THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE IN 1419-20.¹

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The history of France is full of magnificent pages on which the triumphs of her genius are written in fire for the wonderment and profit of all: but the shining periods, as well as the years of discipline and labour that produced them, are interspersed with days of dissension and disillusionment, when national devotion has left only exhaustion and the sense of anticlimax, and France has been pervaded with the accidia or tedium which medieval theologians thought to be a condition endangering the soul. It is as though the intensity of her effort had impaired for the time a nervous system capable of supreme response and superb energy.

Yet this is the rhythm of a people intent on high moments, strivers after glory, to whom politics are a constant essay in transformation, and it cannot be understood without reference to that people's history. Of the perils of such a temperament, both in the life of the individual as well of the nation, French minds have themselves been fully aware. 'Toute la gloire, que je prétens de ma vie, c'est de l'avoir vescue tranquille: tranquille, non selon Metrodorus, ou Arcesilas, ou Aristippus, mais selon moy.' . . . ' Il faut aller à la guerre pour son devoir et en attendre cette recompense, qui ne peut faillir à toutes belles actions pour occultes qu'elles soient, non pas mesmes aux vertueuses pensées: c'est le contentement qu'une conscience bien reglée reçoit en soy, de bien faire. Il faut estre vaillant pour soy-mesmes, et pour l'avantage que c'est d'avoir son courage logé en une assiette ferme et asseuré, contre les assauts de la fortune.' So Montaigne, in one of his maturest essays (De la gloire), as he

¹ Amplification of a lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on the 11th of February, 1942.
thought of the dangers of ambition, and it is well to keep in mind, when regarding a picture of treachery and confusion, the examples of steadfast and measured lives and of faith in the elemental virtues that France has also provided as richly as any nation in Europe.

On 21st May, 1420, the Treaty of Troyes between England and France was issued. In it Charles VI and his queen disowned and disinherited their son, 'so-called the Dauphin', in favour of Henry V and his heirs. The English king was recognised as having full right to the throne of France. During Charles' lifetime he was not to be styled king, only heir to France; but owing to Charles' weak health he was to have the effective government of France, aided by a council of nobles loyal to Charles; he was to control the governmental appointments (to see that 'suitable persons' were appointed), and he undertook to maintain the parlement of Paris and to preserve the laws and customs of the country. He was to retain and administer in full sovereignty Normandy and the other places conquered by him in the campaigns of the last three years. On Charles VI's death these and the territories now obeying, and administered by, the French king, were to pass into his hands, and, with the assent of the three estates of both kingdoms, to form part of the new dual monarchy of France and England, united under the same person, Henry V, and his successors on the English throne.

In this way the problem of Anglo-French relations, the long dispute that had separated the two countries and caused rivers of blood to flow, was to receive its final settlement. The Treaty gave Henry a free hand in making war upon, and conquering, other places and persons that still resisted—the country south of the Loire adhering to the Dauphin. In several clauses, future action against contravening and dissentient elements was taken for granted; these ecclesiastics and Universities that acknowledged Henry were to be maintained in their benefices or their rights; the negative implication is obvious, and is borne out by all surviving records; there was to be general disherison and ejection of the loyal French. A great humiliation had been

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1 Fædera (Hague ed., 1740), iv, 2, 164-166.
inflicted; even more was to follow. In the 1359 peace negotiations the Estates-General of France had declared about a projected peace which awarded large territories below the Loire to England but still left much to the French monarchy: that they would prefer to ‘endure and continue to endure the great confusion in which they lived than that the kingdom should be thus weakened and defrauded’;¹ and they proceeded to reject the conditions King John had accepted. In 1420 the Three Estates, ‘believing and reporting the said Peace to be praiseworthy, necessary and useful to both kingdoms and their subjects and also to the whole of Christendom . . . approve, praise, accept and authorise the Peace . . . fully and faithfully for themselves and their successors’.

These facts may be familiar; yet at a time like the present they inevitably raise the question: how did this astonishing thing happen? How had the life-force of France so failed that it had come, at least in a formal document, not merely to collaboration, but actually to fusion with the enemy? Who were the quislings that had betrayed their country? Were there none in the nobility and knighthood of France who could regard the struggle in its wider aspect as the issue determining for generations the place of their country in Christendom? In framing such questions, it is well to remember that, despite the misery caused by armies, the long struggle of England and France lacked the ‘total’ character of modern warfare, and, apart from certain critical battles, had become at times more a school of arms than a national conflict; that the English nobility mainly spoke, and certainly wrote, in French; and that the Norman and Angevin past had been forgotten by neither side. The two courts had hardly extricated themselves from the traditions of that high-born Anglo-French civilisation in which men like Bertrand de Born and Richard Cœur de Lion moved with ease and effect, and a king like Henry III was prompted, in the words of Matthew Paris, ‘impudently to transgress the bounds of royal magnificence’.

The citizen of Paris, whom historians have sought to identify

¹ Froissart, Œuvres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, vi, 186.
² Fabera, iv, 2, 193.
with Jean Chuffart, canon of Notre-Dame, was clear in his own mind about the answer. The whole trouble came from the Armagnac party. 'I dare say that the King of England would never have been so bold as to set foot in France, but for the dissension which came from that unhappy name; and all Normandy would still have been French, nor would the noble blood of France have been thus spilled, nor the lords of that kingdom thus exiled, nor the battle lost, nor so many good folks have been involved in that pitiful day of Agincourt, when the King lost so many of his good and loyal friends—but for the pride of that unfortunate name, Armagnac.' The canon stated but one side of a story that all have regarded as substantially true: that a man of extraordinary ability, determination and luck had successfully used the dissensions in the heart of the French monarchy to establish the claim of Edward III in 1337, and in so doing to recover the title to lands even wider than the Angevin monarchy of Henry II had governed. Yet to one looking more closely at these events, so general an answer will scarcely be found satisfying. Even if that internecine enmity had let Henry V into France, was it the sole cause of that ignominious collapse? And if not, where does the responsibility lie?

Thirty years later, when most of these troubles were over, and the English garrisons had gone, an aged councillor and member of the parlement, who had loyally followed Charles VII throughout his life, presented to his king a remarkable memorial or series of remonstrances on the government of France, illustrating his remarks by his own observations over many years.

In the registers of the parlement the name of Jean Juvenal des Ursins occurs very frequently; and this was the man, known to us as the historian of his time, who now was Bishop of Beauvais and most trusted of Charles' old friends. His respectful but incisive criticisms of Charles' régime are of special interest, as they touch upon problems of long standing in French history: they are in the form of recommendations preceded by biblical

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2 I am much indebted to Dr. D. Kirkland for her transcript of the remonstrances au roy pour le reformation du royaume, forming vol. ii of her dissertation (Univ. Liverpool Library) under this title from Bibl. Nat., MS. fr. 2701, fos. 86-116.
or classical texts. His observations on military matters are of special interest; under the third and fourth of these headings, Juvénal deals with the personnel of the army and the finances of war. Both the prince and his captains must be vaillants. Vaillance de courage is not hardiesse; it implies discretion, knowledge of the time, method and manner in which to undertake operations (de connaître le fait de la guerre) both in attack and defence; it is more than courage, or rather it is courage and determination used at the right season. Without being too senior, the captains (generals, we should call them) must be men of reason and mature counsel, for an error made in battle can scarcely be put right (as Valerius Maximus says, inemendabilis enim est error qui violentia Martis committitur). L’aage n’a point bâillé l’art de guerre mais l’exercite. And if there is wisdom and experience, there must also be confidence. Numbers are not everything. A large mass of country folk, not trained in arms, can easily be routed and slain. But this, he quickly adds, does not mean that he would rule out the common people; for, to quote his words, ‘I, being Bishop of Beauvais where I have been on a strongly defended frontier, have seen and known charming companions, experienced in feats of arms, who were both vaillans et hardis, valiant and bold, sprung from the stock of labourers and artisans, men who bore themselves as valiantly as the others; and sometimes, in various situations in war, they are even more useful, since they know better how to endure pain and live under primitive conditions (grossement vivre). For as Vegetius has remarked, they can bear the sun, and do not seek the shade, know nothing of baths and luxuries, have simple minds, and are content with little. Valerius also advises taking into the army smiths, iron workers, carpenters, butchers: in other words, our knights must be reinforced by tradesmen and mechanics. On the knights Jean Juvénal has much to say: but the gist is, that they must be men of energy and hard work, not oisiveté. No gentleman is of such high birth that, if he is

1 Like the contemporary Canon of Salisbury, Nicholas Upton, Jean Juvénal makes plentiful use of Vegetius, De Re Militari, a favourite military text-book of the age, and of Valerius Maximus.

2 Fo. 93: Kirkland, op. cit., ii, 324.
slack, a good varlet should not be preferred to him. A Our thoughts
go to the 25th of October, 1415, when the yeomen and rustics of
England after a shattering march, their feet and bodies wet and
cold, but their arms free and their tunics light, shot down the
heavy chivalry of France as it staggered in the mud of Agincourt:
Shakespeare echoed the spirit of Jean Juvénal:

For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition.

And these fine knights, when war is finished, should not disdain
to make their own harness, shoe their own horse, build their own
houses, and do their own carpentering and cobbling. Instead
of being maintained in idleness or roaming about as a menace
to the countryside, they should be settled as farmers on the land
and engage in manual work just like the agricultural labourer or
the artisan.

Juvénal’s second point concerns financial administration to
meet the charges of war. The King should draw much more
fully upon his demesne, which is far greater than it has ever been
before, for he has the chief peerages (pariages), Normandy,
Guienne, Toulouse and Champagne, in his hands. The revenues
of these should be used for the expenses of his household and
the balance should be spent on war, 'discharging your people
who can do no more', and if they must pay, then the three
estates must be consulted, as the Capets used to consult them;
for even granted that the King has power to levy imposts, con-
sultation is a sign that France is the land of free men, and not
of the serfs that are there at present. But Juvénal’s severest
criticisms are of the personnel and methods of the King’s officials
and of the lawyers and judges of the parlement; they show the
intelligent Frenchmen’s deep suspicion of the honesty of the
administration, particularly where the key office of the requêtes
was concerned: the bureau whose special business it was to
deal with petitions involving legal action. Here, as had been
the case in England with Household and Exchequer at times

1 Fo. 93 v.: Kirkland, ii, 234.
2 Fo. 96 v.: Kirkland, ii, 365 f.
3 Fo. 97: Kirkland, ii, 374-375.
4 Fo. 105: Kirkland, op. cit., ii, 471 f.
during the fourteenth century, the King’s private or household office of requêtes had come to supersede the requêtes of the Palais, and Juvénal urged the re-establishment of the public office in the interests of integrity and better satisfaction of petitioners.

These administrative points, because they are fundamental, recall the situation in the France that Henry V had decided to challenge. First, the royal domain. The appanage policy of Philip the Fair, carried out to the full by King John of France, had results of an important nature in a country that constantly needed to maintain its military strength and its finances. The most questionable of the appanages was the territories possessed, in King Charles V’s reign, by John, Duke of Berry, the nobleman who loved hounds and miniatures, and typified much that Christine de Pisan and Juvénal himself suspected. Berry and the Auvergne lay in the centre and western centre of France, and it was not until these lands reverted to the Crown at Duke John’s death in 1416 that, as Dr. Wylie once remarked, a turning-point was reached for France, involving the germ of her regeneration. Of Burgundy, whether held by the elder or the cadet line, John the Fearless or Anthony of Brabant, there was no hope of return. The other great thief in the heart of France was the rich appanage of the Duke of Orléans, which included the counties of Valois, Beaumont-sur-Oise and Touraine, Perigord, Angoulême, and, some years after the murder of Duke Louis in 1407, the counties of Blois and Dunois, purchased with Visconti money. Yet the real strength of the French monarchy lay in Normandy and the valley of the Seine as far as Paris; in Brie and the western part of Champagne. This was what the strategic sense of Henry V grasped. It was not only that the English king claimed Normandy as his own duchy, his right to which was older and more established than to the French crown. Its great river, its routes guarded by securely placed fortresses, made it the key to Paris, the home of the University and of the parlement, the centre of the royal administration. The recovery of Normandy was then the first and most obvious step towards the subjugation of the French monarchy; the second step was to close the waterways and roads to the capital and, while keeping
others out, create there an economic situation so impossible that a strong party of deliverance, one that held out hope of reasonable prices in the halles and at the same time could get rid of the offensive officials, would be welcomed into the city. It need hardly be emphasised that however far the French king felt bound to move from Paris (s'éloigner was the plaintive expression used by the Parisians) and whatever party was in actual control of the city, the centre of the royal administration, the courts of justice, the prisons (especially of the Palais and the two Châtelets) were all there. No other city—Tours, Troyes, Bourges—could compare with it as a rendezvous for the governing, executive interests of France, and there can be no greater mistake in studying these events than to relegate Paris to a minor position in the strategy of the English monarch.

The task of Henry V was made less complicated than it might have been just because the alienation of the French king from his capital was morally, if not physically, assured by the time that Henry entered upon the crucial phase of his campaign. That alienation is an extremely interesting process, since it has its roots in the transformation that was going on within the municipality itself at the end of the fourteenth century. This is marked by the rise of the menu peuple, smaller shopkeepers and journeymen, led by the butchers, appropriately the most violent of the crafts; a revolutionary rather than a democratic movement, but one ready, as in the Cabochian Ordinance of 1413 prescribing elections in all the royal administrative offices, to seize on constitutional forms of government and run them to death. In the early fifteenth century the city was constantly on the edge of serious disorder; the outbreaks, when they came, were against the gens du roi, typified by the friends of the Duke of Orléans. Whatever may be said of his foreign policy, and its immense financial outlay, the influence of Orléans in domestic affairs was of the most improvident kind, and offered opportunities for grave moralists of the University incongruously to join hands with momentarily reputable demagogues of the city. This influence it was that brought into the municipal politics of Paris the man whom Henry V's chaplain (with tart Englishry) calls 'a double-dealer, like all Frenchmen'. *Unus in publico et alius*
in occulto: it is hard to know which to wonder at most; the effrontery which could seek publicly to justify the murder of his principal opponent in 1407, or the power of insinuating himself into the affections of the gens de petit estat as the registrar, Clement de Fauquemberge, calls the more dangerous elements of Paris. From his own experience in Flanders, John the Fearless knew enough about the bourgeoisie and its dislike of the governing class of France to capture the affections of its city. As soon as Bernard of Armagnac had taken up, with more economy and more efficiency, the tradition of the murdered Duke of Orléans, John had two aims: to make himself master of Paris, and to divide up the lands of his enemies with the ally for whose help he was angling from 1411—England.

To take the second of these aims first. It should be noted that the negotiations which Duke John undertook with Henry V at the time of the Leicester parliament, 1414, reached no conclusion on one very significant point. Henry V asked the Duke's ambassadors what the Duke would do, should the King of England take a fortress or make war outside the lands of the Duke's enemies, i.e. in the lands of the King of France? The envoys answered that the matter had been much discussed, but that they could not commit the Duke without instructions. Did the Duke ever give those instructions? There is no evidence one way or the other: yet that surely is the point. Duke John was not anxious that Henry should attack any but his enemies, least of all the capital. He was a peer of France, a peer of the royal blood: whatever he may have felt towards Queen Isabel, even he could feel some spark of loyalty to that object of pity as well as respect, Charles VI. His quarrel was not with Charles, but with the Armagnac league. Hence he held aloof from active intervention in the Agincourt campaign.

In the three years that followed, Henry V must have taken the measure of the man. In the autumn of 1416, after Sigismund, who came over to mediate between the two countries,

1 Gesta Henrici Quinti, p. 104.
had convinced himself that the French Government under Armagnac's influence was speaking with two voices, and had concluded the Treaty of Canterbury with England, Henry crossed to Calais to meet the Duke of Burgundy, and to submit the proposals of Sigismund for a final settlement of the dispute to the ambassadors of the King of France. The author of the Gesta Henrici Quinti says that he could not fathom the negotiations that went on. Duke John held the King in amphiboliis et ambagibus\(^1\) and nothing transpired. The actual agreement between Henry and the Duke, which was kept absolutely secret, is printed in Rymer from the French Roll. It is not a formal document at all, but, in M. Calmette's words, a private minute by the Duke,\(^2\) who therein recognised Henry and his descendants as heirs to the French throne, and promised to do liege homage to Henry, as soon as he had recovered a notable part of the kingdom. Historians have suggested that this document was never put into operation, and remained a dead letter. M. Calmette has conclusively shown that this was not so;\(^3\) yet the real problem, as I see it, is, how long the Duke remained faithful to it.

At first all went well. Henry was able to consolidate his conquests and move further up the Seine. Caen fell on 4th September, 1417; Argentan on 5th October; Alençon on the 23rd; Falaise, first attacked on 1st December, 1417, yielded on 2nd January, 1418. With his army based on Falaise, Caen, Bayeux, and Argentan, Henry could set about the rest of the duchy. Under 7th January, 1418, the Citizen of Paris records that 'at this time all the good towns of Normandy, like Rouen, Montivillers, Dieppe, and several others, when they saw how Caen, Harfleur, Falaise, and several other good towns of the

\(^1\) Loc. supra cit.

\(^2\) Histoire du Moyen Âge, ed. Clotz, t. vii, i, La France et L'Angleterre en conflit, p. 337 and n. : "L'acte n'est qu'une minute, mais de la main du duc". John promised (Faédera, iv, 2, 177) 'que si tost, que à l'aide de Dieu, de nostre Dame et de Monsieur Saint George, le dit Roy d'Engleterre, etc., aura notable partie du dit royaumle de France, il fera au dit Roy d'Engleterre, etc., hommage liege et seremont de foialté, tielle comme soubgit du Royaume de France doit faire à son soveraine Siegneur Roy de France'.

\(^3\) Ibid.
country had been seized by the English without any help coming to them from the King of France for all their entreaties, gave themselves up to the Duke of Burgundy.\(^1\) Rouen called in the Burgundian captain of Dieppe, Guy de Bouteillier. While his other captains did their work in other parts of Normandy, at Domfront and Cherbourg, Henry moved steadily up via Louviers, to Pont de Larche.

It was to be the turn of Rouen now. Yet Duke John never said a word to his captain about his understanding with Henry at Calais. Rouen must be permitted to delay the English king. But before Rouen could be assaulted, the Duke must make sure of his greatest prize. This was scarcely to assist Henry, as certain have implied: the Duke had taken fright at the formidable military machine that was ruthlessly deploying in the Seine valley. On the night of 29th May, he sent Jean de Villiers, the seigneur of L’Isle Adam, Guy de Bar and Claude de Chastellux into Paris to secure the city. There was no opposition, nothing but welcome; the cross of St. Andrew was seen everywhere.\(^2\)

The Prevot, Tanneguy du Châtel, got away with the Dauphin; but Count Bernard of Armagnac and the Chancellor, Henry de Marle, were captured and imprisoned in the Palais. The next fortnight saw incredible scenes of butchery and the complete ineffectiveness of any police arrangements. On 12th June the Armagnac leaders were pulled out of their prisons by the gens de petit estat and murdered, and the Italian banks were plundered.\(^3\)

The seals of the Chancery were lost and nobody knew where the chancellor had gone; the King’s signet was very hard worked indeed. Then followed a general displacement of royal officials by Burgundian supporters. On 14th July Duke John at last arrived with Queen Isabel from Troyes, and Paris received them with joy; it seemed that the misgovernment of the King’s officials would now come to an end with the death of men like the hated John Gauze, ‘le pire de tous’,\(^4\) an adventurer who from being a scullion had become master of the royal artillery. But how little control the Duke had over the city can be seen

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\(^1\) P. 84.
\(^2\) *Journal de Clément de Fauquembergue*, ed. Tuetey, i, 127.
\(^3\) *Ibid.*, i, 136.
\(^4\) Bourgeois, p. 92.
from the events on the night of 20th August, when again the small folk got out of hand and murdered two loyal knights of Charles VI, 1 Enguerrand de Marcoignet his chamberlain, and Hector of Chartres, father of Regnault de Chartres, Archbishop of Rheims, whom they extracted from the Bois de Vincennes, whither they had been taken for protection (after 12th June) from the Bastide St. Antoine. The Prévôt’s officer, who had put up no resistance to the menu peuple, was treated with incredible leniency when inquiries about the scandalous episode were made later. 2

It is extremely interesting to watch the effect of the events of the summer and autumn upon the two Parisians to whom we owe the story of the city—the Citizen and the greffier or registrar. It is clear that not only the gens de petit estat, but the respectable bourgeoisie viewed the royal officials so displaced by the Burgundians with the deepest hatred. Yet the Burgundian entry made things much worse than from an economic point of view. At once the Armagnac party came plundering up to the gates of Paris. 3 From Corbeil, Montlhéry and Melun they came down the river, and tried to stop their Burgundian opponents getting any food from the country. On the other side, no food could come in from the lower Seine. The bourgeois was horrified by the great crowds surrounding the bakers’ houses, and the enormous price of the simplest commodities. At Meaux, the religious of St. Denis tells us, the soldiers of the Dauphin blocked the approach from the east along the Marne. 4 Politically, the violent scenes in Paris had alienated the Dauphin from his father and left the King between two fires.

It was this economic stranglehold that led to the negotiations of the autumn of 1418 and the so-called reconciliation of the Dauphin with the Duke of Burgundy in the Treaty of St. Maur. 5 Duke John had overshot the mark by his seizure of Paris. The new officials and the promise of reform could not avert the threat of starvation. And there was Henry coming inexorably nearer.

1 Fauquembergue, i, 150-152. 2 Ibid., 154.
3 Bourgeois, pp. 104-107, for the miseries suffered by Paris under these conditions. 4 Chronique, vi, 286.
5 On the premature joy of the Paris citizens, cf. ibid., vi, 282.
John had to recant, range himself with the party he hated, and make one last effort to stop the invader. When the siege of Rouen was over and the capitulation made (January, 1419), Henry did not hesitate for a moment. He marched straight to the neighbourhood of Paris and began the gradual reduction of the fortresses guarding the approach to the city; as he continued he negotiated, always threatening to take more, always presenting his opponents with new facts. But in spite of the Treaty between the Dauphin and Burgundy, these new allies took no action. While the siege of Rouen was in progress, the King and the Duke of Burgundy stayed at Pontoise from 24th November to 28th December, wholly inactive.\(^1\) After Rouen had fallen and the English king had advanced towards Pointoise, the King and the Duke were quiescent at St. Denis and ‘gave no help to those at Pontoise’. The Citizen comments on the slowness of Burgundy: he is ‘le plus long homme en tout ses besongnes qu’on peut trouver’—the slowest man that could be found.

The crucial time was the days following the capitulation of Rouen. If in the first three months of 1419 the Treaty of St. Maur had been a reality, Henry could have been stopped, and might have had to be contented with Normandy. But the Duke’s mind was divided. He had given Henry his promise of recognition and his homage. But he must have suspected and disliked the cautious and inflexible young strategist with his control of the sea and his strong communications insured by the earlier victory of the Seine, his captains punctual and disciplined, his power of concentration at the right moment. The Duke wanted to retain Paris where he had posed as a progressive, and to keep Armagnac influence away from the city: he hated the Dauphin, but the Dauphin had the chief strongholds of the Parisis, and was master of the Marne and the upper Seine: his army could live on the land without the pay that his own demanded, the pay without which it had always tended to melt away, for his men were far from their homes. He wanted Isabel for himself, but what was to be done with Charles VI, whose moments of sanity were becoming rarer? The Dauphin’s friends who struck John down at Montereau, and so gave Henry both France and the

\(^1\) Bourgeois, p. 119.  \(^2\) Ibid., p. 113.
Princess Katherine ‘que tant avoms désiré’, struck down a man whose mind had worked itself into a muddle of conflicting impulses, whose determination to have incompatibles had led to a paralysis of the will. It was that paralysis that wrecked France when even after the fall of Rouen he could have saved her; it was not the deed of Montereau nor the selfishness and intractability of the Armagnac party. Duke John is the man mainly responsible.

As soon as he was murdered, it was the people of Paris that in 1419-1420 took in hand to further the Anglo-Burgundian coalition. The English alliance was a matter of expediency, a lesser evil than a dauphinist domination. The Citizen of Paris puts the matter very well in describing the ravaging of the country by the Dauphinists. He wrote, ‘the English on the other hand were as bad as the Saracens. But still it is much better to be taken by the English than by the Dauphin or his followers who call themselves Armagnacs’. At the Council of Arras on 17th October, 1419, Paris definitely declares itself in favour not only of a truce, but ‘a treaty and alliance with the King of England’; before the young Duke Philip and his nobles had actually decided on their future line of action. There is no sign, as far as I can see, at any rate at this stage, of the Burgundian pressure which M. Calmette considers responsible for Paris’s recognition of the Treaty of Troyes. If there was no active friendship for England, the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was at least accepted as the best expedient; and the ‘most circumspect men’ of Paris, as Henry V called them, were engaged in making the best terms they could within the framework of the alliance, not in raising pedantic obstructions or creating difficulties for Henry. When Henry, on 29th February, refused to extend the truce affecting Paris and the surrounding territory unless the castle of Beaumont sur Oise was surrendered (thus hindering the passage of merchandise and food supplies to Paris), Fauquembergue records the outcome of the debate in the parlement as favourable to Henry; the majority of the councillors decided that it would be more expedient than prejudicial to surrender the castle than to irritate the English uselessly.¹

¹ P. 135. ² i, 349-352.
Thus Paris did not listen to its own bishop’s promise of worldwide fame, if it gave union to France by joining the Dauphin. And when on 29th April ambassadors from Troyes appeared and asked the parlement to accept the Treaty, the assembly ‘repondirent “in turba” que oyl par les bouches de plusiers en très grant nombre’.

But did all occupied France, once the Treaty was made, bow to expediency and hide its real feelings? Three types of opinion towards the Treaty of Troyes can be discerned: the official governmental attitude set by Philip of Burgundy and the French court; the comments of the Burgundian chronicles and those of the dauphinists. The first of these was of necessity favourable; but favourable without enthusiasm. The Burgundian chronicles are judiciously reserved: Waurin, Le Fèvre, and Pierre Cochon refrain from general comments; Monstrelet speaks of the ‘infinite risk’ of changing a country’s sovereign, and at least hints that he considers the act prejudicial to King Charles; but the Chronique de Normandie in one passage is more friendly than these:

a better arrangement both for King Charles and his kingdom could not have been desired.

In the same spirit is a contemporary popular song which depicts the Princess Katherine, after bemoaning her fate and repelling her English husband, as crying—

Retourne-toi, embrasse-moi
Mon cher Anglais!
Puisque Dieu nous a assemblés,
Faut nous aimer.

It was making the best of a bad job. But the dauphinist comments take us back to 1359. ‘All the country on the other side of the river Loire (wrote Jean Juvénal of occupied France) is black and obscure for they have put themselves into the obedience of the English. But that country (beyond) remained

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1 Tr. Johnes, p. 424.
2 P. 436.
3 Ed. B. Williams, in Gesta Henrici Quinti (1850), p. 201.
4 In Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant l’opinion Française, p. 13. I owe this and the references to Fénin’s Mémoirs to Miss E. Buckley.
pure and clear in the obedience of the Monseigneur le Dauphin.'

Writing in 1454 Juvénal considered Philip's action shameful and of no value, validity, or profit to himself, and will not give the full terms of the Treaty because of their iniquity and wickedness. And all people of understanding must consider the whole of no value nor effect. Alain Chartier considers the agreement as 'an outrageous and disloyal folly'. Jean Chartier holds that the English have occupied the realm 'without reason' and that the oath of allegiance to the King of England is 'degrading and criminal'.

The south of France opposed the Treaty from the first and continued to show its disapproval in works like Blondel's *Complainte des bons Français*, Alain Chartier's *Quadrilogue Invectif* and *Ballade de Fougerès*, and the chronicle and pamphlets of Thomas Basin. In these the English are castigated for their cruelty, their treachery and deception, for their heretical beliefs, and the misery they have brought to Normandy. The situation in the Anglo-Burgundian territories is the most interesting, for even the varieties of opinion are most marked. The effect of Duke John's murder had been catastrophic. Fénin thought that the wave of feeling which it aroused was the real power behind the Anglo-Burgundian alliance and the young Philip's refusal of the Dauphin's excuses and offers of amendments:

For his (Philip's) council always maintained that the father had been murdered at a time of peace and that no good would come from anything that Charles and his council did.

The problem then was whether this was a strong enough sentiment to act as a moral cement between England and Burgundy, and whether the new régime would be sufficiently firm to keep order and sufficiently tolerant not to arouse dormant patriotic emotions. The upper classes in the Burgundian ranks could mostly be relied upon to respect the English as long as Duke Philip saw fit to continue the alliance; but there were important exceptions. Jacques d'Harcourt, Count of Tankarville

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2 *La Quadrilogue Invectif*, ed. L. Droz, p. 27.
and lord of Montgomery was the leading spirit among the nobles, who after some hesitation deserted to the Dauphin. He had shown himself in every way strangely attached to the Duke of Burgundy who, as Monstrelet said, honoured him above all others. At the end of December, 1420, Harcourt, who still pretended to be attached to the Duke, was waging ‘grievous war by land and sea’ on the English from his castle at Crotoy. Fénin suggests the possible reason; Henry V held the lands of Harcourt’s wife and refused to give them up; whereupon Harcourt ‘turned to the party of the Dauphin’. It was Harcourt who created round Araines and la Ferté centres of dauphinist activity. He became the Dauphin’s lieutenant in the marches of Picardy and the Somme in 1421. Sometimes the noble who is withdrawing his services from Burgundy absents himself without making any formal adhesion to the Dauphin: he simply departs from a siege or important undertaking. Thus the Prince of Orange, as the Burgundian chroniclers note, departed from the siege of Melun. Waurin gives as his reason the plague raging among the besiegers, but Monstrelet and Le Fèvre keep silent about his reasons. Two dauphinist writers, Juvénal and Le Bouvier, put most patriotic speeches into his mouth. Juvénal makes the Prince, when asked to take the oath of loyalty to the new settlement, reply that ‘he was ready to serve the Duke of Burgundy, but that he should take an oath to put the realm into the hands of the ancient enemy, that he never would do’. Waurin himself reported the common rumour that the Prince, ‘with a great number of Burgundians’, refused to accompany Duke Philip from Paris to Meaux, where the Duke was to meet King Henry, ‘so that he could not be required or constrained by Henry to take an oath to him’. It should be said that the refusal to accept the Treaty of Troyes was by no means equivalent to joining the dauphinist cause. Nor should these and other examples of pro-Burgundian rather

1 Monstrelet, p. 452; Waurin, p. 550.
4 Waurin, p. 339.
6 P. 382.
7 Le Bouvier, p. 440.
than pro-English feeling weigh too heavily in the balance. Philip retained many of his lords as active participants in the war on the English side.

It must be admitted that the English made few efforts to endear themselves; the French nobility, accustomed to the slack and rather haphazard rule of former governments, doubtless objected to the rather rigid control now imposed upon them, especially Henry’s attempt to preserve the common people from the great extortions that the nobles made in France and Picardy and throughout all the realm; and specially he (Henry) could no longer suffer that they could billet their horses, dogs and birds on the clergy or common people as they were accustomed to do.¹

The English were often high-handed, dour, and pernickety. Even before the Treaty of Troyes, John Cornwall had made a faux pas in taking prisoners the dauphinist garrison of Roye which held John Luxembourg’s safe-conduct and permission to depart. The Burgundian escort under Hector of Saveuse protested against Cornwall’s action, but Cornwall merely—

frappa Hector de Saveuse sur la main aiant son gauntlet, dont Hector fut bien mal content, mais il n’en peut avoir autre chose.²

At Sens the Earl of Huntingdon delayed negotiations with the besieged by refusing to treat with the town’s ambassador, ‘who had a great beard’. ‘This was not the guise of the English’, and treating could not begin until the beard had been shaved off and English aesthetic sensibilities satisfied.³ Between the Allies, English and Burgundians there was a good deal of rivalry; the English would declare that they were ‘les plus fors’;⁴ at Melun they declared one of the Burgundian assaults ‘a mad enterprise’, despite Henry V’s diplomatic praise of it.⁵

None of the chronicles accuse Henry of favouring the English: on the contrary, they regard his stern treatment of offending Englishmen with admiration and wonder. There is very little truth in the charge made in Fénin, that he took the administration of the country into his own hands, and replaced

¹ Fénin, Mémoires, p. 187.
² Ibid., p. 123; Monstrelet, p. 432.
³ Fénin, Mémoires, p. 138.
⁴ Ibid., p. 139.
⁵ Juvénal, p. 381.
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officials appointed by Duke John and Philip by men of his own choice. Noted Burgundians were appointed to most dignities and to most conquered towns and fortresses outside Normandy. There were exceptions, of course, which the nobility may have been quick to note. The Count of St. Pol lost his position as lieutenant of Paris to the Duke of Clarence; the Sire de Humbercourt was replaced as bailli of Amiens by Robert le Jeune, an English favourite, and, according to the chronicles—though the point is doubtful—L’Isle Adam was removed from the marshalship of France. Indeed, Henry even went out of his way to reward friends of Burgundy involved in the Cabochian régime of 1413.

But the new order was a severe one for any that sought to relations with the Dauphin, or even with parts of the country under his obedience. Between occupied and unoccupied France a great gulf was fixed. In the letters of remission among the Paris documents published by M. Longnon, it appears that to receive private and wholly unpolitical correspondence from territories below the Loire was enough to condemn a man to banishment, and any harbouring of strangers and friends from the unoccupied parts might lead to very serious penalties. Considerable numbers fled from Paris and the surrounding area when the English and Burgundians came, and went to settle in countries held by the Dauphin. They thought that their exile would not be long, but as years went by they began to regret Paris and their goods that had been confiscated because they had absented themselves, and to seek letters of grace from the new Government upon oath of good behaviour. Between the battle of Verneuil (17th May, 1424) and the appearance of Joan of Arc the number of these graces increased and it points to the general discouragement of the conquered.

Seven years were to elapse from this conquest before the flame of France burned once again. The danger of such long periods lies in their encouragement to apathy, in the tendency of the conquered, under threats and blandishments, to accept their

1 Mémoires, p. 150.
2 Paris pendant la domination anglaise, pp. 21-23, 207, 238-239.
3 Ibid., p. xv, and the examples there cited.

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new status to which they become accustomed, and to acquiesce in the very efficiency of a government imposed by force and maintained by diplomacy. Even when the Maid appeared, and, like a meteor, lit the earth and went out again, nobody suspected that it was more than a temporary success for the Dauphin. Yet her condemnation as a relapsed heretic and her death in Anglo-Burgundian hands has come to mean more for history than her victories over the enemy. We can see, as contemporaries could not see, that the cruder her confusion of religion and politics, the stronger beat the heart of free France, the France that will outlast the captains who claimed and claim to hold her in subjection.