THE 39th REGIMENT OF FOOT AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1754-1757

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The connection between the army and the general history of Britain has been very little studied. The military historians have limited themselves to specialized studies, while their co-workers in other fields seem often to be oblivious of the fact that Britain has had a standing army at all. The ethos of the British army has been profoundly influenced by the fact that, for the last two centuries, it has filled a double role, both as a continental force and as a body which has spent much of its time in outlying possessions of the Crown, much the most important of which, until the end of the Second World War, was India. So the story of the first royal regiment to serve in India (1754-7), the 39th Foot, has considerable interest. Moreover it is especially rewarding because it can be studied at two levels; it is well documented in the India Office papers, and the official records are complemented by the papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Bagshawe, which contain both his own letters and the letters of his brother officers.¹

¹ This article is based on the papers of Colonel Samuel Bagshawe in the John Rylands Library and on the following papers in the India Office Library: Home Miscellaneous Series, Abstracts of Letters received from "Coast" and "Bay", Despatches to Madras (Original Drafts), Fort St. David Consultations, The Orme Papers, The Clive Papers. The Madras Public Proceedings and the Madras Select Committee Proceedings have largely been printed for the years 1754-7, the Public Proceedings as Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book (Public Department), vols. 82-7 (Madras, 1941-50), the Select Committee Proceedings as Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book (Military Department), 1754-1756 (Madras, 1912-13). I have used the printed volumes. The Select Committee Proceedings for 1757 have not been printed, and I have used the manuscript volume in the India Office Library. I have also used, in the printed series, Records of Fort St. George, Letters from Fort St. George, 1754, 1756 (Madras, 1942-3). For the papers of Samuel Bagshawe, see F. Taylor, Hand-list of the Bagshawe Muniments deposited in the John Rylands Library (1955). Many extracts from them are given in W. H. G. Bagshawe, The Bagshaws of Ford (privately printed, 1886). I wish to thank
The story of the 39th forms the first chapter in the long association which moulded the character of the British professional army and which is a major episode in the interaction between Indian and British life which has so deeply influenced the history of both countries. The historians often seem to write as if the traffic were all one way. Everyone who is interested in the subject at all knows a great deal about the British impact on India. Much less attention has been devoted to the equally important theme of the effect of the possession of India on British life and institutions. One of the threads was certainly the army, and the impact of the army on society in general. One of the greatest of British soldiers, Wellington, had his first experience of high command as the “sepoy general”; the succession goes down through Roberts to such outstanding leaders of the Second World War as Auchinleck and Slim. The history of the 39th in India was, apart from the detachment which was with Clive at Plassey, unhappy and unsuccessful. It was, however, played out against a background of great events on the Indian scene. The regiment arrived just after the supersession of Dupleix; it went home soon after Plassey and just before the struggle between French and English was fought to a finish in the south. Two of the great English leaders of the time, Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandewash, and Francis Forde, Clive’s right-hand man in Bengal, came out with the 39th, and, when in name it went home, the greater part of the men and a few of the officers transferred to the Company’s service, thus strongly reinforcing the small army of Europeans with which the great victories of the English were won.

The officers of the 39th found themselves in a very difficult position. Not only had they to accustom themselves to a new and dangerous environment; as Francis Forde wrote to Bagshawe, he had been ill and would in Europe have ignored it; “yet in such a place as this when a man is carried off at such short warning, one cannot help being alarmed at the smallest disorder.”¹ They had also to accustom themselves to the command of the

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/136 (1 November 1754).
officials of the East India Company who were, in their own possessions, almost kings in their own right. To the royal troops these seemed jealous, secretive and authoritarian. To the Company's servants the soldiers seemed overbearing, inefficient, and clamant for privileges which had no real relevance to Indian conditions. The Gentleman's Magazine for June 1755 contained a notice of a reward offered by the officers of the 39th for the discovery of the person who had libellously suggested that "the King's Troops are only auxiliaries to the East India Company, and under the unlimited Direction of their Governours and Council".¹ On the other hand the historian Robert Orme, who was a member of the Madras Council himself, wrote to the Secretary of State, "the discipline of regimented Troops, the modes of encampment in Flanders, the heavy baggage, the every manner of warlike operations in Europe are dissonant to the Practices required in Indostan".²

Not only did the establishment of British power in India involve serious problems of adjustment between rulers and ruled; the Europeans themselves were divided and jealous of one another, rallied under the rival banners of the Company and the Crown. One of the best known episodes of this rivalry is the series of disputes between Warren Hastings and the judges of the Calcutta Supreme Court; the story of the relations between Colonel Adlercron and the 39th Foot and the Madras Council is rather similar. The eighteenth century was a quarrelsome and litigious age, and the faults of the time were inevitably exaggerated in a small community of white men, living in close proximity to one another under unhealthy conditions with few of the restraints imposed by the ordinary conditions of European life. At the same time as the Madras Council were quarrelling with Colonel Adlercron, there was a long-drawn-out wrangle going on between them and the Mayor and Aldermen of Madras.³

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/103.
³ Diary and Consultation Book (Public Dept.), lxxxvii (1757), introduction by B. S. Baliga, pp. iv-v.
Wrangling was in the air, but, when it affected officers of the army, some of them with influential connections, it cannot have done good to the standing of the Company at home. Adlercron’s Lieutenant-Colonel, Samuel Bagshawe, was himself a man of good position who had initially made his way under the patronage of William, third Duke of Devonshire.¹ His personal relations with the Company’s officials were friendly, even close; for instance Thomas Saunders, the Governor of Madras who had been the antagonist of Dupleix, wrote to him on arrival home; “I have always taken an opportunity to speak of your politeness & endeavour to promote harmony which I hope does and will flourish”.² Yet Bagshawe clearly felt the gravest dissatisfaction with the Company and its system. So far as the relations of the British and French were concerned, he wrote, “however these transactions may be to the advantage of the English Nation they are such that if the common Rights of Mankind deserve Consideration, both the English and French deserve to be driven off the Coast (of Coromandel)”³. After the regiment had returned from India, he wrote to Adlercron that little attention had been paid to their proceedings and that the Company had an interest which would support it “till a National Enquiry is made into their Management”.⁴ By about 1760 intelligent men were beginning to concern themselves with problems of Indian administration which grew more pressing as the Company changed from an association of merchants into a sovereign power. Bagshawe himself, on his return, drew up a scheme for supplying the Company with troops by enlisting men, who had been discharged by regiments quartered in Ireland, to go to India for five years—a scheme which is of no special importance in itself but which is indicative of this growing concern.⁵ Further there was a humanitarian demand for justice for the peoples of India. In fact, the experiences of the 39th may have added a rivulet to the growing torrent of opinion which felt, as Charles Jenkinson put it, that the affairs of the Company were growing too big “for the

² Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/245 (10 October 1755).
³ Ibid. 2/6/15 (16 February 1756).
⁴ Ibid. 2/6/161 (21 November 1758).
⁵ Ibid. 2/6/147.
The regiment arrived in India in autumn 1754. The previous years had seen the meteoric rise of the French power under Dupleix, the capture of Madras from the English, the emergence of Robert Clive, the successful English operations round Trichinopoly under Stringer Lawrence, and the establishment of the English candidate as Nawab of the Carnatic. The 39th had been sent out at the request of the English Company, fearful of French successes, though the conclusion of the truce of 1754 made the regiment a less welcome auxiliary. Negotiations between the British and French Governments had been undertaken in Europe, and it had been agreed that they should be conducted by commissaries in India. The French, believing that Dupleix lacked the qualifications, decided to supersede him and sent out Godeheu as commissary with absolute authority over their Indian settlements. Godeheu arrived at Pondicherry on 1 August 1754 and at once superseded Dupleix. A suspension of arms was made on 11 October, followed on 26 October by a truce for three months. At the end of December a provisional treaty was made which was to endure until news of its confirmation or otherwise had been received from Europe, neither nation being allowed to obtain new cessions or forts during the truce.

Whatever the true balance of advantage in these arrangements, the English fear and suspicion of their rivals were unquenched. Orme, who came out in 1754 as a member of the Madras Council, wrote that the terms of the truce were so precarious and unequal that they could be justified only if the continuance of the war was deemed incompatible with the existence of the Company. Bagshawe wrote that the revenues of the French acquisitions were fourteen times as much as those of the English, apart from

districts which the French had obtained in Golconda. ¹ The same note appears over and over again in the Madras records, particularly in regard to "Golconda", the territories of the Subahdar of the Deccan to the north. In October 1754 the Select Committee of the Madras Council considered that the French claims in the Deccan, where the French under Bussy had established a predominant position at the court of the Subahdar Salabat Jang, might make further negotiation impossible "unless these unbounded Pretensions are previously reduc'd within the limits of Equality". ² In 1756, when tension was growing again, the Select Committee were negotiating with the French Governor, de Leyrit, who argued that the object of the truce had been to make peace in the Carnatic and who consequently claimed full freedom of action in the Deccan. This interpretation of the truce the English indignantly rejected, arguing that it must be binding in both provinces alike. ³ No peace could be enduring, they argued, if the French were allowed to continue their advance in the north. ⁴ Unless this background of fear and suspicion be remembered, many of the events which befell the 39th cannot be fully understood. It explains the plans of summer 1756, for intervention in the Deccan, which were made abortive by Siraj-ud-daula's attack on the Company in Bengal. It clarifies the attitude of the Madras Government towards the Bengal expedition which they naturally regarded as a mere sideshow in comparison with the danger of a French attack, both in the Carnatic and in the north, where the English settlement of Vizagapatam fell to Bussy in June 1757, a few days before Plassey was fought. Soon after that the 39th were recalled, but it was an officer of the regiment, Francis Forde, who re-established the British position in the Northern Sarkars, defeated the French at Condore and captured Masulipatam (1758-9). ⁵

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/224 (To the Duke of Devonshire, 5 March 1755).
² Diary and Consultation Book (Military Department) (1754), p. 247.
³ Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 105; Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 77 (President and Select Committee of Madras to Secret Committee of East India Company, 1 March 1756); for the arrangement of this series of documents, see S. C. Hill, Catalogue of the Home Miscellaneous Series of the India Office Records (1927).
⁴ Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 70.
The greatest and best known of those who play a part in the Indian adventures of the 39th is, of course, Robert Clive, who returned to the Coromandel Coast in June 1756 as Deputy-Governor of Fort St. David, a subordinate British settlement near Pondicherry where the regiment had originally been stationed. Apart from him the most distinguished of the Company’s officers was Stringer Lawrence, who, because Adlercron was senior to him, took no part in military affairs during most of the time the regiment was in India. Among his juniors were James Kilpatrick, who, after distinguished service, died in Bengal in 1757 and John Caillaud who did valuable work in the troubled southern regions of Trichinopoly and Madura and who later commanded the Company’s troops in both Madras and Bengal. Governor Saunders of Madras returned to England in January 1755 and was succeeded by George Pigot who remained in office until 1763, and who, with Clive’s predecessor as Deputy-Governor of Fort St. David, Richard Starke, was the chief representative of the Company in the quarrels with the royal officers.

The Colonel of the 39th Foot, John Adlercron, was a man over sixty years of age who was probably of Swiss extraction, though the name sounds Swedish. He had become Colonel of the regiment in March 1752, became a Lieutenant-General in 1760 and died in 1766. He was probably too old to face the completely new conditions of Indian service. James Wolfe described him as a “very poor insignificant officer”, and Governor Pigot, writing to Clive about his campaign against the French in 1757 said “this poor Man at the head of the Army makes sad work”. Though the Governor and the Colonel had little reason to love one another, it is a fair judgement enough on the evidence provided. Adlercron’s letters are full of an obstinate, ineffective self-righteousness, of constant appeals to his duty towards “the King my Master”, and of a strong sense of his position as commander-in-chief, all of which must have made him almost impossible to work with. Clearly his relations with his

1 C. T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment (1947), i. 296.
2 Robert Wright, Life of Major General James Wolfe (1864), pp. 317, 318 n.
3 Clive Papers, Box 22 (20 June 1757).
Lieutenant-Colonel, Samuel Bagshawe, and his other officers were bad. "I do not find", wrote Captain Walsh to Bagshawe in 1758, "that there was perfect harmony in the Corps",¹ and the officers' letters suggest that the Colonel was the chief cause of this. He had, wrote Surgeon William Kellett to Bagshawe, who had come home in 1756, dismissed first Carnac and then Lewis, "who had behaved himself to the liking of the Regiment", from being his secretary; "Affairs have not", Kellett went on (25 June 1757), "amended since your Departure".² There is a suggestion in a letter of Major Forde's³ that Adlercron was jealous of Bagshawe; Bagshawe himself thought that the Colonel had on all occasions done his best to "thwart mortify and contradict" him, and had made him believe that "he aims at depriving me of my Commission and would be glad of my Death".⁴

Bagshawe himself had become an ensign in the regiment in 1740 and Lieutenant-Colonel in 1749. He had already lost a leg in an expedition to the French coast in 1746 and was to lose an eye in India, being invalided home in autumn 1756 since it was feared that he might lose the other eye and even his life.⁵ Despite his physical disabilities, he went on serving and raised a new regiment, the 93rd, though he died in 1762 at the age of forty-nine. The picture of him which emerges from his correspondence is a very favourable one. He was clearly an excellent and devoted regimental officer. Kellett wrote to him on one occasion in India, and apologized for bothering him with so long a letter at a busy time, but "that I know you interest yourself in the minutest Things which concern the Regiment".⁶ Long after he came home Captain Archibald Grant was corresponding with him about the remittance to Europe of the money left by the men of his company who had died on service in Bengal and its division among their heirs—a correspondence which suggests

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/2/752 (16 June 1758).
² Ibid. 2/6/150, 151.
³ Ibid. 2/5/147 (10 November 1754).
⁴ Ibid. 2/5/240 (undated and unaddressed).
⁵ Ibid. 2/6/116 (18 October 1756); for details of Bagshawe's career see B.J.R.L. xxxix. 356-9.
⁶ Ibid. 2/5/176 (6 December 1754).
Bagshawe’s concern for the matter as well as Grant’s. His junior officers were clearly devoted to him; his kindness of heart is suggested by the many occasions on which they ask him to perform services for them, from Forde wanting a place for a nephew as a book-keeper among the merchants of Madras to Lieutenant Fortescue asking for two or three pounds of green tea as it was dear and bad at Cuddalore, and for a palanquin for Captain Wray. Bagshawe’s friendship, wrote John Corneille—the “my dear Cor” of the Lieutenant-Colonel’s letters—“makes me look back with pleasure on my India expedition”; and Captain David Hepburne gave practical demonstration of his feelings by offering, on his return home, to lend Bagshawe £600 on whatever terms he liked. Kellett was obviously a close friend; the son of a captain in the 27th Regiment, he became an ensign in 1757, and eventually commanded the regiment at the great siege of Gibraltar 1778-83. The major of the 39th, Verney Lovett, was an officer of aristocratic connections; he does not play a very prominent part in the Bagshawe correspondence. Despite official differences, Bagshawe’s relations with the servants of the Company, like Lawrence, Orme, Caillaud, and Kilpatrick, were as cordial as his relations with his brother officers; the Company’s representatives were, he wrote home in February 1756, “a good Sort of People as can be who neither want Sense nor good Nature & Persons I should choose to be acquainted w’th not only in this but any Part of the World”.

When the regiment received its orders for India, it was serving in Ireland. On 31 January 1754 the Adjutant-General sent instructions that it should be made up by drafts to “three Serjeants three Corporals two Drums and seventy private men per Company”. One hundred men were to be paraded by each regiment providing the drafts from whom an officer of the 39th was to choose fifty. Full administrative details followed from

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1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/163, 167, 199, 202, 203, 204.
2 Ibid. 2/5/123, 129 (23, 26 October 1754).
3 Ibid. 2/2/113 (27 September 1759).
4 Ibid. 2/2/264 (19 August 1758).
5 B.J.R.L. xxxix. 382-3.
6 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/21 (To Capt. Levett, 20 February 1756).
7 Ibid. 2/5/2.
Ladeveze, the regimental agent. Tents were to be provided for the officers, who were themselves to provide beds and bedding; recruiting parties and absent officers were to report back; new clothing was to be issued, "the Coats . . . to be lined with Linnen made shorter than usual, & to have only one fold in the skirts, that they may as light as possible". Further there was the question of an officer's exchange: an ensign on Irish half-pay who wished to go and had the Colonel's approval of the following terms, "to any subaltern whose situation is such that he would chuse to stay behind, viz. He will give his half pay, and one hundred & fifty pounds Irish money for a Lieutenancy Or his half pay and fifty pounds Irish money for an Ensigncy." As time presses a speedy answer must be given "that I may give in the Memorial whilst the Colonel is in London, for nothing of that kind will be done after he has left it." John Calcraft, the famous army agent, who took over the regimental agency at this time, had applied for a year and a quarter's subsistence in advance, which he would invest in silver to save the 40 per cent. discount which had to be paid if money were drawn from India. In fact, the regiment lost heavily through fluctuations in the exchange rate; Bagshawe wrote in November 1754 that they had lost 18½ per cent. on the silver which they had brought with them for the regiment's pay. In August of the following year Calcraft wrote that, because of the loss resulting from taking out the pay in silver, he would try and send the next remittance in "Portugal Gold and round Dollars". Much trouble was also caused by the fact that Major Forde, who had been appointed paymaster, neglected to send home accounts; Calcraft had been unable to pay some of Bagshawe's bills, he explained, because he did not know what credit to give, being ignorant of what Forde had paid to him or to the other officers in India.

For Bagshawe himself the expedition posed some special problems. First of all he was anxious for the rank of Colonel to put him above Major Sewell, who had been, he argued, put into the regiment, and who had a commission of Lieutenant-Colonel of a prior date to his own. However, this difficulty was overcome

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1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/4.  
2 Ibid. 2/5/143.  
3 Ibid. 2/5/237.  
4 Ibid. 2/6/133 (10 December 1756).
by Sewell's retirement. Secondly, he feared that his lameness might cause his transfer to another regiment, and protested vigorously if I am not so active as I have been it is not my fault, I leave it to others to say how I became so, I think I am well esteemed in the Regiment and I hope I shall not be found a Boaster if I say the removing me would be a greater Discouragement to the Men than perhaps the Service would receive benefit from putting into it a quicker Mover.

He must have been cheered by news from Adlercron, who had been received by the Duke of Cumberland, who "told me that you wanted a Legg, that he knew you to be a good & careful Officer". At first he had hoped that his wife might be able to accompany them, but Calcraft informed him that women would not be able to go since the ships would be very full.

Naturally the officers wished to obtain some information about the strange new country for which they were bound, and Bagshawe had some correspondence with Major John Mompesson, who had gone out in 1747 in command of the independent companies sent with Admiral Boscawen's expedition. It was ominous of future trouble that one of the papers which Mompesson sent was a memorial from the captains and subalterns to Boscawen, asking that he "will not oblige us to Role in Duty with those of Merchants, nor to submit to the Command of India Governours or others, but such as have a Regular Established Military Authority over us". There can have been little time for considering such problems in the bustle of preparing for embarkation, which began on 23 March, though it was delayed by damage to the fleet by a storm. A return of the new drafts, made shortly before, showed that they consisted of 483 men. According to the adjutant's return of the distribution of the officers and men on the ships, the regiment's complement consisted of 38 officers (including the chaplain, the surgeon and four surgeons' mates), 30 serjeants, 30 corporals, 20 drummers, and 700 privates. Between the date of augmentation and 2 March 2 men had died, 22 had deserted, and 32 had been discharged.
Indiamen—arrived on the Coromandel Coast between 1 September and 21 December, Bagshawe arriving on the first to land, the Britannia, Indiaman. The detachment of Royal Artillery under Captain William Hislop, sent with the regiment, arrived between the 1st and 22nd September.¹

The arrival of the royal troops coincided, as we have seen, with the truce between the English and the French Companies. Consequently there was no immediate military objective to be achieved which might have enforced co-operation on the Madras Council and Colonel Adlercron alike; any differences which arose between them were likely to rage unchecked. The historian of the Madras Army made the point that the Company was always jealous of its military servants and inclined to keep down their numbers and reduce their authority, a sentiment which the soldiers repaid by being less respectful towards their masters than they would otherwise have been.² The dispatches from home make it clear that relations between Saunders and Lawrence had been bad, and the Madras authorities were urged to show a proper regard for Lawrence’s opinion in military operations and appointments.³ It is not surprising then that Adlercron and his officers faced a suspicious administration. The need for reinforcements, the Madras Select Committee submitted to their masters in London, was certainly urgent, but it might be better, instead of sending royal troops, to send men in the Company’s service in transports or in their own ships.⁴ They wanted men and materials, but, after they had had some experience of Adlercron, they were quite clear that they did not want senior officers. “No officer”, wrote Orme, “of a higher rank than a captain should be sent abroad”.⁵ The powers and prerogatives claimed by Adlercron, Pigot wrote to the Secret Committee in London, were incompatible with the authority of the Company. The inconvenience might be lessened if the field officers were recalled, and the companies made independent, and it would be better still if the men could be incorporated with

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/54, 55.
² Lt.-Col. W. J. Wilson, History of the Madras Army (Madras, 1882), i. 4-5.
⁴ Home Misc. 93 (20), p. 279 (10 November 1754).
the Company's own forces. Unless this were done, the Select Committee thought, "no essential Services can be expected from these Troops".

The Company's servants were jealous of their authority and sensitive of the airs of superiority which the royal troops seemed to assume. The royal officers felt that they were at the mercy of mere merchants who knew nothing of the military art, but yet were anxious to keep everything in their own hands. Adlercron explained the situation, as he saw it, in a letter home of February 1757: "these Gentlemen have been so long and so much accustomed to arbitrary and despotic sway, that they cannot possibly endure any Person, who is not immediately subservient to their Pleasures". Civilian jealousy of the military must have made the situation difficult anyway; it was made even more treacherous by a serious discrepancy between the Crown and the Company view of Adlercron's powers. His instructions, as communicated to the Madras Select Committee on his arrival, referred to him as "commanding in chief the land forces to be employ'd in the East Indies", and ordered him on his arrival in India to take upon himself "the Command of all the Forces, belonging to the Company on the Coast of Coromandel". In correspondence with the officers of other European princes, he was to use the title of "Colonel in our Service, & of Commander in Chief of the Troops of the English East India Company". This clearly gave Adlercron an overriding command, and he claimed accordingly to enjoy "sole authority over the Company's Troops without exception of Places". The instructions sent by the Company were far less extensive since they referred to the Colonel simply as Commander in Chief of His Majesty's land forces without any mention of authority over the Company's troops and garrisons. As a later home dispatch explained, it was not usual to communicate government instructions, and so it had been impossible to send anything more explicit.

1 Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 78-80.  
2 Abstracts of Letters from "Coast" and "Bay", 6 (1754-60), p. 171 (6 June 1757).  
3 Home Misc. 94, pp. 416-17.  
4 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, pp. 218-19.  
5 Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 50 (8 August 1755).  
6 Dispatches to Madras, 1, pp. 156, 256 (2, 15 March 1754).  
7 Ibid. 581 (19 December 1755).
Meanwhile the Madras authorities had to choose between "an opposition to his Majesty's Instructions on the one, and possibly a failure in our Duty to you on the other part". Not unnaturally they chose to obey their own superiors. The Court of Directors had not said that the Company's forces were to be put under Adlercron's command, and they could not have intended such a step to be taken unless they had directly authorized it because it would leave with the "President and Council only a shadow of Government". On the other hand they persuaded themselves that His Majesty's instructions could not really mean what they appeared to mean. Firstly he had expressed his intention of maintaining the Company's rights and privileges, one of which unquestionably was to raise a military force and to appoint officers for it. Secondly the articles of war, made under the Act of Parliament recently passed for the punishment of mutiny and desertion in India, had ordered that royal officers should rank senior to all Company's officers of their own rank; "this & this only", the Select Committee argued, "is the superior Command his Majesty has been pleas'd under the Sanction of Parliament to invest his officers with over those of the Company". The latter argument may seem highly sophistical, but it was probably good enough for men who had already determined what they were going to do. For the moment the Select Committee decided to conceal its views and to invite Adlercron to Madras to negotiate. In sending information to Lawrence of their determinations, however, they wrote frankly that a compliance with "Col Adlercron's [sic] Pretensions... would not be very pleasing to Us".

Quarters and allowances formed the first subject of complaint by the royal forces. Bagshawe, who arrived before Adlercron, wrote to Deputy Governor Starke, complaining of the insufficiency of the quarters and of the fact that the provisions issued were less than those given to the Company's troops. He also asked for fuel, candles, and household furniture for the officers, for horses for the adjutant and the major, and for himself, since he lacked a

1 Home Misc. 93 (20), p. 276 (from President and Select Committee of Madras, 10 November 1754).
2 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, pp. 221-2.
3 Ibid. p. 224.
leg, a horse, a palanquin and peons. The parallel which the royal officers drew was Boscawen's expedition. Adlercron's commission, Starke was reminded, "is as full as Admiral Boscawen's and as absolute over all the Forces of the East India Cy on the Coast of Coromondel. He has the power of Life and Death the Disposal of Commissions at Pleasure, & is to be consulted & is entitled to sit with the Councils of the East India Cy apointed on this occasion on all the Plans of Operations wch shall be formed for the Service of the Comp".  

Adlercron on his arrival repeated the same complaints and demanded a return of the Company's troops at Fort St. David. Once again the Madras Council felt that, in the light of their instructions, the demands of the royal forces were excessive, but they ordered that the colonel, lieutenant-colonel and major be provided with palanquins and horses when in the field but not in garrison, that the troops be victualled for fourteen days after their arrival and that arrangements be made for a plentiful and cheap bazaar to be held at Cuddalore, near Fort St. David, that everything possible should be done to make the quarters of both officers and men convenient, and that such furniture as could be provided for the senior officers should be obtained.

These disputes were annoying but not insoluble; far greater difficulties were provided by the problem of rival authorities. The Madras Council reminded the Council at Fort St. David that, though they were to do all they could to promote good relations, they were always to remember that "the settlement of Fort St. David & its Districts belong to the Company & are committed to Your Charge, the King's Troops are therefore not to have any Command, but are to be consider'd merely as Troops in Quarters". The inconsistency with Bagshawe's views quoted above is obvious. On 30 September the Fort St. David Council informed the Presidency that Adlercron had demanded the command of the Company's troops, the right to give the password at the fort, and the returns of the garrison. At the time

1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/57 (undated).
2 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, pp. 217-18.
3 Diary (Public Dept.) Ixxxiii (June-December 1754), 147-8 (13 September);
Fort St. David Consultations, 8 (1752-6) : 1754, pp. 129-30 (18 September).
4 Fort St. David Consultations, 8 : 1754, p. 133 (21 September).
the Madras Council decided to temporize.¹ In mid-October Adlercron, not choosing to leave his troops himself, sent Bagshawe to Madras to negotiate with the Council over the three points at issue: whether they acknowledged his authority over both the king’s and the Company’s forces, whether they would give him the title of colonel in the royal service and commander in chief of the Company’s troops, and whether they would consult him in their deliberations according to the king’s instructions.²

The negotiations got off to a bad start because they coincided with the arrest and trial by Adlercron of a sepoy of the Cuddalore garrison against the wishes of Deputy Governor Starke.³ Again there was a conflict of view. Adlercron claimed that his instructions gave him sole authority to order courts martial for all offenders whether in the service of the Crown or the Company. The orders sent out by the Court of Directors were not explicit and they did state that they had “power to authorize their President & Council to appoint Courts Martial within the jurisdiction of the Settlement”.⁴ A further grievance on Adlercron’s side was that the suspension of arms with the French had been made without his being informed.⁵ The note of being kept in ignorance of the real course of events runs right through Adlercron’s and Bagshawe’s correspondence, and was a constant and understandable source of irritation.⁶ Despite all these difficulties, Bagshawe’s first impression was favourable and he found Governor Saunders inclined to concessions; however, the Governor soon informed him that some members of the Council were less conciliatory, and Bagshawe felt uncertain what the Governor’s real intentions were.⁷ Later in the month

¹ Fort St. David Consultations, 8: p. 141 (30 September 1754); Diary (Public Dept.) June–December 1754, pp. 168-9 (26 September), 170-1 (30 September).
² Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, p. 244.
⁴ Dispatches to Madras, 1, p. 260 (15 March 1754).
⁵ Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, p. 243.
⁶ Adlercron wrote to Henry Fox (21 November 1756) about events in the Deccan: “I cannot however depend upon the accounts I receive, as I have them only from hearsay; the Company’s Managers never favouring me with the least intelligence, but on the contrary are industrious to keep me in a total ignorance of everything that passes” (Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 208).
⁷ Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/99, 105 (12, 13 October 1754).
Bagshawe wrote that a favourable regulation about allowances was being prepared, to which Adlercron replied that he still could not alter his opinion until his title and power over the Company's troops were accepted. On 31 October Bagshawe and the Council made an agreement. The Commander in Chief agreed not to claim authority over the settlements or their garrisons and to allow regimental courts martial to be held without application being made to him on every occasion. The Governor agreed to recognize Adlercron's title and to send him returns of the settlement garrisons.

At first all seemed to go well, and Adlercron wrote a few days later to Bagshawe to say that he was ready to accept the concession made. He must soon have drawn back, however, perhaps from fear of committing himself against his orders, for Bagshawe was soon arguing that any other arrangement would weaken the hands of the Governor and Company over the natives, would hinder their affairs, and would contravene the orders given them by their superiors which they had to obey. "If each of you", Bagshawe pleaded, "are determined to abide by the Letters of your Powers what can follow but Confusion & endless Opposition, instead of Harmony Discord, Jarring for a good Understanding and Enmity for Friendship". In another letter Bagshawe said that, if the convention were not signed, "Colonel Lawrence has sworn to me he will immediately leave the Country and Service". Yet on 16 December Adlercron, who had come to Madras, informed the President and Council that he could not sign the convention because it was contrary to his instructions, and he gave an equivocal promise that he would not interfere with the command of the garrisons otherwise than he had already done at Fort St. George and Fort St. David. The negotiations had not been entirely in vain; the Madras Council sent orders that the pay and allowances of H.M. troops should be made equal to those of their own at a monthly cost of 1,400 pagodas, and that the troops should be removed from Cuddalore, near Fort St. David, to the

1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/120, 121, 130 (26, 29 October 1754).
2 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, pp. 253-4.
3 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/137 (5 November 1754).
4 Ibid. 2/5/160, 163, 164.
5 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, p. 274; Home Misc. 93 (20), p. 259.
Garden House and the surrounding barracks. It is clear that Bagshawe's insistence had forced them into these measures rather against their will. But on the more material questions of rival authorities his appeals for conciliation had ultimately met with no response from his commander. It is too much to believe that, if the convention had been signed, everything would have worked out entirely happily, but at least there might have been some foundation for co-operation. As it was the fundamental question of the command in the Company's forts and garrisons remained unsettled.

Trouble rumbled on throughout 1755, though the Select Committee tried to avoid a crisis. In July 1755 Adlercron put the commandants at Fort St. David and Cuddalore under arrest for not immediately publishing in their garrisons an order which he had issued before it had been shown to the Deputy Governor. On 4 August a Council of War, consisting of the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel Bagshawe, and Major Lovett repeated Adlercron's claim to supreme authority, stated that this had been neglected and the royal troops treated with indignity, and in consequence that the commander in chief's assurances, given in his letter of December 1754, should be revoked. Adlercron's letter of 8 August to the Select Committee cannot have improved matters. He began with the assumption, expressed in terms as galling as possible, that the Company's officials were without knowledge of military matters, and that they were behaving in a fashion which would display to people in England their ignorance of them. He continued:

"Write to me plainly that you do not intend to employ his Majesty's Forces because you prefer the private Interest of your own Troops and Servants, to Justice or any other Consideration; and that you cannot bear to see any other Authority exercised here but your own; publickly avow what I have too much reason to believe are your private Sentiments, that the King of Great Britain has no Authority in or over your Settlements, I shall then quietly continue as inactive as possible, that the Company's officials were without knowledge of military matters, and that they were behaving in a fashion which would display to people in England their ignorance of them. He continued:"

1 Fort St. David Consultations, 8: 1754, p. 184 (31 December); Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1754, p. 281.
3 "Harmony entirely depends on the Clear Settlement of this Point" (Abstracts of Letters from "Coast" and "Bay" 6, p. 40 (12 January 1755).
4 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1755, pp. 106-7, 111, 114-15, 123, 136, 196; Fort St. David Consultations 8: 1755, p. 90.
you have hitherto industriously kept me, till I have received the King my Master's Orders how to act, or if you disavow this, give me proof of your sincerity by not opposing me in the exertion of my power in its full extent.

To admit the colonel's claims, the Committee observed, "would reduce the Priviledges of the East India Company into a very small Compass indeed, during Colonel Adlercron's Stay in India".¹

After a few months without trouble Adlercron issued (3 January 1756) an order that the garrison at Cuddalore and the out-guards at Fort St. David should receive their orders from him alone. On this occasion the blow struck the Company in a very tender spot—the military subordination of the officers in their own service. The same day ten Swiss of Captain Schaub's company deserted from Cuddalore and the Deputy Governor was not informed until the following day so that the men were able to escape. Further, Schaub himself left Fort St. David and went to Pondicherry, which lies only about fifteen miles away, without either the permission or the knowledge of the Deputy Governor. As a consequence of this the Select Committee decided to ask for a court martial on Captain Schaub.² When the court met in 18 March, Starke charged him with disrespect and neglect of duty for going to Pondicherry without leave and for neglect of duty in not reporting the desertion of the ten men under his command. He was acquitted on the second charge; on the first he was acquitted of neglect of duty but found guilty of disrespect. However it was considered that the submission he had made and the confinement he had suffered were sufficient punishment.³ Schaub's intention, both before his trial and during the proceedings, was clearly to appeal to Adlercron's orders as his justification. He had aimed, as the Select Committee observed in their consultation of 9 April, "to prove his very great respect to Colonel Adlercron and his very little Respect for the Deputy Governor. . . . The Evil therefore which we apprehended from the Publication of that Order (Adlercron's order of

¹ Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 42-58 (President and Select Committee of Madras to Secret Committee of East India Company, with enclosures, 27 October 1755).
² Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, pp. 16-18, 21, 32-3, 36-7, 47-8.
³ The proceedings are in ibid. pp. 135-8.
3 January) has already gain'd fast Root to the entire Ruin of all Military Subordination in the Company's Service.1

Although Adlercron refused to rescind the objectionable order,2 the situation was changed when, in May, he received instructions from the Secretary of War, Henry Fox, informing him that the Company were sovereigns in their own forts which were therefore not under his command, but under the authority of the Company's governors, while the allowances made to the regiment were a matter of bounty not of right.3 These instructions, Lieutenant Carnac wrote to Bagshawe, had given "much satisfaction to the people here, and the face at least of content and good humour appears now upon all occasions between the Commander in Chief and the presidency".4 But the damage had been done and any basis of mutual confidence destroyed. By 1756 war with the French was near. These disputes, Pigot wrote to the Secret Committee in London (March 1756), had hitherto not greatly mattered because there had been no absolute need for the royal troops to take the field. Yet, if they had to do so, their sense of their own superiority would make them demand concessions which would be incompatible with the Company's interest. It is hardly surprising that the Governor deemed Adlercron's declaration that he was responsible to no one but the king "a Lesson to us to employ your Troops and officers in preference".5 The results of that feeling are writ large in the Madras Council's later policy, and in the frustration of the regiment's ambitions to be sent on service.

The conclusion of the truce had left the English with the problem of firmly establishing the authority of the Nawab of the Carnatic. They wished to bring him from Trichinopoly to Arcot, the old capital of the province, and to assert his power over, and to claim his revenues from, the "Polligars" or chieftains in the Madura and Tinnevelly districts, the wide tract of country south of the river Cauvery on which the great fortress of

1 The proceedings are in Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 133; see also Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 73-4.
2 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 148.
3 Public Record Office, W.O. 4/50, p. 457 (13 October 1755); Dispatches to Madras 1, pp. 581-2; Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 167.
4 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/43 (22 May 1756).
Trichinopoly stands. Once the Nawab’s revenues had been collected, he would be able to discharge his considerable debt to the English, who were acutely worried about the expenses of the recent operations of war. Bagshawe certainly looked on these southern districts as a field for service. In December 1754 he wrote to the Commander in Chief asking to be sent to Trichinopoly as the station of next importance to his own. Clearly Adlercron was not sympathetic, for in May Bagshawe noted that this command, or the expedition to the south under Lieutenant-Colonel Heron, soon to be mentioned, was his proper post, but "the Commander in Chief of the King’s Troops thinks otherwise". Nor were the Company any more favourable, for they had employed officers junior to him on lucrative employments, and they feared that the king’s officers would gain knowledge of their transactions. In November 1755 he wrote to the Select Committee protesting against troops being sent on service under a junior officer, and claiming "untill I am convicted of want of Courage, Capacity and Conduct " to be sent in command of any body of troops appropriate to his rank over which the Commander in Chief did not take command himself. The Committee in reply told him that they considered his proper post to be with the regiment. They believed that their omission to put Adlercron at the head of the small expeditions undertaken since the truce was the real source of their troubles with him. The task of collecting money from the polligars and tax-farmers was not, they thought, sufficiently honourable for the king’s forces, and, in a situation where financial issues were of primary importance, it was a serious drawback that they were not responsible to the Company for their conduct. Moreover to move them to Trichinopoly would have been a great additional expense. "We cannot help remarking", the Select Committee explained

1 Cf. the dispatch from England, 25 March 1757: "The Company’s Capital lies Bleeding almost to Death upon the Coast of Choromandel" (Dispatches to Madras 1, p. 716).
2 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/184.
3 Ibid. 2/5/224.
4 Ibid. 2/5/240 (undated and unaddressed); see also 2/6/7 (to Henry Fox, 13 January 1756).
5 Ibid. 2/5/261, 264; Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1755, pp. 215-16, 224.
to the Secret Committee in London, “that until the rumour of Colonel Heron’s having made a large fortune came to St. David, these Gentlemen were particularly well pleased with their Situation and thankful to the Company for their Handsome Allowances”. ¹

The expedition sent to the south in 1755 under Lieutenant Colonel Heron had been a failure, and, when he returned, he was court-martialled at Madras. He was accused of making large private profits out of the money collected from the polligars and of farming out the revenues in consideration of large presents to himself, instead of giving a full account of the money collected and applying it to the benefit of the Nawab and the Company. He was further charged with disobeying orders to return to Trichinopoly, and of conduct unbecoming an officer in permitting images to be removed from a temple and in allowing his force to be surprised on its return march.² He was found guilty, and, Governor Pigot having warned him that civil proceedings might be taken against him, he fled from Madras to put himself under Dutch or French protection. “The Event” wrote Bagshawe, who had been president of the court, to Adlercron, “engages every Body [sic] attention in this Town”.³ The behaviour of “the late unworthy Col’ Heron”, as a home dispatch called him,⁴ must have increased even further the Presidency’s suspicion and fear of military men. He was himself a royal officer, who had joined their service in Madras only in September 1754, a man of comparable rank and background to Adlercron and Bagshawe. Though no proof can be offered for the suggestion, it is a reasonable conjecture that his misconduct strengthened even more their determination not to employ the 39th on service, if that could possibly be avoided. Given the same opportunities, Pigot and his colleagues may have thought, Adlercron and his officers could have done the same; there was the double danger of peculation and of disobedience.

¹ Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 44.
² For an account of the expedition see Orme, Transactions, i. 381-97; Cambridge, War in India, pp. 83-6; Bagshawe’s summary of evidence at the court martial in Bagshawe MSS., 2/5/256-8; see also Diary (Public Dept.), lxxxiv (1755), 262-3. ³ Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/270 (5 December 1755).
⁴ Dispatches to Madras 1, p. 654; see also pp. 650, 721.
While these events had been taking place, the danger of a French war had been steadily growing. In February 1756 the Select Committee decided that, though hostilities were not likely to break out immediately, everything was to be kept in readiness for war. In May a ship, which had left England in November 1755, brought news that fighting had begun in America and that a number of French ships had been taken. The same month a naval squadron under Admiral Watson arrived off the Coast, bringing Clive, who was to succeed to the Deputy Governorship of Fort St. David; they were followed, probably in July, by reinforcements for the 39th Foot under the command of Captain Eyre Coote. In July too, after the Committee had heard news of the expected arrival of a French fleet at Pondicherry, they decided to bring the regiment and the train of artillery from Fort St. David to Madras, a distance by land of about seventy miles. They had been forced, in order that the regiment might be ready to take the field, to comply with large demands on Adlercron’s part for supplies and allowances. The foot and the artillery, under Bagshawe’s command, sailed to Madras in the middle of July. In the previous month Admiral Watson had asked for a detachment of royal troops to make up his ships to their full complement, and a detachment of 280 officers and men, under the command of Major Lovett, had embarked on 13 June.

So the forces were gathering for war. The most promising means of attacking the French seemed at first to be in the Deccan. At the end of May the Select Committee had heard reports of a quarrel between de Bussy and Salabat Jang, which might afford an opportunity to intervene. By July there was a definite scheme to send a detachment to aid Salabat Jang against the French, “a Step”, the Committee thought, “most highly necessary for the Security of the Trade of the English on this Coast.” On 27

1 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 101 (26 February).
2 Letters from Fort St. George (1756), pp. 32-6.
3 Orme, Transactions, i. 410; Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/95; Atkinson, Dorsetshire Regt., i. 70.
4 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, pp. 219-20.
5 Ibid. pp. 70-3, 96-7, 121, 129.
6 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/86, 98 (12, 20 July 1756).
7 Ibid. 2/6/47, 48, 50, 51; Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 204-5.
8 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, p. 185.
9 Ibid. p. 222.
July the Committee decided to send 400 men, and asked Adlercron's advice about their plans. He expressed his own readiness to go on the expedition or to send any of his officers, and gave his own opinion that the 400 men could be spared from the Coast, though he said that the plans must be debated by a council of war. When this assembled it decided that the train of artillery, in addition to the 400 men originally suggested, should be sent, though both Lawrence and Bagshawe did not wish the total force to exceed 400. On 2 August the Select Committee decided to accept the council's recommendations, and to make all necessary preparations. They were thwarted by events in Bengal.

The Madras Council had heard in mid-July of the dispute between the presidency of Fort William and the Nawab, Siraj-ud-daula, and they agreed to send a force of 250 men under Major Kilpatrick, who sailed on 20 July. On 6 August the Governor of Madras informed the Select Committee that the Council had resolved to send further reinforcements to Bengal and to suspend the expedition to Salabat Jang's camp. News of the fall of Calcutta reached Madras on 16 August. Thereafter the course of events can be followed almost day by day. On the 17th the Council decided to consult Admiral Watson and to suspend the embarkation of any more troops. Watson was doubtful about the wisdom of taking his ships up the Hugli, but the Council decided to ask him for his whole squadron and to send all the land forces which could be spared, under the command either of Pigot or of Clive. On the 19th Adlercron was informed of the situation, and it was agreed that 200 Company's troops, forty of the artillery train, and the 264 troops of the 39th already serving on the squadron should be sent.

1 *Diary (Mil. Dept.)* 1756, pp. 241-2, 246-8; Adlercron's account of these events is in Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 207-8; see also Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/101.
2 *Diary (Public Dept.)*, lxxxv (1756), 193-5 (14 July); Orme, *Transactions*, ii. 84.
3 *Diary (Mil. Dept.)* 1756, p. 250; Orme, op. cit. ii. 86-7 gives the reasons expressed for and against expeditions to Bengal and to the Deccan respectively.
5 *Diary (Public Dept.)* 1756, p. 237.
6 Ibid. p. 238; Fort St. David Consultations, 8 (22 August 1756).
7 *Diary (Public Dept.)* 1756, pp. 239-40.
At first there was no suggestion of Adlercron, though he was the senior officer on the coast, going in the command. He complained both then and later of being given no information, and asked that he and his troops should be sent on service, though it was perhaps rather unwise to remind the Council of the ill-usage and grievances which he and his men had suffered. On the 20th and succeeding days the Council was debating whether it was wise to denude the Coast both of the squadron and of the troops, with the strong likelihood that there would be a French war. Finally on the 29th a decision was reached. Admiral Watson was asked to suspend the orders already given for sending a small force. It was agreed to recognize the Governor and Council of Fort William as still in authority in Bengal, and consequently that it would not be appropriate to send Pigot or Clive, who were both senior officials of another presidency, to command. It was further decided that, if the expected England ships brought no news of war, Watson should be asked to sail to Bengal with his whole squadron and Adlercron to go with the regiment and the whole train of artillery. This would meet the demand of the Bengal Council for a really large force, which the Madras Council dared not send until they were more certain about the question of peace and war. The reasons for sending the royal troops are sufficiently important to be given in full.

1. Almost every thing in this Expedition depends on a large and well served Field Train of Artillery.
2. There are not a Sufficient Number of good and proper Field Pieces in the Company’s Stores.
3. Colonel Adlercron in his Letter to the Board of the 20th Instant intimates that his Majesty is unwilling his Forces should be separated.
4. The Board are therefore under the necessity of taking the Resolution they have or of wanting the main Assistance. A good Field Train.

Adlercron wrote later that the Council had never intended to employ the royal troops, and that their offer was merely a device for getting the artillery embarked after which he might be prevailed upon to let them keep it. There is no evidence that this was really the Council’s plan; that their offer to Adlercron

2 Diary (Public Dept.) 1756, pp. 244-8, 258.
4 Home Misc. 94 (4), p. 211 (To Henry Fox, 21 November 1756).
was sincere is suggested by a letter to Clive from Alexander Wynch at Fort St. David (3 September) in which Wynch suggests that Clive is fortunate in being prevented from undertaking the expedition.\(^1\) The Council soon followed up their offer to Adlercron with a letter of detailed instructions (3 September),\(^2\) which may have strengthened the feeling of distrust in Adlercron's mind. After outlining the course of action which was to be followed towards the Nawab, they laid down that Adlercron should be ready to return to the Coast at their request, and that all the property of Calcutta should be delivered up for the benefit of the Company, together with one half of all other captures made, in order to make good the Company's losses. Once again the plans had to be submitted to a council of war. When this met on 20 September, it decided in favour of Adlercron and his force going to Bengal, but found the Council's conditions unacceptable. The requirement that he should be ready to return to the Coast ignored the independence of the Bengal authorities and the two presidencies must "determine that point between themselves"; about the property in Calcutta and other captures no answer could be given except in conjunction with the fleet.\(^3\)

The Council received news of this decision on the 21st. They decided to press on with the expedition, but to keep the troops under their own power and consequently to send Clive in the command.\(^4\) As they explained to Adlercron, the primary points in their minds were the necessity of being able to get the troops back and of making good the Company's losses. "To You", they wrote, "we can only make Requests, our own Officer we know we can certainly command".\(^5\) They still asked, however, that the artillery and part of the king's force under an officer junior to Clive should be sent. But Adlercron absolutely refused to part with the artillery or even to give up the stores which had already been embarked, and which the Governor

\(^1\) Clive Papers, Box 21.
\(^3\) Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 228-30.
\(^4\) Diary (Public Dept.) 1756, pp. 293-7.
finally in desperation removed from the ships.\textsuperscript{1} Watson also tried to get Adlercron not to withdraw the artillery, arguing that the expedition was a national concern. The Admiral held onto the detachment of the regiment serving on board the squadron, though Adlercron first tried to get them back, and then asked to come and command them himself rather than permit them to be commanded by a Company's officer.\textsuperscript{2}

The Select Committee argued, in defence of their actions, that Adlercron was remaining in command at the most important station which would naturally be the main object of a French attack, and also that it was essential to send a commander who could act for the Company in both a civil and a military capacity.\textsuperscript{3} A more honest opinion was that of Alexander Wynch in a private letter (23 September) that there was a much greater chance of success under Clive's command than if the regiment had gone, and that the arrangements made were those most likely to promote the Company's interests.\textsuperscript{4} The official arguments of the Committee, quoted above, were really unconvincing, once they had invited Adlercron to go at all. As he himself argued, he would be left at Madras with only about 400 men, whatever the talk about the importance of the place, while it was impossible for a Company's officer, any more than for him, to have full civil and military authority since they had already recognized the continuing autonomy of the presidency of Bengal.\textsuperscript{5} Neither side comes very well out of the story; if Adlercron was obstructive, the Company was disingenuous, though it is impossible not to sympathize with their appeal for help at a time when their affairs "were never so much immersed in Scenes of difficulty and Misfortune".\textsuperscript{6} The expedition, which was to achieve such brilliant success, sailed on 10 October.\textsuperscript{7}

The detachment of the 39th which sailed with Clive and Watson consisted of three captains, nine subalterns, and 276 men.\textsuperscript{8} Of the

\textsuperscript{1} Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 234-42; \textit{Diary (Mil. Dept.)} 1756, pp. 281, 283-4, 291-2.
\textsuperscript{2} For their correspondence of 26-27 September, see Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 243-6.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Diary (Mil. Dept.)} 1756, pp. 282-3.
\textsuperscript{4} Clive Papers, Box 21.
\textsuperscript{5} Home Misc. 94 (4), pp. 211-12.
\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Diary (Mil. Dept.)} 1756, p. 283.
\textsuperscript{7} Orme, \textit{Transactions}, ii. 119.
\textsuperscript{8} Atkinson, \textit{Dorsetshire Regt.}, i. 71.
three captains, Coote was to rise to far higher fame. Grant became a "fifteen thousand pounder" from prize money. Weller had a kneecap taken off by a cannon ball, and was "spoiled for a foot-soldier". The rest of the regiment stayed in Madras for another year, though the latter part of their history can be rapidly related. The declaration of war made in May 1756 was announced to the Select Committee on 13 November; it was unfortunate, yet characteristic, that there should have been a squabble with Colonel Adlercron whether there should be an official proclamation of war or not. At the end of January 1757 orders to return home were sent to Adlercron from England, though commissioned officers below the rank of field officer, non-commissioned officers and privates were to be permitted, and encouraged, to engage in the service of the Company. The Company at home in sending the news to Madras, explained that, after Adlercron's dealings with the presidency had been reported to the Government, "it plainly appeared to his Majesty's Ministry that the Regiment in the Present Situation could be of little if any Service to the Company". In fact, what might be called the Company view—that what was needed were private soldiers and junior officers alone—had triumphed. The news reached Madras in August; "so many Inconveniencies", the Select Committee observed, "have been experienc'd from Colonel Adlercron's separate Command, that we have the greatest Reason to flatter Ourselves that the present Alteration will produce good Effects if a Large Number of the Men can be engag'd to stay".

By that time the regiment had fought a short campaign. In April and May there was considerable danger that the French might take Trichinopoly. An expedition sent under the command of Francis Forde against Najib-ulla, Governor of Nellore, an important place about 100 miles north of Madras, had been

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1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/2/757 (Capt. Walsh to Bagshawe, 23 November 1758).
2 Ibid. 2/6/134, 137.
3 Diary (Mil. Dept.) 1756, pp. 365-6, 370-2.
5 Dispatches to Madras 1, pp. 669-72 (1 February 1757).
6 Madras Select Committee Proceedings 1757, p. 687.
7 Atkinson, Dorsetshire Regt., i. 92-3.
repulsed, and the Select Committee, since reinforcements could not be spared, ordered Forde to return. In the latter part of May Adlercron took the field with orders to march south through Chengalpat and Wandewash to Fort St. David, to engage the French if he thought he could do so successfully, and to keep open the communications to Trichinopoly. He demolished the fortifications of Uttiranmerur (Ootramallore) and was ordered to attack the fort of Wandewash, the killedar of which was a friend of the French, and which lies approximately equidistant from Madras and Fort St. David. Caillaud had already managed to get into Trichinopoly, and Adlercron, since he lacked the material for a siege, drew off, having burnt the suburbs of Wandewash. On 10 June he was recalled into garrison, since no advantage could be expected from the troops keeping the field.

The Select Committee had emphasized to Adlercron the great importance of speed; in fact, he had moved very slowly. His letters contain their usual undertone of querulousness; after describing the impossibility of a regular siege without heavy cannon and entrenching tools, he added a postscript that he greatly felt the "want of a Marquis to dine in", and asked that, if one be made, it be "round . . . and of a strong sail cloth"!

Meanwhile Lawrence had offered to join the army as a volunteer, and Adlercron had expressed anxiety to have his assistance. It soon became necessary to move the army back against the French, who had plundered Conjeveram, an important town between Madras and Arcot, and the Select Committee tried to persuade Adlercron to remain in Madras and surrender command of the army to Lawrence or to Forde. In the recent march, they wrote in their minutes, "none of the Regulations and precautions absolutely necessary to be observ'd by a Commanding Officer" had been observed, and, in familiar words, while Adlercron commanded, "our Instructions have only the Force of Recommendations, he thinks it in his own Option to execute as much or as little of them as he pleases".

2 Ibid. pp. 400-4.  
3 Ibid. p. 487.  
5 Orme MSS. 61.10 (4), pp. 54-7; Select Cttee. Proc. 1757, pp. 496-7.  
7 Ibid. pp. 528-9.
refused this request, though Lawrence did join the army and the two men worked together harmoniously. Surgeon Kellett, in describing events to Bagshawe, who had gone home in 1756, said "how long this Harmony will subsist is very uncertain, but the Minute it ends we shall return to Garrison".¹ In fact very little was done. The Committee feared to risk a defeat and were anxious to get the army back to garrison to save expense,² while the French, who were entrenched near Wandewash, were also not anxious for an engagement. On 22 July the Committee decided that the army should move back to Conjeveram,³ where part remained in cantonments under Forde and the remainder went back to garrison.⁴

Adlercron and the Company's officials went on quarrelling to the bitter end. They applied considerable pressure to get as many men as possible to transfer, while he tried to hold back men who had enlisted for the Company's service as a bargaining point to force them to make plans for the embarkation of the rest.⁵ Three hundred and thirty-four men in Madras agreed to transfer with almost all the men serving in Bengal.⁶ The veneer of politeness had now quite disappeared. On 22 September the Select Committee asked Adlercron to take passage on the first available ship in order to remove "the Inconveniencies to which the Service has, and must be subjected by a Partition of Command".⁷ Though he maintained that he must be the last person of the regiment to leave, he had eventually to give way as the two ships available could not take all the men (November 1757). Fifty men embarked on these, leaving about sixty more behind with Forde and one subaltern.⁸ It must have been with a great sigh of relief that the Select Committee entered in its minutes, "Colonel Adlercron accordingly takes passage on the Princess Augusta for Europe".⁹

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/150 (25 June 1757); see p. 109 for Bagshawe's return to England.
³ Ib. pp. 640-1.
⁴ Orme, Transactions, ii. 221.
⁶ Atkinson, Dorsetshire Regt., i. 91, 93.
⁸ Abstracts of Letters from "Coast" and "Bay" 6, pp. 179-80.
The Bagshawe papers enable us to paint a very full picture of the everyday life of the regiment in India. Clearly the great problem of health and discipline was caused by drunkenness. Lovett wrote to Bagshawe (25 October 1754), asking him to represent to the Governor of Madras "the Fatal Consequence of the Rack (arrack) Sellers supplying the Men w th the Liquor, we loose a man almost every day, & in spite of all our Care the Hospital flows with it".1 Instructions were sent accordingly from Madras to the authorities at Fort St. David who were to ensure that arrack was sold only by those who were licensed and that liquor put on sale was not adulterated.2 There were other problems of acclimatization as well as drink; in December Surgeon Kellett described to Bagshawe severe illnesses from fever, pains in the bowels, suppression of urine, all due, he thought to "the Excess of Debauchery which reigned for some Time amongst us, the constant heavy rains, the excessive Dampness of the Barracks, & the intolerable Badness of the provisions".3 A year later things had got better; Bagshawe was in Madras for the Heron court-martial, and Kellett reported that the regiment had been very healthy "this Monsoon, seldom exceeding ten in the Hospital & not one has dyed of any Disorder contracted since your Absence".4 The drink problem went on, however; in August 1755 the Fort St. David Council had to close a toddy garden in "Braminy Street in the new Town".5 "on Account of the Continual Riots and Disturbances made there by His Majesty's Troops who constantly frequent there to drink Toddy & get Drunk and beat and abuse the Inhabitants in a shamefull Manner".

There are a good many interesting notes and memoranda on service matters. Every officer was to acquaint himself "with the Method of exercising the Reg as the Major will call upon them to do it "6 and was also to keep an orderly book in which to

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1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/127.
2 Diary (Public Dept.) June-December 1754, p. 218; Letters from Fort St. George, 1754, p. 166.
3 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/176 (6 December 1754).
4 Ibid. 2/5/269 (3 December 1755).
5 Fort St. David Consultations, 8: 1755, p. 109.
6 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/237.
enter all standing orders. 1 Lovett complained, when he was on
duty with the fleet, that he had not a single serjeant or corporal
with him who could read or write. 2 Many of the men had
considerable previous service; a return of June 1756 shows 117
men who had been on the expedition to L'Orient in 1746, and
others who had been besieged in Stirling Castle in the Forty-five. 3
The pay accounts of Bagshawe's company (October-December
1754) shows a week's pay of £17 9s. 11d. for three serjeants,
three corporals, two drummers, and sixty-five privates. 4 An
undated regimental order, presumably issued after disembarka-
tion, says that the men were to be issued with necessaries at no
more than prime cost because, having pay due to them, it would
be in their power to buy them if the pay was issued. However,
those who were in debt were to be charged 6d. a shirt, 6d. a pair
of stockings, 2d. a pair of country shoes, and 1s. a pair of English
above the first price, "as they must be bought with their Capts
money & as a punish 5 to them for being so careless to run in debt,
& to make up losses Capts may suffer by bad debts". 5 Another
order recommends the troops "to learn to Dress Rice as its
likely the Cooking of their Provisions will be very sone be [sic]
throne upon themselves". 6

Apart from a few remarks in the officers' letters about
individuals, mostly concerned with punishments or promotions,
there are very few personal sidelights on the men. The one
exception, which suggests that the British soldier has not changed
very much in 200 years, is contained in the proceedings of a
court martial held by Bagshawe on his voyage home. Corporal
Frost was sentenced to be reduced to the ranks and to be given 200
lashes (though these were remitted) for insulting the ship's first
officer. The evidence relates that Frost had been making a
disturbance and when told to stop had said to the chief officer

1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/231. 2 Ibid. 2/6/68.
3 Ibid. 2/6/49; for the L'Orient expedition see also Atkinson, Dorsetshire
Regt., i. 49-54; Sir John Fortescue, "A Side-Show of the Eighteenth Century",
The Last Post (1934).
4 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/168-74.
5 Ibid. 2/6/230. Captains paid their men and maintained their dress, arms
and accoutrements (B.J.R.L. xxxix. 361).
6 Ibid. 2/6/233.
that it was much fitter for him to gett him a proper place
to lye in wch was his (Mr. Russell's) duty and to see that
he had better provision than stinking beef and further said
that he did not regard him no more than the dirt under his
shoe".1

The frustrations experienced by the officers have been made
clear enough already; "we have no news worth troubling you
with", wrote Kellett to Bagshawe, "every Day gives rise to
some Story, which concludes in its own littleness before Night".2
They did their best to amuse themselves and there was a good
deal of coming and going between them and the French at
Pondicherry, which lay so near to Fort St. David. Lovett went
to a ball at Pondicherry, wrote Bagshawe, "& made a most
extraordinary figure a Guard of the Regt two Toms Toms two
stand of Colors & a silver Staff that he might appear agreeable
to his Rank".3 Later the same year Lovett was expected to give a
ball himself "which has been so long talked of", since a large
company of French ladies had arrived from Pondicherry.4 In
May 1756 Carnac was at Fort St. George, and complained of the
heat, the flies, and the mosquitos. However there were compen­
sations because, during his stay, "there have been three Balls,
a Concert and a Theatrical Entertainment".5 "We are very
melancholy here", wrote Captain Walsh in December 1755,"for
the loss of the Ladies who sett out yesterday for Pondicherry
escorted by Call and Power. Kellet and I (the two gallantest
young Gent of this Garrison) attended them on foot to Pania
River, but were not able to proceed further."6 Miss Berriman
had had an offer from Captain Pascal, wrote Bagshawe to
Caillaud in January 1756, and it was thought she was a fool to
refuse him.7 Later Carnac took up the story of the same lady;
she was to marry on "Friday" a man unnamed; "Cupid must
indeed be a blind archer to dart his shafts from so bad a lodge­
ment, when he might have fixed his residence so much better in
Amy Hopkins' eyes".8

1Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/141 (26 April 1757).  2 Ibid. 2/5/279 (27 December 1755).
3 Ibid. 2/5/195 (Bagshawe to Major Bridge, 19 February 1755).
4 Ibid. 2/5/275 (Martin Yorke to Bagshawe, 20 December 1755).
5 Ibid. 2/6/41 (19 May 1756).  6 Ibid. 2/5/272.
7 Ibid. 2/6/9.  8 Ibid. 2/6/62 (16 June 1756).
Naturally the Bagshawe papers give especially full information about his own affairs. He did not plan, he wrote to the regimental agent in November 1754, to draw his personal pay, but to leave it for the use of his family. If he were to live a year longer, he told the Duke of Devonshire in February 1756, he would have repaid his uncle the money he had borrowed to purchase his lieutenant-colonelcy. There are details of the money he spent, both on food and drink and on presents. He bought from Captain Norway of the Company's service, salt beef, hams and tongues, bread and beer, claret and rhenish. He sent Norway a bill for 200 pagodas to be laid out in China on things "agreeable to a Woman", and a copy of his arms in colour (presumably to be put on a set of chinaware). In April 1755 he bought from Thomas Lockhart "1 sett of China Ware 120 Pieces 4 Pieces Lankeen 2 Cannisters Green Tea 2 Cattys ea" for twenty-six pagodas, and a month earlier Lawrence was buying muslin, necklaces, and earrings for Mrs. Bagshawe. However he warned Lawrence that too much must not be sent. "Oeconomy is a necessary Maxim in Matrimony. We should not give all at once, beside I may go home & must not go empty-handed." 

Stress has already been laid on his friendly relations with the officials of the Company. Caillaud sent him hams and porter and Mrs. Bagshawe a shawl. John Call, the engineer at Madras, sent him a punch ladle "which if not equal to a Bath or Tunbridge one, will I daresay empty many a Bowl of Punch". When Kilpatrick was ordered to Bengal in 1756, he had been expecting to go home, and Bagshawe had been giving him introductions; later he sent Bagshawe news from Bengal. When Bagshawe was ill and waiting to go home, Robert Orme wrote to say that he had sent a loaf of bread every day "because I knew the Difficulty there is of getting any now that is fit to eat". Mrs. Clive asked him to take a letter for Clive's mother, who would certainly be pleased to see someone of whom her son

1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/5/143 (To John Calcraft, 7 November 1754).
2 Ibid. 2/6/15. 3 Ibid. 2/5/207, 2/6/273. 4 Ibid. 2/5/207, 209.
5 Ibid. 2/6/277. 6 Ibid. 2/5/220. 7 Ibid. 2/5/210 (19 February 1755).
8 Ibid. 2/5/234, 242. 9 Ibid. 2/5/190. 10 Ibid. 2/6/84, 87, 106, 2/2/291.
11 Ibid. 2/6/113 (15 October 1756).
thought so highly, and Bagshawe and Clive remained on friendly terms after Bagshawe came home.¹ These letters do throw a far pleasanter light on Madras society than the official records suggest. Personal friendships could flourish amid political disagreement; as Bagshawe wrote to Adlercron during the Heron court martial, the business was likely to be long and tedious. "Indeed the good Entertainment the good Comp'y & the good Claret are no small help to repair in the latter what we want in the first part of the Day."²

Not all the officers of the 39th Foot came home again. Five of the officers serving in Bengal, Adnett, Carnac, Yorke, Donnellan and Broadbridge, and two in Madras, Powell and Edward Forde, took the opportunity of transferring.³ Major Francis Forde, who had remained behind after Adlercron's departure, was appointed early in 1758 to the command of the troops in Bengal in succession to Major Kilpatrick who died of fever in October 1757.⁴ Forde's wife, who wrote to Bagshawe on his return home, was not to have the pleasure, to which she was looking forward, of seeing her husband in summer 1758. Certainly, she wrote, staying abroad was some advantage financially, but, had she power to prevent it, "I would not undergo . . . such another cruel Sepparation, for half India".⁵ Carnac's explanation of his reasons for transferring probably holds good to some degree for all his brother-officers who took the same step. He had got a step in rank to captain; "the Gentlemen of Madras were extremely solicitous for my stay. I was heartily tired of being Seventeen Years a Subaltern in His Majesty's Service, without the least prospect of bettering myself, and besides was so much dissatisfied with Mr. Adlercron that I was resolved to have no further connection with him."⁶

The Colonel himself did not reach Cork until 24 October 1758.⁷ Forde's action in accepting the command in Bengal was, he wrote to Bagshawe, "contrary to His Majesty's Instructions

¹ Bagshawe MSS. 2/6/120 (26 October 1756); 2/2/104-8 are letters from Clive after Bagshawe's return home. ² Ibid. 2/5/254 (2 November 1755).
³ Atkinson, Dorsetshire Regt., i. 91, 93.
⁴ Forde, Lord Clive's Right Hand Man, p. 29.
⁵ Bagshawe MSS. 2/2/187 (6 July 1757). ⁶ Ibid. 2/2/83 (4 March 1758).
⁷ Atkinson, Dorsetshire Regt., i. 95.
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and the orders I left him to follow us by the first ship"; moreover since Forde was paymaster and had sent no accounts, the regimental finances were in confusion, and the agent could not settle them. By February 1759 things were no better; "things are so intricate by Major Forde's staying in India, and the Company refusing to pay his Bills". Captain Hepburne wrote to Bagshawe in November 1758 that he was to succeed to Forde's majority, but then later that Forde's friends had arranged for him to retain it so that Hepburne was not to have it. He repeated the same story of confusion in the accounts; consequently there was no money to start recruiting. At the end of 1760 Captain Campbell wrote that the accounts were all made up, and that Calcraft had paid most of the captains their balances, though the men were beginning to be "very troublesome at its being so long delayed". In fact Corneille was still corresponding with Bagshawe in May 1761 about the final clearance of the Indian account of his company.

Other letters deal with the personal affairs of those who had made the great voyage. Kellett's mother wrote from Cork, saying that her son had drawn on her in Bagshawe's favour for £24 8s. and thanking him for "Your great friendship shown my son". Hepburne was anxious to come to Bagshawe's Derbyshire home at Ford, but his worldly possessions were still in "that vile tub which brought me from India", which had not yet come round from Ireland. Captain Walsh wrote copious military gossip. Brereton, who was a major in Draper's regiment, wanted information about India; the greater part of this regiment, numbered the 79th, landed at Madras in September 1758. Walsh passed on rumours about Coote's future plans, and wrote (16 January 1759) "Coote has got the Battalion to the amazement of Mankind". This battalion, the 84th, landed at

1 Bagshawe MSS. 2/2/39 (30 November 1758).
2 Ibid. 2/2/40 (Adlercron to Bagshawe).
3 Ibid. 2/2/266, 267 (9 November, 7 December 1758).
4 Ibid. 2/2/80 (25 December 1760).
5 Ibid. 2/2/115.
6 Ibid. 2/2/288 (29 April 1758).
7 Ibid. 2/2/262 (2 June 1758).
8 Ibid. 2/2/746 (3 December 1757).
9 Ibid. 2/2/749, 750 (16, 20 December 1757).
10 Ibid. 2/2/759; for the 79th and 84th regiments see Col. H. C. Wylly, Neill's "Blue Caps" (privately printed, n.d.), i (1639-1826), 118.
Madras in October 1759. Coote was luckier than Adlercron and his regiment; a few months later he won the battle of Wandewash.

After the 79th and the 84th a long succession of royal regiments were to follow the 39th Foot, later to become the 1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment, to India. Their title, "Primus in Indis", is not only honourable in itself; it is honourable as the first in a long succession which was to make the histories of both Britain and India different from what they would otherwise have been. This succession has ended only in our own day.