DESPITE all the light that scholars have been able to throw upon Magna Carta and the circumstances of its issue in June 1215, much remains dark. Even the order of the most crucial events is hard to establish, with the principal document bearing a fictitious date, while other important secondary documents bear no dates at all. There is, of course, always some slight hope that new manuscript evidence will be discovered. But fresh material sometimes clouds rather than elucidates an historical problem. This may be true of the long-neglected manuscript which prompts this essay. It is an annotated list of the twenty-five barons who swore to enforce the Charter. Its text is printed at the end of this essay and raises new questions. To place it in its circumstances is not easy; nor does it seem to fit into the usually accepted pattern of events. Discussion of it has inevitably involved a new look at the other evidence. This may be pleaded as extenuation for a somewhat discursive commentary and an oblique approach to the main text. It will also explain the tentative nature of the conclusion.

For various reasons historians have tended to look at the events connected with Magna Carta and its aftermath from the standpoint of the king's camp, even when they show little sympathy with the king's cause. This is encouraged by the natural tendency to treat the rebellion as an episode in the history of the Angevin monarchy, by the form of the Charter as a royal grant, and by the plain fact that royal records tell us more about the king than about the barons. We know where King John was on almost every day of that fateful month of June; it is much harder to find out where the leaders of the baronial party were and what they were doing. Mr. H. G. Richardson, in two

1 I am grateful to Professors V. H. Galbraith and J. C. Holt, who have both read a draft of this paper, for valuable criticism, from which I have always profited, even when I have ventured to disagree. They must not be held answerable for any of my opinions.
important articles,¹ approached the conflict from the baronial standpoint and illuminated it with fresh records from the baronial side. But his study concerned the aftermath of Magna Carta, during the months of July—September 1215. There are still a good many unanswered questions about the activities of the baronial leaders during the months of May and June. Were they predominantly northerners, or northerners and East Anglians? If so, to what extent did their demand for a charter attract support from other parts of England? Who met at Brackley at the end of April and agreed in making formal diffidation? Who rallied to the leaders in London after its fall on 17 May? How were the twenty-five "executors" of the charter appointed? And when? Who composed their retinues and made up the bulk of the barons' fighting force?

These are hard questions. Most of them are perhaps unanswerable. A few records provide names of men whom the king mistrusted at this time; and the sending of an expedition to Exeter early in June shows that King John did not fear trouble only in the north and east of the country. If the recollections of camp-gossip by the "Anonyme de Bethune" and the more refined (but not necessarily more accurate) Latin narratives of Roger Wendover and "Walter of Coventry" could be treated as evidence, we might proceed a little further; but much of this is dubious stuff. There is always a danger that the story is anachronistic, that the writer has confused events which happened before the Charter with those which belong to the time when civil war broke out again. In general, these writers support the opinion held by modern historians—and confirmed by evidence of other sorts, including the choice of the Twenty-five—that the north country and East Anglia were the original centres of disaffection. The most specific piece of relevant news is found in Wendover’s chronicle. This gives forty-four names of barons assembled after Easter 1215, to which Matthew Paris adds the name of Conan son of Ellis.² The forty-four include nineteen of the

² Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series, 1872-83), ii. 585.
Twenty-five who were chosen a few weeks later to control the king, although two important northerners among the Twenty-five—the count of Aumale and William de Mowbray—are missing. Many of the others on Wendover's list are of northern or East Anglian origin, and most of them are recorded as rebels at some later stage of the civil war.

Wendover is of evil repute as a biased and inaccurate reporter. But critical work on his narrative for the reign of John has shown that he is not negligible. Many records came his way. He had papal bulls at his disposal, royal newsletters, administrative orders, and so on. Whether he knew it or not, some of these records were truncated or imperfect, or were mere drafts of instruments which had later been revised. Professor Holt has argued that he had a text of Magna Carta of 1215 which came between the Articles of the Barons and the final engrossment of the Charter. It appears, too, that his version of the Lateran decree for a crusade may be what was recited in the Fourth Lateran Council, though it does not correspond to the text officially published afterwards. So, when Wendover names the ringleaders of the rebellion in April, we must reckon with the possibility that behind his story lies some written document. He certainly did not compose his narrative of this year until ten years later; it is unlikely that he recited all these names from memory. Perhaps he had before him the copy of some list

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1 Hugh Bigot, Geoffrey de Say, William de Albini, and the mayor of London—all of them members of the Twenty-five—are also missing.


4 Though he may have embellished a written list with other names drawn from later sources or from hearsay or imagination, just as Paris added the name of Conan son of Ellis. Cf. Wendover's list of evil counsellors of King John s.a. 1211 (Chronica majora, ii. 533).
drawn up in the baronial camp or else an intelligence-report passed out of Brackley or Northampton to the king.¹

II

The source of Wendover's list is likely to remain unknown, and historians are likely to debate for a long time to come the value of evidence of this sort.² But they have been very willing to accept another list, which Matthew Paris appended to Wendover's account of the Charter. It equally lacks any mark of origin, any note of authenticity. It is not known from any copy earlier than the one which Matthew Paris wrote, about the year 1250. This is the list of the Twenty-five barons chosen by the whole body of the baronage (so it was said) in accordance with the security clause of Magna Carta, to force the king to keep his engagements. When William Blackstone wrote his unsurpassed "Introductory Discourse" to the Charter in 1759 he reproduced Matthew Paris's list from the Chronica Maiora, where it is a marginal addition to Wendover's text, written in Matthew's hand.³ It also occurs, in Matthew's hand, in the "Liber additamentorum" of St. Albans, and in another hand in a St. Albans historical collection of the same period.⁴ Blackstone pointed to three mistakes in Matthew's text,⁵ which he was able to correct by reference to another version of the list, entered in the margin of a text of the Charter in British Museum MS. Harl. 746, fol. 64r. not

¹ Cf. the sheriffs' reports in reply to a government circular of late March 1216 (Rotuli litterarum clausarum, ed. T. D. Hardy (Record Commission, 1833-4), i. 270a) in Rymer's Foedera (Record Commission, 1816-30), i. 144, R. W. Eyton, Antiquities of Shropshire (1854-60), x. 326-7, J. G. Edwards, Calendar of Ancient Correspondence concerning Wales (Board of Celtic Studies, 1935), p. 1. A fourth return, for Warwickshire, has lately come to light in the Public Record Office. See also the letter of an English magnate to a friend early in 1216, with news of Prince Louis's coming (Chron. Rogeri de Hoveden, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1868-71), iv. 189 n. 4.


³ Cambridge, Corpus Christi Coll. MS. 16, fol. 43v, formerly 39v.


⁵ Actually there is only one variant of substance common to all three of the St. Albans group: the reading "Rogerus de Munbray" for Roger de Montbegon; see further below, pp. 291-2.
later than about the year 1300. He did not comment upon the fact that after the first eleven names on the list, the order of appearance differs in the Harleian manuscript from the order of the St. Albans version.

There is no direct evidence to show whence the St. Albans scribes got their list of the Twenty-five. We have to take it upon trust and hope for the best. In its emended form it is at least compatible with our other evidence. Indeed, it receives some slight official support from the undated treaty between the king and Robert fitzWalter and twelve named barons: for all these persons appear in the list of the Twenty-five. Mr. Holt, looking for a channel through which Matthew Paris might have received information about the events of 1215 to amplify Wengover's account, suggests the name of Elias of Dereham, steward of Archbishop Stephen Langton, who was probably at Runnymede and was certainly concerned in distributing copies of Magna Carta in the following weeks. As Mr. Holt recognizes, "Elias is an interesting possibility, but no more". In any case, this list of the Twenty-five was probably in circulation at the royal court, for with it the St. Albans manuscripts preserve thirty-eight names of those magnates and civil servants who "swore that they would obey the mandate of the Twenty-five barons".

1 W. Blackstone, The Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest (Oxford, 1759), p. xx, note u. Blackstone noted one error, "Boys" (actually "Roys") for Ros. Cf. Holt, The Northerners, p. 109, n. 3 and Magna Carta (Cambridge, 1965), p. 338. Liebermann dated this manuscript for no clear reason "c. 1325" (Gesetze der Angelsachsen (Halle, 1903-16), I. xxxix) but Blackstone was probably right (loc. cit.) in ascribing it to the reign of Edward I.

2 Taking the St. Albans list as the norm, the sequence in Harl. MS. 746 is: 14, 13, 21-23, 16, 17, 25, 18, 20, 19, 15, 12, 24.

3 Rymer, Foedera, i. 133, Holt, Magna Carta, p. 342, and cf. Richardson, "Morrow", p. 424. The nine barons denounced by the papal delegates on 5 September 1215 are all of the Twenty-five, and all except Richard de Percy are among the thirteen in the Treaty (Eng. Hist. Rev., xlv (1929), 92).

4 Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th series, xiv. 86-87. It cannot, of course, be assumed that Paris obtained the text directly from an outside source: Cotton MS. Vitell. A.xx shows that it was known to someone else at St. Albans.

5 This appears in Cotton MS. Vitell.A.xx, fol. 98ra preceding the list of the 25. In Paris’s copies it follows the names of the 25 with the same title (reading "Hii iuraverunt" for "Isti iuraverunt") and with a tailpiece which runs: "Omnes isti iuraverunt cogere si opus esset ipsos xxv barones ut rectificarent regem, et etiam cogere ipsum si mutato animo forte recalcitraret."
Mr. Richardson has argued cogently in favour of regarding these thirty-eight as simply "the first to swear" to the common oath to obey the Twenty-five; they were available at court at the time.® If this interpretation is correct the St. Albans manuscripts preserve the copy of an eye-witness record. Moreover, if the list of thirty-eight represents the court before the king left Runnymede and Windsor about 25 June, then it provides a terminus ante quem for the appointment of the Twenty-five. This is important. For it must be remembered that the Charter set their appointment in the future. Its security clause, like the Articles of the Barons, provided for the later election of Twenty-five barons.® At the time of drafting, it seems, they had yet to be chosen.

The delay may seem strange; perhaps it is explicable by the charter-form adopted for the formal settlement. The physical appearance of the Articles of the Barons suggests that the draftsmen originally had other ideas. For here the concessions of the king—the written confirmation of liberties—are set out after the fashion of Henry I's coronation charter or the "Unknown Charter of Liberties". Then the scribe left the space of three lines before setting down a fresh section: "Hec est forma securitatis . . .". This proposed two safeguards for the preceding confirmation of liberties. The Twenty-five were to be appointed to resist infringement,® and the prelates were to give assurances on the king's behalf that he would not get papal authority to repudiate his charter. It looks as though the draftsmen envisaged three documents to cover this unusual situation, which had a strong tincture of treaty-making in it: one document was to be a traditional charter of liberties, the second a treaty, the third a guarantee by the prelates. Had this division been carried out, the "treaty" might well have contained the names of those sworn to enforce it, just as international treaties and truces drawn

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® "Concedimus . . . quod barones eligant xxv barones de regno quos voluerint"; and see c. 52, 55: "xxv baronum de quibus fit mentio inferius in securitate pacis." The Articles read: "Barones eligent xxv barones de regno quos voluerint."
® The 25 are mentioned in Articles, c. 25 and c. 37, but without the "de quibus fit mentio inferius" inserted in the Charter at these points.
up in this reign bore the names of those who swore on behalf of each contracting party to maintain the terms of the settlement.\(^1\) If the idea of three documents was adumbrated, it received a blow when the prelates refused their guarantee in the desired form, and presented other problems besides. It was abandoned during the week or more devoted to final drafting.\(^2\) With the adoption of the charter-form there was less obvious need to state the names of the Twenty-five. Even if they were chosen and their names were known by the time the Charter was ready for final engrossment, there was no compelling reason why the names should be inserted in it. Their election seems therefore to belong to the period between the sealing of the Articles (perhaps as early as 10 June)\(^3\) and 25 June.

Blackstone found in Harl. MS. 746 a list of the Twenty-five independent of the St. Albans version. Does this teach us anything new about the appointment of the Twenty-five, apart from supplying the correction Roger de Montbegon for Roger de Mowbray? It is worth looking for any signs of the origin of the list, even if certainty is not attainable. The Harleian manuscript contains a legal collection, neatly written in Edward I's reign, including the up-to-date Statute of Westminster I and Statute of the Jews (1275), and reaching back to the so-called Laws of Edward the Confessor, of Cnut, and of William I, and to Glanvill. This pre-thirteenth century material predominates. The manuscript is of interest because it stands on the fringe of a remarkable group of books connected with the city of London. It was used by Francis Palgrave\(^4\) and was examined in detail by Felix Liebermann. The latter was particularly concerned with the pseudonymous legal treatises of the twelfth century which it contained and with its lists and genealogy of the Norman kings.

\(^1\) E.g. Rymer, *Foedera*, i. 79 (1200), 95 (1206), 125 (1214).
\(^2\) An observation of Mr. Holt on Wendover's version of the Charter suggests that the idea of a separate *forma securitatis* had not been immediately abandoned (*The Northerners*, p. 118). For the fate of the proposed assurance by the prelates see Cheney, "'The Eve of Magna Carta'", *Bulletin*, xxxviii (1955-56), 311-41, at pp. 335-6.
\(^3\) See Holt, *Magna Carta*, pp. 156, 304-5, for arguments in favour of this as the date of sealing, and for other opinions.
\(^4\) *The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth* (1832), ii, p. cxviii.
It is Liebermann's MSS., and in describing it he observed that considerable parts shared a common source with his MS. Pl (MS. Phillipps 8078, now B.M. Add. MS. 35719), probably written late in Henry III's reign. Further, it emerges from Liebermann's analysis that one text common to Harl. MS. 746 and Add. MS. 35719 is the "Libertas Londoniensis", which only occurs elsewhere in the "London Municipal Collection", represented by several manuscripts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The oldest known manuscript of the group is now divided between Manchester, Rylands Library Lat. MS. 155 and B.M. Add. MS. 14252. This was written early in the thirteenth century. Mary Bateson had opined that "the compiler of the Add. MS. was a Londoner, working most likely in the camera of the Gildhall; his collection is not all of one date, but was gradually put together from 1206 to 1216"; but according to Liebermann's view of the matter Rylands Lat. MS. 155 + B.M. Add. MS. 14252 was a contemporary copy, not the compiler's autograph. If the original was in process of formation in 1215 it is easy to understand why some later copies of the London Municipal Collection contain the text of the "Charter of Runnymede".

1 Gesetze, i. p. xxxix.
3 "A contemporary Manuscript of the 'Leges Anglorum Londonis collectae'", Eng. Hist. Rev., xxviii (1913), 732-45, at p. 744, cf. p. 734. See also Gesetze, i. p. xviii regarding Add. MS. 14252: "um 1210-20 in der Londoner Gildhalle geschrieben." This, "the earliest legal compilation of the commune", says G. A. Williams (Medieval London (1963), p. 77, cf. p. 174), "probably emanated from the Cornhill family". If the suggestion is acceptable—and it is supported by the fact that Add. MS. 14252, fol. 127v contains a bogus genealogy of the Cornhills, printed by J. H. Round, The Commune of London (1899), p. 107—it is of interest to note the textual connections between some parts of the London collection and B.M. Cotton MS. Titus A.xvii (Liebermann's T: see his Quadripartitus (Halle, 1892), pp. 63-64 and Gesetze, i. p. xl). For the Cotton MS. comes from St. Augustine's, Canterbury, and appears to be the subject of references in late thirteenth-century notes in Rylands Lat. MS. 155 (see M. R. James's catalogue, pp. 269-70) and in Andrew Horn's collection, Cambridge, Corpus Christi Coll. MS. 70, fol. 172v. The Cornhill family was connected in various ways with St. Augustine's: see W. Urry, Canterbury under the Angevin Kings (1967), pp. 56-58.
But the text in this London collection which has attracted most attention from historians is the version of the apocryphal Laws of Edward the Confessor which it contains; for it has interpolations, over and above those of the version which Liebermann called ECf retr. Since Liebermann only found the interpolations of the Rylands manuscript in later texts of London origin, he inferred that they were added by the London collector of the time of King John. More recently Mr. Richardson has argued that this “third edition” of the Laws of Edward the Confessor was composed in the early years of Henry II and was not specifically a London product. This is a tacit reversal of Mr. Richardson’s earlier position. The argument for the earlier date depends upon the assumption that the twelfth-century editor of the third recension was aware of the conditions of his own time and anxious to record them. But this is hardly convincing. He was embellishing a book which claimed to go back to Edward the Confessor, and can hardly have wished simultaneously to bring it up to date. On the other hand, Liebermann did not prove that the third recension was of the date of the London Municipal Collection, only that it had not been found in any other context. Whatever one thinks of Mr. Richardson’s argument, the fact remains undisputed that a London collector with an interest in politics, in or soon after the reign of John, assembled texts of the ancient laws of England and the customs of London and some historical miscellanea. Were it not for this, we should not possess the text of the third recension of the Laws of Edward, and we have no evidence that this recension ever existed outside of London. Mr. Richardson refers to Bracton’s knowledge of this recension as proof that it was not confined to the London group of manuscripts; but there is no reason why Bracton should not have had access to the existing Rylands+B.M. MS. or a copy of it.


3 Law and Legislation, p. 58, n. 6.
Liebermann's manuscripts Pl and S seem to some slight degree related to the London Collection, for they contain one London document of the twelfth century, the "Libertas Londoniensis", and much of their contents agrees in a general way with the contents of that collection, including the Charter of Runnymede. One cannot fail to be impressed by the similarity of taste between the compiler of Harl. MS. 746 and the London compilers of Edward I's reign who copied and enlarged upon the original London collector's work. But the actual texts of the documents in the Harleian manuscript often belong to another tradition. Most conspicuously, Pl and S do not contain the interpolations in the Laws of Edward the Confessor which distinguish the third recension. In short, the evidence for connecting Harl. MS. 746 as a whole with London (apart from its inclusion of "Libertas Londoniensis") remains very slight.

This is a pity. The presence of the Charter of Runnymede—a comparatively rare text—in this manuscript remind us that it occurs in the London collection and that London was the rebels' headquarters for the weeks when Magna Carta was incubating. Even if some leaders or representatives camped intermittently or permanently near Runnymede during the fortnight after 10 June, the main baronial force was based on London. And even if the choosing of the Twenty-five (by whatever means) did not take place in London, the news would reach baronial headquarters at once. London officials might be expected to know the details of these happenings, which concerned them nearly, and the mayor of London was chosen to be one of the Twenty-five. In MS. Harl. 746 the list of the Twenty-five is written in the margin of the Charter, on fol. 64r. Although it is in a small neat charter-hand quite distinct from the main hand of the manuscript, both may be the work of one man and the list can be regarded as an integral part of the compilation. But all this does not mean that we can ascribe the list in Harl. MS. 746 to a London source.


2 With other marginalia in the same hand it was written before the rubrics were added, fols. 64r and 66r.
The point has now been reached when it may be profitable to look at yet another, hitherto neglected, version of the list. Lambeth MS. 371 is a small quarto volume from Reading Abbey, composed of many pieces, written in various good thirteenth-century hands. Most of the book consists of historical miscellanea, including extracts from William of Malmesbury (fols. 43 ff.) with additions to the beginning of Henry III’s reign, including two brief accounts of King John’s reign. This part was described by Stubbs in editing William’s *Gesta Regum*, and he noted: “on fol. 56 is given the list of the executors of Magna Carta, and the *summa militum* or number of the knights bound to assist them, one thousand one hundred four score and three, M.C.IIIxxx et III’.” On the page (fol. 57v) next following the list is a text of Magna Carta of 1215, with a few mistakes and omissions. Then come (fol. 59r) an extract from Ralph of Coggeshall on the reign of Richard I and (fol. 72r) the chronicle of Martinus Polonus, abridged. Later in the book occur the *Expugnatio Hibernica* of Giraldus Cambrensis and a French version of Cato’s Distiches with the Latin text, by one Everard le Moine.

The list of the executors of Magna Carta occupies the last eight ruled lines on fol. 56r and lines 2-10 (line 1 being blank) on fol. 57r (the rest blank). The hand is rather later than that of the brief chronicle which precedes it and of the text of Magna Carta which begins at the top of fol. 57v. It appears to be not later than the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Neither the clear indications of two cataloguers—H. J. Todd in 1812 and M. R. James in 1932—nor Stubbs’s intriguing notice have attracted the attention of connoisseurs of Magna Carta. The text is printed below for the first time.

The Lambeth list presents the Twenty-five in a new order,
and introduces a mistake of its own in substituting Arundel for Aumale. The St. Albans, Harleian, and Lambeth lists all give more than half the names in differing order, and seem to represent three distinct traditions. It is therefore of some interest to find that all three agree in the sequence (and in general in the description) of the first eleven. They include the seven earls, the sons of two earls (William Marshal junior and Gilbert de Clare), Robert fitzWalter, and Eustace de Vesci. These magnates were of such consequence that they practically had to be chosen. Perhaps they were named first, and the completion of the baronial committee came at a later stage. On this hypothesis, a list of those picked as the "first eleven" was given wide publicity in some official document or else in a news-letter, and this lay behind all three of the surviving versions. But the original compilers of these lists (or two of them) had to take the other fourteen names where they could find them; and possibly relied on sources deriving from the spoken word; there was no single official list and they had no common source for them.

Comparison of the St. Albans, Harleian, and Lambeth versions reveals another curious feature. The Lambeth text and the three St. Albans texts all read Rogerus de Munbray in place of the Rogerus de Munbezon of the Harleian text. The error, if it is an error, could be the work of a careless scribe, especially since the name Willelmus de Munbray had appeared earlier in each list. Moreover, a scribe writing about 1250 or after might more easily adopt the name of Mowbray since by then William de Mowbray's son Roger had made himself famous, whereas Roger de Montbegon died in 1245 without male heirs. But there is no other obvious reason for relating the Lambeth version of the list to the St. Albans versions. Did two scribes make the same mistake independently, or does this reading indicate that Roger de Mowbray was named before Roger de Montbegon became one of the Twenty-five? If the name of Mowbray is to be taken seriously it must refer, not to William's son, then a child, but to

1 Compared with the St. Albans texts the order of the names in the Lambeth MS. is: 1-11, 25, 12, 13, 21-24, 20, 16, 15, 17-19, 14. For the sequence in Harl. MS. 746 see above, p. 284, n. 2.

2 Montbegon was one of the 25 by the time of the Treaty made between the king and Robert fitzWalter, etc.
another obscurer member of the family, who appears repeatedly in records of John's reign.¹ But on balance it seems preferable to regard the appearance of Rogerus de Munbray as the result of scribal error.

The main interest of the Lambeth text was noted by Stubbs. Unlike the other versions it is not a bare list, but contains evidence (if only it could be rightly understood) of the circumstances of its origin. Briefly, it attaches to each baron's name a quota of knights: *cum cc militibus, cum xxx militibus*, and so on, without indication of how these figures were arrived at. It is primarily the record of some military muster. The list proper does not include the mayor of London as twenty-fifth baron; but it is immediately followed by a note that the mayor of London will hand over the city of London to the barons if the king should want to contravene his charter. In that event all these earls with the knights enumerated and the community of all England must rise against *(insurgere in)* the king. The total of the knights is incorrectly given as 1183. If the first quota "septem viginti" should be emended (as seems probable) to "septies viginti", the real total is 1187; as they stand the quotas amount to 1074, the twenty-four earls and barons excluded. The pattern of the record shows that it was composed not, like the other texts, merely to list the names of the Twenty-five, but to show how many knights each could bring into the field at the time.

Before the problem of these quotas is faced the reference to the mayor deserves attention for the light it throws upon the date of the record. It must be compared with the *conventio* or Treaty, in chirograph form, undated, between King John and Robert fitzWalter and other barons. Of this Treaty the part held by the king, with slits for thirteen baronial seals, is preserved in the Chancery Miscellanea (C. 47/34/1/1) and is on view in the Museum of the Public Record Office.² Comparison of what we

¹ Rotuli litterarum clausarum, i. 13b-481; Pipe Roll 17 John and Praestita Roll 14-18 John (Pipe Roll Soc., n.s. 37, 1964), p. 102.
² Printed by Holt, Magna Carta, pp. 342-3 with facsimiles, plates v and va. It was enrolled on the dorse of the Close Roll 17 John m. 27d, whence Rymer, Foedera, i. 133 and W. S. McKechnie, Magna Carta (2nd edn., Glasgow, 1914), pp. 495-6. Blackstone had printed it from one or the other source in The Great Charter, pp. 25-26.
TWENTY-FIVE BARONS OF MAGNA CARTA

may call the Lambeth Memorandum with the Treaty shows differing arrangements for the control of London.

According to the Memorandum the city, under its mayor (and in possession of a royal charter granted as recently as 9 May),¹ is free to control itself. By implication the baronial party, which had occupied London on 17 May and which certainly treated London as its headquarters throughout the summer, was not in formal control of the city. The Memorandum simply adds, as it were, to the security clause of Magna Carta a practical device for enforcing sanctions against the king: if the king opposes the barons the mayor of London will surrender (traded) the capital to them. The Treaty reveals a different state of affairs from the Memorandum. It arranges that the barons "will hold the city of London by the grant (de ballio) of the lord king" until the feast of the Assumption (15 August), saving to the king in the meanwhile his farms, rents, and clear debts, and the archbishop of Canterbury similarly is to hold the Tower of London by the grant of the king until the same date, "saving to the city of London its liberties and its free customs and saving to anyone his right in the custody of the Tower". City and Tower were to revert to the king at the feast of the Assumption if by then the oath to obey the Twenty-five had been taken throughout the country or if any failure to achieve this could not be blamed on the king. As regards the Tower, it should be remembered that it had not been under the citizens' control and at this juncture did not come into baronial hands. Its custody was claimed unsuccessfully by Geoffrey de Mandeville when baronial claims were being threshed out during the month after the making of peace. In June or July it was apparently transferred from royal custody to the custody of Archbishop Stephen.² We hear no more of it until it yielded to Prince Louis in November 1216. Whether it had been held for all the intervening period by the archbishop's men or had come again under direct royal control we do not know. As regards the city, it is well known that the king never

regained possession of it. By the feast of the Assumption the manifold occasions of dispute and the near certainty that the Pope would denounce the Charter was causing the country to drift back to civil war. It results from this that the provision about London in the Memorandum—that the mayor will hand over the city to the barons if the king contravenes the Charter—must have preceded the Treaty, which puts the city into baronial hands until 15 August.¹ Until the Treaty was drawn up the mayor and citizens presumably could cling to the fiction that the city was theirs to hand over to the barons, even though the barons had been in military control ever since 15 May.

Both documents are undated, and the Treaty has been variously assigned to the third week in July by Mr. Richardson and to 19 June or thereabouts by Professor Holt.² Unfortunately the facts on which a conclusion must be reached are few and susceptible of more than one interpretation. But the discovery of the Memorandum introduces a new element. The capture of the city on 17 May had put London definitely in the power of the rebel barons. But the Memorandum suggests that the barons indirectly controlled the city's government rather than superseded it. Formal continuity of civic government may have been essential to any compromise over the holding of London which could contribute to the so-called firma pax of 19 June. Royal letters after 17 May show the alarm and despondency of the government at the loss of the capital³: it may have been the determining factor in persuading the king to negotiate with the rebels. And the king could best be brought to agreement if the barons claimed to respect the civic institutions. Two considerations might incline them to do so in the interests of peace. By


leaving the city formally in charge of the mayor they were leaving it with an ally: one who engaged with them in negotiating at Runnymede and who was chosen as one of the Twenty-five. Secondly (if the Memorandum may be interpreted as an unofficial note of some agreement between the barons and the citizens) the barons had a formal undertaking from the mayor—or a private understanding with him—that he would surrender the city to them if King John went back on his undertakings. As Mr. Holt has rightly observed: "It is scarcely likely that the king would agree to terms of peace without some arrangement being made on the fate of the capital". "It was an essential part of the original settlement". The Memorandum appears to record this state of affairs. It cannot be earlier than mid-June, when the Charter was being drafted.

When, then, was the Treaty made? Mr. Holt, having stated the case somewhat less definitely in the past, says categorically: "there is no real doubt that it belongs to 19 June or thereabouts." His main argument rests on the fact that a royal writ of 23 July to the barons and others of Yorkshire orders them to restore castles, etc., which they have taken, saying that such restoration was part of the reformacio pacis and was to be concluded by 15 August. The only "reformacio pacis" in the records is that of 19 June; the only document other than the writ which sets 15 August as a time-limit is the Treaty. Therefore, Mr. Holt contends, the Treaty must have been an integral part of the June "reformatio": five weeks later the Yorkshire-men were told to see that a time-limit imposed in June was observed. The argument seems less than compelling.

The first question to be disposed of is: what grounds are there for supposing that the time-limit of 15 August was fixed at the time of the "reformacio pacis", on or about 19 June? The writ of 23 July orders the barons and others of Yorkshire "quod...terras...que abstulistis tempore guerre vel post...reddatis infra festum Assumpcionis Beate Marie proximo instans sicut in reformacione pacis continetur". The action called for

2 Magna Carta, pp. 172-3, 339.
the " sicut " refers to the mode of restoration or to the date is not perfectly clear. The writ does not explicitly say that the time-limit of 15 August—or any time-limit—had been written into the " reformacio pacis ". This may seem to be the obvious, the natural, interpretation; but it has to be studied in the light of other evidence.

If a time-limit was imposed on 19 June it is surely strange that instructions to people in the provinces immediately afterwards did not state it? There is no trace in any of the dozens of writs concerned with carrying out the terms of peace. In The Northerners Mr. Holt attached importance to the reference by " Walter of Coventry " to 16 August as a date fixed in June for the final settlement. But I think that the chronicler's words suggest that this date was not fixed until the situation had deteriorated after the granting of the charter. Moreover, another chronicler, Roger Wendover, says that before the gathering at Runnymede dispersed the king appointed 16 July " ad hoc exequendum ".

The sixteenth of July came and the conditions of peace were not fulfilled. In the atmosphere of disappointment and distrust in which the parties met at Oxford in the third week of July, when the euphoria of Runnymede and dreams of immediate redress had faded, the fixing of a short term within which the settlement had got to be made is understandable. As Mr. Holt has said in a different context: "The optimism with which the Great Charter and the writs of 19 June referred to the newly agreed peace was soon put in question. By the middle of September the country was at war, and at war about the Charter. This was not a sudden or an accidental climax; it was the result of a lengthy development which can be traced back through the summer months to Runnymede itself. The Charter was made possible by its imprecisions and inexactness; these same qualities now meant that its application in practice was bound to become a

There is, then, no a priori reason for supposing that the time-limit of 15 August had been fixed on or about 19 June. The supposition stands or falls on the dating we give to the undated Treaty. Since the only dated reference to the time-limit occurs on 23 July, the possibilities should not be too lightly rejected that this date had only just been fixed and that the undated Treaty belongs to the same day, 23 July, or thereabouts. The fact that its phraseology recalls the writs of late June does not prove that it was contemporaneous with them: the original terms for peace would have to be repeated at any later time when their enforcement was required. Even supposing the time-limit to have been fixed on or about 19 June it would remain to be proved that the decision was immediately enshrined in the undated Treaty. Mr. Richardson fitted the Treaty into the circumstances of late July, when the king's advisers (and perhaps the king himself) met leaders of the baronial party. The royal chancery dated letters at Oxford from 17 to 23 July. The Treaty was copied on to the dorse of the chancery close roll, and the face of this membrane of the roll, as Mr. Richardson observed, bore letters "dated at Oxford on 18 and 19 July (i. 221), whence we may arrive at the approximate date of the agreement". But Mr. Holt interprets the evidence of the enrolments differently. We must therefore examine the arguments and try to decide between them. Two dates have been proposed for the Treaty: c. 17-23 July (Richardson) and c. 19 June (Holt).

In the first place, the face of the membrane contains the enrolment of earlier letters dated 11-15 July, besides those of 18-19 July noted by Mr. Richardson. (The next membrane has letters on its face dated 18-27 July and the dorse is blank.) Secondly, as Mr. Holt observes, it is uncertain that documents were endorsed at the time of the dated enrolments on the face.

1 *Magna Carta*, p. 242. The inclusion of the Security Clause meant that the pope was certain to condemn the Charter (cf. C. R. Cheney, "The Church and Magna Carta", *Theology*, lxviii (1965), 266-72, at pp. 268-71).


3 *Rot. lit. claus.*, i. 220b-223a, 269a.
Thirdly, "the date of the composition of the treaty is quite another matter" from the date at which it was enrolled.\(^1\) Theoretically, at least, these objections are valid. Mr. Richardson seems at first sight to weaken his case by his comment on the declaration of the bishops about the fealty of the barons:

"although this declaration, which is undated, is entered on the dorso of m.21, which bears on the recto documents dated between 28 June and 2 [recte 3] July, there can be no real doubt that it comes from the Oxford council."\(^2\) On the other hand, Mr. Holt weakens the force of his objection by adopting in the case of the declaration the reasoning which he rejects in the case of the Treaty. The bishops' declaration, he says, "in all probability" belongs to 28 June-3 July or thereabouts.\(^3\) Each of these scholars seems to apply a rule of enrolment in one case and to ignore it in another case. But were there rules? What were the habits of chancery clerks in 1215? When they wanted (for whatever reason) to copy a document on to the dorso of a roll, did they choose for the purpose that membrane of the roll which was in current use? Full answers to these questions must await a fuller study of the rolls than they have yet received. On general grounds, and from a reading of the printed editions, a tentative surmise may be permitted. If enrolment was proceeding fairly punctually after the issue (or receipt) of letters, the tendency was for documents destined for the dorso of the roll to be written on the membrane of the corresponding date or on the preceding membrane. Often a scribe may have found it convenient to work on the dorso of the preceding membrane, of which the face was filled; by this means he avoided interrupting current enrolment on the face. But unless the documents for endorsement came late to the chancery, as with "in-letters" from distant parts, they would not be enrolled on membranes which only bear letters of later date on the face; for those membranes had not yet come into use. There is no obvious reason why enrolment of the dateless documents in question—the bishops' declaration and the Treaty—should have been delayed longer than other current

\(^3\) Magna Carta, p. 244, n. 1.
enrolments on the patent and close rolls. Even though neither was a normal chancery instrument, the declaration was doubtless inspired by the king and the Treaty must have received (on the other part) the great seal.

The bishops’ declaration, though undated, contains within itself some significant evidence. It was issued by two archbishops, seven bishops, and “Master” Pandulf, the pope’s nuncio. The same persons, except for the bishop of Chichester and Pandulf, issued undated letters on the interpretation of Magna Carta, c.48, relating to forest customs; these were enrolled with the Treaty on the dorse of the close roll. Both the bishops’ documents were in the king’s interest and must have been requested by the king. It is natural to suppose that they were drafted when these prelates were in attendance upon the king. Turning to the charter roll we find that Archbishop Henry of Dublin constantly attested royal charters between mid-June and mid-July, but none of the other prelates in question did. Bishop Peter of Winchester appears with the king at Corfe on 13 July after several weeks’ absence; none of the other bishops is known to have been at court after 20 June until 18 July at Oxford. Langton does not figure in royal witness-lists until 23 July at Oxford. He is recorded at Staines (21 June), Tarring (6 July), Slindon (9 July), and Pagham (12 July). Bishop Hugh of Lincoln was in his diocese at Newark on 8 July. It seems safest, therefore, to suppose that the bishops’ declaration and interpretation were drawn up in the July council at Oxford.

Does this determine the date of the Treaty, which was enrolled with the bishops’ interpretation? The evidence is not conclusive. Much more needs to be known about chancery practice; and aberrations could doubtless occur in such abnormal

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1 The papal chancery did not style Pandulf magister, nor did Pandulf use the title in his own acts.
2 I owe to the kindness of Mr. Holt the information that these two documents—the only items on memb. 27d—were probably both written at the same time by the same man.
3 Rotuli chartarum, p. 213a.
times as these. But there is no obvious reason why the Treaty should not have been enrolled when it was composed, before the sealed original was sent to the treasury for permanent deposit. Moreover, now that we know that it had been preceded by a period, however short, when the mayor's formal surrender of the city to the barons could be expressed as a future contingency, there is no reason for tying the Treaty to the Charter. Mr. Richardson's view seems preferable: it was an outcome of the Oxford council.

Another pointer is provided by the parties to the Treaty. They are: "dominium Iohannem regem Anglie, ex una parte, et Robertum filium Walteri, marescallum exercitus Dei et sancte ecclesie in Anglia, et Ricardum comitem de Clara, Gaufri- dum comitem Essex', Glouc', Rogerum Bigot comitem Northfolc' et Suthfolc', Saherum comitem Wint', Robertum comitem Oxon', Henricum comitem Hereford', et barones subscriptos, scilicet Willelmmum Marescallum iuniorem, Eus- tacium de Vescy, Willelmum de Mobray, Iohannem filium Roberti, Rogerum de Monte Begonis, Willelmmum de Lanval', et alios comites et barones et liberos homines totius regni, ex altera parte." All of the thirteen named magnates belong to the Twenty-five. They include most, but not all, of the "first eleven". The fact that two of the eleven are missing, as also William de Albini, and that less distinguished persons are named (perhaps brought in, as Mr. Richardson has suggested, to make a quorum) suggests a date after some of the Twenty-five had left the baronial headquarters, and not the time of the Runnymede meetings when, if ever, the whole committee of Twenty-five probably assembled.

One document at first sight conflicts with this interpretation: the letter preserved by Roger Wendover, which Robert fitz-Walter wrote to William de Albini to announce that a tournament fixed for 6 July at Stamford would take place instead near London on 13 July. "You know well how very convenient it is for you and for all of us to safeguard (servare) the city of London, which is our headquarters (receptaculum), and what shame and damage we should incur if we lost it through our own fault." 

This letter must have been written at latest in the first few days of July. It certainly implies that Robert fitzWalter and his associates considered that they virtually controlled London. No doubt they did. But the word *servare* need not mean formal control of the civic government, which was the situation created by the Treaty. Indeed, it might be said that Robert fitzWalter expresses apprehensions which are best understood if a royal garrison in the Tower of London was still a threat to the position of the baronial party in the city; and under the terms of the Treaty the Tower was transferred to the custody of the archbishop. There is no reason to suppose that the Treaty was in existence when the letter was written.

A further possibility remains to be considered. At some time between the making of the Memorandum (in June) and the making of the Treaty (in July) the barons may have persuaded the mayor of London to "tradere civitatem" on the ground that the king had not performed the promises he had made in the Charter. If this happened, the Treaty simply recorded a *fait accompli*. This would indeed provide an attractive interpretation of the letter of Robert fitzWalter to William de Albini and would account for the bitter complaint against the Londoners by the bishop of Winchester and his colleagues on 5 September. But it is not clear that the complaint implies any further overt act of treachery after the surrender of 17 May, although it implies that a city faction has continued to give comfort to the king's enemies. If London had been formally surrendered by the mayor to the barons after Magna Carta, the fact would hardly have escaped record and would surely have been part and parcel of a general insurrection which only occurred later, in August-September.

IV

The tone, as well as the contents, of the Lambeth Memorandum suggests that it was composed in the baronial headquarters at London. Its reference to the *communa totius Anglie* echoes the words of the Articles and the Charter, but the blunt *insurgere in regem* shows a realistic view of the security clause which is

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masked in the legal instrument by talk of distraining and aggrieved. Significantly, the mayor of London, who comes twelfth in the Harleian list of the Twenty-five and fourteenth in the St. Albans version, is only mentioned at the end of the Memorandum, presumably because its accent is on military force. If, as seems certain, the Memorandum records an arrangement preceding the Treaty, it was drawn up between mid-June and mid-July. That being so, what can these quotas of knights mean?

One thing is clear. Although most if not all of the twenty-four barons were tenants-in-chief of the king, the numbers of knights here assigned to them bear no constant relation to the numbers they held enfeoffed of the king. Only in the cases of the earls of Hereford and Oxford is there any close correspondence between their feudal quotas as indicated in the scutage accounts of the Pipe Roll 16 John and the quotas in the Memorandum. What is more, a comparison of the numbers assigned to the various barons in the Memorandum does not point to a constant relationship between the individual's quota and his total holding of knights' fees, whether as tenant-in-chief or as mesne tenant. The list is no general guide to the landed wealth or importance of these men, as the examination of a few examples will show. If the number *septem viginti* set against the name of the earl of Clare is emended (as seems justifiable) to *septies viginti* (VIIxx), then there are, in the whole list, only three quotas of more than a hundred knights. Of these, two are assigned to Gloucester and Clare, the two earls in the baronial camp who held the greatest number of knights' fees; but we are left with the quota of two hundred knights assigned to William Marshal junior, whose holdings were small in his loyal father's lifetime. If one descends to the three quotas of eighty knights, eighty are assigned to the earl of Norfolk (who was enfeoffed of more than double this number of knights' fees), another eighty are assigned to another magnate, William de Mowbray; but the third quota of eighty is assigned to the son of the earl of Clare, whose feudal holdings were certainly far less than this. By contrast, the richly enfeoffed Robert fitzWalter, the "marshal of the army of God and holy Church", is only assigned fifty knights in the Memorandum. This did not represent his feudal standing.
The late Sidney Painter paid attention to the composition of the barons' forces in 1215 and 1216. He analysed the evidence provided by the records of *reversi*, those who returned to the king's allegiance after being in rebellion in 1215 or 1216. It would be extremely interesting [he wrote], to know how many of the minor rebels were vassals who had followed their lords. In theory an English mesne tenant was under no obligation to follow his lord in rebellion—in fact his first duty was fidelity to the crown. At the same time it seems clear that a vassal who followed his lord into revolt was considered to have committed a less serious offense than a man who rebelled without such a feudal connection. Unfortunately it is impossible to determine the feudal affiliations of the vast majority of the lesser rebels. The fact that the percentage of rebel barons from the various shires was roughly the same as that of the free-holders as a whole might indicate that vassals tended to follow their lords. But it may also mean simply that it was unwise to remain loyal to the crown in a region where the rebels were dominant.1

It is hardly surprising to find royal servants like Simon of Pattishall and Henry of Braybrooke were involved in the rebellion in May 1215, when the dissident barons swamped the counties of Northamptonshire and Bedfordshire where their properties lay. The position of the tenants of the honor of Trowbridge, in dispute between the loyal earl of Salisbury and the rebel earl of Hereford, cannot have been comfortable.2

The chronicler known as "Walter of Coventry" or "the canon of Barnwell" has a significant comment on the state of affairs when the barons took Northampton in May 1215 3:

They sent to those near at hand and far afield to throw in their lot with them. And many flocked to them, particularly the younger men, sons and nephews of the magnates, seeming anxious to make names for themselves in warfare. Hence it arose that many houses were divided against themselves: parents and elders stood by the king as their lord, while the juniors were in opposition. We have even known some who for love of their children went over to the other side. And there were some who, though at first they did not agree with the rebels, joined them later because they were friends of fortune or lovers of novelty.

Painter was disinclined to accept the chronicler's emphasis on the youth of the rebels and suggested that he "was clearly thinking of a few well-known cases. The presence of William Marshal the younger in the rebel ranks while his father was a staunch supporter

2 *Rot. lit. claus.*, i. 194b, 200, 202.  
3 ii. 220.
of John must have attracted wide attention."  

The emphasis is the more understandable when we see William Marshal’s quota of two hundred, and Gilbert of Clare’s quota of eighty knights. Between them these two young men apparently commanded nearly a quarter of the quotas of the twenty-four barons when the Memorandum was drawn up.

It is safe, then, to assume that the quotas of the Memorandum were neither recruited nor maintained according to any rules of feudal obligation. Whether or not the rules countenanced the mesne tenant who followed a tenant-in-chief into rebellion and copied his lord’s dissimulation, the legal aspect can have been of small importance. Some were in the baronial camp because they were tenants or friends or loyal servants of the rebel leaders. Some were intimidated by lords or neighbours. Others were there, as “Walter of Coventry” opined, because they were bellicose and wanted to cut a dash. There is no question of a royal army of mercenaries being confronted by a force composed of the combined feudal levies of those tenants-in-chief who had deserted the king. Whether the baronial forces at this stage included mercenaries is doubtful. Late in June the country contained many foreigners who had been recruited for the king and who were now faced with unemployment; but there seems to be no positive evidence.

The disparity between the presumed wealth of some of the twenty-four barons and the quotas assigned to them in the Memorandum suggests that the numbers of knights do not represent an estimate of the total potential force at their disposal. Their total potential resources, assuming that pressure could be consistently applied to tenants (which is unlikely), would include more than this. There were garrisons of castles up and down the country and knights enfeoffed on widely scattered estates. Eustace de Vesci and William de Albini, for instance, might well be concentrating most of the men they could muster on safeguarding their own castles of Alnwick in Northumberland and Belvoir in Leicestershire. The quotas of the Memorandum are

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much more likely to record the numbers (or at least rough estimates)\(^1\) of knights actually under arms in the south east, probably at London, at the immediate disposal of each of these twenty-four magnates. "Walter of Coventry" says that about five hundred knights left Northampton for London in mid-May.\(^2\) If this is approximately true the number in London a month later might well be nearly twelve hundred, as the Memorandum suggests. The purpose of the list can only be a matter for conjecture; but it is hard to see any useful purpose it could have served except as an estimate of numbers of a fighting force: whenever and wherever it was composed there were no more knights at hand. It implies that all available knights were grouped with a definite object in view under the Twenty-five (or rather, the twenty-four apart from the mayor of London). The command is vested in the twenty-four. If there had been other commanders, each with his posse of knights, they would surely have been mentioned and their contributions to the *summa militum* set down.

Given the obscurity of the record, we cannot be certain that all the quotas reflect the application of a single principle. They may indicate partly the resources of individual barons, partly a capacity for leadership and martial renown which had attracted the unattached. Only the latter explanation seems to account for William Marshal's large following. In any case, it would be unwise to suppose that the quotas necessarily corresponded to the command exercised by each of the twenty-four; rather they represent the disposition of a force notionally under unified control, "the Army of God and holy Church". This conjecture is supported by the evidence for William de Albini. According to Roger Wendover (who, as prior of Belvoir, can for once be taken to provide first-hand evidence), after Runnymede William went home to occupy his castle of Belvoir, in Leicestershire. The other baronial leaders repeatedly summoned him to

\(^1\) Only three or possibly four quotas are not of ten or multiples of ten. In a copy made so late as Lambeth MS. 371 it is impossible to be sure that the exceptions are not due to copyists' errors, in the details as well as in the *summa*: William of Huntingfield's quota of seven looks suspicious. But it is equally impossible to put any faith in arbitrary emendation.

\(^2\) ii. 220. It is generally agreed that this was followed by a landslide to the baronial camp. Cf. *Chronica majora*, ii. 587-8.
come south and take charge of Rochester for them. He came to London after Michaelmas. The barons then picked a strong force and put William in command of it. He went to occupy Rochester with 140 knights and all their followers.\textsuperscript{1} It will be noticed that William de Albini had only ten knights set against his name in the Memorandum. But this did not affect the command with which he was entrusted in October. Painter describes him as “perhaps the ablest and most experienced captain in the rebel army”.\textsuperscript{2}

V

To conclude with a summary of tentative findings. No recognizably official list of the Twenty-five barons of Magna Carta is known, and the several existing versions were all written down long after the event. While one of them (the St. Albans version) seems to have a pedigree reaching back to the king's court, the Harleian manuscript may possibly be derived from a London municipal source, the Lambeth manuscript from a baronial source. A comparison of the Charter with the Articles of the Barons suggests that when the Articles were drawn up the draftsmen were planning an orthodox charter of liberties; separate documents were envisaged to safeguard its observance. But in the event the only safeguard was included in the Charter in the basically inconsistent sanctions of clause 61. What may seem to us a trivial matter of form had the effect of leading the pope, in condemning the barons' coercion of the king, to condemn the whole charter of liberties. When, seventeen months later, the liberties were divorced from the unconstitutional sanctions, the Church very naturally and properly approved them.\textsuperscript{3} Our investigation has not discovered how or when the Twenty-five were chosen. But a comparison of the texts suggests that eleven of the chief magnates were designated as executors of the Charter before the remainder had been picked. As for the Lambeth text with its quotas of knights, so strangely neglected, the precise

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Chronica majora}, ii. 621.  
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Reign of King John}, p. 362.  
\textsuperscript{3} Cf. C. R. Cheney, “The Church and Magna Carta”, \textit{Theology}, lxviii (1965), 266-72, at pp. 271-2.
occasion and purpose of the Memorandum is not evident. Yet it has its uses for historians. It helps to dispose of any illusion that the baronial party produced a quasi-feudal levy. Also it provides the first means available to scholars of estimating the numerical strength of the party in its London headquarters at some undiscovered time between mid-June and mid-July 1215.

Lambeth Palace Library, MS. 371, fol. 56v.

¶ Hec sunt nomina baronum qui electi sunt ad observandum omnia que continentur in carta regis secundum demandam baronum.

[column 1] ¶ Comes de Clara cum septem a viginti militibus.
Comes de Arundell b cum XL militibus.
Comes Gloucestrie cum CC militibus.
Comes Wintonie cum XL militibus.
Comes Herefordie cum XL militibus.
Comes Rogerus cum quattuorviginti militibus.

[column 2] ¶ Comes Robertus cum XXX militibus.
 ¶ Willelmus Marescallus cum CC militibus.
 ¶ Robertus filius Walteri cum L militibus.
 ¶ Gilbertus de Clara cum IIIIxx militibus.
 ¶ Eustachius de Vescy cum XXX militibus.
 ¶ Willelmus de Albeny cum X militibus.
 ¶ Hugo Bigot cum XX militibus.

[fo. 57r column 1] ¶ Willelmus de Munbray cum IIIIxx militibus.
 ¶ Galfridus de Say cum XV militibus.
 ¶ Rogerus de Munbray c cum X militibus.
 ¶ Willelmus de Huntingfeld d cum VII militibus.
 ¶ Ricardus de Monte Fichetto cum XXX militibus.
 ¶ Willelmus Malet cum X militibus.

[column 2] ¶ Robertus de Ros cum XX militibus.
 ¶ Willelmus de Lanvallay cum XV militibus.
 ¶ Constabularius Cestrie cum XX militibus.
 ¶ Ricardus de Percy cum X militibus.
 ¶ Ioannes filius Roberti cum X militibus.

Maior d Londonie tradet civitatem Londonie baronibus si forte rex contra cartam suam venire voluerit. Omnes isti comites cum tot militibus et cum communa totius Anglie debent insurgere in regem si forte rex contra cartam suam venire voluerit. Summa militum M C IIIIxx et III.

a septem MS., ? for septies.
b Arundell' MS., for Albermarlie.
c Munbray MS., ? for Munbezon.
d the remainder, following the entry for William Malet, written across the page to make full lines.