JUSTIN MARTYR'S DEFENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

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JUSTIN MARTYR is a figure of perennial fascination in the history of emergent Christianity. He is the first Christian to make a serious attempt to determine the relations between Christianity and philosophy, between faith and reason. No second-century source is more informative about the way in which the first encounters between the Church and educated society looked to a thoughtful Christian. At the same time his extant writings, which are the most voluminous in extent and substance that any Christian up to his time had hitherto written, provide a mass of information about the internal situation of the Church independently of its reaction to external pressures and pagan attacks. It is regrettable that their text, transmitted by a solitary manuscript at Paris, is in a deplorable state, and that as a result of its corruptions we cannot be completely sure of Justin's opinion on all points. Nevertheless, from Justin's pages it is possible to construct a very adequate picture of second-century theology and ethics and even some priceless glimpses of the inner life of the church in worship. Justin is a propagandist, writing to defend Christianity from outside attack and addressing himself, at least in the Apologies, to a prospective pagan audience. Yet there

1 A lecture delivered in the Library series of public lectures.
2 Parisinus graecus 450, dated 11 September 1364, is the only independent manuscript containing Justin's authentic writings, together with much else ascribed to him, in the order (a) Dialogue with Trypho, (b) Second Apology, (c) First Apology. The best edition remains that of J. C. T. Otto (3rd edn., 1876), the handiest that of E. J. Goodspeed (Die ältesten Apologeten, 1914); neither is adequate. A better text of the Apologies is given by A. W. F. Blunt (1911). How much remains to be done is shown by the fine paper by W. Schmid, "Die Textüberlieferung der Apologie des Justin", in Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, xl (1941), 87-137. Schmid has good observations on the text of the Dialogue in his paper, "Frühe Apologetik und Platonismus", in Hermeneia: Festschrift Regenbogen (1952), pp. 163 ff. For convenience, I cite the Second Apology according to the numbering of Otto and Goodspeed, though not accepting the conjectural transposition of the text which they presuppose.
is singularly little in Justin of the uncandid salesman who pushes his wares with high-pressure advertising and is silent about those features which are unlikely to appeal to the public. His theology is not simply intended for export. In fact one of the outstanding characteristics of the man is his integrity, which is written large upon every page that he wrote. He is unaware of any skeletons in his cupboard. The fact that he makes many trivial mistakes is evidence of this; there is an undeniable insouciance about his manner, and a real controversialist would have been more careful to avoid errors that merely offer targets to the opposition. He is no clever advocate. As a writer he lacks the organizing power to arrange his material with desirable clarity. Were he writing today, he would be one of those scholars who place one line of text at the head of the page and cover the rest with lumpy footnotes.

Justin's biography is a well known story. Born of Greek parents early in the second century at Flavia Neapolis in Samaritan territory, he went to Asia Minor to study philosophy with various philosophical teachers. Like many young men of the

1 He may follow the gnostics in his identification of a Roman dedication to the Sabine deity Semo Sancus with a monument for Simon Magus (Ap. i. 26 and 56). His explanation of “Satanas” as derived from Sata = “apostate” and nas = “snake” must have been taken over from some source in which he found it asserted (Dial. 103) ; if he had actually used the argument in a disputation with a Rabbi learned in Hebrew, he would have quickly learnt his mistake. His notorious statement that “Herod” was the king of Judaea at the time when Ptolemy of Egypt was arranging for the Septuagint translation to be made (Ap. i. 31) may be a corruption in the text. Schmid (“Ein rätselhafter Anachronismus bei Justinus Martyr”, Hist. Zeits., lxvii (1958), 358-61) points out that in manuscripts of Appian, Strabo, and Josephus the Parthian name “Orodes” appears as “Herodes” and suggests that in Ap. i. 31.2 we should read Ο̄ρωδής for Ἡρώδης and bracket the mention of Herod in 31.3. This is very possible, and the passage must therefore be removed from the catalogue of demonstrable blunders, of which the longest list is that given by Otto in the introduction to his edition, p. lxx.

2 For the argument that Justin is a brilliant defender of the faith see, e.g. K. Hubik, Die Apologien des hl. Justin (Vienna, 1912). Though unconvincing, it is nearer the truth that the contemptuous scorn with which Justin is treated by J. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (1907), pp. 97-104, a chapter curiously blind to Justin’s positive qualities. The division between critics who have found in Justin a great thinker and theologian and those who have dismissed him as a fool, if not a knave, goes back to sixteenth-century debates, from Latomus and the Magdeburg Centuriators onwards. Geffcken’s scorn is modest compared with that of Conyers Middleton’s Free Inquiry (1749).

3 Ap. i. 1. Cf. Dial. 41. 3 (“we Gentiles”).
time, he started with a Stoic as the most popular type of tutor, but
soon went on to a Peripatetic who too soon asked for his fee.
Justin was shocked that a professed teacher of the truth should
show a grossly unphilosophical interest in his salary, and left
the Peripatetic for a Pythagorean, who in turn disappointed him
by demanding a detailed study of geometry, music and astronomy
as a prerequisite mental discipline in preparation for higher things.
Justin's education had evidently stopped short of these necessaries.
Finally he passed to a Platonist whose transcendentalist mysti-
cism greatly appealed to him. For Justin was in search of "the
vision of God".¹ But while he was one day meditating in
Platonic solitude on the seashore at Ephesus (and the lonely
mouth of the Kaystros is a place well suited for quiet contempla-
tion), he met an old man who pointed out grave objections to the
Platonic doctrine of the soul and proceeded to speak about the
prophets who foretold the coming of Jesus. Justin's conversion
to Christianity in no sense entailed a radical breach with his
philosophical past. He set up as an independent teacher of
Christian philosophy (presumably charging no fees) and wore the
professional philosopher's cloak (which at this period possessed
something of the significance of the modern Roman clerical
collar and provoked the same kind of mixed reaction in the public
mind).² He was at Ephesus in the thirties of the second century,
but he then moved on elsewhere, possibly to Alexandria, more
probably to Rome. After 151 he wrote his First Apology
addressed to the emperor Antoninus Pius. The short supple-
ment commonly (and with some show of reason) called the Second
Apology was apparently written to accompany a reissue of the
First Apology at a special time of crisis in the relations between

¹ Dial. 2.
² Good evidence for the contemporary "image" of the philosopher is pro-
vided by the witty cynicisms of Lucian's dialogues. His charges are reducible to
the four anti-clerical commonplaces: (a) they fail to practise what they preach, (b)
they are only interested in making money, (c) their metaphysical debates are
irrelevant to daily life, and (d) they all disagree with one another, so that it is a mere
random decision which of them is right, and perhaps the truth is that each of them
is right in so far as he asserts his rivals to be mistaken. See, e.g. Icaromen. 29-30;
Timon 57; Piscator 34; Menippus 5; Rhetorvm Praeceptor, passim; Hermotimus 80f.;
Nigrinus 25. Parallels can be found in less cynical writers such as Philostratus,
V. Apollon. Tyan. i. 34. Cf. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Paneg. 10.
the Church and the secular authorities in Rome. The Dialogue with Trypho, which we have in sadly incomplete form,\textsuperscript{1} was written after the First Apology which it mentions. Like the works which Justin wrote against contemporary heresies, unhappily lost except for a fragment or two, the Dialogue was intended for Gentile Christian readers, perhaps also for hellenized, liberalizing Jews. The only other authentic record consists in the Acts of Justin's martyrdom,\textsuperscript{2} which occurred some time between 162 and 168\textsuperscript{3} and is therefore usually asserted by writers in encyclopaedias to have occurred in 165.

Justin writes with a sunny open-heartedness and innocent optimism which is engagingly attractive, even when it leads him into naivety. Nothing could be less haunted than Justin's mind and conscience. A thoughtful Christian of A.D. 150 contemplating the tiny size of his community and the magnitude of the forces entrenched against its revolutionary programme could not fail to conclude that by any natural criterion of judgement the prospects for the Church were less than rosy. Justin remains cheerfully extrovert, confident that Christianity is the divinely planned way and will therefore win. He is the first exponent of the now familiar notion that the Christian apologist has one task above all else, namely to present accurate information about his faith. If Christianity is true, it has nothing to fear from scrutiny. The apologist must never descend to ingenious sophistries to win an argument and must speak without fear or favour as one who has nothing to hide. The rational faculty with which all men have been endowed by God is a providential instrument for arriving at the truth. Fair-minded argument will win with fair-minded readers. The only enemies Christianity has to fear are ignorance of what it is and the prejudice that prevents men from taking pains to dispel their ignorance.

It is readily comprehensible that Justin should hold this view when we remember how much ignorance and prejudice

\textsuperscript{1} A lacuna that in all probability extended to several pages in length occurs in the middle of chapter 74. Perhaps the beginning is also missing.
\textsuperscript{2} The Acts have a separate manuscript tradition, independent of the corpus of Justin's writings.
\textsuperscript{3} The period, that is, when Junius Rusticus was prefect of Rome.
surrounded the second-century Church. In Justin's time a wide credit was still enjoyed by the vulgar charges that at nocturnal rites the Christians indulged in orgies of incest and cannibalism. The evidence of Pliny's report to Trajan shows that belief in the substantial truth of these stories was far from being confined to the uneducated mob. Pliny was astonished to discover from the witnesses whom he tortured that no secret vices were being practised and that the "superstition" was not accompanied by any moral turpitude other than a contumacious refusal to obey Pliny's orders. As late as the middle of the third century, by which time Christian beliefs had become a matter of virtually universal public knowledge, Origen tells us that sometimes he had met good people who thought that there could be no smoke without fire and would not even say "Good morning" to a member of the infamous Christian society. When at the end of his First Apology (61-62, 65-67) Justin describes baptism and the eucharist, there is a clearly implied thesis that, contrary to the natural expectations of his pagan readers, these rites are not black magic, and indeed could hardly be more innocuous and morally improving. The false charges of unmentionable vice provided a justification both for the mob violence and the official attitude of the persecuting government. Justin comments drily that of some of the gnostic sects the charges happen to be true, but they are left unmolested. The other main ground for the persecutions was the "atheism" of the Christians, and to this charge Justin replies that the Church rejects images and the superstitions of pagan cult which are a worship of malevolent spirits, but

1 Justin's reply to the vulgar slanders is in Ap. i. 26; ii. 12, 15. Cf. Dial. 10.
2 Origen, c. Cels. vi. 27.
3 In an important and admirably argued paper, "Why were the early Christians persecuted?", Past and Present, xxvi (November, 1963), G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has argued that the legal ground for the persecution of the Church was exclusively religious, viz. the rejection of the Roman gods, not moral obliquity or contumacy. He replies to the objections of A. N. Sherwin-White in Past and Present, xxvii (April 1964), 28-33. I think the evidence of Pliny and Justin shows that the vulgar accusations were regarded as a moral justification of the legal action and that the clearcut distinction between the religious and the moral, presupposed in the exchange between Mr. de Ste Croix and Mr. Sherwin-White, was not so sharp in antiquity. (Cf. Plotinus ii. 9. 15. 39: "Without true virtue 'God' is a mere word.")
4 Ap. i. 26. 7.
they highly venerate the supreme God, his first-born Son the Logos, the head of a host of good angels, and the Holy Spirit who is in the third place.¹

Justin has no great difficulty in meeting the common accusations of vice and atheism. They arise from incomprehension and misinformation. But there are also pagan objections that are not so quickly brushed off since they presuppose a measure of true information and insight. The first serious nettle which Justin grasps in the very first chapters of his First Apology is the objection that Christians give no reasons and demand blind faith. Justin retorts that faith is not arbitrary prejudice, but an openness, an attitude of readiness to listen and to obey which is strikingly absent from the usual pagan attitude to Christianity which is highly prejudiced against fair-minded investigation. So far from being arbitrary and irrational, Justin’s argument for the supernatural character of Christianity may be labelled as altogether too rationalistic, inasmuch as he depends greatly on the argument from the fulfilment of prophecy in the events of the gospel story. That is to say that the evidence of the supernatural is seen in terms of breaks in the expected natural order.

The value that Justin sets upon the argument from fulfilled prophetic prediction goes back to his conversion after the discussion with the old man at Ephesus, if the account at the beginning of the Dialogue with Trypho is to be trusted. The Dialogue is probably the latest of Justin’s writings, and is a literary dramatization of a controversial disputation held at Ephesus soon after A.D. 135. The presence of several Platonic allusions and reminiscences in the opening *mise-en-scène* does not mean that there is no substratum of event and fact. It is much more probable than not that we are being given an essentially veracious autobiography, even if Justin’s memory, looking back some twenty years, is likely to have foreshortened and compressed the story. Like the rest of us, Justin is remembering the past in a way that the present requires. But the emphatic mention of the argument from prophecy as the principal intellectual ground for his transfer of allegiance from Plato to Christ is in all probability undistorted fact.

¹ *Ap. i. 5-6 and 13.*
There is relatively little appeal in Justin to the miracles done by Christ as evidence of his divine origin. Certainly to Justin himself as a believer they are important. But Justin is well aware that they can be put by sceptics on a par with magic, and that diabolical counterfeits can be so similar as to make it difficult to distinguish divine from infernal wonders. He is also sensitive to the standing weakness of all arguments from miracles: they only carry conviction to those who are actual eye-witnesses of the miracle, and evoke no wonder in those who are dependent on second-hand testimony. Justin avoids entanglement in a discussion about the integrity of the apostolic witnesses.

More numerous than appeals to miracle are the references to the astonishing success of the Christian mission, by this time (says Justin) extended to every known race, so that all have at least some Christian representatives. But Justin does not see this as a vivid concrete fact that can be put before the pagan enquirer with a simple and confident ‘Circumspice’, which we find in the apologists of the Constantinian era. Nothing for Justin equals the compelling power of the appeal to prophecy.

In the Dialogue with Trypho the argument from prophecy receives its classic development. The apparent planlessness of the Dialogue distracts the modern reader who is constantly wondering where the thread of the argument is leading, or even if there is a thread at all. Justin himself explicitly claims to be following an ordered and coherent scheme. The probable explanation is that Justin builds at least the early part of the Dialogue upon previously gathered collections of proof-texts.

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1 Ap. i. 30; Dial. 11. 4.
2 Ap. i. 54. 2; Dial. 69. 6-7.
3 Dial. 69. 6. Hence Justin’s stress on the contemporary miracles of exorcism: Ap. ii. 6; Dial. 30. 3; 76. 6; 85. 2; 111. 2; 121. 3; cf. 49. 8.
4 Ap. i. 39, 53; Dial. 53. 6; 83. 4; 91. 3; 117. 5; 121. 1.
5 Bousset, Judisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom (1915), pp. 282-99, suggested that “conceivably” Justin composed the Dialogue by joining several previous tracts composed by him. Dial. 80. 3 explicitly states that he is reproducing matter from earlier writings. P. Prigent (Justin et l’ancien Testament, 1964) argues that the Dialogue’s chief source was Justin’s lost treatise against all the heresies. This is not improbable.
6 Dial. 11 is programmatic; 39. 8 presupposes self-consciousness about a proper order.
from the Old Testament.¹ For example, chapters 10-29 collect texts attacking external ritual and cult. Chapters 30-44 amass Messianic prophecies. These two broadly homogeneous blocks have a close analogy to the collections which appear in the epistle of Barnabas.² In fact, the epistle of Barnabas and Justin's Dialogue provide much the most important concrete evidence for the history of prophetic testimonies in Christian argument during the long gap between the two collections of testimonies found at Qumran³ and Cyprian's *Ad Quirinum* in the middle of the third century. One cannot be sure of the form of these collections, but their existence can be boldly denied only on the assumption that no one in the ancient Church put anything into writing if he could avoid it, and the hypothesis that such collections were current does something to explain the amorphousness of the Dialogue with Trypho. I think it very likely that it was from such anthologies of biblical texts that Justin drew his notorious series of texts about the Passion of Christ which he accuses the Jews of having deleted from the Septuagint.⁴ With collections of biblical testimonies, as with the contemporary anthologies of poetic citations from the Greek classics, the text is often inferior and attributions vary. It would be easy to adjust quotations to make the desired point more sharply than the authentic original.⁵

¹ F. M. M. Sagnard, "Y a-t-il un plan du Dialogue avec Tryphon?" in *Mélanges J. de Ghellinck*, i (1951), 171-82, saw rightly that the Dialogue is constructed round groups of proof-texts, but succumbs to the temptation to find more coherence than exists.


⁴ *Dial.* 71 ff.

⁵ For this analogy see, for example, A. S. F. Gow, *The Greek Anthology, Sources and Ascriptions* (1958). The great pagan anthology of Stobaeus contains examples of quotations that have suffered minor alterations to make them better fitted to illustrate the desired point.
One logical point about Justin’s argument from prophecy is worth noting in passing. The appeal to prediction depends for its cogency on the production of satisfactory evidence that the fulfilment has actually occurred. In the First Apology the argument is left hanging in the air, because, although Justin feels at liberty to confront his pagan readers with liberal quotations from the Old Testament, he does not feel the same freedom in regard to the gospels. He has not yet got a book called “The New Testament” which he can thrust into the hands of benevolent inquirers. Accordingly, it is difficult for Justin to provide clear evidence for the historicity of the events which prove the prophets to have been inspired in their predictions. He does his best by asking the emperor to look up the census records of Cyrenius’ prefecture in Judaea and also the reports sent to Rome by Pontius Pilate, where he will be sure to find reliable evidence that Jesus really was born at Bethlehem as Micah foretold and that the crucifixion took place just as described in the twenty-second Psalm.¹ In the Dialogue, however, the argument makes much more sense because Trypho is portrayed as sufficiently cooperative to allow Justin to appeal to the “memoirs” of the apostles (which Justin seems to know primarily in a primitive synopsis of the first three gospels to which St. John has not yet been added).² The logical point is made quite explicit in the First Apology where Justin comments frankly that we know the prophets to be inspired in their predictions because the events predicted are known to have occurred. On the other hand, in the case of the Virgin Birth in particular, we can be sure the event occurred because the prediction in Isaiah 7 vindicates the reliability of the gospel record.³ The circularity of this argument was one of the grounds which led Origen to approach it with caution and to lay less weight on prophecy than Justin does.

So much for Justin’s reply to the pagan charge that faith is never given any rational justification. It is of course the reply of a popular apologist, but its contemporary effectiveness can be measured by the intense efforts to undermine it made by the

¹ Ap. i. 34-35 and 48.
² This is suggested by Ap. i. 16. 9-12 and 33. 5.
³ Ap. i. 33. 5.
pagan critic Celsus, who had probably read at least some of Justin's writings with care and attention.¹

Pagan difficulties were not confined to a criticism of faith as an unreasoning decision prior to any consideration of the facts. In the articles of the Christian creed, the most objectionable to a Greek mind was the doctrine of the last things. The “resurrection of the body” sounded much too like a crude resuscitation, inconceivable on Platonic assumptions about the relation of spirit to matter, and self-evidently inferior to the sublime conception of the soul's inherent possession of immortality and natural power to attain the vision of God. Popular eschatology also spoke about judgement to come and threatened punishment by fire. Justin knows of pagan critics who dismiss hell as a mere bogy for children²; but for him the doctrine of judgement hereafter had an essential significance, not only because men are deterred from corrupt behaviour by fear, but also because the assertion of human responsibility for moral action is indispensable to Justin's theodicy.³

Justin's insistence on freedom and responsibility as God's gift to man and his criticism of Stoic fatalism and of all moral relativism are so frequently repeated that it is safe to assume that here he saw a distinctively Christian emphasis requiring special stress.

Several of the pagan criticisms to which Justin replies touch not so much the content of Christian belief as the claim to uniqueness. Why should the Christians suppose that the healing wonders of Christ are superior to those of Asclepius?⁴ Is not the idea of a virgin birth analogous to the birth of Perseus?⁵ Is not baptism very like the lustrations of polytheistic rites, and the eucharist like the ritual meals in the mysteries of Mithras?⁶

Justin is not afraid of these analogies. He can even use them to argue that Christianity is so nearly indistinguishable from the myths of paganism that it is inexplicable that it should be singled

out for persecution by the government. But this is an *ad hominem* debating point, and Justin’s real view is that the few close similarities in myth and cult are caused by malevolent spiritual forces seeking to distract men from divine truth.

Justin has a more accessible answer for the other pagan criticisms. The evidence shows that one of the principal obstacles in the path of Christianity was a deep social and religious conservatism, often reinforced rather than weakened by philosophical scepticism, the effect of which was often to make people (like Cicero) adopt the view that since one cannot be certain of anything it is the more important to continue doing what one’s forefathers have done for centuries. “Paganism” was never a very coherent or unified entity, and was not organized to resist the frontal attack to which the Christians subjected it. But belief died hard in the value of the immemorial rites by which the cosmos might be kept friendly and also in the symbolic power of primitive myth. The romantic notion that by the time Christianity came along polytheistic religion had lost its hold over the allegiance of everyone but illiterate peasants seems to be unsupported by the ancient documents. There might be some Epicureans and religionless cynics like Lucian of Samosata or Oenomaus of Gadara; but in Justin’s time many educated men accepted the traditional religion of the ancient gods, partly with the assistance of philosophical re-interpretations and partly on the principle that one cannot be too careful. The majority of Justin’s contemporaries—Pliny, Plutarch, Epictetus, Celsus, Numenius of Apamea, Maximus of Tyre, Artemidorus of Daldis, Aelius Aristides, the great Galen himself—stand on the anti-sceptical, anti-Epicurean side, mainly on moral and metaphysical grounds, held to entail religious consequences. So much of ordinary social life was permeated by religious presuppositions and by trivial acts with religious associations that the Christian programme seemed a violent and even irreligious overthrow of ancestral tradition. Justin urges that truth is to be preferred to custom, but in a precarious world tradition is often the more highly valued just because it is tradition.

2 *Ap.* i. 2; 12. 6; 12. 11; 53. 12; 57. 1.
Against conservative fears of social revolution Justin answers that Christians are good citizens who pay taxes as Christ commanded, promote peace, are honest in trade, have stable family lives, do not expose their children, and pray for the rulers of the empire, though they also hope for a kingdom not of this world, which is hardly treasonable.\footnote{Ap. i. 11-12, 16-17, 27.} The charge of atheism is nonsense and does not come well from people who hold in high honour philosophers sceptical of all religion.\footnote{Dial. 17. 1; 131. 2.} None of these charges would have been given credit had it not been for Jewish slanders\footnote{Ap. i. 16. 8-14.} and the confusion of true Christians with false professors like the gnostics.\footnote{Ap. i. 16. 14; cf. Dial. 110. 6 (the Romans were the instrument of divine justice in Judaea).} An evil living Christian, declares Justin, is a contradiction.\footnote{Ap. i. 16. 16-17, 27.} The popular notion that Christians are morally corrupt is refuted by their integrity as martyrs when they could escape execution by either a lie or a recantation.\footnote{Ap. i. 4-7.}

Justin often points forward to the political theory of the Christian empire. He thinks it very wrong of the State to raise money by a tax on prostitution,\footnote{Ap. i. 16. 14; cf. Dial. 110. 6 (the Romans were the instrument of divine justice in Judaea).} and thereby anticipates the conception of the Church as the conscience of the State. Although he deplores the persecution of the Church, he makes no plea for religious toleration as a fundamental principle, and even expresses the hope that the State will turn its unpleasant attentions upon the heretical sects.\footnote{Ap. i. 32. 3-4; 63. 16.} Already for Justin the destinies of Church and empire are bound up in the providence of God. It was, he believes, part of the providential plan that Rome should govern Judaea at the time of the incarnation,\footnote{Dial. i. 27. 2; cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paed. iii. 21 f. For Caligula's institution of the tax see Suetonius, Gaius 40.} and that in A.D. 70 Jerusalem should be sacked by the legions as the instruments of divine wrath for the murder of the Messiah and as a drastic intervention to stop the Old Testament sacrifices which the new dispensation had superseded.\footnote{Dial. 46; 92. 2. The Roman destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 was the subject of Old Testament prophecy (Ap. i. 47; cf. Dial. 16. 3-5; 92. 2).} Justin conducts the dialogue with Trypho with courtesy and respect for his Jewish interlocutor, but...
his friendliness to the individual is combined with absolute opposition to Judaism's claim that the law of Moses represents God's last word to the world. He allows however (as some Gentile Christians did not), that a Jewish Christian may keep the traditional Jewish ceremonies if he wishes, provided that he does not require all other Christians to do the same as he. Otherwise Justin illustrates the extent to which the Church has come to think of itself as belonging to the Gentile world in general and to the Roman empire in particular. In one astonishing passage Justin even explains that there is a providential anticipation of the symbolic shape of the cross in the military standards of the Roman army. It is a statement that reminds us how near we stand to Constantine's labarum and how many of the presuppositions of the Christian empire existed long before when the Church was being harassed by the empire and as far from being established as anything could be.

I want to turn now to examine what Justin believed; to consider, that is, not his defences against external criticism but his statements about the inward content of his fundamental beliefs. What, then, is the faith that Justin defends?

Christians worship the God who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the source of all goodness and virtue in whom there is no admixture of evil, and whose power is not limited by any involvement in matter. God made this ordered world through the creator Logos, the firstborn power who is Christ, primarily for the sake of rational beings, both angelic and human, who have been endowed with freedom of choice and a capacity for self-determination. Moral mutability is a mark of the created order. So it came about that both angels and men had the power to fall, and the devil or Satan is an apostate angel who fell in the moment of deceiving Eve, not before, and was followed by a host of other

1 Dial. 47.
3 Ap. i. 6 and 13; ii. 7. 9.
4 Ap. ii. 6. 3 etc.
5 Ap. i. 10. 2; cf. ii. 5.
6 Ap. i. 43-44; ii. 7. 3 ff.
7 Ap. ii. 7. 6; Dial. 5. 4.
8 Dial. 124. 3, cf. 79. 4. Trypho (79.1) objects to the doctrine of the apostasy of angels. Justin interprets Gen. vi. 2 (the sons of God who desired women) to mean the fall of the angels (Ap. ii. 5. 3). For a good discussion of Justin's
angels who now form his army. By their fall Adam and Eve lost that freedom from mortality and from unreasoning passion which they formerly enjoyed. Humanity has retained freedom and reason, and remains without excuse for sin. Nevertheless, despite all his emphasis on moral responsibility, Justin concedes that the chief cause of error is ignorance, that this ignorance of man concerning the end for which God intended him is exacerbated by the deceit of the devil, and that there are some men whose moral instinct has been so corrupted by upbringing and environment that they have lost the sense of the wrongness of such gross vices as murder, adultery and fornication, so that in their case responsibility is necessarily diminished. But these moral “alcoholics”, so to speak, are not allowed to modify Justin’s libertarianism. Every individual since Adam has been subject to the bondage of death and the devil “through his own fault.” Yet man is bound down by idolatry and superstition so that he has not the power to free himself. God could have done away with evil and the devil by the exercise of his omnipotent power, but it is God’s way to preserve and to respect freedom and self-determination. He persuades and does not coerce. Accordingly, history is a dramatic struggle between God and the devil for the possession of man’s soul.

Redemption is a process, whereby God has acted in his providence to check evil and dispel the ignorance that is the cause of man’s sin. God sent the prophets, inspired by the Holy Spirit to predict the coming of Christ. Christ, the universal Logos and seminal Reason, worked through Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics to arrest the moral rot of humanity. It is a sign of the profound resistance of evil to the right and the good that philosophy has had doctrine of evil spirits see H. Wey, *Die Funktionen der bösen Geister bei den griechischen Apologeten* (Diss. Zürich, 1957).
its martyrs, like Socrates and Musonius Rufus, as well as the elect people of God. The instigators of this resistance are the evil powers, overcome by Christ pre-eminently through the mysteries of his birth and crucifixion.

Christ is the pre-existent Logos, "another God" beside the unbegotten Father from whom he was begotten before all creatures. He is "other" than the Father "in number, not in will", and is God of God, Light of Light, derived (that is) like one burning torch from another, so that the original light is undivided and undiminished—an illustration that Justin greatly prefers to that of a ray of light coming from the sun because it brings out better the independence (later theology would have said the "hypostasis") of the divine Logos. He was born as a Jew of the virgin Mary, of the seed of David, in fulfilment of the Father's will, and became man with body, soul and mind, of like passions as ourselves. He lived a sinless life, and taught an ethic of universal validity for all mankind, breaking down the particularity of Judaism, though he kept the Jewish Torah to fulfil the "economy" of the divine plan. We are not to suppose that his moral perfection before God consisted only in the accuracy of his observance of the Mosaic law. He was not merely man, but also God. As divine he was worshipped by the Magi. He did not become Son of God, but always was so. When the gospels say that he "grew" in wisdom, this means that he was always appropriate to the stage reached, acting throughout not for his own salvation but for ours. He was not born as "a man of men". Indeed the blood in his veins came not from human generation but from divine power.

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1 Ap. ii. 8.1 (Heraclitus, Musonius); i. 5.3 (Socrates).
2 Dial. 78.9; 106.1.
3 Dial. 48; 100.2; 129.4.
4 Dial. 56.11; 62.3; 128.4; 129.1-2.
5 Dial. 128.3-4. Philo uses both analogies (Gig. 25; Qu. Gen. ii. 40).
6 Ap. i. 32.14; Dial. 100.3 (Mary of the seed of David); Ap. i. 33 (the virgin birth of Jesus differentiated from pagan analogies by the absence of divine paternity); Ap. i. 32.10 (Christ made flesh and became man); ii. 10.1 (body, reason and soul).
7 Dial. 102.7; 110.6.
8 Dial. 11; 67.10; 93.
9 Dial. 67.6.
10 Dial. 125.3.
11 Dial. 87-88.
12 Dial. 48.4. But he was born "a man among men" (64.7).
13 Dial. 54.2; 63.2; 76.2; Ap. i. 32.9. The notion that the blood in Jesus's veins was of divine rather than human origin is odd and prima facie tending
The incarnation is not a totally miraculous break into history, discontinuous with everything that has gone before. The Logos it was who was manifested to the patriarchs in the Old Testament theophanies.\(^1\) Christ is the new Adam, and Mary corresponds to Eve—a doctrine in which Justin anticipates Irenaeus's great theme of "recapitulation".\(^2\) This doctrine Justin must have developed at length in his lost treatise against Marcion. Marcion's radical rejection of the Old Testament laid an axe to the root of the tree of the argument from prophecy, and threatened to disintegrate Justin's entire conception of the divine activity in and through history from creation through the prophets of the old Israel to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Justin's argument from prophecy is much more than cold, external apologetic; it reflects his view of the divine acts within history, and the correspondence of Adam and Christ is paralleled by many other typological images. Christ is likewise prefigured by such soteriological figures as Noah,\(^3\) Moses (especially his brazen serpent),\(^4\) and Joshua.\(^5\) Every "type" Justin can find is an additional nail in Marcion's coffin as well as a vindication of the Christian reading of the Old Testament.

The conquest of evil cosmic powers looms so large in the background of Justin's conception of redemption that it is surprising to notice the absence of any soteriological motif in his one mention of the descent to Hades.\(^6\) The Cross is for him the central moment in redemption. It is, he says, by the mystery of Christ crucified that God has had mercy upon believers of every race.\(^7\)

\(^1\) Dial. 100. 5; 103. 6.
\(^2\) Dial. 138. 2, cf. 19. 4 (Christ, like Noah, is the head of a new race; the "wood" of the Ark is a type of the Cross).
\(^4\) Dial. 55 ff.; 113. 4; 126-8; Ap. i. 63.
\(^5\) Dial. 100. 5; 103. 6.
\(^6\) Dial. 99. 3.
\(^7\) Dial. 106. 1. Cf. 47. 5 (By God's philanthropia the penitent is held to be sinless).
By the Cross the devils are made to tremble, and the cruciform shape is for Justin a symbol of victory and lordship, not of humiliation.¹ The resurrection marks Christ's conquest over death.² Prefigured by Jonah in the sea-monster,³ and predicted in the prophecy of the suffering servant of Isaiah 53,⁴ it is also symbolized in the observance of the eighth day and by the eight persons saved in Noah's ark.⁵ Justin treats the ascension with vivid poetic imagination: he sees it described in Psalm 24 (23) which prophesies Christ going up through successive doors guarded by angels.⁶ Now he is living in his glorified humanity, a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek.⁷ Thence, preceded by both Antichrist⁸ and Elijah,⁹ he shall come again on clouds with glory to set up a kingdom of perfect righteousness at a renewed Jerusalem, to the grief of unbelieving Jews who have missed their opportunity, and will reign for a thousand years.¹⁰ Finally Christ shall judge the living and the dead.¹¹ There shall be a resurrection of the flesh¹²; some shall be sent to the everlasting fire and others taken to heaven,¹³ which is "deification,"¹⁴ according to whether they have exercised their free will for good

¹ Dial. 49. 8, cf. 41. 1; 91. 3; Ap. i. 55. 2 ff. For Christ's "saving blood," cf. 24. 1; 54. 1; 111. 3; 134. 5; Ap. i. 32. 7. The Passion purified all human sin; Dial. 41. 1. ² Ap. i. 63. 16.
³ Dial. 107-108. ⁴ Dial. 53. 9; 57. 2; 97. 2.
⁵ Dial. 138. 1. On the numerological superiority of eight to seven cf. 24. 1, 41. 4. The preference for eight as the perfect number is connected with the notion that the divine realm is located above the seven planetary spheres and is the region of the fixed stars that do not wander.
⁶ Dial. 36. 5. Justin may be influenced here by the Apocalypse of Peter (17), where this Psalm is similarly cited; German translation from the Ethiopic by Duensing in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, N. T. Apokryphen, ii (1964), 483; English translation in M. R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament, 519.
⁷ Dial. 113. 4-5; cf. 34. 2; 118. 2. ⁸ Dial. 32. 3; 110. 2.
⁹ Dial. 49; cf. Hippolytus, de Antichristo 44, 46 f., where this theme is developed.
¹⁰ Dial. 14; 31-32; 119. 4 (clouds); 80-81 (at Jerusalem), cf. 85. 7; 113. 5; 138. 3; 126. 1 (the Jews' grief), cf. 32. 2; 121. 3.
¹¹ Dial. 118. 1; 132. 1; Ap. i. 52-53.
¹² Ap. i. 8; Dial. 113. 3-4.
¹³ Dial. 117. 3; 120. 5; Ap. i. 12. 1. Christ's gifts are incorruptibility, impassibility, and immortality: Dial. 46. 7; Ap. i. 42. 4; 57. 2.
¹⁴ Dial. 124. 4, interpreting Psalm 82 (81), "You are gods and all the sons of the most high." In Ap. ii. 6. 3 Justin explains that "strictly speaking" only Christ is entitled Son.
or for evil, and whether they repented of their sin and believed before death—for in hell repentance is useless. Hell, however, is only the destiny of those angels and men who have become irredeemably evil beyond possibility of conversion. None is condemned because of the destiny of his lot or because of what God made him, but only because of misuse of responsibility.

In the great meanwhile between the ascension and the delayed final consummation, the Church’s mission extends throughout the world to every known race. Like Noah in the generation after the flood, Christ is the head of a renewed humanity uniting Jew and Gentile, bond and free. By faith and baptism believers receive that new birth which is indispensable for the kingdom of heaven. In the weekly eucharistia or thanksgiving they bless God for both creation and redemption, and receive the bread and wine (mixed with water) not as common food and drink but as the flesh and blood of Christ, a change for which Justin suggests two analogies. The first is the “supernatural” analogy from

1 Dial. 88. 5; cf. 102. 4; Ap. i. 12. 1. 2 Ap. i. 52. 8. Hell is a “place” (19.8), where souls retain sensation (20.4; 52. 3). 3 Dial. 141. 2. Justin explains predestination as grounded on “foreseen merits”; cf. Dial. 44. 11; 140. 4; 141. 2. He also uses traditional language about “the number of the elect” (Ap. i. 45. 1) which he believes to be still incomplete. Cf. Dial. 32. 2.

In pleading for conversion Justin stresses the shortness of the time (Dial. 28. 2), but he explains the delay either by saying that the saints’ presence in the world leads God to hold his hand from destruction (Ap. ii. 7. 1), or by appealing to the idea of election and saying that God foreknows some not yet born who are to be saved (Ap. i. 28. 2; Dial. 32. 3; 39. 2).

6 Dial. 91. 3; 117. 5; 121. 3; 134. 5; Ap. i. 32. 4; 39; 42. 4; 50. 12. 7 Dial. 139. Cf. 134. 5; 28. 4; 88. 1 (male and female).

8 Dial. 43. 2; 44. 4; 86. 6; 138. 2; Ap. i. 62. 9 Dial. 41. 1.

10 Ap. i. 65. 3. The text is odd since it speaks of a “cup of water and wine diluted with water”. Harnack, Brod und Wasser: Die eucharistische Elemente bei Justin (T.U. VII, 2(1891), pp. 117-44) brilliantly tried to argue that the original text did not mention wine, chiefly on the ground that Ap. i. 66. 4 declares the Mithraic rite with bread and water to be a diabolical parody of the eucharist and that wine is mentioned in none of the eucharistic allusions in the Dialogue. The reply by F. X. Funk, “Die Abendmahlelemente bei Justin,” in his Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, i. (1897), 278-92, sufficiently shows that there is too much conjecture in Harnack’s arguments for their acceptance. Nevertheless, Harnack’s discussion collects very valuable evidence that the use of water in the eucharist instead of wine might be found in the second century among Christians other than those who belonged to eccentric sects.
the incarnation: "Jesus Christ our Saviour was made flesh by
the word of God and had flesh and blood for our salvation." The second is the natural analogy of the everyday miracle by which
the food we eat is transformed into the constituent tissue of the
human body.¹

I have tried briefly to summarize the basic essentials of
Justin's doctrinal pattern. He was aware that not every Christi­
an in his time would have said exactly the same as he in all
respects. He knows, for example, of professing Christians who
deny his millenarian hopes and cannot therefore be regarded as
orthodox,² and of others who while accepting the incarnation
do not think the virgin birth necessary to its realization, whose
opinion Justin thinks wrong but not, it seems, intolerable.³ The
virgin birth is defended as part of the tradition Justin has re­
ceived,⁴ but is never made the foundation for an independent
doctrinal development. Justin's theology deserves the epithet
"popular" in the sense that he wants to stress the points
prominent in the mind of ordinary Christian folk with a practical
concern for moral responsibility and a devotion quickened to life
by the dramatic story of the divine acts of redemption through
Christ and the work of the Spirit. His faith is juxtaposed with an
open optimism towards Greek philosophy, and he seems hardly
aware of a deep tension between the two.

It is a remarkable fact that there is more Platonism to be found
in the Dialogue with Trypho than in the Apologies. The manner
in which Justin describes his conversion at Ephesus is evidently
intended to imply that the transition from Platonism to Christian­
ity involves very little renunciation of an unregenerate intellectual
framework.⁵ In most points of substance, he thinks, Plato and
Christ agree.⁶ The God of Abraham is the God of Socrates,⁷

¹ Ap. i. 66. 2, a passage well discussed by F. H. Colson, J.T.S., xxxiii (1922),
167 f.
² Dial. 80. Irenaeus (adv. haer. 5. 33-36) vigorously rebuts those who would
interpret millenarian texts of scripture as symbolic allegory.
³ Dial. 48. 4.
⁴ Dial. 66 ff., cf. 76. 1-2, 84.
⁵ For an excellent discussion of Justin's relation to the contemporary "middle"
Platonism see C. Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus ", in Zeitschrift
für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, xlv (1953), 157-195.
⁷ Ap. i. 46. 3.
transcendent, immutable, nameless, without body, parts or passions.\(^1\) Plato and Moses are likewise agreed that the cosmos is created by the will of God.\(^2\) Admittedly Justin rejects Plato’s myth of the transmigration of the soul; he saw clearly enough that it simply could not fit into his picture of creation and redemption.\(^3\) He also disbelieves the Platonic thesis that the soul possesses immortality as a natural inherent right.\(^4\) But he praises Plato for his critique of anthropomorphic myths and superstitious cults unworthy of God’s greatness.\(^5\) Similarly he holds out a warmly welcoming hand to the austere Stoic ethic, while rejecting (in language that contemporary Platonists used) Stoic pantheism and materialism.\(^6\)

Accordingly Justin combines a radical rejection of the pagan religious tradition with a positive optimism towards classical philosophy. To the question, “How did the Greek philosophers discover so much of the truth about God?” Justin replies that it was partly through their study of the symbolic language of the Old Testament,\(^7\) but above all by the inward working of the Logos, the Word and Wisdom of God, incarnate in Christ, but also universally active and present in the highest goodness and intelligence wherever these are to be found.\(^8\) All rational thought and all right moral conduct are evidence of participation in the universal Reason, the “right reason” of the Stoic moral ideal which Justin finds realized in Jesus.\(^9\) Abraham and Socrates are “Christians before Christ”.\(^10\) History is the stage of God’s acts, but these acts are not confined to Israel. Justin does not say that Greek philosophy was a divine gift parallel and equal to the Old Testament. But the Sower who went forth to sow is the seminal Logos sowing seeds of truth in human minds.\(^11\) Christ is the...

\(^1\) Ap. i. 9-10; 13. 4; 25. 2; 49. 5; 53. 2; 61. 11; 63. 1; ii. 6. 1; 12. 4; Dial. 5. 4; 127. 2 etc.
\(^2\) Dial. 5; Ap. i. 20. 4; 60.
\(^3\) Dial. 4. 6-7 (part of the old man’s refutation of Platonism).
\(^4\) Dial. 5-6.
\(^5\) Ap. i. 5; ii. 10.
\(^6\) Ap. ii. 7. 8-9; cf. i. 20.
\(^7\) Ap. i. 59 f.
\(^8\) Ap. ii. 8. 1; 10. 2.
\(^9\) Ap. ii. 9. 4; cf. i. 46. 2 (the Logos in whom all men participate is Christ).
\(^10\) Ap. i. 46. 3. The context concerns the responsibility of those who lived before the incarnation.
\(^11\) Ap. ii. 8. 3; 13. 3. For two good recent discussions of Justin’s use of the Stoic notion of spermatikos logos see R. Holte, “Logos Spermatikos, Christianity
principle of unity gathering into one the scattered fragments of truth divided among the different schools of Greek philosophy,¹ the one who brings potentiality to actuality, and the teacher who extends truth beyond a narrow elite to uneducated and educated alike.²

This is the language of Justin in the Apologies, especially the "Second Apology". It may be taken as a commentary on Romans i-ii and Acts xvii, which Justin had deeply considered. But it would be entirely wrong to see the Platonism in Justin as if it were a superficial veneer in his thinking. In the Dialogue it becomes clear that the Logos theology is not just a piece of a propagandist language to build a rickety bridge to his Platonic and Stoic friends. We find in the Dialogue that Justin cannot adequately expound his faith without philosophical help. Against Trypho the orthodox (if hellenized) Jew, who is horrified by Christian language about the Son of God which he thinks quite incompatible with monotheism, Justin argues that the God who appeared to the patriarchs and to Moses at the burning bush must be the Logos, the mediator between God and the created world, since the transcendent Father is too remote to have any direct contact with this inferior realm and since the universality of the Father's providential care would be prejudiced if he were to be

and ancient philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies," in Studia Theologica, xii (1958), 109-68, and J. H. Waszink, "Bemerkungen zu Justins Lehre vom Logos Spermatikos", in Mullus: Festschrift Theodor Klauser = Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 1 (1964), 380-90. These two papers, together with that of Andresen cited above, p. 293, n. 5, have done much to bring precision and clarification. I think Holte overstates his criticism of Andresen's view that there is an ethical content to the notion of the "seeds of the Logos", akin to the Stoic conception of semina virtutum; but Holte is surely right (and Waszink after him) in seeing an echo of the parable of the sower and therefore taking spermatikos as active, "the Logos who sows". I would only venture to add that with the idea of seeds of truth, sown by the Logos, Justin ingeniously insinuates that even the correct insights that the Greek philosophers possessed remained in the realm of potentiality and therefore need the gospel of Christ to elevate aspiration to concrete reality.

¹ Ap. ii. 8. 3; 10. 3.
² Ap. i. 60. 11; ii. 10. 8. For the supernatural power of Christianity in bringing moral reformation and truth to the simple and uninstructed, see Tatian 32; Athenagoras, Leg. 12; Irenaeus, adv. haer. iii. 4. 2 ff.; Tertullian, Apol. 46; Clement, Strom. iv. 59; Origen, c. Cels. vii. 41, and many others.
confined within a particular individual in one corner of the earth.\textsuperscript{1} The incarnation, it is implied, is a special case of divine immanence. Justin is the first to develop this theme which is already fore­shadowed in the first chapter of Paul’s epistle to the Colossians.

It would be natural to assume that the principal exponent of the Logos theology in the second century must have been directly and profoundly influenced by St. John’s Gospel and by Philo of Alexandria. The assumption is curiously unsupported by con­crete evidence, and it is one of the more surprising facts about Justin that this should be the case. I believe it to be more probable than not that Justin knew St. John’s Gospel,\textsuperscript{2} but there is no absolutely cast-iron evidence of this, and it is beyond doubt that the specifically Johannine theology has left no clear mark on Justin’s mind. The inwardness and subtlety of Johannine thought may well have been beyond Justin’s range. Between Philo and Justin there are a number of contacts of varying importance. Some of these are merely the common use by both writers of conventional ideas of the time. Others are more significant and could well be taken to show that Justin had studied Philo. Philo, for example, uses the expression “ seminal Logos ” (logos sper­matikos) more than once, though in a different setting and to make a wholly different point.\textsuperscript{3} Philo too explains that the “God” who appeared to Moses at the burning bush was not the Father of all but his ministering powers.\textsuperscript{4} There are six or seven other correspondences in minor details.\textsuperscript{5} All these, however,

\textsuperscript{1} Dial. 60. 2; 127. 2-3; Ap. i. 63. 1.
\textsuperscript{2} The best argued case for this will be found in T. Zahn, Geschichte des N. T. Kanons, i (1888), 516-534; the best negative statement is that of E. Schwartz in Nachrichten d. Götting. Akad., 1908, pp. 142 ff. My own view coincides with that of W. Bousset, Die Evangeliencitate Justins (1891), pp. 115-21.
\textsuperscript{3} Philo, Heres 119; Qu. Exod. ii. 68 (of the divine Logos); Leg. Alleg. iii. 150 (of the human moral sense as the fount of goodness).
\textsuperscript{4} Philo, Vita Mosis i. 66; Somn. i. 231 f.; Fuga 141; Mut. Nom. 134. Another close parallel is the interpretation of “Let us make man . . .” (Gen. i. 27) to be an address by God to the Logos “as if he were another God” (Philo cited by Eusebius, Praep. Evang., vii. 13. 1-2); cf. Justin’s remarks on the “ otherness ” of the Logos (above, p. 289 n. 4), and the discussion of Gen. i. 27 in Dial. 62. Justin’s statement that the generation of the Logos does not mean any division in the being of the Father (Dial. 61. 2; 128. 4) has an important anticipation in Philo, Gig. 25.
\textsuperscript{5} For example, both Philo and Justin stress the namelessness of God, the disagreements of pagan philosophers, and the necessity for not interpreting
add up to less than a certain demonstration of Justin’s direct dependence, and the inner spirit of Justin’s work could hardly be more different. The Dialogue with Trypho is full of typological exegesis of the Old Testament, but there is a spectacular and astonishing absence of anything approximating to Philonic allegory. Likewise there is nothing in Justin of the “mystical” and ecstatic language that is so striking a feature of Philo’s analysis of the psychology of religious experience, and nothing of the strong interest that Philo has in justifying the utility of a liberal education as a preparation for the study of theology. Justin has a far more vivid eschatology, and a stronger sense of the cosmic conflict between good and evil which comes to the fore in his language about the demonic.

Perhaps above all else we must put Justin’s theology of history as a distinctive and personal achievement. When Justin sees Greek philosophy as part of the divine preparation for the gospel and Socrates as a Christian before Christ, he sees the annals of humanity as a twofold story, sacred and profane, Jewish and Gentile, both being converging streams having their providential confluence in Christ and his universal gospel. Justin’s theology of history provides a basis for regarding the tradition of the past both positively and critically. His faith in Christ gives him a criterion of judgement with which he approaches both Plato and the Old Testament, and saves him from being an eclectic of the “jackdaw” type, taking bits and pieces from other men’s systems in order to dress out his own. And the vitalism implicit in his view of history as the stage of divine acts makes him see the course of the world under a single viewpoint in a way that creates the platform for Augustine’s City of God, or for Orosius, or for Dante, or for more modern historians who have sought to see the career of humanity sub specie aeternitatis.

Scripture literally (though Justin has nothing resembling Philonic allegory). Both explain that the angels entertained by Abraham only appeared to eat and drink (Philo, Abr. 118; Qu. Gen. iv. 9; Justin, Dial. 57. 2). Other analogies are either trivial or commonplaces shared by many others.

1 Philo, de Congr. Erud. Gratia and Leg. Alleg. iii. 244 f. (as an allegory of Hagar and Sarah). Justin has no interest in defending the utility of an education in subjects that he had never learnt (Dial. 2. 4-5).