THE social effect of any great war is to speed up the pace of social change; and, when, within the span of a single lifetime, one great war is followed by a second, the cumulative effect is much more than double that of a single great war. In our world in our time we are conscious of this overwhelming cumulative effect in our own experience of the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. In our own case, however, we have not yet had time to see beyond the beginning of the sequel; so perhaps we may find ourselves interested in looking at past instances in which we do know the whole story.

"Double great wars" are rare; but there were three of them in the history of the Graeco-Roman Civilization; and each of these pairs of wars had a decisive effect on the destinies of the society in which it was perpetrated. The first pair was the Archidamian War of 431-421 B.C. followed by the Decelean War of 413-404 B.C.; and this double great war—the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War—was the occasion of the Greek Civilization's breakdown. The second pair was the First Romano-Punic War of 264-241 B.C. followed by the Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C.; and this double great war was the occasion of the Greek Civilization's relapse into a débacle after a brief third-century rally. The third pair of great wars was the Romano-Persian War of A.D. 572-90 followed by its successor of A.D. 603-28; and this double great war was the occasion of the Graeco-Roman Society's final dissolution. The consequences of the second of these three double great wars are the subject of the present lecture.

1 A lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on Wednesday, the 10th of March, 1954.
The Roman Commonwealth on the Eve of the First Romano-Punic War

In the course of seventy years—342-272 B.C.—Rome had imposed political unity, under her own ascendancy, on the whole of Peninsular Italy south of, but not including, the basin of the River Po. These Roman conquests in Cisappennine Italy, rapid though they were, were neither so rapid nor so spectacular as the contemporary conquests of Alexander the Great in South-Western Asia. They were, however, not less momentous; for, as a result of them, the Roman Commonwealth made its entry on to the stage of Greek history as one of five Great Powers in an expanding Greek world. Two of the other four—the Carthaginian Empire and the Kingdom of Macedon—had already been on the map before the face of this map had been changed by the Macedonians' and the Romans' military achievements. The other two—the Achaemenian Empire's Seleucid successor-state in South-West Asia and an insurgent native Egyptian Kingdom's Ptolemaic successor-state in the Lower Nile Valley—were also old empires under new management. The Roman Commonwealth was the only one of the five that was new in reality. Rome had turned herself from a middle-sized city-state into a Great Power by imposing military and political unity upon Italy—an enterprise which had proved to be beyond the strength of the Etruscans in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. and of the Siceliot Greeks in the fifth and fourth.

An expanding Greek world had begun to impinge upon Italy 400 years before the Roman conquest of Italy, and the Roman Commonwealth was entangled in the Greek world because it included two important Italian pieces of it: Magna Graecia (what was left of it, after the infiltration of the Oscan barbarians in the fourth century B.C.) and a semi-Hellenized Etruria, particularly the Etruscan black country (Elba and Populonia). This political entanglement raised questions that were social and cultural; for by the time, in the third decade of the third century B.C., when Rome's conquest of Italy had thus brought Rome back into the Greek World again, Rome
herself and the central Italian heart of her newly-built commonwealth had been out of touch, for some 150 years, with the main movement of Greek history. In the sixth century B.C. Rome had been a partly commercial and industrial city-state ruled by a despot, like the neighbouring Etruscan city-states and the leading Greek city-states of the day: Corinth, Sicyon, Miletus, Athens. But when, towards the end of the sixth century, Rome—again behaving like her more eminent contemporaries—had turned her despot out, she had had to pay for her self-liberation by falling into a state of isolation and weakness that had lasted for about a century; and, when she had exerted her reviving strength in the military and political enterprise of conquering Italy, she had built up her power by turning inland into a culturally and socially backward interior, into which the city-state dispensation had not yet penetrated and in which the native population was therefore more malleable than it was in older and more advanced communities with more deeply engraved memories of a more glorious past. In moulding this native central Italian human raw material, Rome had the institutional advantage of being, herself, a city-state of old standing; but, by the third century B.C., Rome’s way of life had come to be old-fashioned. It was a way that had been put out of date, east of the Adriatic, by the sweeping social and political revolution there in the generation of Alexander the Great; and in 264 B.C. there were at least four signal differences between Rome and some or all of the other Great Powers in the new world into which Rome had now been drawn as a result of her Italian conquests.

One of these differences was constitutional. Since the days of Alexander and his father Philip, the typical constitution of a Great Power in the Greek world had come to be monarchy. Carthage was the only third-century Great Power besides Rome in which the sovereign authority was a city-state. A second difference was a military one. In accordance with the pre-Alexandrine Greek city-state tradition, Rome's fighting-force was a compulsory levy of free citizens possessing property of at least a minimum value; and the contingents furnished, under treaty, by Rome's Italian confederate communities were levied
from the same class. But there was only one other Great Power, besides Rome, that now still had a citizen army, and this was Macedon. The other three contemporary Great Powers—Carthage, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Seleucid Asia—all employed professional armies largely composed of foreign mercenaries. A third difference, closely connected with the military one, was economic. Rome's citizen fighting-force consisted of farmers who made their living by subsistence farming, whereas all the other contemporary Great Powers, except Macedon, had gone over to cash-crop farming with a labour-force, not of citizen-soldiers, but of serfs or slaves who were exempt from military service. In the fourth place, there was an administrative difference which distinguished the Roman Commonwealth sharply from contemporary Ptolemaic Egypt, though not so sharply, perhaps, from any of the other three Great Powers. The Roman Commonwealth in the third century B.C. did not possess anything like the contemporary Ptolemaic professional civil service.

The Question of Rome's Future Role in the Greek World

Now that Rome had made herself into a Great Power by uniting Italy, she was bound to play a leading part in the international life of the Greek world because her military material was as good and as cheap as Macedon's and was many times as numerous. Two questions presented themselves—one military and political, the other social and cultural. What was going to be the Roman Commonwealth's relation to the other four Powers of the day? And in what way, and at what pace, was she going to come into line with the rest of society in her social structure? Evidently, sooner or later, Rome would have to come to terms with the prevailing institutions of the age: monarchy, a professional army, cash-crop farming, a professional civil service. Would Rome's way of "receiving" these institutions be evolutionary or revolutionary?

The effect of the "double war" of 264-201 B.C. was to give both the military-political question and the social-cultural question a revolutionary answer. By 167 B.C. Rome had made herself mistress of the whole Greek world. By that date, one
of the other Great Powers, Macedon, had already been destroyed, and the three survivors were surviving only on sufferance. As a result of this rapid and irreversible overturning of the previous international balance of power, the pace of the Roman Commonwealth's social adjustment to the rest of society was so much speeded up, and the process itself was forced on to such unhealthy lines, that in 133 B.C. a revolution broke out in the Roman Commonwealth which went on for 100 years and which devastated not only Italy but the whole Greek World, before Augustus managed, as he did in and after 31 B.C., to win a reprieve for a society whose moral constitution had, by that time, been fatally undermined.

The Effect of the Double War of 264-201 B.C. on Economic and Social Life in Southern Italy

Southern Italy was the Roman Commonwealth's heel of Achilles. The Lucanian mountains and Apulian downs were unfavourable ground for agriculture by nature; and, since the fifth century B.C., the region's natural economic disadvantages had been aggravated by the social misfortune of its having been furrowed by a sharp frontier—cultural as well as political and military—between the sophisticated civilization of the Greek city-states of Magna Graecia and the barbarism of Oscan intruders who had drifted down from the most remote and most backward parts of Italy: the Appennine highlands and the middle section of the Adriatic coast. This long-drawn-out calamity was capped by the catastrophe of the Hannibalic War. Hannibal cantoned his invading army in the south of Italy in 216 B.C. and maintained his hold there till 203 B.C.; most of Rome's south Italian confederates deserted to Hannibal's side; and, during those fourteen years, the south Italian communities, Greek and Oscan alike, were devastated and depopulated by the ceaseless ebb and flow of savagely conducted military operations. After Hannibal's departure, most of the depopulated lands belonging to traitor communities were confiscated by the Roman state, and these new Roman public lands were then placed at the disposal of Roman capitalists who could afford to exploit them. For the most part they were thrown open, to any grazier
who could pay the annual fee, for pasturage, on the grand scale, with seasonal migrations of the flocks, twice a year, between highlands and lowlands. The patches of good soil in the confiscated lands were leased, not to farmers for old-fashioned subsistence farming, but to planters for producing valuable cash-crops, especially wine and olive-oil. The two new ways of exploiting the confiscated lands both required a large initial outlay of capital; and both the new plantations and the new cattle-runs were operated with slave-labour.

The employment of slave-labour on specialized plantations and on large-scale ranches was a peculiar institution of the Greek world's colonial fringe in the western basin of the Mediterranean. It is first heard of in the territory of the colonial Greek city Akragas (Agrigentum) in Sicily, where Carthaginian prisoners, captured in 480 B.C., had been set to work on the land as slaves. Since about 450 B.C., this Agrigentine slave-plantation system had been introduced, by the Carthaginians themselves, into the African hinterland of Carthage, which they had annexed at about that date. The treatment of the labour-force on commercialized plantations and ranches was more brutal in the west than it was in contemporary Egypt and south-west Asia, where the work was done, not by imported slaves, but by native serfs. The slave-revolts which began to break out on the western plantations and ranches, even before the end of the Hannibalic War, demonstrated that the inhuman treatment of the slaves was bearing the anti-social fruit that was to be expected from it. The slave-herdsmen became overt brigands; the slave-husbandmen became covert rebels, waiting sullenly for the first chance of murdering masters who treated them, not as human beings, but as expendable plant.

Sell off all superfluous property: . . . all old oxen, sickly cattle, sickly sheep, wool, hides, any old wagon, any old slave, a diseased slave, and any other superfluous property. The master should be more of a seller than a buyer.¹

This advice was addressed to planters in a manual published, at some date in the second quarter of the second century B.C., by the respected Roman statesman Marcus Porcius Cato, one

¹ Cato, M. Porcius, De Agricultū, chap. 2.
of the few Roman peasants who had succeeded, in this age, in making their way up into the new post-war capitalist class. The passage illustrates the callousness in the masters that provoked such savage retaliation from the slaves whenever these could find the opportunity.

The Effect of the Double War of 264-201 B.C. on Economic and Social Life in Central Italy

In central Italy, which was the heart of the Roman Commonwealth in virtue of being the chief recruiting-ground of its peasant armies, the effects of the Hannibalic War were far more serious than those of the First Romano-Punic War had been. The first war had been primarily a naval one, and, though the naval operations required oar-power on a large scale, Rome's oarsmen were probably drawn mainly from the sea-faring population of the Magna Graecian and Etruscan ports, and not from the Italian peasantry. There had been no corresponding demands on Rome's land-forces, in which the peasantry were in the first line; and so, even while the first war was being waged, the Roman Government had found itself still able to go on planting new peasant colonies on lands that had been expropriated from ex-enemy Italian communities during the last stages of the foregoing Roman conquest of Italy. On the other hand, the Hannibalic War required the raising of Roman land-forces on a vast scale, and a considerable part of these had to be kept under arms, for years on end, in theatres as far afield from the peasant-soldiers' central Italian homes as Spain and Greece.

This long-term military service overseas uprooted the peasant-proprietor from his farm and so deprived his family of their means of subsistence. The sacrifice now demanded from this class of Roman citizens by the growing military requirements of the Roman state was as disastrous as it was unprecedented, and it was not brought to an end by the ending of the Hannibalic War itself in 201 B.C.; for this awful scourge, which had already devastated southern Italy, went on posthumously ruining central Italy by leaving behind it, as its dire legacy, a crop of supplementary wars in an increasing
number of ever more distant theatres. From 200 B.C. to 146 B.C. there were recurrent wars against Great Powers—Macedon, the Seleucid Monarchy, and Carthage—which ceased only when no Great Power besides Rome herself was left standing. From 200 B.C. to 173 B.C. there was continuous warfare in the north-western Appennines and in the Basin of the River Po to subjugate or eradicate the local barbarians. From 200 B.C. onwards there was also continuous further warfare in Spain, and this went on till the last recalcitrant pocket of Spanish resistance to the Roman conquest was ironed out by Augustus in or after 19 B.C. Moreover, the year 146 B.C., which saw the series of Romano-Macedonian wars terminate in the reduction of Macedon to the status of a Roman province, inevitably also saw the opening of a new front to be manned by expatriated Roman peasant-soldiers along this new province's northern borders, which, henceforward, had to be defended by Roman instead of by Macedonian arms against Macedon's perpetually aggressive barbarian neighbours.

The reason why this continuous warfare in distant theatres was economically and socially disastrous for the Roman Common-wealth was because, throughout the next 100 years after the end of the Hannibalic War, the Roman Government persisted in waging its wars with the old-fashioned military instrument that it had employed with such signal success in its previous conquest of Italy. So long as the central Italian peasant-soldier had been called up only for seasonal campaigns on Italian soil, it had been possible for him to combine the performance of his traditional military duty to the state with his economic and social function of cultivating his garden and providing for his family. But now a sacrifice was being required of him that had no parallel in the world of the day. It was not that the Roman Government was singular in waging long wars far afield; no less long wars still farther afield were being waged in the second century B.C. by the Seleucidae. But in this age every government, except the Roman Government, waged its long-distance wars mainly with professional armies. By employing conscript peasant-soldiers to do professional soldiers' work, the Roman Government, in the course of the second century B.C., completed
the ruin of the subsistence-farming peasantry in central Italy which had been begun by the military demands of the Hannibalic War; and this opened the way for the capture of central Italy, in its turn, by the capitalistic plantation-farming and stock-breeding that had captured southern Italy already.

The ruinous effects of long-term military service overseas on the economy of the peasant-soldier's central Italian farm would drive the victim, sooner or later, to sell his land cheap to some capitalist employing non-conscribable slave-labour. When a *ci-devant* peasant thus found himself and his family landless and homeless, he was confronted with a choice between several alternative new courses.

The eligible course of becoming a capitalist himself was open to him only in theory, for Cato, who did achieve this *tour de force*, was one of those exceptions that prove a rule. It was almost insuperably difficult for a peasant to do what Cato did.

The best of the practicable alternatives was to emigrate across the Appennines into the Po Basin, and there recoup the loss of a central Italian farm by taking up an allotment of the land that had just been expropriated from Transappennine native peoples. On the remote banks of the Transappennine northern waters in the second century B.C., conditions were still favourable for subsistence farming; for the abundant produce of virgin fields reclaimed from the oak-woods could provide subsistence for large peasant families on the spot, while it could not be exported profitably to Cisappennine urban markets down a system of natural waterways that debouched into the wrong sea;¹ and, in consequence, the capitalist planters and cattlemen who were in search of further lands to conquer from the Italian peasantry would not be tempted, at this stage

¹ A pioneer cultivator in the Po Basin in the second century B.C. who had wanted a profitable market for his produce would have found himself in the same plight as a pioneer cultivator in the Mississippi Basin before the advent of the railroad. The Appennines headed off the northern waters, as the Alleghanies and the Appalachians headed off the western waters, from affording to the settler from the other side of the mountains a natural waterway for transporting his produce to the more densely populated regions that he had left behind him. The Po Basin ports Atria and Spina on the Adriatic were as ill-placed for the export of agricultural produce to Rome as the Mississippi Basin port New Orleans was for the export of it to New York.
of the opening-up of the Po Basin, to prise the migrant peasant out of his new farm beyond the Appennine mountain-barrier. Within one hundred and forty-two years of the end of the Hannibalic War, the progeny of the second-century central Italian peasant-settlers in the Po Basin had grown numerous enough to be able to supply Caesar with most of the troops that he required for the conquest of Transalpine Gaul. Yet, one hundred and thirteen years before Caesar took up his Gallic command, the supply of vacant land for central Italian settlers in the Po Basin had given out; for in 173 B.C. all expropriated Cisalpine land that was then still on the Roman Government's hands was alienated to homesteaders in individual allotments;¹ and in this and the following year the Senate also put a stop to the acquisition of new public lands in this region by the old method of barbarism. They censured one of the two consuls for 173 B.C., Marcus Popillius Laenas, for having cold-bloodedly attacked, enslaved, and expropriated an unoffending independent native community, the Statelli; and they did their best to make amends to the consul's victims for the outrage that they had suffered at his hands.² Thus, from the year 172 B.C. onwards, the alternative of finding a new farm beyond the mountains was no longer open to the central Italian peasant who had lost his ancestral farm through a protracted absence on military service overseas.

The second alternative open to him was to emigrate to one of the Cisappennine Italian cities, where new urban jobs were being created by the expansion of a small-scale industry for manufacturing the relatively elaborate apparatus required for the production of wine and olive oil. In 177 B.C. a number of confederate communities represented to the Senate that it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to supply their stipulated quotas of peasant conscripts to the Commonwealth forces because their able-bodied men of military age were migrating in such large numbers to Fregellae and to Rome itself.³

The third and worst alternative for the ci-devant peasant-proprietor was the line of least resistance for him, and was

¹ Livy, Book XLII, chap. 4.
² Livy, Book XLII, chaps. 7-9, 21-22.
³ Livy, Book XLI, chap. 8.
therefore the line that he was apt to take as a rule. This third alternative was for him to stay on the land in Cisappennine Italy as a landless agricultural labourer (politor) who would find seasonal, not permanent, employment in the new olive-yards and vinyards. These "mean freemen", like the plantation slaves, were exempt from military service; but this alleviation of their lot was regarded, not as a privilege, but as a stigma; and their juridical status of being nominally their own masters condemned these "mean freemen" to be treated even worse than their servile fellow-labourers; for the slave-owner whose economic interest deterred him from starving his human chattels to death and from prematurely working them out by intolerably hard labour had no similar interest in the welfare of his temporary hired hands; and he therefore hired them for the shortest possible periods and employed them then on back-breaking work in order to spare the slave-gang that was the permanent nucleus of his labour-force.¹

The Effect of the Double War of 264-201 B.C. in calling into Existence a New Class of Roman Business Men

A city-state could manage its own public affairs without employing a professional civil service: for affairs that were so simple and on so small a scale could be administered, well enough for what was required, by unpaid elective annual public officers; and when, between 342 B.C. and 272 B.C., the Roman city-state swelled itself out to a gigantic size by incorporating the whole of Peninsular Italy, the new Roman Commonwealth was still able to go on administering itself in the old way, because it was organized as an association of city-states, each of which still retained its local autonomy. There were confederate city-states that were externally associated with Rome by treaty; and there were municipal city-states (some of them ci-devant independent communities, others among them Roman colonies) whose citizens had two citizenships, a local municipal one and a national Roman one as well. Thus the administrative problem arising from the great increase in

the scale of the Roman Commonwealth was met, not by creating a professional civil service, but by pushing the old amateur system of local self-government as far as it could be made to go. In the Roman Commonwealth before the establishment of the Principate by Augustus, the only local officials who were not locally elected officers were the "prefects" who were appointed by the annually elected public officers of the Roman city-state itself to supervise for them the administration of certain communities that had been given the Roman citizenship before they had become well enough versed in Roman ways to be able to manage their own municipal government for themselves.

By these expedients the Romans had contrived still to do without a professional civil service even when they had expanded the territory of the Roman city-state itself to embrace about a quarter of Peninsular Italy, and the territory of the Roman Commonwealth to embrace the whole of Peninsular Italy. When however, the Hannibalic War confronted the Roman Government with the novel task of fitting out armies for service overseas and then keeping these distant armies supplied for years on end, they found the task impossible to perform without an efficient organization of some kind; and, since they had no professional civil service, they met this emergency by calling in private enterprise to their aid. The opportunity thus presented by the state's necessity could not be seized by the governing class itself; for in 218 B.C., on the eve of the outbreak of war, the opposition had carried a Lex Claudia debarring senators and their sons from engaging in overseas trade. When the war was over, this veto pushed senatorial capitalists into finding an alternative field for investment in planting and stocking the newly acquired Roman public lands in the south of Italy. Meanwhile, during the war, private enterprise had to be enlisted for servicing the armies overseas; and the government contracts for this lucrative business, for which senators were now legally ineligible, called into existence a new class of Roman businessmen.

What part was this new class going to play in Roman life? The history of one of the earliest of the war-time contracts was
ominous. In 215 B.C., when the Roman treasury was already bankrupt, three companies of contractors undertook to supply the Roman armies in Spain on credit, on condition that the state should insure them against losses. In 212 B.C. it came to light that two of the nineteen contractors had been purposely sinking their ships and making fraudulent returns of the value of the cargoes.¹

Even before this scandal, the Roman Government had been chary of placing public contracts in Roman hands. When, as a result of the First Romano-Punic War, the Island of Sicily had become a Roman province, the contract for collecting the tithe of corn due to the Government from the Sicilian cultivators was let to native Sicilian contractors by the Roman authorities; and, though, in spite of the lesson learnt during the Hannibalic War, the contracts for administering the Italian customs and for working the Spanish mines were let, apparently, to Roman contractors in 179 B.C., the Roman Government preferred, from 167 B.C. to 158 B.C., to close down the profitable Macedonian mines, which the Roman state had inherited from the extinguished kingdom of Macedon, rather than allow Roman contractors to have a finger in the pie.²

In fact, the Roman Government was alert to keep the new Roman business men's wings clipped from the end of the Hannibalic War down to the year 123 B.C., when Gaius Gracchus made their fortunes for them at one stroke, by letting out, on contract, the collection of taxes in the new Roman province of Asia and giving a monopoly of this golden opportunity to the Roman business men as the purchase-price for their support of Gaius's domestic political programme.

The Cumulative Consequences of the Romano-Punic Double War of 264-201 B.C. During the Next Two-thirds of a Century: 201-133 B.C.

The double war of 264-201 B.C. produced, within the next two-thirds of a century, cumulative consequences which were

¹ Livy, Book XXIII, chaps. 48-49; Book XXV, chaps. 3-4.
² Livy, Book XLV, chap. 18.
as grave as they were great. They were grievous within the bosom of the Roman Commonwealth itself and, if possible, still more grievous in the Greek world at large, almost the whole of which now lay at Rome's mercy.

Inside the Roman Commonwealth, the self-supporting peasant-proprietor had been uprooted in southern Italy almost entirely and in central Italy to a large extent; and his disappearance from his original home, south of the Appennines, had been only partially offset by calling into existence a new world of ci-devant Cisappennine peasant-proprietors in the Po Basin. In Peninsular Italy the evicted peasantry had been replaced by a new population of slave-plantation hands and slave-herdsmen. Meanwhile, the Roman Government's military necessities had called into existence a new Roman social class of business men who—like modern western business men in the pre-industrial age—made their fortunes, not by productive economic activities, but by the farming of government contracts.

In the international arena, one half-century—218 B.C. to 167 B.C.—had seen Rome impose her military supremacy on the Greek world without having seen her even begin to manifest either the will or the capacity to establish and administer a world-state to take the place of the parochial Great Powers whom she had now overthrown. After Rome had made her supremacy unchallengeable by shattering Macedon in succession to Carthage, there was an interregnum of 136 years—167 B.C. to 31 B.C.—during which the Romans shamelessly exploited a world which they had wrecked, instead of shouldering their responsibility for rebuilding it and for keeping the new building in order. During these disgraceful years, the only efficient Roman administrators were the public contractors, and these were predatory. It was not till after 31 B.C. that these licensed brigands' descendants were at last converted into civil servants who were efficient and at the same time conscientious.

The Failure of the Roman Revolution of 133 B.C.-31 B.C.

By 133 B.C. the ruin that had been brought upon the Cisappennine Italian peasantry by the burden of long-term military service overseas had gone so far that the Roman Common-
wealth's once seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of peasant-soldiers was now patently beginning to run dry; and the fear of seeing Rome's military power wither at the roots was the motive behind the programme of agrarian reform that was launched by Tiberius Gracchus. Tiberius's measures, though they were intended to be conservative, precipitated a revolution that went on for 100 years and that devastated not only the Roman Commonwealth but the entire Greek world, without ever achieving its purpose. This long revolution passed through two stages—a Gracchan stage lasting from 133 B.C. to 111 B.C. and a Marian stage lasting from 111 B.C. to 31 B.C.—but, in both stages, the revolution was a failure because the radical policy of Marius and the other war-lords who followed in Marius's footsteps was no more realistic than the conservative policy of the Gracchi had been.

The policy of the Gracchi was simply to put back the hands of the clock by reconverting central and southern Italy into a land of peasant-proprietor citizen-soldiers. This policy was foredoomed to failure for two reasons, one economic and the other institutional. The economic reason was that, in Cisappennine Italy in the second century B.C., small-scale subsistence farming was less remunerative than large-scale commercialized plantations and cattle-runs. The institutional reason was that the peasant-proprietors were being re-established expressly for the purpose of their being conscripted, as in the past, for military service; and this traditional demand on them, which had become a crushing burden under the new conditions of Roman warfare that had been inaugurated by the outbreak of the Hannibalic War in 218 B.C., was bound to uproot a re-established peasantry once again, as the Roman state's campaigns came to be fought ever farther and farther afield and to be ever longer and longer drawn out. In these increasingly adverse circumstances the subsistence-farming peasantry's liability to military conscription would have made it impossible for it to resist the encroachments of the capitalist planters and cattlemen, whose slave-labour was exempt from military service, even if, in Cisappennine Italy in this age, the new methods of exploiting the land had not been more profitable in themselves.
The policy of the "political generals", which was tried after the Gracchan policy's failure had become evident, was no more realistic though it was much more drastic and more brutal. Marius and his successors did find a solution for Rome's military problem by tapping a new source of recruitment. Instead of continuing to rely on conscripts levied from the now fast shrinking reservoir of peasant-proprietors, they dipped into the now fast expanding pool of casual free agricultural labour and drew from it an ample flow of volunteers. To these "mean freemen", long-term military service overseas as professional soldiers offered both greater present security and more promising eventual prospects than seasonal work in Italy on other men's plantations, where they were set to do the back-breaking work on which the slave-owners did not wish to expend the life and limb of their permanent human chattels. In the army the "mean free" volunteer could at least count on receiving more or less regular subsistence and pay; and, besides the hope of prize-money, there was "a gentleman's agreement", between the volunteer and the war-lord under whose banner he enlisted, that, when the soldier was eventually discharged, the war-lord should provide him, by fair means or by foul, with a farm of his own on Italian soil. Thus, in effect, the Roman military forces raised by Marius and his successors were private armies, and these private armies were armed trades-unions, whose rank and file provided the boss with brute force for bringing pressure to bear upon the Commonwealth, while the boss used the political "pull" that his command of a private army gave him in order to provide for his "under-privileged" followers at the expense of the propertied classes, including the surviving peasant-proprietors as well as the capitalist planters and cattlemen.

This sinister trades-unionism-under-arms worked effectively, during the eighty years 111 B.C.-31 B.C., in transferring Italian agricultural land from the hands that had been cultivating or grazing it into the hands of professional soldiers who had once been casual labourers on the land before they had joined the army. The point in which the Marian policy was unrealistic was that the ex-agricultural labourers whom it was endowing with farms of their own, through arbitrary acts of
expropriation on a large scale, had long since been incapacitated, by years of professional military service, for settling down to cultivate the farms on which their hearts had never ceased to be set. The agricultural labourer turned professional soldier had, in fact, become unfit for farming before winning by the sword the farm that no milder tool had availed to obtain for him.

Thus the Marian policy carried Italian agriculture a long stage farther down the road to ruin without solving the problem of providing a tolerable life and living for the landless Italian agricultural labourer. The problem remained unsolved until after 31 B.C., when Augustus—the sole survivor of a struggle for existence among rival war-lords—solved it at last by cantoning a deflated professional army along distant frontiers and by providing the soldiers with pensions, as well as with pay, from Imperial funds. The Principate was able to meet this vast financial commitment because it succeeded in creating a civil service that was honest as well as efficient. Until the Roman Government had equipped itself with this professional administrative instrument, it had been impotent to meet the cost of a professional army out of taxation, and had therefore had to let the Marian professional soldiery provide for themselves by plunder and expropriation. But the Augustan Imperial Civil Service, which won a two hundred-years-long reprieve for the Graeco-Roman Society as well as for the Roman Empire, had been created two hundred years too late. A step which ought to have been taken before the end of the third century B.C. had not been taken till just before the end of the last century B.C.; and, in spite of the reprieve that was the reward of overdue action even at the eleventh hour, the two hundred years' delay was fatal in the long run both for the Roman Empire and for the civilization that it had incapsulated. Those two centuries of agony—218 B.C. to 31 B.C.—had taken the life out of the Graeco-Roman World; and this lost life could not be conjured back into the stricken body social by a Roman World Government that had learnt to be beneficent two hundred years too late. This was the nemesis of the double war of 264-201 B.C. Within two hundred years of the fateful assault upon Saguntum, dire Hannibal had posthumously completed the task of taking vengeance upon Rome which he had failed to finish off within his life-time.
THE LAND TAX IN SCOTLAND, 1707-98

BY W. R. WARD, M.A., D.PHIL.,
LECTURER IN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

The land tax was part of the high price which England and Wales had to pay for the Glorious Revolution; it was part also of the price paid by Scotland for full union with them under the Revolution system. But whereas in England, the structure of land tax administration had grown up gradually in answer to successive financial crises, in Scotland it was superimposed at one stroke upon the older system of cess collection, and superimposed as part of the protracted piece of political bargaining concluded by the Act of Union. Thus from the beginning there were many respects in which the land tax system of Scotland differed from that in the south, differences which were to mark its history throughout the century.

In the ninth clause of the Treaty of Union there were two main provisions as to the manner of raising the land tax. The first of these was that the quota was to be "raised and collected in the same manner as the cess now is in Scotland; but subject to such regulations in the manner of collecting as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain". The second was that although the quota was to be fixed at the low figure of £48,000, less than was paid by many English counties, it was nevertheless to be "free of all charges". Under the first provision,

1 For convenience shelf-mark references have been given to all manuscript material in the Public Record Office which has been used in this article. This includes the following classes: Treasury Board Papers (T.1); Out-Letters North Britain (T.17); Out-Letters General (T.27); Minute Books (T.29); Chatham Papers, P.R.O. 30/8 (Out-Letters Taxes and Reference Books have also been examined but yield little information about the Scottish land tax). Reference to volumes of the Calendar of Treasury Books as yet unpublished, are to volumes of proof pages in the P.R.O. References to the Additional MSS. in the British Museum are all to the Newcastle Papers.


3 The £48,000 which Scotland was to pay when the rate in England was 4s. in the £, made no pretence of being a £ rate; it was equivalent to eight months of the old cess, and according to the Scottish Commissioners in the negotiations, it was all the country could bear. G. Burnet, History of his own time, ed. (London, 1875), p. 799.
subject to regulation from Westminster, the Scottish land tax was to be raised under Scottish law (to be discussed later) and by traditional Scottish practice. In England and Wales the quotas upon counties and boroughs were fixed in the Land Tax Acts; in Scotland the custom was that in return for their legal monopoly of trade the Royal Burghs should bear one-sixth of the quota of cess. The Convention jealously guarded its privilege of apportioning this sixth among the burghs according to the fluctuations of trade. In the counties the quotas fixed in the Acts were raised under the supervision of the Commissioners of Supply who, like the English land tax commissioners appointed the assessors and collectors. In Scotland these officials had not a parish, but a whole county to cover.

There was one Receiver-General for the whole of Scotland stationed at Edinburgh, who had all the duties of his fellows in the English counties. But as the Tax Office in London was both distant and ignorant of the special problems of Scotland, and as under Scottish law he had authority over the local Commissioners denied to his English brethren, he assumed many of the functions of oversight exercised in England by the central office. Though appointed and dismissed by the Treasury (to whom he despatched regular accounts of his payments), his main concern was with the masters close at hand, the Barons of the Scottish Court of Exchequer. This court, erected under the Act of 6 Anne c. 26, was composed partly of Scottish and partly of English Barons, and was designed to accommodate Scottish to English Exchequer practice. For the most part, however, the Court pursued a course of inglorious inefficiency.

1 Though in 1708 it decided for the moment to retain the old tax roll. *Extracts from the records of the Convention of Royal Burghs* (cited below as *Convention Records*), iv. 448.

The second provision in the Act of Union that the quotas should be paid free of all charges, prohibited the payment of collectors, Commissioners' clerks and the Receiver by poundage as in England. Hence from the beginning the local Commissioners were forced to turn surplus land tax funds to unofficial purposes to pay their servants, and soon local authorities were using the money for many purposes. The Receiver, who derived his salary from the office of Receiver of Crown Rents and Casualties to which he had been appointed before the Union, became a major pluralist in the financial administration, and had every inducement to profit by his balances instead of remitting them. How did this organization develop in the course of the century?

Local Administration in Scotland: (I) The Royal Burghs

The fundamental problem of land tax administration in the Royal Burghs in the eighteenth century arose from the decaying prosperity of many of the smaller burghs. In this period the wastage of municipal assets went on steadily, and the innumerable petitions for tax relief which came up cannot all be set aside as special pleading. In these cases the Convention would appoint a small committee of representatives of other burghs to investigate the case and make recommendations; periodically the whole tax roll would be revised by Commissioners appointed on oath.

Between 1711 and 1714 this latter procedure provoked a first class battle among the burghs. In 1711, faced by a number of appeals for reduced assessments, the Convention, "considering what great heats and debates doe generally arise among the royal burrows at the alteration of the tax roll", ordered the present roll to continue for a year, merely requiring some of the more prosperous burghs to advance the money due from unfree traders till it came in. The representatives of Glasgow, Aberdeen,

2 Convention Records, e.g. vii. 299, 324, 385.
3 Ibid. v. 194, 196, 401, 473.
Dumfries and Aberbrothock, with the support of Inverness, no doubt fearing that this would become a permanent addition to their assessment, refused to pay. Both sides carried their case to Westminster, making wild allegations against each other.¹

For the moment the recusant burghs gained their point, and their view that assessments should fall upon landed rents rather than upon trade was inscribed in the Act. When in 1712 the Convention met to draw up a new tax roll on this basis, the conflicts between the two parties broke out again over the interpretation of the Act. The recusant party accused the majority of omitting property from assessment. The opinion of the Lord Advocate did nothing to settle the quarrel, and again the dispute went to Westminster. This time the majority with the assistance of the Earl of Finlater (the late Chief Baron) triumphed by the narrow margin of 26 to 21, and the new clause was dropped from the bill.² At the General Convention of July 1713, Aberdeen and the recusants still stood out for the adoption of some definite rule like that of 1711, but in the end a new tax roll was adopted in which all the recusant burghs but Aberdeen received a notable increase in assessment. In the following year Scottish M.P.s began to put pressure on the burghs to settle their differences, and it was finally agreed that three-quarters of the quota imposed on each burgh should be raised on "lands, burrow-rods, tenements, houses, and fishings" traditionally rated within the burgh, and the other quarter upon trade. Thus peace was restored at last after three years' unbroken squabbling.³

Conflicts of this type were not the only threat arising from the decay of certain burghs. The Receiver General might quarter troops on large burghs for debts due by small.⁴ When this was

¹ Convention Records, v. 6-19; Commons Journals, xvii. 13; Extracts from the records of the Burgh of Glasgow (cited below as Glasgow Records), iv. 461, 466, 470; H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission], Portland MSS., x. 370.
³ Convention Records, v. 91-140, passim; Glasgow Records, iv. 515, 519. This division of the assessment between land and trade lasted in Glasgow throughout the century. Ibid. vi. 556; vii. 41, 251; viii. 1, 147.
⁴ Convention Records, vi. 263, 351, 385, 457.
threatened the Convention would put pressure upon those in arrear, but was sometimes reduced to borrowing to avoid quartering. More important was the persistent struggle of the Convention with the unfree traders. Though the Royal Burghs paid their special land tax in return for their legal monopoly of trade, the prosperity of many of them suffered by the ebbing of trade to the burghs of barony and regality. One of the main themes of Convention politics in the eighteenth century was the persistent attempt to check the growth of unfree trade, and with greater realism, since they could not stop it, to turn it into a tax-paying asset. Under William III an Act of the Convention had been made by which burghs of barony or regality might accept "communication of trade", and in return shoulder part of the tax burden of the Royal Burghs. This scheme was a failure. Not many burghs accepted the communication of trade; of those that did some later renounced it. In any case they took on only a trifling part of the quota of cess, and the Royal Burghs had scant legal rights to compel them to pay even this.

For many years, however, the Convention did its best to make the system work. The Receiver was encouraged to quarter on the recalcitrant burghs; individual burghs were given warrants to pursue their local unfree traders; but in 1724 a committee reported that the hopes of the Royal Burghs, either of getting back their trade or of securing their land tax on unfree traders, were illusory without a change in the law. Soon afterwards the burghs which had accepted communication of trade began to renounce it and to take out bills of suspension to hold up the quartering parties. On the advice of the Lord Advocate, the Convention from 1730 to 1733 started at last to press hard for a clause in the Land Tax Acts. In 1745 another committee spurred on the Convention once more to press for their clause. After the issue had been urged in vain till 1749 an approach was made to the Duke of Argyll. He pointed out that their plan to

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1 Convention Records, vi. 33.
3 For all these questions see the report of the subcommittee on unfree trade, 1724. Convention Records, v. 339-47.
4 E.g. 1719. Ibid. v. 210-11.
5 Ibid. v. 149, 238.
6 Ibid. v. 506, 514, 523, 538, 542, 546.
make the M.P.s for the three Lothians, Stirling and Fife, overseers of the assessments on unfree trade would be unacceptable both to the Treasury and to the members for the other counties. The Convention was at once willing to substitute a committee of Barons of the Exchequer and Lords of Session for the obnoxious board of M.P.s. But they were fighting a losing battle, and in 1770 the Convention still had neither its clause nor its land tax from unfree traders. Still worse, a dispute over the land tax on unfree trade between Kirkwall and Stromness which began in the early 'forties and reached the House of Lords in 1756, led to a judgement which restricted still further the tenuous rights of the Royal Burghs to give sanction to their claims by the seizure of the property of unfree merchants.

On one further occasion the burgh land tax came into the public eye, in the course of an interesting agitation for reform in the Scottish burghs led in Parliament by Sheridan. This campaign in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties seemed a good occasion to harry the government, and it was loudly claimed that land tax money had been misapplied. It proved in the end that many burghs (but by no means all) levied rates for local purposes on the land tax assessments, a practice which had certainly continued for years, and had been invited by the provision of the Act of Union requiring the quota to be raised net. The mountain had become a molehill, and in 1793, with Parliament already tiring of reforming schemes and the gyrations of the opposition, the campaign fell flat.

The problems of land tax administration in the Scottish burghs were, therefore, principally two. In Edinburgh, Glasgow and a few other large towns which bore a high proportion of the total assessment, there were the problems common to the growing towns in England. Moreover, although the scheme

1 Convention Records, vi, 184, 213, 238, 246, 252, 264, 296, 311, 332, 349-50, 464; vii, 392.
2 Ibid. vi, 146, 154, 180, 256-7, 269-70, 399, 420, 424, 523, 532, 573.
3 C.J. xliii. 43, 206-8, 539, 554; xlv. 521, 523, 550; xlvi. 654; xlvii. 696, 711, 749-50; xlviii. 377-80, 447, 462, 872, 947, 954-61, 990; Cobbett (Parliamentary History), xxvii. 631-5; xxix. 636 ff., 1183 ff.
4 For trouble with collectors in Glasgow similar to that in English towns: Glasgow Records, vii. 252, 343, 493.
of Glasgow and other towns to prevent an increase in their assessment was defeated in 1711, they gained their ends later for there was no change in the tax roll after 1737 with the exception of a minor adjustment between two burghs in 1768.¹ The burgh quotas became in practice as rigid as the assessments fixed in the Act in England.² But all these issues were complicated by the difficulties found by collectors in small decayed and remote burghs, of collecting and remitting even their trifling quotas; through the law of quartering the large burghs might be penalised for the delinquencies of the small. Like the other authorities concerned in the administration of the land tax, the Convention sought changes in the law which might make their efforts more effective, and like them did not succeed. In this way the land tax problems of the burghs worked themselves out in a way very similar to those of the counties.

Local Administration in Scotland: (II) The Counties

The collection of the land tax from the Scottish counties was no less difficult than from the burghs. From the time of the Union complaints began that the Scottish land tax was in arrear, complaints which were to last the whole century.³ That these complaints were well founded is made clear by the few statistics that are available. In 1746 over £43,000, almost a year's quota, was outstanding in the country, though admittedly 1745 was an exceptional year.⁴ In 1780 the Scottish land tax was almost two and a half years in arrear.⁵ No part of England had ever sunk to these depths of inefficiency, yet the situation continued to deteriorate in the last two decades of the century.⁶ The statistical evidence, fragmentary though it is, leaves no

¹ Convention Records, vii. 300.
² By the 'seventies the Convention itself was meeting part of the quota of several of the poorer towns. Ibid. vii. 474, 526.
³ P.R.O. T. 1/138, fol. 95 (but cf. T. 1/191, fol. 84); T. 1/245, fol. 245.
⁴ P.R.O. T. 1/321, fol. 100.
⁶ P.R.O. T. 29/62, fol. 377; T. 29/64, fol. 409; T. 1/686, fol. 251; T. 1/705, fol. 64.
room for doubt that the collection of the land and assessed taxes in Scotland was one of the great unsolved problems of eighteenth century administration.

Among the most intractable reasons for this situation were the difficulties of Scottish geography. Scottish collectors with a whole county to cover, and remittances from remote places to make, had a much more arduous task than the parish collectors in England, and in the later years of the century were much aggrieved about their pay.\(^1\) A more serious problem was that since the Union much of the financial legislation relating to Scotland had been legislation by reference, owing to the provision in the Act of Union by which the land tax was to be collected as the cess had been previously. As the law of public finance had by no means spoken with one voice at that date, the administration found itself in a position of uncertainty.

The principal penalty which the Receiver might inflict upon counties in arrear was that of quartering parties of troops upon them. Unfortunately this practice from the first suffered from severe administrative difficulties.\(^2\) The Commissioners made sport of the quartering parties and hindered them with legal quibbles.\(^3\) The size of the party was legally proportioned to the size of the arrear,\(^4\) and small units were so roughly handled that commanders became unwilling to release them.\(^5\) Remote parts such as Orkney and Shetland were inaccessible for such long periods that quartering was almost impossible, though in 1753 a full scale expedition to the islands was prepared.\(^6\)

The worst problem was that, though there was no doubt that the Receiver could order quartering upon deficients, the law did not make clear who the deficients were. Under older Scots law,

\(^1\) P.R.O. 30/8/317. "A state of the hardships imposed on the collectors of the land tax in North Britain." Cf. Glasgow Records, viii. 237, 240, 246. In the burghs in 1793 collectors' salaries varied from over £200 p.a. in Edinburgh to that of the unfortunate collector of Forres "where . . . no salary is fixed . . . but the persons liable in payment make him what satisfaction they please for his trouble". C.J. xlvi. 958.
\(^2\) P.R.O. T. 1/191, fol. 84.
\(^3\) P.R.O. T. 1/285, fol. 46.
\(^4\) Convention Records, vi. 155.
\(^5\) P.R.O. T. 1/285, fol. 46.
\(^6\) P.R.O. T. 1/325, fol. 115; T. 1/352, fol. 212; T. 27/27, fols. 71, 79; T. 29/32, fol. 95.
Sheriffs and Stewarts in the counties, and Provosts and Bailies in the burghs, had been liable to summary penalties in the event of the tax not being paid. It seemed probable to one Receiver that by references backward in the Acts, the land tax Commissioners had become heir to both their functions and their responsibilities. But neither Commissioners nor collectors were clearly liable to quartering, and with the law so complex, quartering parties laid themselves open to penalties every time they set out. By the middle of the century the weapon of quartering was blunted in the Receiver's hands, so he persuaded the Barons of the Exchequer to grant horning against some of the northern counties. This ancient method of securing debts under penalty of seizure of moveable property on failure to pay, was even less successful, for the Receiver had no legal means of recovering the expenses incurred, as the land tax quotas had to be paid "free of all charges". The Receiver's second line of defence had failed.

Although the local land tax administration in Scotland suffered from a legal confusion unknown in England, the basic trouble was the same, that the law assumed, rather than required, that the Commissioners would exercise their powers in a public spirited manner. By 1734 the Receiver reported that this premise was no longer justified. Commissioners were interested only in providing a place for a friend as collector, the collectors only in profiting from their balances; both united in obstructing the Receiver. The one hope was a radical overhaul of the law with the object of fixing precisely the duties of the various officials, with precise and efficient penalties for lapses in performance. For these changes Allan Whitefoord pressed for twenty years, but, with that curious supineness which marked all English governments in these affairs, little was done.

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1 For the nature of this process and its fate: P.R.O. T. 1/331, fol. 15; T. 1/333, fol. 5.
2 See the Orkney case of the 'forties; P.R.O. T. 1/325, fol. 115; T. 1/333, fols. 5-6; T. 27/26, fol. 455.
3 The above account of the law is drawn from four long reports by Allan Whitefoord in the P.R.O. As evidence they suffer somewhat by being written in self-defence, but are nevertheless very valuable: T. 1/285, fols. 42-8; T. 1/325, fols. 115-6; T. 1/331, fols. 15-20; T. 1/333, fols. 5-7. A clause was ordered for the land tax bill in 1749: C.J. xxv. 758.
But in nothing is the obstructive temper of the local administration revealed more clearly than in the affair of the new window duties of 1747. The earlier window duties had had a chequered history, but when the copies of the Act of 1747 arrived the entire local administration went on strike, and a few small sums collected in Edinburgh never reached the Receiver. The Commissioners claimed that the poundage was too miserable to offer collectors; the collectors were unwilling to offend their neighbours; the taxpayers led by the clergy refused to pay. Tories in England whispered that the Scottish M.P.s had been promised that nothing would be collected if they would refrain from opposing the bill. The Treasury wrote to all and sundry to know why nothing was raised, and in 1752 the Lord Chancellor confessed that "some method to be sure should be taken to make Scotland pay her taxes, but could any ministry ever hit upon that method?"

In Scotland the Lord Advocate began to use his influence in the region of Edinburgh, and Newcastle got Argyll somewhat reluctantly to help in "putting an end to the evil in a gentle but at the same time in an effectual manner". The Scottish surveyors of window lights also worked hard to produce assessments, and most important of all, despite pressure from Scotland, Newcastle got through an Act for the better collection of the duties. The essence of this Act was to eliminate the

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1 For administrative delay and political controversy: 3 SHS. 17, Minutes of the J.P.s for Lanark, 1707-23, pp. 107-24, passim; Marchmont Papers, ed. Sir G. H. Rose (London, 1831), ii. 54-5; H. Walpole, Memoirs of George II (London, 1822), i. 239. Cal. T.P. v. 441-2.
2 20 Geo. II, c. 3. The Act (inter alia) transferred the management of the duties from the J.P.s to the land tax Commissioners. For administrative defects in Scotland: P.R.O. T. 1/325, fol. 116; T. 1/331, fol. 12.
3 P.R.O. T. 1/337, fols. 88-9; T. 1/326, fol. 179; T. 1/338, fol. 139; T. 1/438, fol. 62-4.
4 Records of the Cust family, ed. L. Cust, iii. (London, 1927), 137. The administrative papers reveal the falsity of the charge.
5 P.R.O. T. 29/31, fol. 295; T. 29/32, fol. 30; Walpole's George II, i. 237.
6 P.R.O. T. 1/350, fol. 183.
8 B.M. Add. MSS. 32736, fol. 9. At their head was Sir Robert Laurie, Bt., brother-in-law of Baron Erskine and M.P. for Kirkcudbright Burghs 1738-41.
influence of contumacious Commissioners. If they chose no collector, the collector of land tax was made *ipso facto* the collector of the window tax. If they failed to appoint assessors, the charge made by the surveyors was made the official assessment. The one defect remaining was that appeals lay to the Commissioners, and that payment could be held up pending settlement. Scotland was set on the high road to the first fully professional system of collection of a direct tax seen in Great Britain.

As the Scottish Commissioners continued to resist, apart from the hearing of appeals they were excluded from the administration. Despite the open jealousy of the London Tax Office, a new system was built from the old window tax administration, consisting of two Surveyors-General with an office in Edinburgh, and twenty Surveyors beneath them. On the latter was placed the tremendous labour of producing all the assessments which were now commonly completed about twelve months in arrear. The post formerly regarded as a sinecure, assumed the greatest importance. The organization of the central office was undertaken by George Innes, the deputy Receiver, who rapidly found himself overwhelmed with work.

The two main issues of the rest of the period were demands for increased pay and staff, and the continued jealousy of the Tax Office towards the new Scottish administration. On all points the Scots emerged victorious. The revenue rose with the appointment of additional staff after examination. The surveyors gained moderate increases in pay. Most notably the Scottish Barons rebuffed all attempts at interference by the Tax Office in Scottish affairs, and won a decisive victory in 1791.

1 B.M. Add. MSS. 33049, fol. 178.
2 P.R.O. T. 1/485, fol. 304; T. 1/630, fol. 69.
3 P.R.O. T. 1/381, fol. 75. As on an earlier occasion (T. 1/329, fol. 74) there was talk of employing the Excise officers but this idea was rejected. T. 1/382, fol. 41; T. 1/543, fol. 95; T. 29/33, fol. 81.
4 P.R.O. T. 1/630, fols. 69-70.
5 P.R.O. T. 1/485, fol. 304; T. 1/618, fol. 219; T. 1/623, fols. 209, 213.
6 P.R.O. T. 1/630, fols. 68-70; T. 1/631, fol. 226; T. 1/643, fol. 153; T. 1/647, fol. 121; T. 1/678, fol. 122; T. 1/719, fol. 5.
7 P.R.O. T. 1/605, fol. 143; T. 1/623, fols. 209, 213; T. 1/686, fol. 110; T. 1/704, fol. 192; T. 1/719, fol. 4; T. 17/25, fol. 166.
when the Taxes Commissioners were making representations about Scottish arrears before the Treasury Board.\(^1\) Hence when the Scottish administration came under the fire of the Select Committee on Finance of 1797 the Tax Office sought revenge by placing entire responsibility upon the Barons.\(^3\)

The point attacked by the Committee was that the cost of collecting the direct taxes as a whole in Scotland was nearly double that in England (despite there being no charges on the land tax), and that whereas the window tax alone cost £11 15s. per cent. to collect in England, the figure for Scotland was £30 per cent.\(^3\) The Scottish Barons showed that without expensive surveyors the money would not come in at all. As for delays, the collectors would not take up the land tax till the assessed taxes could be collected with it after the Surveyors had made their rounds. The defect which Parliament should tackle was to fulfil the promise of the Act of Union to make regulations as to the manner of collecting; the Receiver had no adequate means of compelling the collectors to disgorge their balances.\(^4\)

Thus during the eighteenth century land tax administration in the Scottish counties pursued its own devious and peculiar course, hampered at first by a confusion in the law unknown in the south, impeded by rivalry between bureaucracy in Edinburgh and bureaucracy in London, but finally moving towards a system of tax collection more modern than that in England, both in its professional character and in its cost of maintenance. The poverty and hostility of Scotland had produced the changes in financial administration only effected in England a generation or more later by pressure of high war-time taxation.

**The Scottish Receivers**

The work of the Scottish Receiver was similar to that of his English brethren, and yet more responsible and far-reaching.

\(^1\) P.R.O. T. 1/382, fol. 50; T. 1/485, fol. 304; T. 1/486, fol. 196; T. 1/509, fols. 51, 53, 54; T. 1/707, fol. 114; T. 1/711, fol. 1.
\(^2\) P.R.O. T. 1/793, fol. 355.
\(^3\) 8th Report of the Select Committee on Finance, 1797, p. 9.
\(^4\) P.R.O. T. 1/799, fols. 372-3.
Like them he had to put pressure upon local Commissioners, but he had far more of them to deal with, and found them far more stubborn than any English Receiver. He had to pick his way through the legal maze surrounding quartering, and was expected by the Treasury to be ready with advice for making a bad situation better. The Scottish Receiver was also extremely versatile in his work. From the Union he drew his salary as Receiver of Crown Rents and Casualties. Allan Whitefoord also managed funds arising from various arrears; monies from the Lordship of Dunbar and Ettrick Forest and land in Haddingtonshire; monies imprested from the Excise, Customs and Seizures; compositions on leases of Bishops’ Tythes; Bishopric Rents; the deductions of sixpence in the pound from salaries, not to mention the grants made to support Scottish manufactories and fisheries which he disbursed in co-operation with the Convention of Royal Burghs, business with forfeited estates, and the payment of the whole civil establishment of Scotland. Other Receivers managed other funds, and paid out grants for the capture of deserters from the armed forces.

The work of remittance was often hazardous. Archibald Douglas the first Receiver refused to send money to London by waggon without special orders, as the cost of the guard was prohibitive. Remittance by bill was difficult too, and commonly expensive. It is rather surprising to find that in earlier days much was sent up in English bank notes. Douglas, however, remitted largely through James Douglas, a London merchant.

1 3 SHS. 17. Minutes of the J.P.s for Lanarks, pp. 107, 119; P.R.O. T. 1/191, fol. 84.
2 P.R.O. T. 1/356, fol. 123. 3 Convention Records, e.g. vii. 3.
4 C.J. xxxviii. 78.
5 P.R.O. T. 1/193, fol. 88; T. 1/229, fol. 9.
7 P.R.O. T. 1/191, fol. 84.
8 In the 'twenties a premium of 1 per cent. or 1½ per cent. was usual; P.R.O. T. 1/245, fol. 246, cf. 1714; Call[endar of] T[reasury] B[ooks], xxviii. 20. Sometimes it rose to 2 per cent.: Call[endar of] T[reasury] B[ooks and] P[apers], iii. 39; P.R.O. T. 1/407, fol. 47.
whose firm was to handle this business for three-quarters of a century.¹

The obvious solution to this problem seemed to be that the Receiver should supply the Scottish garrisons with money for pay and subsistence,² taking in return bills on the Paymaster-General in London. Yet despite Treasury support this system never worked well. Sometimes there were too few troops; more often the colonels were tempted by the favourable exchanges to profit by selling their bills to private individuals.³ Checked for a time by the refusal of the Paymaster-General to honour bills other than those payable to the Receiver, the trouble broke out again in the 'forties.⁴ In 1750 Pitt as Paymaster concluded a contract with the Royal Bank by which the Bank was to pay subsistence to the Scottish troops up to £10,000 p.a. and furnish the Receiver with bills on the Bank of England at par. But within a decade even this arrangement was jeopardized by the desire of the Paymasters of the Scottish regiments “to put [the] high exchange in their own pockets”.⁵

The association between the Receivers and the Royal Bank of Scotland in this contract is explained by the study of the Receivers' connections.

The first Receiver after the Union (1708-17) was Archibald Douglas of Cavers, hereditary sheriff of Roxburgh, who had been Receiver of Crown Rents and Casualties and other funds before the Union.⁶ His balances were never large,⁷ he was well spoken of by the Scottish Barons,⁸ and (though trusted by Mar and employed in paying pensions to leading Jacobites) he acted

¹ P.R.O. T. 1/191, fol. 84; T. 29/25, fol. 301; T. 27/23, fol. 358.
² Cal. T.B. xxvii. 51; xxviii. 150.
³ Ibid. xxx. 307; P.R.O. T. 29/25, fol. 301.
⁴ Cal. T.B.P. iv. 274, 275, 498; v. 538.
⁵ P.R.O. T.1/407, fols. 22 ff., especially 43-7.
⁶ H.M.C. R. 7, pt. ii, Douglas MSS., p. 732; but cf. Cal. T.P. iv. 32. For his pay and allowances in this capacity: Cal. T.B. xxiii. 225; xxvi. 336; xxviii. 150, 159. He or his namesake was postmaster for Edinburgh, a place which passed to the son. P.R.O. T. 29/26, fol. 20.
⁷ E.g. C.J. xvi. 432.
⁸ P.R.O. T. 17/6, fol. 3.
⁹ Cobbett, vii. 14; H.M.C. Portland MSS., x. 311.
loyally with Argyll and Carpenter in 1715. Yet he was not reappointed in 1718. His fall began when he offended the Lord Justice Clerk, Sir Gilbert Elliot (who had been a close friend) and the Earl of Roxburgh by assisting his son to displace the former as M.P. for Roxburghshire; it was completed when Sutherland, then First Lord of the Treasury, condemned him for not quitting the service of the Prince of Wales for whose Scottish Revenues Douglas was Receiver. Despite pitiful petitions for his place in later years, Douglas had little to complain of; for he was granted generous expense allowances, payment of debts and a pension, and sat in Parliament for Dumfries, 1727-34.

He was succeeded by Elliot's son-in-law, Sir Robert Sinclair (1718-24), and Charles Cathcart (1725-8), a Groom of the Bedchamber and eighth Lord Cathcart to be. It was Cathcart who began the connection with the Royal Bank, for he was one of the galaxy of administrative personalities numbered among the first nine extraordinary directors. Clearly the Bank proposed to make the best of official connections in the full knowledge that the handling of public balances offered advantages not likely to be found elsewhere. Cathcart was succeeded by his deputy and nephew Allan Whitefoord (1729 till his death in 1766). In his time the connection with the Royal Bank was at its closest, for he was chief cashier from the foundation of the Bank in 1727 to his retirement owing to ill-health in 1745. He was then made an ordinary director, and his deputy as land tax Receiver, the ubiquitous George Innes, was appointed cashier. First unofficially, then through the contact with Pitt, the Royal

1 H.M.C. R. 7, pt. ii, Douglas MSS., p. 732; H.M.C. Laing MSS., ii, 178; P.R.O. T. 17/6, fol. 2.
3 Ibid. p. 732; P.R.O. T. 17/5, fol. 405; T. 17/6, fol. 2.
4 P.R.O. T. 17/6, fols. 4, 105; T. 17/8, fol. 155 (cf. T. 17/12, fol. 416). Marchmont Papers, i. 268. See also C.J. xix. 490. Cf. C.J. xxv. 371.
Bank gained the use of the land tax balances in return for finding bills for the Receiver and paying the Scottish garrisons. More than once this arrangement was threatened, but the Royal Bank could not afford to let the balances slip, and after hard bargaining the contract was renewed on the Treasury's terms in 1764.¹ For the rest of the century the Royal Bank virtually monopolized the land tax remittances.²

Whitefoord's tenure of office was distinguished by his analyses of the law of taxation, his proposals for reform neglected by successive governments, the additional work attaching to the office, and the efforts he and George Innes made to build up a new window tax administration. It was no small feather in his cap that there were no losses on any of the funds under his control in 1745. And it was under him that the problem of expense allowances became serious. Sinclair had had difficulty in obtaining any grant towards administrative expenses like that made to Douglas,³ and Cathcart (perhaps because even in 1766, after his death, his accounts had still not been cleared) had been totally unsuccessful.⁴ Whitefoord received no payment for all his additional work, his nephew, executor and heir, Sir John Whitefoord, paid over his balances promptly, yet he received no expense allowances for eleven years after the Receiver's death, and then only two-thirds of the sum claimed.⁵ The Treasury Board could hardly state more clearly the view that the Receiver must make his living through the use of the balances.

The consequences of this attitude were worked out to the full during the Receivership of John Fordyce (1766-83), a merchant and former director of the Royal Bank.⁶ He was also connected in some way with the Whitefoords, for Sir John was

² In 1791 the Royal Bank attempted to secure a similar monopoly of Excise remittances. P.R.O. T. 1/708, fols. 68-76.
³ Cal. T.B.P. i. 205.
⁴ Ibid. ii. 49; iii. 39; P.R.O. T. 17/11, fol. 255; T. 17/19, fol. 8.
⁵ P.R.O. T. 1/454, fol. 116; T. 1/469, fol. 286; T. 1/518, fol. 144; T. 17/20, fols. 12, 141; T. 17/21, fols. 14, 336, 364.
⁶ Munro, op. cit. pp. 123-4, 400.
one of his sureties, and they appear to have suffered losses together in the famous collapse of the Ayr Bank in 1772, as did another of Fordyce's sureties, Sir Adam Fergusson. Whatever Fordyce may have lost in this affair proved no lesson to him either in keeping watch upon his debtors or in conducting his business, for his correspondence gives the impression that he left most of the work to Innes. Two successive agents, Douglas and Cockburn, and Ferguson and Murdock, failed with large sums of his money in hand, which Fordyce thought had been paid into the Exchequer; by 1781 his arrears exceeded £100,000, and soon after the Treasury made dilatory moves to replace him by his deputy, Robert Scott Moncrieff. But Fordyce evaded severe criticism from the Committee on Public Accounts, and he had powerful friends. Dundas, then Lord Advocate, supported him. The Scottish Barons were reluctant to proceed against him. George Dempster M.P. was active on his behalf in London. Only the failure of a fresh agent brought Fordyce down.

No case could illustrate more clearly how mistaken was the Treasury attitude towards the remuneration of the Scottish Receivers. Fordyce estimated his expenses to the Commission

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1 P.R.O. T. 1/568, fol. 340.
5 P.R.O. T. 29/50, fol. 425. 7 P.R.O. T. 1/583, fol. 334.
8 He was still not poor; in 1787 he calculated his assets which varied from his estate at Aytone to a share in the Clyde Navigation at £86,400; his debt to the Crown then amounted to £56,000. Dundas pushed him on in the Land Revenue Office where he became Surveyor General and produced plans for the reorganization of Crown property with a view to the advancement of himself and his son. He sat for New Romney, 1796-1802, was active on behalf of the government in Berwickshire politics and unsuccessfully contested the seat of Berwick himself. P.R.O. T. 1/736, fol. 178; T. 1/796, fol. 124; T. 1/798, fol. 167; P.R.O. 30/8/136; 8th Report of Committee on Finance, 1797, Appendix A 16, p. 66; Appendix A 19, p. 69.
on Public Accounts at £750 p.a. and to the Treasury at £640 p.a.\(^1\) His salary as Receiver of Crown Rents was £650 p.a., subject to tax. The Receiver’s only way of paying himself for his labour and his risk was by the use of his balances. Granted complacency on the part of the Tax Office and negligence on that of the Receiver, crashes like that of Fordyce were only too probable. The cost of these errors to the public is illustrated by the fact that on Fordyce’s land tax account for 1780 nothing was paid till 1794, and the account was not cleared till 1818.\(^2\) Yet even the fall of Fordyce taught no lesson to the Tax Office and Treasury.

He was succeeded by the Hon. Keith Stewart (1784 till his death in 1795), a professional sailor who became an admiral during his tenure of office, and was no doubt rewarded with the Receivership for deserting the Government after many years’ support as M.P. for Wigtonshire, 1770-84, and speaking with Pitt in the Powell and Bembridge debate.\(^3\) This appointment has the appearance of jobbery as much as any carried through by Pitt’s predecessors. His arrears accumulated rapidly,\(^4\) and on his death he was indebted to the Government on various accounts to the tune of well over £100,000. Still worse, his deputies, John and Alexander Gordon, who held the fort from February to September 1795 when a successor was appointed, retired with over £40,000 in hand, half of which had not been paid two years later.\(^5\)

It was only to be expected that the Committee on Finance of 1797 should devote some of their most savage remarks to the situation in Scotland where for fifty years past not a Receiver had quitted office without leaving a mass of debt. For many years the Receivers had constantly retained a balance in hand of £30,000, plus whatever came in in the course of a quarter. This

\(^3\) He was the second son of the 7th Earl of Galloway by his second wife. J. Chamack, *Biographia Navalis*, vi (London, 1798), 47; Sir J. Fortescue, *Correspondence of King Geo. III*, vi (London. 1928), 389.
\(^4\) House of Commons Library, A. & P. xxvii. 667.
\(^5\) 8th Report of Committee on Finance, 1797, p. 10.
practice encouraged the collectors to keep their balances, and in 1797 Scotland was over £190,000 in arrear on land and assessed taxes, £50,000 more than the annual assessment. Small wonder that the Committee demanded a "radical cure" and "unremitting attention in the part of the Treasury and of the Tax Office". Their own solution was to assimilate Scottish administration as far as possible to the English pattern.¹

This public criticism provided the occasion for more bad blood between the Barons and the Tax Office. The policy of allowing Receivers to retain large balances, which the Taxes Commissioners had complacently followed for so long, they now condemned.² The Scottish Barons retorted that it had always been clearly understood Treasury policy that the Receiver should keep his perquisite of £30,000 and at the end of each quarter remit whatever sum he held above that figure. In any case the Scottish administration should not be reformed without a special Act, a draft of which they transmitted.³ The willingness of both sides to maintain their hostility, even in the face of public criticism boded little good for the future of Scottish land tax administration.

Epilogue

The Receivers' accounts bring out fully the extent to which the administration had decayed.⁴ In the 'nineties it was normal for much less to be remitted within two years of the annual Land Tax Acts coming into force than Douglas had remitted in one year in 1708. After 1775 nothing ever came in in the financial year for which the money was voted. Something of this was due to the local collectors, but the responsibility of the Receivers is brought out in the astonishing acceleration of Fordyce's payments, 1781-3, after the Tax Office had become aware of the precariousness of his position.⁵

² P.R.O. T. 1/793, fols. 355-6.
⁵ Percentage of the quota paid within two years: 1778, 2.1; 1779, 2.1; 1780, nil; 1781, 68.7; 1782, 75.1; 1783, 72.7.
Friction between the Tax Office and the Scottish Barons suggested that reform was unlikely to come from direct administrative pressure. Prospects of parliamentary action could not but be dimmed by the display of English peevishness about the Scottish land tax when the proposal came up to found a Scottish militia (which should be paid from the land tax),¹ and by the way the opposition exploited the complaints about the land tax in the burghs in the 'nineties. Nor was the scandal of the exposures of the select committee of 1797 the stimulus to reform as that of the Commissioners’ strike on the window duties of 1747 had been. In February 1798 a bill recommended by Pitt “for the more speedy collection and remittance of the land and assessed taxes in Scotland” was not proceeded with.² Pitt had brought a new broom into the administration in England, but proved little more successful than his predecessors in Scotland.

Nor did Pitt face the peculiar problems of the Royal Burghs in preparing his scheme for the redemption of the land tax. In England assessments had been stable for so long that it was equitable to make the current rates perpetual and redeemable. In Scotland, however, as Pitt was warned,³ the Convention had never surrendered its right to redistribute the burgh quota. The amount received upon unfree trade varied. Within individual burghs assessments both on trade and property altered frequently. It was characteristic of the Government’s attitude to the Scottish land tax down the century that no special provision was made in the Act for these unusual conditions. In consequence the situation in the burghs went on as before, and over sixty years passed before an Act ⁴ provided that wherever there was a surplus on a burgh assessment, it was to be used for the gradual redemption of the burgh quota. How artificial the situation had become was shown in 1896 when by the Agricultural Rates Act the burghs were freed from their land tax quota;

¹ J. Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, Everyman edn., i. 608; Cobbett, xviii. 1228; *Convention Records*, vii. 20, 40, 41, 85, 103, 522, 524.  
² *Diary and correspondence of Chas. Abbot, Lord Colchester*, i (London, 1861), 136; *C.J.* liii. 291.  
³ P.R.O. 30/8/317, “Brief Relative to the Land Tax . . .”, Fordyce to Dundas.  
⁴ 24 & 25 Vict. c. 91.
in order to preserve the position left unsettled by Pitt's Redemption Act it was provided that the burghs which had partially redeemed their land tax should receive an annual sum equal to the yearly value of the land tax redeemed. This last curious subsidy was perhaps a fitting monument to the ineptness of the land tax legislation which had issued from Westminster ever since 1707. At the terminal dates of this study, the omissions in the Redemption Act are a match for the ambiguities of the Act of Union.
EUMENES OF CARDIA 1

BY H. D. WESTLAKE, M.A.

HULME PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

THE opening of the Hellenistic Age is a period in which the number of leading characters is unusually, even confusingly, large. Almost all these were Macedonians, but among them was Eumenes, a native of the Greek city of Cardia, whose fortunes in the six and a half years that elapsed between the death of Alexander and his own are more fully recorded than those of any Macedonian. He was neither the most powerful nor the most successful leader of his time, and the reason why relatively abundant information about his actions in these years has survived undoubtedly is that the standard history of the Successors was written by his fellow-townsman Hieronymus of Cardia, who served under him throughout his campaigns in Asia. It is for the same reason that the careers of Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, whom Hieronymus subsequently served, are more fully described in extant works dealing with this period than those of their rivals, Ptolemy, Cassander, Seleucus, and Lysimachus. Hieronymus was able to study his successive masters at close quarters, and he enjoyed access to their official documents and confidential correspondence. He evidently made good use of these advantages, and the high quality of his work is clearly visible even through the mediocrity of Diodorus.

How far Hieronymus allowed his historical judgement to be influenced by loyalty to Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius is a question that cannot be determined with any certainty because the surviving fragments of his work are so meagre. 2 Clearly, however, his work did not consist of propaganda on behalf of his successive employers, and there is reason to believe that his treatment of Antigonus and Demetrius was not wholly

1 The substance of a lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on Wednesday, the 5th of May, 1954.
2 They are collected in F Gr Hist 154, F. 1-19.
sympathetic. There is a different reason why he might have exaggerated both the importance and the ability of Eumenes, namely, that they were both Cardians and may possibly have been related. It is, however, difficult to imagine how either the importance or the ability of Eumenes could have been greatly exaggerated without blatantly falsifying historical facts, and these facts were well-known to the contemporaries of Hieronymus, especially at the court of the Antigonids. On the other hand, Hieronymus is surely responsible for the fact that the literary tradition is almost wholly favourable towards Eumenes and generally unfavourable towards persons with whom he was in conflict such as Neoptolemus and Peucestas. It is possible, though unprovable, that, like Thucydides, he strove to achieve impartiality but failed where his own feelings were deeply stirred. His prejudice may perhaps have taken the form of creating the impression that the motives of Eumenes were invariably unselfish and that he was wholly uninfluenced by personal ambition, a point that will be discussed later. He can scarcely have expressed any opinion on the moral character of Eumenes. Extant literary authorities based largely on his work suggest that he was not much given to passing moral judgements on his characters: his yardsticks were rather ability and the acquisition of power, and he apparently admired unscrupulous and even underhand measures whereby a leader was enabled to get the better of his rivals.

It is in the parts of Diodorus Books xviii to xx dealing with

1 This problem, as well as the general character of his work, is ably discussed by T. S. Brown, Amer. Hist. Rev., lii (1946-7), 684-96. My own view, which cannot be developed here, is that he believed Antigonus and Demetrius to have failed to gain their major objectives through their own errors of judgement.

2 The suggestion that they were related rests solely on the fact that the father of Eumenes bore the name Hieronymus (cf. Brown, op. cit. p. 684 with n. 4, who is, however, mistaken in his statement that Eumenes had a son named Hieronymus).

3 It is significant that Diodorus refers with approval to Peucestas at two points, laying emphasis upon his popularity in his satrapy: the first occurs just before his uneasy partnership with Eumenes began (xix. 14. 4-5), the second immediately after it ended (ibid. 48, 5). In the intervening narrative he is frequently mentioned with disapproval.

4 Cf. for example, Diod. xix. 23-4, Plut. Eum. 12. 2-4.
the struggles between the Successors that the work of Hieronymus is most clearly reflected. The chapters describing the last campaign of Eumenes, in which he commanded the army of the "kings" against that of Antigonus, are especially instructive. Here Diodorus achieves a standard perhaps unequalled in any other section of his voluminous history. The narrative is remarkably vivid, showing at many points the hand of an observant and discerning eye-witness, while the detailed accounts of major battles are clearly based on those of a military expert, though Diodorus has been guilty of some omissions. The narrative dealing with the earlier struggles of Eumenes in Asia before he embarked upon his last campaign, though for the most part less detailed, is scarcely less impressive. There is, however, an exception: a part of Book xviii where he describes how Eumenes contrived to escape from an almost desperate situation when besieged at Nora and then unexpectedly found himself more powerful than ever before, is strangely uneven. The reason for the unevenness of these chapters undoubtedly is that at several points Diodorus has followed his source less closely than usual and has chosen to develop his own ideas, as he occasionally does when writing on a subject in which he is especially interested. In this instance the remarkable change in the fortunes of Eumenes provides Diodorus with an opportunity to preach his own uninspired theory of history, namely, that τάχος is fickle and unpredictable. Nevertheless, even in this part of Book xviii the bulk of the narrative is of good quality and based upon information supplied by Hieronymus, who himself played an important part in the negotiations between Eumenes and Antigonus.

1 Cf. the observations of Kahnes and Kromayer in J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder, iv. 3 (1929), 424, on the account of the battle of Paraetacene.
2 W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, ii (1948), 64, describes this theory as "a convenient doctrine which can be invoked to cover any improbability or inconsistency".
3 The clearest examples of passages in Book xviii where Diodorus has temporarily deserted his source are 53. 1-6 (where he recapitulates the career of Eumenes from his appointment as satrap of Cappadocia, stressing his changes of fortune) and 59. 4-6 (where he expounds his own theory). There are, however,
Considerably less valuable is the _Eumenes_ of Plutarch, which is also largely, though not exclusively, dependent upon information derived from Hieronymus. It is not among the best of the Lives. The career of Eumenes after the death of Alexander was almost entirely military, and Plutarch, who insists elsewhere that he writes biography and not history, seems to have felt himself handicapped by a dearth of personal anecdote. His first two chapters, dealing with the period before Alexander died, contain some personal detail mostly discreditable to Eumenes. This material can hardly have been derived from Hieronymus because his work is believed to have begun only with the death of Alexander. A story that Eumenes was of poor and humble origin, which Plutarch rejects, is ascribed by him to Duris, whose sensational history may well be the source of other highly suspect stories included in these two chapters. The influence of Duris may also be responsible for the extravagantly rhetorical tone of a few episodes elsewhere in the _Eumenes_ which are not mentioned by Diodorus. Examples are the encounter between Eumenes and the dying Craterus and the address by the former to the Silver Shields after they had betrayed him: the authenticity of both is doubtful. That Plutarch was not much attracted by Eumenes, and indeed misjudged him, is clearly seen in the latter part of his _Comparison between Sertorius and Eumenes_: cleverness in a Greek was in his day regarded with suspicion by many, and with worse than suspicion by Juvenal. What interested him was whether his principal characters were good rather than whether they were able and intelligent, and, as has already been noted, Hieronymus does not seem to have concerned himself much.

other references to the fickleness of fortune, and the substance of the passages in which they occur may, in some cases at least, have been contributed by Diodorus himself and not derived from his source (cf. 42. 1-2, which will be discussed below, p. 322).

1 _Eum_. 1. 1-2.


3 _Eum_. 17. 5-18. 2, cf. Justin, xiv. 4. 1-18. R. Schubert, _Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit_ (1914), pp. 204-9, maintains that much of _Eum_. 14-15 is derived from Duris.

4 _Comp. Sert. et Eum_. 2. 1-8. The accusation of cowardice in the face of death (2. 8) appears to be false.
with moral issues. Plutarch apparently grew tired of Eumenes: he describes the final campaign in central Asia rather briefly and somehow contrives to omit entirely the great battle of Paraetacene. On earlier events, however, he provides much valuable information not recorded by Diodorus, so that the two most important authorities for the career of Eumenes are conveniently complementary.

Minor authorities supply a few additional points. The Eumenes of Nepos is somewhat fuller and better than most of his brief biographies: unlike the Eumenes of Plutarch, it strikes no note of censure and is in general agreement with the account of Diodorus. The work of Arrian known as τὰ μετ’ Ἀλέξανδρου dealt in considerable detail with a period of little more than two years starting from the death of Alexander, but it survives only in an epitome by Photius and a few fragments,¹ including a recently published papyrus.² In epitomizing the account of Eumenes’ career by Trogus contained in Books xiii and xiv of the Historiae Philippicae Justin is as inaccurate and as prone to empty rhetoric as elsewhere. Polyaeus includes in his collection of Stratagems a few used by Eumenes³ and a few used against him.⁴ A striking feature of these lesser sources is their unanimity: despite minor divergences all present substantially the same picture of Eumenes, which must be that of Hieronymus. This unanimity is evidence of the extent to which his account dominated the literary tradition.

The surviving authorities for the career of Eumenes are in general agreement in differentiating him from most of his principal contemporaries for three main reasons. The first is that he was outstandingly clever, resourceful and persuasive, the second that he was handicapped by being a Greek and not a Macedonian, the third that single-minded loyalty to the

¹ F Gr Hist 156 F 1-11, and in vol. ii of the Teubner Arrian (ed. Roos, 1928) pp. 253-86.
² V. Bartoletti, Papiri greci e latini, xii. 2 (1950), 1284. The arguments of K. Latte, Gött. Nach. (1950), no. 3, pp. 23-7, for assigning the papyrus to Arrian seem to be conclusive.
³ iv. 8. 2-5 (cf. 4. 3, which may be authentic).
⁴ iv. 6. 9-13, 19 (9 contains valuable information not recorded elsewhere).
Macedonian royal house governed his actions. So prominent are these factors in the works discussed above that all three were surely stressed by Hieronymus. The extent of their influence must obviously be considered if the policy and aims of Eumenes are to be fully understood. While all three must be largely authentic, they have been accepted somewhat uncritically in modern times: in the case of the second and third at least, if the character of the evidence be taken into account, important reservations should, in my opinion, be made.

That Eumenes was clever is beyond dispute if there is any truth whatever in the record of his actions. On many occasions the cleverness of his strategy served to counterbalance the weakness or disunity of forces under his command. In the military sphere, however, he was not perhaps more resourceful than Antigonus, who sometimes succeeded in outwitting him. The advantage that he enjoyed over his contemporaries lay rather in the exercise of diplomatic skill, in exploiting to the full the favourable features of his relations with others and in so working upon their feelings that he was able to implement policies which he had no power to enforce. During his long association with Macedonians he had acquired an unrivalled knowledge of their temperament, which he often used with advantage. These qualities are seen most clearly in the accounts of his last campaign when as supreme commander for the "kings" in Asia he somehow succeeded in holding together as an effective fighting force an army in which the disloyalty, insubordination and contentiousness of officers and men were perhaps unequalled even in the Hellenistic Age. However great his difficulties he always found some expedient whereby he was able to surmount them.

The best and most interesting example of his ingenuity is perhaps his establishment of what is known as the "Alexander tent". Acting on the authority of a dream which he professed to have had, he proposed that the insignia of Alexander should be placed on a golden throne and that daily offerings should be

1 References to his cleverness and examples of it occur in all the authorities mentioned above; cf. also the Heidelberg Epitome (F Gr Hist 155), 3. 1.
2 Cf. Diod. xix. 26. 5-8 and 32. 1-2.
made by the principal officers, who should then meet in council in the tent in which this cult was observed as though Alexander were himself presiding. Eumenes made this proposal soon after he assumed command of the Silver Shields, who gladly accepted it. The device proved very valuable when union with the forces of the eastern satraps had enlarged his army but at the same time intensified its discord. He was able to mitigate some causes of friction, including that of his own appointment as supreme commander. To entrust to a committee the direction of operations by an army in the field has obvious drawbacks. Eumenes seems normally to have secured the adoption of his own plans, but in one important and perhaps decisive instance he did not, namely, when the eastern satraps refused to agree to his proposal to march down to the Mediterranean coast. Nevertheless the "Alexander tent" was a brilliant conception, and without it the end would probably have come much sooner. On a subsequent occasion, shortly before the battle of Paraetacene, Eumenes showed psychological insight in telling his Macedonian troops a rather childish fable. Other audiences might well have felt insulted, especially as the fable is not even entirely apposite, but Eumenes rightly foresaw its effect upon his Macedonians, who received it with acclamation.

It may be that Hieronymus somewhat overstressed the cleverness of Eumenes. In the course of his long life he must often have heard Macedonians expressing their claim to be superior to Greeks; perhaps deriving some satisfaction from recording episodes in which Macedonians were outwitted by a Greek, he may unconsciously have allowed such episodes to assume in his work a greater prominence than their importance warranted. It is also easy to believe that, because Hieronymus was personally involved in the difficulties which beset Eumenes, he may have exaggerated them and correspondingly over-estimated the cleverness of Eumenes in extricating

1 Diod. xviii. 60. 4-61, 3, xix. 15. 3-4; Plut. Eum. 13. 4-8; Nepos, Eum. 7. 2-3; Polyæn. iv. 8. 2. M. Launey, Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques, ii (1950), 945-7, points out that this military cult has no parallel in the age of the Successors. 2 Diod. xix. 21. 1-2. 3 Diod. xix. 25. 4-7.
himself. There is, however, no doubt that in this respect the general impression created by the extant sources is authentic.

References to the disadvantage suffered by Eumenes in being a Greek and not a Macedonian are much fewer than those to his cleverness. This disadvantage is, however, mentioned in a number of different connections by Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos, and at least some of these passages are surely derived ultimately from Hieronymus. How far it was open to the ablest Greeks to compete with leading Macedonians in the first years of the Hellenistic Age is an interesting question. Alexander had normally made appointments involving the command of troops from Macedonians alone, but it was his practice to judge men by their quality rather than their nationality, and a few Greeks were included among his Companions and most favoured subordinates. Examples are the Cretan Nearchus, distinguished both as admiral and writer, and the Thessalian Medeius, a very intimate friend of Alexander in the last months of his life. Medeius subsequently commanded some mercenaries for Perdiccas, and both served under Antigonus and Demetrius, but neither attained the position to which his close relations with Alexander might seem to have entitled him. Several lesser Greeks who had served under Alexander are known to have played a part in the struggles that followed his death without securing any significant advancement. These examples might seem to show that it was impossible for any Greek to break down the jealous exclusiveness of the Macedonians. Yet Eumenes was not the only Greek entrusted with a satrapy after the death of Alexander. Laomedon of Mitylene was appointed to the satrapy of Syria, which he held until his expulsion about three years later. A Cypriot from

1 Diod. xviii. 60. 1 and 3, 62. 7, xix. 13. 1; Plut. Eum. 3. 1 and 8. 1 (cf. 18. 2, where the Silver Shields are said to have referred to him as Χερσονήσιον ἅλεθρος); Nepos, Eum. 1. 2-3 and 7. 1.
2 H. Berve, R.E. xvi (1935), cols. 2132-5.
3 F. Geyer, R.E. xv (1931), cols. 103-4.
4 Examples are Aeschylus of Rhodes (H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich, ii (1926), 17) and Andronicus of Olynthus (ibid. pp. 39-40).
5 E. Bux, R.E. xii (1924), cols. 756-7 (the longer of two articles devoted to the same person).
Soloi named Stasanor, who had been in charge of Areia and Drangiana, two of the eastern satrapies, before Alexander died, had his appointment confirmed, and when after two years he was transferred to Bactria and Sogdiana, his successor was Stasander, also a Cypriot and perhaps his relative. The most striking case is that of Lysimachus, satrap and eventually king of Thrace. There is no adequate reason for rejecting the tradition that his father was a Thessalian who migrated to Macedonia. It is true that some authorities describe him as a Macedonian and a citizen of Pella, but citizenship was doubtless conferred upon his father while living at the Macedonian court. Of these Greeks entrusted with satrapies, Eumenes, Laomedon, and Lysimachus—as well as Nearchus, who had been satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia for a time when Alexander was alive—are all known to have lived in Macedonia for a number of years. Hence it is clear that such naturalized Macedonians, as they may be termed, were granted a privileged status not enjoyed by other Greeks and were much less sharply differentiated from native Macedonians because their loyalty was believed to have been proved.

For any Greek to have attempted to usurp the throne of Macedonia by sweeping aside the “kings”, an ambition imputed rightly or wrongly to Leonnatus, Perdiccas, and Antigonus, would have been an act of folly doomed to failure from the outset. A king of Macedonia had to have his succession to the throne formally recognized by the general assembly of the army, and the attitude of the Silver Shields towards Eumenes shows that Macedonians would not, at any rate, at this time, have contemplated accepting a Greek as their king. To this extent Eumenes was undoubtedly in a different position from

1 E. Honigmann, R.E. iii A (1929), cols. 2152-3 (on Stasanor); K. Fiehn, ibid. col. 2152 (on Stasander).
2 F. Geyer, R.E. xiv (1928), col. 1.
3 Laomedon and Nearchus lived at Amphipolis which became a Macedonian city after its annexation by Philip.
4 Stasanor was evidently a man of outstanding ability, but it is not altogether clear why he and Stasander were singled out for appointment to satrapies.
that of his Macedonian contemporaries, to this extent the limits of his potential advancement were circumscribed. On the other hand, there is no justification for assuming that a Greek so long and so intimately associated with the Macedonian court as he had been was automatically disqualified by his origin from competing with Macedonians for responsible positions conferring a substantial measure of independent authority. Polyperchon actually proposed that Eumenes should participate with himself in the guardianship of the "kings." It is therefore somewhat surprising to find so much emphasis laid on the disadvantage suffered by Eumenes in being a Greek. It might be suggested that Hieronymus, who served the house of Antigonus for three generations without attaining high distinction except as a historian, believed himself and other Greeks to have been unjustly denied advancement because of their nationality. Hieronymus can, however, scarcely have invented episodes mentioned in some of the passages cited above from which the Greek origin of Eumenes is seen to have been an important issue in his own lifetime. His enemies are stated to have used it as an instrument of propaganda when seeking to undermine the loyalty of his Macedonian troops. Even more significant are two passages in which Eumenes is said to have referred in public utterances to the consequences of being a Greek. According to Plutarch he declared, when acting as negotiator between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, that "being a foreigner he had no right to interfere in the disputes of Macedonians." Diodorus attributes to him a statement made apparently in the speech in which he proposed the establishment of the "Alexander tent", that he could "expect no position of authority (ἀρχηγία) because he was a foreigner and debarred from the powers native to the Macedonians." If these statements are authentic, Eumenes with characteristic adroitness took advantage of a handicap. A later passage of Diodorus points in the same direction. When

1 Cf. Diod. xviii. 60. 1.
2 Diod. xviii. 57. 3 (cf. Plut. Eum. 13. 1 for a similar suggestion by Olympias).
3 See above, p. 316, n. 1.
5 Plut. Eum. 3. 1.
6 Diod. xviii. 60. 3.
Antigonus tried to bribe Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the Silver Shields, to betray Eumenes. Teutamus was ready to accept until Antigenes persuaded him to change his mind by arguing that, whereas Antigonus would deprive them both of their satrapies, Eumenes would treat them generously "because being a foreigner he would never dare to pursue his own interest (ιδιωτική γνώμη)." It is remarkable that the substance of this secret conversation should have become known even to Hieronymus, especially as Antigenes was executed immediately after the battle of Gabiene.² The most probable explanation seems to be that Antigenes disclosed the treacherous intentions of Teutamus to Eumenes, who then suggested the cogent argument whereby Antigenes successfully appealed to the self-interest of his colleague.

It is thus perhaps legitimate to conclude that Eumenes in his lifetime and Hieronymus after his death were somewhat disingenuous in stressing the handicap imposed by his Greek birth, which debarred him only from the pursuit of ambitions that he had no right to pursue. Exaggeration of this handicap seems to have proved useful to Eumenes by helping him to allay the jealousy of his Macedonian rivals and to secure obedience from those under his command, while Hieronymus was perhaps enabled thereby to represent Eumenes as more unselfish than he actually was.³

That Eumenes was exceptionally loyal to the royal house of Macedonia is mentioned in a number of passages⁴ and is very frequently implied. His loyalty is a cardinal assumption throughout the detailed narrative of Diodorus describing his last campaign against Antigonus. In modern times it has

¹ Diod. xviii. 62. 4-7.
² Diod. xix. 44. 1.
³ The view of A. Vezin, Eumenes von Kardien (1907), pp. 125-6, that the ultimate failure of Eumenes was due to his Greek birth seems to me to be based on an insufficiently critical acceptance of the impression created by the sources.
⁴ Specific references are: Diod. xviii. 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 4; xix. 42. 5, 44. 2; Plut. Eum. 1. 4; Nepos, Eum. 6. 5; Heidelberg Epitome (F Gr Hist 155), 3. 1-2. Diod. xviii. 29. 2, 42.2, and Plut. Eum. 5. 8, refer more generally to the trustworthiness of Eumenes, while Nepos, Eum. 3. 1 stresses his fidelity towards Perdiccas (who was, however, at this time in charge of the "kings").
evoked even more admiration than his military talents or diplomatic skill, and with good reason. It is not my intention to deny either that he was loyal or that his loyalty was admirable. The confidence in him felt by members of the royal house is attested by the summary of a letter written to him by the masterful Olympias in which she described him as the most faithful of her friends and asked him to advise her. It does, however, seem legitimate to question whether his aim was at all times solely to promote the interest of the royal house and whether he was wholly indifferent to his own prospects except as its servant. Decisions made by him both before and after the death of Perdiccas suggest that these doubts are not unwarranted.

When Perdiccas left him to defend Asia Minor against the invading army of Antipater and Craterus, they sent an embassy to invite him to change sides and join them. This offer he rejected, making a counterproposal that he should negotiate a reconciliation between Craterus and Perdiccas. Now Antipater, Craterus and Ptolemy had taken up arms against Perdiccas on the ground that he was plotting to usurp the throne. The validity of this charge, as well as the legal status of Perdiccas at this time, is uncertain. It may be that, because Perdiccas had the "kings" in his charge, Eumenes felt himself obliged to carry out his orders faithfully. Yet of all the leading Macedonians Antipater and Craterus were the most obviously loyal to the royal house and the least suspected of harbouring personal ambitions. It is also clear that, had Eumenes accepted their offer, he would have had his satrapy enlarged but would have lost what was virtually an independent command. Strangely enough, the account of these negotiations by Plutarch, who alone records them in any detail, contains no mention of the "kings", whereas much is made of the personal eminence

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2 Diod. xviii. 58. 2-3, cf. Nepos, Eum. 6. 1-4 and Plut. Eum. 13. 1. Hieronymus must have seen this letter. The negotiations between Eumenes and Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, show that she too trusted him (Arrian (F Gr Hist 156), F 9. 21 and 26, 10. 7-10, 11. 40, cf. Plut. Eum. 8. 6-7 and Justin, xiv. 1. 7).
3 Cf. Nepos, Eum. 3. 1.
between Eumenes and Antipater and the personal friendship between Eumenes and Craterus.

More significant than this episode, which may have been inaccurately transmitted, is the fact that from the death of Perdiccas to that of Antipater, a period of nearly two years, Eumenes was actually fighting against the forces of the “kings”. It is arguable that he had no choice. He had been sentenced to death by the assembly of the Macedonian army, which held him responsible for the death of the popular Craterus, and he was a personal enemy of Antipater, now regent and more powerful than any other Macedonian leader. The actions of Eumenes at this time are inadequately recorded and their motives obscure. Presumably he maintained that the “kings” had been illegally entrusted to Antipater and that it was his duty to fight for the restoration of the position as it had stood before the fall of Perdiccas.\(^1\) There was, however, very little hope of achieving this aim, especially as the surviving adherents of Perdiccas were disunited. Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and other leaders persisted in their refusal to co-operate with Eumenes, whose own forces, though large, were unlikely to, and in fact did not, fight wholeheartedly for a cause that was meaningless to them. If Eumenes had been willing to subordinate all other considerations to the interests of the royal house, which would certainly be damaged by further bloodshed, he could have surrendered unconditionally and faced the consequences. Alternatively, he could have sought to secure the cancellation of the death sentence passed on him by undertaking to put himself and his troops at the disposal of the “kings”. He did neither.

That the opening of negotiations with his enemies at this stage might well have led to a settlement is shown by subsequent events. When his position had been much weakened by his defeat at Orcynia, which cost him the loss of almost all his forces, and he had taken refuge with the remainder in the fortress of Nora, Antigonus made overtures to him as soon as measures

\(^1\) His attempt to win the support of Cleopatra (Arrian F 11. 40) seems to indicate that he claimed to be still in the service of the royal house.
for establishing a blockade had been completed. Diodorus declares that Antigonus, being now in control of the most powerful army in Asia, was already pursuing personal ambitions on a very large scale and was no longer content to obey the "kings" and Antipater. It is, however, highly questionable whether at this stage, while Antipater was still alive, Antigonus had already formed plans to defy the central authority and make himself independent. The attitude of Eumenes in making demands that virtually amounted to a rejection of the offer was probably adopted because he was unwilling to become a mere servant of Antigonus and not because he suspected him of disloyalty to the "kings". Later, when Antigonus again sought a settlement, the position had changed: Antipater was dead, the authority of the new regent Polyperchon was most insecure, and the surviving supporters of Perdiccas had been eliminated. Hence it is rather more likely, though by no means certain, that on this occasion Eumenes evaded the conclusion of an agreement because he was convinced that Antigonus was disloyal to the royal house. The significant fact remains that none of the attempts made by his opponents to come to terms with him led to the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

1 Diod. xviii. 41. 6-7; Plut. Eum. 10. 3-8.  2 Diod. xviii. 41. 4-5.  3 P. Cloché, Mélanges Charles Picard, i (1949), 189-90. The ambitious plans of Antigonus are mentioned only at a later stage by Plutarch (Eum. 12. 1).  4 Some observations of Diodorus on the general aims of Eumenes at this juncture (xviii. 42. 1-2) are highly suspect. They are incompatible with a later passage (see the next note), and the implication that Eumenes was ready to sell his services to the highest bidder conflicts with the picture of him drawn by the narrative of Diodorus. If he had felt as he is said to have felt, he would surely have accepted without hesitation the terms offered by Antigonus. The sentiments here attributed to Eumenes foreshadow the subsequent homilies on the mutability of fortune which, as stated above (p. 311), are almost certainly original contributions by Diodorus himself. This passage also is very probably the fruit of his own surmise and not adapted from material supplied by his source.  5 Diod. xviii. 50. 1-4; Plut. Eum. 12. 1-2. It is noteworthy that Hieronymus communicated the proposals of Antigonus to Eumenes on this occasion. A passage in which Diodorus (xviii. 58. 4) further discusses the reasons why Eumenes refused to listen to Antigonus is very probably derived from Hieronymus. It stresses the devotion of Eumenes to the cause of the infant Alexander and, unlike the passage mentioned in the previous note, is in entire harmony with the general impression created by the narrative.
During the first years after the death of Alexander most Macedonians and many Greeks in Macedonian service evidently desired that the Empire should be held together under the Argead house and that the young Alexander IV should, when he came of age, succeed to the heritage of his father. Loyalty to the memory of Alexander remained strong, as is shown by the success of the "Alexander tent", but self-interest probably exerted an even more powerful influence in favour of maintaining unity under the royal house. The Macedonian rank and file, because they had become professionals, were normally willing to serve anyone who could offer them generous terms and opportunities of winning booty. Often, however, they showed a disinclination to fight each other and evidently much preferred to be left to garrison the conquests of Alexander. The lesser nobles in charge of the smaller or more remote satrapies, who, like the satraps of the Persian Empire, enjoyed a considerable measure of independence, were more likely to be left undisturbed if the Empire were to remain united under the royal house and therefore favoured the maintenance of unity. Hence the cause of the royal house was not inevitably doomed from the outset. On the other hand, the extreme weakness of this cause was manifest, threatened as it was by the ambitions and jealousies of the greater Macedonian leaders. This threat was very grave indeed: it came not only from those believed to be aiming at the establishment of a personal sovereignty over the Empire as a whole but also, perhaps even more acutely, from those who, like Ptolemy, pursued limited objectives and sought for themselves separate and independent kingdoms in a dismembered Empire. While their numbers were small, these men controlled vast resources and enjoyed the enormous power that the principal barons always have enjoyed under a feudal system when the monarchy has been virtually in abeyance. None of them could hope to achieve his ambition if the boy Alexander were allowed to grow to manhood, and he lived to the age of about thirteen only because while a minor he was a

The half-witted and illegitimate Philip Arrhidaeus, the nominee of the infantry, was a mere stop-gap, who would doubtless have been eliminated or ignored.
useful pawn and because even the most unscrupulous Successors hesitated to incur the odium of having put him to death.

These considerations must have been fully appreciated by the clear-sighted and experienced Eumenes. Was he then content to expose himself to endless perils and trials, especially when as supreme commander in Asia he was in constant danger of betrayal, solely for the sake of the rather slender chance that young Alexander might become master of a united empire? The impression created by the history of Hieronymus seems to have been that he was. Hieronymus, however, for all his merits cannot be considered to be a wholly impartial witness, and the remarkable decisions of Eumenes mentioned above provide some grounds for believing that he constantly kept in mind the problem of his own future if, as was likely, the Empire were to break up.

The leaders of the cavalry in the dispute with the infantry at Babylon immediately after the death of Alexander are listed by Arrian in two categories. The first consists of Perdiccas, Leonnatus, and Ptolemy; the second, containing the names of five leaders who ranked after these three, includes Eumenes. Although some important personalities were not at Babylon, the passage provides evidence of the status enjoyed by Eumenes in relation to other leaders when Alexander died. The record of his actions, at any rate not from the point at which the challenge to the authority of Perdiccas brought the first clash of arms, shows how determined he was to maintain this position. If the Empire had remained united under the royal house and Alexander IV had grown to manhood, Eumenes would have had strong claims to be ranked among the principal subordinates of the young king on the same footing as the foremost Macedonians. Whatever the outcome, however, he was evidently not content, as Nearchus and other Greeks seem to have been, to become merely the tool of another's ambition. He could

1 F 1. 2.

2 It might be argued that the inclusion of Eumenes is due to the bias of Hieronymus (Jacoby, n. ad loc.), but he had been appointed to a hipparchy by Alexander and was not obviously unworthy to be classed with Lysimachus and Seleucus.
at almost any time have secured an honourable but subordinate command, with plenty of scope for the exercise of his talents, under one of the leading Macedonians whose equals he had been when Alexander died, but he was adamant in refusing agreements whereby he would have found himself committed to an inferior position of this kind. Had the regency collapsed before his own death, he would certainly have competed with other leaders for the independent kingdoms into which a dismembered Empire would naturally fall. Macedonian troops were not likely to fight wholeheartedly for a Greek, but the limitations of Macedonian manpower were becoming evident, and increasing numbers of Greeks and even Asiatics were being armed and trained in the Macedonian style. Eumenes himself showed, when he built up an effective force of Cappadocian horse soon after assuming control of his satrapy, that Asia Minor could produce cavalry of high quality.

What Eumenes planned to do in a situation which, partly through his own efforts to avert it, arose only when he was dead can only be guessed. There is, however, one curious feature of his relations with the regent Polyperchon which is perhaps to be explained on the assumption that he was believed to have personal aims of the kind tentatively suggested above. When he was appointed supreme commander in Asia, the sentence of death passed on him after the fall of Perdiccas was not annulled. It seriously weakened his authority, being used by his enemies in attempts to undermine the loyalty of his troops, and eventually it enabled Antigonus to have him put to death with some semblance of legality. The omission of Polyperchon to have the sentence annulled can scarcely have been a mere oversight: even if he failed to appreciate that his appointment of Eumenes as supreme commander in Asia did not automatically

1 Cf. the severe and somewhat unjust criticisms of Plut. Comp. Sert. et Eum. 2. 3-5.
3 Plut. Eum. 4. 4-4, cf. Diod. xviii. 29. 3 and 30. 1.
4 According to Diodorus (xviii. 59. 4, the principal passage on the fickleness of fortune) the Macedonians "forgot" their condemnation of him.
5 Diod. xviii. 62. 1 and xix. 12. 1-2 (also apparently Diod. xviii. 63. 2 and Plut. Eum. 8. 11).
cancel the death sentence passed by the army, Eumenes must surely have claimed to be absolved from all charges, a claim that he made in his negotiations with Antigonus at Nora.¹ No explanation of this strange omission on the part of Polyperchon seems to have been offered in modern times.² It may be that he deliberately refrained from taking steps to have the death sentence annulled because he saw in it a valuable means of maintaining his own authority and of curbing any attempt by Eumenes to make himself undesirably independent.³

If there is any validity in the suggestions made in this paper, the traditional picture of Eumenes should be somewhat modified. There is, however, much to admire in the part that he played in the struggles between the Successors during the last years of his life, especially after his appointment as supreme commander for the "kings" in Asia. He was essentially a realist, and in the many difficult situations in which he was involved he showed a remarkable sense of what was practicable. He determined what his policy should be and pursued it with undaunted persistence. Few of his Macedonian contemporaries seem to have understood the altered world in which they found themselves. They had acquired vast power too rapidly. A few decades earlier Macedonia had been a feudal backwater, and not many Macedonians had crossed its frontiers. When the dominating personality of Alexander was suddenly removed, the Macedonian nobles instinctively reverted to the traditional practice of their ancestors, who, whenever the monarchy was weak, had tended to disrupt the unity of the kingdom by self-

¹ Diod. xviii. 41. 7.
² The literary tradition is very unsympathetic towards Polyperchon—possibly because Hieronymus considered that he had given insufficient support to Eumenes—but his decree recalling Greek exiles (Diod. xviii. 56) was a shrewd move, and perhaps he was abler than is generally believed.
³ In discussing the loyalty of Eumenes to the royal house I have not taken into account the fact that in the spring of 317 he appears to have lost his status as supreme commander in Asia because Polyperchon was deposed by a decree issued in the name of Philip Arrhidaeus (Justin, xiv. 5. 1-3, discussed by H. Bengtson, Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit, i (1937), 87-8 and 110-11). Even if Eumenes received a clear picture of the confused situation in Macedonia, which is doubtful, he must have refused to recognize the regency of Cassander: his loyalty was to Olympias and the legitimate branch of the royal house.
seeking turbulence and intrigue. It is not surprising that the Successors strove for the prizes of empire without appreciating its responsibilities, that they succumbed so easily and so short­sightedly to the lure of personal ambition. The fault lay less in their national character than in the limitations of their political experience. Although Eumenes was probably less indifferent to his own interests than Hieronymus seems to have allowed, he did differ from most of the leading Macedonians in being less easily corrupted and therefore more loyal to the house of Alexander. One reason may have been that, as has already been pointed out, the highest prize of all was not open to him. A stronger reason, however, was that he enjoyed the very great advantage of having been born and brought up in the politically and intellectually more advanced atmosphere of a Greek city­state.
IN a forthcoming study on The Origins and Composition of
the Lucan Nativity and Infancy Narrative I advance for con­
sideration the view that Luke i. 46b-55 (Magnificat) and Luke i.
68-75 (first part of Benedictus) are Maccabaean war songs which
found their place in the Third Gospel by way of a Jewish-
Christian (Nazarene) adaptation of the "Baptist Document", i.e. a first century literary record emanating from the circle of
followers of John the Baptist and dealing with John’s birth. The language of these writings was Hebrew.

The present paper will not deal with the complex problem
of how the two songs were modified to the use to which they
were put by successive writers, but will deal exclusively with
the songs themselves and with their original character and
function.

Our knowledge of post-canonical Hebrew poetry is incomplete. That being so we do not sufficiently appreciate the fact that the
generation of Jews who were living in Palestine in New Testament
times possessed a much fuller knowledge of the literature in
question than we do. Post-canonical Hebrew poetry from the
second century B.C. was known, and was still remembered by
Jews in the first, and even in the second, century of our era.
This fact may be illustrated by comparing fragments of Hebrew
songs from 1 Maccabees with poems from 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch.

Amongst the lyrics that are interspersed in the narrative
account of the First Book of Maccabees we read:

1 Macc. ii. 9 . . . her vessels of glory were carried away into captivity,
Her infants are slain in the streets,
Her young men by the enemy’s sword.
10 What nation has not inherited her palaces
And gotten possession of her spoils?
11 Her adorning is all taken away:
Instead of a free woman she is become a slave.
1 Macc. ii. 12 Behold, our holy things and our beauty and our glory are laid waste. And the Gentiles have profaned them. 13 Why should we live any longer?

1 Macc. iii. 45 And Jerusalem was without inhabitant as a desert. There was none of her sons that went in and went out. And the sanctuary trodden down, and the sons of strangers in the citadel—The Gentiles lodged therein. And joy was taken away from Jacob And the pipe and the harp ceased.¹

We compare these poems from the time of Antiochus IV Epiphanes with the dirges composed after the destruction of the Temple by Titus Flavius.

4 Ezra x. 21-3 . . . thou seest
  Our sanctuary laid waste
  Our altar trodden down
  Our Temple destroyed,
  Our harp is laid low
  Our song is silenced
  Our rejoicing has ceased,
  The light of our lamp is extinguished
  The Ark of our Covenant spoiled
  Our holy things defiled,
  The name that is called upon us is profaned.
  Our nobles are dishonoured
  Our priests burnt
  Our levites gone into captivity,
  Our virgins are defiled
  Our wives ravished,
  Our righteous are seized,
  Our children are cast out
  Our youths enslaved
  Our heroes made powerless—And what is more than all:
  Šion's seal is now sealed up dishonoured
  And given into the hands of them that hate us.

2 Bar. x. 6 Blessed is he who was not born,
  Or he, who having been born, has died.
  7 But for us who live—woe unto us
    Because we have seen the affliction of Šion
    And what has befallen Jerusalem.

¹ The translations of this and the following poems are, with negligible alterations, those of the Revised Version, of George Herbert Box and of Robert Henry Charles.
2 Bar. x. 8 I will call the Sirens from the sea,
    And ye, Lilin, come ye from the desert,
And ye, Shedim and dragons from the forest:
    Awake, and gird up your loins unto mourning,
And take up with me the dirges
    And make lamentation with me.

9 Ye husbandmen, sow not again!
    And, oh earth, why givest thou thy harvest fruits?
Keep within thee the sweets of thy sustenance!

10 And thou, vine, why further dost thou give thy wine?
    For no offering will again be made therefrom in Šion,
Nor will first fruits again be offered.

11 And ye, oh heavens, withhold your dew
    And open not the treasuries of rain!
12 And do thou, oh sun, withhold the light of thy rays,
    And do thou, oh moon, extinguish the multitude of thy light!—
For why should light rise again
    When the light of Šion is darkened?

Nothing perhaps shows the profound change in the attitude
to life which the writers of these songs and those for whom the
songs were written had undergone than the cry "Why should
we live any longer?" The belief that fecundity in women was
a sign of God's special grace is turned into its opposite. It is
one of the rare moments in the history of Jewish thought when
despair prevails over hope. The last barrier of defence of an
immensely proud soul is broken; for a moment it looks as if
even the perennial optimism of the Judaic spirit that makes Jews
so exceptionally unsuited for the tragic fate of their race could
not stand up against such catastrophe.

2 Bar. x. 13 . . . ye bridegrooms, enter not in,
    And let not the brides adorn themselves with garlands,
And, ye women, pray not that ye may bear!

For the barren shall above all rejoice
    And those who have no sons shall be glad;
Those who have sons shall have anguish.
    For why should they bear in pain
Only to bury in grief?
Or why, again, should mankind have sons? . . .
From this time, speak no more of beauty
And talk not of gracefulness.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Bar. xi. 2 . . . the grief is infinite,
The lamentation measureless,

. . . . .
Oh YHWH, how couldst thou have borne it!

The similarity, from a Jewish point of view, of the situations in the year 168-167 B.C. and the year A.D. 70-1 is great, and it is understandable that Jewish writers, writing of these events, would have found similar expressions to describe them. It is not contended here that the passages in 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch are merely a recast of the songs of which 1 Maccabees preserves fragments. The dirges in the works of the later writers are new, they are more highly elaborate, much less direct in their expression of grief—yet the pattern which they follow is that of the older poem. In the threnodies in 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch pervades an echo of a Hebrew song of Maccabaean times and there is no mistaking it.

Philo describes in De Vita Contemplativa an assembly of the sect of Therapeutæ and the proceedings which followed upon an exegetic discourse on Scripture passages. "When the president thinks he has discoursed enough . . . applause arises showing a general pleasure in the prospect of what is still to follow. Then the president rises and sings a hymn composed as an address to God, either a new one of his own composition or an old one by poets of an earlier day who have left behind them hymns in many measures and melodies, hexameters and iambics, lyrics suitable for processions or in libations and at the altars, or for the chorus whilst standing or dancing, with careful metrical arrangements to fit the various evolutions. After him all the others take their turn . . . in the proper order while all the rest listen in complete silence except when they have to chant the closing lines or refrains, for then they all lift up their voices, men and women alike."¹ When individual members of the congregation have finished their solo recitals, then "they rise up all together and . . . form themselves into two choirs, one of men and one of women, the leader and precentor chosen for each being the most honoured amongst them and also the

most musical. Then they sing hymns to God composed of many measures and set to many melodies. . . .” ¹

We have here a description of social activities amongst Jews from the age of John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth. It is certainly not taking too great liberty with Philo's record if we assume that the programme of a gathering as that described here was little different whether the persons who took part in it belonged to “orthodox” or sectarian groups.

In De Agricultura we have another instance where the use of a men's choir and women's choir, each with its respective precentor, is recorded. The leader of the men's choir is symbolically called “Moses”, the leader of the women's choir “Miryam”. The song which the two choirs alternately chant is here the psalm Exodus xv. 1b-18—indeed a very ancient example of Hebrew martial poetry. The congregation “sing to God, the giver of victory . . . with answering note they raise harmonious chant” ².

Assemblies of Palestinian Jews in the first decades of the first century had a variety of purposes and covered the whole normal range of the nation's life. It would be unwarranted to assume that all such social gatherings had a principally religious character. It would be equally unwarranted to assume that the selection of hymns which were sung on such occasions was limited in choice to those that have been collected in canonical Psalms. Our knowledge of the subject has been greatly enriched by the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The “Hymns of Praise (or Thanksgiving)” are examples of post-canonical Hebrew psalms that were in circulation amongst a Jewish public in Palestine. These hymns are not specifically battle songs, but information on such comes forward in the “Wars of the Children of Light against the Children of Darkness” ³ where

¹ De Vita Contemplativa, xi (ll. 83, 84); Colson-Whitaker, vol. ix, pp. 164-5.
² De Agricultura, xvii (l. 79); Colson-Whitaker, vol. iii, pp. 146-9.
³ Eleazar Lipa Suqeniq, Megillōth Genūzōth, vol. i (Jerusalem, 1948), p. 19. An example of one such battle hymn is given in Megillōth Genūzōth, vol. ii (Jerusalem, 1950), Pl. XI.
we read that songs of praise were sung by Jewish warriors after their victorious return from battle. The information is not actually new; the custom is attested in 1 Maccabees iv. 24.¹

The point that is of specific interest to us in connection with our query is the form and the contents of the re-appeared Hymns of Praises: they are a mosaic of biblical phrases exactly in the same vein as the Magnificat and Benedictus.

In both songs from the first chapter of the Third Gospel, the Magnificat and the Benedictus, there is hardly a turn of speech and certainly not a single thought not to be found in older Hebrew poetry. Pleasing as the poems are, they are no more than centos of older literary production. When we compare the two hymns with the psalm in 1 Chronicles xvi. 8-36, we are able to recognize that the same principle has been at work in both places: they are pieced together from a variety of older poetic records. The comparison is worthwhile; not only is the working method of the author (or authors) of the hymns in Luke i. identical with the working method of the "author" of the psalm in 1 Chronicles xvi. 8-36, but we discover a marked predilection for the same range of ideas. The taste of the compilers is similar. Comparison will show this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Luke i.</th>
<th>1 Chronicles xvi.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46b</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>10b, 35a</td>
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<td>49a</td>
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<td>49b</td>
<td>10a, 35</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>36b</td>
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<td>51a</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>21b</td>
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<td>19-21a</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>36a</td>
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<tr>
<td>69b</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>15-17</td>
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</tbody>
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etc.

Here as there we are dealing with a collection and agglutination of remembered passages from older Hebrew poetry. The literary taste of the writers in selecting their material and connecting it into consecutive clauses is remarkably similar. The

¹ Compare 2 Maccabees xv. 28-9.
fact that in comparison to "the composer" of the ill-assorted scrap in 1 Chronicles xvi. 8-36 the writer of the lines that are incorporated in Luke i. was a poet Dei gratia does not diminish the importance of the other fact that his work also is no more than a recapitulation of often repeated ideas and a rehearsal of well known poetic expressions. The assumption that the Magnificat and the first part of the Benedictus belong to the same period of history as the compilation of 1 Chronicles xvi. 8-36 is therefore permissible.

The appearance in the New Testament of poems which might have belonged to the repertoire of songs that were sung by the company of Mattathyahu, the rod of YHWH, or—as is more probable—by the subsequent generation of Maccabaean warriors, should not cause surprise. It is not an isolated case.

Great and marvellous are thy works, YHWH God Almighty,
Righteous and true are thy ways, King of the ages,
Who shall not fear and glorify, YHWH, thy name?
For thou art holy, and all the nations shall come And worship before thee,

For thy righteous acts have openly been declared . . .

The superscription given to this fragment from a Hebrew hymn, "The Song of Moses and the Song of the Lamb", must not deceive us; such superscriptions have about the same historical value as the superscriptions of canonical psalms. Yet it is probably the bizarre title that has so far prevented recognition of the origin of the fragment in Revelation xv. 3b, 4 as a Maccabaean hymn which might have been sung on their way to death by the martyrs of YHWH when they refused to bow in worship to Zeus Uranios.¹

From verse 76 to verse 79 the Benedictus speaks of events that lie in the future; verses 68-75 use the past tense. The only logical conclusion it is possible to draw from this difference is that these parts of the Benedictus represent two different strata and are not the work of one author. This suspicion is confirmed when the contents of the two parts are examined and set against each other: only verses 76-9 deal with the future of the child John and are specifically called for by the occasion; they

¹ Remnants of Hebrew liturgical poetry can be found in Revelation iv. 11, xi. 17-8, xii. 12a, xix. 1, 2, 5b, 6b, 7a.
express a father's elated anticipation of the achievements of his son. Verses 68-75 are made up of generalities that have no connection with John's birth. They do not specifically fit the present situation and were written on a completely different occasion which had originally nothing to do with the birth of Zacharias' son.

The Magnificat is a similar case. It has been pointed out that the contents of the Magnificat are inappropriate in the mouth of Mary and could have been spoken more suitably by Elisabeth. Yet even in the mouth of Elishebha the Magnificat

1 It is only possible to give here a cross-section of scholarly opinions on the problem of textual criticism as to whom the Magnificat should be assigned as speaker. The question aroused considerable controversy two generations ago.

François Jacobé "L'origine du Magnificat" (Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses, vol. ii (Paris, 1897), pp. 424-32) raised the issue and brought forward reasons of critical interpretation of the contents of the story in support of the external evidence for the reading "Elisabet" (codices Vercellensis, Veronensis, Rhedigeranus-Vratislaviensis; Irenaeus, Origenes, Niceta of Remesiana, Paulinus of Nola, Cyril of Jerusalem): "Le contenu ... du cantique n'a rien qui soit personnel à Marie", "... le Magnificat n'est qu'un décalque du cantique d'Anne, mère de Samuel. La situation d'Elisabeth n'a-t-elle pas plus d'analogie avec celle d'Anne que celle de Marie?" (p. 431). (François Jacobé) appears to be an early nom-de-plume of Loisy.)

The Jesuit father A. Durand (Revue biblique internationale, vol. vii (Paris, 1898), pp. 74-7) reviewed and rejected Jacobé's statement of the case, though he well understood that the error in the traditional text of Luke i. 46a could have crept in quite inadvertently from a desire for greater precision. "Le texte original devait porter simplement εἰςέρχεται. Le désir de préciser aura fait ajouter par les uns μαρία, tandis que d'autres écrivent εἰςεπάβετα" (p. 76).

Heinrich Weinel, "Ein Vorschlag" (Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. i (Giessen, 1900), pp. 347-51): "... so ist auch an unserer Stelle (Lc. 1, 46) das »Ελισάβετ « sächlich richtig; aber »Μαρία « ist sächlich falsch ..." (p. 350). Not long before he wrote the article, Weinel had spoken of "die drei Psalmen der Maria, des Zacharias und des Symeon in Lc, welche deutlich ein semitisches Original verraten und vielleicht auf jüdische Vorbilder zurückgehen", Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im nachapostolischen Zeitalter bis auf Irenäus (Freiburg, 1899), p. 80.

Carl Gustav Adolf Harnack, in "Das Magnifikat der Elisabet (Luc I, 46-55) nebst einigen Bemerkungen zu Luc I und 2" (Sitzungsberichte der Koeniglisch Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. xxvii (Berlin, 1900), pp. 538-56) collected and surveyed additional reasons of the internal evidence for his preference of the reading "Elisabet" in the O.L. His arguments have to be read.

Friedrich Spitta, "Das Magnifikat, ein Psalm der Maria und nicht der Elisabeth" (Theologische Abhandlungen. Eine Festgabe zum 17 Mai 1902 für
is not entirely convincing. Why does she, in her joy that her shameful barrenness is ended and that she will be rewarded with a child, have to exclaim that YHWH has thrown princes from their thrones and has set up the needy in their stead? These words bear no relation to the situation in which an expectant mother finds herself, and they sound unnatural in Elishebha's, and even more so in Maryam's, mouth.

These considerations lead to the supposition that the Magnificat and the first part of the Benedictus—those passages in which the use of the aorist prevails—were not first written

Heinrich Julius Holtzmann (Tübingen und Leipzig, 1902), pp. 61-94) disagreed with Harnack's analysis and brought forward a number of reasons why the Magnificat should be thought of as spoken by Mary, although—according to Spitta—it was not an original part of the narrative but had been added by the evangelist.

Francis Crawford Burkitt, "Who Spoke the Magnificat?" (Journal of Theological Studies, O.S. vii (Oxford, 1906), pp. 220-7): "St. Luke intended us to understand that the Magnificat was spoken by Elisabeth and not by Mary" (p. 222).

Alfred Firmin Loisy, L'évangile selon Luc (Paris, 1924): "Dans l'ensemble, le Magnificat, n'est qu'un décalque du cantique d'Anne, et c'est la situation d'Elisabeth, non celle de Marie, qui est analogue à celle de la mère de Samuel" (pp. 100-1). Compare the same author's Les Évangiles synoptiques (Paris, 1907), vol. i, p. 303.

Burton Scott Easton, The Gospel According to St. Luke. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary (New York, 1926): "Superficially... "Elizabeth" seems the more natural reading... The parallelism with Zacharias' song... would suggest that the... hymn was uttered by Elizabeth" (p. 14).

Maurice Goguel, Au seuil de l'évangile Jean-Baptiste (Paris, 1928): "... l'hymne connu sous le nom de Magnificat que le texte courant de Luc et la tradition attribuent à Marie mais qui paraît bien avoir originairement appartenu à Elisabeth" (p. 72). "La substitution d'Elisabeth à Marie étant très peu vraisemblable, la leçon » Elisabeth « doit être ancienne" (p. 72, n. 1).

John Martin Creed, The Gospel according to St. Luke (London, 1930): "In spite of the support of all Greek manuscripts and almost all versions, the conclusion should probably be drawn that μαριάμ [viz. in verse 46a] is not original" (p. 22).

I adhere to the opinion that the Third Evangelist intended his readers to understand that the Magnificat was spoken by the mother of John. Reasons for this opinion are submitted in a chapter treating of the relation between the "Baptist Source" and the "Nazarene adaptation" thereof among the literary records that preceded the evangelist's own presentation of the theme. With regard to the wider problem as to the authorship of Luke i. ii. in general, and of the Magnificat in particular, I do not subscribe to Harnack's and Burkitt's propositions.
when the birth of John the Baptist was celebrated in literature, but existed in independent form before then.

Harnack thought that the original language of the Lucan Nativity and Infancy Narrative was Greek; Torrey thought it was Hebrew—but both scholars believed that the lyrics were composed by the same person who wrote the narrative setting in which the lyrics are embedded. Loisy remained undecided as to the questions of author and original language of the poems; while leaving open the possibility that these songs might have been composed in Hebrew and, after translation into Greek, inserted with some retouches and stylistic alterations into the Lucan Birth Narrative by the evangelist, he admits the possibility that they might have been composed in Greek in imitation of the style of the Greek Old Testament. Spitta expressed the view that the authors of the Magnificat and the Benedictus and of the story of John's birth were different persons; he believed the story to have been completed without the songs in verses 46b-55 and 68-79 and to have been amplified by a later hand which inserted the poems. "Das Magnifikat ist erst später (nachträglich) in den Geschichtszusammenhang eingefügt worden. Tatsächlich schliesst sich V. 56 tadellos an V. 45 an." "Viel leichter wird sich alles erklären, wenn man annimmt, dass das Magnifikat . . . vom Evangelisten der von ihm benutzten Geschichte eingefügt worden ist." "Das Magnifikat hat ursprünglich der Geschichte in Luk 1 nicht angehört." "Das Benediktus kann der Erzählung ursprünglich nicht angehört haben, sondern ist ihr aus einem anderen Zusammenhang erst später eingefügt worden." Spitta's explanation, preferable though it is to Harnack's or Torrey's assumptions, does not entirely meet the case. It was not the evangelist who inserted the songs into their present setting. The editor of the Third Gospel did not insert anything

1 "Il est permis de se demander si l'on est en présence d'un cantique hébreu plus ou moins librement traduit et glosé, ou bien d'une composition grecque où l'on aurait imité le style des Septante. La seconde hypothèse se pourrait n'être pas la moins vraisemblable ; mais il est certain que le rédacteur évangelique s'il n'a pas composé les cantiques les a retouchés et appropriés à son style .", L.c., p. 104-5.

2 L.c., p. 85. 3 L.c., p. 89. 4 L.c., p. 90. 5 L.c., p. 72.
anywhere without the guidance of a tradition which he con­
sidered trustworthy and which indicated to him that the inserted
matter was causally connected with the subject with which he
was dealing. The editor of Luke is the most conscientious,
most scrupulous, and most historically-minded of compilers.
He might have changed turns of speech and amplified details in
the light of his own understanding of the tradition or of facts
as had been "delivered" to him, but he definitely refrained from
adding to his text anything on which he possessed no tradition.
There are explanatory glosses in the Third Gospel, there are
notes by which the evangelist attempted to correlate the gospel
story with the political events of the world, but there is not one
single item substantial to the gospel that had not been transmitted
to the editor. He was a poet, but he invented nothing. The Songs
were in the Third Evangelist's edition of Luke, and it was not
the evangelist who had added them to his source. The songs
were in the "Nazarene" Vorlage which the evangelist had at his
disposal. The point at which the songs were added to the
narrative was earlier: they were inserted by the author of the
Baptist Document (Story of John's Birth) into his own narrative;
he knew the lyrics and incorporated them into his own com­
position of the story of John's signal birth. Magnificat and
first part of the Benedictus are Maccabaean Hebrew psalms
which the composer of the Baptist Document knew and which
he found suitable for incorporation into his own work. The
author of the Baptist Document is also the author of verses 76-9.
Spitta is correct in saying that the psalms were written by another
person than the author of the prose narrative—but his explana­
tion that they were later joined to that narrative by someone
other than the composer of the story of John's birth seems un­
warranted.

Jacobé, who treated of the subject before the controversy
between Harnack and Spitta had arisen, correctly remarked of
the loose dovetailing of the lyrics into the narrative: "... les
cantiques, le Magnificat et le Benedictus, ont un peu l'air des
pièces rapportées dans le recit, où ils ne sont qu' à moitié en­
cadrés", 1 "... le Magnificat est un vrai psaume, inspiré

1 L.c., p. 429.
comme le Benedictus, comme le cantique d’Anne, mère de Samuel, comme les psaumes davidiqnes". On reading the first chapter in Luke with an open mind, it is impossible to disagree with Jacobe on this point; verses 46b-55 and verses 68-75 are not organically one with the surrounding setting, but are "des pièces rapportées."  

The relation of the poems Luke i. 46b-55 and Luke i. 68-75 to the narrative of the birth of John the Baptist is the same as that of the hymn 1 Samuel ii. 1-10 or other lyrical sets in the narrative books of the Old Testament to their present background. They are psalms, and like other Hebrew psalms they were written by anonymous authors; they were sung and recited until both their authors and the occasions on which they had been written sank into oblivion. The songs remained and

1 L.c., p. 431.

2 A careful conservative summary of earlier presented views on the subject is to be found in Erich Klostermann, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. ii, Die Evangelien (Göttingen, 1919), "Ein Problem für sich bildet das Magnificat . . . Abgesehen von den auch nur sehr allgemein auf Maria und ebensogut auf Elisabet wie schliesslich überhaupt auf jede Mutter eines glorreichen Sohnes passenden Versen 48 f. (hat) der Hymnus keine . . . Beziehung auf das Erlebnis der Maria und die Ankunft des Messias . . . (Man will) in dem Magnificat einen älteren Dankpsalm erblicken, der vielleicht gerade wegen 48 f. nachträglich diesem Zusammenhang einverleibt (H. Holtzmann), oder umgekehrt durch späteren Einschub von V. 48 f. erst für den Augenblick passend gemacht und dann hier eingelegt wurde (J. Weiss). Umstritten bleibt dabei, ob der Psalm ein Produkt der judenchristlichen Gemeinde darstellt . . . (so z.B. J. Weiss) oder ob er vorchristlichen, d.h. rein jüdischen Ursprungs ist (Hillmann, Merx, Spitta . . .) und entweder auf Erweisungen Gottes in der Vergangenheit Bezug nimmt oder besser in Aoristen, die zeitlosen hebräischen Perfekten entsprechen, ausmalt, was Gott zu jeder Zeit tut” (pp. 374-5).

We may add to this survey of relevant opinions on the relation of the Songs in Luke i. to the narrative setting of the story the view expressed by Martin Dibelius in Die urchristliche Überlieferung von Johannes dem Täufer (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments O.S. xvi, Göttingen 1911): "... dann hätte der Psalm (i.e. Magnificat) ursprünglich gesondert existiert" (p. 74); the Benedictus is characterized by Dibelius as "kein notwendiges Glied der ganzen Erzählung", but "lose eingefügt" (p. 74). Goguel expressed the same opinion in Au seuil de l’évangile Jean-Baptiste: "Ce psaume (i.e. le Magnificat) . . . . pourrait avoir eu originairement une existence indépendante " (p. 73) and "Quant au psaume de Zacharie qui, à cause de la manière dont il est inseré, paraît avoir eu originairement comme le Magnificat une existence indépendante et n’avoir été introduit qu’après coup . . . ." (p. 74).
were saved from sharing the fate of the authors by some later collector or writer who preserved them by ascribing them to some royal or other important personage and who either included them in a book of lyrics such as canonical Psalms or inserted them in some narrative, such as the Hexateuch, Judges, Samuel or Kings. In any case, the new context of the songs had little to do with the circumstances in which they originated. Such may also be the history of the Magnificat and of the longer part of the Benedictus: they may have been written and sung in Maccabaean times by a poet who was one of a band of Jewish warriors and wished to commemorate the fact that princes had been put down and the poor exalted. These songs circulated amongst the people for a period of several generations. They may have been changed in the process of oral tradition, restyled, enlarged, adapted, set to tune for various occasions, as folk-songs are handed on and are constantly being reshaped by the people who use and who preserve them. If that happened to the hymns that are known to us from Luke, the process of changing which the hymns might have undergone was still not advanced enough to obliterate the original character of these poems. It is most likely that both the Magnificat and the first part of the Benedictus which speak of past manifestations of God's power and God's mercy toward Israel, which speak of salvation as an event known to have happened in the past—like the ננרייל לישנה in Exodus xv. 2—not as one awaiting the speaker in future, were written by some Jewish poet who wished to express gratitude for the help God had given in the struggle against the Syro-Macedonian armies. The author of the narrative of John the Baptist's birth knew these songs; he found them to his

1 The fact that ancient poems which are now included in prose narratives of the Old Testament were drawn from older anthologies is explicitly stated in Josua x. 13 and 2 Samuel i. 18. These references must be supplemented by the LXX reading of 1 Kings viii. 53. We read there instead of the se'fer hayashar (book of Yashar) of a biblos tes odes (hymn book). This obviously is the same formula. In the M.T. the letters y and s are transposed. By restoring these two letters to their original order we obtain instead of a mythical "Yashar" a concrete reference to an existing song-book, sefer hash-shir. It is possible that even this transposition is not required. The title of the book may have been yashir = "they sang", to which some later scribe added the article.
liking and thought it fitting to put them into the mouth of the mother and father of John, in the belief that they would be appropriate in their new setting.¹

Let us see whether the contents of the poems fit the assumption that they were composed as war songs in Maccabaean times. There is nothing in the contents of the two hymns that would rule out the idea of their having been composed as Psalms of Praises incanted by a militant crowd before joining battle or as triumphal odes after victory had been achieved on the battlefield. The δώλη in verse 48a need not necessarily be a designation of an actual person of the female sex. It might be Israel, "the virgin daughter of Σιόν", who was meant by this expression. In 1 Maccabees ii. 11, Israel is called a "free woman who is become a slave" (ἐλευθέρα ἐγενήθη εἰς δώλην). The humiliation of the slave-woman is avenged by YHWH's showing strength with his arm in scattering the proud and putting down the foreign princes from their thrones. "He has holpen Israel his servant in remembering mercy" as he had sworn in days of old. 'Ἡ δώλη τοῦ κυρίου, the people of the servants of YHWH, after suffering the humiliation of Seleucid rule had now "been filled with good things"—they had spoiled the camps of Nicanor and Lysias and captured rich booty. It is Israel also who will have to be identified with the ταπευόμαι and πενώντες of verses 52, 53 (Syr sin has "poor" for "hungry" in the latter verse). Innumerable passages in the Old Testament justify this identification.²

¹ The freedom taken by the author of the narrative of John's birth in interpreting the old psalms in his own manner keeps within modest bounds. The views on the Magnificat expressed by more recent writers display a much more felicitous variety. To illustrate this I am quoting Ernest William Barnes' The Rise of Christianity (London, 1947). His Grace holds the following opinion of the Magnificat: "... the most triumphant welcome in religious literature to the uprising of the common man. No other... document shows so plainly that Christianity made headway as a movement among the proletariat" (p. 71).

² To Israel refer the designations: ἸΣ, ταπευόμαι in Isa. xlix. 13; liv. 11; lxvi. 2; ἸΣ (ἸΣ) πτωχὸς in Isa. xxix. 19; lx. 1; Ps. x. 2, 9; cxi. 13; Ps. Sol. xv. 2 (possibly also Ps. lxii. 2, 13; cix. 22); ἸΣ (ἸΣ), πραῖος in Zeph. iii. 12; Ps. cxix. 4; ἸΣ, ταπευόμαι in Zeph. iii. 12 (possibly also ἸΣ, πένης in Ps. cix. 22 and ἸΣ, πτωχὸς in Ps. cxiii. 7, 8), probably ἸΣ in
It is possible to go further than merely saying that Magnificat (Luke i. 46a-55) and Benedictus (Luke i. 68-75) are Maccabaean psalms composed as war songs in Hebrew. One may venture further and specify as closely as possible the function of these songs. It appears that Luke i. 68-75 is a paean that was sung before battle, and Luke i. 46b-55 a psalm of thanksgiving sung after battle. To determine the original character of the Benedictus as a Maccabaean paean one has to compare it with 1 Maccabees iv. 28-34. Here we have a prose account of the respective strengths of Lysias' and Judas Maccabaeus' armies encamped before Beth Shür. The prose account is interrupted by insertion of the prayer of Judas Maccabaeus before his troops joined battle with the Syrians.

... and he prayed and said:

Blessed art thou, saviour of Israel,
Who didst quell the onset of the mighty man
   By the hand of thy servant David,
And didst deliver the army of the strangers
   Into the hand of Jonathan the son of Saul
   And of his armbearer. ...

This is obviously a translation from Hebrew. It is regrettable that only five verses of one Maccabaean prayer of dedication before battle have been preserved. Yet is it really the only prayer of this sort we know? If the five metric lines in 1 Maccabees iv. 30b-33 are compared, as to their style and contents, with Luke i. 68, 69, 71-4, the original character of the

(τα προβατα τα φυλασσομενα μοι), Zech. xi. 7, 11. For other instances see: Brown-Driver-Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford, 1906) under קְוָי, n. 3, and קְוָי, n. 3 (p. 776). Humility befits the people who are called by God’s name: ... To know the people who are called by God’s name: 2 Chron. vii. 14. Poverty and wisdom are the marks of goodness: ... 2 Maccabees xv. 22b-24a.

Compare Alfred Rahlfs, Ἀναω und Ἀναωιμ in den Psalmen (Göttingen, 1892) and see Midrash Naso Rabbah xi. 1: “Anawim applies to Israel who are poor among the nations and go about in humility in their midst and suffer the burden imposed upon them, in order to sanctify the Name of the Holy One ... and to whom the Holy One ... will in the future show grace.” Midrash Rabbah Numbers, vol. i, translated by Judah J. Slotki (London, 1939), pp. 408-9.

1 See also 2 Maccabees xv. 22b-24a.
Benedictus can no longer be doubtful.¹ The psalm in Luke fits exactly the same situation and breathes exactly the same spirit as the prayer of Judas Maccabaeus. The conclusion is inevitable that the Benedictus proper is a Maccabaean paean, invoking the assistance of God before battle and avowing that if God will grant his assistance and will deliver his people from the enemy, the nation will then be able to serve God whole-heartedly without fear of interference from the oppressor.

If the Benedictus was a prayer incanted before battle was joined, the general character of the Magnificat indicates that it is a song of thanksgiving after victorious battle. Such songs are mentioned in the scroll of “The Wars of the Children of Light against the Children of Darkness” and in 1 Maccabees iv. 24. The words “deliverance” and “mercy” which occur in the passage last mentioned are key-words; the Magnificat would fit the situation described in 1 Maccabees.

It has to be noted that the spirit which pervades both lyrics is the spirit of an hopeful, vigorous, young generation, proud of its achievements and its valour. It is the spirit of a people whose favourite self-designation, “the humble ones”, refers to their relation to God, but no man. (It would be difficult to find in the history of any nation a period of 300 years with a succession of men of such self-consuming, self-destroying pride as that of the Palestinian hillbillies—to Antioch and Rome, they were no more—from Mattathias, the son of John, to Simon who is called Bar Kokhba.) When reading the Magnificat and the first eight verses of the Benedictus we must beware of reading into them any sentiment or thought that is not borne out by the contents of these poems themselves but that might be suggested by the general tenor of the story with which, in their present setting, the two psalms are loosely linked together. We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by other passages of quoted speech from that story if we wish to recognize the Magnificat and the Benedictus as what they are. The predominant note in the first two chapters of Luke is the note which the “Nazarene

¹ Compare 2 Maccabees viii. 15 with Luke i. 49b and 72b, further 1 Maccabees iv. 10 and 2 Maccabees viii. 19-21 with Luke i. 72.
adaptor" of the story of John’s birth impressed upon the narrative—a messianist character. Yet nowhere in verses 46b-55, 68-75 is a messiah mentioned or even a messianic situation alluded to. These songs of votive avowal and of thanksgiving look back upon past events of deliverance; there is in them no tension nor direction toward the unknowable future, but only elation over the great mercies that God has already shown. If it were not for the setting of these two psalms and for the messianic spirit that strongly pervades the setting, nobody would chance to think of these psalms as being messianic. No disillusion with “this world” has cast a gloom over the minds of the writers of these songs.

The pastoral idyll of Luke i. 5 - ii. 21, in the penultimate mould of the story which the evangelist took over with only the slightest of changes, was fashioned at a time of relative peace in Israel. The troubles which the armed conflict with Rome brought upon the country and its inhabitants had not yet arisen. Even so, the first century with its sense of imminent friction and constant tension (of which verses Luke i. 32, 33; ii. 25, 26; ii. 34-8, give eloquent testimony) was not the age in which the psalms Luke i. 46b-55 and Luke i. 68-75 came to be written. There occurs in verse 54 and verse 72 the word "remember"; in the first case the poet uses the verb in giving thanks that God has remembered, in the second he expresses his firm confidence that he will remember. The tone and connection in which the verb וְיָשָׁר turns up in works of Hebrew poetry may serve as a safe test in determining whether the subject poetical piece originated in a period of relative well-being or in a period of disaster. The tone in which the word is used in both psalms in Luke i. clearly shows that they were written in an age of success for the Jewish nation. When things become worse, the note changes and there is an impatient, urgent, throbbing demand in Jewish prayers that God may remember. We know this note from the Psalms of Solomon and from some of the benedictions in the Shmoneh Esreh. When things are at their worst and the poet is filled with dark despair, he says, “God no longer remembers the earth” (2 Baruch xxv. 4). The lyrics in Luke i are older than the Psalms of Solomon.
Should the explanation of ἡ ταπείνωσις τῆς δούλης αὐτοῦ the abasement of his bondmaid, as referring to the subjection of Israel under the Seleucids appear far-fetched to some reader (to me it does not so appear), let us say that there is nothing against the supposition that the actual author of the hymn Luke i. 46b-55 might have been a woman, a mother of warriors who gave in these lines expression to her personal feeling of gratitude to God for the safe return of her warrior sons from the battle field. The song might have been composed by one of the nameless mothers of nameless fighters, perhaps a Miryam or perhaps an Elishebha, or a Rachel, or Deborah, or Shulamith, or whatever the name may have been by which she was known to those who knew her—a name that is not even a memory today. All that remained of her may have been a few lines of a song which she sang in thanksgiving to her God for the return of her loved ones from war. The hearts of millions of nameless mothers and sons all over the world have been stirred by these lines, and it is perhaps an act of higher justice that her hymn has been ascribed by Christian tradition, though not by the writer of the Third Gospel, to the symbol of motherhood, to Mary, the mother of Jesus.

APPENDIX 1

Dedication Prayer Before Battle
(Luke i. 68-75)

ברוך יהיה אלהיך ישראל
cייפלך אשר אתה עמל
ונבם💚ךךץ שוקה
בריתך💚ךךץ שבתי
פאשר דברך כי נברךיך
תקרויך אםazziון

1 The following is not a translation of the Benedictus and the Magnificat, but a rendering of what might have been the wording of the primary source of these hymns. I am fully aware of the fallacies that beset attempts at reconstructions of this sort, fallacies of which the present experiment is hardly free. The translation itself is not my work. I consulted and used—besides Hatch’s
Hymn of Thanksgiving After Battle
(Luke i. 46b-55)

וַיֶּלֶךְ וְנִשְׁחָתָה בִּגְדוֹת

וַיִּשְׁמָעַ הָרָוחֵי בָּאֲלֵיכֶם שֵׁעַר
cיִכְאָה רַאָה בֵּנֵי אֲמַתָּה

הוֹגֶה מֵעָשָּׂה כַּל-יוֹרֵוד יָשִׁרָה

ןֶבֶנֶר הַיָּדוֹלֵת שְׁתוֹד-לַי

נְגָרָה יִכְרָוֵשׁ שְׁמָה

טָפָזוֹת עַל-יְנָצוֹר לִידָוָר

עָשָּׂה תִּלֵּי בַּכְּרוֹנוּ

הָפָסִים בּוֹרֵי בְּפָמִית רָבוֹת

וָוְיִרְדִּי שֵּלִיטִים מַכְּפַּקְאָוָה

וְוָוָוְיִרְדִּי סַפְּלִיָּם

and Redpath’s Concordance to the Septuagint—the translations by Elias Hutter (Nürnberg, 1599), by Richard Caddick (London, 1798), by Franz Delitzsch (Berlin, 1885) and by Isaac Eliezer Salkinson (London, 1886). In doing so I found that the Hebrew of successive translators tends to become worse from generation unto generation. My attempt, being the latest in this series, will, I presume, not be exempted from this apparent law of nature.
The Magnificat is clearly composed as a chant for alternate voices. A new tone sets in with verse 51. If we remember what Philo recorded in De Agricultura 79 and De Vita Contemplativa 83, 84 of male and female choirs complementing each other in their recitals, we may think that lines 46b-50 were incanted by the female choir to which the men answered with lines 51-55. I would, however, not unduly stress this point.