s foreign policy into a single constitutional framework, the reform and restructuring of the United Nations and building bridges to enhance the transatlantic relationship. These suggestions aim at forming a more equitable world, and at rendering the EU even more appealing. The policy proposals of Misha Glenny, a journalist and historian specializing in the Balkans, are in the same spirit. In his view, the EU can advance an alternative foreign policy at this time, lending special emphasis to policies concerning the Balkans, the Middle East and immigration. Such policies need not compete with US policy. By adopting such a course, the EU will be in a position to handle crises like the one in Iraq more effectively, as an equal partner with the US.

7.2.4. The recommendations
All the contributors referred to above, irrespective of whether their views are optimistic or not, essentially share the view that the future of transatlantic relations will depend on the further strengthening of European integration, especially in the fields of defence, security and
foreign policy. This would include a fuller presence of the UK in European processes and a greater commitment from France. The contribution by the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) includes suggestions on how to strengthen the EU and secure transatlantic relations. In the TPN essay it is claimed that a strong, effective transatlantic alliance can only be obtained in the framework of common interests at the global level, by encouraging political dialogue and mutual understanding. According to the TPN, the main points of European policy must be co-operation in sectors such as the economy and the increase of European expenditure on defence.

Elmar Brok, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament, outlines a systematic agenda for a new transatlantic relationship, examining the course of action to be taken by the EU. For E. Brok, the question is: How can Europe recover its dynamism and speed up the process of integration (particularly defensive integration), and concurrently restore its relations with the US? Brok considers reinforcing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the best way of reinforcing NATO. What is needed, he claims citing very specific references, is to create a long-term collaborative framework and action plan for combating terrorism, while simultaneously promoting a ‘transatlantic community of action’. A transatlantic marketplace should be formed, and the EU and the US should act together on other important global challenges. In order to formulate and realize such a course, there is a need to expand a dialogue in a renewed transatlantic partnership, and to define civil society as an anchor. Inter-parliamentary co-operation between the US and Europe should also be encouraged.

Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, who is not among the contributors of this volume, agrees with Nye’s views (outlined in 7.2.2. above) regarding the importance of a ‘soft power’. He believes that the lost honour of the US on the diplomatic level, i.e. its tarnished image as a soft power which attains its objectives by persuasion and attraction rather than by coercion, may be saved if the US collaborates with the Europeans on economic, institutional and restructuring issues. He attributes the blame for the rupture between the US and the EU to the US, but also to France. According to Grant, US President George W. Bush must demonstrate a more diplomatic stance and focus on the Middle East peace process. He further states that British Prime Minister Tony Blair must prove that his support for the US was not unlimited, but also had European interests at heart.
Regarding French President Jacques Chirac, he notes that the French President should admit the reality of EU expansion, and pursue friendship among Central and Eastern European countries. He should also stop seeing the objective of the EU as resisting the US. Grant suggests, on the contrary, that a strong West needs more countries enjoying more power, both soft and hard, on both sides of the Atlantic.

A similar evaluation is submitted by Kemal Dervis, former Turkish finance minister, who also believes that while inequalities in the power enjoyed by the EU and US do exist, the American superpower is forced to operate in an exceedingly complex international environment, a fact that imposes the need to co-operate with other powerful international actors, especially on economic issues. In addition, he notes that US actions require greater ‘moral’ and ‘democratic’ legitimacy. Kemal Dervis suggests enhanced European cohesion, institutional changes in the United Nations (such as the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council), a single (common) EU representation in the UN, reinforcement of European civil defence and security, and retaining NATO as the main forum of transatlantic relations, with wider objectives to include building bridges with the Islamic world.

Of similar importance are the views expressed by the former prime minister of Ireland, John Bruton, who argues for the further reinforcement of defence capabilities and integration within the EU. He suggests that in order for the EU to upgrade its position regarding transatlantic relations, it must adhere to and advocate respect for international law and global institutions, and seek to influence public opinion in the US. Concurrently, the EU must secure the development of its economic and cultural links with the US. John Bruton also maintains that there is need for formal, comprehensive talks between the EU and the US regarding three interconnected issues: pre-emptive wars; weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism. The EU and the US should jointly develop – and not only on a governmental level – a new, intelligible and intellectually sustainable doctrine for dealing with the post-11 September world, including clear-cut rules regarding the crucial question of the lawfulness of resorting to use of force.

The issue of preventive war is also addressed by Ted Galen Carpenter, vice-president of the Cato Institute in the US. Ted Carpenter considers that at the root of the rupture in transatlantic relations lies the Bush strategic doctrine on pre-emptive war and the US interventionist policy in the Middle East. He considers that if Europe wishes to reject the role of a junior partner with limited participation and power, it must acquire a solid, cohesive security identity, and support it with reliable resources.
Friedbert Pflüger, a member of the Christian Democrat Party and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, suggests instituting effective mechanisms of transatlantic co-operation and consultation, and a common global agenda. He believes that fuller co-operation is required not only in fighting terrorism, but also in stabilizing countries undermined by internal crises and break ups, unending ethnic conflicts, and dealing with the desperate and marginalized social groups that usually constitute the fighters and core of extreme irredentist or terrorist networks. On issues of common security (terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), transatlantic co-operation must be solid and effective, so as to persuade countries in the Middle East and Central Asia that there is seamless co-operation and common action on both sides of the Atlantic. He also notes that other issues of common interest include contagious diseases, secured flow of supply of energy resources and issues surrounding digital economy.

Alan Henrikson, professor of international relations at the famous Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, recommends specific measures for building closer transatlantic ties. On the ideological level, he suggests focusing on the principles of universality. On the institutional level, he proposes that the transatlantic relationship be organized under a top-level group (a similar proposition, referred to as the ‘steering group’, had been made by H. Kissinger) representing the two pillars of the relationship, NATO and the EU. On the economic level, he promotes the idea of enhanced collaboration though the adoption of a comprehensive economic agreement to include the NAFTA partners. Finally, on the social and cultural level he proposes a global educational programme to include increased transatlantic exchanges and co-operation on distance learning in developing countries, such as those in the Middle East.

World-famous businessman and analyst George Soros believes the rift in EU–US relations is real. He suggests, however, that the two sides can agree on the need for pre-emptive action, if that action stops short of war. The two sides can, or rather they must, agree that the source of many evils in our contemporary world is bad government, and they must therefore undertake a whole range of joint actions, such as ensuring democratic elections. He also suggests that the two sides should agree on some common global objectives and co-operate in pursuing them. He cites greater transparency and accountability for revenues derived from natural resources, and the war against HIV-AIDS as examples of global issues that demand concerted action.
The contribution by Emilios Avgouleas, lecturer in international banking law and finance at the University of Piraeus, addresses cooperation in the fields of economic policy and relations with developing countries. He argues that the role the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (the Bretton-Woods institutions) plays in the international economic landscape has not been given due prominence on the EU–US agenda. He then discusses the neo-liberal doctrine – usually called the ‘Washington consensus’ – that formulates the economic policies dictated by the Bretton-Woods institutions to borrower countries. Finally, he argues that rethinking and reconceptualizing the economic policies that both institutions dictate to the developing world is a very important issue and should take central stage in EU–US relations.

David Andrews, research fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, whose contribution is co-authored by the director of the Institute, Hellen Wallace, also refers to EU–US economic relations. Their main position is that the immediate aim of European policy must be centred on keeping the economic relationship insulated from any political crisis in transatlantic relations. In their essay they suggest that the longer-term aim must focus on the use of the economic relationship as a lever to refashion a more positive political relationship between the EU and the US. The two academics also examine transatlantic relations in the light of the prospects of these relations for further development in the fields of trade, investment and growth. They conclude that the current accumulation of transatlantic problems should not be allowed to continue, since this would ultimately derail efforts to improve global stability.

7.2.5. The studies and their recommendations

At the end of the present volume, we present two lengthy studies, specially prepared for the informal council of foreign ministers in Kastellorizo. The studies address two different issues.

The first study, by the Potsdam Centre for Transatlantic Security and Military Affairs in Germany, has been prepared under the academic supervision of the acclaimed professor of international relations Margarita Mathiopoulos. This study analyses the conditions within which transatlantic relations are evolving, and it analyses their future prospects. She stresses the need for the US and EU to avoid retrogressing to a ‘balance of power’ logic, such as that which prevailed during the nineteenth century. A range of suggestions regarding how and where such relations must develop is presented clearly and concisely.
They include the creation of a ‘European Academy’, the creation of a ‘Transatlantic Area’, the institution of a European seat at the Security Council of the UN and the reform of international law. The study suggests that such changes must be compatible with retaining NATO’s political and military role. In the study it is stressed that NATO must incorporate the ESDP and reinforce its Mediterranean dimension and mechanisms for dialogue, while also being prepared to undertake missions worldwide. A table is included, presenting the main positions of EU member states in terms of transatlantic relations and foreign policy in general. Considerable labour and considerable knowledge about the state of affairs in transatlantic relations have gone into preparing this table. It serves as a useful starting point for conceptualizing and rethinking the whole issue.

The study contains such a wide range of suggestions, that it is impossible to describe them all in detail in this introduction. Original and useful suggestions for anyone wishing to systematically study transatlantic relations and their prospects are included in this volume. May we suggest that readers take pen in hand, read through the Potsdam Institute study, and record their agreement and/or objections to the points that are raised. Readers’ knowledge and views on transatlantic relations will no doubt be enriched by the experience – something that could also be said about all contributions presented in this volume.

The second study, prepared by the Centre for European Studies in Birmingham under the academic supervision of Professor Anand Menon and research fellow Jonathan Lipkin, presents the views expressed internationally just before and during the war in Iraq. The presentation is methodical, and highlights the political and academic conflicts that occurred during the war, regarding present and future transatlantic relations. Anyone who in the future wishes to study the atmospherics and attitudes regarding transatlantic relations before and during the war in Iraq, and understand the mechanisms that shape public opinion on issues of war and peace, will be well satisfied by reading the Menon–Lipkin essay.

We wish the reader a pleasant journey through the pages of this book. They have been written by eminent politicians and analysts of transatlantic relations, and contain the collected ideas, views, and suggestions of people from the most diverse backgrounds; people from many different countries who are active in many different fields, but who are all in pursuit of the same critical objective: how to shape a better world for tomorrow.
Notes

1. We should note here that during the Cold War there had emerged not only a common institutional global system, but also the main elements or tools of US foreign policy as against its allies. By applying such policy, the US tried to commit the Western European states (but also Japan) to a common position against third countries, on global economic and security issues (beyond the rivalry with the system of applied socialism), and regarding culture; further, it tried to commit its allies to a strategy of asymmetrical interconnection and interdependence with the US (Ikenberry, 1996; Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997).

2. In the military field for example, we should note that while the US entered the Second World War as an ally of the Western European states, it denied similar support during the Suez crisis in 1956 (one of the main reasons for the adjustment of UK policy in favour of closer ties with the EEC, the precursor of the EU). The European allies of the US acted in a similar manner as against the war in Vietnam, where they not only failed to display any marked willingness to lend support to the US, but also distanced themselves from US policy.

3. Developments similar to the above military campaigns in the last decade can also be identified in fighting organized crime and terrorism, and in dealing with regional powers that refuse to be subjected to the ‘new order’ as determined by Bush (Senior).

4. The assessment that ‘this is as far as it goes’ with the US and that the US is already in decline makes many within the EU feel that the European Union should redetermine to a considerable extent its relations with the US (Bahr, 2003; Jospin, 2002; Vedrine, 2001). This sentiment led in 2003 to increased collaboration between Germany and France regarding global security issues. As this collaboration became closer, it led France to an increasingly radicalized criticism of the US. In their turn, such radical sentiments brought pressure upon Germany and deepened the (internal) differences between those who believe Germany should share a global role with France – keeping a distance from US policy that would allow them to express criticism thereof – and those who believe Germany can assume alone a leading role in European affairs, as long as it enjoys ‘the support of the global reach of the US’.

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