Narratives of terrorism and security: 'accurate' translations, suspicious frames

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Constructing and disseminating ‘knowledge’ about a number of communities and regions widely designated as a security threat is now a big industry. Much of this industry relies heavily on various forms of translation and, in some cases, is generated by a team of dedicated translators working on full-blown, heavily funded programmes that involve selecting, translating and distributing various types of text that emanate from Arab and Muslim countries: newspaper articles, film clips, transcripts of television shows, selected excerpts from educational material, sermons delivered in mosques. Drawing on narrative theory and using examples from institutions involved in constructing this type of knowledge, this article argues that attempts to discredit such efforts by questioning the ‘accuracy’ of individual translations miss the point. What is needed, instead, is a more nuanced understanding of the subtle devices used to generate dehumanising narratives of Arabs and Muslims through carefully planned and generously funded programmes of translation.

Keywords: translation; narrative; Arab; Muslim; MEMRI

Introduction

The narratives we elaborate about any aspect of the world through translation do not have to be linguistically ‘inaccurate’ in relation to their source to mystify and mislead. Because translation is a textual activity that is closely scrutinised and generally treated with suspicion, undermining a narrative elaborated in any given source text does not necessarily mean direct intervention in the text itself. More can often be achieved by intervening in the space around the text (footnotes, prefaces, addition of visual material) and by the very selection of texts to be translated. This is particularly the case in politically sensitive contexts, where translators and/or those who commission them are aware that other advocacy groups working on the same or similar issues are likely to have access to the source texts and to scrutinise the translations they produce carefully. Maintaining close semantic resemblance to the source text, or those stretches of it that are translated and made available in another language, allows those who produce the translations to claim that they are objective, non-partisan and a trustworthy source of information. Thus, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), one of the major providers of such ‘accurate’ translations, can safely claim in its ‘About Us’ page¹ not only that it is ‘non-partisan’ but that its

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heavily funded translation programme merely ‘bridges the gap that exists between the West and the Middle East’.

This is not to say that examples of blatant mistranslations do not exist, or that they are not contested, nor that the organisations involved in demonising various groups and regions as terrorist are not occasionally tempted to throw caution to the wind to hit the headlines with highly effective sound bites, such as ‘wipe Israel off the map’. Indeed, the translation of this particular sound bite from Persian has been widely contested (see, e.g. Steele 2006, Norouzi 2007) – though the phrase continues to have considerable currency and to be flagged every time the subject of Iran and terrorism comes up. Similarly, a video clip from The Pioneers of Tomorrow, a children’s programme aired on Hamas TV in April 2007, is often cited as evidence of Palestinian antisemitism and Hamas’s attempt to recruit even children to its terrorist agenda. The clip, subtitled and widely circulated by MEMRI, showed a young girl, Sanabel, in conversation with another young girl, Saraa, and a Mickey Mouse character called Farfour. Various mistranslations, as indicated in the following stretch, were discussed at the time by Whitaker (2007), among others. I have added a close gloss in square brackets where relevant to highlight the gap between what Sanabel can be heard to say in Arabic and MEMRI’s subtitles in English.

**Host Saraa, a young girl:** ‘Sanabel, what will you do for the sake of the Al-Aqsa Mosque? How will you sacrifice your soul for the sake of Al-Aqsa? What will you do?’

**Sanabel, young girl on phone:** ‘I will shoot.’ [I’m going to draw a picture.]

**Farfour, a Mickey Mouse character in a tuxedo:** ‘Sanabel, what should we do if we want to liberate...’

**Sanabel:** ‘We want to fight.’ [We want to resist.]

**Farfour:** ‘We got that. What else?’

**Saraa:** ‘We want to...’

**Sanabel:** ‘We will annihilate the Jews.’ [The Jews are shooting us.]

**Saraa:** ‘We are defending Al-Aqsa with our souls and our blood, aren’t we, Sanabel?’

**Sanabel:** ‘I will commit martyrdom.’ [I will become a martyr.]

This translation by MEMRI was contested even by the CNN Arabic desk, who advised talk show host and commentator, Glenn Beck, not to air it. Rather than listen to his own staff translators, Beck decided to invite the Director of MEMRI, Yigal Carmon, to his programme to respond to their charges of mistranslation. Carmon’s response to their criticism of one instance of mistranslation is worth quoting, as it provides an insight into how far an organisation might go to protect its credibility when that credibility rests on the question of accuracy in translation. In the following extract, the Octavia Carmon refers to is Octavia Nasr, a member of staff in the CNN Arabic Department:

She said the sentence where it says... ‘We are going to ... we will annihilate the Jews’, she said: ‘Well, our translators hear something else. They hear “The Jews are shooting at us”.’

I said to her: ‘You know, Octavia, the order of the words as you put it is upside down. You can’t even get the order of the words right. Even someone who doesn’t know Arabic would listen to the tape and would hear the word “Jews” is at the end, and also it means it is something to be done to the Jews, not by the Jews.’

And she insisted, no the word is in the beginning. I said: ‘Octavia, you just don’t get it. It is at the end’... She didn’t know one from two, I mean.

As Whitaker (2007) rightly points out, Carmon does not just challenge the expertise of the CNN Arabic department here but also ignores what all Arabic grammars have to say on the structure of Arabic and the mobility of the object in Arabic syntax.
Instances of such blatant mistranslations aside, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that organisations such as MEMRI are generally very careful about the ‘accuracy’ of their translations and invest heavily in elaborating an image of themselves as non-partisan, trustworthy and highly qualified to comment on and explain issues relating to terrorism and security. MEMRI’s own name signals this very clearly: it calls itself a Research Institute, rather than an advocacy, interest or pressure group, for instance. Repeated challenges to the accuracy of its translations would undermine this image.

MEMRI is not the only organisation that promotes the terrorism and security agenda through translation, but it is by far the largest, most heavily funded and most influential with politicians and the media, especially in the United States. Other organisations engaged in similar programmes, though on a relatively smaller scale, include Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), Middle East Strategic Information (MESI) and The Medialine. I focus largely on MEMRI in the rest of this article and begin by outlining a theoretical framework that should allow us to look beyond the accuracy of individual translations to reach a better understanding of how MEMRI’s entire translation programme participates in constructing Arab and Muslim communities as terrorist and extremist. Following Pappe (2009, p. 128), my interest is in the use of ‘terror’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ as ‘negative nouns and adjectives which intuitively and politically exclude those described in such a way from a legitimate role in the normative and conventional world’.

**Narrative theory**

The model of analysis adopted here, and which makes it possible to demonstrate how narratives elaborated about Arab and Muslim communities through translation do not have to be ‘linguistically inaccurate’ to be misleading, is elaborated in greater detail in Baker (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) and elsewhere. Rather than limiting itself to the local analysis of linguistic or visual material and linking these to the broad notion of ‘discourse’ as ‘social practice determined by social structures’ (Fairclough 1989/2001, p. 14) or as ‘social construction of reality, a form of knowledge’ (Fairclough 1995, p. 18), narrative theory assumes that the unit of analysis is ultimately an entire narrative, understood as a concrete story of some aspect of the world, complete with characters, settings, outcomes or projected outcomes and plot. A model of analysis based on this theoretical framework makes it possible to investigate the elaboration of a given narrative in an individual text or event as well as across several texts and events, and across different media. Using ‘narrative’ as the unit of analysis, and proceeding on the basis that local narratives, those elaborated in a specific text or event, have porous boundaries and are ultimately embedded in and contribute to the elaboration of larger narratives, provides precisely the kind of interface that is necessary to move us beyond the unproductive and widespread tendency to compare original and translated texts stretch by stretch and settle for making statements about their relative accuracy or inaccuracy at a semantic level.

A focus on narrative also allows us to move beyond the longstanding preoccupation in translation studies with examining regular patterns of abstract choices, in the tradition of norm theory (Toury 1995). Scholars of translation typically examine norms of translational behaviour by studying a collection of authentic translations (say, Arabic translations of English detective fiction during the 1990s) and identifying repeated choices, including types of strategy that are typically opted for by the translators represented in that collection, such as how they might deal with culture-specific references and whether or not they break down long sentences into shorter ones. One of the most influential approaches to the study of translation since the 1980s, norm theory arguably privileges behaviour that displays strong
patterns of socialisation and tends to gloss over the numerous individual and group attempts at undermining dominant patterns and prevailing political and social dogma (Baker 2007). By contrast, a focus on the narratives being elaborated within and across texts allows us to engage with the potential motives for both repeated and individual (one-off) choices, and encourages us to look beyond the text into the political and social context of interaction.

Another popular type of theorisation that the notion of narrative allows us to move beyond involves describing and assessing translations with reference to a dichotomy or taxonomy of strategies, with or without elaborating the ethical implications of using such strategies. Perhaps the best known and most nuanced dichotomy to emerge in recent years is Lawrence Venuti’s distinction between foreignising and domesticating strategies (Venuti 1993, 1995). Despite its appeal, Venuti’s dichotomy has also been widely critiqued from a range of perspectives (Tymoczko 2000, Gentzler 2002, Shamma 2005, 2009). In the context of this study, its main weakness lies in the fact that, like all dichotomies, it is ultimately reductive. More specifically, classifying translations as ‘foreignising’ or ‘domesticating’ has the effect of obscuring the intricate way in which translators shift positions within the same text as they negotiate their way around various priorities and challenges (Baker 2007). Analysis of authentic translations often reveals that translators can oscillate within the same text between choices that Venuti would regard as domesticating and ones he would regard as foreignising. And, importantly, this oscillation serves a purpose in the real world – it is neither random nor irrational.

Types of narrative
Narratives are the stories we tell ourselves and others about the world(s) in which we live. These stories provide our main interface with the world. The strand of narrative theory adopted in this article distinguishes between four types of narrative: personal, public, disciplinary and meta-narrative (Baker 2006).

Personal narratives, as the term suggests, are narratives of individuals, who are normally located at the centre of narration; in other words, the individual is the subject of the narrative. They include the ephemeral narratives we exchange with family and colleagues when they ask us what we did or how we felt on a particular occasion, the narratives we tell ourselves and others about who we are and how we relate to the world around us and the narratives of public figures such as Nelson Mandela, Edward Said or Ilan Pappe, whose lives attract wider interest. Biographies, including autobiographies, are all personal narratives in this sense.

Public narratives, by contrast, are elaborated by and circulate among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or educational institution, a political or activist group, the media, the nation and larger entities. The narratives elaborated by MEMRI and similar groups are all public in this sense.

There is a certain overlap between personal and public narratives – and indeed among all types of narrative. The narrative of Edward Said is both personal and public: personal because it is about a specific individual and public because it is shared and elaborated by many groups and individuals. At the same time, no personal narrative can be elaborated merely by the individual at the centre of the narrative: our own narrative is not entirely our own because others participate in elaborating it, and the way they story us inevitably becomes part of that narrative.

Personal and public narratives are highly interdependent in another sense: individuals cannot narrate themselves in a vacuum but must draw on public narratives to develop and legitimise their sense of self, and public narratives can only persist and gain legitimacy if
enough individuals are willing to subscribe to them and narrate themselves in line with the values and beliefs they embody. Moreover, just as dominant public narratives – for example, those that currently depict British Muslims as the enemy within, a threat to ‘our’ way of life – can constrain and frustrate individuals’ sense of self, personal narratives can be woven into public narratives to generate a range of effects, including empathy, and to strengthen stereotypes of a given community. The following extract from an email circular distributed by the activist group CODEPINK on 19 February 2010 and signed by Gayle Brandeis provides a good example of the way in which a personal narrative can be evoked to generate empathy and lend potency to a public narrative (emphasis in original):

As I write this, my three month old baby has pneumonia. He is doing quite well, given the circumstances, but it breaks my heart to see him suffer in any way. My mother took her own life a week after the baby was born, so I feel especially vulnerable right now, especially attuned to potential loss. In this raw, open state, the latest news from Afghanistan hits hard.

Last weekend, twelve members of one Afghan family – including six children – were killed during NATO’s Afghanistan offensive in Marjah. As I grapple with the grief over my mom’s death, as well as worry over my sick baby, I can’t begin to comprehend the grief of those affected by this massive loss. NATO Commander, US General Stanley McChrystal has apologized to President Karzai, but how can his words be anything but cold and empty to those left behind?

Hijazi Al-Sharif (2009) provides an example of the way a personal narrative can be used to strengthen stereotypes. She examines a number of MEMRI despatches that focus on Hanadi Jaradat, a young Palestinian lawyer who blew herself up in October 2003 at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa. Her analysis demonstrates how important episodes of a personal narrative elaborated by a powerful institution can be suppressed to bolster a broader public narrative, in this case that of Palestinians being prone to violence because Islam teaches them to seek martyrdom, implying that the conflict is motivated by religious beliefs rather than political grievances. MEMRI’s elaboration of this personal narrative, Hijazi Al-Sharif argues, strips Jaradat of her humanity and portrays her as sheer evil, in part by failing to mention that her actions were motivated by a range of events that left her traumatised, including the murder of her brother and fiancé by Israeli soldiers.

Disciplinary narratives have at their centre the object of enquiry in a scholarly field: this journal engages in elaborating a range of disciplinary narratives about terrorism, just as medical scholars elaborate narratives about the human body and translation scholars elaborate narratives about various forms of interlingual mediation. The boundaries between disciplinary and public narratives, like those between personal and public narratives, are porous. Many disciplinary narratives come to exercise considerable influence on public life and may form part of the narrative world of lay members of society. The theory of evolution is a good example, as are the various narratives of climate change that permeate our lives today.

Finally, meta-narratives are particularly potent public narratives that persist over long periods of time and influence the lives of people across a wide range of settings. The boundary between public and meta-narratives is particularly difficult to draw, but good candidates for meta-narratives include the Cold War and the various religious narratives of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, given their temporal and spatial reach. The narrative of the so-called War on Terror, like that of the Cold War, may remain potent for a relatively short period of time, compared to Islam for instance, but its impact on the daily lives of people across the world lends it the kind of power and sense of inescapability that justifies its treatment as a meta-narrative. Ultimately, narrative theory acknowledges that where
we choose to draw any boundaries, including boundaries between theoretical categories, is part of the narrative world we are constantly engaged in constructing for ourselves and others.

**How narratives are constructed and framed**

Narrative theory assumes that to elaborate a coherent narrative, it is inevitable that some elements of experience are excluded and others privileged. All narratives are thus constructed according to evaluative criteria that enable and guide *selective appropriation* of a set of events or elements from the vast array of open-ended and overlapping events that constitute experience. The notion of selective appropriation also covers ways of identifying protagonists rather than just the foregrounding of events or parts of events. Thus, for example, a recent study of British media found that ‘Muslims are often identified simply as Muslims . . . are much less likely than non-Muslims to be identified in terms of their job or profession, and much more likely to be unnamed or unidentified’ (Moore *et al.* 2008, p. 4).

The selective foregrounding and backgrounding of individuals, groups and features attributed to them is part of the elaboration of characters that play particular roles in a larger narrative under construction. Selective appropriation is particularly important in this study, where the choice of whose voice, which texts and which extracts from these texts are translated and made to ‘represent’ the values and ethos of the communities in question, is as important as the accuracy with which the selections are rendered into English and other languages.

Narratives also have distinct patterns of *causal emplotment*. Causal emplotment gives significance to independent instances; it is only when events are emplotted that they take on narrative meaning. Emplotment thus ‘allows us to weight and explain events rather than just list them, to turn a set of propositions into an intelligible sequence about which we can form an opinion’ (Baker 2006, p. 67). An interesting pattern of causal emplotment generated by narratives circulated in British media in recent years is reported by the Glasgow Media Group (Philo and Berry 2004), who interviewed a large sample of 800 British adults in connection with the Palestine/Israel conflict and found, among other things, that ‘viewers who were informed by the TV news and had apparently no great interest in the area were more likely to believe that the casualties were about equal or that most had been sustained by Israel’ (Philo and Berry 2004, p. 236; emphasis added). These deductions were derived from the way in which individual episodes of the conflict were narrated in the news, including the extent of coverage of casualties on either side. Together, rather than separately, these individual narratives of events construct a pattern of causal emplotment associated with the Palestine/Israel conflict that is quite familiar to viewers (and readers) of North American and European media.

Narratives are characterised by their *temporality*, meaning that they are embedded in time and space and derive much of their meaning from the temporal moment and physical site of the narration. The now familiar narrative of sectarianism, which depicts Muslims as belonging to one of two warring sects (Shi’a or Sunni) that are unable to live together in peace, is a product of recent wars and invasions that have swept over the Muslim part of the Middle East, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Packer’s research attests to this: based on extensive fieldwork that involved interviewing Iraqi translators and interpreters working for the US military in Iraq, he asserts that ‘[a]lmost no Iraqi claimed to have anticipated . . . the terrifying question “Are you Sunni or Shia?” ’ before the invasion (Packer 2007). In this new narrative environment, individual incidents that might have been explained 10 or 20 years earlier merely as disagreements between neighbours or instances of personal revenge are now routinely interpreted as evidence of growing sectarian...
tension. Another facet of temporality concerns the temporal and spatial ordering of the elements that constitute the narrative. Events are rarely recounted in the order in which they took place, especially in the media, and the way in which time, sequence and spatial setting are used to construct a narrative is therefore meaningful in its own right.

Finally, relationality, another characteristic of narrative, means that individual events (and elements within an event) cannot make sense on their own but only insofar as they constitute elements of an overall narrative. Thus, for example, the concept of martyrdom takes on a very different meaning and value depending on whether it forms part of a contemporary narrative of Islamic ‘Jihad’ or a narrative of the persecution of Christians in the first century. As this example demonstrates, meanings and values vary considerably depending on the temporal and spatial context of narration.

The concept of ‘frame’ overlaps with but is sufficiently distinct from that of narrative to be helpful as a complementary tool of analysis – specifically in terms of demonstrating how the ‘same’ narrative can be framed in very different ways by different narrators. Just as the frame that surrounds a photograph or painting can influence the way we experience it but remains subsidiary to it, the notion of frame is subsidiary to that of narrative. But frames also double up as narratives in their own right; we might think of the interaction between frames and narratives in terms of a set of nested or recursive relations. Thus, for example, the cover image of one English edition of Samuel Huntington’s (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations* shows the title in yellow against a black background, with a cross (symbolising Christianity) at the top, a crescent (symbolising Islam) at the bottom, both in grey and a red star separating the first part of the title (*The Clash of Civilizations*) from the rest (*and the Remaking of World Order*). The most obvious interpretation of the red star is as a symbol of communism, especially given that the cover also features the following quote from Henry Kissinger at the bottom, printed in the same red as the star: ‘One of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the Cold War.’ The colour red also symbolises danger. The cover functions as a frame in that it anticipates and anchors our interpretation of the narrative elaborated in the book, namely, that Islam has replaced communism as the new threat against Western democracies. At the same time, it can be read as a narrative in its own right, a compact version of the narrative elaborated in the main text (Baker 2008).

Drawing on both concepts, ‘narrative’ and ‘framing’, I offer below an analysis of a range of data connected with the ‘industry’ of constructing knowledge about Arab and Muslim communities through translation. As the analyses will attempt to demonstrate, one of the strengths of narrative theory lies in the fact that it does not encourage us to treat any specific translational choice as random, with no implications in the real world. Nor does it encourage us to treat a given choice (such as *Jihad* vs. ‘Holy War’) as a realisation of some broad, abstract norm linked to other abstract choices such as favouring loan words or choosing to stay close to the syntactic structures of the source text. What narrative theory requires us to do instead is to think of individual choices as part of a larger mosaic that is embedded in and contributes to the elaboration of concrete political reality.

**MEMRI’s renarration of Arab and Muslim communities**

MEMRI is a strongly pro-Israel advocacy group established in February 1998 by Col. Yigal Carmon, a former member of the Israeli intelligence service (Whitaker 2002). It elaborates a public narrative of itself as ‘independent’ and ‘non-partisan’ and repeatedly taps into the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ by claiming to be a major player in the fight against terrorism. For example, a newly added section to its website, entitled ‘E-Tributes’,
offers its supporters an opportunity to donate a sum of money and send an e-card to their family and friends to inform them of this donation. The header for this page reads as follows:

For 10 years MEMRI has been committed to bringing reformists in the Arab and Muslim world to the attention of the West, exposing antisemitism in the Arab and Muslim media, researching Islamist ideology and Islamist organizations that threaten the West, and promoting a greater understanding and awareness of the Middle East media and assist [sic] those who are fighting the War on Terror.

The header of another section of the site, entitled ‘Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor’, reinforces the same message:

MEMRI’s Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) scrutinizes Islamist terrorism worldwide, with a special focus on the Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. By monitoring strategic, tactical, ideological, military, and conventional and non-conventional threats to public safety and security, both imminent and potential, and to crucial interests and assets of states targeted by terrorism, it enables those under threat to effectively address and confront these threats.

MEMRI also taps into the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ by aligning itself with many of its architects and with staunch advocates of the so-called fight against terrorism. Its Board of Directors includes Elliott Abrams, former Special Assistant to George W. Bush, and Oliver Revell, former member of the Senior Review Group of the Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism; its Board of Advisors includes James Woolsey, John Bolton, John Ashcroft, Ehud Barak and Jose Maria Aznar, Former Prime Minister of Spain.

MEMRI’s ‘About Us’ page, which has been revised a number of times over the years, offers more interesting insights into the nature of the narratives it promotes and some of the ways in which it uses translation to construct these narratives. At the time of writing, the page outlines MEMRI’s aims and activities as follows (emphasis added):

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region’s media (both print and television), websites, religious sermons and school books. MEMRI bridges the language gap which exists between the West and the Middle East, providing timely translations of Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Hindi, and Turkish media, as well as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East.

Founded in February 1998 to inform the debate over U.S. policy in the Middle East, MEMRI is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)3 organization. MEMRI’s headquarters are in Washington, DC, with branch offices in London, Rome, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Shanghai and Tokyo. MEMRI research and translations appear in several languages – English, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Polish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Hebrew.

It is worth noting that in the current as well as older versions of its ‘About Us’ page, MEMRI maintains offices in various parts of the world, including Jerusalem, but surprisingly none in the regions from which it collects material to be translated (Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan). The only exception – and a recent addition (c. 2008) – is Baghdad, the capital of a country that remains under US occupation. More importantly, the source languages associated with the ‘Middle East’ and targeted by MEMRI are Arabic, Persian (MEMRI has now reverted to referring to this as Farsi), Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Hindi and Turkish. Hebrew, another language spoken in the Middle East, is currently not included as a source language. However, one of the earlier versions of MEMRI’s ‘About Us’ page, discussed in Baker (2006, p. 74), listed Turkish as a target rather than a source.
language and Hebrew (but not Arabic or Persian/Farsi) in both categories (emphasis added):

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region’s media. MEMRI bridges the language gap which exists between the West and the Middle East, providing timely translations of Arabic, Farsi, and Hebrew media, as well as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East.

Founded in February 1998 to inform the debate over U.S. policy in the Middle East, MEMRI is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501 (c)3 organization. MEMRI’s headquarters is located in Washington, DC with branch offices in Berlin, London, and Jerusalem, where MEMRI also maintains its Media Center. MEMRI research is translated to English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish, and Russian.

A later version of the same page (c. 2006) listed Arabic, Persian and Turkish as source languages and English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish and Japanese as target languages. Japanese appeared as a target language at that stage; Russian disappeared from the list but was introduced again as a target language, together with Chinese, in March 2007. Table 1 summarises the highlights of MEMRI’s evolving public narrative of terrorism and security as expressed through the choice of source and target languages of translation. These choices reflect one aspect of the patterns of selective appropriation and causal emplotment that characterise the overall public narrative of terrorism and security as elaborated by MEMRI: which languages are chosen, and whether they are assigned to the source or target category, has implications for the way we understand the relationship between the protagonists represented by these languages.

The pattern of selective appropriation evident in the choice of source and target languages of translation here (not to mention the location of offices) constructs a narrative that divides the world into two camps: those who represent a threat to progressive, democratic societies, and who therefore have to be monitored very closely (through translation), and those who bear the burden of monitoring these sources of security threat to protect the innocent, democratic, civilised Western world against terrorist activities. The source languages index those societies that are depicted as sources of threat in this narrative; the target languages index those that must police the world and fight terrorism. This in turn activates a specific pattern of causal emplotment that characterises MEMRI’s overall narrative. The source language group, which represents protagonists who pose a threat to the free world, is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source languages (to be monitored)</th>
<th>Target languages (to undertake the monitoring)</th>
<th>Approximate date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew</td>
<td>Into English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish, Russian</td>
<td>c. 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Arabic, Persian, Turkish</td>
<td>Into English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Japanese</td>
<td>c. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Pashtu</td>
<td>Into English, German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese</td>
<td>c. March 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Hindi, Turkish</td>
<td>Into English, Chinese, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Russian, Polish and Spanish</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. MEMRI’s evolving narrative of terrorism and security (four versions of ‘About Us’).
emplotted as aggressor, and the target language group, which represents protagonists who are under threat from the first group, is emplotted as victim. The implication is that in invading countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan, or bombing Lebanon or Gaza, the victims are merely responding to the aggression being visited on them. The blame lies fairly and squarely with the source language group. These are the people who initiate violence, the ones we should condemn.

Relationality, a feature inherent in all narratives, is also at work here. Each language accurs a specific value by virtue of its positioning within the narrative. Any change in position in this narrative, from target to source language, signals a change, or an attempt to effect change, in political reality. Turkey was constructed at an earlier time (when it appeared as a target language) as part of the democratic, civilised world entrusted with monitoring the sources of security threat. It has now been moved to the source language camp, perhaps because it is less sympathetic to the United States and Israel than it once was. Hebrew’s brief inclusion as a source language in the early stages may have been intended to signal ‘balance’ of coverage and mask MEMRI’s pro-Israel agenda, but the fact that it is the only language to have ever appeared in both categories (source and target) raises questions about the nature of the narrative being constructed from the very start. Its inclusion as both source and target language, and the exclusion of other source languages from the target group, suggests that speakers of these other source languages do not need to be informed of what goes on elsewhere. Unlike speakers of Hebrew, they simply need to be monitored.

As can be seen from its own description of its activities, MEMRI’s highly successful attempt to narrate Arab and Muslim countries as the major culprits in the ‘War on Terror’ meta-narrative relies primarily on translation. MEMRI’s founder, Yigal Carmon, made the point clearly in an online debate with Brian Whitaker in January 2003: ‘[m]onitoring the Arab media is far too much for one person to handle’, he explained, ‘We have a team of 20 translators doing it.’ These translators locate material from primarily Arab and Iranian sources – newspapers, TV programmes, political speeches, sermons delivered in mosques and school textbooks – and translate it into whatever set of target languages MEMRI chooses to depict as the guardians of the free world at any point in time. The translations are then posted on MEMRI’s website. Individuals and institutions anywhere in the world can subscribe, largely free of charge, to receive this material regularly in one of MEMRI’s target languages. More importantly, MEMRI sends unsolicited translations of selected material to members of the US Congress and journalists in various parts of the world completely free of charge. Brian Whitaker first alerted British readers of The Guardian newspaper to MEMRI’s generous contributions to the media in 2002:

For some time now, I have been receiving small gifts from a generous institute in the United States. The gifts are high-quality translations of articles from Arabic newspapers which the institute sends to me by email every few days, entirely free-of-charge. . . . The emails also go to politicians and academics, as well as to lots of other journalists. The stories they contain are usually interesting. . . . Whenever I get an email from the institute, several of my Guardian colleagues receive one too and regularly forward their copies to me – sometimes with a note suggesting that I might like to check out the story and write about it.

The stories that MEMRI selects for translation, Whitaker further argues, ‘follow a familiar pattern: either they reflect badly on the character of Arabs or they in some way further the political agenda of Israel’ (Whitaker 2002). Harris (2003) acknowledges the same pattern of selective appropriation, noting that ‘MEMRI engages in the practice of publishing selective and decontextualized excerpts of the Arabic press in ways that can present opponents of [Israel’s] occupation as religious extremists or anti-Semites.’
of London, Ken Livingstone, describes MEMRI as a ‘very well-funded’ organisation ‘which specialises in finding quotes from Arab media for circulation in the West. The translation and selection of quotes tend to portray Islam in a very negative light’ (Livingstone 2005, p. 4).

MEMRI’s influence, particularly on politicians and the media, is widely acknowledged. Thomas Friedman, the well-known columnist with the New York Times, frequently cites MEMRI as his source of information (see, e.g. Friedman 2005, 2006). MEMRI’s translations even constituted the main source of ‘evidence’ in a dossier submitted to London’s Metropolitan Police in 2004 calling for the expulsion of Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi from Britain (Baker 2006, p. 75). Dr. al-Qaradawi, a well-known Muslim scholar, had been invited at the time to speak at an interfaith conference organised by the Mayor of London. The controversy was widely debated in the British press, and according to the BBC News (7 July 2004), the Muslim Council of Britain consequently ‘accused sections of the media of conducting a “character assassination” campaign against Dr Al-Qaradawi’.

The press reports on MEMRI’s work, proudly quoted by MEMRI on its site in the past, confirm Whitaker’s, Harris’s and Livingstone’s analysis of the type of narrative that MEMRI’s translations seek to promote through careful selective appropriation:

‘MEMRI, the indispensable group that translates the ravings of the Saudi and Egyptian press . . .’
Weekly Standard, 28 April 2003

‘I am full of admiration for the work MEMRI has done . . . in its dedicated exposure of Arab antisemitism. Until MEMRI undertook its effort to review and translate articles from the Arab press, there was only dim public awareness of this problem in the United States. Thanks to MEMRI, this ugly phenomenon has been unmasked, and numerous American writers have called attention to it.’ US Rep. Tom Lantos, 1 May 2002

‘www.memri.org – What they do is very simple, no commentary nothing else. What they do is they just translate what the Saudis say in the mosques, say in their newspapers, say in government pronouncements, say in their press.’ 1 October 2002, BBC

As noted at the beginning of this article, MEMRI is very careful about the accuracy of its translations, because its credibility can easily be undermined if its opponents were to identify and publicise a list of errors in these translations, whether the errors in question are presented as deliberate or not. Rather than manipulate specific stretches of the text in translation, then, it relies much more heavily on exploiting the narrative feature of selective appropriation, choosing to translate the worst possible examples of Arab, Iranian and Muslim discourse. This serves to activate a pattern of causal emplotment that features Arabs and Muslims as extremist and threatening, and hence culpable for the violence witnessed in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Guantanamo and elsewhere.

MEMRI further strengthens this public narrative by grouping its translations under damning headings. The headings, which act as powerful frames that signal the culpability of the protagonists it depicts as sources of threat, include ‘Antisemitism Documentation Project’, ‘Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project’ and ‘Islamist Websites Monitor Project’. These and similar categories structure the massive archive of translations available on the site. Their choice and arrangement, like the choice of source and target languages, establish a pattern of relationality in which disparate elements such as Islam, terrorism and antisemitism (the latter a phenomenon traditionally associated with Europe rather than the Muslim World) come to be depicted as closely connected and best understood as aspects of the same phenomenon. Other headings such as ‘U.S. and the Middle East’ and ‘Arab-Israeli Conflict’ subtly align Israel with the United States, placing the rest of the Middle
East, including Arab countries, in the opposite camp. One section is entitled ‘Reform in the Arab and Muslim World’, but there are no sections entitled ‘Reform in Israel’ or ‘Reform in the US’, suggesting again – in terms of causal emplotment – that the fault lies with Arab and Muslim countries. Under this heading, MEMRI features translations of texts written by what it designates as ‘reformist’ writers: a few voices from Arab and Muslim countries who argue for freedom of thought, women’s rights and similar causes. The occasional ‘cosmetic’ selection of a non-extremist source serves to give a veneer of balance to MEMRI’s coverage, at the same time as reinforcing the overall portrayal of Arab and Muslim countries as a hotbed of extremism that suppresses the very few sane voices in the region, voices that are now magnanimously being given space on an American site with strong Israeli connections.

A brief glance at the content of one of these sections, the ‘Antisemitism Documentation Project’, offers further insight into some of the ways in which MEMRI constructs its public narratives of Arab and Muslim communities. The header to this section reads as follows (emphasis added):

This section of MEMRI’s website documents Arabic newspaper reports, editorials, and other media sources which are primarily based upon antisemitic themes. During recent years, Arab antisemitism has become a main catalyst of antisemitic incidents throughout the world.

And yet, this page regularly features translations of material from non-Arab sources, especially Iranian newspapers and TV. The following are examples of some of the titles/links to translations that featured in this section of the site on 20 October 2009 (the non-Arab source is highlighted in bold in each case):

Special Dispatch – No. 2108 – Antisemitism Documentation Project – November 9, 2008
Director of Iranian TV Series ‘Secret of Armageddon’ Comments on MEMRI TV’s Translation of Series; Confirms ‘Protocols of Elders of Zion’; Claims ‘Discovery of America by Columbus was Made Possible by Money of Jewish Aristocrats’ – Who Thought America Was Promised Land

Special Dispatch – No. 2095 – Antisemitism Documentation Project – October 27, 2008
Iranian News Channel IRINN Reports on Newly Published Iranian Book On ‘The Great Distortion Of The Historical Event Called The Holocaust, Using The Art Of Satire’

“The Secret of Armageddon” – Iranian TV Series Affirms Protocols of Elders of Zion, Promotes Conspiracy Theories, Claims Jews Are Planning “the Genocide of Humanity” and Iranian Jewish, Baha’i Communities are Plotting to Take Over Iran

In Friday Sermons Across Pakistan, Islamic Clerics Accuse Jewish-Qadiani Nexus of Conspiring Against Islam. By Tufail Ahmad

Special Dispatch – No. 1748 – Antisemitism Documentation Project – October 25, 2007
Iranian President Ahmadinejad Reiterates Proposal for ‘Zionist State’ in Canada or Alaska, Suggests International Committee of ‘Truth-Seekers’ Examine Holocaust, 9/11

What is interesting here is the disconnect between the header to this section, which specifically speaks of ‘Arab antisemitism’, and the sources of many of the items that are routinely included in it. This disconnect reveals MEMRI’s ongoing attempt to blur the distinction between Arab countries and Iran – just as it routinely blurs the distinction between ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ – where it suits it to project the entire region as teaming with Muslim fanatics and to associate Islam per se with terrorism.
This blurring of distinctions between Arabs and Iranians, between Arabic and Persian and between the categories of ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ throughout MEMRI’s output feeds into one of the larger public narratives it painstakingly elaborates in its translations, commentary and the frames it sets up around its various ‘dispatches’. This narrative depicts the conflict in Palestine/Israel as ultimately a religious conflict between Jews and Muslims, rather than a political conflict over territory and resources. Attributing antisemitism to Arabs and Muslims and depicting what it calls Arab antisemitism as ‘a main catalyst of antisemitic incidents throughout the world’ also feeds into this larger narrative of a ‘religious war’, one fuelled by an irrational hatred of Jews rather than resistance to a Zionist colonialist agenda that deliberately collapses the distinction between ‘Jew’ and ‘Israeli’.

The title of one of the items listed under the ‘Antisemitism Documentation Project’ on the same day reads as follows:

*Special Dispatch – No. 2014 – Antisemitism Documentation Project – August 5, 2008*

Members of the Egyptian Unique Moustache Association: We Respect the Moustache of Hitler Because He Humiliated the World’s Most Despicable Sect

The choice of source here – the Egyptian Unique Moustache Association – is highly amusing and betrays the length to which MEMRI is prepared to go to dig up material that can be used in demonising Arab and Muslim communities. Acknowledging that all stories are selective representations of reality, Bennett and Edelman (1985, p. 164) explain that ‘[t]he issue with selectivity is whether a representation funnels emerging reality back into stereotypical terms, or whether it introduces new information in terms of unfamiliar dilemmas, puzzles, and contradictions of the sort that promote critical thought and a self-consciousness of problem-solving behavior’. They further argue that ‘[m]ost stock political formulas drive out the stuff of critical thought and action and replace it with self-fulfilling ideas and habituated action imperatives’ (Bennett and Edelman, 1985, p. 164). This is certainly true of MEMRI’s deliberate selection of material that portrays Arabs and Muslims as extremist, antisemitic and a threat to Western democracies.

Deliberate selective appropriation is a feature that both sides to a conflict can exploit more or less effectively, depending largely on the resources they have available at their disposal. In his *Guardian* article, Brian Whitaker (2002) proposed that Arabs should also use translation to fight back against demonisation programmes of this type:

As far as relations between the west and the Arab world are concerned, language is a barrier that perpetuates ignorance and can easily foster misunderstanding. . . . All it takes is a small but active group of Israelis to exploit that barrier for their own ends and start changing western perceptions of Arabs for the worse . . . It is not difficult to see what Arabs might do to counter that. A group of Arab media companies could get together and publish translations of articles that more accurately reflect the content of their newspapers.

A year or so later, an organisation called Arabs Against Discrimination (AAD) was set up, almost as a direct response to Whitaker’s suggestion. The web site of this organisation no longer seems accessible, but while it lasted it too relied very heavily on translation to promote a counter-narrative of what its members believed Arabs stand for and to expose patterns of racism and discrimination in Israeli society. Without mentioning MEMRI explicitly, their ‘About Us’ page referred to ‘facing up to the campaigns organised by Israeli and Zionist organisations which, through the translation and distribution of Arabic media materials, try to create an impression of rampant anti-Semitism in the Arab world’. Its aims, it declared, were ‘to promote and foster the values and traditions of tolerance,
acceptance and respect for otherness, and coexistence between different cultures, religions, civilisations and peoples. Such values are integral to Arab culture throughout its history. Sadly, AAD does not seem to have had sufficient resources and support to continue its mission.

**Narrative features and framing devices**

Advocacy groups as well as individual translators and interpreters can exploit features of narrativity (temporality, relationality, selective appropriation and causal emplotment) to frame or reframe a text or utterance for a set of addressees. But effective narratives also rely on subtle processes of (re)framing which can draw on practically any linguistic or non-linguistic resource to set up an interpretive context for the reader or hearer. This may include exploiting paralinguistic devices such as intonation and typography, visual resources such as colour, image and layout and linguistic devices such as tense shifts, deixis, code switching and the use of euphemisms. Translators of written text can employ such devices in the body of the translation or, alternatively, around the translation. This distinction can be very important because of the key role that the notions of accuracy and faithfulness tend to assume in the context of professional – and particularly politically sensitive – translation, as is the case here. Below are a few examples of such devices as used by neo-conservative organisations that produce knowledge about Arab and Muslim communities.

First, while keeping the actual translation very close to the original, MEMRI and other groups such as PMW and MESI often add their own titles to translations to frame the narrative as extremist or threatening. Examples of titles that some of these groups add to their translations and ‘reports’ (the latter often consisting of very carefully selected extracts translated from longer texts in Arabic, Persian and other source languages) include the following:

- *Koran Commentary for Children Published in Egypt Features Incitement to Fight Christians and Jews*¹⁴ (MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1744)
- *Egyptian Government Preacher Incites Children to Martyrdom*¹⁵ (Title of MEMRI’s Special Dispatch No. 1197)
- *Kids Seek Shahada Martyrdom for Allah. Palestinian children: Martyrdom for Allah is preferable to life and suicide terror is natural*¹⁶ (Title of video subtitled by PMW)
- *Hamas Blood Libel: Jews drink Muslim blood*¹⁷ (Title of PMW report by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook which features subtitled video of Hamas TV skit)
- *The Nexus Between Iranian National Banks and International Terrorist Financing*¹⁸ (Title of report by MESI)
- *Major Anti-semitic Motifs in Arab Cartoons*¹⁹ (Title of report by MESI)

An existing title (in the source text) can also be replaced by one that is simply ‘discursively alien’ in English. For example, an English translation of an article from the Palestinian newspaper *Alhayat Aljadeeda* was posted on the Watching America web site under the title ‘Oh, America . . . Oh, Empire of Contradictions’ (see Baker 2007 for an extended discussion of this example).²⁰ The original Arabic title is far less flowery and ‘exotic’: it reads ‘Signs on the Road: America and Democracy!!!’ Together with other framing devices used in this particular translation, this new title contributes to elaborating a different narrative from that outlined in the original article. For example, the original *Alhayat Aljadeeda* article,²¹ by Yahya Ribah, argues that the United States preaches democracy only when the results promote its own policies in the Middle East, citing its
opposition to the election of Hamas as an example. There is no sense in the original Arabic text of any confusion on the part of the writer or his compatriots. The article is clear in its condemnation of US policy in the region, including its unremitting support for Israel. A summary added by Watching America precedes the translation of the article itself and constrains the reader’s interpretation of it. It reads as follows:

When America urges nations to espouse democracy and democratic elections, what is it really asking for, what is it really saying? According to this op-ed article from Palestine’s Arabic-language Alhayat Aljadeeda, Washington’s reaction to the election of Hamas has left Palestinians, and others, scratching their heads.

Together, the English title and the summary reconfigure the pattern of causal emplotment established in the original by evoking a public narrative that has considerable currency in the United States in particular, namely, that the problem with American policies in the region is not that they are wrong in and of themselves, but that they are not properly explained to the ‘natives’; that American politicians and military personnel are failing to win the hearts and minds of people in part by sending confusing signals to Arabs and Muslims.

In addition to titles and various types of heading, sub-heading and summaries that can be and are used to reframe narratives in translation, images are also often added to serve similar purposes. In the English translation of the Alhayat Aljadeeda article, for example, Watching America inserts its own images (which do not appear in the source text), complete with suitable captions that frame the translated narrative as part of the broad, meta-narrative of the War on Terror. One such image shows Ismail Haniyeh with his hands extended in prayer. The caption above the photo reads: ‘Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh Prays Before a Speech, Most Likely for Funds . . . Most Likely to Come from Iran.’ Another photo shows a fierce-looking man holding a large gun and surrounded by other armed men. The caption below the photo reads: ‘A militant from the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade on the West Bank, During an Event to Remember One of the Many Acts of Violence that Have Taken Place There.’ These photos and the accompanying captions bear no relationship at all to the content of the article or the argument of its author, but they succeed in establishing a narrative framework – and a pattern of relationality – in which what might otherwise be seen as unconnected elements are brought together and made to look like interdependent phenomena: criticism of the United States, Palestinians (particularly Hamas), Islam (evoked through the mention of prayer), Iran as a source of funds for terrorist activities, violent militancy and martyrdom.

And finally, English translations of articles from Arab and Iranian newspapers are often accompanied by a suitably annotated link to a video clip, usually provided by MEMRI, which acts as a further framing device, encouraging the reader to interpret even the most reasonable of Arabic discourse as one that hides an extremist subtext. The article from Alhayat Aljadeeda is accompanied by a video link, also provided and subtitled by MEMRI, with a suitable photo and annotation. The photo shows a Muslim cleric speaking to a crowd, and is preceded by the title: ‘Video from Palestine: Praise for Suicide Bombing at Hamas Fundraiser.’ A translated quote that appears underneath the photo and functions as a hyperlink reads as follows:

‘After efforts, policies, and plans failed, and when people almost despaired, the whole world was surprised by a certain decision of Hamas. What was the decision? An intifada. An Intifada? Where? In Palestine. In Palestine!’
The various elements of the video link thus reinforce the same pattern of relationality as the captions accompanying the photos and the header introducing the translation, and further contribute to establishing a pattern of causal emplotment that depicts Muslims as deranged, violent extremists with no genuine grievances against the United States or the ‘West’ in general. Interestingly, translations from other languages do not receive this treatment: translations from Chinese, Spanish, French, Dutch and a host of other languages are offered on the Watching America site without links to MEMRI videos that serve to demonise the community in question. The only other language that receives this special treatment (or is subjected to this framing strategy), as may be expected, is Persian.

Ultimately, what these examples suggest is that in the context of a violent conflict over territory and resources that is being widely emplotted as a religious war waged by irrational fanatics against innocent and peace-loving nations, it is imperative that we develop a more robust understanding of the processes involved in effecting such representations, as well as resistance to them. These processes rely on extensive acts of translation at almost every point of interaction.

Concluding remarks

Public narratives of terrorism and security now pervade our lives and are elaborated by a range of influential institutions, including some that present themselves as non-partisan and apolitical. These institutions have a vested interest in portraying certain communities as inherently terrorist and extremist and do so largely by making a range of carefully selected translations available to audiences around the world, especially politicians and the media. Narrative theory allows us to make sense of their entire programmes of translation as well as individual choices at text level.

A more important argument that I have tried to elaborate here is that attempts by Arab and pro-Arab activists to challenge neo-conservative organisations such as MEMRI by casting doubt on the accuracy of their translations miss the point. A group called MEMRI Watch, for instance, operated for a short while in 2007 and described itself as ‘a central resource for critiques of MEMRI’ and as ‘a small collective of translators and analysts who are bothered by the output of MEMRI for various reasons’. This group worked hard to ‘highlight instances of mistranslation and doctoring in MEMRI’s translations’, but clearly did not find enough such instances to justify continued engagement. For, as the examples discussed in this article suggest, MEMRI does not have to mistranslate to promote negative perceptions of Arabs and Muslims. The nature of narrativity is such that much more subtle devices can be used to achieve such ends. Activists who wish to challenge the discourse of security and terrorism and promote a more tolerant, more just narrative of the sources of unrest and violence in our world today would do well to look beyond the semantics of discourse and attempt to understand the narrative mechanisms by which neo-conservative organisations continue to manipulate our perception of reality.

Notes

2. The video clip is no longer available on MEMRI’s website or on YouTube. However, MEMRI’s translated transcript can still be accessed here: http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP157707 [Accessed 21 February 2010].
3. I examined the clip carefully when it was available on YouTube. As a native speaker of Arabic, I can attest to the validity of Whitaker’s analysis. See Hijazi Al-Sharif (2009) for further discussion of this translation.
4. In Arabic, a *shaheed* (martyr) is anyone killed in a conflict, whether or not they choose to be involved in that conflict. What Sanabel is saying here, given her earlier comment, is that she will be killed and hence become a martyr, not that she will *commit martyrdom*.

5. This exchange is transcribed in Whitaker (2007) but the relevant clip from the CNN programme is also available on various sites. See, for example, http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=25423_Outrage_CNN_Covers_Up_Death_Cult_Mickey_Mouse_Video&only [Accessed 21 February 2010].

6. An early version of MEMRI’s website, preserved in the web archives, included this mission statement: ‘In its research, the institute puts emphasizes [sic] the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel.’ The website was revamped after September 11 but the earlier version is still available at http://web.archive.org/web/19990220054656/www.memri.org/about.html [Accessed 21 February 2010].

7. The archived early version of the website introduced Yigal Carmon as follows: ‘Col. (Res.) Yigal Carmon is MEMRI’s President. He served in the IDF/Intelligence Branch from 1968 to 1988. From 1977 to 1982 he was the Acting Head of Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria and the Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Civil Administration. Following Col. Carmon’s retirement from the IDF he was Advisor to Premiers Shamir and Rabin for Countering Terrorism from 1988 to 1993. In 1991 and 1992 he was a senior member of the Israeli Delegation to peace negotiations with Syria in Madrid and Washington.’

8. Hijazi Al-Sharif (2009) provides the most detailed analysis of MEMRI’s composition, activities and translation strategies to date.


11. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/comment/0,,884156,00.html [Accessed 20 February 2010].

12. I am no longer able to locate these quotes on MEMRI's site, which is constantly revamped to project MEMRI as less partisan and more balanced following the exposure of its origins and activities by various individuals and activist groups.

13. MEMRI changes and updates its site constantly. The current list of ‘Subjects’ consists of the following: Jihad and Terrorism Studies, U.S. and the Middle East, Reform in the Arab and Muslim World, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Inter-Arab Relations, Economic Studies, Anitsemitism Documentation Project, Islamist Websites Monitor Project and Urdu-Pashtu Media Project.


22. The website of this group is no longer available.

References


