Being and Time, §15: Around-for References and the Content of Mundane Concern

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2013

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Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6

1. Heidegger on Being ....................................................................................................... 25
   1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being ........................................................................ 25
       1.1.1. The basic articulation of being ................................................................. 32
       1.1.2. Being and regional essences .................................................................... 43
       1.1.3. Objections and rival interpretations .......................................................... 58
       1.1.4. Metaphysical realism and Aristotelian conceptualism ............................ 74
   1.2. Explicating Being .................................................................................................... 85
       1.2.1. Ontology and the ontic ............................................................................. 87
       1.2.2. Modes of access ....................................................................................... 101

2. The Being of Gear ......................................................................................................... 111
   2.1. Explicating the Being of Gear ............................................................................... 111
       2.1.1. Gear and mundane concern ..................................................................... 115
       2.1.2. Two conditions and three basic concepts ................................................ 122
       2.1.3. Property wholes and purposes ................................................................. 142
   2.2. To-hand-ness and Extantness ............................................................................... 149
       2.2.1. Co-instantiation of to-hand-ness and extantness ...................................... 151
       2.2.2. The two-domains view ............................................................................. 155

3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics ......................................................... 171
   3.1. Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern ............................................................ 171
       3.1.1. Situational holism .................................................................................... 173
       3.1.2. Situated normativity ................................................................................ 188
       3.1.3. Prospective control .................................................................................. 197
   3.2. Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics .................................................................... 203
       3.2.1. Gibsonian and Heideggerian ecology ....................................................... 205
       3.2.2. The metaphysics of around-for references ............................................ 211

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 223

References ......................................................................................................................... 225

Word count: 79,460
Abstract

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues raised in the ‘preliminary methodological remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science.
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សមុទ្រភ្នាក់ងារវិបត្តិការិយាល័យ សមុទ្រតូ តំបន់កាល់នៅ ប្រទេសក្តីកែបម្រឿនការពារនិងគ្រប់គ្រងដើម្បីសំគាប់ការបង្កើត និងការប្រការការជំនួយជាមួយរដ្ឋបាល និងការសិក្សាជាតិវិភាគរបស់រដ្ឋបាល។

ការបង្កើតនិងគ្រប់គ្រងរាជធានីប្រការ
ប្រការនៃមហាវិទ្យាល័យ សម្រាប់ការបង្កើតនិងគ្រប់គ្រង
Introduction

In §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (BT) (1927/2006, 66-72), Heidegger presents an account of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states (‘mundane concern’) that remains widely influential in philosophy of action and cognitive science.\(^1\) Heidegger’s account introduces famous concepts such as gear (Zeug), circumspection (Umsicht), and to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit).\(^2\) Graham Harman declares to-hand-ness ‘[t]he key to Heidegger’s philosophy’ (2002, 4): adding that Heidegger’s ‘theory of equipment [sc. gear]’, which §15 of BT presents, ‘contains the whole of the Heideggerian philosophy’, fully encompassing all of its key insights as well as the most promising of the paths that lead beyond them’ (Ibid, 15). Although §15 of BT begins from phenomenology of mundane concern, and is thus proximately valuable for philosophy of mind and cognitive science, I maintain that its primary goal is metaphysical: Heidegger’s description of how objects appear as being in mundane concern carrying implications for metaphysical and even empirical-scientific theories of objects of mundane concern (‘environmental entities’).

Highlighting the phenomenological and metaphysical aspects of §15 of BT in his seminal commentary Being-in-the-World, Hubert Dreyfus reads Heidegger not only as conceiving mundane concern as non-representational ‘absorbed coping’, i.e. as devoid of intentional content, but also as rejecting the traditional metaphysical assumption that ‘entities are reducible to some basic substance or building blocks’

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\(^1\) References to BT feature page numbers from the Einzelausgabe. An intentional state is non-intersubjective insofar as it does not intend objects as subjects. Heidegger employs several stylistic variants of ‘mundane concern’ (‘alltäglichen Besorgens’) including ‘plying [hantierendes], using concern’, ‘concernful engagement’ (1927/2006, 67), ‘using engagement’, and ‘using, plying engagement’ (Ibid, 69).

\(^2\) All translations of German works herein are mine. Following Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of BT (Heidegger 1962), many translate ‘Zuhandenheit’ and ‘Zeug’ as ‘readiness-to-hand’ and ‘equipment’ respectively (cf. McManus 2012a, 68-74). I prefer translating ‘zuhanden’ as ‘to-hand’ over ‘ready-to-hand’ because ‘zuhanden’ literally means ‘to hand’, featuring no element corresponding to ‘ready’. ‘Zeug’ derives from ‘ziehen’ (‘to draw’ or ‘to pull’), thus connoting something drawn or pulled around. Since ‘gear’, but not ‘equipment’, arguably carries such connotations, I prefer translating ‘Zeug’ as ‘gear’ over ‘equipment’. Nevertheless, I deem ‘gear’ and ‘equipment’ virtually synonymous.
Introduction

(1991, 69). Dreyfus notes in place thereof Heidegger’s distinction between ‘two modes of being’ (Seinsarten), viz. to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit), and contention that to-hand beings (Zuhandenes) or gear (Zeug) are incomprehensible in traditional metaphysical terms (Ibid, 60). For mundane concern supposedly represents objects not as mere physicochemical bodies, but as significant and relevant for action (Ibid, 62-63). Expressing this point recently in introducing Heideggerian cognitive science, Julian Kiverstein presents Heidegger as affirming that ‘[t]he entities that coexist with us […] are not simply “present-at-hand” [sc. extant] but have as their mode of being “readiness-to-hand” [sc. to-hand-ness]: they present themselves to us as available to be put to use in the light of our concerns’ (2012, 7).

This thesis seeks to capture the precise phenomenological and metaphysical implications of §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear by articulating a novel interpretation thereof and applying the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action described in recent literature and develop a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics, i.e. a metaphysics of environmental entities. I opt to expound §15 of BT anew, despite the wealth of secondary literature already accomplishing this, because I maintain that popular expositions thereof are largely erroneous. As Parts 1 and 2 argue respectively, this stems primarily from

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3 Although ‘mundane concern’ and its variants are almost synonymous with Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’, §2.1 implies and pp. 186-187 explain that I do not follow Dreyfus in reading Heidegger as conceiving mundane concern as non-representational (cf. Dreyfus 1991, 69).
4 ‘Seinsart’ is alternatively translatable as ‘kind’ or ‘sort’ of being’. ‘Vorhandenheit’ is commonly translated as ‘presence-at-hand’ following Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 1962, 48; cf. McManus 2012a, 56). I follow Albert Hofstadter in translating ‘Vorhandenheit’ as ‘extantness’ (Heidegger 1982).
5 Graham Harman likewise acknowledges the metaphysical import of §15 of BT (‘Heidegger’s tool-analysis’): ‘Heidegger’s tool-analysis has nothing to do with any kind of “pragmatism”, or indeed with any theory of human action at all. Instead, the philosophy of Heidegger forces us to develop a ruthless inquiry into the structure of objects themselves’ (2002, 15).
6 I do not discuss every aspect of §15 of BT, instead dealing exclusively with its explication of the being of gear.
7 Graham Harman testifies to the wealth and diversity of secondary literature expounding §15 of BT: ‘Martin Heidegger’s famous analysis of equipment [sc. gear] has never been denied its due share of attention. Few passages from Being and Time have been cited as frequently or with such persistent enthusiasm. The most casual readers of this work are often able to provide expert accounts of the hammer and its breakdown; surely, no published commentary has passed over the topic in silence. Even so, this celebrated description of the tool has been consistently displaced from the thematic center of Heidegger studies. The analysis of equipment is treated historically, explained as a reworking of issues arising from Aristotle’s discussion of praxis. It is praised biographically, as a fine
misconstruing Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of a being (Seienden) and his claims that gear invariably belongs to a ‘gear-whole’ (Zeugganzen) and is ‘essentially “something around for … [um zu ..]”’ (1927/2006, 68). First, rejecting exclusively phenomenological interpretations, I interpret Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence (regionales Wesen) in a broadly Husserlian sense: a property unifying a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities (Husserl 1913, 19). Second, rejecting interpretations of Heidegger’s discussion of gear-wholes, reference (Verweisung), and around-for (Um-zu) advocated by David Cerbone (1999, 311), Mark Okrent (2002, 201), and Stephen Mulhall (2005, 48), amongst others, I interpret a gear-whole as a unitary plurality of particular items of gear and something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore (Wozu or Wofür), which involves referring (Verweisung) thereto, as consisting roughly in its being situationally relevant for something, e.g. a goal or activity (cf. Christensen 2007, 167). In hindering comprehension of §15 of BT, erroneous interpretations obscure its value for contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Hence, after articulating and defending my interpretation in Parts 1 and 2, I aim to extract such value in Part 3 by applying the position theretofore attributed to Heidegger so as to contribute to, and arguably even resolve, contemporary debates concerning the

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8 I decline German words inserted into sentences herein as if the sentences were German: hence my writing ‘Seins’, ‘Seienden’, and ‘Zeugganzen’ here. Furthermore, following Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 1962), ‘Zeugganzen’ and ‘Um-zu’ are commonly translated as ‘totality of equipment’ and ‘in-order-to’. In translating ‘Um-zu’ as ‘around-for’, I follow Bruin Christensen (2007, 163). Furthermore, ‘Sein’ is a noun formed from the verb ‘sein’ (‘to be’). ‘Sein’ denotes ‘that which determines beings as beings’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 6). ‘Seiendes’ is the noun form of ‘seiend’ – the present participle of ‘sein’. As such, ‘Seiendes’ denotes something that is, i.e. something that has being (Sein) (see p. 26). §1.1.4 highlights Heidegger’s implicit distinction between being (Sein) and existence, with Heidegger intimating that not every existent is a being (Seiendes). Regarding translating ‘ein Seiendes’, Bill Blattner explains that ‘the phrase [“ein Seiendes”] uses the participle, “being”, and suppresses the nonetheless implicit following noun: “the being item”. German can suppress the following noun with impunity, whereas English cannot: in English we cannot write “the turning” when we mean the turning thing, because “the turning” is either a verbal abstract noun or gerund, in either case referring to the activity of turning, not the thing that turns’ (1999, 1).

9 A property ‘unifies’ a class just in case something belongs to that class through instantiating that property. References to Husserl’s Ideas I (1913) feature page numbers from the original German edition.

10 I include ‘roughly’ primarily because I later identify irrelevance as a determinate of around-for, such that being irrelevant is a limiting case of a way something can be around for (um zu) a wherefore (see pp. 141-142). This should be taken as read in similar contexts henceforth.
phenomenology of mundane concern and develop a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics in distinction from Gibsonian counterparts.

Although this thesis focusses on *BT* as Heidegger’s masterwork, it also draws upon subsequent works of the early Heidegger: most notably, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BP)* (1927/1975) and *A Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (PIKCPR)* (1927-1928/1977).\(^{11}\) I rarely mention Heidegger’s works predating *BT*’s publication, e.g. *A History of the Concept of Time* (1925/1979), as these precede *BT*’s systematic formulation of Heidegger’s early ideas. I rely upon no published translation of Heidegger’s works, instead translating from the German myself with reference to Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s line-by-line commentary on *BT* for resolving ambiguities therein (1987; 2005; 2008).\(^{12}\) Moreover, in articulating a broadly Husserlian interpretation of Heidegger’s metaphysics and philosophy of science, Part 1 draws extensively upon Husserl’s *Ideas I* (1913).

Since Heidegger presents §15 of *BT* as undertaking a ‘demonstration’ (*Aufweis*), ‘disclosure’ (*Erschließung*), or ‘explication’ (*Explikation*) of the being of gear, Part 1 is devoted to expounding Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (*Sein*) or synonymously ‘constitution of being’ (*Seinsverfassung*) of a being (*Seienden*) and addressing issues raised in §15 of *BT*’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’ regarding explicating being (*Sein*) (1927/2006, 67-68).\(^{13}\) Since this thesis deals with

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\(^{11}\) Regarding prioritising *BT* over other works, I endorse Bill Blattner’s view: ‘Even though Heidegger did approve the texts in the Gesamtausgabe’s sequence of lectures, nonetheless *Being and Time* is the published text, the magnum opus of Heidegger’s early period. We cannot assume that Heidegger formulated classroom lectures to express his considered judgments precisely[,] […] [W]e have every reason to believe that when an author puts something of the magnitude of *Being and Time* into print, […] it is likely that it is more carefully and directly formulated than classroom lectures’ (1999, xiv-xv). In a similar spirit, von Herrmann writes: ‘*Being and Time* is, like the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a systematic work in the grand style and not, as was claimed for many years in ignorance and blindness, a patchwork pieced together from the Marburg lectures’ (2005, 12).

\(^{12}\) Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann was Heidegger’s Privat-Assistent from 1972 to 1976 (Universität Freiburg 2013). Despite this personal connection to Heidegger and resulting intimate familiarity with Heidegger’s work, however, von Herrmann’s line-by-line commentary on *BT* is rarely discussed in Anglo-American literature. I have translated it specially and refer to it frequently throughout.

\(^{13}\) Heidegger uses ‘demonstration’, ‘disclosure’, and ‘explication’ interchangeably. For simplicity, I favour ‘explication’ throughout. For issues concerning Heidegger’s terms ‘*Sein*’ and ‘*Seiendes*’, see fn. 8. Macquarrie and Robinson translate ‘*Seinsverfassung*’ as ‘state of being’ (Heidegger 1962, 130).
a particular constitution of being, viz. the being of gear, I do not discuss the ‘question of being’ (Seinsfrage) in general, which pursues that common to all constitutions of being as such (Ibid., 4-7). Interpreting Heidegger as developing Husserlian positions from Ideas I (Husserl 1913), Part 1 follows Bruin Christensen’s lead of ‘turn[ing] on its head John Haugeland’s advice to “make Heidegger out to be less like Husserl … and more like Dewey …”’ (Christensen 2007, 172; cf. Haugeland 1982, 15). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear, which begins from phenomenology of mundane concern, and clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand beings (Zuhandenem) and extant beings in the narrow sense (Vorhandenem). ‘Extant being’ (‘Vorhandenes’) and ‘extantness’ (‘Vorhandenheit’) in the narrow sense denote a natural, i.e. physicochemical, being (Seiendes) and the mode-of-being (Seinsart) of natural beings, viz. nature, respectively. Hence, Heidegger refers, for example, to ‘the being of the extant, of nature’ (1927/1975, 240): thus implying that ‘the extant’ and ‘nature’ are interchangeable. In the broad sense, by contrast, ‘extant being’ and ‘extantness’ encompass every instantiator of a mode-of-being other than Existence and every mode-of-being other than Existence respectively (von Herrmann 2008, 241; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 45). Finally, Part 3 applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern to explain three phenomena of mundane concern (‘environmental entities’) in distinction from Gibsonian counterparts. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science.

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14 The question of being remains nonetheless a question of the being of beings (Seienden), since Heidegger insists that ‘[b]eing is in each case and ‘always’ ‘the being of a being’ (1927/2006, 9; 1927/1975, 22). Yet Heidegger implicitly distinguishes explicating constitutions of being, as in §15 of BT, from pursuing the sense of being in general through raising the question of being (von Herrmann 1987, 278-279).  
16 I translate Heidegger’s term ‘Existenz’ as ‘Existence’, capitalised to distinguish it from ‘existence’ in the ordinary sense. I translate ‘existieren’ when used in Heidegger’s sense as meaning ‘to instantiate Existence’ as ‘to Exist’, capitalised to distinguish it from ‘to exist’ in the ordinary sense. Similar applies for terms derived from ‘Existenz’ and ‘existieren’.
§1.1 interprets Heidegger’s conception of the being (Seins) of a being (Seienden).

§1.2 addresses two issues raised in Heidegger’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’ in §15 of BT concerning explicating the being of beings. Since §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear comprises a ‘definition’ (Umgrenzung) of gearedness – as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ – and an ‘exhibition’ (Herausstellung) of to-hand-ness as ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68-69), §1.1.1 clarifies the relationship between gearedness and to-hand-ness. Following von Herrmann in construing Heidegger’s distinction between gearedness and to-hand-ness as exemplifying the doctrine of ‘the basic articulation of being’ into ‘material-content’ (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and ‘mode-of-being’ (Seinsart) respectively (von Herrmann 2005: 21, 169; Heidegger 1927/1975, 321), I interpret ‘defining’ gearedness as consisting in identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear.¹⁷ Though §1.1.2 implies that instantiating the being of gear is also necessary and sufficient for being gear, this is compatible with instantiating gearedness’s being necessary and sufficient for being gear because I read Heidegger as holding that instantiating gearedness entails instantiating the being of gear.¹⁸ Since the sole remaining component of §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear consists in introducing basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of Heidegger’s conditions for being gear and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear, I identify to-hand-ness with the object of an enquiry yielding knowledge of such basic concepts. More generally, modes-of-being are identifiable with objects of enquiries yielding knowledge of basic concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of members of the corresponding regional classes. Heidegger’s term ‘basic concepts’ need not imply such concepts’ primitiveness, only their enabling a basic comprehension of entities of a certain class.¹⁹

¹⁷ Modality throughout is specifically metaphysical unless otherwise specified (see Kment 2012). Heidegger uses ‘mode-of-being’ and ‘way-of-being’ in more than one sense. I deal exclusively with the sense wherein Heidegger describes to-hand-ness as ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (1927/2006, 69): bracketing the sense wherein Heidegger characterises, for example, ‘concernful engagement’ as a ‘mode-of-being’ insofar as it is a mode or way Dasein is (Ibid, 67; cf. ibid, 42).

¹⁸ I use ‘to entail’ such that, necessarily, p entails q if it is true at every metaphysically possible world that if p, then q.

¹⁹ See pp. 51-54. ‘Begriff’ can mean either ‘concept’ or ‘term’. Although Heidegger uses it almost invariably to mean ‘concept’, one should bear in mind its potential ambiguity.
Though some textual data suggest that Heidegger conceives modes-of-being as ways of existing, I baulk at interpreting modes-of-being as ways of existing in light of the paucity of such data (cf. McDaniel 2009): instead conservatively interpreting modes-of-being, like material-contents, as ordinary first-order properties. I regard the popular interpretation of modes-of-being as ways objects can appear (begegnet or erscheinen), i.e. be represented, as inadequate but not incorrect. For though I interpret modes-of-being, like material-contents and constitutions of being, primarily as properties, every property is also a way something can appear as being because every way something can be is also a way something could in principle be represented as being in thought or experience. Furthermore, I reject McDaniel’s interpretation of instantiating the material-content gearedness, as the ‘whatness’ (Washeit) of gear, as consisting in instantiating certain properties essentially (McDaniel 2012, 432): instead interpreting instantiating gearedness as consisting simply in being gear. Consequently, §15 of BT’s definition of gearedness is a specification not of the essential properties of items of gear, but of necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear. This does not preclude that instantiating certain properties essentially is necessary for being gear, of course, though §2.2.2 opposes McDaniel’s readings of various passages as indicating that Heidegger affirms this. In any case, given Heidegger’s doctrine of ‘the basic articulation of being’ (1927/1975, 321), the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) divides exhaustively into a material-content and mode-of-being. Hence, I construe constitutions of being as conjunctive properties, e.g. gearedness and to-hand-ness, whose instantiation consists in something’s instantiating a material-content, e.g. gearedness, and mode-of-being, e.g. to-hand-ness.

§1.1.2 interprets Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden), and therewith every constitution of being (Seinsverfassung), as a regional essence (regionales Wesen) in a broadly Husserlian sense: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – terms all denoting a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities (cf. Husserl 1913, 19). Husserl uses ‘essence’ synonymously with ‘property’ (Ibid, 5), as encompassing every way something could be (Putnam 2002, 106), and thus in a broader sense than that it possesses in analytic

20 Necessarily, x appears (begegnet, erscheint) as F if and only if an intentional state represents x as F.
philosophy: wherein it extends only to properties whose instantiation renders something an entity of a certain kind or class (‘general essences’), which supposedly does not include every property, and properties whose instantiation renders something the individual it is (‘individual essences’) (Schwartz 2009, 610; cf. Correia 2006). As properties unifying regional classes of entity, however, regional essences are a species of general essence.

I justify interpreting Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence through analysing BT’s discussion of ‘districts of being’ (Seinsbezirke) and PIKCR’s discussion of ‘basic concepts’ (Grundbegriffe), ‘outlines’ or ‘outlinings’ (Entwürfe), and the Galilean-Keplerian ‘outlining’ of the being of nature. BT’s discussion of ‘districts of being’, also abbreviated as ‘districts’ (Bezirke), suggests that constitutions of being unify districts (1927/2006, 9). Husserl speaks similarly of a ‘division’ (Austeilung) of being (Seins) into ‘regions of being’ (Seinsregionen), asserting that “material thing” and “soul” are different regions of being’ (1913, 32). Heidegger’s examples of districts and subject-areas include ‘nature’, ‘life’, and ‘history’: all whereof are sufficiently highly general classes that they can legitimately constitute subject-matters of sciences or groups of sciences, viz. natural science, biology, and history respectively (1927/2006, 9). For simplicity, I use the term ‘regional class’ as encompassing every region, district, and subject-area. PIKCR’s discussion of basic concepts, outlines (Entwürfe) of constitutions of being, and the Galilean-Keplerian outlining of the being of nature implies that the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) is the proper object of an investigation furnishing knowledge of basic concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of members of a regional class (1927-1928/1977: 28, 33, 94-95). Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s term ‘regional ontology’ to denote such investigations because the object of every such investigation is the constitution of being (onto) unifying a region (Ibid, 35-37; cf. Husserl 1913, 19).

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21 Husserl also uses the term ‘eidos’ synonymously with ‘essence’: speaking, for example, of ‘the eidos of [a] region’ (1913, 23-24) – that is, the eidos unifying a region. Fabrice Correia calls general essences and individual essences ‘generic’ and ‘objectual’ essences respectively (2006, 753-755).

22 Following Macquarrie and Robinson, ‘Entwurf’ is commonly translated as ‘projection’ (Heidegger 1962, 145).

23 I use ‘investigation’ synonymously with the German ‘Untersuchung’, which encompasses every form of enquiry.
§1.1.3 responds to various objections and rivals to my interpretation of the being (Seins) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence. Significantly, addressing textual data implying that Heidegger holds that nothing can instantiate more than one mode-of-being and therewith more than one constitution of being simultaneously, I propose interpreting Heidegger as holding that modes-of-being can ‘include’ one another such that although nothing can instantiate more than one mode-of-being simultaneously, entities can nevertheless be exactly as if they did so. Rival interpretations include Mark Okrent’s and Herman Philipse’s interpretation of constitutions of being as conferring capacities to instantiate properties in certain ways (Okrent 1988, 20-21; Philipse 1998, 99), Frank Töpfer’s interpretation of constitutions of being as intermediate between mere ways of appearing (Erscheinungsweisen) and properties (2004, 37), and Kris McDaniel’s interpretation of Heidegger’s term ‘being’ (‘Sein’) as meaning ‘existence’ (2009). §1.1.4 reconciles Heidegger’s ostensible metaphysical realism regarding constitutions of being with his claim that being (Sein) exists only ‘in the understanding’ (1927/2006, 183). I read Heidegger as endorsing an Aristotelian conceptualist theory of properties in respect to constitutions of being and their components, viz. material-contents and modes-of-being. This implies that although constitutions of being exist only mind-dependently, entities can yet be mind-independently such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto. I also consider that Heidegger’s theory of properties develops Husserl’s from Ideas I (Husserl 1913, 40-53).

§1.2 addresses two issues raised in §15 of BT’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’ whose comprehension is necessary for adequately interpreting Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear (1927/2006, 67-68). §1.2.1 analyses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological (ontologischen) and ontic (ontischen) investigations. §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear exemplifies the former, which Heidegger distinguishes from the latter as conducting a ‘determining of the structure of [the] being’ of beings rather than ‘a cognising of beingful qualities’ (Ibid, 67). I interpret this as meaning that ontological investigations, in explicating constitutions of being in abstracto, yield no knowledge of which properties entities instantiate and, more generally, no knowledge of the actual world except that derivable from truths about properties in abstracto. Ontological investigations thus yield knowledge only of
properties that *could* be instantiated and concepts enabling comprehension thereof. §15 of *BT*’s explication of the being of gear, for example, yields knowledge of around-for references (*Um-zu-Verweisungen*) as a species of property and the concepts *around-for* (*Um-zu*), *reference* (*Verweisung*), and *wherefore* (*Wozu* and *Wofür*) – concepts required to understand ascriptions of around-for references. This does not imply that anything actually instantiates around-for references; nor does it imply anything about laws of nature governing around-for references’ instantiation at the actual world, e.g. that around-for references supervene on physicochemical properties.\(^{24}\)

Ontic investigations, by contrast, yield knowledge of the actual world: for example, knowledge of which properties entities instantiate and laws of nature governing properties’ instantiation at the actual world.

Husserl articulates a similar conception of ontological investigations in distinguishing ontology as pursuing knowledge of ‘essences’ (*Wesen*), i.e. properties *in abstracto*, from empirical investigations of ‘matters of fact’ (*Tatsachen*). Consequently, ontological knowledge enjoys not merely ‘factual (“empirical”) universality’, unlike knowledge of laws of nature governing the actual world, but rather ‘universality of “essence”’, i.e. ‘“pure”, “strict”, absolute, “unconditional” universality’, grounded exclusively in properties *in abstracto* (Husserl 1913: 8-9, 13-14). Ontological knowledge is nevertheless necessary for ontic knowledge because, as E. J. Lowe observes (2011, 100), one must command some knowledge of ways entities *could* be, i.e. properties *in abstracto*, in order to be able to establish how entities actually are and laws governing how entities can be, i.e. which properties are actually instantiated and laws governing their instantiation.

In addition, Heidegger’s conception of ontological investigations resembles conceptions of metaphysical investigations espoused by, amongst others, E. J. Lowe (2011) and Tuomas Tahko (2012). Such investigations are distinct from, yet nonetheless intimately related to, Ted Sider’s Quinean task of constructing an ‘ideology’ for ‘writing the book of the world’, i.e. describing the actual world (Sider

\(^{24}\) §3.2.2 contends, for instance, that around-for references are realised by and consequently weakly supervene on physicochemical properties.
Introduction

2011, 16). For whereas constructing an ideology involves identifying properties to be ascribed and concepts to be employed in describing the actual world, ontological investigations do not imply that the properties and concepts whereof they yield knowledge in abstracto should be invoked in such a description. Instead, to extend Sider’s metaphor, ontological investigations merely expand our vocabulary: thereby enhancing our ability to furnish accurate and exhaustive descriptions of the actual world whilst remaining neutral as to what those descriptions should include.

§1.2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten or Zugangsweisen) or simply ‘accesses’ (Zugänge) to beings and their being. In §15 of BT’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’, Heidegger states that ‘[o]btaining phenomenological access’ to gear requires ‘placing oneself into’ a state of mundane concern so that ‘how [items of gear] appear from themselves in concern for them’ can be articulated (1927/2006, 67). I interpret Heidegger as asserting this because he holds that objects appear as gear, and therewith as to-hand, only in mundane concern. Therefore, to ‘access’ the being of gear such that it becomes explicable, we must first assume the perspective of mundane concern. This exemplifies Heidegger’s general principle that different modes of access enable knowledge of different constitutions of being, e.g. gearedness and to-hand-ness, and therewith of properties characterising their respective instantiators, e.g. gear-characteristics (Zeugcharaktere) as properties distinctive of gear (Heidegger 1927/1975, 96). Heidegger criticises Descartes for assuming that ‘mathematico-physical cognition’, i.e. the method of mathematical physics, offers the sole possible ‘access’ to beings. In doing so, Heidegger contends, Descartes renders himself oblivious to properties such as intentionality, gearedness, and to-hand-ness: whereof knowledge is supposedly unobtainable through mathematically-physical cognition due to its confinement to quantifiable properties (Heidegger 1927/2006, 95-101). §3.2.1 develops many of the points made in this section in contrasting the methodology of Heideggerian ecology with that of Gibsonian ecology.

§2.1 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. Since, as §1.1.1 explained, Heidegger divides the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) into exactly two
components, viz. a material-content and mode-of-being, Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear accordingly comprises two components: a ‘definition’ (Umgrenzung) of gear’s material-content gearedness and an ‘exhibition’ (Herausstellung) of its mode-of-being to-hand-ness (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68).

Defining gearedness consists in identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear, i.e. for belonging to the regional class ‘gear’. Heidegger thereupon exhibits to-hand-ness by introducing those special concepts (‘basic concepts’) required to comprehend the conditions for being gear. I do not discuss §15 of BT’s treatment of references (Verweisungen) to ‘materials’, ‘nature’, and the ‘public world’ (1927/2006, 70-71), because this does not bear upon Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear.

§2.1.1 establishes how Heidegger identifies the being of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, such that it can be explicated. This involves determining the senses of Heidegger’s terms ‘gear’ and ‘mundane concern’. I interpret Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ as denoting beings (Seiendes) of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). Since it is reasonable and charitable to assume that beings are individuated by their being (Sein), something is a being (Seiendes) of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging just in case it instantiates the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. Therefore, ‘gear’ denotes instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. Hence, von Herrmann characterises Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ as a ‘purely ontological’ term (2005, 120): that is, a term denoting instantiators of a certain constitution of being. I interpret Heidegger’s term ‘mundane concern’, and its stylistic variants, as denoting unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states. ‘Mundane concern’ is thus almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’, though I do not follow Dreyfus in reading Heidegger as conceiving mundane concern as devoid of intentional content (cf. Dreyfus 1991, 69). Identifying the being of gear through intentional content of mundane concern secures the a priori status of §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear by avoiding implying actual instantiation of the being of gear. Moreover, identifying gear and therewith to-hand entities with instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as
instantiating avoids the common error, whereto Denis McManus adverts, of rendering Heidegger’s notion of the to-hand (Zuhandenen) so vague that the distinction between the to-hand and merely extant (Vorhandenen) is robbed of value (McManus 2012a, 72-74).

§2.1.2 expounds Heidegger’s two independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear and three attendant basic concepts. In light of two phenomenological examples from BT and BP, viz. the room and lecture-theatre examples respectively, I identify Heidegger’s conditions for being gear as being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen) and being around for (um zu) something. Heidegger specifies these in asserting that ‘[t]he being of gear belongs always in each case a gear-whole, wherein it can be this gear that it is’ and ‘gear is essentially “something around for …”’ respectively (1927/2006, 68). A gear-whole is a unitary plurality of particular items of gear, not of properties as §2.1.3 criticises David Cerbone for holding (1999, 311). Something’s being around for (um zu) something, i.e. around for (um zu) a ‘wherefore’ (Wozu or Wofür), consists roughly in its being situationally relevant therefor – that is, its being contextually such that someone ought to take it into account in pursuing some goal or activity – not in its being normatively ‘for’ a fixed, specific purpose, as §2.1.3 criticises Mark Okrent for holding (2002, 201). I interpret Heidegger’s claim that gear’s being a component of a gear-whole enables it to be ‘this gear that it is’ as implying that gear’s being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for its instantiating the gear-characteristics it instantiates (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68; 1927/1975, 96).

In specifying his second condition for being gear, Heidegger asserts that ‘[t]he various ways of around-for [Um-zu] […] constitute a gear-wholeness’: that is, that instantiation of determinates of around-for is necessary for gear’s composing gear-wholes (1927/2006, 68). Although Heidegger does not defend this claim, I interpret Heidegger as advancing it because he holds that being around for (um zu) something in some way is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole, which implies that gear-wholes’ existence requires instantiation of around-for’s determinates. For if no determinate of around-for were instantiated, there would be no components of gear-
wholes and therefore no gear-wholes. I interpret Heidegger as affirming that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole because he maintains that being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore (Wozu or Wofür) with other gear is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole – the common wherefore anchoring a plurality of gear to a single point, so to speak, thereby securing its unity. Since Heidegger’s first condition for being gear was identified as ‘being a component of a gear-whole’, that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole additionally implies that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being gear. This explains why Heidegger posits being around for (um zu) something as necessary for being gear. I consider the possible objection that BP’s lecture-theatre example suggests that gear can both appear as belonging to and correlatively belong to a gear-whole despite being irrelevant for the wherefore supposedly anchoring that gear-whole. I rejoinder by construing irrelevance as a limiting case of a determinate of around-for, such that even being irrelevant for something is a way of being around for (um zu) it. For even objects appearing as irrelevant for a given wherefore nonetheless appear insofar as they are relevant therefor, viz. as possessing no relevance therefor, and thus as around for (um zu) it.

The three core basic concepts Heidegger introduces in light of his two conditions for being gear, viz. around-for (Um-zu), reference (Verweisung), and wherefore (Wozu and Wofür), together enable comprehension of around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the species of property whose instantiation is necessary for both conditions’ satisfaction.25 A wherefore (Wozu or Wofür) is a terminus of an around-for reference (Heidegger 1927/2006, 70; 1927/1975, 233). Hence, Heidegger states that ‘[t]he work to be produced’, i.e. the goal to be realised, is ‘the wherefore’ of objects encountered in mundane concern, e.g. tools employed in producing something (1927/2006, 70). Something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore essentially involves its referring (Verweisung) thereto, i.e. its directing attention

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25 I speak of Heidegger’s ‘three core basic concepts’ because although Heidegger does not explicitly specify which of the concepts §15 of BT introduces qualify as ‘basic concepts’ (Grundbegriffe), the three concepts mentioned are the most significant introduced therein.
Introduction

(broadly construed) away from itself thereto (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). This reflects the phenomenological datum that in experiencing something in its relevance, one’s attention is directed away from that which is relevant to that wherefore (wozu, wofür) it is relevant. Although around-for references are ostensibly relational, they are not in fact. For wherefores as such are typically not actual existents, but merely realisable possibilities. Whilst §2.1.2 focusses strictly upon textual data in expounding Heidegger’s three basic concepts, §3.1 develops points made therein in augmenting Heidegger’s phenomenology and applying it to three phenomena of mundane concern.

§2.1.3 critiques rival interpretations of Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear and attendant basic concepts. Interpreting being a component of a gear-whole as consisting in being normatively related to tools of other classes, David Cerbone takes Heidegger’s term ‘gear-whole’ (Zeugganzes) to denote not a unitary plurality of particular items of gear, as on my reading, but rather a unitary plurality of properties whose instantiation renders something a tool of a specific class. Being a hammer, being a nail, and being a piece of wood might compose a ‘gear-whole’, for example. Cerbone thereupon takes Heidegger’s term ‘reference’ (‘Verweisung’) to denote connections between instantiation conditions of such properties, e.g. conditions for being a hammer, being a nail, and being a piece of wood (Cerbone 1999, 201). I reject Cerbone’s interpretation because Heidegger’s room and lecture-theatre examples clearly indicate that Heidegger conceives gear-wholes as comprising particular items of gear, e.g. entities within the room and lecture-theatre, rather than properties. References (Verweisungen) must be interpreted accordingly as properties of particular items of gear rather than connections between instantiation conditions of properties. Mark Okrent interprets being around for (um zu) something as consisting in being normatively ‘for’ a fixed, specific purpose (2002, 201). I reject Okrent’s interpretation because entities’ being normatively ‘for’ fixed purposes cannot unify pluralities of gear in the manner Heidegger requires of instantiation of around-for. For such unification requires that items of gear collectively refer (verweisen) to something common that secures their unity. My interpretation identifies this as the

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26 I say ‘broadly construed’ because this is not necessarily attention in the technical sense (cf. Wu 2011).
Introduction

common wherefore that all items of gear within a plurality are collectively around for 
(um zu) in being (broadly speaking) relevant therefor. I do not thereby deny the 
correctness of the positions Cerbone’s and Okrent’s interpretations attribute to 
Heidegger, of course, only that these are the correct interpretations of §15 of BT’s 
explication of the being of gear.

§2.2 ascertains Heidegger’s position on the issue of whether the modes-of-being to-
hand-ness and extantness in the narrow sense (nature) can be co-instantiated.27 I 
employ ‘extantness’ in the narrow sense throughout and understand ‘co-instantiation’ 
broadly here: such that instantiating a mode-of-being that ‘includes’ another, as 
detailed in §1.1.3, is sufficient for those modes-of-being’s co-instantiation. In 
defending his own interpretation of Heidegger’s position, Kris McDaniel notes the 
prominence of the issue of the relationship between to-hand-ness and extantness 
within secondary literature (2012, 3-4). Since Heidegger holds that instantiating to-
hand-ness implies being gear and, we may assume given its consistency with textual 
data, that instantiating extantness implies being a physicochemical entity, 
Heidegger’s position on this issue effectively determines his position on the question 
of whether something can be both gear and a physicochemical entity 
simultaneously.28 §2.2.1 advances both the weak claim that Heidegger holds that to-
hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated, and therewith that something can be 
both gear and a physicochemical entity simultaneously, and the strong claim that 
Heidegger holds that instantiating to-hand-ness entails instantiating extantness. The 
truth of these claims is suggested by Heidegger’s frequent intimation that to-hand 
entities are (seemingly invariably) justifiably investigable either as to-hand or, 
through disregarding (Absehen) their to-hand-ness, as merely extant (Heidegger 
1927/2006, 70). For such justifiability plausibly requires that to-hand entities be both 
to-hand and extant simultaneously.

§2.2.2 criticises Kris McDaniel’s recent interpretation of Heidegger as holding that 
nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously. McDaniel concludes that

27 See p. 10.
28 See p. 10.
Heidegger holds this primarily because he reads Heidegger as ascribing incompatible properties to to-hand entities and extant entities. Yet McDaniel also adduces many passages ostensibly indicating that Heidegger affirms the numerical distinctness of to-hand entities and extant entities. I reject McDaniel’s interpretation firstly because there are insufficient data suggesting that Heidegger ascribes essential properties to to-hand entities, whereon McDaniel’s reading relies, and secondly because none of the passages McDaniel invokes implies unambiguously that to-hand entities and extant entities are numerically distinct.

Part 3 develops Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, as expounded in §2.1.2, and applies it to explain three phenomena of unreflective action described in recent literature and construct a metaphysics of objects of mundane concern: an ecological metaphysics of environmental entities. §3.1 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern to explain situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. Situational holism is discussed by Erik Rietveld (2008a; 2010; 2012), situated normativity by Sean Kelly (2005) and Erik Rietveld (2008a; 2010; 2012), and prospective control by Gibsonian ecological psychologists including Michael Turvey (1992) and Tony Chemero (2009). §3.2 outlines a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics in distinction from that of Gibsonian ecology, delineating in particular the relationship between around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) and physicochemical properties.

§3.1.1 explains situational holism, i.e. objects’ appearance in mundane concern as composing unitary situational nexus, through invoking Heidegger’s position that objects appear as composing gear-wholes because they appear as collectively around for (um zu) common wherefores. The unitary appearance of a plurality of objects in mundane concern is thus secured through the phenomenological anchorage of that plurality to a single superordinate wherefore such as a goal to be realised or ongoing activity, which remains the constant ‘centre of orientation’ (Orientierungszentrum) for mundane concern (von Herrmann 2005, 126). §3.1.2 explains situated normativity, i.e. objects’ appearance in mundane concern as ‘soliciting’ actions or as
‘affectively alluring’, through invoking Heidegger’s concept of reference (Verweisung). As an essential feature of around-for references, reference supposedly figures invariably in situational relevance. The ‘solicitation’ distinctive of situated normativity is thereupon identifiable with objects’ referring (Verweisung) away from themselves to wherefores in being around for (um zu) them. For experiencing a token around-for reference, i.e. the situational relevance of an object, involves intending neither the token around-for reference nor its bearer explicitly, but rather a wherefore insofar as the relevant object is around for (um zu) it. §3.1.3 phenomenologically explains mundanely concernful prospective control, i.e. agents’ ability to act unreflectively yet adequately in pursuing goals, through invoking Heidegger’s observation that the superordinate wherefore remains the constant ‘centre of orientation’ for mundane concern and, as such, that in reference (Verweisung) whereto everything is experienced in being around for (um zu) it. In thus experiencing everything constantly in its relevance for their respective goals, agents can act unreflectively yet nonetheless adequately in pursuing those goals.

Exploring themes introduced in §1.2.2, §3.2.1 elucidates the relationship between Gibsonian and Heideggerian approaches to ecology: that is, the study of environmental entities. Whereas Heideggerian ecology begins from phenomenology of mundane concern, Gibson begins by describing ‘the environment’ – that is, macrolevel entities in the surroundings of agents: Austin’s ‘moderate-sized specimens of dry goods’ (Austin 1962, 8) – as ‘what is there to be perceived’ (Gibson 1979/1986, 2). Gibson thus neglects properties accessible (zugänglich) only through mundane concern, e.g. around-for references, instead acknowledging only properties such as affordances, i.e. opportunities for action, which remain accessible from a standpoint of detached theoretical observation. Consequently, whilst the Gibsonian is challenged to explain why environmental entities cannot be characterised exhaustively by physics and chemistry alone and so justify the existence of ecology, the Heideggerian appeals to mundane concern’s status as a mode of access (Zugangsart or Zugangsweise) proper to ecology and distinct from that of physical science.
§3.2.2 formulates a plausible metaphysics of around-for references, as the sole species of Heideggerian ecological property (‘gear-characteristic’) discussed herein. Rather than following Gibsonians in positively affirming mundane concern’s veridicality, I instead present my proposed metaphysics of around-for references as an account of what would be the case were mundane concern sometimes veridical. As such, in terms of Heidegger’s distinction analysed in §1.2.1, the metaphysics outlined herein is an ontic rather than ontological theory. For it advances claims not about properties in abstracto, but about laws governing instantiation of properties at the actual world (or nearby possible worlds). In particular, adapting Michael Watkins’s primitivist metaphysics of colour-properties (2005; 2010), I suggest that, despite their primitiveness, around-for references are plausibly realised by and therefore supervene at least weakly on physicochemical properties: such that no entities can differ in respect to their instantiation of around-for references without also differing in respect to their instantiation of physicochemical properties. I advance this claim, thereby securing causal potency for token around-for references, in view of token around-for references’ apparent role in causing not only experiences of objects as instantiating around-for references, but also states of ‘bodily readiness to act’ and ‘attractor states’ (see Rietveld 2012, 213; Kiverstein 2012, 20-22).

Finally, I contend that, as an ontic theory, the metaphysics hereby outlined remains fully compatible with Heidegger’s position in §15 of BT, which is exclusively phenomenological and ontological. In particular, my claim that physicochemical properties realise around-for references does not contradict Heidegger’s position that the to-hand is ‘prior’ to the extant, which Denis McManus dubs ‘the Primacy of Practice Claim’ (2012a, 69). For whilst physicochemical properties enjoy ontic priority over around-for references in realising them, to-hand entities nonetheless remain ‘prior’ to merely extant entities in that, as entities capable of instantiating distinctively ecological properties (‘gear-characteristics’) in addition to physicochemical properties, they are elevated above merely physicochemical entities in the ‘scale of nature’ in a manner analogous to that wherein living entities are traditionally held to be elevated above the non-living (see Lovejoy 1936).
1. Heidegger on Being

1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

1.1.1. The basic articulation of being
1.1.2. Being and regional essences
1.1.3. Objections and rival interpretations
1.1.4. Metaphysical realism and Aristotelian conceptualism

1.2. Explicating Being

1.2.1. Ontology and the ontic
1.2.2. Modes of access

1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

This section interprets Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of a being (Seienden). I first outline my interpretation and the structure of §1.1 before articulating and defending my interpretation in §§1.1.1-1.1.4. Heidegger introduces §15 of BT as undertaking a ‘demonstration’ (Aufweis), ‘disclosure’ (Erschließung), or ‘explication’ (Explikation) ‘of the being [Seins] of the beings [Seienden] appearing most closely’, i.e. beings appearing in the ‘closest mode of engagement’: mundane concern (1927/2006, 66-67).29 Heidegger terms such beings ‘gear’ (Zeug) (Ibid, 68). Heidegger’s term ‘Seiendes’ (‘being’) denotes not an existent (Daseiendes), but rather something that has being (Sein): that is, something instantiating a constitution of being (Seinsverfassung). I accord with Heidegger’s usage of ‘being’, following convention by reserving ‘entity’ for an existent as such (cf. Blattner 1999, 1).30 Though ostensibly nugatory, this distinction is significant because §1.1.4 presents Heidegger as holding that the being (Sein) of beings exists (albeit mind-

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29 See §2.1.1 for ‘mundane concern’ and fn. 13 for ‘demonstration’, ‘disclosure’, and ‘explication’.
30 See fn. 8. By contrast, Bill Blattner opts to translate ‘ein Seiendes’ ‘as “an entity” instead of “a being”, because it is too easy to confuse “being” and “being”’ (1999, 1), i.e. confuse ‘being’ in the sense of ‘Seienden’ with ‘being’ in the sense of ‘Seins’ I seek to prevent such confusion instead by including the corresponding German word in brackets wherever such confusion might arise.
dependently), and is therefore an entity, without itself being a being (Seiendes), i.e. without instantiating a constitution of being.\textsuperscript{31}

Heidegger divides his explication of the being of gear into a ‘definition’ (Umgrenzung) of gearedness (Zeughäftigkeit) and an ‘exhibition’ (Herausstellung) of to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit), which Heidegger characterises as ‘[t]he mode-of-being [Seinsart] of gear’ (1927/2006, 69): ‘The mode-of-being of gear is to be exhibited. This occurs guided by the definition of that which makes an item of gear, gear: gearedness’ (Ibid, 68). This implies that Heidegger’s primary goal in explicating the being of gear is exhibiting to-hand-ness, with the definition of gearedness serving principally as a means towards this end. As may be expected given gearedness’s status as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’, Heidegger’s definition of gearedness consists in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear (1927/2006, 68). Hence, von Herrmann identifies gearedness with being gear (Zugsein) and designates gearedness accordingly as the ‘what-being’ (Wassein) of gear, i.e. what it is to be gear (2005: 169, 120). Heidegger’s exhibition of to-hand-ness, on the other hand, which von Herrmann designates the ‘how-being’ of gear (Ibid: 169, 120; cf. Haugeland 2007, 95), seemingly consists in furnishing basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of Heidegger’s conditions for being gear and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear.\textsuperscript{32} In accordance with his characterising the definition of gearedness as ‘guiding’ his exhibition of to-hand-ness (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), Heidegger introduces as basic concepts those special concepts required to comprehend his conditions for being gear.\textsuperscript{33}

Given the foregoing, interpreting and evaluating §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear requires first establishing what Heidegger means by the ‘being’ (Sein) of gear and why Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear comprises a definition of gearedness and an exhibition of to-hand-ness. As §1.1.1 and §1.1.3 explain, commentators disagree as to what Heidegger means by the ‘being’ and ‘mode-of-

\textsuperscript{31} See pp. 77-78.

\textsuperscript{32} For the term ‘basic concepts’, see pp. 51-54.

\textsuperscript{33} I say ‘those special concepts’ because Heidegger naturally does not mention every concept required to comprehend his conditions for being gear, e.g. concepts of first-order logic.
1. Heidegger on Being

being’ (Seinsart) or ‘way-of-being’ (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) of a being.\textsuperscript{34} Identifying the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) with its existence, Kris McDaniel notes that many instead interpret the being and mode-of-being of a being as a way something can appear as being: a ‘mode of intelligibility’ (McDaniel 2009, 292). Likewise, regarding the modes-of-being to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit), Kris McDaniel expresses what is supposedly ‘the dominant view among scholars of Heidegger’ thus: ‘one and the same entity can be present-at-hand [sc. extant] in one encounter or experience but ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] in another. There is one domain of material beings, which can be encountered in different ways or under different guises’ (McDaniel 2012: 4, 6). For instance, expounding §15 of BT, Gail Soffer writes: ‘The main question addressed by Heidegger here is: how are objects given (or in more Heideggerian language, what is their mode of being) in the world of everydayness?’ (1999, 381). According to Soffer, then, Heidegger’s primary goal in exhibiting to-hand-ness, as ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69), is to describe how objects appear as being in mundane concern.

Whilst granting that describing how objects appear as being in mundane concern is Heidegger’s proximate goal in §15 of BT, I deny that this is his primary goal therein. Rather, Heidegger primarily intends to deliver a foundational comprehension of gear, i.e. entities of the ‘regional’ class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging, by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and furnishing concepts enabling comprehension thereof.\textsuperscript{35} Consequently, pace Soffer et al., Heidegger’s primary goal is metaphysical – more precisely, ‘ontological’ (ontologisch) in Heidegger’s sense – rather than descriptive-phenomenological.\textsuperscript{36} As §2.1.1 explains, Heidegger pursues conditions for being gear and concepts enabling comprehension thereof through purely phenomenological means because mundane concern supposedly invariably represents objects as to-hand gear; so Heidegger can

\textsuperscript{34} As Hofstadter notes (Heidegger 1982, 367), Heidegger uses ‘mode-of-being’ and ‘way-of-being’ interchangeably. I favour ‘mode-of-being’ for simplicity. See also fn. 17.

\textsuperscript{35} Heidegger’s ultimate goal therein is to analyse the phenomenon of worldhood (Weltlichkeit) (1927/2006, 65-66): ‘the account of equipment [sc. gear] was more of a philosophical means than an end in itself insofar as it served to gain access to the ontological structure of […] world or worldhood’ (Sinclair 2009, 50).

\textsuperscript{36} §1.2.1 presents ontology in Heidegger’s sense as investigating concepts and properties in abstracto rather than particulars in concreto.
define *gearedness* and exhibit *to-hand-ness*, thereby explicating the being of gear, solely through mundanely concernful intentional content. Doing so avoids ascribing the being of gear to actual entities, i.e. positing actual gear, thereby preserving the explication’s *a priori* status. Interpretations such as Soffer’s consider only the instrumentally-valuable phenomenological aspect of Heidegger’s explications of being, completely overlooking their metaphysical objectives.

Given the content of §15 of *BT* described above, I interpret the being (*Sein*) of gear as a whole, i.e. its constitution of being (*Seinsverfassung*), as identical with its essence or nature (*Wesen*) as gear. For though *gearedness* in particular – as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68) – might ordinarily be identified with gear’s essence as gear, Heidegger’s positing *to-hand-ness* as a component of the being of gear alongside *gearedness* coupled with his position that beings belong to certain ‘districts’ (*Bezirke*) or ‘subject-areas’ (*Sachgebiete*) through instantiating constitutions of being licenses instead identifying the whole comprising *gearedness* and *to-hand-ness*, viz. the conjunctive property *gearedness and to-hand-ness*, with gear’s essence as gear (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9). More precisely, I interpret the being of gear, like the being (*Sein*) of every being (*Seienden*), as a ‘regional essence’ (*regionales Wesen*) in a broadly Husserlian sense: that is, a property unifying a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities (Husserl 1913, 19-23; cf. Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 33), which Heidegger usually calls a ‘district’ (*Bezirk*) or ‘subject-area’ (*Sachgebiet*) (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9). As I use the term following Husserl, ‘regional essence’ is virtually synonymous with E. J. Lowe’s term ‘fundamental general essence’. Lowe identifies the fundamental general essence instantiated by a cat, for example, with the property *being a living organism* – distinguishing this from more ‘specific’ general essences instantiated thereby such as *being an animal, being a cat*, and *being a Siamese cat* (Lowe 2006, 4-5). *Being a living organism* is arguably identical with the being (*Sein*) of living beings (*Lebendem*), on Heidegger’s view, and thus with the regional essence unifying the regional class ‘life’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9-10). Most importantly for this thesis, my interpretation implies that Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear, which consists in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and

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37 ‘*Wesen*’ is translatable as either ‘nature’ or ‘essence’. I use only the latter for simplicity.
1. Heidegger on Being

thereupon introducing concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of gear, amounts to an articulation of the essence of items of gear as members of the regional class ‘gear’.

As properties unifying regional classes, regional essences are a species of general essence: properties that ‘make an individual to be a member of the kind or kinds of which it is a member’ (Schwartz 2009, 609; Husserl 1913, 24). General essences are distinguished from individual essences, each whereof ‘makes [an] individual to be the individual that it is’ and is thus identical with a ‘thisness’ or ‘haecceity’ (Schwartz 2009, 609). Whilst nothing could instantiate more than one individual essence and no two entities could instantiate the same individual essence, a single entity could instantiate more than one general essence and many entities could instantiate the same general essence (Ibid, 609). A single entity can instantiate the regional essences (‘constitutions of being’) of natural beings and living beings, for example, and thus be both a natural entity and living entity and as such belong to the regional classes ‘nature’ and ‘life’.

Heidegger’s use of the term ‘being’ to denote a general essence is not unprecedented. John Locke, for instance, writes: ‘Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is’ (1689/1975, III.iii.15; Jones 2013), which E. J. Lowe approves as an ‘apt description’ of essence (2011, 105). For example: not only gearedness as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), but also the being of gear as a whole, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, is characterisable as that ‘whereby’ gear ‘is what it is’, viz. gear. For Heidegger holds that instantiating gearedness and to-hand-ness is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for being gear and thus for belonging to the regional class ‘gear’. Furthermore, E. J. Lowe designates specifying existence conditions of entities as members of certain classes, as Heidegger does in explicating the being of gear (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), as a task characteristic of investigations of essences (Lowe 2011, 106).

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38 Husserl also speaks of ‘the general (in our manner of speaking “regional”) essence of a thing’ (1913, 20).
Before I adduce textual data supporting interpreting the ‘being’ of a being as a regional essence in §1.1.2, §1.1.1 expounds Heidegger’s distinction between *gearedness* and *to-hand-ness*. I follow von Herrmann in interpreting these as the material-content (*Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt*) and mode-of-being (*Seinsart*) of gear respectively (2005, 120; cf. Haugeland 2007, 95). Heidegger terms the distinction between material-contents and modes-of-being ‘the basic articulation of being’ (1927/1975, 321; cf. *ibid*, 169-170). Yet many commentators neglect this distinction, instead using ‘the mode-of-being of x’ and ‘the being of x’ interchangeably and often omitting discussion of material-contents entirely (von Herrmann 2005, 21). I acknowledge that such neglect is largely justified, however, since the significance of the basic articulation of being is unclear; and it is ultimately inconsequential for interpreting §15 of *BT*. For whilst Heidegger admittedly divides his explication of the being of gear into a definition of *gearedness* and exhibition of *to-hand-ness*, §15 of *BT* may be considered without loss simply as explicating the being of gear as a whole through specifying conditions for being gear and furnishing concepts enabling comprehension thereof. Attempting to determine the exact contributions of Heidegger’s definition of *gearedness* and exhibition of *to-hand-ness* towards achieving this result is not only of minimal benefit, but also perhaps impossible owing to the paucity of textual data elucidating Heidegger’s distinction. Nevertheless, honouring the basic articulation of being to some degree, I interpret Heidegger as conceiving the being (*Sein*) or constitution of being (*Seinsverfassung*) of a being (*Seienden*) as a conjunctive property comprising a material-content and mode-of-being, e.g. *gearedness* and *to-hand-ness*. Though following many commentators in reading Heidegger as conceiving modes-of-being as ways objects can appear as being, I do so not because I favour an exclusively or even primarily phenomenological interpretation of modes-of-being, but because I interpret modes-of-being as properties that could figure in intentional content. Furthermore, despite acknowledging some textual data supporting interpreting modes-of-being as ways of existing, I baulk at doing so owing to the paucity of such data. Finally, I reject Kris McDaniel’s interpretation of Heidegger’s defining *gearedness* as consisting in identifying essential properties of items of gear: instead construing it as consisting in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear.
§1.1.2 defends my interpretation of the being (Seins) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence through analysing BT’s discussion of ‘districts of being’ (Seinsbezirke) and PIKCR’s discussion of ‘basic concepts’ (Grundbegriffe) and ‘outlines’ (Entwürfe) (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9; 1927-1928/1977, 28-33). I adduce four passages in particular, one from BT and three from PIKCR, as strongly supporting my interpretation: dubbing these the ‘districts passage’, ‘basic-concepts passage’, ‘outlines passage’, and ‘Galileo-Kepler passage’ respectively. §1.1.3 rebuts various objections and rival interpretations. In particular, I critique Mark Okrent’s and Herman Philipse’s interpretation of differences between constitutions of being as corresponding to differences between ways of instantiating properties, Frank Töpfer’s interpretation of constitutions of being as intermediate between mere ways of appearing (Erscheinungsweisen) and properties, and Kris McDaniel’s identifying the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) with its existence.

§1.1.4 determines Heidegger’s position on the mind-dependence of constitutions of being’s instantiation and existence. I interpret Heidegger as affirming that whilst entities can be mind-independently such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto, constitutions of being exist only mind-dependently. Bill Blattner interprets Heidegger similarly on the latter point (1994; cf. 2004). I characterise Heidegger’s position as thus combining metaphysical realism with Aristotelian conceptualism and perhaps as recalling Husserl’s avoidance of Platonic realism (Husserl 1913, 47-50). My interpretation reconciles Heidegger’s claim that, for instance, ‘nature [sc. natural beings] can be [sein] even when no Dasein exists’ (1927/1975, 241; cf. McDaniel 2012, 7), and thus are natural mind-independently, with his position that the being of beings, e.g. the being of natural beings, exists only ‘in the understanding’ and thus only mind-dependently (Heidegger 1927/2006, 183).39 I oppose Cristina Lafont’s transcendental idealist reading, accusing Lafont of erroneously assuming that properties must exist in order for entities to be such that properties are truthfully ascribable thereto. For, like ‘ostrich nominalism’ (Devitt 1980; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2011), the Aristotelian conceptualism I attribute to

39 ‘Dasein’ denotes the ‘particular being [Seiendes] that we ourselves are’ and thus is perhaps necessarily co-extensive with ‘person’ or ‘human being’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36): ‘Both syntactically and semantically, […] what goes for “man” goes for “Dasein”’ (Carman 2003, 39).
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

Heidegger implies that entities could be such that properties are truthfully ascribable thereto even if no properties existed.

1.1.1. The basic articulation of being

§15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear comprises a definition (Umgrenzung) of gearedness and an exhibition (Herausstellung) of to-hand-ness (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). The net result is knowledge of necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension thereof and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Von Herrmann construes Heidegger’s distinction between gearedness and to-hand-ness as exemplifying the doctrine of ‘the basic articulation of being’ into respectively material-contents (Sachhaltigkeiten, Sachgehalte) – whose species are ‘what-being’/whatness’ (Wassein/Waseheit) and ‘who-being’/‘whoness’ (Wer-sein/Werheit) (Heidegger 1927/1975, 169-170; 1927/2006, 45) – and modes-of-being (Seinsarten) or ways-of-being (Seinsweisen, Weisen des Seins, Weisen zu sein): also known as ‘how-being’ and ‘that-being’ (von Herrmann 2005, 21; Heidegger 1927/1975: 321, 432).40

Gearedness is an example of ‘what-being’/‘whatness’ (von Herrmann 2005: 21, 120). Von Herrmann also deems ‘Bewandtnis’ co-extensive with ‘gearedness’ (Ibid, 21; 2008, 235). Likewise, using ‘that-being’ synonymously with ‘how-being’ and therefore with ‘mode-of-being’, John Haugeland writes: ‘Zuhandenheit [sc. to-hand-ness] and Bewandtnis are both defined as the being of equipment. But they’re not the same. The difference between them is what Heidegger calls the articulation of being into that-being and what-being’ (2007, 95). Heidegger appropriates the doctrine of the basic articulation of being not from Husserl, but from the ancient Greeks and Medieval Scholastics (Heidegger 1927/1975, 110).

In BP, Heidegger distinguishes Dasein’s mode-of-being Existence from its material-content whoness: positing ‘whoness and Existence’ as a pair of properties or conjunctive property distinct from ‘whatness and extantness’ (1927/1975, 169-

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1. Heidegger on Being

170). Acknowledging material-contents’ variation according to modes-of-being, Heidegger asserts that ‘[t]he articulation of being’, i.e. basic articulation of being, ‘varies with the particular way-of-being of a being’ (Ibid, 170). That is, no two beings can differ in respect to which modes-of-being they instantiate without also differing in respect to which material-contents they instantiate. In other words, modes-of-being supervene at least weakly on material-contents. Indeed, Heidegger’s positing material-content/mode-of-being pairs such as whoness and Existence and whatness and extantness suggests that he recognises a 1:1 correspondence between material-contents and modes-of-being: such that everything instantiating a certain material-content instantiates a certain mode-of-being and vice versa. This is further implied by Heidegger’s intimation that ‘item of gear’ (‘Zeug’) and ‘to-hand being’ (‘Zuhandenes’) are necessarily co-extensive. For Heidegger speaks of ‘the to-hand ("gear")’ and designates ‘the to-hand’ as a collective term for all gear (1927/2006, 76; 1927/1975, 414). The material-content/mode-of-being pair in this case is gearedness and to-hand-ness. In any case, since the basic articulation of being implies that the being (Sein) of every being (Seienden) divides exhaustively into a material-content and mode-of-being, I interpret the being of every being as a conjunctive property, e.g. to-hand-ness and gearedness. Each conjunctive property comprising a co-instantiable material-content and mode-of-being is a ‘constitution of being’ (Seinsverfassung) and as such, §1.1.2 contends, a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class of entities.

Yet despite thus distinguishing modes-of-being from material-contents, Heidegger neglects to expound the distinction adequately and fails to establish modes-of-being’s theoretical role in distinction from that of material-contents. In BT, moreover, Heidegger does not even introduce the distinction explicitly – instead

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42 For ‘weak supervenience’, see fn. 279 and McLaughlin and Bennett 2011.
43 Though Bruin Christensen presents Heidegger as holding that ‘being an item of equipment [sc. gear] is neither necessary nor sufficient for being ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand]’ because Christensen takes ‘gear’ to denote only ‘entities with a typical use’ (2007, 170-171), this stems from Christensen’s conflating an ‘everyday item of equipment [sc. gear]’ with gear simpliciter. For Christensen switches between speaking of ‘everyday’ gear and gear simpliciter in the same paragraph indiscriminately (Ibid, 170).
44 Hawley and Bird similarly hold that some natural kind properties, i.e. properties whose instantiation consists in something’s belonging to a natural kind, are conjunctive properties (Hawley and Bird 2011, 209). See p. 70.
introducing it only in BP (1927/1975, 321), following the publication of BT. In BT, Heidegger describes both material-contents and modes-of-being as ‘the being’ (Sein) of beings indiscriminately: characterising both Bewandtnis and to-hand-ness as ‘the being’ of intraworldly beings, for instance (1927/2006, 88; Haugeland 2007, 95). Heidegger also therein uses ‘the mode-of-being of x’ apparently interchangeably with ‘the being of x’ and ‘the constitution of being of x’: presenting ‘[t]he ontology of life’, for example, as determining instantiation conditions of life, which Heidegger classifies as a ‘mode-of-being’ (1927/2006, 50), rather than of the constitution of being of living beings or its component material-content. Furthermore, expounding BT, von Herrmann characterises subjectivity (Subjektivität) as the ‘constitution of being (mode-of-being)’ of subjects (1987, 243): thereby implying that ‘constitution of being’ and ‘mode-of-being’ are interchangeable. Hence, I speak of modes-of-being in a ‘narrow sense’ and ‘broad sense’. Modes-of-being in the narrow sense, which is the strict sense according to the basic articulation of being, are components of constitutions of being and counterparts of material-contents. Modes-of-being in the broad sense, by contrast, are identical with constitutions of being. Unless otherwise specified, however, I use ‘mode-of-being’ in the narrow, strict sense.

The foregoing suggests that Heidegger either deemed the basic articulation of being unworthy of discussing in his masterwork BT, instead reserving its discussion for historical lecture-courses critiquing the traditional distinction between essentia and existentia such as BP and Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1927/1975, 172-251; 1928/1978), or perhaps had not yet articulated the distinction sufficiently to enable its explicit introduction. In any case, since this thesis focusses upon BT as Heidegger’s masterwork and as containing his most extensive and considered treatment of gear and mundane concern, the basic articulation of being does not figure prominently herein. Nevertheless, given that gearedness is ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), and as such identical with being gear (Zeugsein) (von Herrmann 2005, 169), we may safely infer that Heidegger’s definition of gearedness in §15 of BT consists exclusively in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear: that is, instantiation conditions of gearedness and therewith of gearedness and to-hand-ness. In which case, since this leaves only one component of Heidegger’s explication of being unaccounted for, we
may deduce that Heidegger’s exhibition of to-hand-ness consists in eliciting basic concepts enabling comprehension of the conditions for being gear and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Therefore, to-hand-ness is identical with the object of investigations yielding such concepts; and, more generally, modes-of-being are identical with the objects of investigations yielding concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of instantiators of constitutions of being comprising those modes-of-being. This characterisation of modes-of-being chimes with the following passage from BT, which implies that basic concepts are explicata of modes-of-being:

All explicata that arise from the analytic of Dasein are obtained in view of its Existence-structure. Because they determine themselves from Existentiality, we call the characteristics of being [Seinscharaktere] of Dasein ‘Existentials’. They are to be distinguished sharply from the determinations of being [Seinsbestimmungen] of non-Dasein beings, which we call ‘categories’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 44).

Furthermore, that ‘exhibiting’ modes-of-being yields knowledge of basic concepts for comprehending instantiators of constitutions of being comprising those modes-of-being suggests that Heidegger conceives modes-of-being’ instantiation as justifying employing certain concepts in pursuing knowledge of their instantiators and perhaps therewith as grounding their instantiators’ capacities to instantiate properties comprehensible only through those concepts.45 The correctness of this reading is implied by von Herrmann’s exposition of Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes’s failure to investigate ‘the mode-of-being of the res cogitans’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 24). Alluding to Heidegger’s distinction between Existence as the mode-of-being of Dasein and existentia, actuality (Wirklichkeit), or extantness in the narrow sense (nature) as the mode-of-being Descartes supposedly ascribes to the res cogitans, von Herrmann writes:

45 See also p. 69.
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

Descartes determines the sense of being of the ‘I am’ not [...] in the sense of ecstatic Existence, but rather grasps the being of the ego [Ich] [...] as existentia, as actuality, in the same sense in which he also enquires about the actuality of corporeal things. The difference between the ego and corporeal things is seen not as a difference of mode-of-being, but only as a difference in essentia: which on the one hand is cogitatio and on the other existentio (1987, 250).

That is, rather than acknowledging differences between the basic concepts one must employ to comprehend egos and corporeal things given corresponding differences between the properties such entities can instantiate, Descartes instead asserts merely that whereas thinking (cogitatio) is necessary and sufficient for being an ego, being extended (extensio) is necessary and sufficient for being a corporeal thing (Ibid, 249-250). Heidegger’s position that Dasein can instantiate properties other than those instantiable by mere corporeal things, and therefore must be comprehended through basic concepts other than those through which mere corporeal things are comprehended, is reflected by his doctrine that Dasein, as instantiating the mode-of-being Existence, instantiates the material-content whoness (Werheit) – rather than whatness (Washeit), which is instantiated by instantiators of other modes-of-being (extantness in the broadest sense) (von Herrmann 2008, 241) – and therefore must be enquired about using who-questions rather than what-questions:

The being [Seiende] that we ourselves are, Dasein, as such cannot be enquired about at all with the question ‘what is this?’. We obtain access to this being only when we ask ‘who is it?’. Dasein is constituted not by whatness, but rather (if we may coin the expression) by whoness. The answer gives not a thing [Sache], but rather an I, you, we (Heidegger 1927/1975, 169).
1. Heidegger on Being

In BT, Heidegger writes similarly:

Existentials and categories are the two basic possibilities of characteristics of being. The beings corresponding to them demand in each case a different way of primary enquiry: a being is a who (Existence) or a what (extantness in the broadest sense) (1927/2006, 45).  

Again, however, in view of the paucity of textual data enabling reliable interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of modes-of-being, I stop short of interpreting Heidegger as positing a correspondence between modes-of-being and capacities to instantiate properties. Another potential interpretative route derives from passages in BP ostensibly suggesting that Heidegger conceives modes-of-being as ways of existing: such that every difference in which modes-of-being entities instantiate consists in a difference between the ways they exist. For example, distinguishing to-hand-ness as the mode-of-being of gear from gearedness as its material-content (specifically its ‘whatness’), Heidegger characterises to-hand-ness as ‘[t]he way beings with this material-content, gear, are’ (1927/1975, 432). This is not charitably interpretable as meaning merely that to-hand-ness is a property. For every property, including gearedness, is a way something ‘is’ or can ‘be’; so to-hand-ness cannot be characterised as the way gear ‘is’. If to-hand-ness were identical with the existence of gear, however, Heidegger would be committed to holding that to-hand-ness is an essential property of its instantiators – unless entities could cease to exist in one way and begin to exist in another without therein ceasing to exist simpliciter. Kris McDaniel reads Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden), rather than a mode-of-being as distinct from a material-content, as a way of existing (2009); so I postpone criticising his reading specifically until §1.1.3. In any case,

46 For ‘extantness in the broadest [sc. broad] sense’, see p. 10. 
47 §1.1.3 grants, however, that Heidegger might recognise such a correspondence between constitutions of being or modes-of-being and capacities to instantiate properties (p. 69). 
48 I interpret McDaniel as identifying the being (Sein), rather than mode-of-being, of a being (Seienden) with its existence primarily because McDaniel fails to distinguish modes-of-being from material-contents and so is seemingly oblivious to the narrow sense of ‘mode-of-being’ in distinction from its broad sense (McDaniel 2009).
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

McDaniel adduces no textual data supporting his reading: instead relying exclusively upon common usage of ‘being’ to mean ‘existence’ (2009, 291).49

That Husserl may be interpreted as conceiving being extant (vorhanden) as consisting in existing provides some historical support for interpreting Heidegger as conceiving modes-of-being, whereof extantness is an example (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36-37), as ways of existing. Husserl remarks that every intentional object of ordinary experience as such ‘carries within [itself] […] the characteristic “there” [“da”], “extant” [“vorhanden”]: in that ordinary experience invariably represents objects as being ‘there’ or ‘extant’ (1913, 53). Interpreting ‘there’ and ‘extant’ correctly here requires recognising two facts about the corresponding German expressions. First, although ‘da sein’ (‘to be there’) literally means to be at a certain location, it commonly means ‘to exist’: such that ‘x ist da’ means ‘x exists’. Second, although being vorhanden literally consists in being before someone’s hand, i.e. in front of someone, ‘vorhanden’ is likewise commonly used such that being vorhanden consists in existing (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36; cf. Carman 2003, 135). Therefore, Husserl’s claim that objects appear in ordinary experience as ‘there’ or ‘extant’ implies that objects appear therein as existing. Hence, Husserl indicates that objects’ appearing as being ‘there’ or ‘extant’ means that subjects are ‘conscious’ of the environment ‘as an existing [daseiende] “actuality”’ rather than merely ‘conceptually’ (auffassungsmäßig), i.e. rather than as if merely entertaining the thought that environmental objects exist without affirming it (1913, 53).

One might infer from this that Husserl holds that being extant consists in existing. Yet, in accordance with the literal senses of the corresponding German expressions, some data suggest that Husserl holds that appearing as being ‘there’ (da) or ‘extant’ (vorhanden) involves something more than appearing as existing: namely, appearing as being at a certain location and appearing as in front of one respectively. Describing ordinary experiential content, for example, Husserl writes that ‘corporeal things are […] simply there for me: “extant” [“vorhanden”], in a literal or figurative

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49 See pp. 73-74.
sense’ (1913, 56). Husserl’s use of the term ‘vorhanden’ to gloss ‘simply there for me’ suggests that being vorhanden essentially involves being ‘there for someone’, i.e. appearing to someone. Whereas Husserl presumably holds that something is vorhanden ‘in a literal sense’ just in case it is before someone’s hand, i.e. in front of someone, something presumably qualifies as vorhanden ‘in a figurative sense’ through appearing to someone in a manner not involving its being in front of them, e.g. a sound in earshot (cf. von Hermann 2005, 124).

In any case, notwithstanding such data, I baulk at interpreting Heidegger as conceiving modes-of-being as ways of existing: instead interpreting modes-of-being conservatively, like material-contents, as ordinary first-order properties. One positive reason for doing so is that Heidegger contends in BP that Dasein should not be conceived as having ‘existence’ (existentia) in the sense wherein this term is traditionally and commonly understood. For Heidegger regards ‘existence’ (‘existentia’) as traditionally synonymous with ‘extantness’ (Vorhandenheit or Vorhandensein) in the broad sense as denoting ‘the way-of-being of natural things in the broadest sense’, i.e. of all beings other than Dasein (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36-37; von Herrmann 2008, 241); and Heidegger regards the mode-of-being of Dasein as not extantness, but Existence (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36-37; von Herrmann 1987, 251-253): ‘Dasein has, not existentia, but Existenz’ (Caputo 1982, 78). Therefore, modes-of-being as a class cannot be identified with ways of existing, at least in the ordinary sense of ‘existing’, since Heidegger maintains that at least one mode-of-being, viz. Existence, is such that its instantiation does not consist in something’s existing in the ordinary sense, i.e. in its being extant (vorhanden). Moreover, since Heidegger outlines no other sense of ‘existence’ wherein even instantiators of Existence as such may be said to ‘exist’, we cannot salvage interpreting modes-of-being as ways of existing by suitably altering the sense of ‘existing’. Though one could opt to interpret only extantness as constituting the existence of its instantiators in light of Heidegger’s identification of extantness with existentia, this would

51 Though Heidegger also denies that Dasein instantiates essentia, this is not essence in the broad Husserlian sense wherein I use ‘essence’ (‘Wesen’) in interpreting constitutions of being as regional essences (§1.1.2), viz. as denoting a property, but rather in the narrow sense wherein ‘essentia’ is supposedly used in the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition (see Heidegger 1927/1975, 140-171; Caputo 1982, 76-81).
attribute an uncharitably heterogeneous conception of modes-of-being to Heidegger. Nevertheless, my interpretation remains open to the possibility that modes-of-being are ways of existing in some non-ordinary sense of ‘existing’.

Another viable interpretation of modes-of-being warrants consideration. Given Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to explications of constitutions of being such as in §15 of BT, many interpret modes-of-being as ways objects can appear (begegnen or erscheinen), i.e. be represented, as being. Frank Töpfer, for instance, interprets modes-of-being as ‘a particular class’ of ‘ways of appearing’ (Erscheinungsweisen), i.e. ways objects can appear as being (2004: 34, 37). Gail Soffer likewise interprets modes-of-being as ways something can be ‘given’ as being: ‘The main question addressed by Heidegger here is: how are objects given (or in more Heideggerian language, what is their mode of being)’ (1999, 381). Edgar Boedeker writes that ‘presence-to-hand [sc. extantness] and readiness-to-hand [to-hand-ness] are just different ways of encountering what Heidegger calls “intraworldly entities”’ (2005, 159; cf. McDaniel 2012, 3), i.e. different ways intraworldly entities can be encountered as being. William J. Richardson suggests that to define gearedness (‘instrumental-ness’) is to ‘discover […] what constitutes [items of gear] as capable of revealing themselves as ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand]’, i.e. what enables gear to appear veridically as to-hand, yet fails to specify what being to-hand involves (1963, 53). Finally, John Richardson reads Heidegger as holding that something ‘may be either ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] or present-at-hand [sc. extant], depending upon the attitude in which it is encountered’ (1986, 48; cf. McDaniel 2012, 3). That is, being to-hand and being extant consist either in appearing as being certain ways or in being an object of certain intentional states (cf. Dreyfus 1991, xi; Frede 1993; Carman 2003, 136; Okrent 1988, 199).

I regard such an interpretation as inadequate but not incorrect. For although I interpret modes-of-being, like material-contents and constitutions of being, primarily as properties, i.e. ways something can be (Putnam 2002, 106), every property is also a way something can appear as being in that every way something can be is also a way something could in principle be represented as being in thought or experience.
1. Heidegger on Being

(McDowell 1994, 27). For if it is possible that $x$ is F, then the proposition that $x$ is F could be entertained, affirmed, or otherwise figure in intentional content. An object might both be and be experienced as being to-hand, for example: in which case, the experience is veridical.\(^{52}\) Hence, expounding §15 of BT, von Herrmann writes that ‘as a mode-of-being or way-of-being’ to-hand-ness is not only a mode or way of being, i.e. a way something could be, but also ‘a way-of-presence: a way beings can be present’: that is, a way something could appear as being (2005, 124).

Yet it is perhaps implausible that concepts as high level as modes-of-being figure in intentional content (see Siegel 2010; cf. Logue 2013). Hence, we might charitably read Heidegger as holding that appearing as instantiating properties distinctive to instantiators of a certain mode-of-being, e.g. gear-characteristics vis-à-vis to-hand beings, is sufficient for appearing as instantiating that mode-of-being. Hinting at this position in alluding to Heidegger’s position that ‘to-hand beings have at most suitability and unsuitability’ (1927/2006, 83), Frank Töpfer writes: ‘In technical, plying [hantierenden] engagement, I experience beings as to-hand objects: determined by suitability and unsuitability’ (2004, 37). Likewise, describing the tactile experience of opening a door, von Herrmann writes: ‘In touching the door, I understand it as a door; I understand its intraworldly significance and its extantness [sc. in the broad sense] in the sense of to-hand-ness. In opening the door and touching the handle, the door is not extant [sc. in the narrow sense] like a contemplated object of cognition; but rather it is “to-hand” for me and my engagement with it’ (2005, 73).

Finally, Kris McDaniel’s interpretation of the material-content gearedness differs from mine. McDaniel interprets instantiating the ‘whatness’ of gear, viz. gearedness (von Herrmann 2005: 21, 120; Heidegger 1927/1975, 432), as consisting in instantiating certain properties essentially: ‘The whatness of a being consists in the essential features of that being’ (2012, 13). Consequently, McDaniel interprets Heidegger’s claim that ‘[g]ear is essentially “something around for … [um zu ..]’ as

\(^{52}\) ‘When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. […] [O]ne can think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that very same thing, that spring has begun, can be the case’ (McDowell 1994, 27).
meaning not that being around for \((um\ zu)\) something is necessary for being gear, as on my reading, but rather that \(\text{being around for } (um\ zu)\ \text{something}\) is an essential property of every item of gear: such that gear’s existence, rather than merely something’s being gear, depends upon its being around for \((um\ zu)\) something (McDaniel 2012, 13; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). From this, we may infer that McDaniel would analogously regard Heidegger’s specification of the first condition for being gear, viz. ‘[t]o the being of gear belongs always, in each case, a gear-whole’ \((Ibid,\ 68)\), as meaning not that being a component of a gear-whole \((Zeugganzen)\) is necessary for being gear, as on my reading, but rather that \(\text{being a component of a gear-whole}\) is an essential property of every item of gear.\(^{53}\)

In rejoinder, I contend that Heidegger’s introduction of \textit{gearedness} as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ indicates that instantiating \textit{gearedness} consists not in instantiating certain properties essentially, but rather in being gear. Therefore, though instantiating certain properties essentially might be necessary for being gear, Heidegger’s definition of \textit{gearedness} as such is a specification not of the essential properties of gear, but of necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear. Consequently, Heidegger’s claims that ‘[g]ear is essentially “something around for … [um zu ..]”’ and ‘[t]o the being of gear belongs always, in each case, a gear-whole’ mean not that \(\text{being around for } (um\ zu)\ \text{something}\) and \(\text{being a component of a gear-whole}\) are essential properties of every item of gear, \textit{pace} McDaniel, but rather that being a component of a gear-whole and being around \((um\ zu)\) something is necessary for being gear.\(^{54}\) This alone does not imply that these properties are essential or accidental to items of gear.\(^{55}\)

In summary, this section explains that §15 of \textit{BT}’s explication of the being of gear comprises a definition \((\text{Umgrenzung})\) of \textit{gearedness} and an exhibition \((\text{Herausstellung})\) of \textit{to-hand-ness} because Heidegger divides the being \((\text{Sein})\) of a being \((\text{Seienden})\) exhaustively into a material-content \((\text{Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt})\) and mode-of-being \((\text{Seinsart})\). Heidegger terms this distinction between the two

\(^{53}\) Cf. §2.1.2.

\(^{54}\) See also §2.1.2.

\(^{55}\) See §2.2.2 for further criticism of McDaniel’s essentialist reading.
components of being (Seins) the ‘basic articulation of being’. Although Heidegger
does not distinguish material-contents and modes-of-being satisfactorily, §15 of BT’s
content suggests that Heidegger conceives material-contents as properties ‘defined’
(umgrenzt) in furnishing knowledge of conditions for being an entity of a certain
regional class and modes-of-being as properties ‘exhibited’ (herausgestellt) in
furnishing knowledge of basic concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of
entities of a certain regional class. In any case, in view of the basic articulation of
being, I conclude that Heidegger conceives a constitution of being as a conjunctive
property comprising a material-content and mode-of-being, e.g. gearedness and to-
hand-ness.

1.1.2. Being and regional essences

This section interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being
(Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence in a broadly Husserlian
sense: a property unifying a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Whereas
Husserl calls regional classes ‘regions’ (‘Regionen’) (1913, 19), Heidegger usually
calls them ‘districts’ (‘Bezirke’) or ‘subject-areas’ (‘Sachgebiete’) (1927/2006, 9).
Regional essences are a species of general essence: properties that ‘make an
individual to be a member of the kind or kinds of which it is a member’ (Schwartz
2009, 609). I say I identify constitutions of being with regional essences in a
‘broadly Husserlian sense’ because whereas Husserl introduces the term ‘region’ as
denoting only the ‘highest material genera’ (1913, 19), i.e. classes of entity that ‘have
no further genus above themselves’ (Ibid, 25), Heidegger posits constitutions of
being as unifying also certain more specific classes characterisable as ‘subdistricts’
or ‘subregions’ (1927/2006, 9). After clarifying Husserl’s terms ‘regional essence’
and ‘region’ by reference to Ideas I, I defend my interpretation of Heidegger by
analysing four passages: one from BT and three from PIKCP, which I dub the
passage’ respectively.

Husserl distinguishes material genera, whereof regions are a species, from formal genera. Husserl conceives a formal genus, e.g. the class of all objects (Gegenstände), as merely an ‘empty form’ of a region rather than a region proper (1913, 22). For whereas a region, as a material genus, is a division within the totality of entities (Ibid, 30), the class of all objects necessarily comprises every entity. For Husserl uses ‘object’ as extending to everything: things, properties, relations, states of affairs, sets, etc. (Ibid: 40-41, 21). Consequently, the property unifying the formal genus ‘object’, viz. objecthood (Gegenständlichkeit), is a ‘completely “empty” essence’; so Husserl regards only material essences as ““genuine” essences’ (Ibid, 21). The region ‘nature’, by contrast, which comprises every physicochemical entity (Ibid, 19), is a division within the totality of entities and ipso facto a material genus, because it is not necessarily true that everything is a natural entity. For even if physicalism were true at the actual world, it would remain at least conceptually possible that non-physicochemical entities exist. Therefore, the property unifying the region ‘nature’ on Husserl’s view, viz. nature, is a material rather than formal essence (Ibid, 19). Though Heidegger does not explicitly posit that constitutions of being unify only material genera in Husserl’s sense, I nevertheless interpret Heidegger as recognising this restriction because his examples of districts and subject-areas, which correspond to regions on Husserl’s view, include no classes characterisable as formal genera (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9).

Using ‘the eidos of [a] region’ synonymously with ‘regional essence’, Husserl characterises a regional essence as ‘a necessary material form of all regional objects’: that is, a property that is not merely formal whose instantiation is necessary and sufficient for belonging to a certain region (1913, 19). Husserl illustrates this by reference to the regional essence nature and region ‘nature’, which he regards as constituting the subject-matter of natural science: ‘[There] corresponds to all natural-scientific disciplines the eidetic science of physical nature generally (the ontology of nature), insofar as to the de facto nature corresponds a purely graspable eidos – the

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57 Though Husserl occasionally uses the term ‘region’ loosely as extending even to merely ‘formal genera’, e.g. the class of all objects (Gegenstände), rather than only to ‘material genera’, he indicates that ‘region’ strictly (schlechthin) denotes only material genera (1913, 21-22).

58 See pp. 47-49.
“essence” nature in general (Ibid, 19). Husserl’s claim that ‘to the de facto nature corresponds a purely grasppable eidos’ or ‘essence’ means that every natural entity instantiates a common property, viz. nature, rendering it a natural entity and as such a member of the region ‘nature’ and therewith an object of natural science (Ibid, 19). Moreover, Husserl conceives ‘the ontology of nature’, which he classifies as a ‘regional ontology’ or synonymously a ‘regional eidetic science’ (Ibid, 19), as investigating not natural entities themselves, unlike natural science, but rather the regional essence nature. In doing so, it confers knowledge of facts derivable from explicating nature considered in abstracto. Such facts supposedly ‘relate in a pure, unconditionally valid way to all possible objects in the region’ in that they relate to everything instantiating nature regardless of whether it is actual or merely possible (Ibid, 19). Heidegger adopts Husserl’s term ‘regional ontology’ to denote both the act of explicating a ‘regional constitution of being’, i.e. a constitution of being unifying a regional class, and a discipline charged with conducting such acts (Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 35-39).

§15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear is a regional ontology of gear, i.e. an account (logos) of the being (onto) of members of the regional class ‘gear’, and as such yields knowledge of gear derivable from explicating the being of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, purely in abstracto. In particular, as §2.1.2 reveals, Heidegger establishes that being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen) and being around for (um zu) something is necessary and sufficient for being gear. For Heidegger’s phenomenological data supposedly indicate that this is necessary and sufficient for belonging to the regional class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging, which is precisely the class of entity Heidegger denotes with the term ‘gear’ (1927/2006, 68). The metaphysical and epistemic role of the being of gear is thus analogous to that of the regional essence nature on Husserl’s account. More generally, the following passage from BT indicates that Heidegger posits different constitutions of being for different ‘districts’ (Bezirke) or ‘subject-areas’

59 Natural science encompasses physics, chemistry, and biology. Physical science, by contrast, encompasses only physics and chemistry: that is, only sciences studying non-living physicochemical entities.
60 See also §1.2.1.
61 See §2.1.1.
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

(Sachgebiete) – terms Heidegger uses almost synonymously with Husserl’s ‘regions’ as denoting regional classes of entity:

**Districts passage**

Being [Sein] is in each case the being of a being [Seienden]. The universe of beings [Seienden] can, in accordance with its various districts, become the field of an exposure and delimitation of determinate subject-areas. These for their part, e.g. history, nature, space, life, Dasein, language, and suchlike, can be thematised into objects in corresponding scientific investigations. Scientific research executes the highlighting and initial fixing of the subject-areas naïvely and roughly. The elaboration of the area in its basic structures in already accomplished in a certain way through pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the district of being [Seinsbezirkes] in which the subject-area is demarcated (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9).

Heidegger’s opening statement that ‘[b]eing is in each case the being of a being’ effectively announces that the districts passage pertains to the being (Sein) of beings (Seienden). Heidegger’s subsequent positing of ‘various districts’ inherent within ‘[t]he universe’, i.e. totality, ‘of beings’ implies that beings (Seiendes) can differ in their being (Sein). For beings (Seiendes) as such are presumably individuated by their being (Sein), just as coloured entities as such are individuated by their colours. Moreover, the term ‘district of being’ in the final sentence, whereof ‘district’ is an abbreviation, implies that districts and therewith subject-areas are unified by their members’ common being (Sein) or synonymously constitutions of being (Seinsverfassungen). Members of the subject-area and district ‘life’ (Leben), for instance, belong thereto because they instantiate a certain constitution of being, viz. that of living beings (Lebendem). The districts passage thus echoes Husserl’s recognition of a ‘division’ (Austeilung) of being (Seins) into ‘regions of being’ (Seinsregionen) (1913: 32, 58). Edith Stein likewise recognises ‘the division of beings [Seienden] into a plurality of objectual areas that are unified in themselves and distinguished from one another’ (Stein 1951/2006, 26). That Heidegger includes ‘nature’ in his examples of subject-areas further suggests that subject-areas correspond to Husserlian regions, since Husserl uses ‘nature’ as his paradigm
1. Heidegger on Being

example of a region (1913, 19). Finally, that Heidegger regards the subject-areas listed as ‘exposed’ and ‘delimited’ districts implies that a district’s becoming a subject-area is a mere Cambridge change.\(^{62}\) For nothing changes in a district’s becoming a subject-area except the cognitive relationship between enquirers and that district. Hence, von Herrmann writes that upon being acknowledged, ‘districts of beings can then become expressly exposed and delimited as “determinate subject-areas”’ (1987, 83). Therefore, Heidegger regards all subject-areas mentioned in the third sentence of the districts passage also as districts.

One datum hindering identifying districts with Husserlian regions is that some districts mentioned in the districts passage are seemingly subdistricts and therefore not ‘highest material genera’ – that is, genera that ‘have no further genus above themselves’ – and so fail to conform to the letter of Husserl’s definition of ‘region’ (Husserl 1913: 19, 25). ‘Life’, for instance, is presumably a subdistrict of ‘nature’ and ‘Dasein’ a subdistrict of ‘life’ and therefore also a subdistrict of ‘nature’. This poses no significant problem for my interpretation, however. For even Husserl, who calls subregions ‘individual components of genera [Gattungskomponenten]’, nonetheless regards subregions as unified by properties capable of undergoing regional ontological investigation and thus as sufficiently general that they may be regarded, broadly speaking, as regions in their own right. This is implied by Husserl’s positing a ‘complex of ontological disciplines’, i.e. disciplines investigating the being (onto) of beings, ‘corresponding to the individual components of [a] region’ (1913, 19), e.g. the region ‘nature’ as comprising the subregions investigated by the various natural sciences. Moreover, every district mentioned in the districts passage is sufficiently general that it could legitimately constitute the subject-matter of a science or group of sciences in the manner Husserl outlines. Hence, expounding the districts passage, von Herrmann writes:

[S]ubject-areas, which can become scientific fields of research, are enumerated. ‘History’ is the subject-area of historical beings, which become

\(^{62}\) ‘[A] Cambridge change in a thing is a change in the descriptions (truly) borne by the thing’, including mere ‘changes in the relational predicates of a thing, such as when I change from having “non-brother” true of me to having “brother” true of me, just when my mother gives birth to a second son’ (Mortensen 2011).
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

objectified in view of various aspects in the historical sciences. ‘Nature’ is the [subject-area of] natural beings: both the non-living and the living, in distinction from humans as historical beings, and as this the subject-area that can be thematised expressly in the manifold natural sciences. ‘Space’ is that subject-area that can be a theme of the science of space – of geometry – and generally of mathematics. ‘Life’ encompasses the subject-area of non-human living beings, plants and animals, which can be objectified in the biological natural sciences. ‘Dasein’ here names, in distinction from the ‘life’ just named, ‘man’ as an independent subject-area, which as the historical being can be a field of research of the historical sciences and at the same time of other sciences like anthropology or psychology. ‘Language’ is, as spoken and written language, that subject-area that can be investigated scientifically and therein objectified in the philological sciences. The respective subject-area becomes in scientific enquiry a scientific area of objects and research (1987, 83-84).

Incidentally, although each of the districts mentioned in the districts passage is presumably actually populated – in that there are actual historical, natural, spatial, living, human, and linguistic entities – it is uncharitable to read Heidegger as positively affirming therein that they are actually populated. For Heidegger distinguishes philosophy, which the districts passage obviously exemplifies, from other sciences (Wissenschaften) in that philosophy is ‘non-positive’ – that is, posits nothing about the actual world – instead restricting itself to purely conceptual (‘ontological’) enquiry (1927/1975, 17). In positing various districts inherent within ‘[t]he universe of beings’, then, Heidegger is positing not that entities of various classes, e.g. natural entities and linguistic entities, actually exist, but merely that there are diverse constitutions of being that entities could instantiate, e.g. that there could be natural entities and linguistic entities. Reading the districts passage thus chimes with Husserl’s characterisation of a region as encompassing ‘the ideal totality of possible individuals’ instantiating the corresponding regional essence (1913, 36). For this signifies that a regional class, e.g. ‘nature’, comprises not only actual instantiators of the corresponding regional essence, e.g. actual natural entities, but

63 See §1.2.1.
even merely possible instantiators of that essence, e.g. natural entities existing only at non-actual possible worlds.

Finally, although the districts passage’s reference to ‘pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the district of being in which [a] subject-area is demarcated’ ostensibly implies that every district that could become a subject-area undergoes pre-scientific experience and interpretation (1927/2006, 9), this is also an uncharitable reading. For Heidegger observes elsewhere that ‘[n]ot all beings and determinate areas [sc. subject-areas] thereof are accessible at every time and to everyone in the same way’: adding that although ‘manifold areas of beings were discovered very early’, e.g. ‘nature, space, soul’, ‘possibilities of access […] to beings are variable in different historical contexts’ (1927/1975, 30). This is plausible in respect to, for instance, the class of all quantum systems: whereof something is a member just in case it is ‘a physical system that behaves exactly in the way […] quantum mechanics describes’ (Lee 2006, 9; cf. Sanz 2012), which is plausibly sufficiently general to qualify as a district. For this district could neither be ‘exposed’ and ‘delimited’ such that it became a subject-area nor even discovered without sophisticated scientific knowledge, so could undergo no pre-scientific experience and interpretation. The district ‘quantum systems’, which constitutes the subject-matter of quantum mechanics, is thus quite unlike the district ‘life’, which undergoes pre-scientific experience and interpretation reflected by, for example, the presence of folk psychological concepts in pre-scientific thought and discourse (see Ravenscroft 2010).\(^64\) Therefore, we should interpret the districts passage charitably as implying only that districts that could become subject-areas undergo pre-scientific experience and interpretation in many cases or perhaps even typically: as with seemingly all the districts listed therein.\(^65\)

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\(^{64}\) In this sense, ‘folk psychology’ denotes ‘a psychological theory constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse’ (Ravenscroft 2010).  
\(^{65}\) Conceiving regional ontology like Husserl and Heidegger, Edith Stein writes that philosophy ‘has that to investigate which the individual sciences assimilate from pre-scientific thought as familiar and self-evident’ (1951/2006, 26). Sciences such as quantum mechanics presumably assimilate very little if anything from pre-scientific thought.
The foregoing analysis of the districts passage indicates that Heidegger conceives the being (Sein) and thus constitutions of being (Seinsverfassungen) of beings (Seienden) as rendering them members of districts of being (Seinsbezirke) and therewith, in many cases, of subject-areas (Sachgebiete): both whereof resemble Husserlian regions in being highly general (‘regional’) classes of entity. From this, we may infer that the ‘being’ or synonymously ‘constitution of being’ of a being is nothing other than a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class. The constitution of being of natural beings, for example, viz. natural-thingliness and nature (von Herrmann 2008, 241), whose instantiation renders something a natural entity, unifies the regional class ‘nature’. Analogously, although Heidegger does not explicitly posit the district ‘gear’, we may safely infer from the foregoing that Heidegger would regard something’s instantiating the constitution of being of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, as rendering it gear and thereby a member of the regional class ‘gear’.

My interpretation is supported further by PIKCPR’s discussion of explications of constitutions of being, which Heidegger therein terms ‘outlines’ or ‘outlinings’ (Entwürfe). I adduce three passages in particular therefrom as strongly supporting my interpretation of constitutions of being: calling these the ‘basic-concepts passage’, ‘outlines passage’, and ‘Galileo-Kepler passage’ respectively. The basic-concepts passage explains that, in their inception, sciences ‘objectify’ subject-areas (herein abbreviated as ‘areas’) in appropriating districts as their subject-matters. In doing so, sciences formulate basic conceptions of their respective subject-matters articulated through basic concepts (Grundbegriffe).

**Basic-concepts passage**

The genesis of a science consummates itself in the objectification of an area [sc. subject-area] of beings; and that means: in the development of an understanding of the constitution of being of the beings concerned. In the development of this understanding of being, the concepts arise that delimit, e.g., what characterises historical actuality as such, what characterises beings as living beings at root: i.e., the basic concepts of the science concerned. With the development of the basic concepts, the respective ground and basis
1. Heidegger on Being

of the particular science and its area [sc. subject-area] is demarcated
(Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 28).

To illustrate Heidegger’s points using one of his examples, we may say that biology objectifies the regional class ‘life’ and therein ‘develops an understanding’ of the constitution of being of living beings that it articulates through biological ‘basic concepts’, which ‘delimit […] what characterises living beings at root’. Basic concepts of contemporary biology, for example, might include concepts such as evolution, metabolism, mutation, and self-replication. Such concepts are basic biological concepts because they express ‘defining characteristics of life’ (Pennock 2012, 8), i.e. characteristics living entities exhibit invariably or at least for the most part, and thus ‘delimit […] what characterises living beings at root’.66

The basic-concepts passage echoes Husserl’s characterisation of ‘regional categories’, a term Husserl uses interchangeably with ‘regional basic concepts’ and thus synonymously with Heidegger’s ‘basic concepts’, as ‘express[ing] that which belongs peculiarly to the regional essence’ unifying the corresponding region, i.e. ‘what must characterise any individual object within the region’ (Husserl 1913, 31).

Husserl adds that regional categories achieve this ‘on the strength of the regional axioms’: that is, ‘truths grounded in the regional essence’. For regional categories are those special concepts figuring in regional axioms (Ibid, 31). Applying this to §15 of BT, that necessarily every item of gear is a component of a gear-whole and that necessarily every item of gear is around for (um zu) something qualify as regional axioms relative to the regional class ‘gear’ and as such are grounded in the regional essence of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, in that their truth follows from the instantiation conditions of that regional essence. Consequently, Heidegger’s basic concepts around-for, reference, and wherefore qualify as regional categories because referring (Verweisung) to a wherefore (Wozu or Wofür) is necessary for being around for (um zu) something, which is necessary for satisfying those conditions.67 Husserl

66 Such concepts, defined in certain ways, might also articulate a basic conception of living entities as concepts through which biological properties ascribed thereto and figuring in biological laws of nature are ultimately defined. For detailed analysis of such definitional relationships between concepts, see Chalmers 2012.
67 See §2.1.2.
additionally characterises regional axioms as ‘a priori’ truths because they are supposedly knowable purely through explicating the corresponding regional essence in abstracto, e.g. nature, which requires no a posteriori knowledge of actual instantiators thereof, e.g. knowledge of which properties actual natural entities instantiate or even that there are actual natural entities (Husserl 1913, 31).68

Significantly for establishing what Heidegger means by the ‘being’ (Sein) of a being (Seienden), the basic-concepts passage states that basic concepts arise through ‘the development of an understanding of the constitution of being’ of living beings (1927-1928/1977, 28). This implies that the constitution of being of living beings is nothing other than their essence as living beings. For basic biological concepts, as previously intimated, articulate an understanding of ‘what it is to be’ a living being. Therefore, the constitution of being of living beings is identifiable with the regional essence unifying the regional class ‘life’: that is, the property unifying the class of all living entities. In PIK CPR, Heidegger terms both the act and product of explicating a constitution of being an ‘outlining’ or ‘outline’ (Entwurf) thereof. The following passage illustrates this by reference to the ‘outlining’ of ‘the constitution of being of the region “nature”’, i.e. the constitution of being unifying the regional class ‘nature’:

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68 I bracket Husserl’s characterisation of regional axioms as specifically synthetic a priori truths because of the dubiousness of the analytic/synthetic distinction and concomitant uncharitableness of interpreting Heidegger’s position through it (Husserl 1913, 37). Although Heidegger admittedly connects truths about properties in abstracto to Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori truths in PIK CPR (1927-1928/1977, 51-56), it is unclear to what extent Heidegger endorses the latter. Furthermore, compare Husserl’s conception of regional axioms to Einstein’s account of deriving regional axioms (‘principles’) of physics: ‘The method of the theorist brings with it that he needs as a foundation general presuppositions, so called “principles”, from which he can deduce consequences. His activity therefore divides into two parts. He must firstly seek out those principles, secondly develop those consequences flowing from the principles. […] [For] […] the first of the tasks mentioned – namely, that of seeking out principles that should serve as the basis of the deduction – […] there is no learnable, systematically applicable method that leads to the goal. The researcher must rather elicit [ableuschen] those general principles from nature, as it were, in that he observes general aims in great complexes of experiential facts that allow themselves to be formulated sharply’ (1930/2010, 123). Though Einstein’s talk of ‘observing general aims in great complexes of experiential facts’ ostensibly suggests that he regards knowledge of regional axioms as attainable only through a posteriori, empirical research, his acknowledgement that ‘there is no learnable, systematically applicable method that leads to’ regional axioms might imply that knowledge of regional axioms is undervisible from empirical research alone and thus perhaps involves a priori elements.
1. Heidegger on Being

Outlines passage

In the outlining of the constitution of being of an area [sc. subject-area] – of the area ‘nature’, for example – lies a reflection on what the beings in general are and how they are. The understanding of being becomes explicit in a certain way, and it understands what it understands so as to conceptualise it. The outlining of the constitution of being of the region ‘nature’ is a definition of the basic concepts of this area: [e.g.] motion, body, location, time (1927-1928/1977, 33).

Heidegger’s reference in the first sentence to ‘what’ and ‘how’ certain beings ‘in general are’ alludes to his distinction between material-contents and modes-of-being. For, as §1.1.1 noted, Heidegger also calls the material-content and mode-of-being of certain beings their ‘what-being’ and ‘how-being’ respectively: designating gearedness and to-hand-ness, for example, as the what-being and how-being of gear respectively (von Herrmann 2005: 21, 120). The outlines passage characterises the outlining of the constitution of being unifying the regional class ‘nature’ as a ‘definition of the basic concepts of this area’. For explicating the being of natural beings involves propounding a specific understanding (‘definition’) of basic physicochemical concepts such as motion, body, location, and time. That such concepts admit diverse definitions is indicated by historical changes in conceptions of motion, body, space, and time – as in the progression from classical to relativistic physics, for instance (Tahko 2012, 41). Most pertinently herein, the outlines passage designates ‘the constitution of being of an area’ as that which is ‘outlined’ (entworfen) in furnishing basic concepts for comprehending members thereof. This again implies that constitutions of being are regional essences, since the object of investigations yielding basic concepts pertaining to a regional class could only be the property unifying that class.

§15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear exemplifies the outlining of a constitution of being as the outlines passage describes. This involves deriving concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of gear, i.e. ‘basic concepts’ or ‘regional categories’ pertaining to the regional class ‘gear’, from necessary and
sufficient conditions for being gear. As §1.1.1 noted, Heidegger conceives the former task as that of ‘exhibiting’ the mode-of-being of gear, viz. to-hand-ness, and the latter as that of ‘defining’ the material-content of gear, viz. gearedness. Accomplishing these tasks constitutes ‘outlining’ the being of gear because gearedness and to-hand-ness is the constitution of being proper to gear: comprising the material-content gearedness, as ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), and the mode-of-being to-hand-ness as ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (Ibid, 69). Furthermore, following Kant’s discussion of the advent of Galilean physics in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1781/1966, B xiv; Christensen 1999, 415-417), Heidegger cites a historical example of an outlining of a constitution of being in recounting Galileo and Kepler’s institution of classical physics:

Galileo-Kepler passage

The basic achievement of Galileo and Kepler was the explicit execution of the mathematical outlining of nature. But what is that other than the outlining of that constitution [Verfassung] that constitutes the being [Seiende] ‘nature’ (in the sense of physico-material beings as such), i.e. the outlining of the constitution of being of nature. The outlining of nature, however, is the priorly executed disclosure of that as which nature qua nature must be understood in advance. The mathematical outlining of nature thus makes that explicit and determines that as a closed area [sc. subject-area] which was hitherto intended in all observational, experimental, calculative, and measuring natural-scientific cognition [Natuerkenntnis]. With this outlining, the constitution of being of the beings that we call ‘nature’ obtains an initial, explicit conceptual determinacy […] Only in the light of the mathematical outlining of nature, i.e. in the definition through the basic concepts body, motion, velocity, time, do particular natural-facts become accessible as natural-facts (1927-1928/1977, 31).

The Galileo-Kepler passage presents Galileo and Kepler as ‘mathematical[ly] outlining’ ‘the constitution of being of nature’, which Heidegger theretofore explained as involving conceiving nature as ‘a closed nexus of changes of location of
1. Heidegger on Being

material bodies in time’ (*Ibid*, 31; cf. Christensen 1999, 415-417).69 This recalls Husserl’s characterisation of classical physics as founded on the principle ‘that it is the essence of a material thing to be *res extensa*’ (1913, 24). Einstein expresses a similar point regarding relativistic physics in stating that ‘[t]he physical world is represented by a four-dimensionalistic physics in stating that ‘[t]he physical world is represented by a four-dimensionalistic continuum’ (1930/2010, 130). The Galileo-Kepler passage designates the constitution of being of nature as ‘that constitution that constitutes the being [Seiende] “nature”’ because the constitution of being of nature is that property whose instantiation constitutes something as a natural being, i.e. the property unifying the regional class ‘nature’. The Galileo-Kepler passage further characterises Galileo and Kepler’s outlining of the being of natural beings as a ‘disclosure of that as which nature qua nature must be understood in advance’. This implies, in accordance with the outlines passage, that the being of natural beings is identical with ‘that as which nature qua nature must be understood in advance’. It is thus identical because anyone pursuing natural-scientific knowledge *must* proceed on the basis of a foundational comprehension of (‘understand in advance’) the regional essence of natural beings, as articulated through basic physicochemical concepts such as body, motion, velocity, and time. For no one lacking such basic concepts could formulate natural-scientific questions and hypotheses, e.g. questions and hypotheses about laws governing the motions of bodies in time, and so could attain no natural-scientific knowledge.

In conclusion, the foregoing textual data indicate that Heidegger conceives the being (*Sein*) or synonymously constitution of being (*Seinsverfassung*) of a being (*Seienden*) as a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class. Such classes are typically, if not invariably, sufficiently general that they can legitimately constitute subject-matters of sciences, e.g. as the districts of ‘nature’ and ‘life’ constitute the subject-matters of natural science and biology respectively. Moreover, outlining (*entwerfend*) the constitution of being unifying a regional class, i.e. the common being (*Sein*) of the members thereof, yields knowledge of basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) enabling a

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69 Christensen expounds the aforementioned passage from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as explaining similarly that ‘the great accomplishment of Galileo and the new science generally is that it discovers the right way to engage in the study of nature: the new student of nature first conceives nature in such a way that it can serve as witness to the truth or falsity of knowledge-claims, then actually puts it in the witness box of experiment and observes the answers nature gives’ (Christensen 1999, 416; cf. Kant 1781/1966, B xiv).
foundational comprehension of its members, e.g. as physicochemical and biological basic concepts enable a foundational comprehension of natural entities and living entities respectively.

Interpretations resembling mine are advocated at least implicitly by Bill Blattner, Herman Philipse, Bruin Christensen, and Denis McManus. Blattner interprets a constitution of being as an ‘ontological framework’: a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an entity of a certain class. For example, ‘one standard that items must meet in order to be substances is persistence through time. In this case, persistence through time belongs to the framework of substantiality (the being of substances)’ (Blattner 1999, 5). This is construable, in line with my interpretation of Heidegger, as meaning simply that persisting through time is an instantiation condition of substantiality: that is, the being (Sein) and, as such, regional essence of substances (Heidegger 1927/2006, 90). Therefore, Blattner is construable as likewise identifying constitutions of being with regional essences. Philipse adverts to ‘a marked tendency in Sein und Zeit to interpret being as the ontological constitution [sc. constitution of being] of specific beings’ (1998, 35). Philipse’s subsequent exposition of Heideggerian regional ontology suggests that he too interprets constitutions of being as properties unifying regional classes. Philipse here uses ‘manner of being’, ‘mode of being’, and ‘Seinsweise’ to denote modes-of-being in the broad sense, i.e. constitutions of being (‘ontological constitutions’):

In a great number of passages of Sein und Zeit, being is conceived of as the manner of being or ontological constitution [...] of specific kinds of beings, such as Dasein, artifacts, natural phenomena, mathematical objects, and so on. According to this conception, [...] phenomenology has to elucidate and conceptualize the ontological constitution (Seinsweise) of the various types of being (“regions”) by pretheoretically describing these modes of being [...] Because Heidegger holds that each region or kind of being [sc. Seienden] has a specific ontological constitution, the phenomenological

70 See p. 35 for the broad and narrow senses of ‘mode-of-being’.
Alluding to the outlines passage, Christensen writes regarding ‘outlines’ (Entwürfe) of constitutions of being: ‘Each Entwurf is […] a certain way of fleshing out the maximally abstract or formal notion of what it is to be. More accurately, it is the fleshing out of those maximally abstract characteristics of entities which according to Husserl constitute the subject-matter of formal [sc. regional] ontology’, e.g. the regional essence of natural entities (Christensen 1999, 434). An outline of the being of nature, for instance, ‘can be described as articulating what it is to be in nature’ (Ibid, 434). Christensen’s implicit definition of a constitution of being, as that which is ‘outlined’ (entworfen) in ‘fleshing out […] what it is to be’ of a certain class, as a ‘maximally abstract characteristic’ alludes to Husserl’s characterisation of a regional essence as a property unifying one of the ‘highest material genera’ of entity (Husserl 1913, 19): that is, classes that ‘have no further genus above themselves’ (Ibid, 25).

Moreover, Christensen is correct in noting that, for example, an outline of the being of natural beings ‘can be described as articulating what it is to be in nature’ (1999, 434). For, as §15 of BT exemplifies, Heidegger conceives outlines as furnishing basic concepts for comprehending entities of a certain regional class, e.g. ‘gear’, through defining ‘what it is to be’ a member of that regional class, e.g. to be gear: that is, through specifying conditions for being a member thereof and therewith instantiation conditions of the corresponding material-content, e.g. gearedness, and constitution of being, e.g. gearedness and to-hand-ness.

Finally, Denis McManus characterises ‘Zuhandenes’ and ‘Vorhandenes’, i.e. instantiators of the modes-of-being to-hand-ness and extantness respectively, simply as ‘kinds of entity’ (2012a: 52, 54, 65). This implies that to-hand-ness and extantness, and therewith perhaps the constitutions of being of gear and natural beings respectively, are kind properties – that is, properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being an entity of a certain kind (see Hawley and Bird 2011). Although regional essences, as properties unifying classes, are arguably characterisable as kind properties – and indeed natural kind properties – I have
conservatively refrained from employing the term ‘kind property’ in my interpretation to avoid attributing to Heidegger a distinction between kind properties and properties of other classes, which would be insufficiently supported by textual data.

1.1.3 Objections and rival interpretations

There are various possible objections and rivals to my interpretation of constitutions of being as regional essences. First, Heidegger’s frequent use of the definite noun-phrase ‘the mode-of-being of \( x \)’ in \( BT \) implies that nothing instantiates more than one mode-of-being simultaneously: whether in the narrow or broad sense.\(^{71}\) But interpreting constitutions of being as regional essences implies that a single entity could instantiate more than one constitution of being – and thus, \textit{ipso facto}, more than one mode-of-being in the broad sense – and therewith, in at least many cases, more than one mode-of-being in the narrow sense.\(^{72}\) As §2.2 contends, for example, a single item of gear might instantiate both the mode-of-being of gear, \textit{viz. to-hand-ness}, and the mode-of-being of natural beings, \textit{viz. nature (extantness in the narrow sense)}, simultaneously. I offer two rejoinders to this objection. First, in every case wherein Heidegger employs the phrase ‘the mode-of-being of \( x \)’, Heidegger may be read as picking out \( x \) in such a way that it is clear which mode-of-being Heidegger intends that phrase to denote. For instance, Heidegger speaks of ‘the mode-of-being of living beings \([\text{Lebendem}]\) as such’ and ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (1927/2006: 10, 68). \textit{Life} may be designated ‘the mode-of-being of living beings as such’, even though living entities might also instantiate other modes-of-being such as \textit{nature} and \textit{Existence (Ibid, 49-50)}, because \textit{life} is the mode-of-being \textit{proper} to living beings. Similarly, even though items of gear might instantiate other modes-of-being in addition to \textit{to-hand-ness}, \textit{to-hand-ness}’s status as the mode-of-being \textit{proper} to gear – in that it figures in the being of gear: \textit{gearedness and to-hand-ness} – means that \textit{to-hand-ness} may be designated ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’.

\(^{71}\) (1927/2006: 9-10, 11, 50, 55, 60, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 82, 84, 85, 96, 97, 303). See Abbott 2005 for why definite noun-phrases imply this.

\(^{72}\) See p. 35 for the broad and narrow senses of ‘mode-of-being’. 
Second, Heidegger may be interpreted as holding that certain modes-of-being stand in determinable-determinate relationships such that some modes-of-being ‘include’ others. Husserl adverts to such ‘inclusion’ relationships between essences (Wesen), which include regional essences, when he writes that ‘[t]he eidetic singularity’ – that is, a specific essence (Husserl 1913, 30) – ‘implies all the generalities’, i.e. more general essences, ‘lying above it, which for their part “lie in one another” hierarchically: the higher always in the lower’ (Ibid, 31). Michael Loux suggests similarly that ‘the kinds to which a thing belongs form a nested hierarchy’; ‘the more general kinds are included in or implied by the less general kinds in the hierarchy’ (2006, 115). Such ‘inclusion’ relationships between modes-of-being might imply that although nothing instantiates more than one mode-of-being simultaneously, something may nevertheless be exactly as if it instantiated more than one mode-of-being by virtue of such ‘inclusion’ relationships. For example, by virtue of to-hand-ness’s ‘inclusion’ of nature, a to-hand entity might be exactly as if it instantiated both to-hand-ness and nature (extantness in the narrow sense) even though it in fact instantiates only to-hand-ness.

The correctness of this interpretation is suggested by Heidegger’s intimation that via an act of ‘disregarding’ (Absehen), instantiators of certain modes-of-being are justifiably investigable as though they instantiated another mode-of-being.73 For if such entities were not at least exactly as if they instantiated the latter mode-of-being, investigating them as though they instantiated it would be unjustifiable. For example: Heidegger writes regarding ‘nature’, in the sense of the natural environment, that ‘its mode-of-being as to-hand can be disregarded, it itself becoming discovered and determined merely in its pure extantness’ (1927/2006, 70). That is: one may prescind or abstract from the natural environment’s instantiation of to-hand-ness in order to investigate it as though it merely instantiated extantness in the narrow sense (nature), as might occur in natural-scientific enquiry (von Herrmann 2005, 127). Heidegger’s phrase ‘its pure extantness’, moreover, implies that the natural environment is indeed at least exactly as if it instantiated extantness. Similarly, Heidegger writes regarding considering a window as to-hand gear and a merely extant (natural) thing: ‘We can conceal [verdecken] the gear-characteristics [Zeugcharaktere] initially emerging in

73 See §2.2.1 for further discussion of this issue.
natural engagement with such things as a window, which constitute its characteristic of use, and consider the window merely as an extant thing’ (1927/1975, 96). That is, we can prescind or abstract from the properties characterising the window as to-hand gear (‘gear-characteristics’), and therewith from its to-hand-ness, so as to consider it as if it were merely extant in the narrow sense (natural).\footnote{As p. 16 noted, I follow Heidegger in using ‘gear-characteristics’ to denote properties peculiar to gear and therewith of to-hand entities, e.g. around-for references, in distinction from other properties, e.g. physicochemical properties.}

That to-hand-ness ‘includes’ extantness (nature) also explains Heidegger’s describing to-hand-ness as ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear, in which it manifests itself from itself’ (1927/2006: 69), despite intimating that to-hand entities are also natural (extant in the narrow sense) and can therefore be justifiably investigated as such. For as a determinate of extantness (nature), to-hand-ness is characterisable as the mode-of-being ‘in which [gear] manifests itself from itself’ in the same way that, say, a living being may be said to ‘manifest itself from itself’ only when appearing as living rather than as merely natural. Given to-hand-ness’s ‘inclusion’ of extantness (nature), moreover, I speculatively yet charitably interpret Heidegger as holding that instantiating the being of gear as a whole (gearedness and to-hand-ness) implies instantiating the being of the natural (natural-thingliness and nature). This entails that, necessarily, every item of gear is a physicochemical entity and that the district ‘gear’ is a proper subdistrict of the district ‘nature’: just as Heidegger presumably regards the district ‘Dasein’ as a proper subdistrict of the district ‘life’, which is in turn presumably a proper subdistrict of the district ‘nature’ (1927/2006: 9, 150, 194).\footnote{See pp. 47-48. See also §2.2 for further discussion of such issues.}

Regarding life and Existence, i.e. the mode-of-being of Dasein (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36-37), Heidegger writes: ‘Life is its own mode-of-being, but essentially accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative interpretation; it determines what must be so that such a thing as mere life can be’ (1927/2006, 50; cf. ibid, 194). Subsequently, moreover, Heidegger writes that life ‘can be ontologically fixed only in privative orientation towards Dasein. Even Dasein...
can be considered as pure life. In that case, it moves – for the biologico-physiological perspective – into the district of being that we know as the animal and plant world. In this field, data and statistics about the lifespans of plants, animals, and human beings can be obtained’ (Ibid, 246). This suggests that instantiators of Existence are justifiably investigable as though they also instantiated life, i.e. investigable with regard to their merely biological properties rather than their specifically human properties, which is construable as presupposing that Existence ‘includes’ life such that although instantiators of Existence might instantiate no mode-of-being besides Existence, they are nonetheless exactly as if they instantiated both Existence and life.

The second objection targets my identification of the being (Seins) of a being (Seienden) with a property. §15 of BT states that its explication of the being of beings is ‘no cognising of beingful [seiender] qualities of beings, but rather a determining of the structure of their being’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67). This might suggest that the being of a being is not among its ‘beingful qualities’, since otherwise investigating its being would surely involve ‘cognising of beingful qualities’. Assuming that being a property is sufficient for being a beingful quality, it seemingly follows that the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) is not a property. Hence, expounding Heidegger’s concept of a ‘mode-of-being’, albeit without specifying the narrow or broad sense, Frank Töpfer writes:

Understood or disclosed modes-of-being represent an intermediate dimension belonging neither merely on the side of the ‘subject’ nor merely on the side of the ‘object’: they characterise the experienced being, yet are not its real, immanent properties, but rather a correlate of an act of understanding [Verstehens] for which the being appears in its mode-of-being (2004, 37).

Töpfer adds that ‘being [Sein] is […] no ontic, immanent property of a being and cannot be clarified at all in its significance otherwise than from its givenness in intentional relationships’, i.e. through its figuring in content of intentional states (Ibid, 37). In rejoinder, I read Heidegger’s distinction between ‘cognising of beingful
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

qualities’ and ‘determining of the structure of [beings’] being’ not as signifying that the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) is not a property, but rather as distinguishing between ascertaining which properties entities actually instantiate and explicating the being of beings. §15 of BT, for example, does not involve establishing that something actually is gear or instantiates around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen), but rather only the specification of conditions for being gear and provision of basic concepts enabling knowledge of properties such as around-for references in abstracto. Consequently, ‘determining the structure of [gear’s] being’ involves no ‘cognising of beingful qualities’, i.e. ascertaining actual instantiation of properties.76

Incidentally, Töpfer’s notion that modes-of-being occupy ‘an intermediate dimension’ between subjects and objects is construable as implying that modes-of-being are ‘a priori categories of the understanding’, as Taylor Carman maintains, such that a mode-of-being is ‘not grounded in but grounds our experience of objects’ (Carman 2003, 136). For a priori categories of the understanding are not derived from experience, and so do not belong ‘merely on the side of the “object”’ as Töpfer puts it, but yet as ‘ways of appearing’ (Erscheinungsweisen) are ways objects can appear as being and so do not belong ‘merely on the side of the “subject”’ (Töpfer 2004, 37). Although Heidegger might indeed deny that some modes-of-being are derived from experience in light of, for example, his position that the nature of certain intentional states determines that their objects invariably appear therein as instantiating certain modes-of-being in the narrow sense – e.g. mundane concern and to-hand-ness, and theoretical contemplation (Betrachtung) and nature (extantness in the narrow sense) (Heidegger 1927/2006: 11, 28; Töpfer 2004, 37; von Herrmann 1987, 131) – this epistemic position in no way compromises such modes-of-being’s status as properties. Heidegger characterises to-hand-ness, for instance, which is the mode-of-being objects supposedly invariably appear as instantiating in mundane concern, as no ‘mere characteristic of conception’, but rather ‘the ontologico-categorial determination of [some] beings, as they are “in themselves”’ (1927/2006, 71): thus implying that to-hand-ness is not merely a way something can appear as

76 See §1.2.1 for further discussion of the relationship between such investigations.
being, but also a way something can be. Since whether modes-of-being and constitutions of being are a priori categories of the understanding is a question for epistemology or the philosophy of mind, I discuss it no further herein. For this thesis deals exclusively with §15 of BT's explication of the being of gear, whose content is metaphysical and phenomenological.

Fifth, in reading Heidegger as holding that each mode-of-being and therewith constitution of being confers a capacity to instantiate properties in a certain way, Mark Okrent and Herman Philipse imply that being a regional essence is not sufficient for being a constitution of being. For conferring a capacity to instantiate properties in a certain way is not necessary for being a regional essence, since a regional essence is simply a property unifying a regional class. Okrent illustrates his interpretation by contrasting Existence, i.e. the mode-of-being of Dasein (Heidegger 1927/1975, 36-37), with substantiality, i.e. the supposed mode-of-being of substances (cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 90). Upon relating Heidegger’s distinctions between constitutions of being to distinctions between Aristotelian ontological categories, Okrent begins by articulating a simple interpretation that he subsequently rejects:

The most obvious way […] to interpret Heidegger's suggestion that Dasein has a kind of being [sc. mode-of-being] distinct from substances and all other kinds of being [sc. Seienden] is to think of Heidegger's ‘existence’ [sc. Existence] as a distinctive way in which substances can be modified. Thus, it might be thought that just as all sensible substances can be qualified in having a temporal location, and all physical substances are modifiable by spatial position and extension, those substances that happen to be Dasein are characterizable by intentional properties, such as believing that or seeing that (1988, 20).

On this reading, then, Existence is merely a property whose instantiation confers the capacity to instantiate intentional properties, e.g. believing that lead is a metal and

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77 See pp. 167-170 for further analysis of this quotation.
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

seeing that Socrates is sitting. Okrent insists, however, that this position ‘is definitely not Heidegger's account of the ontological distinctiveness of Dasein’ (Ibid, 20), proceeding to articulate his own interpretation thus:

Existing beings, Dasein, are both individuals and primary subjects of predication. Dasein isn’t a substance with a distinctive kind of essential property; for Heidegger, it is a subject of predication which is not a substance at all. This means that for Heidegger it is always wrong to think of existence [sc. Existence] or of being self-intending as a property of some ordinary substance. Rather, the difference between beings that [E]xist and ordinary substances is thought of as a difference in the way they are subjects that can be modified, and a difference in what it is for each of these kinds of being [sc. Seienden] to be modified. What ontologically differentiates Dasein from substance is not that the one can be an individual subject and the other cannot but that what it is to have properties (to be an individual subject) is different for substances than it is for [E]xisting beings (Ibid, 20).

According to Okrent, then, Heidegger categorically denies that Dasein, as the paradigmatic instantiator of Existence, is a substance and therefore denies that being Dasein consists in being ‘a substance with a distinctive kind of essential property’, e.g. the property of being capable of instantiating intentional properties or of being self-intending. Hence, whilst interpreting Existence as identical with the property being self-intending, Okrent interprets Heidegger as accordingly denying that Existence is a ‘property of some ordinary substance’ (Ibid, 20). Okrent instead reads Heidegger as distinguishing instantiators of Existence from substances ‘in the way they are subjects that can be modified’, i.e. the way they can instantiate properties: such that there is ‘a difference in what it is for each of these kinds of being’, viz. Existing beings and substances, ‘to be modified’, i.e. instantiate properties (cf. ibid, 21). This implies that ‘[w]hat ontologically differentiates Dasein from substance’ is ‘that what it is to have properties […] is different for substances than it is for [E]xisting beings’ (Ibid, 20). Therefore, Dasein instantiates properties in a different way from substances. Okrent interprets such differences between ways of instantiating properties as the hallmark of ‘a difference in being’, i.e. in constitution
1. Heidegger on Being

of being, as opposed to a mere ‘difference in property’, i.e. a merely ontic difference (Ibid, 21).

Okrent supports his reading by adverting to Heidegger’s statement that ‘[t]he characteristics exhibitable in [Dasein] are not extant “properties” of a being “appearing” [“aussehenden”] thus-and-so, but rather in each case possible ways to be and only that’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 42; Okrent 1988, 20-21). This suggests that Okrent is correct in affirming that ‘what it is to have properties […] is different for substances than it is for [E]xisting beings’ in implying whereas a substance’s instantiating properties consists in its being such that it can ‘appear’ certain ways, Dasein’s instantiating properties consists merely in its being certain ways. In line with his identifying Existence with being self-intending, Okrent conceives properties instantiated in the latter way as ‘means, ways, or procedures through which [Dasein] intends itself” (1988, 21). Although Okrent thereby posits a class of property characterising Dasein, he evidently does not regard these as properties of substances because he denies that Heidegger conceives Dasein as a substance (Ibid, 20).

Philipse’s reading resembles Okrent’s closely on these points. Introducing Heidegger’s notion of a constitution of being (‘ontological constitution’), Philipse follows Okrent in interpreting Heidegger as distinguishing the being of Dasein from that of gear (‘tools’) and natural beings (‘a stone or a mountain’) partly by reference to the different properties instantiators of these constitutions of being can instantiate because they instantiate those constitutions of being:

There is a marked tendency in Sein und Zeit to interpret being as the ontological constitution [sc. constitution of being] of specific beings, such as ourselves. We are in a way different from that of tools and from that of a stone or a mountain. When I say, ‘Charles is worried,’ this statement presupposes a constitution of being of Charles that is very different from the constitution of being expressed by ‘This stone is heavy.’ The statement that Charles is worried would not make sense unless Charles lived into his future
and unless the deep structure of his existence were characterized by what Heidegger calls concern (Philipse 1998, 35).

This passage implies that instantiating the being of Dasein is necessary for instantiating properties such as being worried, in that the statement ‘Charles is worried’ ‘presupposes a constitution of being of Charles’ unlike that of stones. Also like Okrent, however, Philipse presents Heidegger as holding that instantiating a constitution of being confers not only a capacity to instantiate certain properties, but also a capacity to instantiate properties in a certain way:

Heidegger’s point in Sein und Zeit is not simply that Dasein is capable of having another range of properties, states, dispositions, or modifications than, say, artifacts such as tables or occurrent things such as stones. We will easily admit that a human being may be courageous, for instance, and that it is nonsensical to say of a stone that it is, or is not, courageous. Heidegger’s point purports to be a deeper one: that what it is for a human being to have such a property is different from the way a stone has a property. Being courageous is a manner in which we pro-ject our Dasein into the future. Dasein can only be courageous because it is already concerned with itself, because its own being is an issue for it, and because it has to live out its being. The possibility of Dasein’s being courageous or not courageous presupposes the entire existential and temporal structure of concern and being-with-others-in-the-world as the ‘condition of its possibility’. Being courageous is a way of ‘performing’ (vollziehen) our existence. Logically speaking, Heidegger claims that our uses of the copula ‘is’ are not topic-neutral. When we say that Alexander is brave, the verb ‘is’ expresses an existential project, not a state or property of a substance. In expressing an existential project, the verbal form ‘is’ indicates the specific ontological constitution [sc. constitution of being] of humans, Dasein (Philipse 1998, 99).
1. Heidegger on Being

Philipse’s notion that ‘what it is for a human being’, i.e. Dasein, to instantiate a property such as being courageous is different from the way a stone has a property is virtually identical to Okrent’s notion that ‘what it is to have properties […] is different for substances than it is for [E]xisting beings’ (Okrent 1988, 20). Alluding to Heidegger’s aforementioned distinction between ‘extant properties’ and Dasein’s mere ‘ways of being’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 42), Philipse adds here that ‘[b]eing courageous is a manner in which we project our Dasein into the future’. Consequently, ‘what it is’ to instantiate a property such as being courageous differs from ‘what it is’ to instantiate a property such as having mass, i.e. properties whose instantiation does not involve ‘pro-jecting one’s Dasein into the future’. Finally, Philipse presents Heidegger here as holding that instantiating the constitution of being of Dasein is necessary for being capable of instantiating properties of the class Philipse dubs ‘existential projects’ and therewith for instantiating properties in the distinctive way existential projects are instantiated, viz. as involving ‘pro-jecting one’s Dasein into the future’: ‘The possibility of Dasein’s being courageous or not courageous presupposes the entire existential and temporal structure of concern and being-with-others-in-the-world as the “condition of its possibility”’.

In rejoinder, I contend that even supposing Okrent and Philipse were correct in reading Heidegger as affirming that each mode-of-being or constitution of being confers a capacity to instantiate properties in a certain way, this is in any case ultimately analysable as the position that instantiating a mode-of-being or constitution of being confers a capacity to instantiate certain properties. For all differences between ‘what it is’ for entities to instantiate properties are analysable purely through differences between the instantiation conditions of the properties concerned. For example: Philipse’s distinction between ‘what it is’ to instantiate physicochemical properties such as having mass and existential projects such as being courageous is analysable purely through differences between the instantiation conditions of physicochemical properties and existential projects. Thus whereas ‘pro-jecting one’s Dasein into the future’ might be necessary for instantiating being courageous, as Philipse suggests (Philipse 1998, 99), it is not necessary for instantiating having mass. We may accordingly distinguish properties for whose instantiation ‘pro-jecting one’s Dasein into the future’ is necessary, e.g. existential
projects, from those for whose instantiation this is not necessary, e.g. physicochemical properties. This eliminates talk of instantiating properties ‘in different ways’ in favour of speaking merely of instantiating properties of different classes, e.g. physicochemical properties and existential projects. Therefore, despite Philipspe’s insistence that ‘Heidegger’s point in Sein und Zeit is not simply that Dasein is capable of having another range of properties, states, dispositions, or modifications than, say, artifacts such as tables or occurrent things such as stones’, but rather additionally ‘that what it is for a human being to have such a property is different from the way a stone has a property’ (1998, 99), the latter position is in fact reducible to the former. Similar points apply for Okrent’s interpretation.

Although I conservatively stop short of interpreting Heidegger as holding that conferring a capacity to instantiate certain properties is logically necessary for being a mode-of-being or constitution of being, my interpretation nevertheless allows that Heidegger might hold that each mode-of-being or constitution of being confers upon its instantiators a capacity to instantiate certain properties. For instantiating a constitution of being, e.g. that of gear, living beings, or natural beings, and therewith the mode-of-being it comprises, plausibly confers a capacity to instantiate properties corresponding thereto, e.g. gear-characteristics (Zeugcharaktere), physicochemical properties, or biological properties.78 Denis McManus advocates such a position in discussing Heidegger, suggesting that ‘physics reveals the physical properties of things, chemistry reveals the chemical properties of things, and so on’ (2012a, 200). That Heidegger himself endorses such a position is suggested by the basic-concepts and outlines passages’ claim that explicating or ‘outlining’ a constitution of being yields knowledge of basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling a foundational comprehension of its instantiators (1927-1928/1977: 28, 33).79 For introducing special concepts to comprehend certain entities is necessary only when those entities can instantiate properties incomprehensible through concepts already possessed. For example: Heidegger introduces the basic concepts around-for (Um-zu), reference (Verweisung), and wherefore (Wozu and Wofür) in explicating the being of gear in

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78 For ‘gear-characteristics’, see p. 16.
79 See pp. 51-54.
§15 of *BT* because gear can instantiate around-for references (*Um-zu-Verweisungen*), which are supposedly incomprehensible through concepts other than the aforementioned (1927/2006, 68).

Sixth, interpreting constitutions of being as regional essences might be uncharitable in light of the implausibility that instantiating a single property, even one conjoining a material-content and mode-of-being, renders something a member of a regional class. For something is, for example, a living being seemingly not by virtue of its instantiation of a single property conjoining a material-content and mode-of-being, whatever this distinction might amount to, but rather by virtue of its instantiation of many physicochemical properties such that it can instantiate distinctively biological properties such as *growth, metabolism*, and *mutation* (Pennock 2012, 8; cf. Weber 2011). Hence, Robert T. Pennock characterises life as a ‘fuzzy cluster concept’ whose instantiation in fact consists in instantiating various properties (2012, 6); and David Chalmers contends that ‘life is a functional property’ whose instantiation consists in something’s being such that it can instantiate biological properties (1995, 71-72). More generally, Hawley and Bird construe natural kind properties as complex properties: whether as merely *conjunctive* properties, such that being an entity of a certain kind consists in instantiating many distinct properties, or *structural* properties, such that being an entity of a certain kind consists in possessing a certain structure (Hawley and Bird 2011).

In rejoinder, I point out that identifying constitutions of being with regional essences does not imply that Heidegger would deny that constitutions of being – or, for that matter, material-contents and modes-of-being – are unanalysable as, say, cluster concepts, functional properties, or structural properties. Indeed, the basic-concepts and outlines passages suggest that Heidegger may even be interpreted as conceiving constitutions of being as merely *heuristic* concepts whose sole function is to serve as objects of investigations yielding knowledge of membership conditions of regional

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classes and basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) enabling a foundational comprehension of their members (1927-1928/1977: 28, 33). In §15 of *BT*, for example, the being of gear (*gearedness and to-hand-ness*) is simply that which is explicated in pursuing knowledge of conditions for being gear and basic concepts for comprehending gear. Knowledge of such conditions and concepts, as *explicata* of the being of gear, is far more valuable to enquirers than knowledge of *gearedness and to-hand-ness* alone as the *explicandum*. Consequently, in accordance with Carnap’s position that *explicata* should ‘replace’ and ‘succeed’ their respective *explicanda* because the latter upon explication are ‘no longer necessary in scientific talk’ (1950: 3, 6), so might conditions for being gear and attendant basic concepts ‘replace’ and ‘succeed’ *gearedness and to-hand-ness* in that the latter ceases to play a theoretical role upon being explicated.

Seventh, Heidegger’s ascription of *Existence* and therewith, I shall suppose, the whole constitution of being of Dasein to Dasein (1927/1975, 237), world (*Ibid*, 237), language (*Ibid*, 296), and sciences (1927/2006, 11) might suggest that a constitution of being cannot be a regional essence for two reasons. First, there is seemingly no regional class whereto all these entities belong. For whereas Dasein is a human being (*Ibid*, 11), world is that which Dasein is ‘in’ (*Ibid*, 53-54), language is something used by Dasein, and science is something Dasein undertakes. In rejoinder, I contend that there is a regional class whereto Dasein, world, language, and sciences belong: namely, the class of all *human* entities – where something’s being human consists not in its being a human being, i.e. being Dasein, but rather in being either a human being or something related to human beings such that it ought to be understood in human terms, i.e. through Existentials (see Heidegger 1927/2006, 44). I thus endorse a position like that Taylor Carman expresses in the following passage, which suggests that something’s instantiating Dasein’s mode-of-being (‘kind of being’), whether in the broad or narrow sense, consists in its being such that it ‘must be made sense of in the way one makes sense of human beings’:

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81 See pp. 51-54.
To say that the world, the sciences, and perhaps even language, have ‘Dasein’s kind of being’ [sc. mode-of-being] is not to say that they are Dasein. What Heidegger has in mind with such claims, I think, is that human practices and institutions must be made sense of in the way one makes sense of human beings, which is radically different from the way one makes sense of nonhuman entities […]. To say that institutions have Dasein’s kind of being [sc. mode-of-being], then, is simply to say that they are human institutions, not that they are Dasein (Carman 2003, 40).

Second, Heidegger names ‘language’ as a district distinct from ‘Dasein’ (1927/2006, 9). But supposing that Dasein and language instantiate the same constitution of being and that constitutions of being are identical with regional essences, it seems that language and Dasein should not belong to different districts. For regional essences are properties unifying districts. In rejoinder, I suggest that Heidegger might hold that language instantiates a constitution of being that is a determinate of the constitution of being of Dasein: just as I earlier proposed interpreting Heidegger as holding that to-hand-ness is a determinate of nature, Existence a determinate of life, and life a determinate of nature. Consequently, given my second rejoinder to the first objection, language could be exactly as if it instantiated the constitution of being of Dasein, and consequently belong to the district ‘Dasein’, in addition to belonging to a district distinct from ‘Dasein’, viz. ‘language’, through instantiating a determinate of Dasein’s constitution of being. On this reading, the district ‘language’ is a proper subdistrict of the district ‘Dasein’. Language would thus stand in a relationship to Dasein analogous to that wherein gear and living beings stand to natural beings and wherein Dasein stands to living beings and natural beings.

Eighth, just as many interpret modes-of-being as ways objects can appear as being (Erscheinungsweisen), as §1.1.1 explained, so might constitutions of being, as properties conjoining modes-of-being and material-contents, be identified with ways objects can appear as being. For Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear in §15 of BT, for instance, ostensibly consists primarily in describing content of mundane

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82 See pp. 59-62. Recall that nature is identical with extantness in the narrow sense (see p. 10).
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

concern; so constitutions of being must seemingly be ways objects can appear as being. As §1.1.1 observed regarding modes-of-being, however, my interpretation does not imply that constitutions of being are not ways objects can appear as being; and the success of Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear indeed requires that objects – specifically those of mundane concern – can appear as instantiating the constitution of being of gear, viz. *gearedness and to-hand-ness*. For Heidegger explicates the being of gear through its figuring within mundanely concernful intentional content. Moreover, extending the position §1.1.1 expressed regarding modes-of-being, Heidegger may charitably be interpreted as holding that appearing as instantiating properties distinctive of instantiators of a constitution of being is sufficient for appearing as instantiating that constitution of being. For example: appearing as instantiating around-for references, which as gear-characteristics (*Zeugcharaktere*) are distinctive of gear (Heidegger 1927/1975, 96), is sufficient for appearing as instantiating the being of gear, viz. *gearedness and to-hand-ness*. Similarly, appearing as instantiating the property *looking at a tree*, which as a biological property (broadly construed) is distinctive of living beings, is sufficient for appearing as instantiating the being of living beings.\(^{83}\)

Ninth, to revisit an issue §1.1.1 raised, Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ of a being is arguably most straightforwardly interpreted not as a regional essence, but rather as the existence of an entity.\(^{84}\) Kris McDaniel advocates the latter, interpreting differences between the being (*Sein*) of beings (*Seienden*) as consisting exclusively in differences between ways entities exist. McDaniel simply assumes that ‘being’ (*‘Sein’*) is synonymous with ‘existence’: ‘I do not distinguish between “existence” and “being” and “what there is”’. On the view to be articulated, everything that there is exists or has being, but existing things can exist in different ways or enjoy different modes of being [sc. in the broad sense]’ (McDaniel 2009, 291).\(^{85}\) Hence, McDaniel adduces no textual evidence supporting interpreting Heidegger as identifying the being (*Sein*) of a being (*Seienden*) with its existence.

\(^{83}\) Cf. p. 42.
\(^{84}\) §1.1.1 explained that although some data suggest that Heidegger conceives modes-of-being as ways of existing, these are insufficient to justify interpreting modes-of-being as ways of existing (pp. 38-41).
\(^{85}\) See fn. 48.
1. Heidegger on Being

Although common usage of ‘being’ to mean ‘existence’ constitutes *prima facie* evidence for McDaniel’s reading, I earlier adverted to John Locke’s identification of the essence of something with its being: ‘*Essence* may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is’ (Locke 1689/1975, III.iii.15; Jones 2013). Moreover, I deny that textual data support interpreting Heidegger as meaning ‘existence’ by ‘being’; instead, §1.1.2 showed that textual data indicate that Heidegger uses the terms ‘being’ and ‘constitution of being’ to denote regional essences. As identical with a regional essence, the being of a being is not identical with its existence, i.e. that ‘whereby it is’ *simpliciter*, but rather is that ‘whereby it is what it is’. The being of gear, for example – that is, the constitution of being and, on my interpretation, regional essence *gearedness and to-hand-ness* – is not that whereby gear is *simpliciter*, but rather that whereby gear is gear. For instantiating *gearedness and to-hand-ness* consists not in existing in a certain way, but rather in being gear. Moreover, not only does instantiating *gearedness and to-hand-ness* not consist in existing in a certain way on my reading, but *gearedness and to-hand-ness* need not even be instantiated essentially by its instantiators such that the existence of its instantiators depends upon their instantiation thereof. For, *pace* McDaniel, I deny that textual data support the claim that Heidegger ascribes essential properties to to-hand entities (cf. McDaniel 2012). In particular, §2.2.2 rejects McDaniel’s reading of various passages from *BT* and *BP* as implying that to-hand entities and natural entities instantiate some properties essentially.

Finally, it might be objected that Heidegger’s designation of *gearedness* as the material-content of gear suggests that Heidegger identifies material-contents rather than constitutions of being with regional essences. For *gearedness* is identical with *being gear* (*Zeugsein*) (von Herrmann 2005, 269), and Heidegger’s defining *gearedness* consists in specifying conditions for instantiating *gearedness* and therewith for being gear (1927/2006, 68); so something belongs to the regional class ‘gear’ seemingly through instantiating *gearedness* rather than through instantiating *gearedness and to-hand-ness*. In rejoinder, I maintain that the districts, basic-

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86 See p. 30.
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

concepts, and outlines passages, as expounded in §1.1.2, suggest that it is indeed the conjunctive property *gearedness and to-hand-ness*, as the constitution of being of gear, that Heidegger would identify with a regional essence. Although, given *gearedness*’s identity with *being gear*, instantiating the *gearedness* alone is admittedly logically sufficient for being gear, Heidegger’s intimation of the necessary co-extensiveness of ‘to-hand being’ (‘Zuhandenes’) and ‘item of gear’ (‘Zeug’), whereto §1.1.1 adverted, implies that *gearedness* and *to-hand-ness* are necessarily co-instantiated.

So Heidegger holds that instantiating *gearedness and to-hand-ness* is also at least metaphysically necessary and sufficient for being gear. Consequently, Heidegger’s defining *gearedness* is a specification of conditions for instantiating not only *gearedness*, but also *gearedness and to-hand-ness*.

### 1.1.4. Metaphysical realism and Aristotelian conceptualism

§§1.1.1-1.1.3 articulated Heidegger’s conception of constitutions of being without establishing his position on the mind-independence of their instantiation and existence. This section accomplishes the latter, interpreting Heidegger as affirming that although constitutions of being and their components, viz. material-contents and modes-of-being, exist only mind-dependently, entities can nevertheless be mind-independently such that constitutions of being and their components are truthfully ascribable thereto. I read Heidegger as holding, for example, that although the mode-of-being *nature* and therewith the being of natural beings exists only if there are minds, there could be natural entities even if there were no minds. This implies that being natural does not require the existence of *nature*. Natural entities at mindless possible worlds can remain such that *nature* is truthfully ascribable thereto despite the non-existence of *nature* at those worlds because *nature* exists at the actual world.

Interpreting Heidegger thus reconciles his apparent realism regarding constitutions of being’s instantiation, e.g. his claim that ‘nature can be [sein]’ – that is, be such that the being of natural beings, which comprises *nature*, is truthfully ascribable thereto – ‘even when no Dasein exists’ (1927-1928/1977, 241; cf. McDaniel 2012, 7), with his position that being (*Sein*) exists only mind-dependently:

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87 See p. 34.
Mind-dependence passage

Beings [Seiendes] are independently of experience, knowledge, and comprehension whereby they become disclosed, discovered, and determined. But being [Sein] ‘is’ only in an act of understanding [Verstehen] of that being [Seienden] to whose being something such as understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] belongs [viz. Dasein] (Heidegger 1927/2006, 183).

The mind-dependence passage’s claim that ‘[b]eings are’ mind-independently signifies not that beings exist mind-independently, but rather that beings are mind-independently such that being (Sein) is truthfully ascribable thereto. For as previously noted, Heidegger uses the verb ‘to be’ (‘sein’) to mean ‘to have being’ (Sein): that is, ‘to instantiate a constitution of being’.

I clarify the significance of Heidegger’s enclosing ‘is’ within scare quotes in affirming that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’, which I interpret as signifying that being (Sein) exists rather than that being (Sein) instantiates being (Sein), in rebutting Cristina Lafont’s interpretation shortly. Elsewhere, Heidegger writes similarly that ‘only so long as Dasein, i.e. the ontic possibility of understanding of being, is, “is there” [“gibt es”] being’ (1927/2006, 212).

Despite Heidegger’s position that ‘natural beings can be even when no Dasein exists’ (1927/1975, 241), passages such as the mind-dependence passage lead some to interpret Heidegger as endorsing transcendental idealism in respect to constitutions of being: affirming that something’s being such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto requires Dasein’s existence, whilst according mind-independent existence to concrete particulars. This would imply that although there is, for example, no mindless possible world containing natural entities, there are mindless possible worlds containing concrete particulars. Cristina Lafont advocates this reading, interpreting Heidegger as holding that whilst ‘that there are entities has nothing to do with us’, ‘what they are depends on our prior projection [sc. Entwurf,”

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88 See p. 26 and fn. 8.
89 See pp. 77-78.
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

outline] of their being’ (Lafont 2007, 106).\(^{90}\) ‘[W]hat they are’ may be understood here as signifying both ways entities are (i.e. properties) themselves, e.g. nature, and entities’ being those ways, e.g. entities’ being natural.\(^{91}\) Consequently, ‘the world is not made out of self-identifying entities; we are the ones who divide the world into different entities according to our interpretations of their being’ (Ibid, 106).

Lafont justifies her reading through interpreting Heidegger as affirming that for entities to instantiate properties mind-independently, those properties must belong ‘to those entities themselves’ in that they must be ‘some ontic structure or properties that those entities have’ (Lafont 2007, 106). Since ‘ontic’ means ‘beingful’ (seiend) (Heidegger 1927/2006, 63), this means that Heidegger holds that for every property, \(F\), if \(F\) is not a being (Seiendes), then nothing is \(F\) mind-independently. Lafont induces her reading from Heidegger’s claims that ‘[t]he being [Sein] of a being [Seienden] “is” not itself a being [Seiendes]’ and that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’ (Heidegger 1927/2006: 6, 183; Lafont 2007, 106). For these imply that being (Sein), which is not a being (Seiendes), is not instantiated mind-independently because it exists only in an act of understanding.

In rejoinder, whilst recognising Heidegger’s denial that being (Sein) is a being (Seiendes) and affirmation that being exists ‘only in an act of understanding’, I deny that this implies that Heidegger holds that nothing is mind-independently such that being (Sein), e.g. the being of natural beings, is truthfully ascribable thereto. For the Aristotelian conceptualism I attribute to Heidegger implies that the existence of \(F\), e.g. the being of natural beings, is not necessary for something’s being \(F\), e.g. being a natural entity. For being \(F\) consists not in being related to \(F\) in instantiating it, but instead is a primitive notion. Therefore, something can be \(F\) mind-independently even though \(F\) exists only mind-dependently, i.e. exists ‘only in an act of understanding’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 183). This implies the falsity of Lafont’s reading of Heidegger as holding that if \(F\) is not a being (Seiendes), then nothing is \(F\) mind-independently. For, on my Aristotelian conceptualist interpretation, Heidegger

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\(^{90}\) See fn. 22 for the term ‘projection’.

\(^{91}\) Lafont herself does not add this clarification, but it is charitably inferrable.
1. Heidegger on Being

denies that being (*Sein*) and therewith constitutions of being are beings (*Seiendes*) (*Ibid.*, 6), yet nevertheless allows that entities can be mind-independently such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto: hence his asserting that ‘nature’, i.e. natural entities, ‘can be’, i.e. be such that a constitution of being is truthfully ascribable thereto, ‘even when no Dasein exists’ (1927-1928/1977, 241).

Lafont overlooks another important point. Lafont assumes that Heidegger’s denial that the being (*Sein*) of a being (*Seienden*) is a being (*Seiendes*) is straightforwardly compatible with the mind-dependence passage’s claim that the being (*Sein*) of beings (*Seienden*) ‘is’ in the understanding (Heidegger 1927/2006: 6, 183). For Lafont evidently regards Heidegger’s position in regard to these claims as ultimately coherent (Lafont 2007, 105-106). But if the ‘is’ in the mind-dependence passage’s claim (1927/2006, 183), which Heidegger encloses in scare quotes, means ‘is a being [*Seiendes*]’, then these positions are blatantly incompatible. For a mind-dependent being (*Seiendes*) is a being (*Seiendes*) nonetheless, so the mind-dependence passage’s claim would contradict Heidegger’s denial that the being (*Sein*) of a being (*Seienden*) is a being (*Seienden*). Charity demands, therefore, that we attribute to Heidegger a distinction between being a being (*Seiendes*) – that is, instantiating a constitution of being – and existing. Heidegger’s enclosing ‘is’ in scare quotes in ascribing mind-dependent existence to being (*Sein*) in the mind-dependence passage presumably signifies that although it is not the case that being (*Sein*) is ‘in an act of understanding’ in the literal sense, i.e. in the sense of having being (*Sein*), being nevertheless ‘is’ therein in the sense of existing.\(^{92}\) Incidentally, moreover, Heidegger’s denial that the being (*Sein*) of beings (*Seienden*) is itself a being (1927/2006, 6), i.e. something that *has being*, should be endorsed by everyone on the pain of an infinite regress. For if the being (*Sein*) of a being (*Seienden*) had being (*Sein*) and were therefore a being (*Seiendes*), then the being of this being would have being and therefore be a being (*Seiendes*); and the being of this being would have being and therefore be a being (*Seiendes*), and so on, *ad infinitum*.\(^{93}\)

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\(^{92}\) Cf. p. 126.

\(^{93}\) E. J. Lowe justifies denying that essences of entities are entities in a similar way (2006, 8).
1.1. Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Being

In contrast to Lafont, then, I read Heidegger as holding that entities can be mind-independently such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto even though constitutions of being exist only mind-dependently. The first half of my interpretation expresses a metaphysical realist position regarding constitutions of being, i.e. that ‘the world is as it is independently of how humans take it to be’ (Khlentzos 2011). This contradicts transcendental idealist positions such as that Lafont ascribes to Heidegger (Lafont 2007, 106). The second half of my interpretation accommodates the mind-dependence passage’s claim that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’ by attributing Aristotelian conceptualism to Heidegger in respect to constitutions of being. Sir Anthony Kenny illustrates Aristotelian conceptualism in expounding Aquinas’s Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of properties.94

Aquinas tells us that there are three ways of considering any given nature. We can consider it in respect of the esse [sc. existence] it has in individuals, or in respect of the esse it has in the mind; or we can consider it absolutely, in the abstract, without reference to either esse. The nature of horse, for instance, occurs in individual horses, and we can study it by examining these individuals, Bellerophon or Eclipse or Red Rum. We can consider also the concept horse as it occurs in the mind: as when we say that the concept horse is a concept easily attained. But we can also consider in the abstract what is involved in being a horse: and this is what Aquinas calls the absolute consideration of the nature of horse. […] He is not saying that there exists any such thing as the abstract nature of horse: the only esse that the nature of horse has is (as particular) in individual horses and (as universal) in the mind. The absolute consideration is not the consideration of an abstract entity in some third realm: it is a consideration that abstracts from the only two kinds of esse that Aquinas is willing to attribute to specific natures (Kenny 2002, 73).

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94 Since I am concerned exclusively with interpreting Heidegger, I naturally bracket the question of the accuracy of Kenny’s interpretation of Aquinas.
Kenny thus presents Aquinas as holding that the property being a horse, for example, exists not only ‘as particular’ ‘in individual horses’, in that some entities are horses, but also ‘in the mind’ as a mind-dependent object of thought. Although being a horse is thus considerable as a property in abstracto, being a horse does not exist mind-independently – in a ‘third realm’ – instead existing only insofar as there are actual horses, wherein it is instantiated rather than a property as such, and as a mind-dependent object of thought: its ‘two kinds of esse’. Hence, according to Aquinas, ‘there are no universals [sc. properties] existing outside the mind’ (Kenny 2002, 74).

Articulating this doctrine generally, and describing it as ‘the standard view of concepts and propositions’ ‘prior to the twentieth century’ and as endorsed by the early Husserl, Mark Balaguer explains similarly that conceptualism ‘is the view that there do exist numbers — or properties, or propositions, or whatever — but that they do not exist independently of us; instead, they are mental objects; in particular, the claim is usually that they are something like ideas in our heads’ (Balaguer 2009). I advocate interpreting Heidegger as adopting Aristotelian conceptualism at least in respect to constitutions of being, if not every property. This reconciles Heidegger’s affirmation that natural entities are natural mind-independently with the mind-dependence passage’s claim that being (Sein) exists ‘only in an act of understanding’. Since Aristotle and the Aristotelian Scholastics influenced Heidegger greatly (Kisiel 1993, 227-308), moreover, it is not implausible that he would adopt this position.

Although I have assumed the most straightforward reading of the mind-dependence passage’s claim that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’, viz. as implying that being (Sein) and therefore constitutions of being exist mind-dependently, a less straightforward alternative is available that ostensibly avoids committing Heidegger to affirming the mind-dependent existence of constitutions of being. This alternative reading instead attributes to Heidegger Husserl’s position that properties can be intentional objects, and thus ‘“be” in acts of understanding’, without existing at all. Given Husserl’s influence upon Heidegger, moreover, it is again historically plausible that Heidegger would adopt this position. Husserl presents his view in

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95 Balaguer’s claim that conceptualism ‘has serious problems’ is strictly irrelevant here (Balaguer 2009), as my aim is not to defend conceptualism but rather to establish that Heidegger endorses it.
responding to the objection that positing ‘essences’ (*Wesen*) (i.e. properties) as intentional objects implies ‘Platonic realism’, i.e. the position that properties exist mind-independently (1913, 40). Husserl categorically denies that being an intentional object entails existing, illustrating this through the example of imagining a centaur. Husserl writes that even though the imagined centaur is an object of a ‘psychical’ (i.e. mental) state, it does not enjoy mental existence; in fact, it does not exist at all:

> The centaur itself is naturally nothing psychical; it exists neither in the soul nor in consciousness, nor elsewhere. It is indeed ‘nothing’; it is altogether ‘imagination’. Expressed more precisely: the imaginational experience is imagination of a centaur. In that respect, there admittedly belongs to the experience itself ‘intended centaur’, fantasised centaur. But one may not now conflate precisely this imaginational experience with that which is imagined in it as such (*Ibid*, 42-43).

Though the intentional object herein happens to be fictional, Husserl subsequently indicates that one should not infer therefrom that essences are likewise fictional. For Husserl maintains that ‘intuition of essences’ (*Wesenserschauung*), i.e. the act of intending essences, ‘is an originally giving act’, rather than producing its object like imagination as in the above example, ‘and as such the analogue of sensory perception and not of imagination’ (*Ibid*, 43). This disanalogy notwithstanding, however, Husserl’s claim that being an intentional object does not imply existing is nonetheless applicable to intuitions of essences. That someone intends the property *gearedness* in defining it, for instance, might not imply that *gearedness* exists: whether mentally and thus merely mind-dependently or in a third realm and thus mind-independently. Although this conclusion might suggest that Husserl would deny the mind-dependence passage’s claim that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’, that claim may be interpreted less straightforwardly as implying only that being (*Sein*) can be an intentional object. For as Husserl observes regarding

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96 For Platonic realism, see Miller 2010.
97 For something to be ‘intended’, as I use the term herein, is for it to be an object of an intentional state.
imagine a centaur, ‘there admittedly belongs to the experience itself “intended centaur”, fantasised centaur’. That is, even though the intended centaur ‘exists neither in the soul nor in consciousness’, one may nevertheless truthfully describe the intended centaur as ‘belonging to’ (i.e. ‘in’) the experience itself. Heidegger’s claim that being (Sein) ‘is’ in an act of understanding is accordingly interpretable as positing only that being thus ‘belongs to’ acts of intending being (Sein) in that it is an intentional object thereof. This avoids the doctrine of ‘intentional inexistence’ construed as positing intentional objects’ existence in intentional states (see Huemer 2010).

Furthermore, as with Aristotelian conceptualism, Husserl’s seemingly categorical denial of properties’ existence does not imply that entities cannot be mind-independently such that properties are truthfully ascribable thereto. Although Husserl would affirm, for example, that there is no possible world at which nature exists, there might still be mindless possible worlds and indeed possible worlds containing minds at which natural entities exist. Denying that the non-existence of properties entails that nothing can be such that properties are truthfully ascribable thereto is commonly known as ‘ostrich nominalism’ (Devitt 1980; cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2011), which Quine expresses in the following passage:

One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny, except as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common. The words ‘houses’, ‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ denote each of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ denotes each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word ‘redness’, nor, for that matter, by the word ‘househood’, ‘rosehood’, ‘sunsethood’. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible (Quine 1948, 29-30).
Bill Blattner favours an interpretation somewhat resembling mine in presenting Heidegger as ‘a transcendental idealist about being, but not about entities [sc. beings]’ (1994, 198; cf. 2004, 335). In other words: even though the being (Sein) of beings (Seienden) exists only mind-dependently, beings (Seiendes) can nevertheless exist mind-independently as beings of the classes they are. Blattner’s interpretation thus likewise contradicts Lafont’s. Moreover, as on my reading, Blattner presents Heidegger as justifying his position through the premise that because being (Sein) actually exists (albeit mind-dependently) by virtue of Dasein’s actual existence, we can truthfully ascribe constitutions of being to beings at mindless possible worlds despite the non-existence of being (Seins) at those worlds. Blattner supports his interpretation by reference to the following passage from BT, which I follow Blattner in calling the ‘then passage’ (Blattner 1994, 187):

Then passage

[O]nly so long as Dasein, i.e. the ontic possibility of understanding of being, is, ‘is there’ ['gibt es'] being. When Dasein does not exist, then dependence also ‘is’ not and in-itself also ‘is’ not. Suchlike is then neither intelligible nor unintelligible. Intraworldly beings are then also neither discoverable nor can they lie in concealedness. Then, it can neither be said that beings are nor that they are not. It can now, however, so long as understanding of being and therewith understanding of extantness is, be said that then beings will still continue to be (Heidegger 1927/2006, 212).

On my reading, the then passage affirms firstly that being (Sein) and therefore constitutions of being and their components, properties such as dependence, and concepts like in-itself (An-sich) exist only mind-dependently: ‘Only so long as Dasein […] is, “is there” being’; ‘[w]hen Dasein does not exist, then dependence also “is” not and in-itself also “is” not’. This implies secondly that ‘[w]hen Dasein does not exist’ properties and concepts such as material-contents, modes-of-being, dependence, and in-itself are ‘neither intelligible nor unintelligible’. For existing is necessary for instantiating properties and therefore for being intelligible or being unintelligible. Thirdly, since the existence of properties is necessary for the discoverability or concealedness of beings (Seienden) because the (mind-dependent)
existence of properties is necessary for the occurrence of intentional content wherein they figure, ‘[i]nterworldly beings are then also neither discoverable nor can they lie in concealedness’. Fourthly, since properties cannot be ascribed unless they exist, constitutions of being cannot be ascribed at a mindless possible world: ‘Then, it can neither be said that beings are nor that they are not’. Heidegger’s omission of scare quotes enclosing ‘are’ here signifies that he intends ‘are’ to be understood in the literal sense of ‘to be’, i.e. to instantiate being (Sein) and therefore a constitution of being. Nevertheless, since being (Sein) actually exists by virtue of the actual existence of minds, we can truthfully ascribe constitutions of being, material-contents, and modes-of-being, e.g. extantness, to entities at mindless possible worlds. Hence, Heidegger writes finally: ‘It can now, however, so long as understanding of being and therewith understanding of extantness is, be said that then beings will still continue to be’, i.e. continue to instantiate constitutions of being. Expounding the final two sentences of the then passage in a similar way, Blattner writes:

[N]ow we can say that entities [sc. beings] will continue to be, even if we do not. The idea seems to be this: if we now ask ourselves, ‘Will the sun continue to exist, even if we humans all die out?’ the answer we give is, ‘yes’. Why? Because we understand the sun as something occurring [sc. extant] (1994, 186).

Blattner’s illustration supposes that the sun’s being extant is necessary and sufficient for its existence. Blattner here presents Heidegger as holding that although the mind-dependence of being (Seins) means that being, in the form of particular constitutions of being, could neither be ascribed to nor denied to be instantiated by beings if there were no Dasein, we can nevertheless say now that ‘beings will still continue to be’, i.e. still instantiate constitutions of being even in the absence of Dasein, because there is now an ‘understanding of being’, i.e. because constitutions of being currently exist ‘in acts of understanding’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 183). Hence, on Blattner’s reading, we can truthfully say that the sun will continue to ‘exist’ even if humans become extinct ‘[b]ecause we understand the sun as something [extant]’ and can

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98 I omit Blattner’s distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ ‘standpoints’, (1994, 186), as this is purely epistemological and therefore irrelevant for this exclusively metaphysical section.
therefore now truthfully ascribe extantness to the post-Dasein sun. My interpretation goes further than Blattner’s, however, in explaining why Heidegger affirms the merely mind-dependent existence of being (Seins) by attributing to Heidegger a theory of properties in respect to constitutions of being according where to properties enjoy only a mind-dependent existence, viz. Aristotelian conceptualism. In endorsing Aristotelian conceptualism, Heidegger holds that at a mindless world ‘it can neither be said that beings are nor that they are not’, i.e. be said neither that beings (Seiendes) instantiate being (Sein) nor that they do not instantiate being, as the then passage states, because at mindless worlds there exist no constitutions of being that might be ascribed or denied to be instantiated.

In summary, this section contends that Heidegger denies the mind-independent existence of constitutions of being yet affirms that something can be mind-independently such that a constitution of being is truthfully ascribable thereto. Heidegger maintains, for instance, that something could be a natural entity, which entails its being such that the constitution of being of natural beings is ascribable thereto, even if that constitution of being did not exist. For on the Aristotelian conceptu alist theory of properties I attribute to Heidegger in respect to constitutions of being, the existence of properties is not necessary for something’s being such that properties are truthfully ascribable thereto.
1. Heidegger on Being

1.2. Explicating Being

Heidegger introduces §15 of BT as undertaking a ‘demonstration’, ‘disclosure’, or ‘explication’ of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) (1927/2006, 66-67). §1.1 interpreted the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class of entities. This section expounds Heidegger’s conception of investigations of the being of beings, which the terms ‘demonstration’, ‘disclosure’, and ‘explication’ all denote. In particular, I clarify the goal and method of such investigations: paying particular attention to the goal and method of §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. As previously noted, §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear comprises two components: a definition (Umgrenzung) of gearedness and an exhibition (Herausstellung) of to-hand-ness (1927/2006, 68). The net result is knowledge of supposedly independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear, viz. being a component of a gear-whole and being around for (um zu) something, and three basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension thereof and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. §15 of BT explicates the being of gear phenomenologically, through intentional content of mundane concern. For Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ (‘Zeug’) denotes ‘the beings appearing in [mundane] concern’ (1927/2006, 68), i.e. beings of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging; so, by definition, everything appearing in mundane concern appears therein as gear and therewith as instantiating the being of gear.99 Consequently, the being of gear is explicable purely through mundanely concernful intentional content as a property objects appear therein as instantiating the being of gear. §15 of BT thereby yields knowledge of the being of gear, by specifying conditions for being gear and basic concepts for comprehending these, without positing the actual existence of gear.

This section elucidates concepts and distinctions figuring in Heidegger’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’ in §15 of BT underlying Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear (1927/2006, 67-68). §1.2.1 clarifies Heidegger’s distinction between ontic and ontological investigations. Whereas ontic

99 See §2.1.1. For the figuring of modes-of-being and constitutions of being in intentional content, see pp. 42, 72-73.
investigations ascertain facts about the actual world, e.g. facts about actual entities and laws of nature governing instantiation of properties at the actual world, *ontological* investigations pursue knowledge of being (*Seins*), e.g. through furnishing basic concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of instantiators of a certain constitution of being. This distinction closely relates to Husserl’s conception of ‘regional ontology’, as investigating the being (*onto*) of members of a regional class (1913, 19), and to Heidegger’s doctrine of the ‘ontological difference’: the distinction between being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiendem*) (1927/1975, 22). For ontic and ontological investigations are characterisable as investigating beings (*Seiendes*) and being (*Sein*) respectively (Heidegger 1927/2006: 27, 63). Heidegger distinguishes ontology as he conceives it from ontology as traditionally and commonly conceived, thus employing the term ‘ontology’ in a ‘formally broad sense’ (*Ibid*, 27). Heideggerian ontology must, for example, be distinguished from Quinean ontology, which addresses questions about the actual world. Conceiving ontology in a Quinean manner, for instance, Ted Sider writes: ‘Ordinary ontology is no more remarkable than wondering about the weather. We ask whether there is ice-cream in the freezer, whether there is a twenty for a cab, whether there is a game on television. In more expansive moments we ponder the existence of black holes, gods, UFOs, or anything at all beyond the world of space and time’ (2011, 197). Heideggerian ontological investigations address no such questions regarding what actually exists: instead closely resembling enquiries featuring not only in Husserlian regional ontology, but also in contemporary conceptions of metaphysics advocated by E. J. Lowe and Tuomas Tahko – both of whom conceive metaphysics as investigating only metaphysical possibilities *a priori* (Lowe 2011; Tahko 2012).

§1.2.2 establishes Heidegger’s position on ‘modes of access’ (*Zugangsarten*, *Zugangsweisen*) or simply ‘accesses’ (*Zugänge*) to beings (*Seiendem*) and their being (*Sein*). Heidegger affirms that the being of gear is ‘accessible’ (*zugänglich*) only through mundane concern and, in critiquing Descartes’s account of perception and the being of intraworldly beings, contends that some constitutions of being, e.g. the being of gear, and properties characterising their instantiators, e.g. gear-

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100 ‘The highlighting of the being [*Seins*] of beings and the explication of being [*Seins*] itself is the task of ontology’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 27). ‘The description remains cleaved to beings [*Seienden*]. It is ontic. Yet being [*Sein*] is sought’ (*Ibid*, 63).
1. Heidegge on Being

characteristics, are inaccessible through certain methods, e.g. that of mathematical physics (1927/2006: 67, 95-96). I apply Heidegger’s concept of ‘modes of access’ to critically assess Tuomas Tahko’s view of the role of thought experiments in metaphysics. §3.2.1 develops points made in this section in distinguishing the methodologies of Heideggerian and Gibsonian ecology, which differ chiefly in their modes of accessing environmental entities.

1.2.1. Ontology and the ontic

This section elucidates Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations both by analysing Heidegger’s own claims thereabout and by connecting the distinction to Husserl’s conception of regional ontology and Tahko’s and Lowe’s conceptions of metaphysics. Heidegger indicates that §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear qualifies as an ontological investigation, i.e. an investigation of being (onto), when he writes in his ‘preliminary methodological remark’: ‘In the disclosure and explication of being [Seins], beings [Seiende] are in each case the preliminary and attending theme; the true theme is being [Sein]’. Heidegger adds that explicating the being (Sein) of beings (Seienden) is ‘no cognising of beingful qualities of beings [Seienden], but rather a determining of the structure of their being [Seins]’ (1927/2006, 67). §1.1.3 expounded this as meaning that explicating the being of beings involves not ascertaining which properties those beings actually instantiate, but rather explicating a constitution of being in abstracto.101 Nevertheless, Heidegger points out that ‘[a]s an investigation of being’, §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear ‘brings to an independent and explicit consummation the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein already in each case and is “alive” in every engagement with beings’ (Ibid, 67).

Beings (Seiendes) are ‘in each case the preliminary and attending theme’ in ‘disclosing’ and ‘explicating’ being (Sein), i.e. in ontological investigations, because ‘[b]eing [Sein] is in each case’ and ‘always’ ‘the being of a being [Seienden]’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 9; 1927/1975, 22). For although we may explicate, say,

1.2. Explicating Being

gearedness and to-hand-ness as a property in abstracto, it remains precisely as a property a way something could be and as such comprehensible only by reference to possible instantiators. For to comprehend gearedness and to-hand-ness is to grasp what something’s being to-hand gear consists in. Heidegger’s explication of gearedness and to-hand-ness brings ‘to an independent and explicit consummation’ Dasein’s understanding of being through explicating intentional content of mundane concern, which represents objects as to-hand gear insofar as objects appear therein as instantiating gear-characteristics, e.g. around-for references.¹⁰² Thus, through intending objects in mundane concern, Dasein manifests an understanding of gearedness and to-hand-ness as the being (Sein) of those objects. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this connection to beings (Seiende), ‘the true theme is being’ because ontological investigations pursue not facts about actual items of gear, unlike ontic investigations in ‘cognising the beingful qualities of beings’, but rather only knowledge of the being (Seins) of gear in the form of conditions for being gear and basic concepts enabling comprehension thereof and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear.

In yielding knowledge of conditions for being gear, i.e. conditions for belonging to the regional class ‘gear’, Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear accords with Husserl’s principle that ‘encapsulation of the truths grounded in [a] regional essence constitutes the content of [a] regional ontology’: that is, an account (logos) of the being (onto) of members of a certain region, e.g. ‘gear’ (Husserl 1913, 31). For example: the truths reflected by Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear, viz. that necessarily every item of gear is a component of a gear-whole and that necessarily every item of gear is around for (um zu) something, are grounded in a regional essence in that these propositions are true because of facts about instantiation conditions of a certain regional essence, viz. the being of gear: gearedness and to-hand-ness. In particular, the two propositions are (ex hypothesi) true because being a component of a gear-whole and being around for (um zu) something is necessary for instantiating the being of gear.

¹⁰² See pp. 42, 72-73.
1. Heidegger on Being

As pursuing knowledge exclusively of properties and concepts in abstracto, ontological investigations are purely a priori in Husserl’s sense of ‘eidetic’ (Husserl 1913, 5). Husserl famously conceives eidetic investigations as involving the ‘phenomenological reduction’ or ‘epoché’, i.e. the bracketing of all claims about the actual world, which he conceives as making “pure” consciousness accessible to us’ (Ibid: 65, 68). Heidegger also acknowledges the role of the phenomenological reduction in ontological enquiry, but conceives it instead as a ‘leading back of investigative consideration from naïvely comprehended beings [Seienden] to being [Sein]’, i.e. from intending objects as instantiating constitutions of being to intending the constitutions of being themselves, rather than as enabling access to “pure” consciousness’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 29). Accordingly, in his ‘preliminary methodological remark’ in §15 of BT, Heidegger writes that the beings appearing in mundane concern, viz. gear, ‘as beings thus appearing’, i.e. as beings appearing in mundane concern, ‘come into view of a “cognition” [“Erkenntnis”] that, as phenomenological, looks primarily to being [Sein]’, viz. to the being of gear, rather than to gear itself (1927/2006, 67).

Consequently, §15 of BT seeks not to determine which properties objects of mundane concern actually instantiate, e.g. whether certain entities instantiate around-for references and which they instantiate, nor laws of nature governing entities’ instantiation of certain properties at the actual world, e.g. whether around-for references are realised by physicochemical properties, but instead only to ascertain conditions for being gear, i.e. conditions for belonging to the regional class whereunto mundane concern represents objects as belonging, and basic concepts required to comprehend these, e.g. around-for, reference, and wherefore. This explains why §15 of BT is purely phenomenological, dealing exclusively with intentional content of an imagined state of mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67-69). For whilst

103 John Deely expresses Heidegger’s position on the role of the phenomenological reduction as that ontological enquiry ‘must concern itself not with the beings but with the Being [sc. Sein] of [b]eings [sc. Seienden]’, i.e. “with beings as they have entered for the researcher upon the mode of esse intentionale: and the first requisite for securing such a standpoint is precisely the phenomenological “turn of sight” or “reflective gaze”’ (Deely 1971, 94). That is, ontological enquiry focusses not upon beings (Seiendes) instantiating constitutions of being, but upon the constitutions of being themselves via intentional content wherein they figure (‘esse intentionale’).

104 In §3.2.2, by contrast, I defend the ontic claim that around-for references are realised by, and therefore supervene on, physicochemical properties.
knowledge of properties’ instantiation conditions and basic concepts is plausibly obtainable purely phenomenologically through explicating intentional content, phenomenology alone cannot determine which properties entities actually instantiate and laws of nature governing properties’ instantiation at the actual world. For intentional content can be non-veridical and thus potentially mislead us as to how entities actually are. Ontic knowledge must instead be attained through theories accommodating data from all sources, not only those derived from phenomenological reflection (cf. Noë 2007). Hence, although Heidegger’s introduction of §15 of BT as investigating ‘the being of the beings appearing most closely’ might suggest that Heidegger seeks knowledge of actual objects of certain intentional states (1927/2006, 66), this reading is uncharitable. Rather, Heidegger’s statement implies only that §15 of BT investigates the being (Sein) objects appear as instantiating in ‘the closest type of engagement’, viz. mundane concern (Ibid, 66-67). ‘The beings appearing most closely’ are gear insofar as objects appear ‘most closely’ as gear: that is, as beings (Seiendes) of the class unified by gearedness and to-hand-ness as the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating.105

Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear, then, is ontological rather than ontic. In BP, Heidegger offers a criterion for distinguishing between ontological and ontic propositions and thereby investigations in demarcating the subject-matter of philosophy, which Heidegger conceives as purely ontological, from those of the positive, ontic sciences: ‘Philosophy is the science of being’ (1927/1975, 17), i.e. ‘ontology’ (Ibid, 15), whereas ‘[a]ll non-philosophical sciences have beings for their theme’ and so are ontic (Ibid, 17).106 Non-philosophical sciences are positive sciences because ‘[a]ll propositions of the non-philosophical sciences, even of mathematics, are positive propositions’. Positive propositions are so called because they posit beings (Ibid, 17). On a strong reading, this means that a proposition is positive and thereby ontic just in case it implies the existence of some beings. Even

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105 See also §2.1.1.
106 Graham Harman advocates interpreting ‘ontic’ as meaning ‘pertaining to extantness’ rather than ‘pertaining to beings’, but adduces no textual evidence in support: ‘Heidegger studies has often been sidetracked by a serious misunderstanding of the term ontic. While many readers behave as though it meant “pertaining to objects [sc. beings]”, it actually means “pertaining to presence-at-hand [sc. extantness]”’ (Harman 2002, 6).
the Goldbach conjecture, for example, which states that every even integer greater than 2 is the sum of two primes, is construable as *positing* even integers greater than 2 and primes. For, at least on a straightforward reading, this proposition could not be true if no even integers greater than 2 or primes existed (cf. Colyvan 2011).¹⁰⁷ I favour a weaker reading of Heidegger’s notion of ‘positing’, however, such that a proposition is positive and thereby ontic just in case it implies something about the actual world that is not mere corollary of truths about properties. I do so charitably in light of the dubiousness of holding that even statements expressing laws of nature, as advanced in theories formulated by empirical sciences, imply the existence of beings. Husserl, for his part, affirms that even statements expressing laws of nature imply the existence of beings, however, contrasting these with statements expressing ‘purely eidetic’ truths entailed by facts about properties alone:

The proposition ‘all bodies are heavy’ admittedly posits no particular thing [*Dinglichkeit*] inside the natural world. Nevertheless, it does not have the unconditional universality of eidetically universal propositions insofar as it, in accordance with its sense as a law of nature, still introduces with itself an existential positing, viz. that of nature itself, [i.e.] of spatiotemporal actuality: all bodies – in nature: all ‘actual’ bodies – are heavy. By contrast, the proposition ‘all material things are extended’ has eidetic validity and can be understood as purely eidetic[.] […] It expresses what is grounded purely in the essence of a material thing and in the essence of extension (1913, 16).

According to Husserl, then, even the statement that all bodies are heavy, which for illustration’s sake we may follow Husserl in assuming expresses a law of nature (*Naturgesetz*) (*Ibid*, 16), implies the existence of some beings.¹⁰⁸ For on Husserl’s reading, it means that all *actual* bodies are heavy and thus implies that some bodies exist. I reject Husserl’s reading, however. For as Karl Popper observes, statements of

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¹⁰⁷ I say ‘at least on a straightforward reading’ in view of nominalist responses to the indispensability argument (see Colyvan 2011). Discussing such issues naturally falls outside the scope of this thesis. Incidentally, in deeming all mathematical proposition positive propositions, Heidegger disagrees with Husserl. For Husserl characterises ‘pure mathematics’ as a science ‘pure from positing of facts [*Tatsachensetzungen*]’ (1913, 16).

¹⁰⁸ Though Husserl apparently conceives statements of laws of nature as mere generalisations, we may charitably read him as conceiving them as purporting to express nomologically necessary truths (see Carroll 2010).
1.2. Explicating Being

laws of nature are expressible as _negations_ of existential statements such that they do not imply the existence of beings (Popper 1934/1994, 45-46). The supposed law that all bodies are heavy, for instance, is expressible as a negation of the statement that there is a non-heavy body: such that it means that there is no non-heavy body. On this reading, the statement that all bodies are heavy, _pace_ Husserl, does not imply the existence of beings. For the truth of the statement that there is no non-heavy body does not even require that the actual world be non-empty, much less that it contain bodies.

Nevertheless, the statement that there is no non-heavy body does, for all that, assert something whose truth depends upon something other than facts about properties _in abstracto_: namely, that the actual world contains no non-heavy bodies. Since its truth depends upon facts about the actual world, this assertion expresses a law of nature governing the actual world that, in enjoying only _nomological_ necessity (see Carroll 2010), might not hold at other metaphysically possible worlds. Consequently, the statement that there is no heavy body does in fact contrast with Husserl’s example of a purely eidetic statement, _viz._ that all material things are extended, whose truth ‘is grounded purely in the essence of a material thing’ – _material-thingliness_, say – ‘and in the essence of extension’, _viz. extension_, and thus is _metaphysically_ necessary (Husserl 1913: 16, 14-15). Additionally, Husserl notes that only purely eidetic and as such metaphysically necessary truths are knowable solely through reflecting upon ‘essences’ (i.e. properties) _in abstracto_. Whereas one can supposedly know that all material things are extended, for example, purely ‘on the basis of a free fiction of such a thing’, _i.e._ merely through imagining a material thing (_Ibid_, 16), one cannot know the supposedly merely nomologically necessary truth that all bodies are heavy in this manner because this truth is (_ex hypothesi_) underviable solely through reflecting on the properties _being a body_ and _being heavy_ alone.

Given the foregoing, we may interpret Heidegger charitably as regarding the hallmark of a positive and thereby _ontic_ statement as not its implying the existence of some beings, but rather its asserting something whose truth depends upon something other than facts about properties _in abstracto_. Conversely expressed, I interpret
Heidegger as deeming the hallmark of a positive, ontic statement its asserting something whose truth-value varies across metaphysically possible worlds. Since this typically, though admittedly not invariably, consists in asserting something about the actual world in particular, ontic investigations are roughly conceivable as investigations advancing claims about the actual world. Expressing a similar conception using ‘empirical science’ instead of ‘positive science’ or ‘ontic science’, Karl Popper writes: ‘there are many “logically possible worlds”; that system which we call “empirical science” should, however, represent only the one “actual world”’ (1934/1994, 15). By contrast, ontological investigations advance no claims specifically about the actual world, instead yielding knowledge solely of ways something could be: that is, of properties and concepts in abstracto. For example: §15 of BT’s claim that being a component of a gear-whole and being around for (um zu) something is necessary and sufficient for being gear does not imply that there are actual components of gear-wholes, entities that are around for (um zu) something, or gear (1927/2006, 68). Rather, its truth-value depends exclusively upon the instantiation conditions of gearedness and gearedness and to-hand-ness.

Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations closely resembles E. J. Lowe’s and Tuomas Tahko’s distinction between metaphysical investigations and those of non-philosophical sciences. Lowe characterises metaphysics as ‘the science of the possible, charged with charting the domain of objective or real possibility, at least some grasp of which is an indispensable prerequisite for the acquisition of any empirical knowledge of actuality’ (2011, 100). Properties qualify as ‘objective or real possibilities’ because a property is by definition a way something could be (Putnam 2002, 106). Some knowledge of possibilities is prerequisite for acquiring knowledge of the actual world because

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109 My ontic claim in §3.2.2 regarding realisation of around-for references by physicochemical properties is one exception where I hereby allude. For it strictly concerns those proximate possible worlds at which around-for references are instantiated, which might or might not include the actual world, rather than the actual world as such.

110 I say ‘specifically about the actual world’ because although claims about properties and concepts imply something about the actual world, they do so only insofar as the actual world is a metaphysically possible world. Husserl, for his part, indicates that he conceives ‘essences’ (Wesen), i.e. properties, strictly as ways something could be when he writes that ‘to each essence correspond possible individuals that would be its de facto instances [Vereinzelungen]’ (1913, 16).

111 Recall that Heidegger deems gearedness, to-hand-ness, and therewith gearedness and to-hand-ness necessarily co-extensive (see p. 34).
acquiring knowledge of the actual world consists in establishing that certain possibilities are actual or non-actual. For pursuing such knowledge involves enquiring whether certain possibilities are realised, e.g. whether the Higgs boson exists, and testing hypotheses that certain possibilities are realised, e.g. that the Higgs boson exists (cf. Tahko 2012, 28). To engage in such enquiry, we must already possess knowledge of properties, e.g. *being a Higgs boson*, whose instantiation or non-instantiation might be established. Hence, Tahko writes that ‘empirical knowledge in itself is not able to determine what is actual […], for a priori inquiry is needed to delimit the space of possibilities from which the actual structure of reality can be identified by empirical means’ (2012, 39). Our knowledge of properties determines the range of our ontic investigations, moreover, because we can establish the actuality or non-actuality only of possibilities whereof we have knowledge. No one lacking the concept *Higgs boson* and therewith knowledge of the property *being a Higgs boson*, for example, could even frame the question of whether the Higgs boson exists or formulate the hypothesis that it does exist; nor, *a fortiori*, could they answer the question nor verify or falsify the hypothesis. For even if they uncovered data conclusively indicating the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson, their lacking knowledge of the *possibility* of there being a Higgs boson would prevent them from recognising those data as indicating this.

That is why Heidegger stresses the importance of basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*). For if lacking concepts as specific as *Higgs boson* prevents acquisition of significant knowledge, this is true to an even greater degree for concepts whereupon our knowledge ultimately rests. Someone lacking basic biological concepts such as *evolution*, *metabolism*, *mutation*, and *self-replication* (Pennock 2012, 8), for example, would be thereby prevented from acquiring ontic biological knowledge. For biological theories are expressed using such concepts; and comprehending more specific biological concepts, principles, data, etc., requires grasping such basic concepts. §15 of *BT*’s furnishing *around-for*, *reference*, and *wherefore* as basic concepts enabling comprehension of gear plays an analogous role to furnishing such basic biological concepts. But whereas basic biological concepts have undergone refinement over centuries of research and reflection, Heidegger maintains that philosophers have remained oblivious to both gear as such and, *a fortiori*, basic
concepts enabling its comprehension. Hence, Heidegger states whilst ‘[t]he Greeks’, for example, ‘had an appropriate term for “things”: “pragmata”’, which ostensibly suggests that they acknowledged gear as such, in fact ‘[t]hey ontologically left precisely the specifically “pragmatic” character of pragmata in the dark and determined them “primarily” as “mere things”’ (1927/2006, 68). That is, the ancient Greeks failed to comprehend pragmata on the basis of specifically ‘pragmatic’ concepts such as around-for, reference, and wherefore – all pertaining to objects’ pragmatic relevance – and instead relied exclusively on concepts such as ‘substantiality, materiality, extendedness, juxtaposition…’ (Ibid, 68). This is analogous to distinguishing living beings from non-living beings but nevertheless attempting to understand both in exactly the same basic terms, e.g. as mere aggregates of particles.

Although ontological investigations determine possibilities a priori by furnishing knowledge of properties and concepts in abstracto, Lowe distinguishes such metaphysical enquiries from conceptual analyses:

As metaphysicians inquiring into the natures of possible and actual things, we are thereby implicitly formulating theses concerning how those things can adequately – and so should properly – be thought of by us, and to that extent we are concerned with our concepts of those things. But it is not that we should first identify our concepts and then, by studying them, come to proclaim various theses concerning the natures of the things that we think about by deploying those concepts. That procedure would be entirely back-to-front. Our task, to the extent that it involves concepts, is to frame or formulate concepts that are, plausibly, adequate ways of thinking about certain genuinely possible things (Lowe 2011, 105).

§15 of BT exemplifies Lowe’s point. For Heidegger seeks therein not to analyse concepts already possessed, but rather to furnish knowledge of new concepts enabling a foundational comprehension of gear for the first time, e.g. around-for, reference, and wherefore. Heidegger therefore does not ‘first identify our concepts’
and thereupon ‘proclaim various theses’ about gear, but rather attempts to ‘frame or formulate concepts that are, plausibly, adequate ways of thinking about certain genuinely possible things’, viz. gear. Although Heidegger provides such concepts by explicating intentional content of mundane concern, which might be construed as analysing concepts already possessed in that ordinary intentional content features such concepts, properties represented as instantiated in mundane concern are not ordinarily grasped explicitly therein and so must indeed be *explicated* through concepts such as those Heidegger provides.\(^{112}\) Hence, Heidegger characterises his investigation of the being of gear as bringing ‘to an independent and explicit consummation the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein already in each case and is “alive” in every engagement with beings’ (1927/2006, 67). The understanding of being Dasein manifests in mundane concern, insofar as it intends objects as to-hand gear, must be independently ‘consummated’ and made ‘explicit’ precisely because it is ordinarily merely latent and implicit (von Herrmann 2005, 115). Recognising this, Theodore Kisiel writes that ‘Heidegger repeatedly tries to point below our conceptual grasping and logical defining to the *horismos* of meaning, which defines the scope as well as the limits of the human situation, which is first of all given not through the senses or the intellect but in *actus exercitu* of existence in the world’, i.e. in mundane concern (Kisiel 2002, 99).

Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations is further illustratable by reference to interpretations that blur it. In expounding Heidegger’s account of gear, for example, Bruin Christensen presents Heidegger as holding that ‘what and how things are at the level of practical dealing with them, their everyday identity and appearance, is *just* as real as the identity they have under theoretical description and explanation’ (Christensen 1998, 77). Christensen’s interpretation is correct insofar as Heidegger regards the properties objects appear as instantiating in mundane concern (‘what and how things are at the level of practical dealing with them’) as ‘real’ ways something *could* be, just as Heidegger would recognise properties figuring in ‘theoretical description and explanation’ as ‘real’ ways something *could* be. But, as §2.2.2 argues apropos of passages from *BT*, contrary to the implication of Christensen’s phrase ‘*just* as real’, Heidegger does not assert that

\(^{112}\) ‘To explicate’ literally means ‘to make explicit’.
anything actually instantiates properties mundane concern represents objects as instantiating, e.g. around-for references. Rather, Heidegger affirms only that ‘what and how things are at the level of practical dealing with them’ could be ‘just as real’ as their identity ‘under theoretical description and explanation’. in that entities could instantiate not only properties recognised by physical science, for example, but also properties mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. I aim to accommodate such a possibility in §3.2.2, which articulates a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics of possible worlds at which mundane concern is sometimes veridical.

Heidegger’s conception of ontological enquiry is further illustratable by contrast with Ted Sider’s Quinean account of constructing an ‘ideology’, i.e. a set of ‘primitive notions’, for ‘writing the book of the world’:

The world has a distinguished structure, a privileged description. For a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts, so that its conceptual structure matches reality’s structure. There is an objectively correct way to ‘write the book of the world’ (Sider 2011, i; cf. Quine 1983).

Heidegger and Sider are engaged in distinct yet closely connected enterprises. For whereas Sider seeks to determine which concepts we ought actually to employ in ‘writing the book of the world’, i.e. in describing the actual world, Heidegger’s ontological investigations pursue knowledge only of concepts we might employ therein. To extend Sider’s metaphor, Heidegger seeks merely to expand our vocabulary. Even though we will inevitably not use every word in our vocabulary in ultimately writing the book of the world, increasing our vocabulary nevertheless informs our word selection by making us aware of manifold ways wherein we could express what empirical research reveals about the actual world. By thus increasing our vocabulary, we improve our chances of ‘matching reality’s structure’ and thereby

113 ‘Vocabulary’ need not be metaphorical here if we consider that terms express concepts and that ‘Begriff’ can mean both ‘concept’ and ‘term’ (see fn. 19).
1.2. Explicating Being

striking upon Sider’s coveted ‘objectively correct way to “write the book of the world”’.

Sider’s observation that ‘truth is not enough’ for ‘a representation to be fully successful’ is true partly because even a ‘book of the world’ containing only true statements might still express only a small fraction of all truths about the actual world. This connects to Denis McManus’s discussion of Heidegger’s concept of an ‘outline’ (Entwurf) of a constitution of being, which McManus translates as ‘projection’.114 As §1.1.2 noted apropos of the outlines and Galileo-Kepler passages, Heidegger characterises basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling a foundational comprehension of instantiators of a certain constitution of being, i.e. entities of a certain regional class, as ‘outlining’ that constitution of being.115 In comprehending living beings through basic concepts such as evolution, mutation, and self-replication, for example, we conceive living beings in a definite way and thereby ‘outline’ the regional essence of living beings. McManus discusses the sceptical view that since we must always rely on some basic concepts and therewith upon the outline they express, we could never know whether our outline of a constitution of being were ‘correct’. For we could not adopt a perspective free from all outlines so as to be able to determine which is correct given the corresponding constitution of being ‘as it is in itself’. McManus rebuts this view by pointing out that outlines cannot themselves be correct or incorrect. Rather, each outline enables comprehension of a specific range of facts through the basic concepts expressing it; but it does not thereby imply that those are the only facts about instantiators of the outlined constitution of being. Comprehending living beings exclusively through biochemically-defined basic biological concepts such as evolution, mutation, and self-replication, for example (see Weber 2011), enables knowledge of facts about processes of evolution, mutation, and self-replication. But it does not thereby imply that there are no facts about, say, the phenomenal character of living beings’ experiences. For rather than implying such facts’ non-existence, the outline merely omits them from consideration (McManus 2012a: 143-144, 149-150).116 McManus

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114 See fn. 22.
115 See pp. 53-56.
116 To apply Wittgenstein’s famous Tractarian analogy, such facts fall through the ‘net’ of the biochemistry-centric biological outline (see Wittgenstein 1921/2006, 6.341).
1. Heidegger on Being

illustrates this point using the example of quantifiable properties such as heights and weights, which someone might shun on the grounds that comprehending entities in such quantifiable terms involves concepts introduced by enquirers rather than somehow ‘inherent’ within objects themselves:

[T]here is something peculiar in the reaction, ‘We want to know the true (? inherent?) properties of these elements, not merely their heights and weights’. The dream of revealing objects not with respect to any such interest but ‘in themselves’ is precisely a dream, and a confused one at that. To approach objects with these particular interests is not to place between them and ourselves parochial interests; rather, it is to ask of them a determinate question (McManus 2012a, 150).

McManus’s point holds to an even greater degree for relationships between outlines of different constitutions of being. For example, regarding the relationship between the to-hand and the extant in the narrow sense, i.e. the natural, McManus writes:

To take two of the very few examples of ‘disclosures of Being’ that the early Heidegger’s work offers, our understanding of the world as Zuhanden [sc. to-hand] and our understanding of the world as Vorhanden [sc. extant] reveal what one might call different ‘aspects’ of the world and they do so in such a way that they do not compete with one another; they reveal different bodies of fact, not the same body of facts more or less well. In this sense, it is clear that being about the same world does not require mutual corrigibility; only being about the same aspect of the world – the same body of facts – does that. So what if different ‘understandings of Being’ stand to one another not […] as different theoretical accounts of the physical stand to one another, but instead – to extend our proposal a little further – as claims about objects’ colours stand to claims about their owners, or their ages, or their distance from the Eiffel Tower? (2012b, 9).
As McManus observes, different groups of basic concepts expressing outlines of the being of gear and the being of natural beings ‘reveal what one might call different “aspects” of the world’ in enabling us to comprehend ‘different bodies of fact’. These ‘do not compete with one another’ because facts expressed using one group of concepts can neither contradict nor logically entail facts expressed using another.\footnote{I say ‘logically entail’ to distinguish this relationship from entailment as defined in fn. 18.}

That a particular entity is around for \textit{(um zu)} something, for instance, can neither contradict nor logically entail that the entity is an aggregate of molecules. These facts might be related through laws of nature, of course, such that one cannot obtain at the actual world without the other also obtaining; but this does not constitute a \textit{logical} relationship of contradiction or logical entailment between these facts.\footnote{§3.2.2, on the other hand, presents an account of the \textit{ontic} relationship between around-for references and physicochemical properties.} By contrast, ‘different theoretical accounts of the physical’ are different accounts of physical entities at the \textit{actual} world, which can of course ‘compete with one another’ and admit of correctness and incorrectness. The superiority of Newtonian and relativistic physical theories over those of the ancient Greeks, for example, stems from their describing the actual physical world more accurately, i.e. their ‘writing the book’ of the physical world more adequately (Sider 2011, i), not from superiority of their basic concepts \textit{in abstracto}. For concepts and properties are almost invariably genuine ways something \textit{could} be, regardless of whether they are actually instantiated.\footnote{I say ‘almost invariably’ because some concepts might express impossibilities, e.g. \textit{square circle}.}

Concepts’ superiority and inferiority instead arises chiefly in application to the actual world.

In summary, this section characterises Heidegger’s distinction between ontological investigations, which §15 of \textit{BT}’s explication of the being of gear exemplifies, and ontic investigations as that between investigations yielding knowledge of properties and concepts \textit{in abstracto} and investigations yielding knowledge of the actual world. Heideggerian ontological investigations thus resemble not only Husserlian regional ontology, but also metaphysical enquiries as conceived by such contemporary metaphysicians as E. J. Lowe and Tuomas Tahko. The goal of such investigations is, however, distinct from yet nevertheless closely connected to Ted Sider’s aim of constructing an ‘ideology’ in a Quinean sense: a set of concepts for ‘writing the book’.
of the world’, i.e. describing the actual world. For whereas an ideology specifies which concepts should be employed in describing the actual world, Heideggerian ontological investigations confer knowledge only of concepts and properties in *abstracto* (‘expand our vocabulary’) and so cannot indicate *which* concepts should figure in such descriptions.

1.2.2. Modes of access

This section expounds Heidegger’s doctrine that there is more than one ‘mode of access’ (*Zugangsart, Zugangsweise*) to beings (*Seiendem*) and their being (*Sein*), which Heidegger intimates in introducing the mode of access proper to gear and its being in the following passage from §15 of *BT*’s ‘preliminary methodological remark’:

> The phenomenologically pre-thematic beings – here, therefore, that which is used, found in production – become accessible in placing oneself into [mundane] concern. Strictly speaking, this talk of ‘placing oneself into’ is misleading; for we do not need first to place ourselves into this mode-of-being of concernful engagement.¹²⁰ Mundane Dasein already is always in this manner: e.g. opening the door, I make use of the handle. Obtaining phenomenological access consists rather in thrusting away oppressive and attendant interpretative tendencies, which conceal the phenomenon of such ‘concern’ generally and at the same time therewith, *a fortiori*, beings as they appear from themselves in concern for them (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67).

‘The phenomenologically pre-thematic beings’ in question here are gear, since it is gear whose being is to be explicated (*Ibid*, 68). As §2.1.1 explains, Heidegger’s term ‘gear’, in denoting ‘the beings appearing in [mundane] concern’ (*Ibid*, 68), denotes beings of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging. Since we may reasonably and charitably assume that beings (*Seiendes*) are individuated by their being (*Sein*), this implies that ‘gear’ denotes instantiators of the constitution of

¹²⁰ For the relevant sense of ‘mode-of-being’ here, see fn. 17.
being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating, viz. *gearedness and to-hand-ness* (Ibid, 68-69). Heidegger states that such beings ‘become accessible in placing oneself into mundane concern’ because, we may infer, he holds that objects appear as gear, i.e. as instantiating *gearedness and to-hand-ness, only* in mundane concern. Hence, von Herrmann identifies *to-hand-ness* through definite description as ‘the mode-of-being in which intraworldly beings are present pre-theoretically and pre-scientifically in natural behaviour towards them: in understanding engagement with them’ (von Herrmann 1987, 130; cf. Töpfer 2004, 37). Consequently, to explicate the being of gear, we must first ‘place ourselves into’ mundane concern by at least imagining being in such a state.121 But since ‘[m]undane Dasein already is always in this manner’, e.g. unreflectively turning the handle of a door, Heidegger notes that ‘[o]btaining phenomenological access consists’ not so much in positively placing oneself into a state of mundane concern, as in assuming one’s ordinary standpoint and ‘thrusting away oppressive and interpretative tendencies’ liable to obscure ‘beings as they appear from themselves in concern for them’ and thereby prevent explicating the constitution of being they appear therein as instantiating.

Heidegger subsequently illustrates this point by supposing that the connotation-laden term ‘things’ (*Dinge*), instead of ‘gear’, were employed to denote the beings (*Seiendes*) whose being (*Sein*) is to be explicated:

[I]n this addressing of the beings as ‘things’ (*res*) lies an inexplicit, anticipatory ontological characterisation. The analysis continuing from such beings [*Seienden*] to being [*Sein*] encounters *thingliness* and *reality*. The ontological explication thus continuing finds characteristics of being [*Seinscharaktere*] like *substantiality, materiality, extendedness, juxtaposition* (1927/2006, 67-68).

121 Husserl likewise affirms the possibility of conducting ontological investigations through purely imagined states when he writes that ‘we can, in order to grasp an essence itself originally, proceed from corresponding experiential intuitions: just as well, however, also from non-experiential, non-existence-grasping [nicht-daseinerfassenden]’, but rather “merely imagined” intuitions. […] [W]e can […] apprehend manifold pure essences originally and eventually even adequately[...]. […] It is therein indifferent whether such a thing were ever given in actual experience or not’ (Husserl 1913, 12-13). Cf. ‘[t]he world of life [*Lebenswelt*] opens itself only to a subject who makes use of his linguistic- and agential-competence. He provides himself access by participating at least virtually in the communications of the members and thus becoming himself at least a potential member’ (Habermas 1981, 165). Cf. pp. 208-209.
1. Heidegger on Being

Thus, even if one assumes a mundane concernful standpoint, ‘addressing’ objects appearing therein as ‘things’ might lead one to explicate the intentional content of one’s assumed state erroneously as if objects appeared therein not as to-hand gear, but rather as ‘things’ and ‘real’ – that is, as instantiating the material-content thingliness (Dinglichkeit) and mode-of-being reality (Realität) (nature, extantness in the narrow sense) (Heidegger 1927/1975: 37, 96; von Herrmann 2008, 241).

Distorting the explication in this manner would, Heidegger suggests, lead inevitably to the introduction of basic concepts apt for comprehending not gear, but mere things: ‘substantiality, materiality, extendedness, juxtaposition’. Such concepts, resembling those of Cartesian metaphysics (Heidegger 1927/2006, 95-101), differ markedly from Heidegger’s basic concepts for comprehending gear, e.g. around-for, reference, and wherefore, which issue from supposedly faithfully-explicated content of mundane concern.

The foregoing indicates that Heidegger holds that gear and its being (Sein), viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, demand a peculiar ‘mode of access’ (Zugangsart, Zugangsweise). In other words: the being of gear is accessible only under certain conditions, viz. through faithfully explicated content of mundane concern, because objects appear as to-hand gear under only those conditions. Heidegger states his position on modes of access generally as that ‘[a]cesses to [beings], their exploration, and correspondingly formation of concepts and mode of proof differ in each case in accordance with what beings are in respect of their material-content’ (Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 27). That is, the material-content of a being prescribes the mode of access to it, how it should be investigated, how one should form concepts for comprehending it, etc. For ‘beings can show themselves from themselves in various ways, in each case according to the mode of access to them’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 28). In other words, our mode of access determines how objects appear as being and thus which properties are thereby accessible. Whilst instantiators of the material-content gearedness as such demand investigation through mundane concern, for example, instantiators of the material-content of natural beings, which von Herrmann identifies as natural-thingliness (von Herrmann 2008, 241), require as such the methods of physical science. Heidegger’s position recalls Husserl’s claim that ‘each science’ is attended by ‘certain intuitions’
1.2. Explicating Being

(Anschauungen) as special ‘sources’ (Urquellen) of ‘grounding’ for its ‘correct statements’ (Husserl 1913, 10-11). Whilst Husserl designates the special source of grounding for natural-scientific statements as ‘natural experience’, for instance, he designates ‘self-perception’ as the special source of grounding for statements about ‘ourselves and our conscious states’ (Ibid, 11). Modes of access thus conceived are naturally comparable to sense modalities: each whereof enables access to sensible properties of a special class, e.g. visible, gustatory, and audible properties (see MacPherson 2011). Hence, in discussing Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s concept of ‘phenomena’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 30-31), von Herrmann characterises even ‘vision, taste, [and] hearing’ as ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten) (von Herrmann 1987, 312).

In light of such data, using ‘mode-of-being’ in the broad sense, Von Herrmann represents Heidegger as holding that ‘[i]t is the mode-of-being of a being that prescribes the mode of access to the being’ and that ‘[t]here are as many accesses to [beings] as modes-of-being’ (2005, 215). Von Herrmann analyses the notion of objects ‘prescribing’ or ‘demanding’ a certain mode of access, which he here calls a ‘mode of treatment’ (Behandlungsart), as meaning that ‘they can in general be thematised only in this mode of treatment and every other method founders in their thematisation’ (1987, 282): as is supposedly the case in respect to gear and mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67). Denis McManus attributes a similar position to the young Heidegger, who posits many ‘subject-correlates’, which would later become modes of access, and ‘object-correlates’, which would later become constitutions of being (McManus 2012a, 11-48). The positions von Herrmann and McManus thus attribute to Heidegger amount to the claim that, in both ontological and ontic investigations alike, investigators must tailor their methods to the being (Sein) of the beings (Seienden) they are investigating. Since objects appear as to-hand gear only in mundane concern, for example, anyone seeking to explicate the being of gear must ‘place himself into’ mundane concern. Likewise, anyone seeking to determine which gear-characteristics (Zeugcharaktere), e.g. around-for references, something actually instantiates must likewise ‘place himself into’ mundane concern. For as properties distinctive of gear, gear-characteristics appear as instantiated only
when objects appear as gear (Heidegger 1927/1975, 96). If one were to adopt a standpoint of detached observation instead of that of mundane concern, nothing would appear as instantiating around-for references, say, because objects appear as instantiating around-for references only insofar as they appear as situationally relevant for one’s own goals or activities.

Incidentally, in connection with sociological methodology, Jürgen Habermas defends a position recalling Heidegger’s claim that the being of gear and therewith gear-characteristics become accessible only when one ‘places oneself into’ (versetzt sich in) mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67). Habermas’s view ‘from within’ here is naturally analogous to Heidegger’s perspective of mundane concern insofar as adopting the perspective of mundane concern involves relinquishing that of a detached observer in favour of an ‘involved’ or ‘engaged’ perspective:

The understanding of a symbolic utterance requires, fundamentally, participation in a process of communication [Verständigung]. Meanings – whether they are embodied in actions, institutions, work products, words, cooperational contexts, or documents – can become disclosed only from within. Symbolically pre-structured actuality forms a universe that must remain hermetically sealed – indeed unintelligible – to the view of an observer incapable of communication. The world of life [Lebenswelt] opens itself only to a subject who makes use of his linguistic- and agential-competence. He provides himself access by participating at least virtually in the communications of the members and thus becoming himself at least a potential member (Habermas 1981, 165).

In critiquing Descartes’s accounts of the being (Sein) of intraworldly beings (Seienden) and perception, Heidegger mentions ‘mathematico-physical cognition’, i.e. the approach characteristic of mathematical physics, as another example of a

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122 Cf. pp. 42, 72-73.
123 See §1.2.2, §2.1.2, and §3.1.
124 For discussion of the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ views of phenomena, see McDowell 1994: 147.
1.2. Explicating Being

mode of access. Heidegger contends that Descartes’s reliance upon mathematico-physical cognition to the exclusion of other modes of access blinds him to perceptual intentionality and therewith to intentional content:

Descartes translates the mode-of-being of a perception of something into the only one he knows. The perception of something becomes a certain juxtapositional being-extant of two extant res extensae; the relationship of motion of both is itself in the mode of extensio, which primarily characterises the extantness of a corporeal thing (1927/2006, 97).

According to Heidegger, ‘the only mode-of-being [Descartes] knows’ is the mode-of-being nature (extantness in the narrow sense) or perhaps the constitution of being of natural beings as a whole, because mathematico-physical cognition, in its confinement to quantifiable properties, can access only natural beings as such. Consequently, Descartes analyses perception in purely quantifiable terms, viz. as consisting in the relative motion of two bodies. Charity demands, however, that Heidegger not be interpreted here as advancing the ontic claim that some actual mental states involve instantiation of properties other than those Descartes mentions. Rather, as is suggested by BP’s treatment of perceptual intentionality (1927/1975, 77-94), Heidegger’s claim is presumably the purely ontological one that the concept perception cannot be explicated in the purely quantifiable terms Descartes advocates, but must instead be explicated in intentional terms. We may infer, moreover, that Heidegger holds that, conceived as involving intentionality, perceptions instantiate the mode-of-being Existence, in the case of human perceptions, or life, in the case of those of non-human animals. Hence, von Herrmann writes in expounding Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes’s conception of human cognitive states that ‘cogitationes are determined by the mode-of-being Existence as concernful behaviours’ (von Herrmann 1987, 250).

125 I say ‘or perhaps the constitution of being of natural beings as a whole’ because it is unclear whether Heidegger is using ‘mode-of-being’ here in the narrow or broad sense (see p. 35).
126 I assume for illustration’s sake that Heidegger’s reading of Descartes is correct.
1. Heidegger on Being

Critiquing Descartes’s account of tactile perception of hardness (Descartes 1644/2010, 23), Heidegger adverts to a further ramification of Descartes’s analysing perception in purely quantifiable terms: adding that ‘[t]hrough [Descartes’s] interpretation of hardness experience, the mode-of-being of sensory perception and therewith the possibility of comprehending the beings appearing in such perception in their being is extinguished’ (1927/2006, 97). That is, by analysing tactile perception in purely quantifiable terms congenial to mathematical physics, Descartes renders himself oblivious not only to intentionality, but also to intentional content: for example, mundane concern’s representing objects as to-hand gear and therewith as instantiating gear-characteristics. For intentional content is recognisable only insofar as one recognises intentionality. Hence, Heidegger also criticises Descartes for assuming the ‘mathematico-physical cognition’ characteristic of mathematical physics to be ‘[t]he sole and genuine access’ to ‘intraworldly beings’, i.e. objects not intended as subjects: in that Descartes’s confinement to mathematico-physical cognition and consequent elimination of intentionality leads him to overlook the diverse properties figuring in intentional content, e.g. gear-characteristics (Heidegger 1927/2006, 95-98; cf. 1927-1928/1977, 30-31; von Herrmann 2005, 210-216).127

Writing five years after the publication of BT, Jacques Maritain echoes Heidegger in warning similarly of the limitations of mathematical physics:

Physics rests upon ontological reality; it is concerned with causes; it is set in motion by a love for the nature of things. But it looks upon this ontological reality, these physical causes, from an exclusively mathematical point of view. It considers them only in respect to certain analytical translations, certain cross-sections effected by mathematics. It retains only the measurable behaviour of the real, namely, measurements made by our instruments. (These measurements are, indeed, real and, thanks to them, the entities and symbols of mathematical physics are grounded in reality). But it is to the...

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127 As §1.1.2 explained (pp. 55-56), Heidegger interprets Galileo, and therewith modern physical science, as conceiving physicochemical properties and facts such that they are accessible to mathematical physics (1927-1928/1977, 31). Adopting this conception, however, does not by itself commit one to endorsing the supposedly deleterious position Heidegger attributes to Descartes, however, viz. that mathematical physics affords the sole possible access to physicochemical entities. For the Galilean may allow that there might be facts about physicochemical entities that escape mathematical physics and thus demand another mode of access and perhaps therewith another discipline, e.g. ecology (see §3.2.1).
measurable that physics reduces all its concepts (1932/1995, 65; cf. Einstein 1930/2010, 130).\textsuperscript{128} 

In relying exclusively upon mathematico-physical cognition, Descartes would not only lack ontological knowledge of intentionality as a property in abstracto, but would also be thereby rendered incapable of ascertaining whether and which intentional properties are instantiated or even not instantiated. For, as §1.2.1 observed, one must command knowledge of properties in abstracto to be able to investigate their actual instantiation (cf. Lowe 2011, 100).\textsuperscript{129} Acknowledging this, Denis McManus writes that ‘Heidegger points […] to a crudity in our thinking about the Being [sc. Sein] of entities being sustained by a crudity in our thinking about subjectivity: very roughly speaking, by assimilating our dealings with all entities to their contemplation or disinterested observation, we assimilate all entities to those we contemplate or disinterestedly observe’ (2012a, 17). In other words: in assuming that ‘contemplation or disinterested observation’, as might be employed in natural-scientific enquiry, is the sole available mode of access to entities, one unwittingly conceives all objects of enquiry as instantiating only properties knowable (both in abstracto and as instantiated) through contemplation or disinterested observation. McManus subsequently proposes conceiving the ‘ontological understanding’ Heidegger encourages us to pursue as consisting not in ‘the possession of the right theory or body of doctrine’, i.e. not in ontic knowledge of the actual world, but rather in ‘a form of attention that [one] pays to what [one] says and does’ (McManus 2012a, 221). For in attending to the diversity of modes of access and thereby to how one investigates entities (‘what one does’), one develops sensitivity for the diversity

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. ‘[t]hrough purely mathematical construction, we are able, in my opinion, to find those concepts and those lawful connections that deliver the key for the understanding of natural phenomena’ (Einstein 1930/2010, 130). ‘Natural phenomena’ is charitably understood here as denoting objects of natural science as such: such that Einstein’s claim is that purely mathematical construction enables knowledge of concepts and lawful connections enabling natural-scientific knowledge, not that purely mathematical construction enables comprehensive knowledge of natural entities per se. Compare also Leslie Armour’s exposition of Charles de Koninck’s position: ‘[I]t looks, when we read the physics books, as if what must be being said is that “all reality consists of atoms” or “all reality consists of physical forces and fields”. The notions of force and field, in turn, would have to be understood through mathematical formulae. But what is being said is only that reality, conceptualised in a certain way at a certain level of abstraction, is to be understood as a set of forces and fields’ (Armour 2008, 21). Cf. pp. 55-56.

\textsuperscript{129} See pp. 94-96.
1. Heidegger on Being

of concepts and properties accessible through those diverse modes of access that one might ultimately invoke in ‘writing the book of the world’: that is, in describing the actual world (‘what one says’).\(^{130}\)

By contrast, contemporary accounts of \textit{a priori} metaphysical investigations such as those discussed in §1.2.1 arguably fail to acknowledge diversity in modes of access. Tuomas Tahko, for example, speaks simply of ‘thought experiments’ as the distinctive tool of the metaphysician: defining these as ‘inquiries into the different possible states of affairs which are compatible with a given set of pre-conditions’ (2008, 130). Although Tahko’s definition admittedly does not exclude enquiries such as Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear, which indeed explicates ways entities could be and therefore ‘different possible states of affairs’, the term ‘thought experiment’ nevertheless suggests an enquiry conducted exclusively from a standpoint of detached observation, which is incapable of yielding knowledge of properties accessible only through mundane concern such as \textit{gearedness}, \textit{to-hand-ness}, and gear-characteristics. For example: in both the \textit{Doppelgänger} thought experiment, which investigates ‘whether your physical duplicate can be mentally identical to you’ (Tahko 2008, 132-133), and Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment (\textit{Ibid}, 138-139), one assumes the perspective of a detached observer passively considering imagined scenarios. If such examples were treated as paradigmatic of thought experiments generally, one would inevitably overlook properties whereof knowledge can be obtained only via modes of access other than that of detached observation, e.g. around-for references as properties accessible only from the mundanely concernful perspective of intending objects in their relevance for one’s goals and activities. Hence, expounding Heidegger’s distinction between modes of access, which he here calls ‘havings’, McManus adverts to the deleterious tendency to ‘forget that our engagement with entities comes in the form of a diversity of “havings”’ (2012a, 197-198). For in doing so, we blind ourselves to properties accessible only through modes of access other than those wherewith we are familiar.

\(^{130}\) Cf. pp. 98-99.
In summary, this section interprets Heidegger as positing a plurality of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen) to beings (Seiendes) and their being (Sein) enabling knowledge of correspondingly different properties both in abstracto and as instantiated. §15 of BT exemplifies this through Heidegger’s position that objects appear as to-hand gear and therewith as instantiating gear-characteristics, i.e. properties distinctive of gear, only in mundane concern. Consequently, knowledge of gear-characteristics both in abstracto and as instantiated is attainable only via content of mundane concern. Similarly, criticising Descartes, Heidegger denies that knowledge of intentionality and therewith intentional content is attainable through the mode of access proper to mathematical physics, whereupon Descartes supposedly exclusively relies.

Part 1 has advocated interpreting Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class. Most pertinently for this thesis, the being of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, is the property unifying the regional class ‘gear’. This implies that instantiating gearedness and to-hand-ness is necessary and sufficient for being gear. Furthermore, explicating (or ‘outlining’) the being (Sein) of a being (Seienden), as §15 of BT does in respect to gear, enables a foundational comprehension of entities of the regional class unified by that constitution of being through identifying conditions for belonging to that regional class and furnishing basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) required to comprehend those conditions. Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear (§2.1) and establishes Heidegger’s position on the issue of whether to-hand-ness and extantness in the narrow sense (nature), and plausibly therewith the constitutions of being of gear and natural beings, can be co-instantiated (§2.2).
2. The Being of Gear

2.1. Explicating the Being of Gear

2.1.1. Gear and mundane concern
2.1.2. Two conditions and three basic concepts
2.1.3. Property wholes and purposes

2.2. To-hand-ness and Extantness

2.2.1. Co-instantiation of to-hand-ness and extantness
2.2.2. The two-domains view

2.1. Explicating the Being of Gear

§1.1 interpreted Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class of entities. This implies that §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear (Zeugs) is an explication of the regional essence of gear: the property unifying the regional class ‘gear’. In addition, §1.1.1 revealed that Heidegger distinguishes two components of the being (Seins) of a being (Seienden): material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart). Most pertinently, Heidegger conceives the being of gear as comprising the material-content gearedness and mode-of-being to-hand-ness (1927/2006, 68-69; von Herrmann 2005: 21, 120), which implies that the being of gear is identical with the property gearedness and to-hand-ness. §1.2 revealed that §15 of BT explicates the being of gear via content of mundane concern (alltäglichen Besorgens). For Heidegger maintains that gear ‘becomes accessible in placing oneself into [mundane] concern’ (1927/2006, 67): in that objects supposedly appear as gear, and therewith as instantiating gearedness and to-hand-ness, only in mundane concern. §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear comprises both a specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear, which Heidegger characterises as a ‘definition’ (Umgrenzung) of gearedness, and the introduction of basic concepts (Grundbegriffe)
enabling comprehension of those conditions, which Heidegger implicitly characterises as an ‘exhibition’ (*Herausstellung*) of *to-hand-ness*.¹³¹

This section expounds §15 of *BT*’s explication of the being of gear. In light of the foregoing, this section comprises three subsections. §2.1.1 determines how Heidegger identifies the being of gear such that it can be explicated. Determining this involves establishing the senses of Heidegger’s terms ‘gear’ and ‘mundane concern’. Given that §15 of *BT* explicates the being of gear and Heidegger introduces the term ‘gear’ as denoting ‘the beings [Seiende] appearing in concern’ (1927/2006, 68), which context implies is specifically *mundane* concern, we may infer that the constitution-of-being explicated is that objects appear as instantiating in mundane concern. For in denoting ‘the beings appearing in [mundane] concern’, ‘gear’ denotes beings *(Seiendes)* of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging. Since we may reasonably and charitably assume that beings *(Seiendes)* are individuated by their being *(Sein)*, i.e. constitutions of being, this implies that ‘gear’ denotes instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. Heidegger designates this as *gearedness and to-hand-ness* (1927/2006, 68-69; von Herrmann 2005, 120). Consequently, Heidegger can explicate the being of gear purely through explicating the constitution of being objects appear as instantiating in mundane concern. In turn, I uncontroversially interpret ‘mundane concern’, and Heidegger’s stylistic variants thereof, as denoting unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states. This implies that ‘mundane concern’ is almost synonymous with Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69), though I reject Dreyfus’s reading of Heidegger as denying that mundane concern features intentional content.

§2.1.2 identifies and analyses Heidegger’s two independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear and three attendant core basic concepts. Heidegger derives these from phenomenological data of mundane concern. §15 of *BT* presents these data through an example of someone residing in a room. *BP* presents similar data through an example of someone sitting in a lecture-theatre. In

¹³¹ See pp. 35-36 for why I say ‘implicitly’.
light of objects’ appearing in mundane concern primarily as components of situational nexus (‘gear-wholes’), Heidegger identifies being a component of a gear-whole as the first necessary condition for being gear. Although Heidegger does not explain why he posits this condition, I interpret him charitably as doing so in light of the phenomenological data because he maintains that those properties objects appear therein as instantiating that characterise them specifically as beings of the class whereto they appear as belonging therein (i.e. as gear), viz. gear-characteristics (Zeugcharaktere), characterise them specifically as components of gear-wholes. Therefore, being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for instantiating gear-characteristics and consequently for being gear. Instantiating gear-characteristics is plausibly necessary for being gear in the same way that instantiating biological properties is necessary for being a living being and instantiating physicochemical properties necessary for being a natural being.

Heidegger identifies being around for (um zu) something as the second condition for being gear. Something’s being around for (um zu) something, which is by definition a wherefore (Wozu or Wofür), consists roughly in its being situationally relevant therefor (cf. Christensen 2007, 167): that is, its being so related to context that it is such that it ought to be taken into account in pursuing that wherefore. Consequently, something appears as around for (um zu) a wherefore, and therein as referring (verweisend) thereto, insofar as it appears in its relevance therefor. The most salient species of wherefore are goals and activities. Although Heidegger again does not explain why he deems being around for (um zu) something necessary for being gear, I interpret him charitably as doing so because he holds that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole. In turn, I interpret Heidegger as holding this because he maintains that being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore with other gear is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole, i.e. for satisfying the first necessary condition for being gear. Finally, I interpret Heidegger as maintaining this because he conceives a common wherefore as anchoring a plurality of gear to a single point, so to speak, thereby securing its unity. I rebut the possible objection that one of Heidegger’s examples suggests that even irrelevant gear, which as such is seemingly around for

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132 See p. 217.
2.1 Explicating the Being of Gear

(um zu) no common wherefore with other members of a plurality, can compose a gear-whole therewith by construing irrelevance as a limiting case of an around-for reference (Um-zu-Verweisung) such that irrelevance is classifiable as a determinate of around-for (Um-zu). For even objects appearing as irrelevant for, say, a goal or activity appear in their relevance therefor, and thus as around for (um zu) it, precisely through being appearing as lacking relevance therefor.

The three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) Heidegger introduces in light of his two conditions for being gear are around-for (Um-zu), reference (Verweisung), and wherefore (Wozu and Wofür). Necessarily, something is a wherefore just in case something is around for (um zu) it (Heidegger 1927/1975, 233); and Heidegger holds that referring (verweisend) to a wherefore is necessary for being around for (um zu) it (1927/2006, 68). Hence, instantiating around-for consists in instantiating an ‘around-for reference’ (Um-zu-Verweisung): in that instantiators of around-for refer (verweisen) to that wherefore (wozu or wofür) they are around (um). Heidegger seemingly conceives around-for’s involvement of reference as explaining why wherefores (Wozu or Wofür), e.g. goals or ongoing activities, rather than objects utilised in pursuing them, are the constant phenomenological ‘centre of orientation’ in mundane concern: with objects constantly ‘referring’ (verweisend) agents away from themselves to that wherefore (wozu or wofür) they are relevant (von Herrmann 2005, 126). §3.1 develops and defends the phenomenology of mundane concern attributed to Heidegger herein, whilst §3.2 outlines a metaphysics of around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) in relationship to physicochemical properties.

Finally, §2.1.3 addresses rival interpretations of Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear and attendant basic concepts. David Cerbone interprets Heidegger’s first condition for being gear, viz. being a component of a gear-whole, as meaning that being normatively related to tools of other classes is necessary for being a tool. Cerbone accordingly interprets a gear-whole as a unitary plurality not of particular items of gear, as on my reading, but of properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being a tool of a specific class, e.g. being a hammer and being a nail. Cerbone thereupon interprets ‘references’ (Verweisungen) as connections between
2. The Being of Gear

instantiation conditions of such properties (Cerbone 1999: 311, 314). I reject Cerbone’s interpretation primarily because Heidegger’s descriptions of content of mundane concern, wherein the term ‘gear-whole’ figures and wherefrom the concept reference is derived, evidently feature wholes comprising particular items of gear rather than properties. Mark Okrent interprets Heidegger as conceiving being around for (um zu) something as consisting in being normatively ‘for’ a fixed, specific purpose, e.g. as a hammer is for hammering (Okrent 2002, 201). I reject Okrent’s interpretation primarily because entities’ being ‘for’ such fixed purposes could not unify gear-wholes in the manner Heidegger requires of around-for’s instantiation.

2.1.1. Gear and mundane concern

This section determines how Heidegger identifies the explicandum of §15 of BT, viz. the being of gear: gearedness and to-hand-ness, such that it can be explicated. Heidegger introduces the term ‘gear’ (’Zeug’) as denoting ‘the beings appearing in concern’ (1927/2006, 68): explaining that '[t]he mode-of-being of gear’, viz. to-hand-ness (Ibid, 69), ‘is to be exhibited guided by the prior definition’ of gearedness (Ibid, 68), thus explicating the being of gear. Although Heidegger speaks of ‘concern’ (Besorgens simpliciter in introducing the term ‘gear’, Heidegger presents §15 of BT as explicating the being of ‘the beings appearing most closely’: that is, appearing in ‘the closest mode of engagement’, i.e. Dasein’s typical mode of engagement, which Heidegger identifies specifically as ‘plying, using’ (hantierendes, gebrauchendes) concern rather than concern simpliciter (Ibid, 66-67; cf. von Herrmann 2005, 112-113). ‘Plying, using concern’ is one of Heidegger’s stylistic variants of ‘mundane concern’ (Ibid: 134, 189), alongside ‘concernful engagement’ and ‘using engagement’ (Ibid: 68, 69). Von Herrmann glosses all these terms as denoting ‘mundane, pre-theoretical behaviours’, in contrast to ‘theoretical cognising’ (2005, 112-113), and characterises Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ as denoting specifically ‘the beings appearing in having-to-do engagement [Umgang]’: that is, in mundane, pre-theoretical states rather than detached, theoretical states (Ibid, 119-120). Therefore, we may understand Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ as denoting specifically ‘the beings appearing in mundane concern’.
Given Heidegger’s distinction between entities and beings (Seiendem) noted in §1.1, ‘the beings appearing in mundane concern’, and thus ‘appearing most closely’, are not those entities that happen to be intended in mundane concern, but rather beings (Seiendes) of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging.\textsuperscript{133}

Since we may reasonably and charitably assume that beings (Seiendes) are individuated by their being (Sein), i.e. constitutions of being, beings belong to the same class through instantiating the same constitution of being. As unified by a constitution of being, i.e. a regional essence, each such class is a regional class of entities. Consequently, a being belongs to the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging, and is therefore gear, through instantiating the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. This constitution of being unifies the regional class ‘gear’. §1.1 revealed that Heidegger designates the being of gear, and therefore the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. This does not imply that appearing as to-hand gear consists merely in being an intentional object of mundane concern, of course, contrary to what some commentators might claim (Richardson 1986, 48), but rather that mundane concern is such that objects invariably appear therein as to-hand gear.\textsuperscript{134} This holds even when objects appear as ‘un-to-hand’ (unzuhanden) in mundane concern, which supposedly occurs when the flow of mundane concern is interrupted (Heidegger 1927/2006, 73-75; cf. Dreyfus 1991, 70). For Heidegger

\textsuperscript{133} See p. 26 and fn. 8.

\textsuperscript{134} For John Richardson’s interpretation, see p. 41.
states that even therein, objects are phenomenologically ‘still not devoid of all to-hand-ness’ (1927/2006, 73): that is, objects still appear therein as to-hand. As §1.2.2 intimated, von Herrmann affirms not only the sufficiency, but also the necessity of appearing in mundane concern for appearing as to-hand and therewith, I infer given that to-hand-ness is proper to gear, as gear: ‘the to-hand being, which is determined by the mode-of-being to-hand-ness, is not present (extant) for a cognising, but rather is present (to-hand) for concernful engagement’ (2005, 124). That is: objects cannot appear as to-hand and thus as gear in purely cognitive states, but only in mundane concern (‘concernful engagement’).  

Recognising that Heidegger introduces the term ‘gear’ to denote instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating, von Herrmann distinguishes Heidegger’s use of ‘gear’ (‘Zeug’) as a ‘purely ontological term’, i.e. one denoting instantiators of a certain constitution of being, from its ordinary ‘ontic’ use as denoting entities wherewith we engage pre-theoretically:

How is the word ‘Zeug’ [sc. ‘gear’] used in the German language? We need only to think of the compounds ‘Schreibzeug’ [sc. ‘stationery], ‘Nähzeug’ [sc. ‘sewing kit’], ‘Werkzeug’ [sc. ‘tool’], ‘Fahrzeug’ [sc. ‘vehicle’] and many more. This use of the word shows that ‘Zeug’ always stands for such to which we relate ourselves in the manner of pre-theoretical engagement. But if the word ‘Zeug’ is reserved from now on as an ontological term, then it pertains not only to that which we ontically designate as ‘gear’ in our language. As a purely ontological term, it stands for every being [Seiende] that appears in concernful engagement (2005, 120).

The final statement that ‘gear’ ‘stands for every being that appears in concernful engagement’ means that Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ denotes beings (Seiendes) of the class whereto concernful engagement, i.e. mundane concern, represents objects as belonging. Hence, von Herrmann characterises ‘gear’ as a ‘purely ontological term’.

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135 See pp. 103–106.
2.1 Explicating the Being of Gear

For, given that beings (Seiendes) are individuated by their constitutions of being, ‘gear’ thereby denotes instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. Since Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ denotes instantiators of the constitution of being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating, Heidegger can explicate the being of gear purely through content of mundane concern. Moreover, Heidegger does not even posit actual states of mundane concern: instead restricting himself to a merely imagined state of mundane concern whereinto he ‘places himself’ (1927/2006, 67). This preserves the purely ontological, a priori status of Heidegger’s explication, as discussed in §1.2.1, by avoiding implying anything about the actual world that is not merely corollary of truths about properties and concepts explicited therein. Before proceeding to expound Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear through content of mundane concern, it remains to establish exactly which species of intentional state ‘mundane concern’ denotes and thereby which intentional states’ content §15 of BT describes and analyses.

Mundane concern is a species of concern (Besorgens). Bruin Christensen explains that ‘Besorgen [sc. concern] comprises all our dealings and interactions, whether theoretical or practical, with entities in their capacity as non-“selves”’, i.e. non-intersubjective human intentional states, with Christensen enclosing ‘selves’ in scare quotes in light of Heidegger’s avoidance of terms such as ‘self’ and ‘subject’ in favour of terms such as ‘Dasein’ (Christensen 1998, 79). That being non-theoretical is indeed not necessary for being concernful (besorgend) is implied by Heidegger’s classification of ‘contemplation’ (Betrachten) as a ‘mode of concern’ (1927/2006, 69). Hence, von Herrmann writes that ‘concern’ ‘does not denote the practical character of […] engagement’ (2005, 113). Christensen contrasts concern with Heidegger’s concept of solicitude (Fürsorge), which I translate as ‘ministration’: ‘Fürsorge comprises all our dealings with others in their capacity as […] other “selves” or “subjects”’ (1998, 79), i.e. all intersubjective human intentional states.136

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136 Von Herrmann illustrates the potential interplay between concern and ministration using Heidegger’s example of caring for a patient: ‘Being-with [Sein-mit], as ministration, does not occur outside concernful being by the to-hand, but rather both ways of being interpermeate in manifold ways. Food and clothing are also to-hand beings, which are connected to the bodiliness of the intraworldly appearing other. Care of the sick body pertains immediately to the body of the other. But
Christensen’s reading implies that a human intentional state is one of concern (Besorgens), i.e. concernful (besorgend), insofar as it does not represent objects as subjects (in a suitably broad sense). In short, ‘concern’ (‘Besorgen’) denotes non-intersubjective human intentional states. In light of its consistency with textual data and von Herrmann’s reading, and in the absence of objections, I endorse Christensen’s interpretation of ‘concern’.

I interpret Heidegger as implicitly distinguishing mundane concern from other species of concern solely through its being unreflectively purposeful. This is suggested firstly by Heidegger’s examples of mundane concern, which comprise turning a door-handle (1927/2006, 67), residing in a room or lecture-theatre (Ibid, 68-69; 1927/1975, 231-232), hammering (1927/2006, 69), shoemaking (Ibid, 70; 1927/1975, 431; 1925/1979, 260-262), reading a clock (1927/2006, 71), and seeing a trafficator whilst driving (Ibid, 78-79). Each thereof is plausibly unreflective, in proceeding without deliberation and without explicit (‘thematic’) attention to individual objects (Christensen 1998, 77), and yet purposeful, in being goal-directed. Moreover, as §2.1.2 and §3.1 explain, Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern famously describes the phenomenological ‘recession’ (Zurückziehen) of objects of mundane concern in highlighting ‘that which is to be produced’, i.e. the respective goal to be realised, at their own expense (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69; 1927/1975, 232-233). Describing an act of entering a lecture-theatre mundanely concernfully in BP, Heidegger observes likewise that the ‘benches’ and ‘door handle’ are ‘there in this peculiar way: such that we circumspectly [umsichtig] pass by them, circumspectly avoid that we bump into them, and suchlike’ (1927/1975, 232; cf. Blattner 2006, 51). This phenomenon of ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) is plausibly peculiar to unreflectively purposeful intentional states because it is precisely in such states that objects are not attended to explicitly in the course of purposeful behaviour in the manner Heidegger describes. I conclude, therefore, quite

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even in caring for the body, engagement with to-hand beings that serve the care of the sick body plays a role’ (2005, 311; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 121). Whereas the ‘[f]ood and clothing’ are intended concernfully, in that they do not appear as subjects, the patient is intended ministratively, in that he appears as a subject.
uncontroversially, that Heidegger’s term ‘mundane concern’ denotes unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states.

Expounding §15 of BT, Bill Blattner hints at a similar interpretation of mundane concern: ‘to encounter a piece of equipment [sc. gear] is to use it. To use it, moreover, is to use it for some task, and typically in such use we are immersed in what we are doing and paying little or no attention to the equipment [sc. gear] itself’ (2006, 52). In other words, intending something as gear necessarily involves engaging with it purposefully, i.e. ‘using it’ in a broad sense, and unreflectively, in that ‘we are immersed in what we are doing’. Richard Polt’s reading of Heidegger as holding that ‘[t]he only way to understand ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] entities is to handle them’ is too strong, however, if understood literally as meaning that only objects of tactile concern appear as to-hand (Polt 1999, 50). For the examples §2.1.2 highlights, viz. the room and lecture-theatre examples, seemingly feature visual mundane concern primarily or even exclusively. Moreover, §15 of BT articulates specifically the phenomenology of ‘[t]he sight’ guiding mundane concern, viz. ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69). Though Blattner maintains that ‘Heidegger uses “sight” and related words throughout Being and Time as metaphors for intelligence’ (2006, 49), a literal interpretation of ‘circumspection’ would suggest that §15 of BT’s phenomenology of mundane concern implies nothing about content of non-visual concern (Besorgens). My interpretation does not depend upon this being the case, however; and nothing suggests that Heidegger would deny that objects can appear as to-hand gear in mundanely concernful states of other sense-modalities. In expounding one example of Heidegger’s, for example, von Herrmann suggests that a door appears as to-hand to someone in their act of turning the door-handle in order to open it: ‘In the opening of the door and touching of the handle, the door is not extant as a considered object of cognition, but is rather “to-hand” for me and my engagement with it’ (2005, 73; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 67). This might be taken to imply that objects of tactile concernful intentional states can appear as to-hand therein (cf. Okrent 2000, 195). Similarly, Günter Figal represents Heidegger as holding that ‘genuine access’ to to-hand beings ‘lies in living [Leben], so far as it is experience [Erleben] of the world’ (2007, 13). Figal’s strictly
2. The Being of Gear

untranslatable word ‘Erleben’ denotes human experience in toto, encompassing states of every sense modality.

Denis McManus has recently objected to Bill Blattner’s characterisation of ‘the ready-to-hand’, i.e. the to-hand, as ‘an entity defined by its involvement in our practices’ on the grounds that on Blattner’s reading, even seemingly paradigmatically merely natural, and thus not-to-hand, entities such as ‘the objects of physical science’ might qualify as to-hand through their ‘definability by involvement in practices’ of, say, physical-scientific research (Blattner 2006, 54-55; McManus 2012a, 71-72).

McManus warns that readings like Blattner’s risk rendering Heidegger’s distinction between the to-hand and the merely natural, i.e. extant in the narrow sense, so vague that it is robbed of value (2012a, 72-74). By contrast, I do not follow Blattner in interpreting to-hand entities, and therewith gear, merely as entities ‘defined by [their] involvement in our practices’, but rather as beings (Seiendes) of the class whereto mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. As unified by a constitution of being, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, which §1.1 interpreted as a regional essence, this class qualifies as a regional class of entities on a par with those constituting, for example, the subject-matters of biology and natural science: the regional classes of ‘life’ and ‘nature’ respectively. My interpretation therefore preserves the value of Heidegger’s distinction between the to-hand and the merely natural by honouring Heidegger’s clear phenomenological designation of the being of gear through content of mundane concern whilst also respecting its metaphysical import as a property unifying a regional class. §3.2.1 testifies to the clarity of Heidegger’s distinction between the to-hand and merely natural in arguing that Heidegger’s demarcation of environmental entities (‘to-hand gear’) from merely physicochemical entities (‘merely natural entities’) permits distinguishing ecology’s methodology and subject-matter, viz. environmental entities, from those of physics and chemistry to an extent Gibsonians have hitherto failed to achieve.

In summary, this section contends that Heidegger identifies the being of gear as the constitution of being objects appear as instantiating in mundane concern.

Accordingly, Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ denotes instantiators of the constitution of
being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating. Identifying the being of gear purely phenomenologically in this manner avoids implying actual instantiation of the being of gear and, coupled with Heidegger’s reliance solely upon imagined states of mundane concern, preserves the purely ontological, \textit{a priori} character of §15 of \textit{BT}’s explication of the being of gear. Finally, I interpret Heidegger’s term ‘mundane concern’ and its stylistic variants as denoting unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states.

\subsection{2.1.2 Two conditions and three basic concepts}

§15 of \textit{BT} introduces Heidegger’s three core basic concepts for comprehending gear, viz. \textit{around-for} (Um-zu), \textit{reference} (Verweisung), and \textit{wherefore} (Wozu and Wofür), to comprehend two independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear derived from a paradigm example of mundane concern that, as such, features objects appearing as to-hand gear. The example involves someone residing (wohnend) in a room. In \textit{BP}, Heidegger presents similar phenomenological data using the example of sitting in a lecture-theatre. Heidegger intends these paradigmatic examples to capture ‘how [beings] appear from themselves \textit{in concern} for them’ (1927/2006, 67), i.e. how objects truly appear whenever intended mundanely concernfully, thereby concretely illustrating the being of gear. I first present the aforementioned examples from \textit{BT} and \textit{BP} before expounding the passages wherein Heidegger introduces his two independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (the ‘gear-wholes passage’ and ‘around-for passage’). Whilst Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear are readily identifiable, exactly why Heidegger deems these necessary for being gear is unclear and thus interpretable only speculatively. Consequently, much of this section is devoted to reconstructing the reasoning behind Heidegger’s specification of these conditions. Accomplishing this requires expounding Heidegger’s three core basic concepts, though this is also hindered by the paucity of textual data.

Nevertheless, §3.1 articulates these concepts extensively independently of textual data in developing and defending Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §2.1.3 discusses rival interpretations of Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear and concepts of \textit{reference} and \textit{around-for}. I do not discuss every aspect of §15 of \textit{BT},
instead dealing exclusively with its explication of the being of gear: that is,
Heidegger’s conditions for being gear and attendant basic concepts.

Room example

Stationery, pen, ink, paper, pad, desk, lamp, furniture, window, doors, room. These ‘things’ never show themselves primarily separately, in order to then fill out a room as a sum of the real. That appearing most closely [Nächstbegegnende], though not thematically apprehended, is the room: and this, again, not as that ‘between the four walls’ in a geometric spatial sense, but as residing-gear [Wohnzeug]. Out of [aus] it, the ‘décor’ [“Einrichtung”] shows itself; within this, the respective ‘individual’ items of gear. Before this, a gear-wholeness is in each case already discovered (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68-69).

Lecture-theatre example

Sitting here in the lecture-theatre, we certainly do not apprehend walls – unless we are bored. Nevertheless, the walls are already present before we think of them as objects. Much else besides is given to us before all thinking determining. Much else, but how? Not as a confused accumulation of things, but as a surroundings [Umgebung] that contains within itself a closed, intelligible nexus. What does that mean? Here a thing with these properties, there another with those, a juxtaposition, superposition, and confusion of things: such that we, as it were, grope forwards from one to the other in order to ultimately, progressively collecting the individual things, institute a nexus? That would be a sophisticated construction. Rather, a thing-nexus is primarily given – even if not explicitly and expressly consciously. […] The closest things that surround us, we call gear. […] Given to us primarily is the unity of a gear-whole (Heidegger 1927/1975, 231-232).

Although these examples themselves require little exposition and serve a primarily instrumental role in furnishing data wherefrom conditions for being gear are
The Being of Gear

derivable, we should note the following three terminological points regarding the
room example. First, Heidegger’s phrase “individual” items of gear naturally
excludes the gear-whole composed thereof. I use the word ‘individual’ in this sense
throughout. Second, Heidegger’s term ‘Einrichtung’ (‘décor’) denotes the contents of
the room insofar as they are ordered or arranged (eingereichtet) (cf. Christensen 2007,
164). We may reasonably assume that Heidegger regards everything listed in the first
sentence of the passage, except the room itself, as a component of the décor. Third, I
follow von Herrmann in taking Heidegger’s term ‘stationery’ to denote a gear-whole
rather than an individual item of gear, but yet nonetheless a component of the décor –
a gear-whole within a gear-whole (von Herrmann 2005, 122). Whilst this section
focuses upon Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear as the central issue in §15
of BT, I articulate and defend Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern in
§3.1. For now, however, Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern is further
elucidatable by contrast with Husserl’s phenomenology of ordinary experience. In
particular, von Herrmann suggests that Heidegger intends his description of the
appearance of objects as to-hand gear in mundane concern to contrast with Husserl’s
description of the mundane appearance of ‘extant’ ‘corporeal things’ in the following
passage from Ideas I (von Herrmann 2005, 118):

I am conscious of a world endlessly extended in space, endlessly becoming
and having become in time. I am conscious of it – that means in particular: I
encounter it vividly; I experience it. Through vision, taste, hearing, etc., in
the various modes of sensible perception, corporeal bodies are simply there
for me […]: ‘extant’, in a literal or figurative sense (Husserl 1913, 56).

Husserl’s characterising objects as appearing as vorhanden, i.e. as before (vor) the
hand, naturally contrasts with Heidegger’s characterising objects as appearing as
zuhanden, i.e. as to (zu) hand in being available for use: ‘If there lies in
“Zuhandenheit” a connection to bodily-constituted engagement, then
“Vorhandenheit” implies that a being [Seiende] is before the “hand” – vor-handen
for an act of cognition’ (von Herrmann 2005, 124).137 Moreover, Husserl’s claim that

‘corporeal bodies are simply there for me’ contrasts with Heidegger’s description of objects in the room and lecture-theatre examples as appearing primarily as composing ‘gear-wholes’ rather than ‘separately’ or even ‘as a confused accumulation of things’. Nevertheless, Husserl adds subsequently that ‘this world’ whereof he speaks in the above passage ‘is therein not there for me as a mere material world [Sachenwelt], but rather in the same immediacy as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. I readily discover the things before me furnished, just as with material qualities [Sachbeschaffenheiten], so with value characteristics: as beautiful and hateful, as appealing and unappealing, as appropriate and inappropriate, etc. Things stand there immediately as objects of use: the “table” with its “books”, the “drinking glass”, the “vase”, the “piano”, etc.’ (1913, 58).

Though Heidegger rejects Husserl’s concept of value (Wertes) as vague (1927/2006: 68, 99; von Herrmann 2005, 124), Heidegger expresses a related notion in observing that the room in the room example appears as ‘residing-gear’: that is, as something valuable for residing.

**Gear-wholes passage**

Strictly speaking, one item of gear never ‘is’. To the being of gear belongs always in each case a gear-whole [Zeugganzen], wherein it can be this gear that it is (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68).

Heidegger’s first necessary condition for being gear is being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen). My term ‘component’ denotes a proper part of something, but is otherwise mereologically non-committal.138 Expressing the condition roughly initially, the gear-wholes passage states: ‘Strictly speaking, one item of gear never “is”’. That is, it is impossible that only one item of gear exists. As with his claim that ‘being “is” only in an act of understanding’ as analysed in §1.1.4 (Heidegger 1927/2006, 183), I thus interpret Heidegger’s enclosing ‘is’ in scare quotes as signifying that ‘is’ here means ‘to exist’ rather ‘to be’ (sein), i.e. to instantiate being (Sein), which §1.1 identified as its literal sense.139 The second sentence of the gear-

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138 See Koslicki 2008.
139 See p. 26 and fn. 8.
wholes passage develops the first: ‘To the being of gear’, i.e. to *gearedness*: the what-being of gear (von Herrmann 2005, 121), ‘belongs always in each case a gear-whole’.¹⁴⁰ That a gear-whole ‘belongs always in each case,’ to *gearedness*, i.e. to ‘that which makes an item of gear, gear’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), means simply that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being gear. For we also speak of the essential properties of something as ‘belonging’ to its essence insofar as they are concomitant with that essence.¹⁴¹ I interpret Heidegger’s adverbs ‘always’ and ‘in each case’ as differing in sense, however. Whereas ‘always’ signifies that every item of gear is a component of a gear-whole *so long as* it is gear, ‘in each case’ signifies that this holds *in every possible case* such that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being gear. For although ‘in each case’ is ostensibly non-modal, that Heidegger is defining the property *gearedness*, rather than expressing mere generalisations about gear, licenses my modal reading.

Although the gear-wholes passage indicates that Heidegger deems being a component of a gear-whole necessary for being gear, Heidegger does not explain why he holds this. It is apparent, however, that in both the room and lecture-theatre examples, every item of gear appears primarily as a component of a gear-whole: namely, the respective décors of the room and lecture-theatre. Although Heidegger might be interpreted as simply *inducing* therefrom that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being gear, this is uncharitable. For, even supposing that necessary truths can be induced from particular cases, two examples of gear alone cannot justify inducing a necessary truth about gear. Instead, I speculatively yet charitably interpret Heidegger as inferring from the two examples that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being gear because he holds that the examples indicate that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for instantiating gear-characteristics. The latter is plausible insofar as the individual items of gear in the examples appear therein primarily as components of gear-wholes: such that the properties they appear as instantiating therein as beings of the class whereunto they appear as belonging, viz. gear-characteristics, are plausibly properties specific thereto as components of gear-wholes and whose instantiation

¹⁴⁰ For Heidegger’s adjunct ‘wherein it can be this gear that it is’, see p. 128.
therefore requires entities’ being components of gear-wholes. This is exemplified by the species of gear-characteristic figuring most prominently in this thesis, viz. around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen). For instantiating around-for references involves roughly being situationally relevant for a goal or activity in the manner §3.1.1 describes at length, which requires appropriate relatedness to co-components of a unitary situation and therefore being a component of a gear-whole (cf. Christensen 2007, 167).  

The above reconstruction of Heidegger’s reasoning is supportable through interpreting Heidegger’s adjunct to the first sentence of the gear-wholes passage that being a component of a gear-whole enables gear to ‘be this gear that it is’. I interpret this as signifying that for every item of gear, x, being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for x to instantiate the gear-characteristics it instantiates. The gear-characteristics gear instantiates make it ‘this gear that it is’ in the same way that a physicochemical substance’s instantiation of the physicochemical properties it instantiates make it the physicochemical entity it is (cf. Heidegger 1927/1975, 96). That being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for gear’s being ‘this gear that it is’ follows from the claim I attributed to Heidegger as justifying his identifying being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being, viz. that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for instantiating gear-characteristics. For if nothing that were not a component of a gear-whole could instantiate gear-characteristics, then no item of gear could instantiate the gear-characteristics it actually instantiates were it a component of no gear-whole.

In expounding Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, however, Bruin Christensen suggests a stronger interpretation of Heidegger’s notion that being a component of a gear-whole enables gear to ‘be this gear that it is’. Christensen reads Heidegger as asserting that ‘the individual entities seen’ in mundane concern, ‘because seen in their relevance [for what one is doing], are seen as internally related to this background nexus’, i.e. to a gear-whole whereof they are components such as

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142 See pp. 182-183, 216 for situational relevance’s context-dependence.
the décor of the room or lecture-theatre (Christensen 1998, 78). The ‘internal relatedness’ of gear to a ‘background nexus’ implies that items of gear appear in mundane concern as existentially dependent upon their being components of those gear-wholes whereof they appear as components. Thus whereas I interpret Heidegger as holding merely that being a component of some gear-whole is necessary for being gear, Christensen’s account of Heidegger’s phenomenology suggests that Heidegger would affirm that for every item of gear, there is a gear-whole whereof it could not fail to be a component. I reject Christensen’s reading as too strong because the gear-wholes passage’s implication that gear’s being a component of a gear-whole enables it to ‘be this gear that it is’ suggests only that being a component of some gear-whole, rather than of a particular gear-whole, enables an item of gear to be the gear it is.

Moreover, Christensen adduces no additional textual data in support of his stronger reading. §3.2.2 revisits this issue in considering persistence conditions of gear.144

**Around-for passage**

Gear is essentially ‘something around for …’. The various ways of around-for – such as servingness, contributoriness, usability, handiness – constitute a gear-wholeness [Zeugganzheit]. In the structure around-for lies a reference from something to something (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68).

Heidegger’s second condition for being gear is being around for something (um zu ..), which the around-for passage expresses thus: ‘Gear is essentially “something around for …”’. In asserting this, I reject Kris McDaniel’s implicit interpretation of Heidegger’s claim that ‘[g]ear is essentially “something around for …”’ as meaning that being around for (um zu) something is an essential property of every item of gear (McDaniel 2012, 13-14). I do so primarily because Heidegger is here defining gearedness, which §1.1.1 revealed to consist in specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear rather than in identifying properties essential to instantiators of gearedness.145 My reading does not, however, rule out that Heidegger would affirm that being around for (um zu) something is essential to every item of

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144 See pp. 222-223.
145 See pp. 42-43.
2. The Being of Gear

gear, though §2.2.2 rejects McDaniel’s attribution of essentialist claims to Heidegger in connection with the to-hand and extant.

As §3.1 explains in detail, being around for (um zu) something consists roughly in being situationally relevant therefor (cf. Christensen 2007, 167). Although Heidegger again does not explain why he deems being around for (um zu) something necessary for being gear, I interpret the around-for passage’s second sentence as identifying the reason. ‘The various ways of around-for […] constitute a gear-wholeness’ means that instantiation of determinates of around-for – e.g. servingness, contributoriness, etc. – is necessary for gear’s composition of gear-wholes (cf. von Herrmann 2005, 120). Although Heidegger once again does not indicate why he affirms this, I interpret him speculatively yet charitably as doing so because he holds that instantiating a determinate of around-for – that is, being around for (um zu) something in some way – is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole. That Heidegger would endorse this position is plausible for at least two reasons. First, since gear-wholes require components, the position implies that instantiation of determinates of around-for is necessary for the existence of gear-wholes; so my interpretation explains why the around-for passage’s second sentence affirms this. Second, since instantiating a determinate entails instantiating its determinable (Funkhouser 2006), the position implies that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole and therefore necessary for being gear; so my interpretation also explains why Heidegger designates being around for (um zu) something as necessary for being gear. For being a component of a gear-whole is Heidegger’s first condition for being gear, so Heidegger is committed to holding that everything necessary for being a component of a gear-whole is also necessary for being gear.

To establish the above reading’s charitableness, however, I must render it plausible that instantiating a determinate of around-for is necessary for being a component of a

\[146\] For details of the determinable-determinate relationship generally, see Funkhouser 2006. Furthermore, although I speak for simplicity as though Heidegger posits a purely modal relationship between instantiation of determinates of around-for and the wholeness of a gear-whole, my interpretation admits reframing using concepts such as grounding (see Raven 2012).
2.1 Explicating the Being of Gear

gear-whole. Accomplishing this requires first clarifying Heidegger’s basic concept around-for (Um-zu). Interpreting around-for also involves expounding the other two core basic concepts Heidegger introduces to enable comprehension of his two conditions for being gear, viz. reference (Verweisung) and wherefore (Wozu and Wofür). For these three concepts are intimately related in that being around for (um zu) something entails referring (verweisend) thereto and Heidegger’s term ‘wherefore’ (Wozu and Wofür) denotes the terminus of an around-for reference (Um-zu-Verweisung): that is, something ‘wherefore’ (wozu or wofür) something is ‘around’ (um). These three concepts together enable comprehension of Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear because being around for (um zu) something is Heidegger’s second condition and being around for (um zu) something is (on my interpretation) necessary for being a component of a gear-whole, which is Heidegger’s first condition. Though my interpreting these concepts is constrained by the few textual data elucidating them, §3.1 articulates these concepts extensively in developing and defending Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern; so I refer the reader thereto for additional information.

The around-for passage gives four examples of determinates of around-for: servingness (Dienlichkeit), contributoriness (Beiträglichkeit), usability (Verwendbarkeit), and handiness (Handlichkeit) (1927/2006, 68). Elsewhere, Heidegger adds being of import (von Belang sein) and detrimentality (Abträglichkeit) (1925/1979, 252; 1927/2006, 83; cf. Christensen 2007, 166). These are all ways of being relevant for something (Christensen 2007, 167). Heidegger deems reference (Verweisung) an essential aspect of around-for: ‘In the structure around-for lies a reference [Verweisung] from something to something’ (1927/2006, 68). This implies that referring (verweisend) to something is necessary for being around for (um zu) it. Heidegger calls something wherefore (wozu or wofür) something is around (um) a ‘wherefore’: ‘[Gear] is always something around for [um zu], referring [verweisend] to a wherefore’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 233). In §3.2.2, I gloss something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore (Wozu or Wofür) as consisting in its being such that it ought to be taken into account in pursuing that wherefore.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{147} See p. 217.
I follow von Herrmann in using the term ‘around-for references’ (‘Um-zu-Verweisungen’) to denote determinates of around-for of all degrees of generality (von Herrmann 2005, 124). Servingness (Dienlichkeit) is an around-for reference, for example, because being of service (dienlich) for a wherefore consists in referring (verweisend) thereto in being around for (um zu) it. The six determinates of around-for mentioned above ostensibly suggest its relationality (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68; cf. 1925/1979, 252). For whenever something is of service, contributory, usable, etc., there is something wherefore (wozu or wofür) it is of service, contributory, usable, etc. Von Herrmann implicitly acknowledges this ostensible relationality of around-for in illustrating three determinates: ‘The house is something around for residing in; the wood is something around for constructing a table from (usable for). The tool is something around for wielding for the construction of a chair (it is handy for)’ (2005, 121). Although Mark Sinclair observes that Heidegger’s determinates of around-for ‘are never clearly distinguished from each other’ (2006, 55), von Herrmann’s examples indicate that differences between determinates of around-for consist roughly in differences between ways something can be relevant for a wherefore (cf. Christensen 2007, 167). For example: a house might be of service for residing in being such that it constantly enables and facilitates residing; a block of wood is usable for constructing a table from in being such that it can be turned (verwandt) from its merely potentially valuable condition to fulfil the definite function of a table; a tool is handy for wielding for the construction of a chair in being such that it is readily deployable to further the construction of a particular chair. Being detrimental (abträglich), moreover, which von Herrmann does not discuss, consists in being negatively relevant for a wherefore (Christensen 2007, 166).

Von Herrmann’s examples of token around-for references suggest, however, that around-for references are not in fact relations. For the termini of those tokens are not actual entities. The phrases ‘constructing a table from’ and ‘wielding for the
2.1 Explicating the Being of Gear

construction of a chair’, for example, do not denote actual entities; instead, they denote merely possible actions or events (2005, 121; cf. Christensen 1997, 85-86). For the respective entities are around for (um zu), and thus refer (verweisen) to, a possible (future) action or event in being relevant therefor. Likewise, in two of Heidegger’s paradigm examples of around-for references, viz. the reference (Verweisung) of a hammer to hammering and a sign to showing (1927/2006: 83, 79-81), the wherefore is no actual action or event, but seemingly rather an action or event in abstracto. Heidegger accordingly recognises the difficulty of comprehending references as a species of relation (1927/1975, 233), despite acknowledging that they may be understood as relations ‘extremely formally’ (1927/2006, 77): perhaps only inasmuch as ‘x is around for y’ is a relational expression. §3.1.1 explores this issue further in discussing, amongst other issues, the particularity and demonstrative specifiability of wherefores.

Proceeding now to reference (Verweisung), one should note firstly that ‘Verweisung’ derives from the verb ‘verweisen’ (‘to refer’). ‘Verweisen’ typically means ‘to refer’ in the sense of ‘to direct away’ – as a receptionist might refer someone to another person or place, i.e. direct them away from herself thereto (cf. Christensen 2007, 167). Hence, I interpret Heidegger as holding that something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore involves its referring (verweisend) away from itself to that wherefore (wozu or wofür) it is around (um). So, for example, being of service (dienlich) in Heidegger’s sense necessarily involves the server referring away from itself to that wherefore (wozu) it is of service. The essential referentiality of around-for references is reflected phenomenologically by the ‘recession’ (Zurückziehen) of objects in mundane concern in highlighting a wherefore at their own expense and thus referring away from themselves thereto: ‘That wherewith mundane engagement primarily dwells is not the tools themselves’, i.e. objects around for (um zu) the wherefore the agent is pursuing, ‘but rather the work – that which is to be produced’,

149 See pp. 184-186.
150 Cf. Pope Benedict XVI’s characterisation of the relationship of the Son to the Father, which §3.1.2 discusses (pp. 178-179): ‘[the] ego [Ich] of Jesus is pure referredness [Verwiesenheit] to the “you” [Du] of the Father – not standing in itself, but rather is actually just a “way”’ (Ratzinger 2000/1968, 19). The ‘pure referredness’ of Jesus’s ego consists in its referring everything away from itself to the Father; it is, as it were, transparent or at least translucent (see pp. 193-194).
2. The Being of Gear

i.e. the wherefore pursued as a goal to be realised, ‘is that which is primarily of concern [Besorgte]’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67-68). Von Herrmann accordingly characterises the wherefore pursued as mundane concern’s ‘centre of orientation’ (Orientierungszentrum) (2005, 126).\(^\text{151}\) Likewise, expressing Heidegger’s position, Christensen writes:

\[\text{[T]o perceive something in its relevance for what one is doing is precisely to be directed by it away from what it is in itself to the respect in which its being what it is in itself is good or bad for what one is doing. The entity perceived, together with all its properties, withdraws behind its Geeignetheit [sc. suitability]} \] (Christensen 2007, 167; cf. Hall 1993, 126; Harman 2002, 25).\(^\text{152}\)

Hence, describing the mundanely concernful appearance of a trafficator, Heidegger states that the ‘circumspect overview’ a driver acquires through observing it in operation ‘does not apprehend’ the trafficator itself; ‘rather it obtains an orientation within the environment’ (1927/2006, 79). §3.1.2 discusses reference extensively in explaining the phenomenon of situated normativity. ‘Reference’ accordingly denotes the way objects appear in mundane concern as ‘relating’ to wherefores in being around for (um zu) them. The reference (Verweisung) from an instantiator of around-for to a wherefore might not be the sole reference implicated in something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore, however. As explained below, for example, I read Heidegger as holding that gear’s being collectively around for (um zu), and thus referring to (verweisend), a common wherefore involves also referring (verweisend) to other gear around for (um zu) the same wherefore.

I return now to explaining why Heidegger identifies being around for (um zu) something as necessary for being gear. As stated in analysing the around-for passage, I interpret Heidegger as doing so because he holds that instantiating a determinate of

\(^{151}\) See pp. 180-185.

\(^{152}\) ‘[E]quipment [sc. gear] functions by pushing us beyond itself, by vanishing in favor of the visible reality that it brings about’ (Harman 2002, 25).
around-for, i.e. being around for (um zu) something in some way, is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole. This position, I contended, underlies Heidegger’s claim that ‘[t]he various ways of around-for […] constitute a gear-wholeness [Zeugganzheit]’: that is, that instantiation of determinates of around-for is necessary for gear’s composing gear-wholes (1927/2006, 68). Since the gear-wholes passage identifies being a component of a gear-whole as necessary for being gear, it follows that being around for (um zu) something is likewise necessary for being gear. I propose interpreting Heidegger as affirming that being around for (um zu) something in some way is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole because he holds that a plurality of gear’s being a gear-whole requires that all members thereof be collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore (Wozu or Wofür). Given my expositions of around-for, wherefore, and reference, this means roughly that gear’s collective relevance for a common wherefore is necessary for its composing a gear-whole: that is, a unitary plurality of gear. The common wherefore anchors the plurality of gear to a single point, so to speak, thereby securing its unity.

Gear’s being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore implies that individual items of gear relate or indeed refer (verweisen) to one another in being around for (um zu) the common wherefore. An analogy illustrates why such collectiveness is plausibly necessary for gear’s composing a gear-whole. A plurality of wayfarers sharing a common destination might be no more than a mere plurality of individuals heading to the same place rather than a unitary party. To qualify as the latter, and thus constitute a whole, they must not only share a common destination, but also be related amongst themselves in view of that common destination: for example, by conversing together thereabout, sharing provisions gathered for the journey, and agreeing upon the appropriate route thereto. Others heading to the same destination are not members of the single unitary party, despite the sameness of their destination, because they are not collectively bound therewith for that common destination.

153 See pp. 129-130.
Although my interpretation is admittedly speculative in light of the paucity of textual data enabling reliable interpretation, one statement from §15 of BT in particular suggests that Heidegger indeed holds that gear’s being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore is necessary for its composing a gear-whole. Describing an example of mundanely concernful production, Heidegger writes: ‘the work’, i.e. ‘that which is to be produced’ – the ultimate wherefore in production (1927/2006, 69-70) – ‘sustains the referential-wholeness [Verweisungsganzheit] inside which the gear appears’ (Ibid, 70). That ‘the work’ as ‘that which is to be produced’ ‘sustains the referential-wholeness’, i.e. the wholeness of the gear-whole insofar as it features references (Verweisungen), implies that the work to be produced unifies the gear-whole by anchoring it to a single point and is thus necessary for the plurality of gear’s composing a gear-whole. As explained below, a gear-whole is therefore a referential-manifold (Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit) and as such instantiates referential-wholeness insofar as all components are collectively around for (um zu), and thus refer (verweisen) to, a common wherefore and therewith also refer (verweisen) to co-components of the gear-whole insofar as they are also around for (um zu) that common wherefore. I endorse von Herrmann’s recommendation that Heidegger’s term ‘work’ and definition thereof as ‘that which is to be produced’ be understood ‘in the broad sense’ (von Herrmann 2005, 125): implying that ‘work’ denotes not only physical products narrowly construed, but instead extends to every goal to be realised and therewith to every wherefore insofar as it is a possibility to be realised. In short, then, Heidegger’s statement that ‘the work […] sustains the referential-wholeness’ implies that gear’s being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore is necessary for its composing a gear-whole. Von Herrmann illustratively suggests something like the interpretation just offered in analysing Heidegger’s room example:

[T]here is the pen, which refers to the ink and this to the paper and this to the pad; the gear-whole of the stationery refers, for its part, to the desk on which it lies; the desk refers to the lamp standing next to it, which illuminates the desk and enables writing on it in the light; desk and lamp refer to other furniture; they all refer to the window for the letting-in of daylight and fresh air, to the door for entering and exiting; and everything together refers to the room. We move assuredly within this referential-manifold when we inhabit
2.1 Explicating the Being of Gear


Von Herrmann adds that the ‘referential-manifold’ detailed in the first sentence is identical with ‘the gear-whole’, viz. the décor of the room, ‘in its gear-wholeness’ (Ibid, 122; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 69). Consequently, the term ‘referential-manifold’ may be regarded as necessarily co-extensive but not synonymous with ‘gear-whole’. For whilst the former denotes a gear-whole insofar as it features a system of references, the latter denotes a gear-whole insofar as it is a unitary plurality of gear. Moreover, although the referential-manifold is indeed a manifold, von Herrmann implies here that it is unitary because ‘everything together’, i.e. collectively, ‘refers to the room’, as that around for (um zu) – specifically, of service (dienlich) for – the superordinate activity of residing (Wohnen) or habitation (Bewohnen).154 Hence, the room example states that the room – and, through collectively referring thereto, everything therein – appears as ‘residing-gear’ (Wohnzeug): gear around for (um zu) residing (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69; cf. 1927/1975, 233). In this instance, ‘the work’ as ‘that which is to be produced’ is the activity of residing. For everything in the room ultimately appears as around for (um zu) residing in the room as a realisable possibility in a manner roughly analogous to that in which tools appear as around for (um zu) the particular work to be realised through their use.

Additionally, Von Herrmann’s (strictly untranslatable) observation regarding the ‘stationery’ gear-whole in the room example that the pen ‘refers to the ink and this to the paper and this to the pad’ means that the pen refers the ink to the paper and refers the paper to the pad supporting it.155 For the pen – as the writing instrument par excellence – both the reference of the ink to the paper, since the pen applies the ink to the paper, and in turn the reference of the paper to the pad, since the latter supports the former during the application of the pen thereto. This is

154 For the term ‘superordinate wherefore’, see pp. 173-174.
155 Recall that von Herrmann conceives the ‘stationery’ mentioned in the room example’s first sentence as a gear-whole that is itself a component of a gear-whole, viz. the décor of the room (see p. 125).
reflected phenomenologically by the appearance of, respectively, the pen as referring away from itself to the ink applicable to the paper through it, the ink as referring away from itself to the paper whereto it is applicable because the pen refers to the ink, and the paper as referring away from itself to the pad supporting it because the pen refers the ink to the paper. Though von Herrmann does not specify a common wherefore of these entities, they doubtless appear as collectively around for (um zu) writing in some way: perhaps as collectively of service (dienlich) therefor. Therefore, the stationery exemplifies collective around-for reference (Um-zu-Verweisung) to a common wherefore in that its components refer (verweisen) to one another in the aforesaid ways in being around for (um zu) their common wherefore. The foregoing indicates, moreover, that we may describe not only agents as being ‘referred’ (verwiesen) from objects to wherefores, say, insofar as the former appear as referring (verweisend) to the latter, but also objects themselves as being ‘referred’ to other objects and in turn to wherefores insofar as those objects are such that they appear in mundane concern as directing us away from themselves to other objects and wherefores because other objects refer thereto.

That the various entities within the room’s décor collectively refer to the room itself or its wherefore, viz. residing (Wohnen), as in the stationery example, is further suggested by von Herrmann’s assertion that ‘[w]e move assuredly within this referential-manifold when we inhabit [bewohnen] the room’ and thus engage in the activity of residing (Wohnen). We ‘move assuredly within this referential-manifold’ precisely ‘when we inhabit the room’ because the referential-manifold appears to us as collectively anchored in the single superordinate wherefore, i.e. activity or goal, of residing (Wohnen): wherein we are engaged. For every component of the décor appears not only as ultimately around for (um zu) either the room itself, as von Herrmann might have it, which in turn appears as around for (um zu) residing, or perhaps simply residing itself, but also as referring to co-components of the décor in appearing thus. Our ‘assuredness’ (Sicherheit) derives from our implicit acknowledgement of all gear therein as thus collectively around for (um zu), e.g. of service (dienlich) for or of import (von Belang) for, the single superordinate activity wherein we are engaged, which in turn serves as the foundation for subordinate
activities within the room involving specific regions of the referential-manifold. Bill Blattner speaks similarly of the room in Heidegger’s room example as featuring ‘an entire context of equipment [sc. gear], all arranged and arrayed so that it can serve its appointed purpose’ (2006, 51-52), which von Herrmann calls ‘the specific concernful engagement with it’ (von Herrmann 2005, 122). §3.1 extensively develops the phenomenology of collective around-for reference (Um-zu-Verweisung) and thereby situational holism hereby sketched.

Von Herrmann would presumably also follow Heidegger in recognising that the various components of the décor appear as instantiating various determinates of around-for in participating in the collective around-for reference. The pen, for example, is handy (handlich) for writing on the paper, which is for its part usable (verwendbar) for writing on; and both form part of the stationery gear-whole, whose components are collectively of service (dienlich) for writing. Such parochial around-for references contribute to the intricate referential-manifold of the décor. Finally, the phrase ‘specific [spezifische] concernful engagement’ in the final sentence of von Herrmann’s exposition signifies that residing is the engagement (Umgang) characteristic for rooms as a species of gear: by dint of practice, convention, custom, habit, etc. For the German ‘spezifisch’, unlike the English ‘specific’, means ‘specific’ only in the strictly taxonomic sense. That residing is the specific engagement with rooms does not entail that the sole possible engagement with rooms is residing, nor even that rooms invariably appear in mundane concern as around for (um zu) residing. An Amazonian tribesman, for example, might not perceive a room as around for (um zu) residing because he is not attuned to socio-cultural practices governing their use (cf. Rietveld 2008a, 978-979). §3.1.1 explores this issue further in analysing the relationship between situational holism, such as that outlined above, and property holism as described by Julian Kiverstein (2012, 3-4).  

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156 See pp. 181-182.
157 The stationery is thus a microcosm to the macrocosm of the room.
158 Heidegger expresses the relationship between proximate and ultimate wherefores using the schema ‘with … in …’ (‘mit ... bei ...’). For example: with hammering, in fixing; with fixing, in protection against bad weather, etc. (1927/2006, 84). Cf. §3.1.1’s exposition of Rietveld’s description of the architect’s experience of objects wherewith he engages (pp. 181-182).
159 See pp. 177-179.
Bruin Christensen favours a similar interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, and correspondingly Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear, to that presented above. Christensen expresses Heidegger’s position as that ‘the individual entities seen’ in mundane concern, ‘because seen in their relevance [for what one is doing], are seen as internally related to this background nexus’, i.e. to a gear-whole whereof they are components such as the décor of the room or lecture-theatre (1998, 78). For example: the appearance of entities within the room as collectively around for (um zu) our single superordinate activity of residing explains their appearance as composing a single gear-whole. The unity of the common, superordinate wherefore thereby secures the unitary appearance of the plurality of gear. Elsewhere, moreover, articulating Heidegger’s phenomenology in cognitive-scientific terms, Christensen writes that ‘what an intelligently behaving system works on, what it relates to as “data”, are irreducibly those relations of relevance or salience in which entities and events in its operating environment stands, given what the system is doing’ (1997, 85). ‘[W]hat the system is doing’ thus stands as the common, superordinate wherefore: with individual entities appearing only insofar as they ‘relate’ thereto through instantiating around-for references (‘relations of relevance or salience’).

Nevertheless, one passage from BP (the ‘benches passage’) suggests that Heidegger might deny that being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore is necessary for composing a gear-whole. For the benches passage ostensibly suggests that gear appearing as around for (um zu) no common wherefore with other members of a plurality can nevertheless appear as composing a gear-whole therewith. Since such appearances could be veridical, it follows that being collectively around for (um zu) a common wherefore is not necessary for composing a gear-whole. The benches passage describes the mundanely concernful experience of entering a lecture-theatre with a view to, say, finding a seat. The term ‘gear-nexus’ (‘Zeugszusammenhang’) is another stylistic variant of ‘gear-whole’:

Benches passage
When we come in here through the door, we do not apprehend the benches as such, no more than the door-handle. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: such that we go by them circumspectly, circumspectly avoid that we bump ourselves, and suchlike. [...] We say, a gear-nexus surrounds us (Heidegger 1927/1975, 232-233; cf. Christensen 1998, 77).

Heidegger thus implies that the décor (*Einrichtung*) of the lecture-theatre ‘surrounds us’ phenomenologically as a ‘gear-nexus’, i.e. appears as a gear-whole, despite some components thereof, e.g. fully occupied benches, appearing as irrelevant for our superordinate wherefore of, say, seeking a seat or finding a seat. For we simply ‘go by them’, ‘avoid that we bump ourselves’ on them, etc., in light of their irrelevance for our superordinate wherefore. This is ostensibly incompatible with the position that being collectively around for (*um zu*) a common wherefore is necessary for composing a gear-whole inasmuch as these benches appear (potentially veridically) as components of a gear-whole without appearing as collectively around for (*um zu*) the common wherefore of its other components, e.g. the activity *seeking a seat* or goal *finding a seat*.

In rejoinder, I read Heidegger as holding that even the benches we merely ‘go by’ appear as collectively around for (*um zu*) the common wherefore, e.g. *seeking a seat* or *finding a seat*, precisely through appearing as irrelevant. For even irrelevant objects are, in Christensen’s words (1998, 78), ‘seen in their relevance’ for what we are doing insofar as they appear as having no relevance for our activity or goal. Accordingly, even irrelevant objects appear as referring (*verweisend*) away from themselves to our activity or goal precisely in appearing as irrelevant therefor. We simply ‘go by’ the benches ‘circumspectly’, for example, because they appear immediately in their relevance, and thus as around for (*um zu*), our superordinate wherefore. Consequently, even irrelevance (*Irrelevanz*) may qualify as a determinate of around-for.\(^{160}\)

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\(^{160}\) Christensen might characterise irrelevance as ‘negative relevance’ (2007, 167).
That Heidegger would endorse my rejoinder is suggested by his use of the adverb ‘circumspectly’ (‘umsichtig’) in describing the experience of the benches in the benches passage. For Heidegger’s term ‘circumspection’ (‘Umsicht’) denotes the ‘sight’ proper to mundane concern (1927/2006, 69), whereby mundane concern ‘subordinates itself’ (sich unterstellt) to ‘the referential-manifold of around-for’: that is, the manifold of around-for references figuring in a gear-whole. This implies that even in seeing the irrelevant benches, our state of mundane concern ‘subordinates itself’ to the around-for references they appear therein as instantiating: to precisely their ultimate irrelevance for ‘that which is primarily of concern’ (Ibid, 69-70), viz. the common, superordinate wherefore of the components of the décor of the lecture-theatre.

In summary, this section interprets Heidegger as identifying being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen) and being around for (um zu) something as independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear. A gear-whole is a unitary plurality of particular items of gear, e.g. the décor of a room or lecture-theatre. Being around for (um zu) something consists roughly in being situationally relevant therefor. Heidegger affirms that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for being gear because he maintains that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for instantiating gear-characteristics, which is itself necessary for being gear. Heidegger holds that being a component of a gear-whole is necessary for instantiating gear-characteristics because gear-characteristics are properties specific to components of gear-wholes as such in that instantiating them requires relatedness, or rather referredness (Verwiesenheit), to co-components of gear-wholes: as exemplified by collective around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) to common wherefores unifying gear-wholes. Heidegger identifies being around for (um zu) something as necessary for being gear because he holds that being around for (um zu) something is necessary for being a component of a gear-whole, which is his first necessary condition for being gear. Heidegger does so, I aver, because he maintains that a plurality of gear’s being collectively around for (um zu) for a common wherefore (Wozu or Wofür) is necessary for its composing a gear-whole. For a

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161 See pp. 136-137.
162 See p. 124.
common wherefore anchors a plurality of gear to a single point, so to speak, thereby securing its unity.

2.1.3. Property wholes and purposes

My interpretation of Heidegger’s two conditions for being gear, viz. being a component of a gear-whole and being around for (um zu) something, differs from interpretations advocated by David Cerbone and Mark Okrent respectively. Consequently, moreover, my interpretation of reference (Verweisung) differs from Cerbone’s and my interpretation of around-for (Um-zu) from Okrent’s. Cerbone interprets Heidegger’s first condition for being gear, viz. being a component of a gear-whole, as meaning that being normatively related to tools of other classes is necessary for being a tool. On Cerbone’s interpretation, a ‘gear-whole’ is a unitary plurality not of particular items of gear, as on my reading, but of properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being a tool of a specific class. The ‘references’ (Verweisungen) unifying such pluralities of properties are connections between instantiation conditions of properties. Cerbone illustrates his interpretation in the following passage using the example of a hammer:

As Heidegger sees it, the ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] entities that we encounter in our everyday dealings stand in myriad referential relations, which together constitute their respective identities. Thus, a hammer is something with which to hammer in nails in order to hold two pieces of wood together toward the building of a house[.] […] These referential relations are a web of internal relations in the sense that the ‘nodes’ of the web cannot be specified in isolation from others: what it is to be a hammer can only, Heidegger argues, be articulated in these terms. The ‘referential totality’ [sc. referential-manifold] is thus essential to the constitution of the hammer qua hammer: an entity that […] occupied a different place within the referential totality or occupied no place at all […] would not be a hammer (1999, 311; cf. 314).
Cerbone’s statement that ‘[w]hat it is to be a hammer can only […] be articulated in these terms’ implies that standing in certain normative relations to ‘gear’, i.e. tools, of other classes is necessary for being a hammer. For example: being ‘something with which to hammer in nails in order to hold two pieces of wood together’, i.e. being for hammering in nails for holding two pieces of wood together, is necessary for being a hammer. Satisfying this condition involves standing in normative relations to nails and pieces of wood generally, rather than to particular nails and pieces of wood. Cerbone calls these ‘referential relations’, thereby indicating his interpretation of Heidegger’s concept reference (Verweisung). Such ‘references’ compose a ‘referential totality’, i.e. referential-manifold (Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit), insofar as the instantiation condition of, say, being a hammer ‘refers’ to the instantiation conditions of being a nail and being a piece of wood. For example: being ‘for driving nails to fix pieces of wood’ might be necessary for being a hammer, being ‘for driving with hammers to fix pieces of wood’ necessary for being a nail, and being ‘for fixing using nails driven with hammers’ necessary for being a piece of wood.

On Cerbone’s interpretation, then, references obtain not between particulars, e.g. particular hammers, nails, and pieces of wood, but between properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being a tool of a specific class, e.g. being a hammer, being a nail, being a piece of wood. Hence, Cerbone describes the ‘referential totality’ in the above passage as articulating ‘[w]hat it is to be a hammer’ – that is, the property being a hammer – rather than which gear-characteristics a particular hammer instantiates or how it refers (verweist) to other particular items of gear. Cerbone accommodates Heidegger’s implication in the gear-wholes passage that being a component of a gear-whole enables gear to be ‘this gear that it is’ by observing that something’s being a hammer, for example, requires its occupying a certain ‘place within the referential totality’ (cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). Thus, necessarily, nothing that is not ‘something with which to hammer in nails’ is a hammer. Therefore, gear’s being ‘this gear that it is’ – i.e. a tool of the class it is: a hammer, say – depends upon its ‘place within the referential totality’. For this figurative ‘place’ consists in a certain property, e.g. being a hammer, standing in certain relations to other properties, e.g. being a nail, through connections between
the instantiation conditions thereof. Mark Okrent and Stephen Mulhall favour similar interpretations of Heidegger’s first condition for being gear (Okrent 2002, 201; Mulhall 2005, 48).

Cerbone’s interpretative errors stem from interpreting a gear-whole as a unitary plurality of *properties* whose instantiation consists in something’s being a tool of a specific class rather than as a unitary plurality of *particular* items of gear. Neither of Heidegger’s paradigmatic phenomenological examples of gear-wholes, viz. the room and lecture-theatre examples, support the former interpretation; on the contrary, they support the latter. The gear-whole appearing in the room example is evidently the décor (*Einrichtung*), which comprises particulars such as those Heidegger lists rather than properties (1927/2006, 68-69). Similarly, the ‘closed, intelligible nexus’ within the ‘surroundings’ of the lecture-theatre, whose ‘unity’ is ‘[g]iven to us primarily’, is obviously the décor of the lecture-theatre, which likewise comprises particulars (1927/1975, 231-232). The components of the décors of the room and lecture-theatre do not include, say, the properties *being a pen* and *being a bench*, as they must to support Cerbone’s interpretation, but rather particular pens and benches. Cerbone’s interpretation is also uncharitable. For Heidegger’s aim is to explicate the general way objects appear as being in mundane concern; and it is phenomenologically implausible that second-order relations between properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being a tool of a specific class figure in content of mundane concern. Instead, unitary pluralities of particulars appear: as on my interpretation of Heidegger and Erik Rietveld’s phenomenology of unreflective action as analysed in §3.1.1 (Rietveld 2010; 2012). I do not question the correctness of the *position* Cerborne’s interpretation attributes to Heidegger, of course, only its correctness as an *interpretation* of Heidegger. Indeed, analysing Julian Kiverstein’s articulation of such a position (Kiverstein 2012, 3-4), §3.1.1 endorses a position like that Cerbone attributes to Heidegger regarding gear-wholes without thereby endorsing Cerbone’s interpretation of Heidegger as such.163

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163 See pp. 177-179.
Okrent interprets Heidegger’s second condition for being gear, viz. being around for (um zu) something, as meaning that being normatively ‘for’ a fixed, specific purpose is necessary for being a tool, e.g. as being for hammering with is necessary for being a hammer. Hence, following Macquarrie and Robinson in translating ‘um zu’ as ‘in order to’ instead of ‘around for’ and ‘Wozu’ as ‘towards-which’ instead of ‘wherefore’, Okrent writes that ‘the “towards-which” is a specific way of being put to use: the hammer is there in order to hammer with, it has the function of hammering’ (Okrent 2002, 201). This contrasts with my interpretation of Heidegger’s second condition for being gear as meaning roughly that being situationally relevant for something, as opposed to being normatively ‘for’ a fixed purpose, is necessary for being gear (cf. Christensen 2007, 166).

I reject Okrent’s interpretation of around-for primarily because it renders around-for’s instantiation incapable of unifying pluralities of gear in the manner the around-for passage demands: ‘The various ways of around-for […] constitute a gear-wholeness’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). For whereas collective relevance plausibly explains a plurality of gear’s being a gear-whole through anchoring the plurality to a single, common wherefore, gear’s being for specific purposes through belonging to certain classes could not explain this. That pens are for writing with and lamps for illuminating things, for example, cannot explain why the particular pen and lamp in the room example are co-components of the single gear-whole that is the décor. By contrast, the pen and lamp’s collective relevance together with everything else in the décor for the common wherefore residing explains their composing a gear-whole by anchoring the many items of gear to a single point. Okrent himself does not confront the problem of how around-for’s instantiation is supposed to unify gear-wholes because he follows Cerbone in conceiving gear-wholes as unitary pluralities of properties: presenting Heidegger as holding, for example, that ‘what it is to be a hammer is defined in terms of how things that are hammers are to be used with other types of equipment within a holistically integrated system of functional relations’ (Okrent 2002, 201).
Nevertheless, one problematic textual datum for my interpretation of *around-for*, which constitutes *prima facie* evidence for Okrent’s, is that Heidegger seemingly designates the wherefore for which every sign is of service (*dienlich*) as *showing* (*Zeigen*): ‘the “reference” *showing*, i.e. referring to *showing* in being around for (*um zu*) it, ‘is the ontic concretion of the wherefore of a servingness [*Dienlichkeit*]’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 78); and Heidegger further states that the ‘specific [*spezifischer*] gear-characteristic’ of signs ‘consists in *showing*, i.e. in being around for (*um zu*) *showing* (*Ibid*, 77; cf. 1927/1975, 414-415; Okrent 2002, 201). This might suggest that something acquires an around-for reference through belonging to a specific class, e.g. signs, as on Okrent’s interpretation, rather than through being situationally relevant for something. For if the latter were the case, as I have it, then it seems that a sign could in principle be around for (*um zu*) *any* wherefore according to its relevance in a particular situation, which ostensibly implies that *showing* would not be its ‘specific’ wherefore.

In rejoinder, I contend that my interpretation permits distinguishing something’s *specific* (*spezifischer*) around-for reference, e.g. a sign’s being of service (*dienlich*) for *showing*, from around-for references it instantiates through being relevant for something in a particular context. For the sense of the German ‘*spezifisch*’ is narrower than that of the English ‘specific’. Whilst the latter can mean ‘particular’ or ‘respective’, the former invariably means that something pertains to a species in the taxonomic sense. Analysing Heidegger’s room example, for instance, von Herrmann states that ‘residing in the room is the specific [*spezifische*] concernful engagement with it’ (2005, 122; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 68). For rooms as a species are ‘residing-gear’: that is, gear specifically (*spezifisch*) of service (*dienlich*) for residing. Heidegger may thus consistently and unambiguously affirm that the *specific* wherefore or gear-characteristic of signs is *showing* – and thus the ‘appropriate type of engagement’ or ‘having-to-do’ therewith *following* (*Ibid*, 79) – whilst allowing that particular signs can be around for (*um zu*) various wherefores according to their situational relevance. Nevertheless, signs typically appear as being around for (*um zu*), or more specifically as of service (*dienlich*) for, *showing* and thus as instantiating their ‘specific’ (*spezifische*) around-for reference. For, as §3.1.1 explains, subjects to whom signs appear are typically familiar with conventions and norms governing
2. The Being of Gear

their use and thereby pre-disposed to perceive them as, say, of service for showing something, regardless of context (cf. Kiverstein 2012, 3-4; Thompson 2007, 247; Rietveld 2012, 214-215).\(^{164}\)

Heidegger may also consistently state that each item of gear ‘belongs in a gear-nexus inside which it has its specific \textit{spezifische} gear-function’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 414). A sign, for instance, might be said to be constantly of service for \textit{showing} whatever the makeup of the gear-whole whereof it is a component and regardless of which other around-for references it might instantiate within that gear-whole. For as its \textit{specific} around-for reference, signs’ being of service, and thus being relevant, for \textit{showing} derives from the conventions and norms governing their use rather than facts about particular situations wherein they figure.\(^{165}\) Importantly, however, this does not imply that the sign’s being of service for \textit{showing} is invariably the around-for reference rendering it a component of a gear-whole, i.e. the around-for reference whereby it participates in the collective around-for reference to a common wherefore. For even though this role is usually fulfilled by signs’ specific \textit{(spezifische)} around-for reference, another around-for reference might happen to fulfil this role in an exceptional context. Hence, on my interpretation, Heidegger’s concept \textit{around-for} is sufficiently broad as to encompass both specific \textit{(spezifische)} around-for references and contextual around-for references; and the objection consequently fails.

In summary, this section rebuts two rival interpretations of Heidegger’s conditions for being gear and concepts \textit{reference} and \textit{around-for}. Cerbone’s interpretation of gear-wholes as unitary pluralities of properties whose instantiation renders something a tool of a specific class, rather than of particular items of gear, is uncharitable and implausible given both Heidegger’s aim of explicating content of mundane concern, wherein such ‘property wholes’ clearly do not figure, and the room and lecture-theatre examples’ exemplification of gear-wholes in the form of their respective décors. Okrent’s interpretation of being around for \textit{(um zu)} something as consisting

\(^{164}\) See pp. 177-179.
\(^{165}\) See also pp. 177-179 and fn. 284.
in being normatively ‘for’ a fixed, specific purpose, rather than in being situationally relevant for something, is likewise uncharitable and implausible because entities’ being for fixed purposes cannot unify pluralities into gear-wholes in the manner the around-for passage demands of around-for’s instantiation (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68).
2. The Being of Gear

2.2. To-hand-ness and Extantness

This section clarifies Heidegger’s position on the issue of whether the modes-of-being to-hand-ness and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense, i.e. nature, can be co-instantiated.166 ‘Extantness’ denotes extantness in the narrow sense throughout. In advocating his own interpretation, Kris McDaniel notes the prominence of this issue within secondary literature (2012, 3-4). We may assume that what holds for co-instantiation of to-hand-ness and extantness (nature) also holds for co-instantiation of constitutions of being wherein they figure, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness and natural-thingliness and nature respectively (von Herrmann 2008, 120). For, as §1.1.1 noted, Heidegger implies that to-hand-ness and gearedness are necessarily co-instantiated; and we may reasonably suppose, in the absence of textual data to the contrary, that the same holds for natural-thingliness and nature. Therefore, the question of whether to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated is also effectively the question of whether it is possible that some items of gear and physicochemical entities are numerically identical. Furthermore, §1.1.3 suggested interpreting Heidegger as holding that something can be exactly as if it instantiated more than one mode-of-being simultaneously without actually instantiating more than one mode-of-being. This occurs by virtue of a determinable-determinate or ‘inclusion’ relationship between those modes-of-being, e.g. life’s ‘inclusion’ of extantness in being a determinate thereof. Though Heidegger’s possible denial that modes-of-being can, strictly speaking, be co-instantiated should be borne in mind, I speak for simplicity as though instantiating a mode-of-being ‘including’ another entails instantiating and therefore being capable of instantiating the latter. Addressing herein only the ontological issue of whether Heidegger allows that to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated, I postpone discussing whether Heidegger recognises an ontic priority relationship between to-hand entities and extant entities until §3.2.2 (cf. McManus 2012a, 69).167

After I have briefly outlined Heidegger’s conception of extantness through developing ideas presented in §1.2.2, §2.2.1 interprets Heidegger as affirming at least

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166 For the identification of extantness in the narrow sense with nature, see p. 10.
167 See pp. 219-220.
that *to-hand-ness* and *extantness* can be co-instantiated whilst also suggesting that Heidegger affirms that instantiating *to-hand-ness* entails instantiating *extantness*. Accordingly, §2.2.2 argues against Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as denying that *to-hand-ness* and *extantness* could be co-instantiated, which McDaniel dubs the ‘two domains view’ (2012: 6, 4).

Though *BT* often contrasts *to-hand-ness* with pure (*purerm*) or mere (*bloβerm*) *extantness* (1927/2006: 70, 71, 73, 80, 83), Heidegger does not explicate *extantness* therein. 168 This is plausibly because Heidegger regards *extantness* as having already been explicated sufficiently, albeit perhaps unwittingly, in traditional philosophy (*Ibid*, 96-98). Nevertheless, Heidegger implies that objects appear as merely extant either typically or invariably in theoretical consideration or contemplation (*Betrachtung*), mere observation (*Hinsehen*), and thematic ascertainment (*Feststellung*) (*Ibid*: 74, 75); and to-hand objects supposedly appear as merely extant to some degree when mundane concern is interrupted (*Ibid*, 73; cf. Sadler 1996, 84). Hence, Frank Töpfer presents Heidegger as holding that ‘[i]n a merely contemplative attitude to beings, I experience them as merely extant’ (2004, 37); and Gail Soffer writes that ‘presence-at-hand [sc. *extantness*] is the way an object is given to a theoretical attitude’ (1999, 381). Moreover, Soffer suggests that Heidegger identifies *extantness* primarily negatively through contrasting it with *to-hand-ness* (1999, 383).169 Similarly, whilst contending that Heidegger uses ‘extant’ in many senses (*McManus* 2012a, 62-75), Denis McManus writes on one occasion: ‘The *Vorhanden* are the “kind” of entity one encounters when one forgets a deep sense in which entities come in “kinds”’ (*Ibid*, 198). Finally, it is generally acknowledged that *extantness* is intimately related to objects of natural science as such (*McManus* 2012a, 62-68). Heidegger presents Descartes, for example, in conceiving objects exclusively in terms congenial to mathematical physics in the manner §1.2.2 described, as ‘presupposing for [intraworldly beings] the mode-of-being of pure *extantness*’: that is, as assuming that intraworldly beings are merely extant rather than to-hand (1927/2006, 99; emphasis removed). Accordingly, von Herrmann

168 I use ‘pure’ and ‘mere’ interchangeably throughout, following Heidegger.
suggests that Heidegger regards physical science as studying entities considered as purely extant (2005, 127; cf. 1987, 131); and Cerbone represents physicalists as effectively affirming that everything is merely extant (1999, 313-314).¹⁷⁰

2.2.1. Co-instantiation of to-hand-ness and extantness

Notwithstanding the contrast between to-hand-ness and mere extantness, I read Heidegger as affirming at least that to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated. This mirrors Heidegger’s apparent position on the relationship between Existence and extantness, and life and extantness (1927/2006: 55, 50), which §1.1.2 discussed.¹⁷¹ I also propose the stronger claim, however, that Heidegger holds that, necessarily, every to-hand entity is extant – that is, that at no possible world is there a to-hand entity that is not extant. I induce this from Heidegger’s frequent intimation that to-hand entities may veridically be ‘regarded’ (angesehen), i.e. intended, as extant. The following four quotations exemplify this, suggesting at least that to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated and arguably that instantiating to-hand-ness entails instantiating extantness.

First, speaking of ‘nature’ (Natur) in the sense of the natural environment, Heidegger writes: ‘Its mode-of-being as to-hand can be disregarded, it itself becoming discovered and determined in its pure extantness’ (Ibid, 70). This implies that the natural environment is simultaneously both to-hand (‘Its mode-of-being as to-hand’) and extant (‘its pure extantness’) and that, through an act of ‘disregarding’ (Absehen), it may even be considered as if it were purely extant. Von Herrmann suggests that such disregarding enables natural-scientific investigation of the natural environment (2005, 127).¹⁷² Heidegger thereby echoes his claim that Dasein ‘can with a certain right, within certain limits, be conceived as merely extant’ (1927/2006, 55). Second, in BP, Heidegger writes: ‘We can conceal [verdecken] the gear-characteristics [Zeugcharaktere] initially emerging in natural engagement with such

¹⁷⁰ Cf. fn. 127.
¹⁷¹ See pp. 59-62.
¹⁷² Cf. Heidegger’s account of enabling geometrical enquiry about space as purely extant through disregarding the specifically to-hand spatiality of to-hand objects (1927/2006, 122; von Herrmann 2005, 272).
things as a window, which constitute its character of use, and consider the window merely as an extant thing’ (1927/1975, 96). The window’s gear-characteristics constitute its ‘character of use’ in that they make it ‘this gear that it is’, i.e. everything it is specifically as gear (cf. 1927/2006, 68). The hereby intimated justifiability of considering the window as merely extant implies that the window is simultaneously both to-hand and extant. Third, describing the south-wind’s appearance as a sign, i.e. gear of a specific class (Ibid, 77), and thus as to-hand, Heidegger writes: ‘As this merely occurring being, as which it may be meteorologically accessible, the south-wind is never primarily extant’ (Ibid, 80). The implication here is that although the south-wind does not appear primarily as merely extant, instead appearing primarily as to-hand in mundane concern, it is nevertheless justifiably cognisable as merely extant in, for example, meteorological research. Finally, contemplating talk about a hammer as to-hand and ostensibly the same hammer as extant, Heidegger writes:

**Hammer passage**

Why is it that in modified talk, its whereabout [Worüber] [sc. the hammer] shows itself differently? Not because we refrain from handling, but also not because we merely disregard the gear-character [Zeugcharakter] of this being, but rather because we regard the appearing to-hand being [Zuhandene] ‘anew’: as an extant being [Vorhandenes]. The understanding of being that guides concernful engagement with the intraworldly being has switched. But does the fact that instead of considering a to-hand being, we ‘conceive’ it as extant already constitute scientific behaviour? Besides, even a to-hand being can yet be made the theme of scientific investigation and determining, e.g. in the exploration of an environment – of the milieu – in the context of a historical biography. […] The to-hand being does not need to lose its gear-character in order to be capable of becoming an ‘object’ of a science. Modification of the understanding of being does not appear to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis of theoretical behaviour ‘towards

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173 Cf. p. 128.
174 Heidegger occasionally speaks in an abbreviated, *prima facie* metaphysical manner in formulating phenomenological claims where context clearly indicates his phenomenological intent.
2. The Being of Gear

things’. Certainly – if modification implies: a change in the mode-of-being understood, in the understanding, of the being concerned (1927/2006, 361).

Heidegger implies herein that a single hammer may justifiably be ‘regarded’ either as to-hand or as extant. Unlike previous quotations, the hammer passage states that the hammer is considered as extant, rather than as merely extant. Accordingly, Heidegger observes that the hammer’s to-hand-ness is not merely negatively ‘disregarded’; instead, the hammer is positively ‘regarded’ ‘anew’, viz. as extant. For even though instantiating to-hand-ness might entail instantiating extantness, something appearing as to-hand in mundane concern might yet be said not to appear as extant therein because it appears therein as instantiating properties distinctive of to-hand beings, viz. gear-characteristics, and thus as possessing ‘gear-character’, rather than properties distinctive of extant beings, viz. physicochemical properties. Therefore, the hammer passage notes, considering a hammer as extant rather than as to-hand involves a ‘switch’ in how the hammer appears as being. In any case, the hammer passage states that not only objects considered as extant, but even objects considered as to-hand can be investigated scientifically: ‘The to-hand being does not need to lose its gear-character in order to be capable of becoming an “object” of a science’. Heidegger’s brief characterisation of investigation of the to-hand suggests that it resembles contemporary ecology – a science of the environment (Umwelt) as such or, to use Max Scheler’s term, the milieu (Gibson 1979/1986, 2; Scheler 1916, 139). Hence, scientific investigation of the to-hand requires no ‘change in the mode-of-being understood’ as instantiated by ‘the being concerned’. That is, agents need not positively ‘regard’ to-hand objects as extant, and thereby change which mode-of-being they intend them as instantiating, to investigate them scientifically. Again, this implies that being to-hand implies being extant: in that to-hand objects are justifiably considerable as either in accordance with enquirers’ aims.

Nevertheless, David Cerbone maintains that the hammer passage is at least compatible with Heidegger’s distinguishing numerically therein between the to-hand and extant hammer:
Heidegger talks of seeing the hammer in two different ways – the hammer-as-hammer and, let us say, the hammer-as-wood-and-iron. […] In the first way of seeing, the hammer counts as a hammer, and is counted (numerically) accordingly, as one hammer, whereas in the second, the hammer no longer counts as the familiar item of equipment [sc. gear], and just how it is to be counted becomes an open question: one can count molecules, atoms, the space-time points occupied by those molecules and atoms, and so on. […] [I]n the change of seeing, different entities get seen, as is illustrated by all these new possibilities of counting. […] [T]his new way of seeing is directed toward the material composition of the hammer, to the entities, however many there are, which make it up: of course, in seeing these different entities, one still looks at the hammer, since surely the material which makes up the hammer is there and nowhere else (1999, 313).

Cerbone’s claim that in regarding the hammer as extant, one intends ‘the material composition of the hammer’ is plausible because the hammer appears therein as instantiating physicochemical properties (‘as wood and iron’) rather than gear-characteristics (‘as a hammer’). But I reject Cerbone’s implication that intending the hammer as extant involves intending something numerically distinct from the to-hand hammer because it entails intending many objects (‘one can count molecules, atoms’, etc.) rather than the ‘one hammer’. For the hammer could appear unitarily as extant, and thus as the same hammer, through appearing as, say, a unitary composite of wood and iron or even a unitary aggregate of molecules. Furthermore, the hammer passage nowhere mentions a plurality of extant objects appearing in intending the hammer as extant: instead speaking of ‘an extant being’, viz. one and the same hammer considered as extant. Therefore, pace Cerbone, the hammer passage implies that Heidegger deems the to-hand hammer and extant hammer numerically identical. Nevertheless, Cerbone is doubtless correct in presenting Heidegger as recognising that which entities should be mentioned in describing the hammer scientifically is ‘an open question’. For this is an ontic question for empirical science and therefore outside Heidegger’s exclusively ontological ambit for reasons §1.2.1 detailed.
2. The Being of Gear

2.2.2. The two-domains view

Kris McDaniel has recently interpreted Heidegger as holding that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (2012, 1-2). McDaniel thus denies both my weak claim that Heidegger allows that to-hand-ness and extant-ness can be co-instantiated and, a fortiori, my strong claim that Heidegger affirms that, necessarily, every to-hand entity is extant. McDaniel dubs his reading the ‘two domains view’, which he contrasts with the supposedly ‘dominant view among scholars of Heidegger’, viz. ‘the one domain view’: that Heidegger holds the classes of all to-hand entities and all extant entities to be necessarily co-extensive (2012: 6, 4). According to McDaniel, advocates of the latter typically construe Heidegger’s distinction between to-hand-ness and extant-ness as a merely phenomenological distinction: that is, a distinction merely between two ways objects could appear as being. As §1.1.1 noted, for example, John Richardson, reads Heidegger as holding that ‘what we would ordinarily consider the same entity […] may be either ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] or present-at-hand [sc. extant], depending upon the attitude in which it is encountered’ (1986, 48; McDaniel 2012, 3). Though my strong claim that Heidegger affirms that being to-hand entails being extant approaches it, I do not endorse the one-domain view. For I deny that there is sufficient textual evidence warranting interpreting Heidegger as holding that being extant entails being to-hand. As §1.1.1 explained, moreover, I deny that Heidegger conceives the distinction between to-hand-ness and extant-ness as a merely phenomenological distinction. For, again as §1.1.1 explained, I read Heidegger as affirming that to-hand-ness and extant-ness are primarily ways entities could be and only thereby ways entities could appear as being. For every way something could be is also a way something could in

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175 Though McDaniel acknowledges Cerbone’s advocacy of a similar view, McDaniel notes that Cerbone’s is weaker than his own (2012, 6-7; cf. Cerbone 1999).
176 Graham Harman is therefore atypical in advocating the one-domain view whilst defending a primarily metaphysical, as opposed to phenomenological, reading of Heidegger’s distinction between to-hand-ness and extant-ness: ‘The analysis of equipment is not a limited regional description of hammers, saws, toothpicks, and other technical devices. Rather, the famous tool-analysis holds good for all entities, no matter how useful or useless they might be. Beings themselves are caught up in a continual exchange between presence-at-hand [sc. extant-ness] and readiness-to-hand [sc. to-hand-ness]. This dual structure belongs to every entity, and is not a statement about the ups and downs of human activity’ (Harman 2002, 4).
177 See p. 41.
principle be represented as being, e.g. in experience or thought (cf. McDowell 1994, 27).

McDaniel defends the two-domains view in two ways, whereto I respond in turn. First, he infers its truth from Heidegger’s supposedly ascribing ‘incompatible properties to the ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] and the present-at-hand [sc. extant]’ in several passages (McDaniel 2012, 7). Second, McDaniel induces it from many passages suggesting that Heidegger distinguishes numerically between to-hand entities and extant entities. McDaniel identifies two examples of Heidegger’s supposedly ascribing incompatible properties to to-hand entities and extant entities. First, McDaniel reads Heidegger as holding that whereas every to-hand entity depends existentially upon persons and their activities, no extant entity is thus dependent (Ibid, 1-2). Consequently, for every to-hand entity, \(x\), there is no possible world at which \(x\) exists but no persons have ever existed; but for every extant entity, \(y\), there is a possible world at which \(y\) exists but no persons have ever existed. This implies that for everything that is both to-hand and extant, there is both no possible world and at least one possible world at which it exists but no persons have ever existed. Therefore, nothing is both to-hand and extant. Second, McDaniel reads Heidegger as holding that whereas every to-hand entity necessarily instantiates at least one value-property, no extant entity necessarily instantiates at least one value-property. This implies that for everything that is both to-hand and extant, there is both no possible world and at least one possible world at which it instantiates no value-properties (Ibid, 1-2). Therefore, nothing is both to-hand and extant. Crucially, the incompatibility arises because McDaniel presents Heidegger as ascribing essential properties to to-hand entities that he does not ascribe to extant entities. For Heidegger supposedly holds that for every to-hand entity, it could not have existed had persons not existed and could not exist without value-properties.

By contrast, I deny not only that Heidegger ascribes to to-hand entities the essential properties McDaniel presents him as ascribing, but also that Heidegger ascribes essential properties to to-hand entities tout court. I do so primarily because, to my

\(^{178}\) See pp. 41-42 and fn. 52.
knowledge, no textual data unambiguously suggests that Heidegger ascribes essential properties to to-hand entities. Yet additionally, since essentialism is a controversial doctrine (Robertson and Atkins 2013), avoiding attributing essentialist claims to Heidegger is also parsimonious and arguably even charitable.\(^\text{179}\) McDaniel’s use of textual data suggests that he fails to consider that rather than advancing claims about essential properties of entities, Heidegger is in fact advancing claims only about properties entities must instantiate to belong to certain classes. For instance, McDaniel interprets Heidegger’s claim that ‘intraworldliness belongs to the being of the extant, of nature, not as a determination of its being, but as a possible determination’ as meaning that ‘natural entities […] could exist independently of […] being in a world’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 240; McDaniel 2012, 7–8). McDaniel thus interprets Heidegger’s claim as meaning not that being intraworldly is not necessary for being natural, as I do, but rather that natural entities could exist without being intraworldly (‘exist independently of […] being in a world’). McDaniel does so because he takes Heidegger’s phrase ‘the being of the extant, of nature’ to denote not the regional essence of natural beings, wherewith §1.1.2 indicated natural beings’ ‘being’ (Sein) to be identical, but rather natural entities’ set of essential properties. On my reading, that intraworldliness ‘belongs to the being of the extant’ only ‘as a possible determination’ means that being intraworldly does not belong to the regional essence of natural beings, i.e. is not necessary for belonging to the regional class ‘nature’. On McDaniel’s reading, by contrast, that intraworldliness ‘belongs to the being of the extant’ only ‘as a possible determination’ means that intraworldliness does not belong to natural entities’ set of essential properties.

Whereas §1.1.2 defended interpreting the ‘being’ (Sein) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence, however, McDaniel adduces no textual data supporting interpreting the ‘being’ of a being as its set of essential properties.

McDaniel again fails to consider my non-essentialist reading in expounding Heidegger’s discussion of the whatness (Washeit) of gear.\(^\text{180}\)

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\(^\text{179}\) Essentialism asserts that some entities instantiate some properties essentially (Robertson and Atkins 2013).

\(^\text{180}\) Cf. pp. 42–43.
The *whatness* of a being consists in the essential features of that being. Heidegger tells us that we are *confronted* every day with these essential features; these essential features are *given* in comportment. Moreover, these essential features that make up what it is to be a being of this sort are fixed by the kind of equipment [sc. gear] that they are (McDaniel 2012, 13).

Contrary to McDaniel’s bald assertion that ‘[t]he *whatness* of a being consists in the essential features of that being’, ‘whatness’ is instead commonly used synonymously with ‘general essence’: ‘a general essence is sometimes called a quiddity or whatness’ (Schwartz 2009, 609). A general essence, unlike an ‘individual’ essence, is not identical with something’s set of essential properties, but is rather a property whose instantiation consists in something’s being an entity of a certain kind or class (*Ibid*, 609). Instantiating a general essence need not involve instantiating any properties essentially; instead, it consists in satisfying conditions for being an entity of a certain class. The ‘*whatness* of a being’, therefore, *pace* McDaniel, is a property something instantiates that renders it a member of a certain class. Hence, as §1.1.1 and §2.1.2 showed, Heidegger’s definition (*Umgrenzung*) of *gearedness* – the ‘*whatness*’ or ‘*what-being*’ of gear (von Herrmann 2005, 21) – consists in specifying not essential properties of gear, but rather necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear.

Furthermore, McDaniel proceeds to say, seemingly oblivious to the distinction, that those ‘essential features’ wherein ‘[t]he *whatness*’ of gear supposedly consists also ‘make up what it is to be a being of this sort’, viz. gear. McDaniel thus erroneously assumes that every property whose instantiation is independently necessary and jointly sufficient for being gear is also essential to every item of gear. In particular, McDaniel proceeds to mention Heidegger’s claim, analysed in §2.1.2, that gear is ‘essentially “something around for …”’ (1927/2006, 68). Assuming that some persons’ having existed is necessary for being around for (*um zu*) something, McDaniel glosses Heidegger’s phenomenological data supporting this claim as implying that to-hand entities ‘*show* themselves as dependent’, i.e. as existentially dependent upon persons such that there is no possible world at which they exist but
no persons exist (2012, 13). This indicates that McDaniel interprets Heidegger’s specification of a necessary condition for being gear, viz. being around for (um zu) something, either instead or also as specifying an essential property of every item of gear.

Similar confusion undermines McDaniel’s exposition of the following passage from *BP*, wherein Heidegger discusses gear’s ‘individuation’.

**Individuation passage**

Gear appears always inside a gear-nexus [Zeugszusammenhang]. Every particular item of gear carries that nexus with it, and only with respect to it is it this. The specific thisness of an item of gear, its individuation, if we take this word in a completely formal sense, is not determined primarily by space and time, in the sense that it occurs at a certain spatial- and temporal-position; but rather gear-character and the gear-nexus is, in each case, that which determines an item of gear as this (Heidegger 1927/1975, 414-415).

McDaniel contends that ‘[t]his passage expresses Heidegger’s views on when a piece of equipment [sc. gear] is’ and implies that ‘[t]he identity conditions of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand things are different’. In particular, McDaniel expounds Heidegger’s contrast between individuation through ‘gear-character’ and ‘gear-nexus’ and individuation through ‘spatial- and temporal-position’ as signifying that items of gear are ‘individuated by their node in a network of equipmental relations’ rather than by being ‘located at the same spacetime region’. Consequently, McDaniel reads Heidegger as holding that for every item of gear, x, occupying a certain ‘node in a network of equipmental relations’, i.e. a gear-nexus or gear-whole, is necessary and sufficient for being x (McDaniel 2012, 8-9). This implies that every item of gear instantiates being a component of a gear-whole essentially.

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181 McDaniel relies exclusively upon Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of *BT* (Heidegger 1962) and Albert Hofstadter’s translation of *BP* (Heidegger 1982). McDaniel’s interpretation is considerably more plausible as an interpretation of these translations than of Heidegger’s works themselves.
2.2 To-hand-ness and Extantness

Whilst granting that the individuation passage specifies identity conditions, I read it as specifying identity conditions of items of gear *as such* rather than *per se*. In particular, that ‘gear-character and the gear-nexus is, in each case, that which determines an item of gear as this’ means that for every item of gear, $x$, instantiating certain gear-characteristics and referring to co-components of a gear-whole and wherefores in certain ways is necessary and sufficient for being numerically the same item of gear as $x$. That Heidegger is referring to identity conditions of gear *as such* is implied by his speaking of ‘[t]he specific thisness of an item of gear’, i.e. the thisness of an item of gear *qua* gear, and ‘that which determines an item of gear as this’, i.e. as the item of gear it is. The ‘specific thisness of an item of gear’ is contrasted with the ‘specific thisness’ of natural beings, i.e. the identity conditions of physicochemical entities *as such*, whereto Heidegger alludes in mentioning ‘spatial- and temporal-position’ (cf. McDaniel 2012, 9). Unlike McDaniel’s, my reading does not attribute any claims about essential properties of items of gear to Heidegger. For that instantiating certain gear-characteristics and referring to co-components of a gear-whole and wherefores in certain ways is necessary and sufficient for being numerically identical with $x$ *insofar as* $x$ is gear does not imply that instantiating those gear-characteristics, etc., is necessary for being $x$. On my reading, $x$ could exist not only without instantiating those gear-characteristics, etc., but even without being gear.

I turn now to McDaniel’s second way of supporting the two-domains view: namely, adducing various passages supposedly implying numerical distinctness of to-hand entities and extant entities. Since McDaniel does not invoke the following quotations to demonstrate Heidegger’s ascription of incompatible properties to to-hand entities and extant entities, his exposition thereof is not compromised by his failure to distinguish essential properties from properties something must instantiate to belong to a certain class. Nevertheless, I contend that none implies numerical distinctness of to-hand entities and extant entities.

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182 Given Heidegger’s purely ontological intentions (see §1.2.1), this claim is charitably readable as one of necessity.
183 Cf. pp. 222-223.
2. The Being of Gear

The to-hand shows itself in its specific worldliness, which is on no day the same, precisely in unsteady seeing of the ‘world’: flickering according to mood. Theoretical observation has dimmed the world always already to the uniformity of the purely extant, inside which uniformity admittedly lies enclosed a new abundance of that discoverable [Entdeckbaren] in pure determining (Heidegger 1927/2006, 138).

McDaniel takes Heidegger’s claim that, through intending everything as ‘purely extant’, ‘[t]heoretical observation’ reveals a ‘new abundance of that discoverable in pure determining’, i.e. that discoverable through considering objects as purely extant, to mean that a group of entities, viz. extant entities, numerically distinct from those previously discoverable, viz. to-hand entities, becomes discoverable (McDaniel 2012, 19). I deny that Heidegger’s claim implies this, however. Instead, Heidegger plausibly means merely that a ‘new abundance’ of aspects of objects becomes discoverable through ‘pure determining’, e.g. physicochemical properties as those aspects accessible only through physical-scientific methods.¹⁸⁴ This idea is also expressed in the hammer passage (1927/2006, 361), which suggests that regarding the hammer as extant enables access to properties other than those accessible through intending it as to-hand.¹⁸⁵ McDaniel’s erroneous interpretation stems from Macquarrie and Robinson’s misleadingly liberal translation of ‘Entdeckbaren’ (‘that discoverable’) as ‘things discoverable’ (Heidegger 1962, 177). McDaniel’s reading would certainly be justified if the passage posited ‘a new abundance of things discoverable in pure determining’, since this would imply that the things in question are hitherto inaccessible entities. But my stricter translation allows that the ‘new abundance of that discoverable in pure determining’ is in fact a ‘new abundance’ of aspects of the same objects that were previously discoverable.

McDaniel subsequently invokes Heidegger’s claim that ‘[t]he sharpest mere observation of the thus-and-so constituted “appearance” of things is not able to discover a to-hand being [Zuhandenes]’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69; McDaniel 2012,

¹⁸⁴ See §1.2.2.
2.2 To-hand-ness and Extantness

19-20). Even in translation, this quotation is ambiguous. Heidegger might mean, and plausibly does mean, simply that nothing could appear as to-hand to someone merely observing it. For even if someone were to merely observe a to-hand being, and thereby discover an entity, the being’s not appearing as to-hand to them arguably justifies us in denying that they ‘discover a to-hand being’ specifically. Instead, they would doubtless discover an extant being (Vorhandenes) in that the entity would appear as extant rather than as to-hand. In German, the quotation supports McDaniel’s reading even less. For Heidegger’s word ‘Zuhandenes’ denotes a to-hand being as such, not merely a being that is to-hand.

McDaniel proceeds to invoke the following two quotations as implying that ‘there are two distinct kinds of things, and for each kind of thing, there is a distinct way of encountering that kind that reveals that kind of thing as it most truly is’. McDaniel contends, moreover, that ‘[i]t’s difficult to see how the one domain view can accommodate these passages’, and that even if it can do so, ‘the interpretation will be a convoluted one’ (2012, 21). The first is as follows:


This quotation means, pace McDaniel, that an extant being as such, i.e. a Vorhandenes, appears most purely to someone letting it appear to him as the specific Seiende it is, viz. as a Vorhandenes. Heidegger’s point is epistemic: identifying the appropriate mode of access to extant beings as such, viz. ‘purely observational letting-appear’. That this involves letting the being (Seiendes), viz. the Vorhandene, appear ‘in itself’ means only that the object appears therein as a Vorhandenes, and thus as the being (Seiendes) it is, rather than as instantiating

186 See §1.2.2. The term ‘letting-appear’ (Begegnenlassen) alludes to Heidegger’s contrast between letting a being (Seiendes) appear ‘in itself’ and ‘forcing’ it ‘into concepts that the being, in accordance with its mode-of-being, resists’ (1927/2006, 150).
another mode-of-being and therewith constitution of being, e.g. as to-hand gear.187 McDaniel is correct in reading the passage as implying that Vorhandenes are a ‘distinct kind of thing’ with a ‘distinct way of encountering’, i.e. mode of access to, ‘that kind that reveals that kind of thing as it most truly is’ (2012, 21); but this does not, pace McDaniel, imply that no Vorhandenes is a Zuhandenes. For a single entity can belong to more than one kind simultaneously, e.g. be both a Vorhandenes and Zuhandenes; and although Vorhandenes as such are ‘revealed most purely’ through ‘purely observational letting-appear’, just as to-hand gear as such is ‘revealed most purely’ through mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67), this does not entail that entities that are extant or to-hand are ‘revealed most purely’ through only one mode of access. For, as Heidegger observes in the hammer passage, different modes of access can reveal different aspects of the same entities (Ibid, 361). Therefore, Heidegger could affirm that every Vorhandene ‘appears most purely for a purely observational letting-appear of the being [Seienden] in itself’ whilst consistently affirming even that, necessarily, every extant entity is numerically identical with a to-hand entity. McDaniel’s second quotation is as follows:

To-hand gear appears, in respect of its ‘true in-itself’, precisely not to a thematic perception of things (Ibid, 354).

This quotation is analogous to the previous. Since to-hand-ness is the ‘being-in-itself’ of gear as such, in that to-hand-ness is the mode-of-being proper to gear (Ibid, 69), to-hand gear cannot appear in its ‘true-in-itself’, i.e. as to-hand gear, to ‘a thematic perception of things’ (‘mere observation’).188 For, as previously noted, Heidegger holds that nothing can appear as to-hand therein.189 Similar points apply for the following passage, which McDaniel does not quote but which Cerbone cites in defending the two-domains view:

187 Recall that ‘being’ (‘Seiendes’) does not mean ‘entity’ (see p. 26).
188 See p. 34.
189 See p. 103.
2.2 To-hand-ness and Extantness

[O]nly if intraworldly beings can appear at all does the possibility exist to make the merely extant accessible in the field of these beings. These beings [Seiende] can, on the basis of their mere extantness, be determined in respect of their ‘properties’ in ‘functional concepts’ (1927/2006, 88; cf. Cerbone 1999, 312).

Although Heidegger’s talk of ‘mak[ing] the merely extant accessible’ might suggest that he holds that some entities are merely extant, i.e. not to-hand, and thereby that not every extant entity is to-hand, I interpret Heidegger as meaning only that enquirers can become capable of intending objects as merely extant, e.g. through physical-scientific methods. In becoming thus capable, enquirers ‘make the merely extant accessible’ as such in the field of [intraworldly] beings’. For they can then access not only the species of intraworldly being Heidegger calls ‘to-hand gear’, but also natural beings. Again, that to-hand gear and natural beings are distinct classes of being (Seienden) does not entail that nothing is both to-hand gear and a natural being, since something can belong to many classes of being (Seienden) and indeed entity simultaneously. The next passage concerns Heidegger’s stance on the natural environment:

Nature here may, however, not be understood as the merely extant. […] The wood is a forest, the mountain a quarry, the river water-power; the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. With the discovered environment appears the ‘nature’ thus discovered. Its mode-of-being as to-hand can be disregarded, it itself becoming discovered and determined in its pure extantness. To this discovery of nature, however, nature as that which ‘stirs and strives’, assails us, captivates as landscape, remains concealed. The plants of the botanist are not flowers on the lynchet; the geographically-fixed ‘source’ of a river is not the ‘spring in the ground’ (1927/2006, 70; cf. McDaniel 2012, 21).
McDaniel reads this passage as affirming that two entities, one of which is present-at-hand [sc. extant], the other of which is ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand], are numerically distinct. He tells us that an entity, the Nature of our environing world, is hidden, and a distinct entity, the ‘Nature’ that is the object of the sciences, is made manifest. The entity studied by the botanist – a part of the Nature studied by the sciences – is not identical with the flowers of the hedgerow. The source of a river is not identical with the springhead in the dale (2012, 21).

McDaniel conveniently overlooks Heidegger’s assertion that the mode-of-being of nature ‘as to-hand can be disregarded’, nature thereby ‘becoming discovered and determined in its pure extantness’. For this sentence implies the contrary of McDaniel’s reading, viz. that to-hand nature and extant nature are numerically identical. Moreover, pace McDaniel, Heidegger does not say that ‘an entity, the Nature of our environing world’, i.e. ‘that which “stirs and strives”, etc., is hidden [sc. concealed]’, but rather that nature as ‘that which “stirs and strives”, etc., ‘remains concealed’. Heidegger’s preposition ‘as’ implies that he is talking about the single nature under another mode of presentation, not of a numerically distinct nature. Finally, supposing with McDaniel, pace von Herrmann (2005, 127; cf. Sinclair 2006, 60), that Heidegger’s list of pairs of entities in the final sentence contrasts the extant with the to-hand, I read Heidegger as highlighting therein a distinction between numerically identical entities under two distinct modes of presentation, viz. as to-hand and as extant. Heidegger does not say that ‘[t]he plants of the botanist’ are ‘not identical with’ ‘flowers on the lynchet’, pace McDaniel, but rather that they ‘are not’ ‘flowers on the lynchet’. The latter is consistent with their numerical identity, since it plausibly implies only a difference in mode of presentation rather than numerical difference. McDaniel dismisses such a reading as rendering Heidegger’s statement a ‘trite truism disguised in poetic rhetoric’ (2012, 22), but I demur. For Heidegger stresses in both §15 of BT and his critique of Cartesian metaphysics that to-hand-ness has traditionally been overlooked or suppressed completely (1927/2006: 67, 99); so Heidegger in fact regards the
2.2 To-hand-ness and Extantness

distinction between to-hand-ness and extantness as two ways objects can appear as being, which are correlatively also ways entities could be, as greatly significant.¹⁹⁰

The final passage McDaniel invokes concerns the relationship between to-hand-ness and extantness vis-à-vis their instantiators:

**In-itself passage**

The mode-of-being of these beings is to-hand-ness. It may not be understood, however, as a mere characteristic of conception [Auffassungscharakter]: as if such ‘aspects’ were talked into the ‘beings’ primarily appearing, as if a primarily in itself extant world-stuff [Weltstoff] were ‘subjectively coloured’ in this manner. […] To-hand-ness is the ontologico-categorial determination of beings as they are ‘in themselves’. But ‘there are’ to-hand beings [Zuhandenes] only on the basis of extant beings [Vorhandenem]. Granting this thesis for now, does it follow hereout that to-hand-ness is ontologically founded in extantness? (Heidegger 1927/2006, 71; cf. McDaniel 2012, 22).¹⁹¹

Using ‘to have being’ synonymously with ‘to exist’, McDaniel comments:

Heidegger is telling us that, necessarily, ready-to-hand [sc. to-hand] things have being only if present-at-hand [sc. extant] things have being. […] The hammer is numerically distinct from the hunk of wood and metal. The former is ready-to-hand, the latter is present-at-hand. These two entities are distinct, and yet intimately related: the present-at-hand thing makes up or constitutes the ready-to-hand thing. You can’t imagine a hammer not made out of some hunk of matter; it’s metaphysically impossible. Ready-to-hand things exist only if present-to-hand [sic] things exist. […] But it does not

¹⁹⁰ For Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes, see pp. 106-110.
¹⁹¹ Oddly, McDaniel does not include the final two sentences, even though they are necessary to support his reading.
follow that the ready-to-hand is \textit{metaphysically determined} by the present-at-hand. The present-at-hand would metaphysically determine the ready-to-hand […] if it were the case that the existence of ready-to-hand objects is entailed by the existence of present-at-hand objects. But this is not the case[.] […] So the present-at-hand is \textit{necessary} for the ready-to-hand, but certainly is not \textit{sufficient} (2012, 22-23).

McDaniel thus reads the in-itself passage as affirming, firstly, that the existence of extant entities is \textit{necessary} for the existence of to-hand entities. In other words, there is no possible world at which there are to-hand entities but no extant entities. McDaniel bases this reading on Heidegger’s supposition that “‘there are’ to-hand beings”, i.e. that to-hand beings exist, ‘only on the basis of extant beings’. Yet McDaniel adds that the existence of extant entities does not \textit{suffice} for the existence of to-hand entities. That is, at least one possible world contains extant entities but no to-hand entity. McDaniel thus erroneously interprets Heidegger’s intimation that to-hand-ness is not ‘ontologically founded’ in extantness as a claim about the \textit{ontic} conditions for the existence of to-hand entities.\footnote{Recall that ontology in Heidegger’s sense is concerned exclusively with concepts and properties \textit{in abstracto} (§1.2.1).} McDaniel does not affirm therewith, of course, that being extant is necessary but not sufficient for being to-hand, since he reads Heidegger as denying that to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated.

By contrast, I read the in-itself passage as dividing into three parts. First, Heidegger counters a possible objection to his exhibition (\textit{Herausstellung}) of to-hand-ness as the mode-of-being mundane concern represents objects as instantiating, \textit{viz.} that to-hand-ness is merely a secondary way those objects appear as being – ‘a mere characteristic of conception’, ‘subjective colouring’, or ‘aspect’ subsequently ‘talked into’ objects appearing primarily as extant. Though Heidegger does not rejoinder explicitly here, his foregoing phenomenology of mundane concern as ‘[t]he closest mode of engagement’ implies that the objection fails because objects in fact appear primarily in mundane concern and therein as to-hand (1927/2006, 66-67). Therefore,
2.2 To-hand-ness and Extantness

to-hand-ness cannot be a mere ‘characteristic of conception’, ‘subjective colouring’, or subsequently ‘talked into’ objects appearing primarily as extant. For its being any of these would imply that it is not a way objects primarily appear as being (von Herrmann 2005, 131-132). Moreover, Heidegger’s denial that to-hand-ness is ‘a mere characteristic of conception’ plausibly also implies that to-hand-ness is not merely a ‘characteristic’ something can be ‘conceived’ as instantiating, but also a characteristic something can actually instantiate, i.e. a property: a way something can be.

Second, having addressed the objection, Heidegger affirms that to-hand-ness is in fact ‘the ontologico-categorial determination of beings’, i.e. of some beings, ‘as they are “in themselves”’.\(^{193}\) I interpret the first phrase as signifying that to-hand-ness is not merely a way something can appear as being, but rather a mode-of-being and as such a property and a component of a constitution of being, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness. As a property, to-hand-ness is a ‘determination’. As a component of being (Seins), to-hand-ness is ‘ontologico-categorial’ rather than merely ontic like other properties. For as a component of being, to-hand-ness is ontological; and Heidegger uses ‘categories’ to denote ‘determinations of being [Seinsbestimmungen] of non-Dasein beings [Seienden]’, whereof gear is an example (1927/2006, 44). To-hand-ness is an ‘ontological-categorial determination of [some] beings’ because, as the mode-of-being necessarily co-instantiated with gearedness, it is ‘[t]he mode-of-being of gear’ (Ibid, 69).\(^{194}\) Moreover, that this ontologico-categorial determination, viz. to-hand-ness, characterises items of gear ‘in themselves’ means simply that gear instantiates to-hand-ness rather than merely appearing as to-hand non-veridically. This directly counters the objection that to-hand-ness is a mere ‘characteristic of conception’ or suchlike. Von Herrmann also advocates this interpretation in expounding the above passage: ‘To-hand-ness is, as a mode-of-being, a way of the being-in-itself of beings: just like extantness’ (2005, 132; cf. Töpfer 2004, 41-44; Christensen 1998, 77).\(^{195}\)

\(^{193}\) ‘Some’ is implicit in the German.

\(^{194}\) For to-hand-ness’s necessary co-instantiation with gearedness, see p. 34.

\(^{195}\) Cf. pp. 41-42.
Third, Heidegger expresses an ontic thesis potentially threatening his previous characterisation of to-hand-ness, viz. that the existence of extant entities is necessary for the existence of to-hand entities. This ontic thesis might appear incompatible with Heidegger’s claim that to-hand-ness is an ‘ontologico-categorial determination’. For it might be taken to imply that to-hand entities, i.e. items of gear, are simply composites of merely extant entities, e.g. objects of chemistry and physics, and therefore must also be merely extant ‘in themselves’. For it is unclear how a mere composite of merely extant entities could instantiate a mode-of-being besides extantness. Yet, pace McDaniel, Heidegger merely supposes this ontic thesis – neither endorsing nor denying it – in order to point out that it does not entail the ontological thesis that to-hand-ness is ‘ontologically founded in extantness’, i.e. that to-hand-ness is conceptually derived from extantness (von Herrmann 2005, 219-220).\textsuperscript{196} Heidegger thereby diverts attention from the ontic relationship between to-hand entities and extant entities to the ontological relationship between to-hand-ness and extantness.

Von Herrmann represents Heidegger as denying that to-hand-ness is ontologically founded in extantness on the grounds that to-hand-ness is related to extantness as Existence is related to life, viz. such that knowledge of basic concepts for comprehending the extant are obtainable only through a ‘privative interpretation’ of to-hand-ness (2005, 132; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 50). For if to-hand-ness were ontologically founded in extantness, knowledge of such basic concepts should be obtainable independently of, and perhaps even must precede, knowledge of basic concepts for comprehending the to-hand. The claim von Herrmann therewith attributes to Heidegger is purely ontological: its truth-value implying nothing about the actual world that is not merely corollary of truths about properties.\textsuperscript{197} Heidegger’s position on this point thus contrasts with Husserl’s regarding the ‘regions of being’ Husserl calls ‘material thing’ and ‘soul’. Husserl states that ‘the latter is founded in the former’ and that ‘thereout awakes the foundation of doctrine about the soul in doctrine about the body’ (1913, 38).

\textsuperscript{196} This does not preclude to-hand-ness’s being a determinate of extantness, of course (see pp. 59-62).
\textsuperscript{197} See §1.2.1.
In summary, this section interprets Heidegger as holding that to-hand-ness and extantness (nature) can be co-instantiated. In addition, it proposes the stronger claim that Heidegger affirms that instantiating to-hand-ness entails instantiating extantness. Since to-hand-ness and extantness are the modes-of-being peculiar to gear and physicochemical entities respectively, to-hand-ness and extantness’s relationship may be understood as determining the relationship between gear and physicochemical entities. Both my weak and strong interpretative claims contradict Kris McDaniel’s reading of Heidegger as denying that to-hand-ness and extantness can be co-instantiated, which I accordingly oppose. Part 2 has interpreted Heidegger as identifying the being of gear (gearedness and to-hand-ness) as that constitution of being objects appear as instantiating in mundane concern. Consequently, Heidegger’s term ‘gear’ denotes members of the regional class whereto mundane concern represents objects as belonging. Identifying the being of gear thus preserves the a priori character of §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear by avoiding implying instantiation of the being of gear, i.e. positing actual gear. In explicating the being of gear, Heidegger identifies two independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear: being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen) and being around for (um zu) something. A gear-whole is a unitary plurality of particular items of gear. Being around for (um zu) something consists roughly in being situationally relevant therefor. Heidegger’s acknowledgement of the possibility of co-instantiation of to-hand-ness and extantness, and therewith perhaps of something’s being both gear and physicochemical simultaneously, implies that a metaphysics of environmental entities need not distinguish numerically between environmental entities and physicochemical entities. Part 3 applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, as outlined in §2.1.2, and develops a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics founded on Heidegger’s recognition that the subject-matters of ecological science and physical science intersect.
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

3.1. Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

3.1.1. Situational holism
3.1.2. Situated normativity
3.1.3. Prospective control

3.2. Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics

3.2.1. Gibsonian and Heideggerian ecology
3.2.2. The metaphysics of around-for references

3.1. Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

This section develops and defends Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, as expounded in §2.1.2, to explain three phenomena of mundane concern discussed in contemporary philosophy of action and cognitive science. Since ‘mundane concern’ denotes unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states, Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern articulates how objects not appearing as subjects appear when intended unreflectively purposefully.198 As previously noted, although the term ‘mundane concern’ is almost synonymous with Dreyfus’s ‘absorbed coping’, I prefer the former because the latter implies an absence of intentional content (Dreyfus 1991, 69). Authors discussing the three phenomena treated herein typically speak not of unreflectively purposeful non-intersubjective states generally, but specifically of non-intersubjective unreflective actions. The latter are, however, a species of mundanely concernful state insofar as such actions are purposeful (see Wilson and Shpall 2012). Erik Rietveld introduces the notion of unreflective action through observing that ‘[i]n many episodes in our daily lives we act adequately, yet unreflectively’: where ‘adequacy’ consists in benefitting the agent or according with norms and acting ‘unreflectively’ implies acting ‘without explicit deliberation’ (2008a, 973; cf. 2010, 183). Employing

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198 To be ‘intended’ in this sense is to be an object of an intentional state.
Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’, Sean Kelly introduces non-intersubjective unreflective action similarly thus:

[S]killful, absorbed coping is what one is engaged in when one performs activities without paying attention. So, for instance, when I am walking along with a friend, lost in a philosophical conversation, I nevertheless am able skillfully to reach out, grasp the doorknob, and open the door; without even noticing that it is happening, my hand forms itself naturally to the shape of the knob (2005, 17).

The first two phenomena analysed herein, viz. situational holism (§3.1.1) and situated normativity (§3.1.2), are supposedly invariant features of mundanely concernful intentional content. The third phenomenon, viz. mundanely concernful prospective control (§3.1.3), is a datum about unreflective action. That situational holism and situated normativity are supposedly invariant features of mundanely concernful intentional content does not imply that mundane concern invariably features intentional content: only that whenever it does, these invariably figure in its content. Despite being invariant, however, these features admittedly might figure to varying degrees: as in Heidegger’s examples of interruptions in mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 73-75; Dreyfus 1991, 70).

The phenomenon of situational holism is that objects appear in mundane concern primarily as composing unitary situational nexus, rather than as discrete entities. §2.1.2 revealed that Heidegger calls such nexus ‘gear-wholes’, ‘gear-nexus’, or ‘referential-manifolds’. Erik Rietveld, on the other hand, calls such nexus ‘fields of affordances’: conceiving them as unitary arrays of possibilities for action (Rietveld 2012, 211). §3.1.1 explains situational holism through Heidegger’s position that objects appear in mundane concern as composing gear-wholes because they appear as collectively around for (um zu) common wherefores (Wozu or Wofür). A common wherefore, e.g. a goal to be realised, phenomenologically anchors a plurality of objects to a single point, so to speak, thereby securing its unity. I characterise every

199 See pp. 117-118.
such wherefore as ‘superordinate’ because it is that whereto every component of a situational nexus appears as ultimately referring (verweisend). The phenomenon of situated normativity is that objects appear in mundane concern as ‘soliciting’ actions or, otherwise expressed, as ‘affectively alluring’. §3.1.2 explains situated normativity through Heidegger’s position that referring (verweisend) to a wherefore is necessary for being around for (um zu) it and as such figures necessarily in objects’ situational relevance for goals and activities. ‘Solicitation’ or ‘affective allure’ is identifiable with reference (Verweisung) because experiencing a reference (Verweisung) involves being ‘referred’ away from the referrer to the referent such that the latter is highlighted at the former’s expense. The phenomenon of mundanely concernful prospective control is that humans can act adequately when pursuing prospective goals unreflectively. §3.1.3 asserts that mundanely concernful, and thus unreflecting, agents can exercise prospective control because they constantly intend situational nexus (gear-wholes) in light of their respective goals, which appear as common, superordinate wherefores whereto every object appears as referring (verweisend). Superordinate wherefores thus guide action, so to speak, in that agents constantly experience everything in its relevance therefor, such that agents need not reflect in order to act adequately in pursuing them. In each section, I first outline the respective phenomenon by reference to relevant literature before analysing it through applying Heidegger’s phenomenology from §2.1.2.

3.1.1. Situational holism

As the room and lecture-theatre examples in §2.1.2 revealed, Heidegger maintains that mundanely concernful agents primarily intend unitary situational nexus and only secondarily intend components thereof. Heidegger calls such nexus ‘gear-wholes’ (Zeugganzes), ‘gear-nexus’ (Zeugszusammenhänge), and ‘referential-manifolds’ (Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeiten): ‘Given to us primarily is the unity of a gear-whole’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 232); ‘[w]e say, a gear-nexus surrounds [umgibt] us’ (Ibid, 233; cf. 1920-1921/1995, 11); ‘[t]he work sustains the referential-manifold...

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200 Heidegger’s designation of situational nexus as thus phenomenologically primary remains consistent with his identification of ‘that which is to be produced’, viz. the goal to be realised, as ‘that which is primarily of concern [Besorgte]’ and as such enjoys ultimate phenomenological primacy in mundane concern (1927/2006, 69-70). For situational nexus are phenomenologically primary only relative to individual items of gear, not tout court.
inside which the gear appears’ (1927/2006, 70). In his commentary on Plato’s *Sophist*, Heidegger likewise identifies the ‘whole context of the acting Dasein’ as the primary object of *phronesis* (practical wisdom), which fulfils a similar role in Aristotle’s philosophy to circumspection (*Umsicht*) in Heidegger’s in guiding mundanely concernful action (Heidegger 1924-1925/1992, 147; cf. Dreyfus 2005, 51).

Consequently, even when mundanely concernful agents intend particular objects, these appear as components of situational nexus that the agents still intend and indeed arguably must still intend for engagement with those objects to be contextually apposite (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68-69; 1927/1975, 231-233; von Herrmann 2005, 122-123). The phenomenon of *situational holism* is that objects appear in mundane concern as composing such unitary situational nexus.

Situational holism is widely acknowledged in recent literature. John McDowell, for example, posits a ‘concretely situation specific discernment’ (2007, 340; cf. Dreyfus 2005, 54): that is, a sensitivity to demands of situations as wholes, enabling an agent to ‘do justice to the full situation’ (Rietveld 2010, 189-190). Erik Rietveld speaks likewise of an unreflective agent’s sensitivity ‘to a very rich as well as a highly specific situation’ and ‘sensitivity-based appreciation of the particular situation’ (*Ibid*, 189-190). For ‘[a]cting appropriately requires that a complex and particular situational context is taken into account’ (Rietveld 2012, 215). For instance: an architect visually assessing the placement of a door has ‘a sense of the right proportions (or other specific aspects) of this object in its context’ and can thereby improve ‘the situation as a whole’ (Rietveld 2008a: 980, 987). The architect is thus ‘able to take the complex particular situational context into account’ (*Ibid*, 994).

Rietveld regards such ‘context sensitivity’ as ‘characteristic of skillful unreflective action’ including ‘everyday unreflective action’ and thus of all mundanely concernful action (*Ibid*, 996).

Yet whereas Heidegger typically identifies ordinary macrolevel physicochemical entities, e.g. tables and pens, as composing unitary situational nexus, as in the room and lecture-theatre examples (1927/2006, 68-69; 1927/1975, 231-233; von Herrmann

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201 For ‘circumspection’, see p. 142.
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

2005, 122), Rietveld instead identifies the behavioural possibilities (‘affordances’) offered by those entities. Rietveld characterises mundanely concernful context-sensitivity, for example, as ‘adequate responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances’ (2012, 211): the field being a unitary array whereof the affordances appear as components. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s term ‘referential-manifold’ (‘Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit’) is roughly equivalent to Rietveld’s ‘field of affordances’ inasmuch as a referential-manifold is a whole comprising token references (Verweisungen) – most notably, token around-for references – rather than their bearers, viz. gear (Zeug) (von Herrmann 2005, 124).

202 But not every token around-for reference is an affordance. Something’s being detrimental (abträglich) to an activity, for instance, is a relevance without being a behavioural possibility (cf. von Herrmann 2008, 53).

In describing fields of affordances, Rietveld echoes Heidegger’s claims that ‘strictly speaking, one item of gear never “is”’ and that ‘[t]o the being of gear belongs already, in each case, a gear-whole’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 68), as analysed in §2.1.2. Rietveld observes that ‘any affordance is surrounded by many other available affordances’ (2012, 225), such that ‘we are always situated in a field of multiple relevant affordances soliciting us’ (Rietveld, forthcoming: 31). For ‘[o]ur everyday activities unfold in situations that offer a multiplicity of possibilities for action’ (Rietveld 2012, 211):

[W]e are not only drawn by the one affordance we are currently dealing with, but we are also affected to some extent by other significant affordances in the background. This field of affordances is not some amorphous sum of affordances. This field is structured and reflects the dynamically changing concerns of the individual (some affordances stand out and are privileged over others in the particular situation because of these concerns) (Rietveld,

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202 For ‘around-for reference’ and ‘reference’, see pp. 131-134 and §3.1.2. Kadar and Effken erroneously take Heidegger’s term ‘equipment’, i.e. ‘gear’ (‘Zeug’), to denote entities ‘analogous to Gibson’s affordances’, i.e. opportunities for behaviour, rather than ‘things’, i.e. physicochemical substances (Kadar and Effken 1994, 313). Instead, ‘around-for reference’ (‘Um-zu-Verweisung’) is the Heideggerian term closest in sense to Gibson’s ‘affordance’.

175
3.1 Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern


‘[A]n architect at work’, for example, ‘can simultaneously be responsive to his digital drawing pen, the image on his computer screen, the cup of coffee that solicits grasping and drinking, […] and multiple affordances on the horizon of his current drawing situation’ (Rietveld 2012, 210-211). A tailor is likewise ‘able to unreflectively switch from cutting, to sewing, to taking a bite from his apple, to answering the phone’ (Rietveld, forthcoming: 34). The tailor is therein ‘situated in a field of multiple relevant affordances affecting him’, which become phenomenally salient at different times in accordance with his ‘dynamically changing concerns’ (*Ibid*, 35; cf. Kiverstein and Rietveld 2012, 2).

The *concrete* holism Heidegger and Rietveld describe is distinct from, yet closely connected with, an *abstract* holism §2.1.3 discussed as described in Cerbone’s interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of a ‘gear-whole’ (*Zeugganzen*). Whereas the former is a holism of *particulars* – whether gear, affordances, or token around-for references – the latter is characterisable as a holism of *properties* constituted by connections between instantiation conditions of properties. Illustrating the latter, Dreyfus asks: ‘What do we know when we know what it is to be a chair?’ – answering that ‘[i]t is not just what a chair is for in some narrow sense but how it fits in with tables and all the rest of our activities which is crucial’ (1991, 63). Being for sitting at tables, for instance, might be part of ‘what it is to be a chair’: that is, necessary for instantiating *chairness* and therewith for being a chair. In turn, being for sitting at upon chairs might be necessary for instantiating *tableness* and therewith for being a table (cf. Cerbone 1999: 311, 314). Julian Kiverstein maintains that such property holism is reflected in experiential phenomenology:

Equipmental entities are assigned roles within human practices of activity, and it is against the backdrop of our practices that equipment shows up for us as significant. Computers for instance are used for writing introductions to books like this one, introductions form part of academic anthologies,
anthologies are used by readers for the sake of their research, an activity
humans mostly undertake in the context of the academic world. […] A large
part of our inhabiting a familiar world is our knowing how to find our way
about these involvement networks. They delineate the contexts within which
our everyday activities are situated (Kiverstein 2012, 3-4).

Kiverstein’s computer, for example, appears to him as usable for writing the
introduction to the book because of his disposition to perceive it thus, inculcated by
the social practice of using computers for writing and attendant social conception of
what it is to be a computer. In that sense, the computer ‘shows up for [Kiverstein] as
significant’ ‘against the backdrop’ of the practice of using computers for writing.
Since such practices govern many entities we engage with, especially artefacts,
humans possess many similar dispositions to perceive objects both as relevant and as
connected with functions of other entities in their specific socially-dictated ways
(Ibid, 6). Kiverstein might also perceive, say, his desk as usable for supporting his
computer, cup as usable for drinking the coffee therein, etc., because of socially-
inculcated dispositions to perceive these entities thus. Hence, as Kiverstein says in
closing the passage, ‘[a] large part of our inhabiting a familiar world is our knowing
how to find our way about these involvement networks’, which so to speak ‘delineate
the contexts within which our everyday activities are situated’ (cf. Heidegger
1927/1975, 414; Christensen 2007, 166). For ‘the way in which [an] individual is
responsive to [a] situation has been shaped by a history of activity in practice’,
forming dispositions facilitating mundane concern (Rietveld 2008a, 993).\footnote{203 We
do not literally ‘find our way about’ such involvement-networks, of course, since these
are ‘networks’ of properties. Rather, our implicit knowledge thereof facilitates our
literally ‘finding our way about’ instantiators of properties they comprise.}

Possessing such dispositions is plausibly even a precondition of mundane concern
qua unreflective and therewith of situational holism in at least many contexts:
enabling agents to ‘immediately distinguish the relevant possibilities for action in
situations within their familiar practices’ and thereby perceive fields of affordances,

\footnote{203 Cf. pp. 147-148.}
3.1 Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

referential-manifolds, etc. (Rietveld 2008a, 981). For without this dispositional, socially-inculcated familiarity with entities, agents might need to reflectively consider entities discretely, therewith abstracting from their status as components, in order to work out their possible uses (cf. Christensen 1997, 83-84). Nevertheless, in every episode of mundane concern, ‘here and now it is this individual’s object-directed affective behaviour’, rather than knowledge of relationships between classes of entity, ‘that orients the flow of activity in a way that is normatively adequate and immediate’ (Rietveld 2008a, 993).

§2.1.2’s interpretation of Heidegger as explaining gear’s composing gear-wholes through collective around-for references is applicable to explain the phenomenon of situational holism. I presented Heidegger as holding that gear composes gear-wholes, and correlatively appears as composing gear-wholes, insofar as pluralities of gear are collectively around for (um zu) common wherefores (Wozu or Wofür): for example, goals to be realised through employing components of the gear-whole. Heidegger’s position implies phenomenologically that a mundanely concernful agent primarily intends a unitary situational nexus, rather than discrete entities, because he intends objects not only in their relevance for a common wherefore, e.g. his goal in the situation, but also as referring (verweisend) to one another in their relevance therefor.

As §2.1.2 explained, this inter-referredness of objects in their relevance for a common wherefore constitutes their collective relevance: as distinct from objects’ merely being relevant for a common wherefore without referring to one another in that relevance (cf. Christensen 1998, 78; 1997, 83-85). I call a common wherefore anchoring a plurality of gear a ‘superordinate’ wherefore because it is that wherefore (wozu or wofür) members of the plurality appear as ultimately around (um). For a superordinate wherefore is that which a mundanely concernful agent ultimately pursues in his particular situation, e.g. the primary goal he intends to realise therein, and consequently that whereto he experiences everything as referring (verweisend) in its relevance therefor. Superordinate wherefores contrast with

204 See pp. 188-189’s discussion of issues connected with the frame problem.
206 See §3.1.2 for further details of reference (Verweisung).
207 See pp. 135-140.
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

‘subordinate’ wherefores: goals or activities agents intend objects as around for (um zu) insofar as they are ultimately around for (um zu) superordinate wherefores.

On Heidegger’s account, the common, superordinate wherefore – typically the ‘work to be produced’: the goal to be realised (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69-70) – remains the constant phenomenological ‘centre of orientation’ (Orientierungszentrum) in mundane concern (von Herrmann 2005, 126). As such, a superordinate wherefore anchors the many objects within a situation to a single point, so to speak, thereby rendering them a ‘closed, intelligible nexus’ instead of a mere ‘disordered accumulation’ (Heidegger 1927/1975, 231-232). Although, as previously noted, Rietveld also recognises that no ‘field of affordances’ in mundane concern appears as a disunitary ‘amorphous sum of affordances’ because ‘[w]hat we care about in the concrete situation is reflected in the structured field of relevant affordances’ that ‘reflects the dynamically changing concerns of the individual’ (forthcoming: 31, 36-38), Rietveld fails to make Heidegger’s step of explaining the unitarily structured appearance of situational nexus in mundane concern through the appearance of the collective relevance and therein reference (Verweisung) of many objects to the agent’s respective superordinate wherefore (‘what we care about in the concrete situation’): typically, the primary goal to be realised by the agent in their concrete situation (cf. Christensen 1997, 83-85).

Moreover, although Rietveld recognises that upon entering mundane concern, agents exchange active attention to discrete entities for ‘immediate responsiveness to the experienced demands of the world’ (forthcoming, 7), he again fails to observe that

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208 I say ‘typically’ because ongoing activities might also qualify as superordinate wherefores, though even these do so arguably qua goals to be realised (see fn. 233). The term ‘Orientierungszentrum’ can denote, either literally or figuratively, a fixed perspective wherefrom something is viewed; but it is also commonly used in ordinary German to denote somewhere offering guidance, e.g. a tourist office. §2.1.2 (p. 136) endorsed von Herrmann’s construal of Heidegger’s phrase ‘work to be produced’ in a ‘broad sense’: that is, as not restricted to physical products narrowly conceived (von Herrmann 2005, 125).

209 ‘Against a general background awareness of context, which has no particular entity, event, or set thereof as its intentional object, I see certain things and events standing out as relevant for what I am doing in certain ways’ (Christensen 1997, 83-84). ‘What I am doing’ is the superordinate wherefore I am in the process of realising, whilst the ‘certain ways’ of relevance are various determinates of around-for.
these demands are issued, so to speak, by superordinate wherefores constantly guiding mundane concern. The superordinate wherefore, as the phenomenological ‘centre of orientation’, thus determines mundanely concernful intentional content to the extent that a high degree of conscious attention to individual entities is obviated and the unreflectiveness of mundane concern preserved.\textsuperscript{210} Indeed, this guidance is such that, as Heidegger famously observes and §3.1.2 analyses, objects of mundane concern phenomenologically ‘recede’ (zurückziehen), in ‘translucently’ highlighting the wherefore whereto they collectively refer (verweisen) at their own expense (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69; von Herrmann 2005, 125; Kelly 2005, 17).\textsuperscript{211}

To illustrate Heidegger’s phenomenology of collective relevance through one of Rietveld’s own examples, the architect at work might intend his pen, albeit not explicitly in such detail (Christensen 1998, 77; Kelly 2001), not merely as affording – that is, being around for (um zu) – drawing simpliciter, but as affording drawing in between answering calls, drinking coffee, and considering the work already complete in order that the building is designed (cf. Rietveld 2012, 210-211).\textsuperscript{212} The architect therein intends the pen’s affording drawing as referring (verweisend) not only to the superordinate wherefore, viz. designing the building, given the role drawing plays in realising it, but also therein to other affordances or their bearers – for instance: the telephone’s affording communication, the cup’s affording drinking, and the plan’s affording considering – insofar as they in turn refer to the superordinate wherefore given the respective roles of their subordinate wherefores relative to others in realising the superordinate.\textsuperscript{213} The phenomenal salience of affordances and their bearers concomitantly varies during activity according to their apparent relevance for

\textsuperscript{210} See §3.1.3. Note that I do not categorically deny that the individual entities are consciously attended to (see pp. 183-184). I follow Wayne Wu in using the term ‘conscious attention’ to denote the obverse of ‘phenomenal salience’, such that: ‘Necessarily, a subject S consciously attends to an object o or property F iff o or F is phenomenally salient to S’ (Wu 2011, 94).

\textsuperscript{211} For my ‘translucence’ metaphor, see pp. 194-195.

\textsuperscript{212} Rietveld remarks that his ‘example of the architect at work is of crucial importance because it shows that not just simple routines but also types of activity that were traditionally seen as “high-level” cognition can be understood in terms of unreflective responsiveness to a field of affordances’ (2012, 209-210).

\textsuperscript{213} Specifications of wherefores, e.g. designing this building, should be regarded throughout as merely imprecise illustrations given the phenomenological richness of plausibly only demonstratively specifiable wherefores (see pp. 184-186).
the superordinate wherefore relative to others, increasing and diminishing as required (Rietveld, forthcoming: 31, 36-38).

All affordances within the ‘field’ the architect intends thus appear as referred (verwiesen) not merely individually, but together with one another and the pen’s affordance, i.e. collectively, to the common, superordinate wherefore. Through experiencing such inter-referredness, the architect indeed commands a sensitivity ‘to a very rich as well as a highly specific situation’ encompassing all these objects in their references to one another in being around for (um zu) (‘affording’) the superordinate wherefore (Rietveld 2010, 189-190). Of course, such inter-referredness is never consciously attended to explicitly in mundane concern given mundane concern’s essential unreflectiveness (cf. Christensen 1998, 77); nor need all the intentional content wherein it figures even be ‘available for cognition’ or ‘rational reflection’ to the extent that subjects could invariably express that content conceptually (Almäng 2008: 162-163, 169-172; cf. Bermúdez and Cahen 2011). For, as is necessary for unreflective action, the agent’s focus is upon the superordinate wherefore to be realised rather than the complex referredness of objects subordinated thereto. As Heidegger puts it, ‘[e]ngagement with gear subordinates itself to the referential-manifold of around-for’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69): such that ‘the references themselves are not considered, but rather “there” in the concernful submission to them’ (Ibid, 74). That is, we ‘allow ourselves’ in mundane concern ‘to be responsive to relevant affordances’ and thus ‘respond to affordances with instinctive ease’ (Rietveld, forthcoming: 3).

Finally, Heidegger’s position that objects appear as referring to one another in appearing as collectively around for (um zu) a common, superordinate wherefore is also suggested by the observation that experiences of situational relevance are

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214 Aiming solely to capture the intentional content involved in situational holism, I bracket the issue of the conceptuality of such content (and even that of the conditions for content’s being non-conceptual), instead assuming its thorough conceptuality. In granting, for example, that the architect must possess the concepts of building and design in order to intend objects in reference to the wherefore designing this building, I would imply on some definitions of conceptual content that the architect’s corresponding mundanely concernful intentional content is conceptual (Bermúdez and Cahen 2011).
heavily context-dependent: in that the presence or absence of other objects might intensify, diminish, or otherwise alter objects’ apparent relevance. For instance: Callias’s superordinate wherefore of avoiding danger upon entering the vicinity of a lion would prescribe that he flee were it not for his perceiving a cage enclosing the lion. Consequently, Callias perceives the lion not as severely detrimental (*abträglich*) in light of his wherefore of avoiding danger, but perhaps even as irrelevant *given the presence of the cage*. That is: though Callias experiences both lion and cage (however unthematically) as distinct entities, they appear as referring to one another such that the lion’s apparent threat is at least temporarily suppressed by the cage. Nevertheless, were the cage to be opened, Callias’s prior grasp of the lion’s merely context-dependent benignity would enable him to apprehend immediately that the lion at that point threatened his superordinate wherefore of avoiding danger and demanded a prompt response.

Several objections to my Heideggerian explanation of situational holism might arise, however. First, it is perhaps questionable whether mundanely concernful agents act with superordinate wherefores ‘in mind’ in reference (*Verweisung*) whereto they might experience objects they encounter. Rietveld, for example, writes that no ‘representation of a goal’ is needed in mundane concern (forthcoming, 13; 2008a, 993; cf. Dreyfus 1991, 68-69). Instead, a mundanely concernful agent ‘is just allowing himself to be moved to improve’ his situation (Rietveld, forthcoming: 993; cf. Kelly 2006, 4) by responding to ‘the world’s demands’ (Kelly 2006, 16). In rejoinder, I contend that entertaining a conception of a wherefore is not necessary for intending objects in their collective relevance therefor. Appropriating the common metaphorical characterisation of perceptual attention as a ‘spotlight’ (Wu 2011, 94), we may say that wherefores are not that *whereupon* the spotlight falls, but rather that *in the light whereof* objects around for (*um zu*) that wherefore appear (cf. Christensen 1997, 85). In non-metaphorical terms: although wherefores are that in reference (*Verweisung*) whereto mundanely concernful agents experience everything they encounter, wherefores are not the sole objects of experience and attention. For objects around for (*um zu*) those wherefores are also intended and attended to in their

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215 For illustrative purposes, I suppose that Callias does not intend the lion as a subject (see p. 172). For discussion of plausibly ‘instinctive’ wherefores such as Callias’s, see p. 201.

216 See also p. 216.
relevance therefor. Thus, in fulfilling its essential guiding role, a superordinate wherefore is not the sole object of mundane concern but yet ‘illuminates’ every object intended, so to speak, insofar as objects appear in their collective relevance therefor.

Consequently, intending a wherefore does not and indeed must not exclude other intentional objects, since acting in the light of a wherefore requires that one also intend objects ‘illuminated’ thereby (cf. Christensen 1997, 88). Indeed, one’s attention can shift among objects ‘illuminated’ by a superordinate wherefore: the ‘spotlight’ thereby falling on different objects standing in the general light of the wherefore (cf. Wu 2011, 97). Hence, Christensen presents Heidegger as conceiving of circumspection (Umsicht) as ‘an ever-present seeing of the individual things relevant to what one is doing in their relevance for what one is doing against a background awareness of a diffusely present totality of things’ and as such as ‘a foreground seeing of relevance moving around within [a] background awareness’ (1998, 78; cf. 1997, 83-84).

Second, it might be objected that situations, activities, and a mundanely concernful agent’s transition from one situation and activity to another are so fluid that the notion of a single, fixed wherefore entertained by and thus guiding an agent is seemingly an abstraction distorting the phenomena. Even if such a wherefore were specifiable in mundanely concernful intentional content, moreover, this specification must be so complex in light of how particularised, nuanced, and layered human wherefores are that the suggestion that mundanely concernful agents constantly entertain such conceptions of wherefores so as to be continuously guided thereby is untenable. In rejoinder, it is plausible that mundane concern invariably intends superordinate wherefores demonstratively. For example: Coriscus might

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217 Cf. pp. 201-203.
218 ‘What is in the foreground and what is in the background for us constantly shifts, depending both on what happens in the environment, and on our current concerns’ (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2012, 2; cf. von Herrmann 2005, 126).
219 Space does not permit a thorough treatment of demonstrative intentional content; see Shieber 2010 for further details. In any case, many issues connected with demonstrative identification of perceptual
experience his stationery in the course of writing a letter in reference (Verweisung) to the superordinate wherefore of writing this letter, in all its particular richness, part whereof already appears on the sheet before him. Such demonstratives are token, rather than type, demonstratives in Joe Levine’s sense (2010, 171-172), since goals to be realised are particular events or states of affairs (cf. Textor 2012). Moreover, whilst the sheet whereon Coriscus is writing is, so to speak, the physical ‘centre of orientation’ (Orientierungszentrum) of the nexus of stationery around it, the particular letter to be written is the ultimate phenomenological centre of orientation guiding Coriscus’s use of the stationery in the course of writing (cf. von Herrmann 2005, 126).

Coriscus might even intend his superordinate wherefore merely as this wherefore, which might pick out either his ultimate goal of writing the letter or his ongoing activity of writing the letter. Moreover, a demonstrative mode of presentation eliminates need for an agent to intend himself as figuring in the wherefore. Coriscus need not intend his wherefore specifically as his writing of the letter, for example, though his intentional content nonetheless refers (bedeutet) to his writing of the letter demonstratively. Demonstrative intending of wherefores also accommodates the fluidity of mundane concern and phenomenological richness of wherefores. A passenger reading a book on a bus, for instance, might demonstratively intend either his ongoing activity, involving both reading and travelling to a particular destination, or complex goal of (say) finishing a particular chapter and reaching his destination simply as this wherefore. Jan Almäng similarly suggests that agents intend prospective actions in such detail that they cannot be ‘conceptually described’. Almäng’s use of the phrases ‘very specific way’ and ‘such a movement’ imply that he is referring to actions specified through their properties, however, rather than demonstratively like wherefores on my proposal:

objects are irrelevant here, since wherefores are not concrete existents but rather realisable possibilities as such.

220 See p. 133.

221 I include ‘bedeutet’ to signify that I am employing ‘refers’ on this occasion in Frege’s rather than Heidegger’s sense (see Evans 1982, 8-10).

222 Cf. pp. 221-222.
If I am riding my bicycle and suddenly encounter someone cycling in the opposite direction on a course to collide with me, I can perceive the situation as avoidable if I move in a very specific way, but not otherwise. This specific way can to some extent be conceptually described, but not in a way sufficient to capture the detail of my knowledge of my movement. I may know that I should initially move my body to the left, in order to change the course of my bicycle slightly. But I have no way of expressing in detail my knowledge of how much I should move my body to the left, or of the exact way that I should do this [...]. Nevertheless, I perceive the situation as avoidable if I perform such a movement (2008, 171; cf. Christensen 2007, 171).

Third, Heidegger’s description of the appearance of particular objects in their collective relevance to a superordinate wherefore in mundane concern is challengeable on the grounds that mundanely concernful sensitivity to a whole situation need not imply that objects appear therein as being any way at all. Sean Kelly, for example, writes that ‘skillful, absorbed coping’, i.e. mundane concern, ‘is a way of engaging normatively with the world instead of a way of describing it’ (2005, 16). That is, mundanely concernful agents respond adequately to the demands of situations without representing entities therein as being any way in doing so. Hubert Dreyfus suggests likewise that action-guiding intentional states ordinarily feature no intentional content, instead coming to feature intentional content only when ‘the situation requires deliberate attention’ (1991: 70, 76; cf. Christensen 1998, 66; Christensen 1997, 78).

In rejoinder, it must be observed firstly that the phenomenon of situational holism, which I invoke Heidegger’s phenomenology of collective relevance to explain, is essentially a feature of intentional content: namely, the appearance of objects as composing wholes in mundane concern. Hence, I admit that if it were shown that mundane concern is absolutely devoid of intentional content, my explanation of situational holism and even Heidegger’s phenomenology of collective relevance, insofar as it purports to articulate mundanely concernful intentional content, would
be redundant. For the existence of the phenomenon to be explained would have been denied. Moreover, supposing Dreyfus were correct in restricting intentional content to only some action-guiding intentional states, viz. those involving ‘deliberate attention’ (1991: 70, 76), Heidegger’s phenomenology of collective relevance and therewith my explanation of situational holism would accordingly be confined to any remaining states featuring the phenomenon of situational holism. Nevertheless, it remains plausible that at least some mundanely concernful states feature intentional content and therewith that the phenomenon of situational holism can occur: whereof Heidegger’s account of collective relevance offers one plausible explanation. In any case, plausibly following Heidegger, I grant Kelly’s claim that the intentional content of mundane concern is not akin to a description: inasmuch as mundane concern is ordered not to describing objects as they are in abstraction from relations to agents, but rather to realising wherefores thereof; but both Heidegger and I would nonetheless insist that objects must appear as instantiating some properties therein insofar as objects are intended in their relevance for wherefores. For I follow Christensen in both asserting and reading Heidegger as asserting, pace Dreyfus (1991), that mundane concern ‘always involves everyday, natural perceptual consciousness of entities as relevant in this or that way, hence requiring this or that response, given what one is currently doing’ (Christensen 1997, 88).

Fourth, it might be argued that the phenomenon designated ‘situational holism’ is merely a product of the diminished degree of conscious attention to objects, i.e. ‘soft focus’ (cf. Wu 2011, 94), in mundane concern rather than consisting in objects’ appearing in their collective relevance for superordinate wherefores. This is interpretable as implying that the phenomenon designated ‘situational holism’ is one of primitively non-representational phenomenal character rather than intentional content (cf. Ganson and Bronner 2013). In rejoinder, I aver that although mundane concern is certainly connected with a diminished degree of conscious attention to objects, as Heidegger himself famously observes (1927/2006, 69), this occurs precisely because mundanely concernful agents intend everything in their collective relevance for superordinate wherefores, rather than the latter being a representationalist misconstrual of the former. For if mundanely concernful agents did not already intend everything in reference to their wherefores, they would need to
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

attend expressly, reflectively, and therefore non-mundane-concernfully to each entity to determine how it is relevant (Christensen 1997, 83). The difficulty of modelling the former without sliding into the latter constitutes at least one variant of the ‘frame problem’: the problem of modelling ‘the ability of intelligent beings like humans to recognize relevance or salience’ (Christensen 1997, 84; cf. Shanahan 2009), which Christensen relates to Heideggerian phenomenology like that outlined herein thus:

Intelligent beings do not infer to the relevance of things around them on the basis of what they see, rather they see things directly and insightfully as relevant in this or that way for current activity. For them, there is no frame problem in need of solution. So the lesson of the frame problem and the thought experiments which articulate it is that what an intelligently behaving system works on, what it relates to as ‘data’, are irreducibly those relations of relevance or salience in which entities and events in its operating environment stand, given what the system is doing. Such relations constitute the input to any system insofar as it is genuinely perceiving and on that basis responding intelligently to things in its environment. The inputs to any genuinely perceiving, intelligently behaving system are always already structured in terms of their relevance for what the system is doing. Anything less and the frame problem will not be solved – or more correctly, avoided (Christensen 1997, 85; cf. Kiverstein 2012, 3-6).

Thus, since the intentional content of mundanely concernful states (‘what an intelligently behaving system works on’) is naturally geared towards (‘always already structured in terms of’) superordinate wherefores (‘what the system is doing’), agents can simply respond to the situation as a whole in view of their respective wherefores without needing to ‘calculate’ or otherwise ‘infer to the relevance of things’ (Christensen 1997: 83, 85). Hence, entering mundane concern involves switching from an active to a passive stance wherein the responsibility of guiding behaviour is, as it were, offloaded from the agent to the superordinate wherefore in reference (Verweisung) whereto they experience everything they
encounter: thereby eliminating need for a high degree of conscious attention to individual objects.\footnote{223}{Cf. pp. 199-200. I borrow the ‘offloading’ metaphor from Andy Clark, who speaks of offloading ‘memory onto the world’ through ‘the use of external symbolic media’ (1998, 201).}

Finally, it might be objected that since many objects appear as irrelevant in mundane concern yet nonetheless as components of whole situations, objects’ appearance as collectively relevant for superordinate wherefores cannot explain situational holism, i.e. their appearance as composing wholes. In rejoinder, as §2.1.2 stated apropos of Heidegger’s position, I maintain that irrelevance may be regarded as a limiting case of relevance inasmuch as objects appearing as irrelevant to a wherefore are nonetheless intended \textit{in their relevance} for, i.e. \textit{insofar as} they are relevant for, that wherefore even in being intended precisely as irrelevant therefor. For they are intended as having no \textit{relevance} to the wherefore and as such as, say, ignorable.\footnote{224}{See p. 217. In addition, objects are intendable as nonetheless \textit{potentially} relevant to a superordinate wherefore even whilst appearing as devoid of relevance \textit{de facto}.} In summary, this section applies Heidegger’s position that mundane concern represents objects as collectively around for (\textit{um zu}) common wherefores to explain the phenomenon of situational holism: the appearance of objects in mundane concern as composing situational nexus. The common, superordinate wherefore whereeto all objects within a situational nexus appear as collectively referring (\textit{verweisend}), e.g. the goal or ongoing activity of the agent to whom those objects appear, secures the unitary appearance of the plurality of objects by anchoring them collectively to a single point.

\textbf{3.1.2 Situated normativity}

The phenomenon of situated normativity, or lived normativity (Rietveld 2008a, 993), is the appearance of objects in mundane concern as ‘soliciting’ behaviours or, otherwise expressed, as ‘affectively alluring’ insofar as they afford, are around for (\textit{um zu}), or otherwise relevant for wherefores (Rietveld, forthcoming: 31-32).\footnote{225}{Rietveld also uses the term ‘experienced normativity’ interchangeably with ‘situated normativity’ and ‘lived normativity’ (forthcoming, 12); but ‘experienced normativity’ is terminologically

Erik Rietveld introduces the phenomenon thus:
[S]olicitations are not merely perceived possibilities that reflect what one could or could not do. The demand character (what the thing or event is inciting or ordering [...] ) is intrinsic to the experience of a relevant affordance. The phenomenology of responsiveness to affordances in unreflective action suggests that the individual feels immediately attracted or drawn to act in a certain way [...]. His or her activity is immediately summoned by the situation (2012, 212).

One must, however, distinguish objectual and subjectual components of experiences of situated normativity. Intending something as ‘soliciting’ or ‘summoning’ certain behaviour consists in some object other than the subject appearing as being a certain way: namely, as soliciting or summoning certain behaviour. But the experience of being ‘immediately attracted or drawn to act in a certain way’ consists in the subject appearing to themselves as being a certain way, viz. as immediately attracted or drawn to act in a certain way. The former is the phenomenon of situated normativity, at least as I use this term; whilst the latter merely correlates therewith, albeit plausibly nomologically. These objectual and subjectual aspects of such experiences often remain undistinguished in the literature, however. Sean Kelly highlights the specifically normative aspect of situated normativity:

[T]he affordances that solicit me to act when I am absorbedly coping with tools or obstacles or escape routes are normative in the sense that they draw

unsatisfactory because other forms of normativity, e.g. ethical normativity, can also be experienced (Heft 2003, 158), e.g. experiencing acts as immoral whilst performing them (see p. 192).

226 This implies the possibility of affective states with intentional content. Though Rietveld implies the classification of the affective state in question specifically as a feeling (2012, 212), his neglect to analyse this notion might warrant not taking ‘feeling’ in the narrow sense it possesses in contemporary philosophy of emotions in denoting a species of affective state (cf. de Sousa 2013).

227 The latter is plausibly analysable in terms of affective states; but since this thesis does not discuss Heidegger’s account of affective states, I say little about affect as such herein. Nevertheless, it might be that at least some mundanely concernful affective states possess intentional content like that described herein.

228 My distinction between these objectual and subjectual components of experiences of situated normativity falls on the first side of, and is therefore distinct from, Byrne and Hilbert’s distinction between properties experiences represent objects as instantiating and properties of experiences (Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 5-6). For I am here contrasting intentional content ascribing properties to objects other than the subject with that ascribing properties to the subject. See p. 214 for metaphysical discussion of subjectual components.
3.1 Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

a certain action out of me; escaping over here feels ‘right’, like it is the thing that is ‘called for’, like it is what I am ‘drawn’ to do. To describe properly the phenomenology of these kinds of activities I cannot but use a vocabulary that is rich in normative significance (2005, 16).

Thus, an agent simultaneously experiences both an object as ‘drawing’ a certain behaviour out of him, e.g. escaping through a particular hole, and himself as ‘drawn’ to undertake that behaviour, e.g. escape through the hole. Rietveld interprets the latter as a ‘feeling’ of a ‘relevance-related change in the readiness of coping skills’: the relevance intended causing the agent to become ‘bodily set to respond to the situation’ by soliciting a certain behaviour from him (2012, 213). An experience of becoming ‘bodily set to respond’ is plausibly a feeling in the technical sense insofar as it is an awareness of ‘a collection of bodily responses’ (de Sousa 2013). Rietveld characterises the peculiar normativity whereof Kelly speaks, viz. situated normativity, as ‘very basic’: ‘it is revealed when we distinguish better from worse, correct from incorrect, optimal from suboptimal, or adequate from inadequate in the context of a specific situation’ (2008a, 974). Elsewhere, Rietveld writes that ‘the experienced solicitations to which I am unreflectively responsive already reflect an appreciation related to how things can be improved’ (forthcoming, 15). That is, in undertaking behaviours solicited by situations, agents manifest an unreflective sensitivity to the demands of their situations given their respective superordinate wherefores. This is reflected in Heidegger’s use of the preposition ‘for’ (zu) in the term ‘around-for’ (Um-zu), which signifies a perhaps inherently normative directionality. In adequate mundanely concernful action, moreover, mundanely concernful agents act how they ought given their respective wherefores: thereby unreflectively conforming to norms prescribing how they should act in their particular situations. As Rietveld notes regarding social norms, however, mundanely concernful agents need not articulate norms governing their behaviour in order to conform thereto:

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229 Cf. fn. 247.
230 These are, of course, norms of action rather than norms of being (see Glüer and Wikforss 2009).
Explicit social norms are best understood as useful abstractions from a third-person perspective that articulate the regularities that are already manifest in the coordinated behaviour of a community of individuals. These underlying regularities are what we should primarily be interested in, because people are already doing something when a norm is expressed explicitly by an observer (2008a, 988).

Sean Kelly recognises, moreover, that situated normativity must be distinguished from the ‘full-blown kind [of normativity] of ethical or moral norms’ (2005, 16; cf. Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011). 231 Harry Heft adverts to experiences of the latter, however, which are seemingly less frequent than experiences of situated normativity, in distinguishing perceiving a pen as something one can grasp from perceiving it as something one ought to grasp (2003, 158). It is neither necessary nor sufficient for experiencing something as ‘soliciting’ a certain behaviour in the manner distinctive of situated normativity that one experience it as something one ought to behave with thus. One might experience a pen, for instance, as something one ought to grasp without experiencing it as soliciting one to grasp it, e.g. in experiencing that one ought to commence formidable work; and one might experience it as soliciting one to grasp it without experiencing it as something one ought to grasp, e.g. if one were merely tempted to write something (Rietveld, forthcoming: 31–32). Other experiences of objects as exemplifying ‘full-blown’ normativity might include experiences of objects as permitting certain actions, in that one would not transgress in acting thus, e.g. experiencing a field as permitting walking after noticing that it forms part of a public park (cf. Wedgwood 2006). Yet although situated normativity does not essentially involve such ‘full-blown’ normativity, no solicitation is a ‘mere possibility’ for behaviour (Rietveld 2012, 212). For something’s soliciting a certain behaviour is neither implied by – nor, arguably, implies (Kelly 2005, 19) – its appearing as capable of being behaved with thus.

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231 Other species of ‘full blown’ normativity might include normativity of meaning and intentional content (Glüer and Wikforss 2009).
Heidegger’s analysis of situated normativity centres upon the concept of *reference* (Verweisung), which constitutes the directionality inherent in something’s being around for (um zu) a wherefore. Reference’s figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content explains not only experiences of solicitation, moreover, but also the phenomenological ‘recession’ (Zurückziehen) of objects therein.\(^{232}\) As §2.1.2 explained, Heidegger holds that referring (verweise *nd*) to something is necessary for being around for (um zu) it; but not vice versa (1927/2006, 68). Around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) are therefore just one species of reference. Other species might include to-hand (zuhandene), i.e. ecological, spatial properties (Ibid, 102-110; cf. Arisaka 1995), which I discuss herein only in passing. Though I interpret around-for references specifically as non-relational because wherefores are seemingly invariably non-existents, viz. unrealised goals as such and ongoing activities *qua* unrealised goals, other references (e.g. to-hand spatial properties) might be relational, since referentiality might be a second-order property instantiable by both non-relational and relational properties alike.\(^{233}\) For whilst some entities might refer to non-existent wherefores in being around for (um zu) them, others might refer to other actual entities in, say, being spatially related thereto or referring to the materials composing them (Heidegger 1927/2006: 70, 102-104; Arisaka 1995).

To refer (verweisen) to something is to ‘point’ or otherwise direct attention, broadly construed, away from oneself thereto (cf. Christensen 1997, 167).\(^{234}\) Hence, characterising relationships between persons of the Trinity, Pope Benedict XVI writes that ‘[the] ego of Jesus is pure referredness [Verwiesenheit] to the “you” [Du] of the Father’: in that it ‘stands not in itself, but is actually just a “way”’ (Ratzinger 2000/1968, 19). For Jesus states: ‘My teaching is not my teaching’ (John 7,16) and ‘I

\(^{232}\) For the latter, see pp. 133-134 and Heidegger 1927/2006: 69.

\(^{233}\) Ongoing activities are intended ‘*qua* unrealised goals’ insofar as one pursues their prolongation. In doing so, one intends not the ongoing action as such, which is indeed an existent, but rather the ongoing event *as occurring in the future* and thus as yet unrealised and *de facto* non-existent. For no agent need intend anything in its relevance for what he is already doing *as such*, but only in its relevance for *realisable* possibilities. Hence, Christensen characterises mundane concern as ‘essentially future-directed’ (1997, 85). I say wherefores are ‘seemingly invariably non-existents’ in that they have the same ontological status as, for example, *hammering with* insofar as every particular hammer is for *hammering with*.

\(^{234}\) Cf, pp. 133-134. Attention is ‘broadly construed’ here in that I am not using ‘attention’ in its technical sense (cf. Wu 2011).
seek not my will, but rather the will of him who has sent me’ (John 5,30).

Analogously, entities around for (um zu) wherefores direct attention, broadly construed, away from themselves thereto. For precisely in, rather than merely subsequent to, experiencing something as around for (um zu) a wherefores, one’s focus is upon the wherefore as such, as ‘that which is primarily of concern’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69-70), rather than upon the token around-for reference per se or, a fortiori, its bearer. For in mundane concern, ‘the references themselves are not considered, but rather “there” in the concernful submission to them’: that is, in pursuing their wherefores (Heidegger 1927/2006, 74); and objects intended as around for (um zu) wherefores, including subordinate wherefores, ‘rrecede’ phenomenologically to highlight those wherefores at their own expense (Ibid, 69).

Figuratively speaking, as §3.1.1 intimated, objects intended as around for (um zu) wherefores as such are translucent but not transparent. For although superordinate wherefores qua referents are their focus in keeping their ‘eyes on the prize’, mundanely concernful agents still intend both referrers and token references in intending wherefores qua referents. Agents thus intend referrers as referring to their referents: the referent being the primary object, the token reference the secondary object, and the referrer the tertiary object. In the case of negative determinates of around-for such as detrimentality (Abträglichkeit), for instance, agents intend their instantiators insofar as they are detrimental to their respective wherefores and thus, in doing so, must be sensitive not only to those wherefores themselves, but also to the referrer’s detrimentality therefor. Therefore, though we would like to believe that everything is transparent to our intention, this is not the case. When we are using our hammer, we are not conscious of it in the sense of looking at it, listening to it, noting how it is to touch, and so forth. Indeed, when expertly using it, my hammer becomes so

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235 These are my translations of Pope Benedict’s German scriptural quotations (Ratzinger 2000/1968, 19).
236 I say ‘the wherefore as such’ because the wherefore is intended not discretely, but rather specifically as the wherefore of that whereof it is the wherefore. See below.
237 Note that whilst referentiality thus figures in intentional content, this does not imply that the phenomenology of shifting one’s attention from the object around for (um zu) a wherefore to the wherefore is analysable purely through intentional content of one’s states intending the object and the wherefore without mentioning phenomenal character (cf. Ganson and Bronner 2013).
238 See pp. 183-184. This notion of phenomenological ‘transparency’ is like that invoked in connection with intentional content (see Lycan 2006; Tye 2002).
239 Heidegger states in another context that ‘the referrer [Verweisende] can be adequate to its possible function’, viz. referring, ‘only when it shows itself in itself’ (1927/2006, 31). Von Herrmann glosses this as meaning that ‘[t]he referrer […] can refer to the other only when the referrer shows itself in itself” (1987, 307).
240 Cf. ‘when I am using my hammer, I am not conscious of it in the sense of looking at it, listening to it, noting how it is to touch, and so forth. Indeed, when expertly using it, my hammer becomes so
3.1 Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

may follow Rietveld in speaking of ‘fields of affordances’ or, in Heidegger’s terminology, ‘referential-manifolds’, we must bear in mind that affordances and token references are not the sole intentional objects even in the most unreflective mundane concern (cf. Dreyfus 1991, 251; Christensen 1998, 66).\footnote{Compare the position Bruin Christensen attributes to Dreyfus, which §3.1.1 followed Christensen in rejecting both as an interpretation of Heidegger and per se (pp. 186-187): ‘[T]he thesis that in everyday skilful engagement with familiar things no “representations”, i.e. no standard folk-psychological states or experiences, are necessarily involved is rather counterintuitive, at least when taken literally. Surely, when I am routinely hammering away, I do see that or how the nail is going as it should, namely, straight, as I intend. Surely, I quite literally perceive, come the appropriate moment, that the nail has been hammered in as required, so that it is time to stop hammering. So is Dreyfus right in attributing the above-mentioned thesis to Heidegger? Does Heidegger ever say that in so-called “absorbed coping” with everyday things there is no representational intentionality, in the quite radical sense that all, or indeed even most, of the above everyday descriptions are false?’ (Christensen 1998, 66; cf. Dreyfus 1991: 70, 251).}

In referring away from themselves, objects experienced as around for (um zu) wherefores are characterisable as ‘soliciting’ the pursuit – or, in the case of negative determinates of around-for such as detrimentality, ‘eliciting’ the safeguarding – of their respective wherefores. Since subordinate wherefores are in turn experienced as around for (um zu) superordinate wherefores, this effectively means that every episode of mundane concern involves a situational nexus’s constant solicitation of an agent’s pursuit of a superordinate wherefore.\footnote{I say ‘effectively’ because I assume that situational nexus are neither intentional objects nor entities in their own right, so they could not strictly be said to ‘solicit’ action in appearing as referring (verweisend) to a wherefore.} For objects appearing as composing a situational nexus appear as collectively referring (verweisend) to a superordinate wherefore. A mundanely concernful agent may therefore be described as ‘just allowing himself to be moved to improve’ his situation (Rietveld 2008a, 993; cf. Kelly 2006, 4) by responding to ‘the world’s demands’ (Kelly 2006, 16). For constant solicitation implies continuous ‘relevance-related change in the readiness of coping skills’ (Rietveld 2012, 213), which furthers mundanely concernful activities and thereby enables their continuation.

much part of me, so much an extension of my body, that I have no awareness in which reference is made specifically to it. Yet if, as Heidegger intimates, in such use I look away from my hammer (Wegsehen), this is only because I am so to speak looking along it (Entlangsehen) to the […] entities upon which I am working, or which have intruded upon what I am doing’ (Christensen 1997, 88).
Moreover, feelings of being ‘drawn’ to behave in certain ways, which constitute an essential subjectual component of solicitation or ‘affective allure’ (Rietveld, forthcoming: 31-32; Kelly 2005, 16), may also be regarded as at least correlating to experiences of token around-for references and perhaps even as caused by token around-for references themselves. Consequently, so long as it is read as referring to solicitations exerted by situational nexus insofar as they appear as referring (verweisend) to superordinate wherefores, we may endorse Kelly’s claim that ‘it is in principle impossible to be solicited to act in one way while actually doing something else’ because ‘in order to do something other than what I am solicited to do, I have to step outside of my [unreflective] engagement with the world’ (2005, 21). For mundanely concernful agency is essentially a continuous response to the demands of situations in light of superordinate wherefores exerting a constant affective ‘pull’ on agents (Rietveld 2008a, 994; cf. Kiverstein 2012, 20-21); so doing anything other than pursuing or safeguarding one’s respective superordinate wherefore requires that one ‘kick against the goad’ and therewith exit mundane concern.

Even if an agent were pursuing several superordinate wherefores simultaneously, their coordinated pursuit thereof would ensure that they could still simply respond to the world’s demands and thereby act adequately unreflectively. In such a case, the many coordinatively pursued superordinate wherefores are expressible conjunctively as a single complex wherefore. Someone shuffling cards whilst watching television, for instance, might pursue the superordinate wherefore shuffling these cards and watching this programme. If superordinate wherefores were not thus coordinated, the agent could not simply respond to the world’s demands and thereby act adequately unreflectively because he would find himself in a quandary resembling that of Buridan’s ass in attempting to respond to different demands from different wherefores simultaneously.

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244 One might be solicited by subordinate wherefores without pursuing them, of course, if pursuing them at a given point does not appear as facilitating one’s pursuit of the superordinate wherefore: just as one might salivate upon seeing food without proceeding to eat it.
The following objections might arise to my Heideggerian analysis of situated normativity, however. First, it might be objected that identifying solicitation with reference (\textit{Verweisung}) does not constitute an informative analysis of situated normativity, unlike the explanation of situational holism presented in §3.2.2, but rather merely relabels situated normativity as ‘reference’. In rejoinder, I maintain that identifying situated normativity, or at least its objectual component, with reference (\textit{Verweisung}) together with specifying the relationship of reference to other concepts such as \textit{around-for} yields an informative theoretical accommodation of situated normativity by establishing how it figures in intentional content and therewith how it might figure in an ecological or ecologico-metaphysical theory.\textsuperscript{245} For whilst situated normativity is a phenomenon specified purely phenomenologically, \textit{reference} is a property and as such specifiable primarily metaphysically but also phenomenologically via its figuring within intentional content.

Second, it might be objected that reference (\textit{Verweisung}) cannot be identical with situated normativity because whereas solicitation is essentially \textit{normative}, in involving agents’ being ‘solicited’ or ‘drawn’ to act, reference involves merely direction of attention away from a referrer to a referent and thus is devoid of normativity. Since someone’s attention can therefore be directed away from and by something to something else without their being therein solicited or drawn to the latter in any way, reference is seemingly distinct from situated normativity and so the Heideggerian analysis founders. In rejoinder, one must distinguish \textit{objectual} and \textit{subjectual} components of experiences of situated normativity.\textsuperscript{246} I contend that whilst reference, which is perhaps non-normative, exhausts the objectual component of such experiences, i.e. the distinctive aspect of the way they represent objects other than the subject as being, the peculiarly normative aspect of being \textit{solicited by} something is arguably contributed largely if not exclusively by subjectual components of such experiences, e.g. feelings of changes in readiness of bodily

\textsuperscript{245} See §3.2.2.
\textsuperscript{246} See p. 190.
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

coping skills, which constitute the solicitive ‘pull’ or ‘draw’ objects exert upon agents in light of wherefores (Rietveld 2008a, 994; Kelly 2005, 16).\footnote{Though the presence of ‘for’ in ‘around-for’ (‘Um-zu’) suggests that Heidegger conceives around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as essentially normative, the German preposition ‘zu’ – like the English ‘to’ – does not carry strong connotations of normativity and might instead be interpreted as signifying merely the inherent directionality of around-for references constituted by referentiality (cf. Christensen 2007, 167).}

In summary, this section applies Heidegger’s articulation of situational relevance through the concepts around-for (Um-zu) and reference (Verweisung) to explain the phenomenon of situated normativity: the appearance of objects in mundane concern as ‘soliciting’ actions or, alternatively expressed, as ‘affectively alluring’. Heidegger’s position that referring (verweisend) to something is necessary for being around for (um zu) it, and thereby being relevant therefor, explains situated normativity in implying that experiences of solicitation involve the experiencer’s being phenomenologically ‘referred’ (verwiesen) away from the referrer to the referent, viz. that wherefore (wozu or wofür) the referrer is around (um).

3.1.3. Prospective control

Gibsonian Michael T. Turvey introduces the phenomenon of prospective control generally as ‘control concerned with future events, usually interpretable as goals to be realized’, e.g. ‘walking across a room cluttered with furniture to close a door’ or ‘positioning oneself to receive a pass in a game of [American] football’ (Turvey 1992, 174).\footnote{Gibsonians often use prospective control as a litmus test of ecological theories (Kadar and Effken 1994, 299; Turvey 1992, 193).} Since §3.2 centres on Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, I consider only mundanely concernful prospective control: that is, unreflective, non-intersubjective prospective control. In any case, Turvey’s examples suggest that mundanely concernful prospective control is paradigmatic, since both are seemingly intended to exemplify control exercised during the course of unreflective engagement with objects not intended as subjects, viz. furniture, doors, and American footballs.
§3.1 Three Phenomena of Mundane Concern

§3.1.1 defended Heidegger’s explanation of situational holism through the appearance of objects in their collective relevance for a superordinate wherefore, which secures the holistic appearance of a plurality of objects by anchoring them phenomenologically to a single point. In doing so, superordinate wherefores were noted to fulfil a guiding function: ‘illuminating’ a situational nexus through their status as referents whereto agents are constantly referred (verwiesen). Referrers (Verweisende) remain ‘translucent’ in highlighting their respective referents at their own expense. This is especially true of superordinate wherefores as that whereto every subordinate wherefore appears as referred (verwiesen) in appearing as subordinate thereto.\(^{249}\)

Hence, mundanely concernful prospective control is characterisable simply as ‘immediate responsiveness to the experienced demands of the world’ wherein one is ‘moved to improve’ one’s situation (Rietveld, forthcoming: 7, 36-37; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 69): but wherein, crucially, situational ‘demands’ appear in light of a superordinate wherefore as one’s constant phenomenological ‘centre of orientation’ (von Herrmann 2005, 126).\(^{250}\)

By contrast, Turvey – like many Gibsonians – overlooks the roles of situational holism and situated normativity in presenting only perceiving discrete (i.e. non-holistically organised) affordances, conceived as mere (i.e. non-soliciting) dispositions of entities to support behaviours (1992, 179), as enabling prospective control (Ibid, 174).\(^{251}\) In particular, specifying necessary conditions of prospective control, Turvey writes that ‘conducting an act requires that one perceive whether the act as a whole is possible, what subacts are possible with respect to the surface layout, and the possible consequences of current subacts if current (kinetic, kinematic) conditions persist’ (1992, 174). Turvey’s account thus neglects the vital roles of situational holism and situated normativity, as analysed in §3.1.1 and §3.1.2, in enabling unreflectively purposeful action and therewith mundanely concernful prospective control.\(^{252}\) Moreover, in analysing Turvey’s examples, a Heideggerian

\(^{249}\) See pp. 181-182.

\(^{250}\) See pp. 183-184.

\(^{251}\) Admittedly, some Gibsonians also recognise an essential axiological component of affordance (Kadar and Effken 1994, 303; Heft 2003, 157); but none acknowledge situated normativity. Heft, for example, writes that ‘with affordances we do enter […] the world of “oughts” – that is, the world of values’ (2003, 158); therein overlooking the subtler situated normativity (cf. p. 192).

\(^{252}\) See §§3.1.1-3.1.2.
account would not posit perceptions of the kinds Turvey designates as necessary, e.g. perceptions of the possibility of one’s reaching the door and catching the ball. Instead, walking across a cluttered room or positioning oneself to receive a pass requires merely that one respond to ‘the experienced demands of the world’ by intending a situational nexus in light of the corresponding superordinate wherefore (what Turvey calls the ‘act as a whole’), e.g. reaching that door and catching this ball (Rietveld, forthcoming: 7).

Tony Chemero errs in a similar way to fellow Gibsonian Turvey in designating the sole objects of action-guiding perception as affordances conceived as token relations between environmental features, e.g. stair risers, and agential abilities, e.g. stair-climbing abilities (2009, 145; cf. Prosser 2011, 479-480): such that perceiving an affordance amounts merely to perceiving one’s situation as supporting a specific behaviour (Chemero 2009, 140). Though Chemero’s account of the conditions for prospective control thus differs slightly from Turvey’s in designating the requisite objects of perception therein as possibilities offered by situations instead of possibilities offered by individual entities, it designates them nonetheless as discrete, mere possibilities for behaviour. Thus, despite demonstrating sensitivity to phenomenology of prospective control to the extent of acknowledging that ‘the usual phenomenology of humans’ does not involve the appearance of such token relations as such, instead involving the appearance only of affordances as possibilities for behaviour (Ibid, 147), Chemero like Turvey overlooks the phenomena of situational holism and situated normativity entirely. Turvey and Chemero both imply, therefore, that mundanely concernful behavioural guidance requires only perception of a mere plurality, rather than a situationally holistic nexus or ‘field’ (Rietveld, forthcoming 3), of possibilities for behaviour that exerts no situatedly normative ‘pull’ on the agent through its components’ collective reference (Verweisung) to a superordinate wherefore.

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253 These specifications of wherefores are again merely imprecise illustrations (see fn. 213). See pp. 184-186 for the arguably essential role of demonstratives in specifying wherefores.
254 Prosser likewise omits explicit mention of situated normativity in conceiving an affordance as ‘a relation between a subject and an object that depends on the causal powers of the subject and, in many cases, the causal powers of the object. It is a relation that has to do with the possibilities for causal interaction between the subject and the object’ (2011, 479).
Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the essential roles of situational holism and situated normativity in mundane concernful prospective control, my Heideggerian account does not imply that discrete, non-referential possibilities for behaviour such as those Turvey and Chemero describe are never experienced in mundane concern. Bence Nanay argues persuasively, for example, that someone who attempts to catch a ball despite knowing that an unbreakable window separates him therefrom nonetheless perceives the ball simply as catchable, albeit not necessarily consciously (2012, 9-10). Since this example does not seem to exemplify prospective control (given the absence of a goal), I may consistently grant Nanay’s claim. If the example were construed as exemplifying mundane concernful prospective control, however, e.g. if a plausibly ‘instinctive’ superordinate wherefore such as avoiding injury were posited, then the ball might instead be taken to appear, along with other objects, as (say) detrimental (abträglich) for the agent’s superordinate wherefore and thus as soliciting catching as a subordinate wherefore. In that case, the agent’s attempt to catch the ball despite his knowing that an unbreakable window intervenes is explainable through the gearedness of his unreflective state of mundane concern to the instinctive superordinate wherefore of avoiding injury: which, perhaps because it is geared towards an instinctive wherefore or perhaps owing simply to limitations of mundane concern, does not utilise some knowledge ordinarily available in reflective states. Supposing the former explanation and appropriating Kiverstein’s deployment of Walter Freeman’s research, one might speculate that neural ‘attractor landscapes’ involved in unreflectively securing such instinctive superordinate wherefores cannot be influenced by some acquired knowledge, even of the situation at hand, such that mundane concernful agents’ experience and behaviour in light of such wherefores remain ‘insulated’ therefrom (cf. Kiverstein 2012, 20).

It might be objected, however, that my Heideggerian account undermines the phenomenon of regulative guidance control in mundane concern: that is, one’s awareness therein of ‘control involving [one’s ability] to choose and act differently in the actual circumstances’ (O’Connor 2010; cf. Fischer 1994). For the ‘translucency’ of subordinate wherefores might imply, seemingly contrary to common phenomenology, that mundane concernful agents are almost completely

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unaware of pursuing those wherefores, in being constantly referred (verwiesen) away therefrom, and consequently are oblivious to their ability to disengage therefrom and pursue alternatives.256 Gibsonian accounts like those defended by Turvey and Chemero, by contrast, in designating non-‘translucent’ pluralities of behavioural possibilities as objects of even mundanely concernful perception, preserve unmitigated awareness of alternatives and therewith the phenomenon of regulative guidance control.

In rejoinder, I follow Rietveld in acknowledging the phenomenon of mundanely concernful regulative guidance control inasmuch as ‘[e]ven though we respond to affordances’ – or, on my Heideggerian account, token around-for references in light of phenomenologically primary superordinate wherefores – ‘with instinctive ease, we do not experience our skillful unreflective activities as fully automatic or beyond our control’ (emphasis added; Rietveld, forthcoming: 3). For, given that mundanely concernful action essentially involves ‘allowing oneself to be moved to improve’ one’s situation in pursuing a superordinate wherefore (emphasis altered; Ibid, 36-37; cf. von Herrmann 1987, 103), there persists an essentially suspendible commitment to responding to solicitations to pursue ‘translucent’ subordinate wherefores in that one voluntarily pursues the superordinate wherefore determining the intentional content of one’s mundane concern (cf. Christensen 1997, 86). For the ‘translucency’ of subordinate wherefores to an agent depends upon his sustained assent to pursuing the superordinate wherefore whereto they refer (verweisen): that is, his commitment to realising a goal or prolonging an activity unreflectively. Incidentally, Rietveld and Kelly convincingly present this ability to ‘allow’ oneself to be unreflectively responsive to the demands of situations as one significant, if not the sole, feature distinguishing unreflective action of mature humans from that of higher non-human animals and perhaps pre-linguistic children (Rietveld, forthcoming: 14-15; Kelly 2006, 7). For at least higher non-human animals, like mature humans, seemingly ‘can perceive affordances’ and perhaps therewith, we might speculate, enjoy the phenomena of both situational holism and situated normativity to at least some

256 Mundanely concernful agents are only almost completely unaware of pursuing subordinate wherefores because subordinate wherefores are ‘translucent’ but not ‘transparent’ (see pp. 194-195).
In summary, this section applies Heidegger’s theoretical accommodation of situational holism and situated normativity to explain mundanely concernful prospective control as enabled by objects’ appearance as collectively around for (um zu) common wherefores and therewith as referring (verweisend) thereto such that agents can act adequately unreflectively in light of superordinate wherefores, which fulfil an essential guiding role as the ‘centre of orientation’ (Orientierungszentrum) for mundane concern.

257 The latter claim naturally remains revisable in light of, amongst other things, neurophysiological data concerning action-specific perception in non-human animals (cf. Carrier 1980; Heyes and Dickinson 1990). Heidegger writes that ‘plants and animals’ are ‘not extant like stones are’, since ‘we find in plants and animals a way of being orientated to other beings that surround them in a certain way’, i.e. the capacity for intentionality (1927-1928/1977, 20). For discussion of Heidegger’s position on non-human animals, see Elden 2006.
3. Mundane Concern and Ecological Metaphysics

§3.1 developed and defended Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, bracketing the question of the veridicality of the intentional content outlined. This section investigates potential metaphysical implications of its veridicality, thereby laying foundations for Heideggerian ecology: a Heideggerian science of environmental entities (cf. Smith 2009). Positively affirming the veridicality of mundane concern might also be theoretically desirable, e.g. to ‘save the phenomena’ of mundane concern or avoid implausible theories of perception arguably implied by error theories thereof. Regarding colours, for example, Michael Watkins writes that ‘visual experience is veridical, much of the time, or at least we have insufficient reason to deny that it is’ (2010, 123). Gibsonians, on the other hand, assume the veridicality of perception as a matter of principle: construing ‘perception as the incorrigible basis for knowing the environment’ (Oytam and Neilson 2007, 267), and thus as ‘direct and immediate access to reality’ (Crane 2011), maintaining concomitantly that ‘objects and events have inherent meaning, which is detected and exploited by the animal without mental calculation’ (Jones 2003, 107; cf. Smith 2009, 125; Reed 1992, 17-18; Kadar and Effken 1994, 301; Chemero 2009, 135-136). John Sanders defends this Gibsonian conception of perception on the grounds that ‘there is no neurophysiological evidence [...] that supports the notion that the human brain is functionally arranged into “processors” of the relevant kind’ to justify conceiving perception as anything other than ‘direct and immediate access to reality’ (Sanders 1999, 131).

Nevertheless, I do not affirm the veridicality of mundane concern here: instead restricting myself to the more modest task of determining what would be the case were it at least sometimes veridical. Accommodating metaphysical consequences of the content described in §3.2 yields a partial metaphysical theory of objects of mundane concern – a partial ecological metaphysics of environmental entities. It is only partial because around-for references, whilst being the sole peculiarly ecological species of property discussed herein and figuring prominently in mundanely concernful content, are not the sole species of property an ecological metaphysics must accommodate. Others plausibly include ecological spatial properties (see Heidegger 1927/2006, 102-104; Arisaka 1995). §3.2.1 contrasts
3.2 Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics

Heideggerian ecology with that of J. J. Gibson and contemporary Gibsonians, with reference to similar ideas propounded by Husserl and Scheler. Gibson overlooks the phenomena of situational holism and situated normativity, and therewith properties such as around-for and reference, because he commences his investigation of ‘how we see […] the environment around us’ (1979/1986, 2) by describing not content of mundane concern, but ‘[t]he ordinary familiar things of the earth’ (Ibid, 8-9) as ‘what is there to be perceived’ (Ibid, 2; cf. Michaels 2003, 136). Though the latter remain intentional objects of mundane concern on my Heideggerian account, which thus preserves consistency with common-sense phenomenology, I contend that properties such entities appear as instantiating in mundane concern, e.g. around-for references, are fundamentally inaccessible through a phenomenologically-naïve description like Gibson’s. For whereas, in Heidegger’s terms, Gibson’s ‘description remains adhered to beings’ and is thus merely ‘ontic’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 63), accessing the aforementioned properties requires special basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) accessible only through content of mundane concern (Heidegger 1927/2006, 67-69).

Moreover, contemporary Gibsonians’ unquestioning assimilation of Gibson’s ecological foundations renders them largely oblivious to the phenomenology of mundane concern. As a result, many Gibsonians occupy the awkward position of assuming the veridicality of action-guiding perceptual content whilst lacking an adequate description of it.

§3.2.2 presents a metaphysics specifically designed to accommodate the possible veridicality of intentional content described in §3.1. Adapting Michael Watkins’s primitivist metaphysics of colour (2005; 2010), with reference also to Jonathan Cohen’s colour functionalism (2003), I propose conceiving around-for references, as the class of property responsible for both situational holism (§3.1.1) and situated normativity (§3.1.2) and therewith also for the phenomenology of mundane concern (§3.1.3), as primitive, non-relational properties that are nonetheless both realised by and therefore supervene on physicochemical properties. As such, around-for references confer upon their instantiators a subset of the causal powers conferred by their instantiators’ physicochemical properties. This

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258 See §1.2.2 and §2.1.2.
permits reconciling the *ex hypothesi* primitively non-physicochemical nature of around-for references with the apparent causal potency of their instances.

### 3.2.1. Gibsonian and Heideggerian ecology

J. J. Gibson introduces his masterwork *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979/1986), which institutes Gibsonian ecology as the study of environments (*Ibid*, 2), as ‘a book about how we see’ (*Ibid*, 1). Gibson’s starting point, however, is not a descriptive-phenomenological examination of intentional content of visual experience, but rather a description of ‘the environment’ itself. Gibson justifies this approach by stating that ‘what there is to be perceived has to be stipulated before one can even talk about perceiving it’ (*Ibid*, 2). Gibson distinguishes the environment from ‘[t]he world of physics’ in three respects. First, environmental entities, as entities readily perceptible without scientific apparatus, are ordinary macrolevel entities – Austin’s ‘moderate-sized specimens of dry goods’ (1962, 8) – rather than their microlevel components (Gibson 1979/1986, 8-9). For example: mountains and trees are environmental entities but, as such, objects of neither physics nor chemistry, since these sciences need not posit such macrolevel entities in explaining phenomena.

Edmund Husserl’s and Max Scheler’s demarcations of respectively the ‘world of life’ (*Lebenswelt*) and ‘milieu’ from the world as described by natural science stress this first difference in particular. Husserl distinguishes the ‘world of life’ as the ‘one, common world of experience’ from that described by natural science as the supposed ‘being-in-itself’ of entities, which implies that the world of life is by contrast merely ‘subject-relative’ (1956/2012, 128-129). But whereas Heidegger focusses upon mundane concern and its peculiar intentional content, Husserl speaks predominantly of objects of ‘mere sense-perception’ (von Herrmann 2005, 210): ‘We begin our considerations as men of the natural life: imagining, judging, feeling, willing “in a natural attitude”. […] I am conscious of a world endlessly extended in space, endlessly becoming and having become in time. I am conscious of it – that means in

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259 I refer to page numbers from the original German edition of Husserl’s *Krisis* (1956/2012).
3.2 Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics

particular: I encounter it vividly; I experience it’ (Husserl 1913, 48).\textsuperscript{260} Similarly, Scheler remarks that ‘the milieu-sun, for example, is not the sun of astronomy; the meat that is stolen, bought, etc., is not a sum of cells and nerves with the chemical and physical process occurring within them’. For human experience ordinarily represents objects as instantiating properties quite different from those ascribed by modern physical science, e.g. value-properties (Scheler 1916, 139; cf. Smith 2009, 123-124).\textsuperscript{261} Hence, Husserl observes that ‘the world’ is ‘not there for me as a mere material world [Sachenwelt], but rather in the same immediacy as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. I readily discover the things before me furnished, just as with material qualities [Sachbeschaffenheiten], so with value characteristics: as beautiful and hateful, as appealing and unappealing, as appropriate and inappropriate, etc.’ (1913, 58).\textsuperscript{262}

Second, Gibson holds that environmental entities as such, unlike merely physicochemical entities, instantiate organism-relative properties. ‘The medium in which animals can move about’ as such, for instance, features not ‘geometrical points’, unlike physical space as such, but rather ‘points of observation’. For ‘[a]ny point in the medium is a possible point of observation for any observer who can look, listen, or sniff’ (Gibson 1979/1986, 17). Third, adverting to the most salient species of ostensibly organism-relative property, viz. value-properties (‘meanings’), Gibson insists that whereas ‘[t]he world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things’, ‘[t]he world of ecological reality […] does’. ‘If what we perceive were the entities of physics […], meanings would have to be imposed on them. But if what we perceive are the entities of environmental science, their meanings can be discovered’ (Ibid, 33). Such ‘meanings’ are none other than ‘affordances’: ‘The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill’. A ‘surface’ affords ‘support’, for instance, by virtue of its ‘physical properties’, e.g. its being ‘horizontal, flat, extended, and rigid’, such that the surface is ascertainable as offering support when ‘measured relative to the animal’ (Ibid, 33).

\textsuperscript{260} Cf. pp. 125.
\textsuperscript{261} Similar ideas are expressed in Sellars 1963, 1-40 and Armour 2008, 21-23.
\textsuperscript{262} Cf. p. 126.
As such, affordances are construable as functional properties: in that something’s affording, say, a behaviour consists in its being such that something can behave thus therewith, e.g. walk thereupon (cf. Cohen 2003, 2-4; Levin 2013).263 Gibson maintains, moreover, that affordances are ‘external to the perceiver’ and as such can be ‘directly perceived’ (1979/1986, 33). Adopting Gibson’s ecological metaphysics, Tony Chemero likewise characterises ‘[t]he environment’ as ‘meaning laden in that it contains affordances’ and therefore as not ‘merely physical’. Chemero identifies the primary motivation for doing so as the desire to recognise action-guiding experience as ‘direct’ (2009, 136; cf. Smith 2009, 125; Sanders 1997; 1999; Reed 1992), i.e. as ‘immediate access to reality’ or ‘openness to the world’ (Crane 2011), and thus as typically veridical.264

By contrast, the starting-point of Heideggerian ecology as I conceive it is the phenomenology of mundane concern. Although the principal objects of mundane concern are doubtless ordinary macrolevel entities like those Gibson posits as peculiarly environmental entities, the properties mundane concern represents such objects as instantiating, as §3.1 indicated, do not include affordances as Gibson conceives them, i.e. mere possibilities for behaviour.265 For, as §3.1 revealed, objects appear in mundane concern not merely as such that they can be behaved with, but rather as referring (verweisend) to wherefores in being around for (um zu) them. §1.2.2 adverted to Habermas’s claim that ‘[m]eanings […] can become disclosed only from within’: in that ‘the world of life [Lebenswelt] opens itself only to a subject who makes use of his linguistic- and agential-competence’, who thereby ‘provides himself access by participating at least virtually in the communications of the members and thus becoming himself at least a potential member’ (Habermas 1981, 165). Gibson describes the environment not ‘from within’, as Habermas would put it, i.e. from the perspective of mundane concern accessing the ‘world of life’ and ‘meanings’ in the form of gear-characteristics such as around-for references, but exclusively from without, i.e. from the perspective of a detached observer.

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264 Cf. p. 204.
265 See pp. 199-200.
Strictly speaking, however, given his methodology, Gibson does not err in omitting around-for references from his description of ‘the environment’. For objects can appear as around for (um zu), and thus as referring (verweisend) to, wherefores only in mundane concern; whereas in describing ‘the environment’, Gibson assumes the detached standpoint of purely theoretical cognition (theoretischen Erkenntnis), which necessarily disregards (absieht) such properties (Heidegger 1927/2006, 69). Whilst so-called environmental ‘meanings’ such as affordances, as merely properties of ordinary macrolevel physicochemical entities ‘taken relative to the animal’ (Chemero 2009, 136), remain describable from a purely theoretico-cognitive standpoint despite being reasonably ‘high-level’ (see Siegel 2010), around-for references are such that they can appear only relative to one’s own wherefores and insofar as one assumes, whether actually or merely imaginatively, the essentially unreflective – and therefore non-theoretical – standpoint of mundane concern. Objects can appear as instantiating around-for references only relative to one’s own wherefores because of the essential action-guiding role of mundanely concernful intentional content. Heidegger expresses this point when he writes that ‘[t]he merely “theoretically” observing view of things [Dinge]’, i.e. of merely physicochemical entities, ‘is devoid of understanding of to-hand-ness’ and therewith of gear and gear-characteristics (1927/2006, 69). For ‘theoretical cognition is guided in its understanding of being not by an understanding of to-hand-ness, but of extantness [Vorhandenheit]’ (von Herrmann 2005, 124; cf. 1987, 131). Consequently, objects cannot appear as instantiating gear-characteristics, e.g. around-for references, in theoretical cognition.

266 See §1.2.2 and §2.2.1
267 Cf. Gibsonian Claire Michaels on the issue of whether one can perceive the affordances, i.e. behavioural possibilities, of other agents: ‘[T]he perception of affordances for others […] ought not qualify as the perception of affordances. For instance, my seeing that some man could sit on some seat (seeing that the seat affords sitting to that man) should not qualify as “perceiving an affordance.” This is not to deny that people make such judgments […], but the question is “what is the domain of that perception?” To deem such perception to be the perception of affordances is to make perceiving affordances nothing more than perceiving relations. In my opinion, seeing that the outfielder will be able to catch the ball is more like seeing that the falling tree will hit the house than it is like seeing that I will be able to catch the ball. There ought to be something very special about perceiving affordances, in that such perception presumably can set up action systems to act, direct attention to appropriate action-guiding information, and so forth. Perceiving affordances is more than just perceiving relations’ (2003, 139).
268 See pp. 103-106.
Nevertheless, gear-characteristics can still be theorised about, e.g. in a phenomenological account of mundane concern (§2.1.2; §3.1) or metaphysical account featuring properties appearing as instantiated therein (§3.2.2). Recognising this, Heidegger writes in the hammer passage that ‘even a to-hand being can yet be made the theme of scientific investigation and determining, e.g. in the exploration of an environment – of the milieu’ (1927/2006, 361). For as Heidegger explains, an explication of the being of gear, which yields basic concepts such as around-for and reference, is an ‘independent and explicit consummation of the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein already in each case and is “alive” in every engagement with beings’: in this case, the understanding of objects as to-hand gear and thus as capable of instantiating gear-characteristics (Ibid, 67). Therefore, whilst the source wherefrom the basic concepts are derived is non-theoretico-cognitive, viz. mundane concern, the output of an ‘independent and explicit’ explication of its content can nevertheless become an object and element of theory. Hence, expounding Heidegger’s statement, von Herrmann writes that an explication of the being of gear comes to this explicit consummation of the understanding of being not through setting concernful engagement [sc. mundane concern] aside and reflecting upon it, but rather through explicitly going along with concernful engagement and through leading the pre-phenomenological inexplicit understanding of being over into the explicit, made explicit, understanding of being (von Herrmann 2005, 115; cf. Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 28).

Von Herrmann illustrates this methodological point generally in expounding Heidegger’s discussion of Kant’s conception of ‘phenomena’ (Heidegger 1927/2006, 30-31). Supposing Kant’s position for illustration’s sake, von Herrmann writes that invariant structures of experiential content that Kant calls ‘pure subjective forms of intuition’, viz. ‘space and time’, which enable ‘empirical appearances’ by structuring

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270 ‘In the sciences, where beings as such become objects, an explicit development of the understanding of being is obviously required. In other words: the essence of objectification’, which Heidegger deems necessary for scientific investigation (Heidegger 1927-1928/1977, 26-27), ‘lies in the explicit consummation of the understanding of being in which the basic constitution [sc. constitution of being] of the beings that are to become objects becomes intelligible’ (Ibid, 28).
experiential content (von Herrmann 1987, 313), primarily ‘show themselves “unthematically” in appearances [Erscheinungen]’, i.e. only as characterising spatiotemporal objects.\textsuperscript{271} Spatiotemporal objects themselves, on the other hand, are invariably intended thematically (Ibid, 312). Hence, in order for statements to be advanced about space and time in abstracto ‘as pure forms of intuition in themselves’, e.g. ‘that space is the a priori wherein [Worinnen] of an ordering’ (Ibid, 314), they ‘must first of all be brought to show themselves’, i.e. become thematic in intentional content, even though they cannot in fact be ‘separated’ from spatiotemporal objects since they can appear only as characterising objects (Ibid, 313).\textsuperscript{272} Endorsing von Herrmann’s reading in view of the plausibility of the position he attributes to Heidegger, I reject Christensen’s reading of Heidegger on this point:

If […] we wish to get at this everyday being [sc. to-hand-ness] we must recognize that because we are not expressly aware of things in our dealings with them, we must access this being in its privative form, that is, by examining how these things show themselves when there is a hitch or […] a breakdown (Christensen 1998, 77; cf. Dreyfus 1991, 70).

For, as von Herrmann says, just as someone can advert to space and time per se despite their appearing merely as characterising spatiotemporal objects, so can explicators access the being of gear by ‘going along with’ mundane concern and thus need not resort to explicating a mere ‘privative form’ of to-hand-ness as figuring in the intentional content of a limiting case of mundane concern, e.g. interrupted activity (see Heidegger 1927/2006, 73-74). Moreover, the two examples Heidegger

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The degree whereto space and time are unthematic is arguably heightened by their supposedly invariant presence. For as Wittgenstein says in the Philosophical Investigations, ‘[t]he aspects of things that are most important for us are concealed by their simplicity and mundanity. (One cannot notice it, – because one has it always before one’s eyes)’ (1953/2006: §129; cf. von Savigny 1988, 174). Exemplifying this, Heidegger holds that ‘Dasein finds itself primarily in things’ (1927/1975, 227; cf. 1927/2006, 119): such that it is only secondarily aware of its own intentional states, by way of their intentional objects (1927/2006, 119; von Herrmann 2005, 303). Hence, space and time are arguably unthematic not only because they invariably appear only as characterising spatiotemporal objects, but also because of the general phenomenological priority of intentional objects over intentional content and properties figuring therein (see Lycan 2006; Tye 2002).
\item Compare Habermas’s description of the adoption of a ‘reflective attitude’ to ‘cultural patterns of interpretation’ that ‘normally only enable […] interpretative accomplishments’ such that they are ‘made the theme’ of an enquiry (1981, 123-124). For discussion of such procedures in hermeneutic phenomenology, see Gadamer 1960/2010: 270-276.
\end{enumerate}
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primarily uses to explicate the being of gear in *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems*, viz. the room and lecture-theatre examples respectively (*Ibid*, 68-69; 1927/1975, 231-233), tell against Christensen’s reading and in favour of von Herrmann’s by exemplifying ordinary unreflective rather than abnormal, interrupted mundane concern.\(^{273}\)

In summary, this section distinguishes the Heideggerian phenomenological approach to ecology, as centring upon content of mundane concern, from the Gibsonian approach, which begins with a phenomenologically-naïve description of the environment conducted from a perspective of detached observation. In exploiting the perspective (‘mode of access’) of mundane concern, the Heideggerian approach enables knowledge of properties both *in abstracto* and as instantiated that are knowable only through that content and hence unrecognised by Gibsonians in their obliviousness to content of mundane concern. Gibsonians thus err in an analogous way to Descartes, as represented by Heidegger (1927/2006, 95-98), in assuming that detached observation offers the sole possible perspective on environmental entities.\(^{274}\)

### 3.2.2 The metaphysics of around-for references

Unlike the Gibsonian, Heideggerian ecology and the ecological metaphysics underlying it aim exclusively to accommodate content of mundane concern. The sole peculiarly Heideggerian properties discussed in analysing the three phenomena featured in §3.1 were around-for references (*Um-zu-Verweisungen*), to whose metaphysical accommodation this section is accordingly devoted. Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern and regional ontology of gear remains neutral on the question of whether anything actually instantiates around-for references. For as §2.2.1 explained, §15 of *BT* is purely ontological and as such implies nothing about the actual world except corollaries of truths about properties and concepts *in abstracto*. In any case, this section presents a plausible metaphysics of environmental entities at proximate possible worlds at which around-for references are instantiated.

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\(^{273}\) See §2.1 for analysis of these two examples.

\(^{274}\) See pp. 106-110.
3.2 Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics

In particular, since entities appearing as instantiating around-for references are typically if not invariably physicochemical entities, viz. macrolevel aggregates of objects of physics and chemistry, this section sketches a plausible account of the relationship between around-for references and physicochemical properties, i.e. ‘properties described in the vocabulary of physical science’ (Allen 2011, 153). In particular, I suggest that around-for references might be realised by and therefore supervene on physicochemical properties.275

§3.1.2 identified two characteristics of around-for references plausibly rendering them, like colours on primitivist conceptions of colour-properties, incapable of being ‘identified with properties specified in other terms’ (Byrne and Hilbert 2007, 74), e.g. ‘properties described in the vocabulary of physical science’: physicochemical properties (Allen 2011, 153), and therefore primitive (Byrne and Hilbert 2007, 73-74; cf. Watkins 2005; 2010). The first is the perhaps primitively normative directionality involved in being around for (um zu) something; the second is the concomitant essential referentiality of around-for references, such that every appearance of a token around-for reference involves the subject being ‘referred’ (verwiesen) away from the referrer to the referent.276 Though some deny the primitiveness of normative properties, insisting that they too can be ‘naturalised’ (see Papineau 2007; cf. Bedke 2012; Cerbone 1999, 315-316), and so might affirm the naturalisibility of the first characteristic, I proceed on the assumption that either or both of these characteristics of around-for references render them incomprehensible in purely physicochemical terms and, indeed, primitive.277 If around-for references were instead deemed non-primitive, of course, accommodating them metaphysically would be comparatively straightforward.

275 I restrict myself to merely suggesting that these supervenience and realisation relationships obtain because I do not conduct a full defence of this position, which would involve defending it from objections like that posed by Paul Audi (2012), instead merely proposing it as one plausible account of relationships between around-for references and physicochemical properties that might serve to ‘exorcise’ the ‘spookiness’ surrounding around-for references, as McDowell might put it (see McDowell 1994, 176).
276 See pp. 191, 193, 197, fn. 247.
277 Though interpreting Heidegger’s concept of around-for differently, David Cerbone deems the normative purposefulness inherent in around-for references incomprehensible in purely physicochemical terms (1999, 316). Compare my rejoinder to the objection that analysing situated normativity through reference alone eliminates the essentially normative aspect thereof (p. 197).
Despite around-for references’ primitiveness, it is desirable that their instances be recognised as causally potent. For token around-for references are not only supposedly perceptible, and as such must surely contribute to causing perceptions thereof (Dorsch 2009, 298-299), but also plausibly contribute to causing subjectual components of experiences of situational holism mentioned in §3.1.2, e.g. feelings of ‘relevance-related change in the readiness of coping skills’ and such change itself (Rietveld 2012, 213), and their neural correlates, e.g. reawakening of cell assemblies, attractor states, and ‘transitions between attractor landscapes’ (Kiverstein 2012, 20-22). Yet to secure causal potency for token around-for references, one must either controversially deny the causal sufficiency of instances of physicochemical properties for the aforementioned events (cf. Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 6-7) or else explain how instances of around-for references relate to instances of physicochemical properties such that they participate in such causal processes.

Rejecting the former option, partly in view of the plausibility of physical completeness (see Robb and Heil 2013), I pursue the latter by adapting Michael Watkins’s primitivist metaphysics of colour. Watkins conceives colour-properties as primitive, non-relational properties whilst contending that they both supervene on and are realised by physicochemical properties and consequently can fulfil causal roles (2005, 35). An analogous position in respect to around-for references is especially plausible given that entities’ behavioural relevance, which Heidegger’s notion of an ‘around-for reference’ theoretically articulates, is seemingly a function of their ultimately purely physicochemically characterisable non-relational and relational properties: insofar as something’s behavioural relevance consists in its being such that it, say, ought to be taken into account.

Implying that colours’ realisation by physicochemical properties implies their supervenience thereon, Watkins summarises his position thus: ‘[C]olours contribute causal powers that are a subset of those powers contributed by the many (perhaps complex) physical properties that realize them. Colours are, then, as basic and fundamental as the complex physical properties on which they supervene’ (2005, 48-278

See pp. 215-216.
3.2 Heideggerian Ecological Metaphysics

49; cf. 2010, 131). For example: being scarlet is that property whose instantiation is ‘the only necessary and sufficient cause’ of veridically appearing as scarlet. But ‘it is never the case that something’s being scarlet is the only sufficient cause’ of its veridically appearing as scarlet (Watkins 2005, 47). For something’s instantiating properties realising scarlet, e.g. P and Q, is also sufficient for causing veridical appearances thereof as scarlet at worlds at which P and Q realise scarlet. But since properties other than P and Q might realise scarlet at other possible worlds, being scarlet is the sole necessary and sufficient cause of veridically appearing as scarlet. For it is thus possible that something is scarlet, and consequently can appear veridically as scarlet, but does not instantiate P and Q. But supposing P and Q realise scarlet at the actual world, everything actually instantiating P and Q is scarlet. Therefore, colours supervene at least weakly on physicochemical properties. For, at the actual world, if any two entities, x and y, are physicochemically indiscernible, then they are also indiscernible with respect to colour.279

In light of the ostensible causal potency of token around-for references and the aforementioned functionally-characterisable nature of behavioural relevance, I suggest that around-for references might relate to physicochemical properties in a way analogous to colours on Watkins’s theory. Instantiating around-for references plausibly contributes the power to cause not only veridical appearances of objects as instantiating them, but also the ‘reawakening of neural circuits’ such that a subject enters ‘an attractor state’: a set whereof is called an ‘attractor landscape’ (Kiverstein 2012, 20). For ‘[t]he brain’s movement into an attractor state corresponds with the animal’s readiness to act on an affordance’, or token around-for reference, ‘in the environment’ (Ibid, 20). In other words: the brain’s movement into an attractor state correlates with ‘a relevance-related change in the readiness of coping skills’ and experiences such as feeling ‘immediately attracted or drawn to act in a certain way’ (Rietveld 2012, 212-213; cf. §3.1.2), which are plausibly ‘relevance-related’ specifically in that they are caused by relevance in the form of token around-for references.

279 ‘A-properties weakly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible world w and any individuals x and y in w, if x and y are B-indiscernible in w, then they are A-indiscernible in w’ (Kim 1984/1993a; 1987/1993b; cf. Smith 1993, 234-238; McLaughlin and Bennett 2011).
Perhaps unlike with colours, however, these supposed effects of token around-for references are heavily context-dependent: in accordance with the highly particularised nature of superordinate wherefores. Therefore, the physicochemical properties realising around-for references, and thus those whereon around-for references supervene, must seemingly include relational properties. For, as §3.1.1 indicated, agents intend objects in their collective relevance for superordinate wherefores; so an object’s power to cause (say) veridical appearances of being around for (um zu) a given wherefore in a certain way, e.g. as handy (handlich) or detrimental (abträglich) therefor, concomitant ‘changes in the readiness of coping skills’, feelings of being ‘immediately attracted or drawn’ to act, etc., requires its being suitably related to other components of the situational nexus. For example: if the lion Callias encounters is caged, it will not appear to Callias as detrimental for the superordinate wherefore avoiding danger because it is not thus detrimental given its relationship to the cage. The lion in that case would, moreover, not cause Callias to become ‘bodily ready’ to flee, nor to feel ‘immediately attracted or drawn’ to flee. Although one might construe the cage as merely masking the lion’s disposition to appear as detrimental on the grounds that lions appear thus to standard subjects in standard conditions (see Choi and Fara 2012), the notions of ‘standard subjects’ and ‘standard conditions’ find little traction here given the variety of human wherefores and situations.

Whatever the makeup of the subvenient base, that around-for references supervene on physicochemical properties is generally plausible in light of the nature of the relevance Heidegger’s concept of an ‘around-for reference’ theoretically articulates. For the relevance of a physicochemical entity to a given wherefore is interpretable as a function of its ultimately physicochemically characterisable non-relational and relational properties (including its relations to subjects), as roughly formulable: necessarily, $x$ is relevant to some wherefore, $\varphi$, if and only if $x$ is such that it ought to

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280 See pp. 182-183, 184-186.
281 As Stalnaker shows, however, this does not preclude individual supervenience (1996, 238; cf. McLaughlin and Bennett 2011).
be taken into account in pursuing φ (cf. Christensen 2007, 170). Something’s being such that it ought to be taken into account is in turn analysable as its being such that it would be irrational not to (or perhaps, following Wedgwood, not to intend to) take it into account (cf. Wedgwood 2006, 137).

Varieties of relevance, as expressed by Heidegger’s examples of determinates of around-for, are in turn construable as ways entities can be such that they ought to be taken into account in pursuing a given wherefore. For example: x’s being detrimental for φ is analysable as its being such that x ought to be, say, either fought or evaded in pursuing φ. Even something’s being irrelevant, which I earlier declared a limiting case of relevance, is construable as its being such that it ought to be (say) ignored, which is correspondingly a limiting case of ‘taking something into account’.

Whilst stopping short of analysing relevance quite as I propose, Christensen nevertheless intimates that something’s relevance might be grounded in ultimately purely physicochemically properties. For he suggests that something has ‘positive relevance’ for an activity ‘in virtue of what it is, what the subject is doing and what the subject can in general do’ (2007, 170); and all three of these are arguably exhaustibly analysable in terms of something’s ultimately purely physicochemically characterisable non-relational properties (‘what it is’) and dispositional and occurrent relations to subjects (‘what the subject is doing and what the subject can in general do’). Hence, my proposed primitivist metaphysics of around-for references is construable as conceiving instantiating around-for references as rendering entities such that they ought to be taken into account in pursuing a given wherefore: with instantiating determinates of around-for rendering entities such that they ought to be taken into account in certain ways, e.g. fighting or evading, ignoring.

Physicochemical properties realise around-for references, moreover, insofar as the

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282 Heidegger characterises circumspection (Umsicht) as ‘taking account’ (Rechnung tragend) of entities in intending them as around for (um zu) wherefores (1927/2006, 81). I use the phrase in the same sense.

283 Note that this is the ‘practical or deliberative ought’ as opposed to the ‘political ought’ (see Wedgwood 2006, 132-135). That is: ‘x ought to be taken into account in pursuing φ’ does not mean that it is ‘generally desirable’ that x be taken into account in pursuing φ, but rather that some agent ought to take x into account in pursuing φ.

284 One can even ‘pursue’ showing, as the wherefore of a sign of service (dienlich) for showing (see pp. 147-148), insofar as one seeks to realise the possibility of the sign’s showing its object by letting oneself be guided by the sign towards that object.

285 See pp. 141-142, 189.
properties whose instantiation renders entities such that they ought to be taken into account in pursuing wherefores are physicochemical properties: whether non-relational or relational.

As Watkins similarly points out in connection with his analogous metaphysics of colour, however (2005, 49-50), my position does not entail that for something to instantiate an around-for reference just is for it to be such that it ought to be taken into account in pursuing some wherefore. For around-for references are not properties whose instantiation consists in something’s being such that it ought to be thus taken into account, but rather properties whose instantiation renders entities such that they ought to be thus taken into account. Hence, my position is ultimately construable as a species of role functionalism like that advocated by Jonathan Cohen in respect to colour (Cohen 2003, 2-4). For, beyond conferring the aforementioned causal powers, around-for references essentially render their instantiators such that they are relevant, i.e. ought to be taken into account, and thus are definable by their roles. I hold that around-for references are merely realised by, rather than identical with, physicochemical properties partly because the physicochemical properties ultimately rendering an entity relevant, i.e. such that it ought to be taken into account, confer causal powers beyond those recognisable as conferred by around-for references, e.g. powers to affect scientific instruments (cf. Watkins 2005, 45).

286 Compare Eike von Savigny’s illuminating presentation of the position he attributes to Wittgenstein: ‘The social embedding of expressive behaviour runs to the extent that the members of the group concerned have a certain attitude [Einstellung] in respect to the expressive behaviour and in respect to the human being who manifests it. One can express that in view of Locke, thus: that the expressive behaviour impresses them in a certain way. The impression that they receive from the expressive behaviour is caused firstly by their attitude and secondly by the internal state determining the expressive behaviour; the person is therefore, thanks to their internal state, in a mental state because this causal relationship obtains. Hence, a mental state is a capacity (that a person has thanks to their internal state) to elicit certain impressions in people with a certain attitude. Mental states can therewith be regarded as secondary qualities relative to internal states as primary qualities and relative to people with a certain attitude. (The attitude corresponds to that causal mechanism that, according to Locke, is responsible for primary qualities eliciting certain perceptual impressions in us)’ (von Savigny 1988, 16). On my position, token around-for references per se, like colours on Cohen’s position (2003), are analogous to the ‘internal states’ rather than the ‘mental states’. For they are not dispositions, but rather the bases of dispositions. Yet since around-for references are defined in terms of the dispositions they ground, they cannot be identified (qua properties) with the physicochemical properties realising them (e.g. having C-fibres firing) because these are not defined in terms of those dispositions (cf. Cohen 2003, 4).
Nevertheless, some objections arise to my partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. First, the consistency of my proposed metaphysics of around-for references with Heidegger’s position is questionable on the grounds that it ostensibly accords metaphysical priority to what Heidegger would call the ‘merely extant [Vorhandenes]’, viz. physicochemical properties, over the to-hand (Zuhandenes), viz. around-for references. For as Denis McManus has recently observed, ‘[j]ust about every commentator on Heidegger will agree, in some way or other’ with interpreting Heidegger as holding that ‘the Zuhanden is prior to, or more fundamental than, the Vorhanden’ (2012a, 69; cf. Heidegger 1927/2006, 71). On my position, by contrast, physicochemical properties are seemingly ‘prior to’ and ‘more fundamental than’ around-for references insofar as they realise them: such that the latter supervene on the former. For this effectively implies that the metaphysical role of around-for references is parasitic upon that of physicochemical properties.

In rejoinder, whilst admitting the ontic priority of instances of physicochemical properties over instances of around-for references implied by the aforesaid realisation relationship, I read Heidegger as affirming only the ontological priority of to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) over extantness (Vorhandenheit) insofar as to-hand-ness and therewith gearedness and to-hand-ness distinguish their instantiators, viz. environmental entities, such that they can instantiate properties merely extant entities cannot, viz. gear-characteristics, and thus are elevated thereover in the ‘scale of nature’. Hence, Heidegger may consistently endorse the ontic claim that “there are” to-hand entities only on the basis of extant entities’ whilst denying that ‘to-hand-ness is ontologically founded in extantness’ (1927/2006, 71). For whilst every item of gear might instantiate extantness and thereby be a physicochemical entity, that to-hand-ness is conceptually underived from (not ‘ontologically founded in’) extantness and in fact is such that its instantiators can instantiate properties merely extant entities cannot preserves to-hand-ness’s ontological priority over extantness.

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287 For the term ‘scale of nature’, synonymous with ‘chain of being’, see van der Hammen 1983, 183-184; cf. Lovejoy 1936. For Heidegger’s ontological/ontic distinction, see §1.2.1.
Second, my proposed metaphysics forestalls John Searle’s objection that, in affirming *to-hand-ness*’s priority over *extantness*, Heideggerians conflate phenomenological and metaphysical priority by according ontic priority to properties appearing as instantiated in ordinary human experience, whereof around-for references are examples, over properties recognised by physical science, e.g. having *negative charge* (Searle 2005, 325). For I follow Searle in recognising the ontic priority of physicochemical properties over around-for references by affirming that physicochemical properties *realise* around-for references. This nonetheless remains consistent with Heidegger’s famous assertion that ‘*to-hand-ness* is the ontologico-categorial determination of [gear] as it is “in itself”’ and therefore no mere ‘subjective colouring’ (emphasis removed; 1927/2006, 72). For even if *to-hand-ness* itself were, like around-for references and perhaps all gear-characteristics, realised by physicochemical properties, this would nowise diminish *to-hand-ness*’s status as a property and as such a way entities can be ‘in themselves’, in the sense that they can be genuinely to-hand, rather than a mere ‘subjective colouring’, i.e. merely a way objects can appear only secondarily and non-veridically as being (cf. von Herrmann 2005, 131-132).²⁸⁹

Furthermore, Searle’s affirmation of the *mind-dependence* of instantiation of properties he follows Dreyfus in associating with *to-hand-ness*, e.g. *being a hammer*, is plausible, because instantiation of such properties seemingly depends upon something’s being assigned a specific role, e.g. driving nails (Searle 2005, 324-345). No possible world at which no agents have ever existed contains hammers, for example, since nothing therein has been assigned the role of being used to drive nails. This does not warrant inferring the mind-dependence of instantiation of around-for references, however, since being around for (*um zu*) something consists not in possessing a socially-assigned role, but roughly in being relevant for a wherefore. Around-for references are arguably ascribable to entities even at agentless worlds inasmuch as entities therein (thanks to their instantiation of physicochemical properties) remain *such that* they ought to be taken into account in pursuing various arbitrarily specifiable wherefores and can concomitantly cause *de facto* non-existent

²⁸⁹ See pp. 168-169.
agents that might pursue those wherefores, i.e. agents pursuing those wherefores at proximate possible worlds, to enter states of bodily readiness, etc. If around-for references strongly supervene on physicochemical properties, moreover (see McLaughlin and Bennett 2011), every physicochemical-duplicate therein of something at, say, the actual world is also indiscriminable with respect to around-for references. Nevertheless, the absence of agents naturally renders ascribing around-for references to entities at agentless worlds explanatorily idle.

Third, it might be objected that my proposed metaphysics cannot accommodate something’s being around-for a single wherefore in incompatible ways. For instance: a cliff might be simultaneously both detrimental (abträglich) for a lame man’s pursuing a particular destination and handy (handlich) for a rock climber’s pursuing the very same destination. Since detrimentality seemingly excludes handiness and vice versa, the cliff instantiates incompatible properties. In rejoinder, I contend that no two agents can pursue the same wherefore; so no incompatibility can arise, since the lame man’s and rock climber’s wherefores are necessarily distinct. For though we may roughly specify their superordinate wherefores in the same way, e.g. ‘reaching that destination’, the lame man pursues his reaching that destination whilst the rock climber pursues his reaching that destination. For in accordance with his action-guidance role, mundane concern guides each subject towards realising his respective goals and furthering his respective activities. This remains consistent with mundanely concernful content’s plausibly demonstrative designation of superordinate wherefores, which excludes explicit representation of wherefores as one’s own.

For a wherefore’s not being specifically intended as involving oneself does not entail its not involving oneself. For example: though the rock climber might experience everything only in reference (Verweisung) to this wherefore, e.g. reaching the destination or striving towards that destination, he nonetheless experiences everything in reference to his reaching the destination or striving towards the

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290 See pp. 214-216.
291 ‘A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds \(w_1\) and \(w_2\) and any individuals \(x\) in \(w_1\) and \(y\) in \(w_2\), if \(x\) in \(w_1\) is \(B\)-indiscernible from \(y\) in \(w_2\), then \(x\) in \(w_1\) is \(A\)-indiscernible from \(y\) in \(w_2\)’ (Kim 1984/1993a; 1987/1993b; cf. Smith 1993, 238-239; McLaughlin and Bennett 2011).
292 See pp. 184-186.
destination, since it is precisely this that is identified demonstratively in his mundanely concernful intentional content.293

Finally, although constraints preclude a satisfactory treatment herein, a Heideggerian ecological metaphysics should also address the persistence conditions of gear. Responding to McDaniel, §2.2.2 interpreted Heidegger’s individuation passage as implying plausibly that for every item of gear, x, instantiating certain gear-characteristics and referring to co-components of a gear-whole in certain ways is necessary for being numerically the same item of gear as x. Since Heidegger intends therein solely to contrast identity conditions of gear as such with identity conditions of natural beings as such, e.g. occupying a certain spatiotemporal location, he does not specify exactly the persistence conditions of items of gear as such: that is, conditions for items of gear to remain the same items of gear. As §2.1.2 noted, however, in expounding Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, Bruin Christensen writes: ‘the individual entities seen, because seen in their relevance [for what one is doing], are seen as internally related to [the] background nexus’ (1998, 78; cf. 1997, 83-85). In other words: because components of a gear-whole appear as collectively relevant for a common wherefore in being around for (um zu) it, they appear therein as existentially dependent upon their being components of that gear-whole. The existential dependence figuring in this phenomenology implies that no component of a gear-whole could exist were it not a component of the gear-whole whereto it actually belongs. That components of gear-wholes themselves depend existentially upon being components of those particular gear-wholes is implausible, however. The architect’s pen, for example, could surely survive ceasing to be a component of the gear-whole whereto it de facto belongs. For even if the pen thereby ceased to be gear, it would still exist as a physicochemical entity and thus plausibly remain numerically the same entity. Therefore, whilst endorsing Heidegger’s position that instantiating certain gear-characteristics and referring to co-components of a gear-whole in certain ways ultimately determine identity and therewith persistence conditions of items of gear as such, I reject the stronger position implied by Christensen’s phenomenology.

293 Cf. p. 185.
In summary, this section outlines a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics of possible worlds at which mundane concern is sometimes veridical by suggesting that around-for references, as the most prominent species of Heideggerian ecological property, are realised by and thus supervene at least weakly on physicochemical properties. This position reconciles the veridicality of mundane concern with the platitude that environmental entities are physicochemical entities, which §2.2 advocated interpreting Heidegger as endorsing. Although my proposed ecological metaphysics ostensibly conflicts with Heidegger’s widely acknowledged affirmation of the priority of the to-hand (Zuhandenen) over the extant (Vorhandenen), I read Heidegger as affirming only the ontological priority of to-hand-ness over extantness, in that to-hand entities can instantiate properties merely extant entities cannot instantiate and to-hand-ness is underived from extantness, whereas I affirm only the ontic priority of the extant over the to-hand, in that physicochemical properties realise gear-characteristics.

Part 3 has developed and applied Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, as initially presented in §2.1.2, to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature: situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. I then sought to accommodate the metaphysical implications of that phenomenology’s veridicality, specifically its representing objects as instantiating around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen), suggesting that around-for references are realised by and therefore supervene at least weakly on physicochemical properties. This constitutes a partial metaphysical foundation for Heideggerian ecology, which is distinguished from Gibsonian ecology primarily through its phenomenological starting-point and methodology.
Conclusion

This thesis presents a novel interpretation of §15 of *BT*’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs), developing and applying the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and outline a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. In enabling comprehension of §15 of *BT*, the thesis also delivers a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of a being (Seienden) and conception of ontological investigations in distinction from ontic investigations. In accomplishing this, this thesis contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship in expounding anew Heidegger’s widely influential phenomenology of mundane concern and explication of the being of gear, but also to contemporary philosophy of action, cognitive science, and ecological psychology in elucidating phenomenology of unreflective action and laying metaphysical foundations of a phenomenologically-informed Heideggerian ecology in distinction from phenomenologically-naïve Gibsonian ecology.

§1.1 interpreted Heidegger as conceiving the being (Sein) or constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a regional class of entities. Heidegger’s doctrine of ‘the basic articulation of being’ implies that the being of a being divides exhaustively into a material-content and mode of being (1927/1975, 321). Though Heidegger affirms that constitutions of being exist only mind-dependently, he nevertheless holds that entities can be mind-independently such that constitutions of being are truthfully ascribable thereto. §1.2 interpreted Heidegger as distinguishing ontological investigations as yielding knowledge of properties and basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) purely *in abstracto* from ontic investigations as yielding knowledge of the actual world and elucidated Heidegger’s position on modes of access (Zugangsarten or Zugangsweisen) to beings and their being.

§2.1 expounded Heidegger’s explication of the being of gear, viz. gearedness and to-hand-ness, which comprises both a definition (Umgrenzung) of gearedness (Zeughaftigkeit), as the material-content of gear, and an exhibition (Herausstellung) of to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit), as the mode-of-being of gear. Heidegger explicates
Conclusion

the being of gear through its figuring within content of mundane concern: that is, of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective human intentional states. Heidegger posits being a component of a gear-whole (Zeugganzen) and being around for (um zu) something as independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being gear: introducing the basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) around-for (Um-zu), reference (Verweisung), and wherefore (Wozu and Wofür) to enable comprehension of these conditions. §2.2 established Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense (nature). Rejecting Kris McDaniel’s reading of Heidegger as denying that something can be both to-hand and extant simultaneously, I argued that Heidegger holds at least that something can be both to-hand and extant simultaneously and plausibly that instantiating to-hand-ness entails instantiating extantness (nature).

§3.1 developed and applied Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern, as expounded in §2.1, to explain the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. In particular, I deployed Heidegger’s position that objects appear in mundane concern as composing wholes because they appear as collectively around for (um zu) common wherefores, e.g. superordinate goals or ongoing activities, and that situational relevance essentially involves something’s referring (Verweisung) away from itself to that wherefore (wozu or wofür) it is relevant. §3.2 furnished an account of the metaphysics of around-for references, affirming their realisation by and supervenience on physicochemical properties, and distinguished the approaches of Heideggerian and Gibsonian ecology: noting that whereas Gibson takes a naïve description of perceptible macrolevel entities as his starting point, Heidegger begins from phenomenology of mundane concern. Consequently, whereas Heidegger recognises properties accessible (zugänglich) only through mundane concern, Gibson remains oblivious thereto.
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240