EUMENES OF CARDIA

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THE opening of the Hellenistic Age is a period in which the number of leading characters is unusually, even confusingly, large. Almost all these were Macedonians, but among them was Eumenes, a native of the Greek city of Cardia, whose fortunes in the six and a half years that elapsed between the death of Alexander and his own are more fully recorded than those of any Macedonian. He was neither the most powerful nor the most successful leader of his time, and the reason why relatively abundant information about his actions in these years has survived undoubtedly is that the standard history of the Successors was written by his fellow-townsman Hieronymus of Cardia, who served under him throughout his campaigns in Asia. It is for the same reason that the careers of Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, whom Hieronymus subsequently served, are more fully described in extant works dealing with this period than those of their rivals, Ptolemy, Cassander, Seleucus, and Lysimachus. Hieronymus was able to study his successive masters at close quarters, and he enjoyed access to their official documents and confidential correspondence. He evidently made good use of these advantages, and the high quality of his work is clearly visible even through the mediocrity of Diodorus.

How far Hieronymus allowed his historical judgement to be influenced by loyalty to Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius is a question that cannot be determined with any certainty because the surviving fragments of his work are so meagre. Of course, however, his work did not consist of propaganda on behalf of his successive employers, and there is reason to believe that his treatment of Antigonus and Demetrius was not wholly

1 The substance of a lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on Wednesday, the 5th of May, 1954.
2 They are collected in F Gr Hist 154, F. 1-19.
sympathetic.  

There is a different reason why he might have exaggerated both the importance and the ability of Eumenes, namely, that they were both Cardians and may possibly have been related.  

It is, however, difficult to imagine how either the importance or the ability of Eumenes could have been greatly exaggerated without blatantly falsifying historical facts, and these facts were well-known to the contemporaries of Hieronymus, especially at the court of the Antigonids. On the other hand, Hieronymus is surely responsible for the fact that the literary tradition is almost wholly favourable towards Eumenes and generally unfavourable towards persons with whom he was in conflict such as Neoptolemus and Peucestas.  

It is possible, though unprovable, that, like Thucydides, he strove to achieve impartiality but failed where his own feelings were deeply stirred. His prejudice may perhaps have taken the form of creating the impression that the motives of Eumenes were invariably unselfish and that he was wholly uninfluenced by personal ambition, a point that will be discussed later. He can scarcely have expressed any opinion on the moral character of Eumenes. Extant literary authorities based largely on his work suggest that he was not much given to passing moral judgements on his characters: his yardsticks were rather ability and the acquisition of power, and he apparently admired unscrupulous and even underhand measures whereby a leader was enabled to get the better of his rivals.  

It is in the parts of Diodorus Books xviii to xx dealing with

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1 This problem, as well as the general character of his work, is ably discussed by T. S. Brown, *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, lii (1946-7), 684-96. My own view, which cannot be developed here, is that he believed Antigonus and Demetrius to have failed to gain their major objectives through their own errors of judgement.  

2 The suggestion that they were related rests solely on the fact that the father of Eumenes bore the name Hieronymus (cf. Brown, op. cit. p. 684 with n. 4, who is, however, mistaken in his statement that Eumenes had a son named Hieronymus).  

3 It is significant that Diodorus refers with approval to Peucestas at two points, laying emphasis upon his popularity in his satrapy: the first occurs just before his uneasy partnership with Eumenes began (xix. 14. 4-5), the second immediately after it ended (ibid. 48, 5). In the intervening narrative he is frequently mentioned with disapproval.  

4 Cf. for example, Diod. xix. 23-4, Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2-4.
the struggles between the Successors that the work of Hieronymus is most clearly reflected. The chapters describing the last campaign of Eumenes, in which he commanded the army of the "kings" against that of Antigonus, are especially instructive. Here Diodorus achieves a standard perhaps unequalled in any other section of his voluminous history. The narrative is remarkably vivid, showing at many points the hand of an observant and discerning eye-witness, while the detailed accounts of major battles are clearly based on those of a military expert, though Diodorus has been guilty of some omissions. The narrative dealing with the earlier struggles of Eumenes in Asia before he embarked upon his last campaign, though for the most part less detailed, is scarcely less impressive. There is, however, an exception: a part of Book xviii where he describes how Eumenes contrived to escape from an almost desperate situation when besieged at Nora and then unexpectedly found himself more powerful than ever before, is strangely uneven. The reason for the unevenness of these chapters undoubtedly is that at several points Diodorus has followed his source less closely than usual and has chosen to develop his own ideas, as he occasionally does when writing on a subject in which he is especially interested. In this instance the remarkable change in the fortunes of Eumenes provides Diodorus with an opportunity to preach his own uninspired theory of history, namely, that τύχη is fickle and unpredictable. Nevertheless, even in this part of Book xviii the bulk of the narrative is of good quality and based upon information supplied by Hieronymus, who himself played an important part in the negotiations between Eumenes and Antigonus.

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1 Cf. the observations of Kahnes and Kromayer in J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, iv. 3 (1929), 424, on the account of the battle of Paraetacene.

2 W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, ii (1948), 64, describes this theory as "a convenient doctrine which can be invoked to cover any improbability or inconsistency".

3 The clearest examples of passages in Book xviii where Diodorus has temporarily deserted his source are 53. 1-6 (where he recapitulates the career of Eumenes from his appointment as satrap of Cappadocia, stressing his changes of fortune) and 59. 4-6 (where he expounds his own theory). There are, however,
Considerably less valuable is the *Eumenes* of Plutarch, which is also largely, though not exclusively, dependent upon information derived from Hieronymus. It is not among the best of the Lives. The career of Eumenes after the death of Alexander was almost entirely military, and Plutarch, who insists elsewhere that he writes biography and not history, seems to have felt himself handicapped by a dearth of personal anecdote. His first two chapters, dealing with the period before Alexander died, contain some personal detail mostly discreditable to Eumenes. This material can hardly have been derived from Hieronymus because his work is believed to have begun only with the death of Alexander. A story that Eumenes was of poor and humble origin, which Plutarch rejects, is ascribed by him to Duris, whose sensational history may well be the source of other highly suspect stories included in these two chapters. The influence of Duris may also be responsible for the extravagantly rhetorical tone of a few episodes elsewhere in the *Eumenes* which are not mentioned by Diodorus. Examples are the encounter between Eumenes and the dying Craterus and the address by the former to the Silver Shields after they had betrayed him: the authenticity of both is doubtful. That Plutarch was not much attracted by Eumenes, and indeed misjudged him, is clearly seen in the latter part of his *Comparison between Sertorius and Eumenes*: cleverness in a Greek was in his day regarded with suspicion by many, and with worse than suspicion by Juvenal. What interested him was whether his principal characters were good rather than whether they were able and intelligent, and, as has already been noted, Hieronymus does not seem to have concerned himself much other references to the fickleness of fortune, and the substance of the passages in which they occur may, in some cases at least, have been contributed by Diodorus himself and not derived from his source (cf. 42. 1-2, which will be discussed below, p. 322).

1 *Eum.* 1. 1-2.
4 *Comp. Sert. et Eum.* 2. 1-8. The accusation of cowardice in the face of death (2. 8) appears to be false.
with moral issues. Plutarch apparently grew tired of Eumenes: he describes the final campaign in central Asia rather briefly and somehow contrives to omit entirely the great battle of Paraetacene. On earlier events, however, he provides much valuable information not recorded by Diodorus, so that the two most important authorities for the career of Eumenes are conveniently complementary.

Minor authorities supply a few additional points. The Eumenes of Nepos is somewhat fuller and better than most of his brief biographies: unlike the Eumenes of Plutarch, it strikes no note of censure and is in general agreement with the account of Diodorus. The work of Arrian known as τὰ μετ’ Ἀλέξανδρου dealt in considerable detail with a period of little more than two years starting from the death of Alexander, but it survives only in an epitome by Photius and a few fragments,¹ including a recently published papyrus.² In epitomizing the account of Eumenes’ career by Trogus contained in Books xiii and xiv of the Historiae Philippicae Justin is as inaccurate and as prone to empty rhetoric as elsewhere. Polyaenus includes in his collection of Stratagems a few used by Eumenes³ and a few used against him.⁴ A striking feature of these lesser sources is their unanimity: despite minor divergences all present substantially the same picture of Eumenes, which must be that of Hieronymus. This unanimity is evidence of the extent to which his account dominated the literary tradition.

The surviving authorities for the career of Eumenes are in general agreement in differentiating him from most of his principal contemporaries for three main reasons. The first is that he was outstandingly clever, resourceful and persuasive, the second that he was handicapped by being a Greek and not a Macedonian, the third that single-minded loyalty to the

¹ F Gr Hist 156 F 1-11, and in vol. ii of the Teubner Arrian (ed. Roos, 1928) pp. 253-86.
² V. Bartoletti, Papiri greci e latini, xii. 2 (1950), 1284. The arguments of K. Latte, Gött. Nach. (1950), no. 3, pp. 23-7, for assigning the papyrus to Arrian seem to be conclusive.
³ iv. 8. 2-5 (cf. 4. 3, which may be authentic).
⁴ iv. 6. 9-13, 19 (9 contains valuable information not recorded elsewhere).
Macedonian royal house governed his actions. So prominent are these factors in the works discussed above that all three were surely stressed by Hieronymus. The extent of their influence must obviously be considered if the policy and aims of Eumenes are to be fully understood. While all three must be largely authentic, they have been accepted somewhat uncritically in modern times: in the case of the second and third at least, if the character of the evidence be taken into account, important reservations should, in my opinion, be made.

That Eumenes was clever is beyond dispute if there is any truth whatever in the record of his actions. On many occasions the cleverness of his strategy served to counterbalance the weakness or disunity of forces under his command. In the military sphere, however, he was not perhaps more resourceful than Antigonus, who sometimes succeeded in outwitting him. The advantage that he enjoyed over his contemporaries lay rather in the exercise of diplomatic skill, in exploiting to the full the favourable features of his relations with others and in so working upon their feelings that he was able to implement policies which he had no power to enforce. During his long association with Macedonians he had acquired an unrivalled knowledge of their temperament, which he often used with advantage. These qualities are seen most clearly in the accounts of his last campaign when as supreme commander for the "kings" in Asia he somehow succeeded in holding together as an effective fighting force an army in which the disloyalty, insubordination and contentiousness of officers and men were perhaps unequalled even in the Hellenistic Age. However great his difficulties he always found some expedient whereby he was able to surmount them.

The best and most interesting example of his ingenuity is perhaps his establishment of what is known as the "Alexander tent". Acting on the authority of a dream which he professed to have had, he proposed that the insignia of Alexander should be placed on a golden throne and that daily offerings should be

1 References to his cleverness and examples of it occur in all the authorities mentioned above; cf. also the Heidelberg Epitome (F Gr Hist 155), 3. 1.
2 Cf. Diod. xix. 26. 5-8 and 32. 1-2.
made by the principal officers, who should then meet in council in the tent in which this cult was observed as though Alexander were himself presiding. Eumenes made this proposal soon after he assumed command of the Silver Shields, who gladly accepted it. The device proved very valuable when union with the forces of the eastern satraps had enlarged his army but at the same time intensified its discord. He was able to mitigate some causes of friction, including that of his own appointment as supreme commander. To entrust to a committee the direction of operations by an army in the field has obvious drawbacks. Eumenes seems normally to have secured the adoption of his own plans, but in one important and perhaps decisive instance he did not, namely, when the eastern satraps refused to agree to his proposal to march down to the Mediterranean coast. Nevertheless the "Alexander tent" was a brilliant conception, and without it the end would probably have come much sooner. On a subsequent occasion, shortly before the battle of Paraetacene, Eumenes showed psychological insight in telling his Macedonian troops a rather childish fable. Other audiences might well have felt insulted, especially as the fable is not even entirely apposite, but Eumenes rightly foresaw its effect upon his Macedonians, who received it with acclamation.

It may be that Hieronymus somewhat overstressed the cleverness of Eumenes. In the course of his long life he must often have heard Macedonians expressing their claim to be superior to Greeks; perhaps deriving some satisfaction from recording episodes in which Macedonians were outwitted by a Greek, he may unconsciously have allowed such episodes to assume in his work a greater prominence than their importance warranted. It is also easy to believe that, because Hieronymus was personally involved in the difficulties which beset Eumenes, he may have exaggerated them and correspondingly over-estimated the cleverness of Eumenes in extricating

1 Diod. xviii. 60. 4-61, 3, xix. 15. 3-4; Plut. Eum. 13. 4-8; Nepos, Eum. 7. 2-3; Polyaen. iv. 8. 2. M. Launey, Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques, ii (1950), 945-7, points out that this military cult has no parallel in the age of the Successors. 2 Diod. xix. 21. 1-2. 3 Diod. xix. 25. 4-7.
References to the disadvantage suffered by Eumenes in being a Greek and not a Macedonian are much fewer than those to his cleverness. This disadvantage is, however, mentioned in a number of different connections by Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos, and at least some of these passages are surely derived ultimately from Hieronymus. How far it was open to the ablest Greeks to compete with leading Macedonians in the first years of the Hellenistic Age is an interesting question. Alexander had normally made appointments involving the command of troops from Macedonians alone, but it was his practice to judge men by their quality rather than their nationality, and a few Greeks were included among his Companions and most favoured subordinates. Examples are the Cretan Nearchus, distinguished both as admiral and writer, and the Thessalian Medeius, a very intimate friend of Alexander in the last months of his life. Medeius subsequently commanded some mercenaries for Perdiccas, and both served under Antigonus and Demetrius, but neither attained the position to which his close relations with Alexander might seem to have entitled him. Several lesser Greeks who had served under Alexander are known to have played a part in the struggles that followed his death without securing any significant advancement. These examples might seem to show that it was impossible for any Greek to break down the jealous exclusiveness of the Macedonians. Yet Eumenes was not the only Greek entrusted with a satrapy after the death of Alexander. Laomedon of Mitylene was appointed to the satrapy of Syria, which he held until his expulsion about three years later.

1 Diod. xviii. 60. 1 and 3, 62. 7, xix. 13. 1; Plut. Eum. 3. 1 and 8. 1 (cf. 18. 2, where the Silver Shields are said to have referred to him as Xερρωνσίτης άλεθρος); Nepos, Eum. 1. 2-3 and 7. 1.

2 H. Berve, R.E. xvi (1935), cols. 2132-5.

3 F. Geyer, R.E. xv (1931), cols. 103-4.

4 Examples are Aeschylus of Rhodes (H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich, ii (1926), 17) and Andronicus of Olynthus (ibid. pp. 39-40).

5 E. Bux, R.E. xii (1924), cols. 756-7 (the longer of two articles devoted to the same person).
Soloi named Stasanor, who had been in charge of Areia and Drangiana, two of the eastern satrapies, before Alexander died, had his appointment confirmed, and when after two years he was transferred to Bactria and Sogdiana, his successor was Stasander, also a Cypriot and perhaps his relative. 1 The most striking case is that of Lysimachus, satrap and eventually king of Thrace. There is no adequate reason for rejecting the tradition that his father was a Thessalian who migrated to Macedonia. It is true that some authorities describe him as a Macedonian and a citizen of Pella, but citizenship was doubtless conferred upon his father while living at the Macedonian court. 2 Of these Greeks entrusted with satrapies, Eumenes, Laomedon, and Lysimachus—as well as Nearchus, who had been satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia for a time when Alexander was alive—are all known to have lived in Macedonia for a number of years. 3 Hence it is clear that such naturalized Macedonians, as they may be termed, were granted a privileged status not enjoyed by other Greeks and were much less sharply differentiated from native Macedonians because their loyalty was believed to have been proved. 4

For any Greek to have attempted to usurp the throne of Macedonia by sweeping aside the "kings", an ambition imputed rightly or wrongly to Leonnatus, Perdicas, and Antigonus, would have been an act of folly doomed to failure from the outset. A king of Macedonia had to have his succession to the throne formally recognized by the general assembly of the army, 5 and the attitude of the Silver Shields towards Eumenes shows that Macedonians would not, at any rate, at this time, have contemplated accepting a Greek as their king. To this extent Eumenes was undoubtedly in a different position from

1 E. Honigmann, R.E. iii A (1929), cols. 2152-3 (on Stasanor); K. Fiehn, ibid. col. 2152 (on Stasander).
2 F. Geyer, R.E. xiv (1928), col. 1.
3 Laomedon and Nearchus lived at Amphipolis which became a Macedonian city after its annexation by Philip.
4 Stasanor was evidently a man of outstanding ability, but it is not altogether clear why he and Stasander were singled out for appointment to satrapies.
that of his Macedonian contemporaries, to this extent the limits of his potential advancement were circumscribed.\(^1\) On the other hand, there is no justification for assuming that a Greek so long and so intimately associated with the Macedonian court as he had been was automatically disqualified by his origin from competing with Macedonians for responsible positions conferring a substantial measure of independent authority. Polyperchon actually proposed that Eumenes should participate with himself in the guardianship of the "kings".\(^2\)

It is therefore somewhat surprising to find so much emphasis laid on the disadvantage suffered by Eumenes in being a Greek. It might be suggested that Hieronymus, who served the house of Antigonus for three generations without attaining high distinction except as a historian, believed himself and other Greeks to have been unjustly denied advancement because of their nationality. Hieronymus can, however, scarcely have invented episodes mentioned in some of the passages cited above from which the Greek origin of Eumenes is seen to have been an important issue in his own lifetime. His enemies are stated to have used it as an instrument of propaganda when seeking to undermine the loyalty of his Macedonian troops.\(^4\) Even more significant are two passages in which Eumenes is said to have referred in public utterances to the consequences of being a Greek. According to Plutarch he declared, when acting as negotiator between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, that "being a foreigner he had no right to interfere in the disputes of Macedonians".\(^5\) Diodorus attributes to him a statement made apparently in the speech in which he proposed the establishment of the "Alexander tent", that he could "expect no position of authority (ἀρχή) because he was a foreigner and debarred from the powers native to the Macedonians".\(^6\) If these statements are authentic, Eumenes with characteristic adroitness took advantage of a handicap. A later passage of Diodorus points in the same direction. When

\(^1\) Cf. Diod. xviii. 60. 1.
\(^2\) Diod. xviii. 57. 3 (cf. Plut. Eum. 13. 1 for a similar suggestion by Olympias).
\(^3\) See above, p. 316, n. 1.
\(^5\) Plut. Eum. 3. 1.
\(^6\) Diod. xviii. 60. 3.
Antigonus tried to bribe Antigones and Teutamus, the commanders of the Silver Shields, to betray Eumenes. Teutamus was ready to accept until Antigones persuaded him to change his mind by arguing that, whereas Antigonus would deprive them both of their satrapies, Eumenes would treat them generously "because being a foreigner he would never dare to pursue his own interest (iδιοσπραγγειον)". 1 It is remarkable that the substance of this secret conversation should have become known even to Hieronymus, especially as Antigones was executed immediately after the battle of Gabiene. 2 The most probable explanation seems to be that Antigones disclosed the treacherous intentions of Teutamus to Eumenes, who then suggested the cogent argument whereby Antigones successfully appealed to the self-interest of his colleague.

It is thus perhaps legitimate to conclude that Eumenes in his lifetime and Hieronymus after his death were somewhat disingenuous in stressing the handicap imposed by his Greek birth, which debarred him only from the pursuit of ambitions that he had no right to pursue. Exaggeration of this handicap seems to have proved useful to Eumenes by helping him to allay the jealousy of his Macedonian rivals and to secure obedience from those under his command, while Hieronymus was perhaps enabled thereby to represent Eumenes as more unselfish than he actually was. 3

That Eumenes was exceptionally loyal to the royal house of Macedonia is mentioned in a number of passages 4 and is very frequently implied. His loyalty is a cardinal assumption throughout the detailed narrative of Diodorus describing his last campaign against Antigonus. In modern times it has

1 Diod. xviii. 62. 4-7. 2 Diod. xix. 44. 1.
3 The view of A. Vezin, Eumenes von Kardien (1907), pp. 125-6, that the ultimate failure of Eumenes was due to his Greek birth seems to me to be based on an insufficiently critical acceptance of the impression created by the sources.
4 Specific references are: Diod. xviii. 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 4; xix. 42. 5, 44. 2; Plut. Eum. 1. 4; Nepos, Eum. 6. 5; Heidelberg Epitome (F Gr Hist 155), 3. 1-2. Diod. xviii. 29. 2, 42. 2, and Plut. Eum. 5. 8, refer more generally to the trustworthiness of Eumenes, while Nepos, Eum. 3. 1 stresses his fidelity towards Perdiccas (who was, however, at this time in charge of the "kings").
evoked even more admiration than his military talents or diplomatic skill,¹ and with good reason. It is not my intention to deny either that he was loyal or that his loyalty was admirable. The confidence in him felt by members of the royal house is attested by the summary of a letter written to him by the masterful Olympias in which she described him as the most faithful of her friends and asked him to advise her.² It does, however, seem legitimate to question whether his aim was at all times solely to promote the interest of the royal house and whether he was wholly indifferent to his own prospects except as its servant. Decisions made by him both before and after the death of Perdiccas suggest that these doubts are not unwarranted.

When Perdiccas left him to defend Asia Minor against the invading army of Antipater and Craterus, they sent an embassy to invite him to change sides and join them. This offer he rejected, making a counterproposal that he should negotiate a reconciliation between Craterus and Perdiccas. Now Antipater, Craterus and Ptolemy had taken up arms against Perdiccas on the ground that he was plotting to usurp the throne. The validity of this charge, as well as the legal status of Perdiccas at this time, is uncertain. It may be that, because Perdiccas had the "kings" in his charge, Eumenes felt himself obliged to carry out his orders faithfully.³ Yet of all the leading Macedonians Antipater and Craterus were the most obviously loyal to the royal house and the least suspected of harbouring personal ambitions. It is also clear that, had Eumenes accepted their offer, he would have had his satrapy enlarged but would have lost what was virtually an independent command. Strangely enough, the account of these negotiations by Plutarch, who alone records them in any detail,⁴ contains no mention of the "kings", whereas much is made of the personal emirity

² Diod. xviii. 58. 2-3, cf. Nepos, Eum. 6. 1-4 and Plut. Eum. 13. 1. Hieronymus must have seen this letter. The negotiations between Eumenes and Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, show that she too trusted him (Arrian (F Gr Hist 156), F 9. 21 and 26, 10. 7-10, 11. 40, cf. Plut. Eum. 8. 6-7 and Justin, xiv. 1. 7).
³ Cf. Nepos, Eum. 3. 1.
between Eumenes and Antipater and the personal friendship between Eumenes and Craterus.

More significant than this episode, which may have been inaccurately transmitted, is the fact that from the death of Perdiccas to that of Antipater, a period of nearly two years, Eumenes was actually fighting against the forces of the "kings". It is arguable that he had no choice. He had been sentenced to death by the assembly of the Macedonian army, which held him responsible for the death of the popular Craterus, and he was a personal enemy of Antipater, now regent and more powerful than any other Macedonian leader. The actions of Eumenes at this time are inadequately recorded and their motives obscure. Presumably he maintained that the "kings" had been illegally entrusted to Antipater and that it was his duty to fight for the restoration of the position as it had stood before the fall of Perdiccas.¹ There was, however, very little hope of achieving this aim, especially as the surviving adherents of Perdiccas were disunited. Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and other leaders persisted in their refusal to co-operate with Eumenes, whose own forces, though large, were unlikely to, and in fact did not, fight wholeheartedly for a cause that was meaningless to them. If Eumenes had been willing to subordinate all other considerations to the interests of the royal house, which would certainly be damaged by further bloodshed, he could have surrendered unconditionally and faced the consequences. Alternatively, he could have sought to secure the cancellation of the death sentence passed on him by undertaking to put himself and his troops at the disposal of the "kings". He did neither.

That the opening of negotiations with his enemies at this stage might well have led to a settlement is shown by subsequent events. When his position had been much weakened by his defeat at Orcynia, which cost him the loss of almost all his forces, and he had taken refuge with the remainder in the fortress of Nora, Antigonus made overtures to him as soon as measures

¹ His attempt to win the support of Cleopatra (Arrian F 11. 40) seems to indicate that he claimed to be still in the service of the royal house.
for establishing a blockade had been completed. 1 Diodorus declares that Antigonus, being now in control of the most powerful army in Asia, was already pursuing personal ambitions on a very large scale and was no longer content to obey the "kings" and Antipater. 2 It is, however, highly questionable whether at this stage, while Antipater was still alive, Antigonus had already formed plans to defy the central authority and make himself independent. 3 The attitude of Eumenes in making demands that virtually amounted to a rejection of the offer was probably adopted because he was unwilling to become a mere servant of Antigonus and not because he suspected him of disloyalty to the "kings". 4 Later, when Antigonus again sought a settlement, the position had changed: Antipater was dead, the authority of the new regent Polyperchon was most insecure, and the surviving supporters of Perdiccas had been eliminated. Hence it is rather more likely, though by no means certain, that on this occasion Eumenes evaded the conclusion of an agreement because he was convinced that Antigonus was disloyal to the royal house. 5 The significant fact remains that none of the attempts made by his opponents to come to terms with him led to the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

1 Diod. xviii. 41. 6-7; Plut. Eum. 10. 3-8. 2 Diod. xviii. 41. 4-5. 3 P. Cloché, Mélanges Charles Picard, i (1949), 189-90. The ambitious plans of Antigonus are mentioned only at a later stage by Plutarch (Eum. 12. 1). 4 Some observations of Diodorus on the general aims of Eumenes at this juncture (xviii. 42. 1-2) are highly suspect. They are incompatible with a later passage (see the next note), and the implication that Eumenes was ready to sell his services to the highest bidder conflicts with the picture of him drawn by the narrative of Diodorus. If he had felt as he is said to have felt, he would surely have accepted without hesitation the terms offered by Antigonus. The sentiments here attributed to Eumenes foreshadow the subsequent homilies on the mutability of fortune which, as stated above (p. 311), are almost certainly original contributions by Diodorus himself. This passage also is very probably the fruit of his own surmise and not adapted from material supplied by his source. 5 Diod. xviii. 50. 1-4; Plut. Eum. 12. 1-2. It is noteworthy that Hieronymus communicated the proposals of Antigonus to Eumenes on this occasion. A passage in which Diodorus (xviii. 58. 4) further discusses the reasons why Eumenes refused to listen to Antigonus is very probably derived from Hieronymus. It stresses the devotion of Eumenes to the cause of the infant Alexander and, unlike the passage mentioned in the previous note, is in entire harmony with the general impression created by the narrative.
During the first years after the death of Alexander most Macedonians and many Greeks in Macedonian service evidently desired that the Empire should be held together under the Argead house and that the young Alexander IV should, when he came of age, succeed to the heritage of his father. Loyalty to the memory of Alexander remained strong, as is shown by the success of the “Alexander tent”, but self-interest probably exerted an even more powerful influence in favour of maintaining unity under the royal house. The Macedonian rank and file, because they had become professionals, were normally willing to serve anyone who could offer them generous terms and opportunities of winning booty. Often, however, they showed a disinclination to fight each other and evidently much preferred to be left to garrison the conquests of Alexander. The lesser nobles in charge of the smaller or more remote satrapies, who, like the satraps of the Persian Empire, enjoyed a considerable measure of independence, were more likely to be left undisturbed if the Empire were to remain united under the royal house and therefore favoured the maintenance of unity. Hence the cause of the royal house was not inevitably doomed from the outset. On the other hand, the extreme weakness of this cause was manifest, threatened as it was by the ambitions and jealousies of the greater Macedonian leaders. This threat was very grave indeed: it came not only from those believed to be aiming at the establishment of a personal sovereignty over the Empire as a whole but also, perhaps even more acutely, from those who, like Ptolemy, pursued limited objectives and sought for themselves separate and independent kingdoms in a dismembered Empire. While their numbers were small, these men controlled vast resources and enjoyed the enormous power that the principal barons always have enjoyed under a feudal system when the monarchy has been virtually in abeyance. None of them could hope to achieve his ambition if the boy Alexander were allowed to grow to manhood, and he lived to the age of about thirteen only because while a minor he was a

1 The half-witted and illegitimate Philip Arrhidaeus, the nominee of the infantry, was a mere stop-gap, who would doubtless have been eliminated or ignored.
useful pawn and because even the most unscrupulous Successors hesitated to incur the odium of having put him to death.

These considerations must have been fully appreciated by the clear-sighted and experienced Eumenes. Was he then content to expose himself to endless perils and trials, especially when as supreme commander in Asia he was in constant danger of betrayal, solely for the sake of the rather slender chance that young Alexander might become master of a united empire? The impression created by the history of Hieronymus seems to have been that he was. Hieronymus, however, for all his merits cannot be considered to be a wholly impartial witness, and the remarkable decisions of Eumenes mentioned above provide some grounds for believing that he constantly kept in mind the problem of his own future if, as was likely, the Empire were to break up.

The leaders of the cavalry in the dispute with the infantry at Babylon immediately after the death of Alexander are listed by Arrian in two categories. The first consists of Perdiccas, Leonnatus, and Ptolemy; the second, containing the names of five leaders who ranked after these three, includes Eumenes. Although some important personalities were not at Babylon, the passage provides evidence of the status enjoyed by Eumenes in relation to other leaders when Alexander died. The record of his actions, at any rate not from the point at which the challenge to the authority of Perdiccas brought the first clash of arms, shows how determined he was to maintain this position. If the Empire had remained united under the royal house and Alexander IV had grown to manhood, Eumenes would have had strong claims to be ranked among the principal subordinates of the young king on the same footing as the foremost Macedonians. Whatever the outcome, however, he was evidently not content, as Nearchus and other Greeks seem to have been, to become merely the tool of another's ambition. He could

1 F 1. 2.

2 It might be argued that the inclusion of Eumenes is due to the bias of Hieronymus (Jacoby, n. ad loc.), but he had been appointed to a hipparchy by Alexander and was not obviously unworthy to be classed with Lysimachus and Seleucus.
at almost any time have secured an honourable but subordinate command, with plenty of scope for the exercise of his talents, under one of the leading Macedonians whose equals he had been when Alexander died, but he was adamant in refusing agreements whereby he would have found himself committed to an inferior position of this kind. Had the regency collapsed before his own death, he would certainly have competed with other leaders for the independent kingdoms into which a dismembered Empire would naturally fall. Macedonian troops were not likely to fight wholeheartedly for a Greek, but the limitations of Macedonian manpower were becoming evident, and increasing numbers of Greeks and even Asiatics were being armed and trained in the Macedonian style. Eumenes himself showed, when he built up an effective force of Cappadocian horse soon after assuming control of his satrapy, that Asia Minor could produce cavalry of high quality.

What Eumenes planned to do in a situation which, partly through his own efforts to avert it, arose only when he was dead can only be guessed. There is, however, one curious feature of his relations with the regent Polyperchon which is perhaps to be explained on the assumption that he was believed to have personal aims of the kind tentatively suggested above. When he was appointed supreme commander in Asia, the sentence of death passed on him after the fall of Perdiccas was not annulled. It seriously weakened his authority, being used by his enemies in attempts to undermine the loyalty of his troops, and eventually it enabled Antigonus to have him put to death with some semblance of legality. The omission of Polyperchon to have the sentence annulled can scarcely have been a mere oversight: even if he failed to appreciate that his appointment of Eumenes as supreme commander in Asia did not automatically

1 Cf. the severe and somewhat unjust criticisms of Plut. Comp. Sert. et Eum. 2. 3-5.
3 Plut. Eum. 4. 4-4, cf. Diod. xviii. 29. 3 and 30. 1.
4 According to Diodorus (xviii. 59. 4, the principal passage on the fickleness of fortune) the Macedonians "forgot" their condemnation of him.
5 Diod. xviii. 62. 1 and xix. 12. 1-2 (also apparently Diod. xviii. 63. 2 and Plut. Eum. 8. 11).
cancel the death sentence passed by the army, Eumenes must surely have claimed to be absolved from all charges, a claim that he made in his negotiations with Antigonus at Nora.\textsuperscript{1} No explanation of this strange omission on the part of Polyperchon seems to have been offered in modern times.\textsuperscript{2} It may be that he deliberately refrained from taking steps to have the death sentence annulled because he saw in it a valuable means of maintaining his own authority and of curbing any attempt by Eumenes to make himself undesirably independent.\textsuperscript{3}

If there is any validity in the suggestions made in this paper, the traditional picture of Eumenes should be somewhat modified. There is, however, much to admire in the part that he played in the struggles between the Successors during the last years of his life, especially after his appointment as supreme commander for the "kings" in Asia. He was essentially a realist, and in the many difficult situations in which he was involved he showed a remarkable sense of what was practicable. He determined what his policy should be and pursued it with undaunted persistence. Few of his Macedonian contemporaries seem to have understood the altered world in which they found themselves. They had acquired vast power too rapidly. A few decades earlier Macedonia had been a feudal backwater, and not many Macedonians had crossed its frontiers. When the dominating personality of Alexander was suddenly removed, the Macedonian nobles instinctively reverted to the traditional practice of their ancestors, who, whenever the monarchy was weak, had tended to disrupt the unity of the kingdom by self-

\textsuperscript{1} Diod. xviii. 41. 7.
\textsuperscript{2} The literary tradition is very unsympathetic towards Polyperchon—possibly because Hieronymus considered that he had given insufficient support to Eumenes—but his decree recalling Greek exiles (Diod. xviii. 56) was a shrewd move, and perhaps he was abler than is generally believed.
\textsuperscript{3} In discussing the loyalty of Eumenes to the royal house I have not taken into account the fact that in the spring of 317 he appears to have lost his status as supreme commander in Asia because Polyperchon was deposed by a decree issued in the name of Philip Arrhidaeus (Justin, xiv. 5. 1-3, discussed by H. Bengtson, \textit{Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit}, i (1937), 87-8 and 110-11). Even if Eumenes received a clear picture of the confused situation in Macedonia, which is doubtful, he must have refused to recognize the regency of Cassander: his loyalty was to Olympias and the legitimate branch of the royal house.
seeking turbulence and intrigue. It is not surprising that the Successors strove for the prizes of empire without appreciating its responsibilities, that they succumbed so easily and so short-sightedly to the lure of personal ambition. The fault lay less in their national character than in the limitations of their political experience. Although Eumenes was probably less indifferent to his own interests than Hieronymus seems to have allowed, he did differ from most of the leading Macedonians in being less easily corrupted and therefore more loyal to the house of Alexander. One reason may have been that, as has already been pointed out, the highest prize of all was not open to him. A stronger reason, however, was that he enjoyed the very great advantage of having been born and brought up in the politically and intellectually more advanced atmosphere of a Greek city-state.