Residential Concentration, Ethnic Social Networks and Political Participation:
A mixed methods study of Black Africans in Britain

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD in Social Change in the Faculty of Humanities

2013

Silvia Galandini

School of Social Sciences
# Table of contents

Table of contents ............................................................................................................. 2  
List of tables ......................................................................................................................... 5  
List of figures ....................................................................................................................... 7  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 10  
Declaration .......................................................................................................................... 11  
Copyright Statement .......................................................................................................... 12  
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ 13

CHAPTER 1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 14  
  1.1 Thesis structure ............................................................................................................ 19

CHAPTER 2. Theoretical Framework and Research Questions ............................................. 20  
  2.1 Political participation as a multidimensional concept .................................................. 20  
  2.2 Residential concentration and political participation .................................................... 23  
  2.3 The effect of ethnic-based social networks on political participation ......................... 30  
  2.4 Black Africans in Britain: the role of internal diversity ............................................... 36  
  2.5 Research questions and hypotheses ............................................................................. 44

CHAPTER 3. Research Design and Methodology ................................................................. 49  
  3.1 The mixed-method approach: a complementary logic .................................................. 49  
  3.2 The quantitative enquiry .............................................................................................. 53  
      3.2.1 The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study .................................................. 53  
      3.2.2 Data analysis .......................................................................................................... 55  
      3.2.3 Measuring ‘ethnic residential concentration’ ........................................................ 56  
  3.3 The qualitative enquiry ............................................................................................... 63  
      3.3.1 The case-study approach ....................................................................................... 63  
      3.3.2 The case studies: Ghanaians and Somalis .............................................................. 64  
      3.3.3 The fieldwork context: London ............................................................................. 71  
      3.3.4 Sampling, data collection and data analysis strategies ......................................... 77
### CHAPTER 4. Residential Concentration and Political Participation ............... 83

4.1 Political participation of Black Africans: descriptive findings .................. 87
4.2 Residential concentration and political engagement: the regression model .... 93
4.3 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 107

### CHAPTER 5. Residential Concentration and Ethnic Social Networks ............. 111

5.1 Ethnic organisations .................................................................................. 114
   5.1.1 Individual participation in ethnic organisations .................................... 114
   5.1.2 The creation of ethnic organisations ..................................................... 122
   5.1.3 Function and structure of ethnic organisations ...................................... 131
5.2 Ethnic places of worship .......................................................................... 137
   5.2.1 Church and mosque: beyond worship .................................................. 140
   5.2.2 Ethnic mosques and churches: the role of ethnic clustering ................. 144
5.3 Ethnic informal networks ......................................................................... 154
   5.3.1 Ghanaians and Somalis: between fragmentation and cohesion .............. 158
   5.3.2 Spatial proximity and informal contacts with co-ethnics: a complex scenario 161
5.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 165

### CHAPTER 6. Ethnic Social Resources and Political Participation ................. 170

6.1 Ethnic organisations and political engagement ....................................... 173
   6.1.1 Ghanaian and Somali organisations: a different political role ............... 186
6.2 Ethnic places of worship: between religion and politics .......................... 191
6.3 Ethnic informal networks: discussing politics ......................................... 197
6.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 206

### CHAPTER 7. Conclusions ........................................................................... 212

7.1 Residential concentration and ethnic-based social resources .................... 214
7.2 Ethnic-based social resources and political participation ........................ 218
7.3 With a little help from my community: concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation ................................................................. 224
7.4 Residential concentration: good or bad for political participation? ............ 227
7.5 Main limitations, contributions and future research ................................. 230
References .................................................................................................................. 236

APPENDIX A. Variables coding .................................................................................. 257
APPENDIX B. Tables Chapter 5 .................................................................................... 261
APPENDIX C. Tables Chapter 6 .................................................................................... 262
APPENDIX D. Interview guide ...................................................................................... 264
APPENDIX E. Participant information sheet ................................................................. 271
APPENDIX F. Participant consent form ........................................................................ 274

Word count: 67,299
List of tables

Table 3.1: Complementary mixed-method approach .............................................52
Table 3.2: EMBES 2010 – sample size ....................................................................54
Table 3.3: EMBES 2010 cluster size (LSOA) – Black African sample ......................55
Table 3.4: Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA – summary statistics (all ethnic groups) ....57
Table 3.5: Percentage of Black Africans in LSOA – quartiles (EMBES 2010) ............60
Table 3.6: Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA – England, 2001 Census ....................60
Table 3.7: Testing the curvilinear relationship between residential concentration and the outcomes of interest (political participation and ethnic-based social networks) – Bivariate logistic regression ....................................................................................................62
Table 3.8: Ghanaian- and Somali-born living in England & Wales and London – 2001 and 2011 Census .................................................................................................72
Table 3.9: The qualitative sample - Demographic characteristics of Ghanaians and Somalis ..................................................................................................................80
Table 4.1: Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA – Quartiles for each ethnic group (EMBES 2010) ....................................................................................................................93
Table 4.2: Residential concentration and voting in general elections for Black Africans and other ethnic minority groups – logistic regression ...........................................98
Table 4.3: Residential concentration and non-electoral participation for Black Africans and other ethnic minority groups – logistic regression ...............................100
Table 4.4: Political participation and area-level deprivation (2007 IMD score) for Black Africans – bivariate logistic regression (England only) .................................104
Table 4.5: Non-electoral participation by residential concentration and area-level deprivation (Black Africans, England only) – logistic regression .........................106
Table 5.1: Residential concentration and participation in ethnic organisations – Logistic regression .....................................................................................................................118
Table 5.2: Attendance in ethnic places of worship and residential concentration – Logistic regression .............................................................................................................140
Table 5.3: Ethnic informal networks and residential concentration – Logistic regression ................................................................. 157
Table 6.1: Political participation and ethnic-based social resources – Logistic regression .................................................................................................................. 175
Table 6.2: Organisational membership and political participation, Black Africans – Crosstab (%)................................................................................................................................ 176
Table 6.3: Voter turnout and eligibility to vote – Ghanaians and Somalis (%) .................. 183
Table 6.4: Political participation and ethnic places of worship – Logistic regression..... 193
Table 6.5: Political participation and ethnic informal networks – Logistic regression ... 199
Table B.1: Ethnic-based social networks and residential concentration (full models) – Logistic regression ................................................................................................................................. 261
Table C.1: Voter turnout and ethnic social resources (full models) – logistic regression ...................................................................................................................................................... 262
Table C.2: Non-electoral participation and ethnic social resources (full models) – logistic regression........................................................................................................................................... 263
List of figures

Figure 2.1: Population change 2001–2011 by ethnic group (England and Wales) ..............38
Figure 2.2: Ethnic groups in the London region (as percentage of total population) – 2001 and 2011 Census .................................................................................................................39
Figure 2.3: Greater London – Projected Ethnic Population (2001–2031) ......................39
Figure 2.4: Main relationships addressed and hypotheses tested ..................................44
Figure 3.1: Convergent parallel mixed-method design ..................................................50
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Black Africans in LSOA – distribution (EMBES 2010) ..........58
Figure 3.3: Residential concentration (quartiles) and political participation of Black Africans (%) .....................................................................................................................................61
Figure 3.4: Residential concentration (quartiles) and ethnic-based social resources of Black Africans (%) ..................................................................................................................61
Figure 3.5: The embedded multiple-case study design ..................................................64
Figure 3.6: Residential concentration of ‘Other Central and Western Africans’ in London boroughs – 2001 Census ...........................................................................................................73
Figure 3.7: Residential concentration of Somalis in London boroughs – 2001 Census ...74
Figure 3.8: Fieldwork setting – London boroughs ..........................................................75
Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 – Hypotheses tested ....................................................................83
Figure 4.2: Voter turnout by ethnic group (%) ................................................................88
Figure 4.3: Participation in at least one non-electoral activity by ethnic group (%) ......90
Figure 4.4: Number of non-electoral activities by ethnic group (%) ............................91
Figure 4.5: Type of non-electoral participation by ethnic group (%) .............................92
Figure 4.6: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Black Africans by percentage of Black Africans in LSOA (quartiles) (%) ........................................................................94
Figure 4.7: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Caribbeans by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) .........................................................................................95
Figure 4.8: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Indians by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%) .........................................................................................95
Figure 4.9: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Pakistanis by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%) .........................................................................................96
Figure 4.10: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Bangladeshis by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%) .................................................................................. 96
Figure 4.11: Area-level deprivation by residential concentration (Black Africans, England only) – Interval plot.......................................................................................................................... 105
Figure 4.12: Residential concentration and political participation – hypotheses tested . 107
Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 – Hypotheses tested.............................................................................. 111
Figure 5.2: Participation in ethnic organisations – Black Africans (%)................................. 115
Figure 5.3: Participation in voluntary organisations by ethnic group (%) ............................ 116
Figure 5.4: Participation in ethnic organisations by residential concentration – Interval plot.......................................................................................................................... 117
Figure 5.5: Somali organisations and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 124
Figure 5.6: Ghanaian organisations and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 125
Figure 5.7: Somali organisations and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 126
Figure 5.8: Ghanaian organisations and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 126
Figure 5.9: Attendance in ethnic places of worship – Black Africans (%) ......................... 137
Figure 5.10: Attendance in places of worship by ethnic group (%) ................................. 138
Figure 5.11: Attendance in ethnic places of worship by residential concentration – Interval plot.......................................................................................................................... 139
Figure 5.12: Christian denominations amongst Ghanaians (%) ..................................... 141
Figure 5.13: Somali mosques and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 145
Figure 5.14: Ghanaian churches and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 146
Figure 5.15: Somali mosques and residential concentration London – Local authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 147
Figure 5.16: Ghanaian churches and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011 ................................................................................................. 147
Figure 5.17: Attendance in ethnic places of worship – Somalis and Ghanaians, Christians and Muslims (%)......................................................... 153
Figure 5.18: Ethnic informal networks by ethnic group (%).......................... 155
Figure 5.19: Ethnic informal networks by residential concentration¹ – Interval plot (mean – 90% confidence intervals)......................................................... 156
Figure 5.20: Ethnic informal networks – Somalis and Ghanaians (%).......... 158
Figure 5.21: Residential concentration and ethnic social networks – hypotheses tested 166
Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 – Hypotheses tested.................................................. 170
Figure 6.2: Voter turnout by participation in ethnic organisations among Black Africans – Interval plot.......................................................... 174
Figure 6.3: Non-electoral engagement by Participation in ethnic organisations among Black Africans – Interval plot................................................. 174
Figure 6.4: Voter turnout by attendance in ethnic places of worship among Black Africans – Interval plot......................................................... 192
Figure 6.5: Non-electoral engagement by attendance in ethnic places of worship among Black Africans – Interval plot................................................. 192
Figure 6.6: Voter turnout by ethnic informal networks among Black Africans – Interval plot.......................................................... 198
Figure 6.7: Non-electoral engagement by ethnic informal networks among Black Africans – Interval plot......................................................... 198
Figure 6.8: Interest in British politics by interest in home-country politics amongst Ghanaians, Somalis and Black Africans – Interval plot............................. 205
Figure 6.9: Ethnic social resources and political participation – hypotheses tested........ 207
Figure 7.1: The main relationships of interest ............................................. 213
Figure 7.2: The link between residential concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation – final results....................................................... 224
Abstract

Silvia Galandini
University of Manchester
PhD Social Change
30th September 2013

Residential Concentration, Ethnic Social Networks and Political Participation: A mixed methods study of Black Africans in Britain

The impact of ethnic residential concentration on the process of integration of ethnic minorities into the mainstream society has been increasingly debated among both scholars and policy makers across Europe. This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate by addressing the effect of ethnic residential concentration on the political participation of Black Africans in Britain. The study pursues three main objectives: investigating the marginalising or mobilising impact of co-ethnic residential concentration on political participation; disentangling the processes underpinning this relationship by focusing on the effect of ethnic-based social networks, represented here by voluntary organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks; exploring the influence of the immigration-related heterogeneity that characterises the Black African community on the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social networks and political participation. A mixed-method approach is adopted. The quantitative enquiry focuses on the Black African community as a whole and relies on secondary data drawn from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Electoral Survey. The qualitative enquiry is based on primary data collected through face-to-face interviews and participant observation among Ghanaians and Somalis in London.

The quantitative analysis shows that, among Black Africans, residential concentration has a mobilising effect on voter turnout but a marginalising effect on non-electoral participation. Ethnic social networks do not seem to mediate this relationship. Residential concentration is significantly, and positively, correlated to individual participation in ethnic places of worship and embeddedness in ethnic informal networks but not to involvement in ethnic organisations. In turn, the latter positively influences non-electoral engagement whereas ethnic places of worship and informal networks are not related to political engagement. The qualitative findings suggest that residential concentration is more relevant for the creation of and participation in ethnic organisations among Somalis than among Ghanaians. However, this relationship is likely to be influenced by other contextual factors such as institutional support, ethnic diversity and tribal homogeneity. Somali organisations also seem to play a more active political role than Ghanaian groups with regard to both electoral and non-electoral engagement. The two communities appear to be more similar when considering the relationship between ethnic religious institutions and informal connections with co-ethnics. These networks are not necessarily dependent on ethnic residential clustering and their effect on political engagement is primarily linked to informal political discussion. Overall, the results suggest that the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social networks and political participation of Black Africans varies considerably between the two national groups researched, primarily due to their immigration-related characteristics, as well as across modes of political engagement (i.e. electoral, non-electoral) and local contexts.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Copyright Statement

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual-property.pdf), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on presentation of Theses.
Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the funding received from the Philip and Ruth Davidson Prize Doctoral Scholarship which has allowed me to undertake this research.

I am sincerely grateful to my supervisors Prof Edward Fieldhouse and Dr David Cutts for all the guidance and encouragement they gave me at all stages of this PhD.

I would like to thank my examiners, Prof Anthony Heath and Prof Mary Waters, who provided encouraging and detailed feedbacks and suggestions.

This study would not have been possible without all the people I met, worked with and interviewed in London. I owe them a huge debt for their time and effort, for sharing with me their unique stories and for making me part of their lives.

I also would like to thank Dr Vanessa May for her invaluable advice and contribution to the mixed-method approach. Great thanks to Punita Chowbey, Mubarak M. Ismail, James Camp for their guidance and help with the fieldwork.

I would like to thank the staff and students at the Institute for Social Change for providing a rich and stimulating environment to explore new ideas. Thank you in particular to Prof Rachel Gibson and Dr Siobhan McAndrew.

Thank you to all my friends for being always helpful in numerous ways – thank you to Dr Benjamin Lee, Lee Bentley, Cheryl Anderson, Verena Wisthaler, and Nancy White. Many thanks to Dr Laurence Lessard-Phillips for her feedbacks and continued encouragement. A very special thank you to Dr Marta Cantijoch for her sincere friendship, enormous help and support.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Emanuela and Nelso, for believing in me and my husband Clarence who, with his unconditional love, has given and continues to give me the courage to pursue my dreams.
CHAPTER 1. Introduction

In recent years, the increasing streams of international migration have inevitably contributed to the rise of more diverse societies across Europe. Such diversity has arisen not only from the ethnic and racial heterogeneity naturally stemming from migrations, but also from the multiplicity of demographic and cultural profiles, trajectories of socio-economic integration, legal status and residential patterns that characterise the various ethnic groups. With regard to Britain, where the minority ethnic population has increased from 3 to 4.6 million between 1991 and 2001, Vertovec (2007) has devised the term ‘super-diversity’ in order to describe this complex mosaic of socio-cultural, political and economical factors underpinning the recent arrival of ‘new immigrants’ who have joined the already established ethnic communities (Ray et al., 2008). The demographic, socio-economic and political changes produced by this growing heterogeneity have led to an intense debate within both academic and public policy discourses about, on the one hand, the approach European democracies should be adopting in order to integrate ethnic minority groups in the socio-political, cultural and economic mainstream and, on the other, the results achieved by the integration models developed and supported so far.

In this framework, ethnic residential patterns have become an increasingly relevant issue. Drawing from the scholarly American tradition which sees ethnic concentration as a proxy for the social distance from the societal mainstream (Park and Burgess, 1921; Wirth and Reiss, 1964; Gordon, 1964), both political and academic discourses in Europe have begun to emphasise the close relationship between the phenomenon of ethnic urban enclaves and the achievement of satisfactory levels of socio-economic inclusion of ethnic minorities.

In Britain the debate about the status of race relations, ethnic diversity and integration primarily stemmed from the 2001 race riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnley, as well as from the London bombings in 2005. These events represented a crucial turning point for the country and its commitment to embracing a multicultural perspective and supporting ethno-cultural and religious diversity. In 2005, Trevor
Phillips, chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, suggested that the emphasis on preserving cultural heterogeneity that had characterised the British race relations policies, particularly since the 1960s, has hindered the support to a common identity and shared values that can ‘build bridges’ between ethnic minorities and the host society. Phillips argued that the tendency to underline differences and underestimate the importance of unity has ultimately supported “the effective isolation of communities, in which some people think special separate values ought to apply” (Phillips, 2005: 'The British Balance', para. 3). What made Phillips’s speech particularly relevant in the debate over ethnic diversity and integration was the claim that this lack of homogeneity and unity is physically represented by the increase in ‘residential segregation’ and even the existence of ‘ghettos’ similar to those that can be found in the United States. Similar arguments were brought forward by the Prime Minister David Cameron in a recent speech about radicalism and Islamic extremism: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” (Cameron, 2011: para. 8).

Ethnic residential concentration has therefore become a highly sensitive and politicised matter and the intense discussion amongst both scholars and policymakers has primarily concentrated on the extent of ethnic segregation in Britain, particularly with regard to the presence of America-style ghettos (Johnston et al., 2002a, 2002b; Johnston et al., 2004, 2007; Poulsen et al., 2001; Peach, 2007, 1996). It has also examined the benefits and drawbacks of ethnic enclaves concerning the various aspects of the process of minorities’ integration and social cohesion.

With regard to the process of political integration, scholars have lent support to two competing hypotheses about the desirability of encouraging co-ethnic residential concentration (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b). On the one hand, the marginalising hypothesis argues that spatial clustering is detrimental to the integration of ethnic minorities in the political, but also socio-economic and cultural, mainstream. In particular, the concentration in highly deprived areas, along with the reduced contacts with the host society and the enhancement of in-group cohesion and solidarity, do generate unfavourable conditions for political inclusion (Massey and Denton, 1993, 1989; Schonwalder, 2007). On the other hand, the mobilising hypothesis points out the
benefits and opportunities produced by ethnic density. Living in close contact with co-ethnics strengthens groups consciousness, increases the chance for ethnic leaders and candidates to emerge and cooperate with mainstream political actors (e.g. political parties and candidates) in order to mobilise community members, and also reinforces ethnic-based formal and informal social networks that can become resources for political integration (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Leighley, 2001; Bilodeau, 2009; Alesina and Ferrara, 2000).

The hypotheses about the processes that underpin the positive or negative effect of residential concentration are mainly rooted in scholars’ speculations based on traditional theories that identify politically relevant resources which might play a mediating role in the relationship (e.g. group consciousness, bonding social capital, mobilisation). Nonetheless, this aspect has been rarely tested empirically. Ethnic-based social networks – social connections created amongst co-ethnics (Putnam, 2000) – appear to be a valuable starting point for this investigation. First of all, ethnic enclaves have traditionally been described as the natural environment for the creation and development of these ethnic-specific networks (Zhou, 2005). Moreover, bonding and exclusive social connections have been linked to both negative and positive effects on political engagement, exactly as for ethnic enclaves. The main arguments for the negative hypothesis are based on the idea of ethnic social resources limiting the contacts between minority and majority groups and hence hindering the process of integration and the acquisition of politically relevant resources (Uslaner and Conley, 2003). On the contrary, the positive effect should be derived from the general benefits of social connectedness, regardless of its ethnic nature (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Leighley, 2001; Bloemraad, 2006b; Maxwell, 2012; Lane, 1959) as well as from the reinforcement of ethnic-specific resources (e.g. group consciousness and ethnic leaders) (Schlichting et al., 1998; Miller et al., 1981; Tate, 1991; Calhoun-Brown, 1996).

The focus on the Black African community enriches the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, the Black African community in Britain is considerably under-researched compared to the Caribbean and Asian communities, despite the remarkable growth of this community since 1991 (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010). Due to this increase, Black Africans are likely to become an economically, socially and politically relevant
community in the near future. Therefore, the factors influencing their political mobilisation should be investigated. Secondly, the notable internal heterogeneity that characterises the Black African category, primarily due to the numerous national groups that make up the community, enables the research to investigate the relationship between co-ethnic concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation in the light of extremely divergent immigration histories, socio-cultural and religious background, and integration experiences. The attention paid to this heterogeneity is aimed at deconstructing the notion of political integration as a homogeneous and straightforward process and at providing a detailed account of the political implications of ethnic residential concentration.

Some relevant gaps in the body of knowledge about the relationship between residential concentration and political participation can be identified. First of all, there has been relatively little research amongst British scholars about the political implications of co-ethnic residential concentration (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b). Moreover, little attention has been paid to the processes that mediate this relationship and further research is needed to shed light on the underpinning dynamics that are activated by ethnic density and which affect political engagement of ethnic minorities (Bilodeau, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008b). The ethnic social capital model, which has growingly attracted the scholarly interest, appears to be a solid starting point to test the possible ‘missing link’ between ethnic concentration and political participation. However, the existing literature generally addresses only one specific form of ethnic-based connection (predominantly ethnic organisations) whereas this study will address three different, although intertwined, networks: ethnic organisations, ethnic places of worship and ethnic informal networks. Last but not least, the lack of research about Black Africans and their political participation in the light of differences across African national groups is addressed by this study.

The present study aims to fill these gaps by testing both the marginalising and mobilising hypotheses that link residential concentration to political engagement, on the one hand, and by investigating the mediating impact of ethnic-based social resources.
More specifically, the study intends to:

- investigate the impact of co-ethnic residential concentration on political participation;
- disentangle the processes underpinning this relationship by focusing on the effects of ethnic-based social networks, represented here by ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks;
- explore the influence of the immigration-related heterogeneity that characterises the Black African community on the relationship between co-ethnic concentration, ethnic-based networks and political participation.

The research adopts a mixed-method approach, comprising qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. The quantitative enquiry is based on analysis of secondary data drawn from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey. The focus of the quantitative analysis is the Black African community as a whole, due to the insufficient sample of Ghanaian and Somali nationals available in the data. The qualitative enquiry involves the collection of primary data through face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and participant observations. The fieldwork focuses on two African national groups presenting divergent immigration histories, integration experiences and socio-cultural backgrounds: Ghanaians and Somalis. The fieldwork was carried out in the boroughs of North and East London where the two communities are concentrated (2001 Census). Rather than pursuing triangulation and convergence, this mixed-method design aims to generate a detailed, in-depth and articulated account of the relationships of interest by capturing them from different perspectives. This complementarity logic is aimed at emphasising the strengths and overcome the weaknesses of each methods in order to “give a better sense of the whole” (Mason, 2006b: 6).
1.1 Thesis structure

The thesis has seven chapters. Chapter 2 defines the theoretical framework of the study. In particular, it provides a definition of political engagement as a multidimensional concept; reviews the argument in favour of the mobilising and marginalising effects of residential concentration on political participation; clarifies the role played by ethnic social networks in hindering or fostering political mobilisation; and describes the Black African community in the UK. Finally, the chapter outlines the research objective, questions and hypotheses.

Chapter 3 explains the aims of the mixed-method approach, as well as providing a detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative enquiries (i.e. methods of data collection and analysis, sampling strategies, description of secondary data, case studies and the fieldwork context).

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. It addresses the direct relationship between residential concentration and political participation by presenting the findings of the quantitative analysis referred to Black Africans as whole, as well as four other ethnic groups (Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi).

Chapter 5 explores the impact of ethnic concentration on ethnic social resources through both quantitative (Black Africans) and qualitative (Somali and Ghanaians) enquiries. It also provides valuable insights of how the two African national communities develop their formal and informal social connections and the main functions served by these ethnic networks.

Chapter 6 investigates the effect of ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal networks on political participation through both qualitative and quantitative data, as for the previous chapter. Furthermore, the qualitative enquiry highlights the ways in which Somalis and Ghanaians perceive and participate in politics.

Finally, Chapter 7 summarises and discusses the main findings in relation to the three relationships of interest. It finally reflects on the main limitations and contributions of the study, as well as on the opportunities for future research.
CHAPTER 2. Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

This chapter presents the theoretical background that guides the research. Section 2.1 defines the notion of political participation (i.e. the main outcome variable) and points out its multidimensional and complex nature. Section 2.2 concentrates on competing hypotheses about the mobilising and marginalising impact of residential concentration on political participation of ethnic minorities. Section 2.3 focuses on the impact of ethnic-based social networks on political participation. Section 2.4 provides a description of the Black African community in Britain and highlights its internal heterogeneity. Finally, the research aims, research question and hypotheses are stated in Section 2.5.

2.1 Political participation as a multidimensional concept

Political participation is the main outcome of this study. Therefore, it is important to define which activities are addressed as political engagement.

The present study embraces the idea of political participation as a multidimensional and complex phenomenon entailing modes of engagement that go ‘beyond the ballot’. Whereas the early research about political participation focused exclusively on traditional forms of participation such as voter turnout, campaign activities and party membership (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), since the 1970s scholars have progressively expanded the scope of the definition of political participation (Teorell et al., 2007; Van Deth, 2001; Verba and Nie, 1972). In particular, scholars have developed a variety of more extensive definitions stemming from the idea that politics does not merely refer to the selection and action of governments, but also and more generally to the “authoritative allocation of values” (Teorell et al., 2007: 336; Brady, 1999: 738). Rosenston and Hansen (1993: 4) defined political participation as “an action directed explicitly toward influencing the distribution of social goods and social values”, and Brady (1999: 737) suggested that it represents an “action by ordinary citizens directed
toward influencing some political outcomes”. Based on these definitions of the aims pursued by political participation, the repertoire of political actions has been broadened to incorporate activities such as attending demonstrations and strikes, signing petitions, engaging in political consumerism (i.e. boycotting and boycotting goods and services), being involved in advocacy groups (i.e. civic participation) or taking part in violent or illegal protests (e.g. occupying buildings) (see also Van Deth, 2001: 15).

Marsh and Kaase (1979) grouped the modes of political participation into ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’, whereas Teorell et al. (2007) suggested a classification into ‘representational’ and ‘extra-representational’ activities based on the channels of expression used and the mechanism of influence exerted. More generally, the different dimensions of political participation are referred to as ‘electoral’ and ‘non-electoral’ engagement.

The inclusion of both modes of participation in this study is, first of all, related to the specific focus on the political effect of residential concentration, which can be considered as a contextual factor, a specific characteristic of the environment in which individuals are embedded. Previous literature exploring the extent to which neighbourhoods affect political engagement argued that political activities that are performed by individuals alone (e.g. voting) are less likely to be affected by contextual factors, such as residential concentration, than those performed collectively (e.g. donating money) (Giles and Dantico, 1982; Huckfeldt, 1979). This argument, however, was challenged by scholars claiming that even activities that are performed individually can be affected by the local context and be socially determined as much as activities that would be classified as ‘social’ (Kenny, 1992; Pattie and Johnston, 2000). The inclusion of a wider range of political activities in the analysis provides a valuable opportunity to capture the effect of ethnic residential concentration on different modes of participation.

1 Huckfeldt (1979) as well as Giles and Dantico (1982) did not explicitly refer to the distinction between electoral and non-electoral participation when exploring neighbourhood effects. Individual activities included voting; sending messages to political leaders; sending letters to newspapers and magazines; wearing campaign buttons or stickers. Social activities included active campaigning; attending political meetings, rallies or dinners; working for parties or candidates; joining or donating money to political parties; joining community groups. Despite this focus on electoral or more conventional modes of participation, it is possible to see how, in this framework, voter turnout is clearly defined as an ‘individual activity’. Other forms of participation such as rallies or donating money to political causes, which are generally referred to part of non-electoral engagement, are described as ‘social activities’.
This would in turn help shed some light on the extent to which neighbourhood effects emerge even when addressing activities traditionally recognised as ‘individual’, such as voter turnout.

The analysis of different dimensions of political participation is also important when addressing an ethnic minority group such as Black Africans. More recent or non-Commonwealth immigrants in the UK would be less likely to be entitled to vote than long-established individuals who have acquired British citizenship and those who have migrated from Commonwealth countries. Scholars have highlighted the need to research the involvement in non-electoral political activities in order to take into account immigrants who are formally excluded from the electoral domain as they are not entitled to register and vote (Lien, 1994; Eggert and Giugni, 2011; De La Garza R. and Desipio, 1994). The evidence provided by previous literature about the remarkably low level of electoral registration amongst Black Africans in the UK makes the inclusion of non-electoral participation even more cogent (Electoral Commission, 2005).

Furthermore, different forms of political involvement may be influenced in different ways by the resources available within ethnic communities (Wong et al., 2005). For instance, a growing amount of literature has shed light on the significant variations in the effect produced by ethnic associations on political participation when taking into consideration both electoral and non-electoral engagement (Togeby, 2004) or even political attitudes, such as political interest (Berger et al., 2004). Religious institutions were also found to influence protest activities of Muslim migrants more than their overall political participation (Eggert and Giugni, 2011). More generally, by broadening the analysis to include electoral and non-electoral participation, it would be possible to test whether different resources, both at the community and individual level, have different impacts on these modes of engagement (Verba et al., 1995).

Political participation is a multidimensional construct not only because of the existence of different modes of engagement. When investigating ethnic minorities, a second element of complexity is represented by the involvement in political activities that
target homeland politics (i.e. ‘transnationalism’\(^2\)) or ethnic-related issues rather than host-country politics or more general ‘mainstream’ issues (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Morales and Morariu, 2011; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Seo, 2011). The debate about the relationship between these transnational and ethnic-based practices and the process of political integration in the host-country is still ongoing. Whereas some scholars argue that this mode of participation is likely to spill over into a more active involvement in the mainstream society (Morales and Morariu, 2011; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003), other scholars claim that it significantly hinders the ability of ethnic minorities to become part of the political mainstream (Berger et al., 2004; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Although the study will not directly and extensively address the relationship between home- and host-country politics, these components of immigrant political participation may emerge in the study of Black Africans and therefore ought to be acknowledged.

2.2 Residential concentration and political participation

The impact of residential patterns of ethnic minorities has long been studied with regard to various aspects of the integration process such as health and well-being (Karlsen et al., 2002; Stafford et al., 2009), employment, social mobility and educational attainments (Lin, 2000; Zhou, 2005, 2009). In the UK, the scholarly interest about the relationship between ‘ethnic density’, i.e. the percentage of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood,\(^3\) and

\(^2\) The phenomenon of transnationalism has been increasingly researched as a consequence of the increase in the number of international migrants, as well as their willingness to maintain strong connections with the country of origin not only in the political sphere, but also in a wider range of economic, cultural and social domains (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Glick Schiller N. and Fouron, 1999; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007; Vertovec, 2003). In particular, the scholarly debate has focused on the conditions that generate this phenomenon, but more importantly its consequences on the process of integration within the country of residence (Portes, 1999; Portes et al., 1999).

\(^3\) The study concentrates on the effect of ‘ethnic density’ rather than the construct of ‘segregation’. The latter refers to the level of residential concentration but also to other measures of contact and separation between majority and minority groups (Peach, 1996; Finney and Simpson, 2009). Segregation is generally linked to negative processes of alienation and discrimination. As this study aims at exploring the potentially mobilising and marginalising forces at play in ethnic enclaves, the term ‘concentration’ has been preferred over ‘segregation’. That being said, it is important to notice that the great bulk of the literature that this study draws on refers to the concept and construct of segregation.
political participation has emerged in more recent years (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b).

The study of neighbourhood ethnic composition is rooted in the general idea that political participation is influenced not only by individual characteristics (e.g. socio-economic status, gender or age) but also by contextual factors (Putnam, 1966; Leighley, 2001: 5-6, 1995; Przeworski, 1974). Huckfeldt (1979: 579) suggests that political engagement “seldom occurs in individual isolation”, as it is determined by social stimuli and also often performed as a collective action. This ‘social’ nature of political participation is relevant when concentrating on ethnic minorities. Some scholars have recently argued that the process of political incorporation is closely related to contextual and community-level factors in particular when politically relevant resources at the individual level are scarce, as in the case of ethnic minorities (Bloemraad, 2006b; Maxwell, 2012; Tate, 1991).

The arguments and evidence that have been presented by scholars about the effect of ethnic residential concentration on political participation was framed by Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008a, 2008b) in terms of a dichotomous debate between two competing hypotheses. On one side, the ‘marginalising hypothesis’ suggests that residential concentration leads to lower levels of political engagement. On the other side, the ‘mobilising hypothesis’ refers to the possibility that by living together, ethnic minorities are likely to develop resources that can benefit political participation. Whereas Fieldhouse and Cutts concentrated on electoral registration and voter turnout, this study adopts the competing hypotheses framework and extends it to a wider range of political activities.

The marginalising hypothesis primarily refers to the traditional assimilationist paradigm that sees ethnic residential concentration as a proxy for the lack of integration and the social distance between ethnic minorities and the mainstream society (Park and Burgess, 1921; Wirth and Reiss, 1964; Gordon, 1964). As stated by Phillips (2007: 1150): “Levels of minority ethnic segregation are often regarded as a lens through which to measure a country’s progress towards an integrated and stable society”. Massey and Denton (1989: 373) argue that ethnic segregation is “problematic because it isolates a
minority group from amenities, opportunities, and resources that affect social and economic well-being”. 4 This is particularly true in the case of African Americans, whose level of segregation, according to Massey and Denton, is so extreme it is to be defined as ‘multidimensional hypersegregation’ (Massey and Denton, 1993, 1989). The negative impact of segregation primarily derived by its ability to maintain, reproduce and hence exacerbate “the spatial concentration of poverty” (Massey, 2004: 16). Poor and racially concentrated neighbourhoods in turn expose individuals to social issues, such as high crime rates and family instability, as well as welfare dependency, low educational achievements and detrimental health outcomes (Massey, 2004). What is even more important for political engagement is that individuals who live in highly concentrated neighbourhoods are more likely to be characterised by low socio-economic status in terms of educational and professional achievements, income and employment status. The lack of these resources is traditionally linked to lower levels of political engagement (Verba et al., 1995; Huckfeldt, 1979).

Furthermore, it has been argued that contextual poverty (i.e. neighbourhood deprivation) in ethnic enclaves socially isolates and alienates minorities, hence negatively affecting political psychological resources, i.e. political trust and efficacy (Cohen and Dawson, 1993). Both poverty at the area-level and scarce socio-economic resources at the individual level lead to the detrimental effect of ethnic enclaves on political engagement. Therefore, what seems to count the most is the close and almost inevitable correlation between ethnic concentration and deprivation. The latter appears to be the main culprit for the lower levels of political engagement. It is important to note that the literature presented so far primarily refers to the case of the African American community whose experience of residential segregation and socio-economic isolation cannot be simply applied to the European context. Nonetheless, it has been found that ethnic minorities in the UK tend to concentrate in the most deprived areas and this may give a strong case to the marginalising hypothesis (Phillips, 1997). Some evidence

4 Massey and Denton (1989: 374-376) proposed a more complex measurement of segregation which goes beyond the percentage of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood. The scholars suggested five indices capturing different dimensions of segregation: evenness, proportion of minorities that would have to disperse to achieve an even distribution (i.e. index of dissimilarity); exposure, the degree of potential contact between majority and minority groups; clustering, proximity of minority areas; concentration, relative amount of space occupied by minorities (neighbourhoods).
supporting the claim of the detrimental effect of contextual poverty in ethnically homogenous areas was presented, for instance, by Maxwell (2008) with regard to political participation of non-European migrants in France.

The disengagement of segregated minorities is not only due to economic inequalities but also by social isolation from the mainstream. As the contacts with the mainstream population are limited and hampered by spatial concentration, the opportunities for social and political inclusion in the host-country available to ethnic minorities are dramatically reduced (Massey and Denton, 1993; Cohen and Dawson, 1993). This argument was also supported by the social capital theory. In this framework, social connections created amongst co-ethnics are generally referred to as ‘bonding social capital’. This term was devised by Robert Putnam (2000) to describe strong, inward-looking ties between homogenous groups. On the contrary, ‘bridging social capital’ represents outward-looking networks encompassing “people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam, 2000: 22). The latter is considered to be more desirable for political engagement and more generally for the quality and strength of democracy. Cross-cutting networks indeed facilitate the creation of wider and more generalised trust that nourishes the sense of civicity and social cohesion which spills over into political trust and, ultimately, into heightened political and civic engagement (Putnam et al., 1993). Ethnic residential concentration is expected to negatively impact on political participation of ethnic minorities insofar as it supports the preservation of bonding social capital. As a consequence, it facilitates social isolation, out-group hostilities and in-group loyalty. Furthermore, it has been claimed that ethnic-based social networks developed along ethnic enclaves encourage a more active engagement in homeland politics and ethnic-specific political issues rather than supporting a more general involvement in host-country political matters. According to some scholars, this ‘political transnationalism’ represents a ‘distraction’ from the process of political incorporation (Morales and Morariu, 2011; Seo, 2011).

The positive effect of geographical concentration, in contrast, has been argued with reference to voter turnout and electoral registration (Anwar, 2001; Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Bilodeau, 2009; Schlichting et al., 1998; Leighley, 2001), political integration (Maxwell, 2008) as well as civic engagement (Alesina and
Various arguments have been presented in support of the mobilising hypothesis. First of all, the residential proximity with co-ethnics is deemed to reinforce group consciousness (Schlichting et al., 1998; Huckfeldt, 1986, 1983; Guterbock and London, 1983). This is defined by Miller et al. (1981: 495) as a form of identification implying “a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests”. Richard Shingles (1981) argues that higher self-esteem and cynicism towards the system nourished by group consciousness reinforce political efficacy and mistrust, which, in turn, favour “high-initiative, conventional policy behaviour for otherwise unmotivated citizens” (Shingles, 1981: 81). Whereas some studies have confirmed the tendency of individuals expressing high group consciousness to be more engaged in political activities (Stokes, 2003; Wilcox and Gomez, 1990; Guterbock and London, 1983; Quintelier, 2009; Olsen, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972), further research has highlighted that the validity of this theory varies remarkably across ethnic groups (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Klobus-Edwards et al., 1978; Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Marschall, 2001; Lien, 1994; Jackson, 1987; Verba et al., 1993; Tate, 1991, 1993; Cohen and Kapsis, 1978).

Residential concentration has also been linked to two other phenomena that are generally described as strong predictors of ethnic participation: the emergence of ethnic candidates and the process of political mobilisation activated by mainstream political elites (Uhlane et al., 1989; Leighley, 2001; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Predelli, 2008; 5

---

5 The first formal articulation of this theory was presented by Olsen (1970), who found that African Americans who “identify as members of an ethnic community” (Olsen, 1970: 695) are more active in both civic and political engagement than non-identifiers. Verba and Nie (1972) also found that Blacks who mentioned race more than once proved to be more likely to participate than the average White, even after controlling for the socio-economic status. Miller et al. (1981) devised a much more clear and complex definition of group consciousness, going beyond the simple identification with a specific ethnic community and distinguished between the concepts of group membership, identification and consciousness (see also Jackman and Jackman, 1973; Conover, 1984; Mclain et al., 2009; Gurin et al., 1980; Campbell et al., 1954; Brown, 1931).

6 Richard Shingles referred to Gamson’s (1968) claim that mistrust represents the rationale for political action, while a strong sense of efficacy provides the optimal confidence to actually take action. In this perspective, the combination of low political trust and high political efficacy is the most effective in order to support participation. Shingles argued that the system-blame process implied by group consciousness does allow individuals within the Black community to “acquire a healthier, improved self-image along with a more critical, cynical view of the system” (Shingles, 1981: 78). The approach proposed by Shingles was also adopted by Klobus-Edwards et al. (1978) and Guterbock and London (1983).
Anwar, 1991). According to the traditional empowerment theory\(^7\), the achievement of representation in the political arena encourages the political involvement of ethnic minorities in two ways: directly through the mobilising actions of ethnic candidates and indirectly by reinforcing political trust and efficacy as well as improving political attentiveness (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Tate, 1991, 1993). With regard to political mobilisation, mainstream political elites may be more prone to engaging in mobilising actions when ethnic communities are more concentrated for two reasons. Firstly, communities become more visible and therefore more politically relevant for parties and candidates who would then be more likely to invest a greater number of resources in mobilising the specific group (Leighley, 2001).\(^8\) Secondly, spatial proximity facilitates the emergence of ethnic leaders. The latter have been identified as crucial political actors (Uhlaner et al., 1989; Bloemraad, 2006a; Anwar, 1991) who can liaise with mainstream political elites in order to pursue what Uhlaner (1989) defines as ‘relational goods’. According to Uhlaner, political participation is determined by an intense interplay between political candidates and community leaders. The former aim at winning electoral competitions and the latter is interested in achieving the implementation of policies favourable to the community. These interests are channelled into a mutually supportive relationship between the two actors which generally culminates in mobilising actions carried out by ethnic leaders.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) Bobo and Gilliam (1990: 378) defined the concept of ‘political empowerment’ as “the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making”. Their study of the African-Americans’ socio-political involvement shed light on the positive impact of black political empowerment. Individuals living in high-black-empowerment areas were indeed found to be more likely to engage socially and politically than Blacks living in low-empowerment areas as well as Whites, after controlling for socio-economic status.

\(^8\) Hill and Leighley (1999) also suggested that ethnic homogeneity strengthens mobilising institutions, such as party competitiveness, partisan ideology and ease of voter registration requirements, which are on the contrary weakened by ethnic diversity.

\(^9\) Uhlaner argued that the mobilising strategies actuated by community leaders are primarily rooted in the idea of ‘relation goods’. In order to galvanise group members into voting and hence enable the trade with candidates, leaders can appeal to people’s desire for inclusion and the idea that, within the group, political action represents an ‘entry tickets’ for those who want to be included. The success of mobilising actions depends on the leaders’ ability to persuade community members that everybody in the group will act in the same way and by underlying the importance of group solidarity and unity to make this action beneficial. In Uhlaner’s words: “Leaders can increase participation to the extent that can convey the message that their group’s identity is politically important, that the group’s action is crucial for achieving an important outcome” (Uhlaner, 1989: 279).
The mobilising resources highlighted so far (i.e. group consciousness, ethnic leaders, political mobilisation) are in most cases rooted in the existence of strong ethnic-based social networks nourished by ethnic enclaves (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001: 64-65). The latter are traditionally described as the natural environment for the flourishing of ethnic-specific institutions and informal connections. In the arguments supporting the marginalising hypothesis, these ‘bonding’, inward-looking constructs are linked to processes of socio-economic isolation and political disengagement. In sharp contrast, the claims in favour of a mobilising effect of residential concentration emphasise the ability of ethnic-based social networks to represent a resource for ethnic minorities (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Cattacin, 2009). This is the case, for example, of ethnic religious institutions and ethnic organisations which have been found to reinforce, among others, group consciousness (Tate, 1991), social trust (Fennema and Tillie, 2001, 1999) and political mobilisation (Maxwell, 2012; Bloemraad, 2006a). In his study of Caribbeans and South Asians communities in the UK, Maxwell (2012) argues that the development of strong group-based resources significantly supports the political mobilisation of ethnic communities and although more segregated groups are less socially integrated, their ‘bonding’ resources make them more politically influential and active. To some extent, residential concentration and ethnic ties emerge as a ‘positive side-effect’ of a more generally negative phenomenon of socio-economic isolation and social separation between minority and majority ethnic groups, which is physically represented by ethnic enclaves.

This literature review has shown that residential concentration has been associated with political participation of ethnic minorities both as a negative constraint and a positive resource. However, far too little attention has been paid to the processes that lie beneath this relationship. Scholars have presented various explanations in support of both the mobilising and marginalising hypotheses, but they have not attempted to empirically investigate their relative or individual strength (Bilodeau, 2009). In this regard, ethnic-based social networks provide a valuable point of reference in the study of the ‘missing link’ between residential concentration and political participation as they are associated with both political marginalisation and mobilisation. The following section
(2.3) clarifies which ethnic social networks are considered by the study and how they have been found to influence political participation.

### 2.3 The effect of ethnic-based social networks on political participation

Previous literature has described social connectedness as a means to nourish individual political involvement (Lane, 1959: 187-202; Leighley, 1990). In particular, scholars have focused on the role of three main social networks: voluntary associations (Verba et al., 1995; Cassel, 1999; Olsen, 1972; Verba et al., 1993; Newton, 1997; Leighley, 1996; Teorell, 2003; Verba and Nie, 1972; Ayala, 2000; Salway et al.); religious institutions (Peterson, 1992; Verba et al., 1995); and interpersonal networks (Mcclurg, 2003; Tillie, 2004; Weatherford, 1982; Huckfeldt, 1979; Giles and Dantico, 1982). In recent years, scholars have investigated whether social networks created amongst co-ethnics have a similar impact on political engagement of ethnic minorities. Rather than focusing only on one specific ethnic social resource, as the majority of the studies in the field, this study investigates both formal and informal networks. More specifically, three forms of ethnic-based ‘social capital’ are addressed: ethnic organisations,\(^\text{10}\) ethnic places of worship and ethnic informal networks. As highlighted in Section 2.2, ‘bonding’ social networks, namely those created amongst homogeneous groups such as ethnic minorities, have been linked to both positive and negative effects on political participation.

The negative effect of ethnic-based social networks primarily stems from their inward-looking and exclusive nature. Due to their ethnic character, indeed, these networks operate within a domain that is limited by the shared ethnic and cultural characteristics of their members. The existing literature addressing the beneficial impact of general associational engagement on political and civic participation argues that only ‘bridging’ social networks produce the generalised trust and positive attitudes towards

\(^{10}\) Some scholars distinguish ‘ethnic’ from ‘immigrant’ associations, arguing that the former results from the development of initial groups created by recent immigrants, who progressively settle and become ethnic minority rather than immigrant communities (Moya, 2005). The present study exclusively adopts the term ‘ethnic association’ to refer to both groups of immigrants and long-established ethnic minorities.
cooperation that bring to higher political trust and participation (Putnam et al., 1993; Wollebaek and Selle, 2003; Paxton, 2007). On the contrary, the ‘strong ties’ developed within homogenous groups such as ethnic communities are deemed to support in-group loyalties, out-group conflicts and particularised interests. Consequently, individuals who have a strong ethnic identity and socialise primarily with their co-ethnics are expected to be more likely to engage in their own ethnic community and possibly withdraw from the societal and political mainstream (Uslaner and Conley, 2003: 333). Political disengagement is not the only negative outcome highlighted by scholars with regard to ethnic-based social networks. The latter are also expected to significantly influence the content of political actions. By encouraging involvement in one’s own ethnic community, ‘bonding’ connections could hinder the interest and participation in host-country politics and mainstream political issues in favour of homeland politics and ethnic-related issues (Morales and Pilati, 2011; Berger et al., 2004). In the European context, this negative hypothesis was tested particularly by focusing on voluntary organisations. Evidence was found that engagement in ethnic organisations exerts a positive effect on political participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities exclusively when individuals also take part in cross-ethnic associations. This lends some support to the argument that ethnic-dominated associational networks might be less politically beneficial than their cross-ethnic counterparts and, although no significant detrimental effect was observed, greater benefits can be drawn from participation in cross-cutting networks (Van Londen et al., 2007; Stromblad and Adman, 2009; Stromblad et al., 2011; Jacobs et al., 2004).

The competing hypothesis that has been supported is that ethnic-based social networks can benefit political participation. Scholars have argued that they should be considered as specific form of capital that, despite their ‘bonding’ nature, can be utilised by ethnic minorities in order to advance the process of social, economic and political integration (Zhou and Bankston, 1994; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Since ethnic minorities generally lack the socio-economic resources that stimulate and make political engagement possible (Verba et al., 1995), ethnic networks “can be seen as the ‘weapon of the weak’” (Stromblad et al., 2011: 118) to the extent to which they compensate for this weakness (Leighley, 2001).
Fennema and Tillie’s (2001, 1999) ethnic civic community model is one of the main reference points for the ‘positive’ argument. In the attempt to account for the variations in the level of political involvement amongst ethnic minorities in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie referred to the notion of ‘civic community’ developed by Putnam et al. (1993) and applied it to the specific and distinctive case of ethnic communities. They identified civic community which comprised “voluntary associations of free citizens that are set up to pursue a common goal or a common interest” (Fennema and Tillie, 2001: 29). Fennema and Tillie’s fundamental argument is that even though this civic community is shaped along ethnic identities (i.e. ‘ethnic civic community’), it still promotes the generation of social trust which then translates into political trust and political engagement, as described by Putnam. Ethnic groups that have a stronger civic community, which is represented by a dense network of ethnic organisations, are likely to be more active in the political arena due to their capacity to “produce collective goods and pursue common goals” (Fennema and Tillie, 2001: 33). The empirical evidence presented by Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) showed that Turks in Amsterdam have a stronger ethnic civic community and are also more politically active than Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. Several studies tested the ethnic civic community theory and, despite providing some empirical evidence for it, they shed new light on the remarkable variations in the impact of ethnic social capital on political participation across national and local contexts (Van Heelsum, 2005), ethnic groups and modes of

---

11 The concept of ethnic civic community was measured on the basis of a civic community index based on the following indicators: the number of organisations in the community (this information was found in the files of the Chamber of Commerce), the quantity of isolated associations (i.e. without interlocking directorates) and the number of interlocking directorates in the network. The scholars also included the use of ethnic TV channels and newspapers as examples of mass communication tools that reinforce ethnic civic community (Fennema and Tillie, 2001).

12 Togeby (2004) questioned this argument by showing that, in Denmark, associational engagement has no effect whatsoever on social trust within all the ethnic groups considered. Furthermore, social trust did not prove to be a significant predictor of political participation, both informal and electoral. On the basis of the empirical analysis Togeby concluded: “There are no negative relations with social trust and no negative relations with voter turnout [...] On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to talk about generation of social capital” (2004: 528). Van Londen et al. (2007) reached similar conclusions and rejected the idea of a mediating function of social trust in the relationship between political and associational engagement.

13 Fennema and Tillie (2001) measured political participation as voting turnout in the municipal elections in 1994 and 1998 as well as the level of political trust, that is to say, trust in political parties, municipal council and Amsterdam civil servants.
political participation (e.g. national and local elections, political behaviours and attitudes) (Berger et al., 2004; Togeby, 2004).

Fennema and Tillie primarily concentrated on ethnic organisations. However, other scholars have highlighted how both ethnic voluntary organisations and ethnic places of worship can provide politically relevant resources that are very similar to those provided by their mainstream counterparts. A well-established body of literature, indeed, claims that associational engagement and church attendance generally benefit political participation by facilitating the acquisition of civic skills that can be utilised in the political domain (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995; Myrberg, 2011); by exposing their members to political stimuli and political information (Olsen, 1972; Verba et al., 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001); and by promoting opportunities of political recruitment and mobilisation (Brady, 1999; Leighley, 1996; Verba et al., 1993). Evidence of the ability of ethnic organisations to produce civic skills was presented by Stromblad and Adman (2009). Tate (1993) found that Black churches in the US bolster political participation of African Americans and argued: “The church provides a structured setting where Blacks gain important political skills and where political information can be shared” (Tate, 1993: 96). Black churches in the US were also described as crucial in the process of political recruitment and mobilisation (Calhoun-Brown, 1996) as well as in the acquisition of organisational and cognitive resources (e.g. political trust and efficacy) that heighten voter turnout (Harris, 1994). That being said, the ability of places of worship to generate these resources is influenced by various factors such as the ‘political character’, denomination and internal structure of the church attended. In the American context, for instance, Calhoun-Brown (1996) found that exclusively ‘political churches’ are able to increase the likelihood of their members to participate in primary and general elections as well as non-electoral activities.\textsuperscript{14} Verba et al. (1995) found that attendance in Protestant but not in Catholic churches politically mobilises members as the former provide more regular opportunities to participate beyond the religious services. This produces a mobilising impact on African Americans, who are mainly Protestant, but not on

\textsuperscript{14} ‘Political churches’ are defined by Calhoun-Brown (1996: 942) as churches that are led by politically active ministers; where explicitly political messages are delivered to members and candidates are openly supported; and where donations to political campaigns are collected.
predominantly Catholic Latinos, who are ultimately less involved in politics (see also Cavendish, 2000; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Eggert and Giugni (2011) also found that membership in religious groups, but not church attendance, has a positive effect on electoral and non-electoral participation for Muslims but not for Christians, probably as a result of the focus of Christian organisations on the private rather than public sphere, which, on the contrary, is the main domain in which Muslim associations operate.

Ethnic-based formal networks can also generate ethnic- or group-specific resources, as claimed by the ‘negative’ argument. By strengthening inward-looking, exclusive networks, ethnic minorities reinforce their sense of belonging to the community. However, unlike the ‘negative’ argument, these ‘bonding’ connections are not considered detrimental. On the contrary, they are seen as ‘tools’ that can be used to bring communities into the mainstream political arena (Lane, 1959: 255). In particular, two of the most important ethnic political resources are deemed to derive from ethnic social networks: group consciousness and ethnic leaders.15 The former has been mainly linked to attendance in ethnic religious institutions both in the US (Wilcox and Gomez, 1990; Tate, 1991; Jamal, 2005) and the UK (Johnson, 1991). Ethnic leadership is closely dependent on the existence of ethnic organisations and places of worship which represent the main channels through which these community representatives not only emerge but also operate and guide the community (Myrdal, 1944; Tate, 1993; Bloemraad, 2006a). Indeed, ethnic networks provide a visible and formal environment where leaders can create connections with both the ethnic community and the mainstream society. It is interesting to note, for instance, how in Fennema and Tillie’s (2001, 1999) model the strength of the ethnic civic community closely depends on the interconnections created amongst ethnic organisations by leaders (i.e. interlocking directorates), as the latter ‘bridge’ the community to the outside political and social environment.

So far, greater attention has been paid to the political impact of formal ethnic networks whereas there has been little research about the political role played by ethnic informal networks. However, it is necessary to go beyond formal organisational networks and investigate informal connections in which the former are ultimately rooted. In

15 A more detailed description of these concepts can be found in Section 2.2.
general, scholars claimed that frequent interpersonal connections, regardless of their ethnic nature, benefit political engagement by producing a mobilising effect on less active individuals through contact with more politically active individuals (Passy and Giugni, 2001). Tillie (2004) applied this claim to ethnic-based networks by arguing that those who have contacts with socially active people (i.e. members of ethnic organisations) are more likely to have indirect access to their acquaintances’ social capital, which in turn has positive political implications. Furthermore, informal political discussion favours the circulation of political knowledge, the acquisition of political expertise (Bennett et al., 2000; Mcclurg, 2003; Abrams et al., 2005; Toka, 2010; Holbert et al., 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991) and processes of political recruitment (Klofstad, 2007). The political benefits derived from interpersonal networks closely depend on various factors, such as the level of political expertise and activism of those involved in these networks (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Tillie, 2004) as well as the size, frequency and intensity of informal contacts (Mcclurg, 2003; Leighley, 1996). When these factors increase, informal networks are expected to become more influential for political engagement. It could be argued that the political impact of ethnic-based informal networks is maximised by the fact that these interpersonal connections are based on regular and close-knit relationships. However, this positive effect could be hindered by the lack of political expertise and knowledge of those involved in these networks (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). With regard to the process of naturalisation, for example, Bloemraad (2006b) emphasises the role played by ethnic interpersonal networks in providing individuals with skills, knowledge and resources that can be used to acquire citizenship, which is one of the essential conditions for electoral participation. Due to the interlinked nature of migration processes, new immigrants can generally count on the expertise of family and friends who are already in the country. Nonetheless, the scholar points out that these networks do have limitations, especially when co-ethnics share the same integration issues, such as poor language knowledge or lack of citizenship (Bloemraad, 2006b: 80-83).

What emerges from this literature review focusing on formal ethnic-based networks is the contrast between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ arguments. Whereas the latter underlines the challenges in translating involvement in ethnic-specific organisational networks (either religious or non-religious) into political engagement, the
former claims that, regardless of their ‘bonding’ character, ethnic organisations and religious institutions can still play a fundamental role in the process of political integration. In particular, the ‘positive’ argument suggests that better organised communities can mobilise through ethnic-specific resources. In Bloemraad’s words: “Immigrants’ political incorporation rests in part on the community’s capacity to organize, that is, on the available stock of organizations serving new and established migrants” (2006b: 162). This should be even more true in the case of Britain, where the multicultural approach to migrant integration not only tolerates but also actively promotes cultural groups’ rights and the development of ethnic-specific resources, such as ethnic organisations (Cinalli and Giugni, 2011; Bloemraad, 2006b: 171; Maxwell, 2012: 21; Stromblad et al., 2011). The contrast between benefits and drawbacks of ethnic-based social connections are much less clear when it comes to informal networks. This is primarily due to the main gap identified in the literature, that is to say, the lack of studies addressing ethnic formal as well as ethnic informal networks. Not only the political effect of the latter is widely under-researched in favour of the former, but these two constructs are rarely investigated together as part of a unique process. This study aims at filling this gap by concentrating on the three forms of ethnic-based networks. Furthermore, it is important to point out that, at least with regard to ethnic organisations and religious institutions, the empirical evidence has highlighted remarkable variations in the political role of these networks across national contexts, ethnic groups, religious denominations and modes of political engagement. The focus on a diverse ethnic group such as the Black African community as well as the investigation of both electoral and non-electoral participation wants to be a starting point for acknowledging and investigating at least some of these complexities.

2.4 Black Africans in Britain: the role of internal diversity

The British African community has its roots in the development of the slave trade and the colonialist expansion of Britain between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Walvin, 2000; Daley, 1998). After the abolition of slavery in 1833, immigrants from African colonies, particularly in West and East Africa, continued to migrate to the UK
primarily as seamen and settled in London, Liverpool, Cardiff and other major ports along the British coastline. The bulk of international migration flows began after World War II when the nature of the African diaspora changed dramatically. An increasing number of affluent young immigrants arrived from Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone primarily to pursue higher education and professional training, hence bringing the percentage of African students from 14% to 43% between 1939 and 2009 (Daley, 1998). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, following political independence of the British colonies in Africa, affluent men and women mainly from Ghana and Nigeria started populating the middle-class neighbourhoods of London. Moreover, an increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees escaping from the socio-political instability of countries like Uganda, Somalia, Eritrea, Congo, Angola and Ethiopia were seeking protection in the UK (Daley, 1998). Although extremely relevant, this first wave of asylum seekers was not as exceptional as the one that characterised the 1990s, which produced a noticeable increase in the size of the African diaspora.

In contemporary Britain, the Black African community is an important and growing component of the Black and Minority Ethnic population that in the country, as illustrated in Table 2.1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991¹</th>
<th>2001²</th>
<th>2011³</th>
<th>Change 2001-2011 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>209,589</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>484,783</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>499,030</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>565,621</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>830,205</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,051,844</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>455,363</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>746,619</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>161,701</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>282,811</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total pop.</td>
<td>49,890,277</td>
<td>52,041,916</td>
<td>56,075,912</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Source: 1991 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright, Table L06.
² Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright, Table KS06.
³ Source: 2011 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright, Table KS201EW.
The number of Black Africans in England and Wales has steadily and remarkably increased since 1991, when the first Census measuring ethnicity recorded the presence of about 209,500 Black Africans. This number doubled to just below 485,000 in 2001 and finally reached the extraordinary figure of 989,000 in 2011, an increase of about 104%. In just two decades since 1991, Black Africans went from representing the 0.4% of the total population of England and Wales to being the third ethnic minority community in the country (1.8%) after Indians and Pakistanis. It is between 2001 and 2011 that the African group has experienced an extraordinary growth compared to other ethnic minorities. The sources of this growth have been identified in both natural change (40%) and, even more importantly, by new immigration flows (60%), as shown in Figure 2.1. This suggests that the community is not only growing but it is also becoming a mix of new and well-established national groups. The 2011 Census provides evidence that the increasing arrivals of African nationals has contributed to the rise in the foreign-born population between 2001 and 2011 (Jivraj, 2013).

Figure 2.1: Population change 2001–2011 by ethnic group (England and Wales)

Source: The graph can be found in Simpson (2013: 1). The calculations are based on the following sources: 2001 Census (enhanced to full population estimates) and 2011 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright; Total Births and Deaths for England and Wales (Office for National Statistics); Life Tables for England and Wales 2005-7 (Office for National Statistics).
In 2001, the overwhelming majority (78%) of Black Africans were found to concentrate in the London region, where the group represented the 5.3% of the total population. In 2011, this percentage increased to 7% and the African community became the first ethnic minority group in the region just above Indians (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Ethnic groups in the London region (as percentage of total population) – 2001 and 2011 Census

![Graph showing the percentage of different ethnic groups in London from 2001 to 2011.](source)

Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright, Table KS06.
Source: 2011 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright, Table KS201EW.

Figure 2.3: Greater London – Projected Ethnic Population (2001–2031)

![Graph showing the projected ethnic population in Greater London from 2001 to 2031.](source)

Source: Based on estimates by the Greater London Authority (2010: 6)
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, this positive change in the Black African population in London is in line with the ethnic group population projections presented by the Greater London Authority in 2010. According to these estimates, the African diaspora will continue to grow in the next decades, in contrast with the Black Caribbean community which is expected to level out.

Overall, these figures show that the African community does represent a significant portion of the ethnic minority population both in the country and even more so in London. Recent studies have highlighted that, despite this remarkable growth, there has been a lack of interest in the development and integration of the Black African community in Britain amongst both academic and policy discourses (Daley, 1998). As Mitton and Aspinall (2010: 179) argue:

“Most of the discourse, policy and public understanding of migration and multiculturalism in Britain over the past 30 years has been based on the experience of Black Caribbean people who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s from Jamaica, Trinidad and other places in the Caribbean, and that of South Asian communities from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The experience of Black Africans as a distinct group from Black Caribbeans has not made nearly so much impact on public policy.”

In particular, the processes of political mobilisation and participation of Black Africans have been rarely investigated in depth and the great bulk of policy or scholarly literature has either addressed the community as part of the more general ‘Black’ or ‘Afro-Caribbean’ groups (see, for example, Statham, 1999) and single African groups have been researched independently without being necessarily linked to the Black African community as a whole (e.g. Somalis).

What is also interesting about this community is its extraordinary internal diversity. Despite this not being generally acknowledged and addressed in the literature, the Black African category includes a myriad of cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds, as well as a plethora of migration histories and integration experiences that primarily derive from the numerous national groups that comprise it (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010). Elam and Chinouya (2000) have identified some of the main factors that differentiate African groups. First of all, the community is a mixture of well-established
and more recent groups. Nigerians and Ghanaians are given as examples of long-established communities who migrated in the early 1960s and who can already count numerous second and third generations. The Somalis, Congolese and Zimbabweans are some of the most recent migrants (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010: 185).

The reasons for migration also diverge. Whereas more recent communities primarily came to the country as asylum seekers, the arrival of the more established groups was mainly determined by professional training, higher education or other forms of voluntary migration (e.g. employment or family reunification). Elam and Chinouya also highlight significant variations in religious backgrounds (Ugandans and Ghanaians are predominantly Christian, Somalis are wholly Muslim and Nigerians present a mix of affiliations) and English language proficiency (this ranges from widespread amongst Nigerians, Ghanaians and Ugandans to limited to few categories amongst Somalis). Some of the national groups, such as the Somalis and Nigerians, also present a remarkable internal difference in terms of ethnicity, religion and region of origin (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010). African communities moreover differ in their integration experience. In general, the Black African community suffers from a progressively deteriorating socio-economic disadvantage, in spite of higher educational qualifications, not only with regard to other ethnic groups (particularly Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) but also the White majority (Berthoud, 2000; Li and Heath, 2008; Daley, 1998). Mitton and Aspinall (2010, 2011), however, show that some African groups, such as Somalis and Congolese, present very high rates of unemployment and a very low educational attainment, while other groups, such as the Ghanaians and Zimbabweans, have generally experienced a more successful process of socio-economic integration. In light of this diversity, some scholars have even questioned the appropriateness of the term ‘Black African’ to represent these complexities and effectively guide both policy-making and scholarly research (Aspinall and Chinouya, 2008). In this regard, Daley argues that: “The term Black African is a census rather than a social category” (1998: 1703).

Recognising and addressing this internal heterogeneity is particularly important in this study as the differences between African national groups could significantly influence the relationships between residential concentration, ethnic-based social networks and political participation. In particular, the different immigration-related characteristics (i.e.
immigration history, integration experience and cultural, linguistic, religious background) could determine the ways in which communities shape and develop their social networks and organisational resources, participate in politics and ultimately ‘utilise’ ethnic enclaves in the process of political integration. With regard to the development of strong ethnic-based social networks, for instance, Breton claimed that the more a given group’s characteristics diverge from the host society, the more disadvantaged the group is. The more the group’s size increases, the stronger are the ethnic institutions (e.g. ethnic organisations) and internal resources created by the community. It could be argued that African groups such as the Somalis are more likely to have achieved what Breton defines as “institutional completeness” (Breton, 1964: 193-194), that is to say, well-established organisational networks that provide the community with sufficient resources without having to refer to mainstream support. However, well-established but less disadvantaged communities could have also developed efficient ethnic networks by virtue of their longer stay in the host society (Myrberg, 2011: 104). Evidence of variations across ethnic groups with divergent immigration-related characteristics has also been pointed out with regard to the effect of ethnic social networks on political participation (see Section 2.4). Leighley (2001: 9-10) suggests differential effects of ethnic density on political engagement for African Americans and Latinos due to their political histories, political influence and level of residential concentration. Similarly, Maxwell (2012) argued that ethnic clusters have a greater effect on political mobilisation of ethnic communities who are more socially segregated (e.g. South Asians in the UK). These represent only a few examples of how the relationships of interest are likely to vary across ethnic groups.

Rather than exploring the political role played by ethnic enclaves and ethnic social networks by comparing Black Africans to other ethnic minority groups (e.g. Caribbeans and Asians), this study focuses solely on the African community. The national groups by which the community is composed provide valuable cases to test the extent to which and how different immigration and integration patterns influence the relationship between residential concentration, social networks and political participation. This is an approach that has been developed, for instance, for studying intra-group variations in the political engagement of Latinos in the US (Wrinkle et al., 1996; Stokes, 2003). The lack of literature focusing on the British Black African group and its national components limits
the possibility of predicting how the association between ethnic density, ethnic social networks and political participation vary.

The remarkable growth of the Black African community and its internal diversity represent two of the various factors that guided the identification of the group as the main focus of this study. The evidence that emerges from previous literature addressing the political engagement of ethnic minorities in the UK points out that the level of electoral registration and voter turnout for Black Africans is lower than the White majority as well as the Asian communities (Electoral Commission, 2005; Heath et al., 2011). Nonetheless, very few studies have attempted to explore the mechanisms that may be facilitating or hindering political participation within this community (Heath et al., 2011). Although recent evidence has shown that the level of residential concentration of Black Africans is decreasing and the community has generally been associated with the less concentrated patterns of Black Caribbeans (Simpson, 2012; Phillips, 1997), the 2001 Census data, to which this study originally referred, described the group as being “over-represented in Inner and Outer London only and under-represented elsewhere” (Rees and Butt, 2004: 183). The continuous influx of new migrants from Africa is likely to facilitate the process of residential concentration, at least in the short term and particularly in the London region which offers better opportunities of employment and education as well as contacts with the existing diaspora (e.g. ‘chain migration’) (Finney and Simpson, 2009; Simpson, 2012; Daley, 1998). This makes the study of ethnic enclaves and their political effects amongst Black Africans particularly relevant.

---

16 In 2001, there were 479,665 Black Africans in England and Wales and 378,933 in London. In 2011, the Census recorded 989,628 Black Africans in England and Wales and of those 573,931 were living in London. The Index of Dissimilarity, i.e. the “group’s spread across England and Wales compared to the spread of the rest of the population” (Simpson, 2012: 2) for Black Africans has decreased from 68% in 2001 to 54% in 2011 (-13%) (100% means complete separation whereas 0% means completely even spread). This represents a higher decrease than the one recorded for Indians (-5%), Pakistanis (-0%), Bangladeshis (-3%) and Caribbeans (-4%) (Simpson, 2012).
2.5 Research questions and hypotheses

This study primarily aims at exploring the relationship between residential concentration and political participation of Black Africans in Britain by focusing on the role played by ethnic-based social networks. Moreover, the research investigates these relationships in light of the internal diversity of the Black African community as a consequence of the divergent immigration-related factors characterising the national groups that compose it. More specifically, the research intends to:

- investigate the impact of co-ethnic residential concentration on political participation;
- disentangle the processes underpinning this relationship by focusing on the effect of ethnic-based social networks, represented here by ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks;
- explore the influence of the immigration-related heterogeneity that characterises the Black African community on the relationship between co-ethnic concentration, ethnic-based networks and political participation.

The study addresses the following research questions and hypotheses (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4: Main relationships addressed and hypotheses tested
RQ1. Does residential concentration affect political participation of Black Africans in Britain?

The existing empirical evidence has found evidence of both negative and positive effects of co-ethnic concentration on ethnic minorities’ political participation. On the one hand, the strong correlation between ethnic clusters and deprivation, along with infrequent contacts with the mainstream society and stronger inward-looking solidarity (i.e. bonding social capital) represent the main arguments in support of the marginalising hypothesis, which looks at ethnic concentration as detrimental for the process of political integration. On the other hand, the mobilising hypothesis argues that residential proximity enhances group consciousness and favours mobilisation processes by both ethnic leaders and mainstream political elites. It also nourishes ethnic-based social networks, such as ethnic associations and religious institutions, which can be crucial resources for political participation. It is not clear to what extent the American evidence, which is still predominant in the field, can be applied to the British context and more importantly to the Black African community. Despite the apparent commonalities, the level of segregation and deprivation suffered by African Americans can be hardly compared to the integration and immigration experiences of the British Black Africans. It is possible that the less concentrated residential patterns of Africans in the UK would not produce any significant pattern of political mobilisation or marginalisation, as noted by a recent study by Heath et al. (2011). Nonetheless, empirical evidence about the positive political effects of ethnic density amongst the South-East Asian communities has been found (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b) and this encourages further research. Therefore, the present study addresses the relationship between residential concentration and political participation of Black Africans by testing the two competing hypotheses.

H1 – Black Africans living in areas characterised by high concentration of co-ethnics are less likely to be involved in political activities than those living outside those areas.

H2 – Black Africans living in areas characterised by high concentration of co-ethnics are more likely to be involved in political activities than those living outside those areas.
Despite the attention paid to testing the positive or negative influence of ethnic density, very few studies to date have explored how residential concentration influences political participation. Ethnic-based social networks are traditionally described as a natural product of spatial proximity between co-ethnics and, as emerges from the literature, they are linked to both processes of political marginalisation and mobilisation within ethnic enclaves. Consequently, the study adopts them as main point of reference in investigating the ‘missing link’ between residential concentration and political participation. The first step in this investigation is to understand to what extent ethnic-based social networks are reinforced and nourished by ethnic spatial concentration. Traditionally, ethnic enclaves have been described as the natural environments in which ethnic social networks can flourish. Consequently, the second research question and the third hypothesis are formulated as follows:

RQ2. To what extent and how does residential concentration influence ethnic-based social resources within the Black African community?

H3 – Co-ethnic residential concentration supports and enhances ethnic-based social resources represented by ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks.

The second step is represented by the investigation of the political impact of ethnic social networks, as stated by the third research question:

RQ3. To what extent and how does participation in ethnic-based social resources affect political participation of Black Africans?

As for the relationship between residential concentration and political participation, mixed findings have been presented by the existing literature with regard to the political role played by ethnic-based social networks. The exclusive and ‘bonding’ nature of these networks is regarded as negative by some scholars who point out the need for ethnic minorities to develop closer links with the mainstream society in order to become more politically integrated. By limiting their engagement to ethnic-specific networks, individuals miss out on valuable opportunities of political participation and they tend to be more involved in homeland or ethnic-related politics rather than developing a wider interest in
mainstream politics. However, other scholars have argued that despite being ‘ethnic’, organisations, religious institutions and informal networks can be utilised as means for political mobilisation. Ethnic networks can function as their mainstream counterparts and provide civic skills, political mobilisation and recruitment opportunities, political information and social trust. Formal religious and non-religious institutions, moreover, reinforce group consciousness and connect ethnic communities to the outside society by mobilising resources, supporting the process of integration and stimulating collective political actions. In order to follow the path traced by the first research question (i.e. competing hypotheses), both the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ standpoints are tested:

H4 – Ethnic-based social resources are expected to negatively influence political participation.

H5 – Ethnic-based social resources are expected to positively influence political participation.

The literature addressing the relationships of interest (i.e. ethnic density, ethnic social networks and political participation) highlight the great variations that can occur across ethnic communities which present divergent immigration-related characteristics. The focus of this study is the Black African community, which is composed of numerous national groups presenting different immigration histories, integration experiences and cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. This internal diversity is acknowledged and investigated in order to highlight its impact, if any, on the relationship between ethnic density, ethnic social networks and political engagement:

RQ4. How do immigration-related factors influence the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social networks and political participation?

Since the Black African community is considerably under-researched, there is no reliable evidence about how immigration-related characteristics influence the relationship of interest. Therefore, the hypotheses have been formulated in a non-directional manner and
will be tested primarily through the qualitative case study involving two African national groups, i.e. Somalis and Ghanaians.\textsuperscript{17}

H6 – Immigration-related factors that characterise the various national groups within the wider Black African category are deemed to influence the relationship between co-ethnic residential concentration, ethnic-based social networks and political participation.

\textsuperscript{17} See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, for a description of the two national groups and the criteria followed for their selection as case studies.
CHAPTER 3. Research Design and Methodology

The study applied a mixed-method approach compounding both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis drew secondary data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) and addressed the Black African community as a whole. The qualitative enquiry was based on the collection of primary data through semi-structured face-to-face interviews and participant observation amongst two African communities presenting diverging immigration-related characteristics, namely Somalis and Ghanaians. The fieldwork was conducted in the boroughs of East and North London where the two communities are highly concentrated.

This chapter provides a description of the structure, philosophical assumptions and aims of the mixed-method design that was adopted (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 illustrates the quantitative enquiry and Section 3.3 describes the qualitative study.

3.1 The mixed-method approach: a complementary logic

The qualitative and quantitative methods were mixed according to a convergent parallel design which implies that data collection and analysis are carried out separately for the two enquiries which are merged only when interpreting the final results (Clark and Creswell, 2011: Chapter 3; Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2011: 77). As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the data collection stage exclusively related to the qualitative fieldwork as the quantitative analysis was based on the analysis of secondary data.

The mixed-method design was guided by an integrative or complementary logic. Rather than attempting to validate the findings from one method with the other (i.e. triangulation or corroborative logic), the study assumed that qualitative and quantitative methods can be used to investigate various facets of the same phenomenon (May, 2010; Woolley, 2009).
Each method is indeed suited to addressing different levels of analysis, and their specific strengths were identified and utilised to shed light on the different pieces of the jigsaw (Rossman and Wilson, 1985; Jick, 1979; Sale et al., 2002). This ultimately “give[s] a better sense of the whole” (Mason, 2006b: 6), rather than converging in “one unique picture of reality” (Erzberger and Prein, 1997: 144). By adopting a complementary logic, the present study reaffirmed the pragmatic argument of a substantial compatibility between qualitative and quantitative research, and sought to use the interplay between the two methods as a valuable tool in capturing and understanding the multifaceted nature of the relationship between ethnic concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation (May, 2007; Hammond, 2005; Mason, 2006a; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003).
As the complementary approach to mixed-method was aimed at capturing the complexity of the reality researched, the contradictory findings that naturally emerged from the two methods were treated as an expression of this complexity. As argued by Slonim-Nevo and Nevo (2009: 125), it should not be assumed that “inconsistent findings are necessarily contradictory” and one method should refute the other. Contradictory findings can be made sense of and integrated as part of the same complex phenomenon. In the framework of this integrative approach, each research question was investigated by applying both methods, rather than separating them into qualitative and quantitative research questions, as illustrated in Table 3.1 (Corden and Hirst, 2008: 211). The only exception is represented by the research question focusing on the impact of immigration-related factors on the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation (RQ4). Due to the small sample of Somalis and Ghanaians in the EMBES dataset, the differences between the two national groups could not be addressed quantitatively.

More generally, the quantitative and qualitative enquiries complemented each other in three ways. First of all, the quantitative enquiry provided an overall insight of the Black African community in Britain and set the context for the qualitative fieldwork. The latter, on the contrary, with its focus on the specific cases of Ghanaians and Somalis in North and East London helped acknowledge the internal diversity of the African community and therefore studies the phenomena of interest in the light of this heterogeneity. Secondly, the quantitative analysis concentrated on general and objective patterns of association whereas the qualitative analysis shed light on individual experiences and interpretations, underpinning processes and group dynamics (Erzberger and Prein, 1997). Thirdly, the use of secondary survey data allowed the comparison of the level of political engagement and involvement in ethnic social networks in both high and low concentration areas. The qualitative data were gathered in areas where Somalis and Ghanaians are highly concentrated and hence offered an insight into the processes taking place in ethnic enclaves.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Main phenomenas explored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ1. Does residential concentration affect political participation of Black Africans in Britain?</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Black Africans</td>
<td>Effect of percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood on individual voter turnout and non-electoral participation (controlling for individual socio-economic and immigration-related characteristics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Somalis and Ghanaians</td>
<td>How ethnic concentration and political participation are linked through ethnic social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ2. To what extent and how does residential concentration influence ethnic-based social resources within the Black African community?</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Black Africans</td>
<td>Effect of percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood on individual participation in ethnic organisations, ethnic places of worship and ethnic informal networks (controlling for individual socio-economic and immigration-related characteristics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Somalis and Ghanaians</td>
<td>• Individual level: experiences of engagement in ethnic social networks; ‘informal volunteering’; how individuals get involved in ethnic organisations; the relevance of spatial proximity for maintaining contacts with co-ethnics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Aggregate level: function and structure of ethnic-based social networks; impact of ethnic enclaves on the creation of these networks; identification of other area-level factors that can influence ethnic social networks (particularly ethnic organisations) and the role played by ethnic density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ3. To what extent and how does participation in ethnic-based social resources affect political participation of Black Africans?</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Black Africans</td>
<td>Individual voter turnout and non-electoral participation regressed on percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood (controlling for individual socio-economic and immigration-related characteristics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Somalis and Ghanaians</td>
<td>• Individual experience of political engagement through ethnic-based social networks (particularly ethnic organisations); the role played by ethnic leaders; the ‘political’ character of ethnic formal networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Collective dimension of political participation; engagement in homeland politics; the possible interplay between home- and host-country politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ4. How do immigration-related factors influence the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation?</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Somalis and Ghanaians</td>
<td>How the divergent immigration-related characteristics of these two communities influence the creation of and participation in ethnic social networks; political engagement; the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social networks and political participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following sections illustrate in more detail the quantitative (Section 3.2) and qualitative (Section 3.3) enquiries.

### 3.2 The quantitative enquiry

#### 3.2.1 The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study

The quantitative enquiry is based on secondary data drawn from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), which is the first nationally representative survey of ethnic minorities in the UK since the 1997 British Election Study (BES) (Heath et al., 2011; Howat et al., 2011). Unlike the latter, where a booster ethnic sample was added to the main BES, the 2010 EMBES represents the first stand-alone survey addressing the civic and political behaviours and attitudes of the main five ethnic groups in the country – Black Africans, Black Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The survey adopted a clustered, stratified sampling strategy based on the Postcode Address File as the sample frame for addresses. The primary sampling unit (PSU) is represented by the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOAs) in England and Wales and by Data Zones (DZs) in Scotland. The PSUs were ranked in terms of the percentage of the adult population belonging to each of the five ethnic groups according to the 2001 Census data. Only the areas with a value greater than 80% for any ethnic group were retained. The 715 PSUs that were finally selected, of which 119 were randomly allocated to a reserve pool, were first stratified by ethnic mix; secondly, by combination of NUTS1 regions; and thirdly, by population density. The ethnic mix for each PSU was calculated by adjusting the 2001 Census data with the most recent year of the Citizenship Survey, which entails a booster sample of ethnic minorities. This allowed for population change and differences in the response propensity across ethnic groups.

---

18 LSOAs are utilised in England and Wales, whereas Scotland refers to Data Zones. There are 32,844 LSOAs in England and 1,909 in Wales, and 6,505 Data Zones in Scotland. Their average population size is 1,500 and the minimum is 1,000 inhabitants.

19 ‘Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics’ (NUTS) is a hierarchical classification of spatial units created by the European Office for Statistics (Eurostat) and it is used in the member states only. NUTS1 corresponds to England, Scotland, Wales and the government office regions in England.
A random sample of 25 to 75 addresses was established within each PSU. A pre-printed Kish grid was used to randomly select one individual in each household, among those eligible for the survey. Over a total of 31,324 addresses were issued for screening, just above 26,000 were screened and 4,224 individuals were found to be eligible. Table 3.1 reports the total sample size achieved.

Table 3.2: EMBES 2010 – sample size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/refused</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010 (Howat et al., 2011). Unweighted frequencies.

The fieldwork was conducted between 7 May 2010 (i.e. the day after the general elections) and 31 August 2010. The survey consisted of a face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews as well as a mail-back questionnaires. The latter was left at all addresses where the face-to-face questionnaire was conducted, but only 975 questionnaires were returned (i.e. response rate: 35%).

The face-to-face questionnaire included items about demographics and socio-economic status; length of residence in the UK, country of origin, citizenship, English proficiency, religion; voter turnout and non-electoral engagement; attitudes towards political issues; partisanship; ethnic and religious identity; group consciousness and attitudes toward integration; discrimination, prejudice and social distance; and ethnic social capital. The mail-back questionnaire focused on attitudes toward democracy,
immigration, integration, equality, elections, women and ethnic minorities in politics; political discussion; feelings of attachment and belonging; religion and politics; religious extremism.

3.2.2 Data analysis

The quantitative analysis was carried out with STATA 12 by applying multivariate logistic regression. The initial plan of conducting multilevel modelling analysis had to be abandoned due to the low number of individuals from the Black African community clustered in Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). When filtering the dataset and retaining the Black African sample only, the EMBES includes a total of 301 Primary Sample Units (PSUs) represented by 300 LSOAs for England and Wales, and 1 Data Zone for Scotland. As shown in Table 3.2, the majority of areas had only one individual and the maximum cluster size was 7.

Table 3.3: EMBES 2010 cluster size (LSOA) – Black African sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Black Africans (individuals) in LSOA</th>
<th>Number of LSOAs (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (individual)</td>
<td>176 (58.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (individuals)</td>
<td>67 (22.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (individuals)</td>
<td>29 (9.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (individuals)</td>
<td>21 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (individuals)</td>
<td>6 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (individuals)</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (individuals)</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of LSOAs</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite not applying a multilevel modelling strategy, clustered robust standard errors were applied in the logistic regression analysis in order to account for the fact that individuals are clustered into neighbourhoods (i.e. LSOAs) and observations may hence
be correlated within these areas. This strategy is also appropriate in dealing with clustered sampling strategy utilised in the EMBES as it relaxes the assumption of independence between observations.

Design weights were applied to descriptive statistics as well as bivariate and multivariate analysis. The EMBES dataset provides a design weight variable which was calculated by multiplying three main selection probabilities (Howat et al., 2011: 16):

- address selection probability;
- 1/number of dwelling units at the address;
- 1/number of eligible individuals at the selected dwelling unit.

The design weight is recommended when analysing ethnic groups separately, as in this study.

3.2.3 Measuring ‘ethnic residential concentration’

Ethnic residential concentration is defined as the percentage of co-ethnics in the Lower Super Output Area. The EMBES dataset entails five continuous variables describing the percentage of each ethnic group at the LSOA level which are based on the 2001 Census data. As shown in Table 3.3, the minimum concentration of Black Africans in the neighbourhood is 0% and the maximum concentration is 43.62%. The average concentration for Black Africans (7.47%) is very similar to the average concentration of Black Caribbeans (7.97%) and considerably lower than the mean density for Indians (16.11%), Pakistanis (22.34%) and Bangladeshis (18.31%). The three Asian communities also present much higher maximum values of concentration, which in the case of Pakistanis reaches just below 87%. The maximum level of concentration for Black Africans and Black Caribbeans remains, in contrast, well below 50%.

20 The percentage of Black Africans and other specific ethnic minorities is calculated by dividing the count for the specific group by the total population in the LSOA.
Table 3.4: Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA – summary statistics (all ethnic groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>68.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>26.09</td>
<td>22.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Summary statistics calculated by selecting the specific sample for each ethnic group.

This original continuous variable was recoded into a four-category variable representing quartiles and was introduced in the regression models as a set of dummy variables, with the first quartile as reference category. The decision to use a categorical rather than a continuous variable was based on two reasons.

First of all, the variable measuring the percentage of Black Africans was characterised by a positive skewness (skewness=1.83, kurtosis=6.94), as the majority of respondents live in areas with zero or very low percentage of co-ethnics. The histogram in Figure 3.2 shows the variable distribution when only the Black African sample is taken into account. Variables measuring ethnic density are often positively skewed due to the high proportion of individuals living in low concentration areas. In their study of the impact of residential concentration and birth outcomes, for example, Baker and Hellerstedt (2006) utilised a three-category variable to deal with the high skewness of the continuous measure of ethnic density.

21 Skewness for other ethnic groups: Indians=1.32, Pakistanis=0.57, Bangladeshis=1.13, Caribbeans=0.78. Kurtosis: Indians=4.03, Pakistanis=2.09, Bangladeshis=3.02, Caribbeans=3.03. The details about Skewness and Kurtosis refer to the specific sample for each ethnic group.
Secondly, the use of a categorical rather than continuous variable helped explore non-linear relationships between residential concentration and the outcomes of interest (both political participation and ethnic-based social resources). In particular, it was possible to investigate whether negative or positive effects of ethnic density appear only beyond a certain threshold (Maxwell, 2012: 120) or whether a curvilinear relationship exists between concentration and political engagement as well as involvement in ethnic-based social networks (Hardy, 1993: 75-82). The use of categories to address non-linearity in the impact of residential concentration was adopted by previous literature focusing on health (Stafford et al., 2009; Shaw and Pickett, 2011; Karlsen et al., 2002), educational outcomes (Bennett, 2011) and racial discrimination (Magee et al., 2008). A categorisation for Black Africans in the UK was proposed by Stafford et al. (2009) in their study of...
ethnic density and health amongst ethnic minorities in the UK. The scholars applied the following cut-offs for both Black Africans and Caribbeans: 0.5%, 5%, 10% and 20%. This categorisation was primarily aimed at maximising the sample size in category and allowing comparisons across five ethnic groups through overlapping categories (i.e. Africans, Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) and no specific theoretical reasons were brought to justify the cut-offs. Despite being based on the 2001 Census data as in the EMBES dataset, this classification could not be reproduced in this study since it refers to a slightly higher level of geography, namely the Middle Super Output Areas (MSOAs). Examples of dichotomisation of the variable measuring ethnic density were primarily found in the American literature (Saunders et al., 2012; Pinney and Serra, 1999). However, the levels of co-ethnic concentration used in this literature to established cut-off points (>65% and >90%) were not deemed to be suitable as references as they refer to the more concentrated African American community and would not reflect the lower degree of density of Black Africans in the UK. Moreover, a binary variable would have been a speculative construct raising issues of reliability due to the absence of a dichotomised measure of ethnic density that has been tested by previous literature.

In this study, the continuous variable measuring the percentage of Black Africans in LSOA was divided into quartiles. The use of quartiles allowed the construction of objectively equal-sized groups, as shown in Table 3.5, and was hence preferred to the creation of categories based on arbitrary cut-offs, especially due to the lack of literature investigating ethnic density amongst Black Africans in the UK. In light of the generally low level of concentration of Black Africans in Britain, it is plausible to claim that neighbourhoods included in both the third and fourth quartiles could be considered as high concentration areas.
Table 3.5: Percentage of Black Africans in LSOA – quartiles (EMBES 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–1.35</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>25.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.36–5.39</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>24.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.40–10.30</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.31–43.62</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As illustrated in Table 3.6, the maximum level of concentration amongst Black Africans is 43.87%. Only about 3% of the 32,482 LSOAs in England were inhabited by more than 5.40% of Black Africans (i.e. third quartile in the EMBES data) in 2001 and a mere 2% exceeded 10.31% (i.e. fourth quartile). The initial exploratory analysis suggested that the relationship between residential concentration and some of the outcomes of interest might not be monotonic, hence providing some support for the decision to adopt a categorical measure of ethnic density.23

Table 3.6: Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA – England, 2001 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0–43.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0–41.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0–83.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0–85.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0–83.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright – Table KS06: Key Statistics, Ethnic group by NeSS Geography.

23 The coding for the outcome variables is illustrated in the empirical chapters (Chapter 4 for political participation and Chapter 5 for ethnic-based social networks) as well as in Appendix A. The relationships between these outcomes and residential concentration will be addressed in detail in the empirical chapters.
As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the percentage of Black Africans who are involved in ethnic informal networks varies noticeably across the categories of residential concentration in a non-linear way. In contrast, voter turnout and non-electoral participation seem to follow linear patterns.

Figure 3.3: Residential concentration (quartiles) and political participation of Black Africans (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Chi2(voter turnout)=8.5 (3 df), p<0.10, Chi2(non-electoral participation)=9.5 (3 df), p<0.10.

Figure 3.4: Residential concentration (quartiles) and ethnic-based social resources of Black Africans (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Chi2(ethnic organisations)=2.04 (3 df), p>0.10, Chi2(ethnic places of worship)=10.17 (3 df), p<0.10, Chi2(ethnic informal networks)=16.72 (3 df), p<0.05.
The hypothesis of curvilinear relationships was also tested by running bivariate logistic regression analysis with both the original continuous variable for residential concentration of Black Africans and a quadratic term for the same variable. The results presented in Table 3.7 show that the only cases where both variables are statistically significant and the hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship is hence supported is the involvement in ethnic places of worship and informal networks.

Table 3.7: Testing the curvilinear relationship between residential concentration and the outcomes of interest (political participation and ethnic-based social networks) – Bivariate logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
<th>Ethnic organisations</th>
<th>Ethnic places of worship</th>
<th>Ethnic informal networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Black Africans</td>
<td>0.06(0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.06*(0.04)</td>
<td>-0.02(0.03)</td>
<td>0.09(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.07(0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black Africans (squared)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00(0.00)**</td>
<td>-0.00(0.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.21(.018)</td>
<td>-0.92*(0.22)</td>
<td>-0.24(0.19)</td>
<td>-0.24(0.18)</td>
<td>0.70(0.19)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised regression coefficients, design weights and clustering applied. P-value≥0.10*, ≥0.05**, ≥0.01***.

Although the addition a quadratic term helps identify non-linear relationships, the use of a categorical variable was preferred in order to highlight patterns where more than one turning point is present, as in the case of informal networks.

The main drawback of categorising the continuous measure of ethnic density is that quartiles may not detect the cut-offs that produce meaningful differences in the effect of residential concentration. However, the study wants to provide a first attempt to look at potentially non-linear relationships between ethnic density and political engagement as well as ethnic-based social resources. As argued by Karlsen et al. (2002: 1660), the use of dummy variables should not hinder the emergence of linear relationships in case these exist.
3.3 The qualitative enquiry

3.3.1 The case-study approach

The qualitative enquiry shifts the attention from the Black African community as a whole to the cases of two specific African national groups, namely Somalis and Ghanaians. These communities were identified and selected on the basis of their divergent immigration histories, integration experiences as well as religious, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. As will be explained in more details in Section 3.3.2, Ghanaians represent a well-established and generally well-integrated African community, whereas Somalis are a more recent group and has integrated less successfully integrated group. London was identified as the fieldwork setting in virtue of the exceptional clustering of Black Africans. The research was carried out in four boroughs located in North and East London where Somalis and Ghanaians concentrate.

An embedded multiple-case study design was adopted. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the two main cases, i.e. Somalis and Ghanaians, were located in a specific context (i.e. boroughs). The ethnic social networks that were addressed by the study (i.e. ethnic-based organisations, places of worship and informal networks) represented the units of analysis embedded in each case (Yin, 2009: 59).

The counter-case of low concentration areas was not identified and included in the study as the primary aim of the qualitative fieldwork was to understand the processes linking ethnic density, social networks and political engagement in the specific context of ethnic enclaves. Providing evidence of these relationships in low concentration areas was not within the qualitative fieldwork’s scope and was primarily addressed by the quantitative enquiry. In addition, more practical considerations about the inclusion of low concentration areas were taken into account. Firstly, the identification of a sample of Somalis and Ghanaians in low concentration areas would have been significantly

---

24 Full ethical approval for the qualitative fieldwork was granted by the University Ethics Committee 5 (flagged Humanities) in September 2011 – Project reference number: 11146. The participant information sheet and consent form distributed to all participants can be found in Appendixes E and F. Ethical approval was sought as the study was conducted amongst participants that could have potentially included asylum seekers, who are considered to be vulnerable subjects.
challenging and even unfeasible due to the extremely low numbers of community members in those neighbourhoods. Secondly, time and resource constraints limited the ability of the researcher to further expand the fieldwork setting. Having said that, the snowball sample generated within high concentration area assured some extent of diversity by involving a large variety of individuals coming from different urban areas including low concentration neighbourhoods.

Figure 3.5: The embedded multiple-case study design

The following sections illustrate the main differences identified between Ghanaians and Somalis (3.3.2); provide a description of the main fieldwork setting (3.3.3); and describe the sampling and data collection strategies as well as the main characteristics of the sample achieved (3.3.4).

### 3.3.2 The case studies: Ghanaians and Somalis

Recent studies have underlined that Ghanaians and Somalis effectively represent the internal heterogeneity characterising the Black African group as the two communities diverge in their immigration history, and integration experience as well as their cultural, linguistic and religious background (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010).
In spite of these differences, both groups are generally classified in national and local statistics as being part of the ‘Black African’ category. Based on the 2001 Census figures referring to the African foreign-born population, they represent, along with Nigerians and Zimbabweans, the largest African communities in the country and particularly in the London region (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010: 184-185; Arthur, 2008). As it will be highlighted in the next session (3.3.3), their presence in the country has been constantly growing in the past decade. That said, Ghanaians and Somalis effectively represent the extremes of a continuum describing the internal diversity of Black Africans. The following section highlights some of the main factors that distinguish the two communities and make them the cases on which this study focuses.

Length of residence: Ghanaians and Somalis portray the distinction between established ethnic minorities and ‘new immigrants’, respectively. The Ghanaian community represents one of the largest established minority groups within the African community, along with Nigerians. The number of Ghanaians climbed from just above 11,000 in 1971 to almost 33,000 in 1991 (Daley, 1998). The 2001 Census recorded 55,537 Ghanaian-born individuals in England and Wales (Van Hear et al., 2004) and the 2011 Census raised this figure to 93,846 (+69%). Contrary to Ghanaians, the overwhelming

---

25 Although Nigerians share several immigration-related features with the Ghanaian community, the latter was deemed to be a more suitable case to be studied in order to effectively represent the internal diversity of Black Africans. As Ghanaians, Nigerians represent one of the largest African group in Britain (2001 Census data reported by Mitton and Aspinall, 2011: 184) and, more specifically, in the London region (Mackintosh, 2005: 70). Furthermore, they are generally described as a long- and well-established African community presenting higher rate of employment and educational achievements as well as a better knowledge of English than other African groups. Despite these commonalities, Nigerians were not identified as a suitable case study to be contrasted with the Somali community for three main reasons. First of all, Nigeria (i.e. the homeland) is characterised by a great political and social instability, although not as acute as in Somalia. In contrast, Ghana has been experiencing more stable economic, political and social circumstances in the past two decades. Secondly, due to this socio-political turmoil in the homeland, Nigerians, despite representing one the most well-established African communities and primarily migrating to achieve higher education (i.e. student visas), still represent a significant proportion of the asylum seekers arriving in the UK (Aspinall and Chinouya, 2008: 191; Blinder, 2013: 7). Thirdly, about 50% of the population in Nigeria is Muslim and this was deemed to be like to determine a more religiously diverse diaspora community in Britain (Elam and Chinouya, 2000: 6). This would have not facilitated the comparison with a predominantly Muslim group such as the Somali community. The decision to concentrate on Ghanaians was therefore based on the need to maximise, however possible, the differences between the two African groups.

26 Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright – Commissioned Table C0115a (Mackintosh, 2005: 149-152).

27 Source: 2011 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright – Table QS203EW, Country of birth (detailed)
majority of Somalis arrived in the country during the 1980s and 1990s primarily as asylum seekers or through the channel of family reunions. The official statistics registered 43,373 Somalis in 2001 in England and Wales and according to the 2011 Census this population has significantly increased to 101,370 (+134%). Both communities have grown in the past decade but Somalis certainly present the greatest growth.

Reasons for migrating: The immigration history of Ghanaians and Somalis is characterised by different ‘push’ factors and motivations. The immigrants from Ghana who arrived in the UK during the 1940s were primarily pursuing higher education qualifications and professional training particularly in the field of engineering, medicine and nursing (Arthur, 2008; Peil, 1995). Even after the independence of Ghana in 1957, Ghanaians continued to migrate for training and education, also driven by the economic crisis that heavily hit the country during the 1970s (Arthur, 2008; Daley, 1998). Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, the political instability in the home-country significantly boosted the number of Ghanaian asylums seekers (Aspinall and Chinouya, 2008). Nowadays, the most common reasons for migration are still represented by higher education, specialist training and employment (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). Khalid Koser described the Ghanaian international migration as a “labour diaspora” (2003: 6), and Arthur has pointed out that amongst Ghanaian immigrants “international migration is perceived as a form of economic pilgrimage” (Arthur, 2008: 31). The incessant outflow of highly skilled workers, particularly in the health sectors, is becoming an issue for Ghana and international institutions, such as the International Organisation for Migrations, are supporting the Ghanaian government in the development of training and employment programmes as deterrents to this damaging ‘brain drain’ (IOM, 2011).

The Somali community in Britain presents a different immigration history. The very first migrants from Somalia arrived in the country during the late nineteenth century, leaving the British Somaliland protectorate as seamen. Initially, Somalis settled in port cities, such as London, Liverpool and Cardiff, but as a consequence of the economic growth linked

---

28 Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright - Commissioned Table C0115a (Mackintosh, 2005: 149-152).

29 Source: 2011 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright – Table QS203EW, Country of birth (detailed)
to heavy industries in the 1950s, Somalis moved to the Midlands and the Northern regions, where they formed large communities in Sheffield and Manchester, for instance (Hopkins, 2006; Harris, 2004; ICAR, 2007). Despite these early settlements, the Somali community is generally considered as a recent group compared to the Ghanaian or Nigerian communities. According to a report published by the Institute for Public Policy (IPPR, 2007), 72% of Somalis arrived in Britain after 1996, against only 40% of Ghanaians. The migration influxes from Somalia are primarily rooted in the internal political instability and the escalation of violence caused by the termination of Siad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991, which culminated in a devastating civil war. The country has never completely recovered from these tragic events and the collapse of governmental authority has exacerbated the internal feuds between clans and ultimately nourished the so called “victim diaspora” (Koser, 2003: 6). The number of asylum applications received by Somali nationals peaked in 1999, when it reached over 7,000 claims, but has been remarkably decreasing since then.

**Demographic Characteristics:** Different migration histories can lead to different demographic traits. First of all, the age structure of the two communities diverges. Ghanaians are generally older than Somalis, mostly as a consequence of the longer length of time spent in the country. The Ghanaian community has a higher proportion of individuals aged between 30 and 59, whereas amongst Somalis children and young people dominate (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). The analysis of gender composition also reveals different patterns between the two communities. Although within both groups the percentage of women has been increasing since 1980s, hence reversing the traditional male-dominated immigration, the most remarkable variation in the number of women has been registered amongst Somalis. As suggested by Mitton and Aspinall (2010), the proportion of Somali women in Britain rose from 39% in 1985 to 58% between 2001 and 2005, with a peak of 74% in the early 1990s (see also Harris, 2004: 23). According to the scholars, this change has been primarily determined by the increase in the number of women who decided to migrate independently from husbands and family members. In contrast, family reunions were the main push factor in the 1950s and 1960s.

Finally, the household structure of Ghanaians and Somalis differs. Black African families tend to be larger than the White British ones, and Somalis present the highest percentage
(24%) of households composed by four or more members. Divorce and separation rates are remarkably high for both Ghanaians and Somalis. The Somali community, not surprisingly, presents the highest proportion of female lone parents amongst ethnic minorities, perhaps as a direct consequence of the gender and age composition of migrations from Somalia (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010).

Religion: Religious affiliation is extremely relevant when considering not only the differences between Ghanaians and Somalis, but also the extent to which they diverge from the host society. The religious composition of Ghana is fairly heterogeneous. The great majority of Ghanaians in the homeland (70%) are Christian, with a prevalence of Pentecostals (24%), 16% are Muslim and 8.5% follow traditional beliefs (CIA, 2011). Similarly, British Ghanaians belong to Christian denominations, in particular Anglican, Roman Catholic and Pentecostal (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). On the contrary, Somalis are predominantly, if not wholly, Sunni Muslim. This reflects the religious composition of Somalia, which is unusually homogenous in comparison to other African countries where fragmentation prevails (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). Religion represents for Somalis a significant element of contact with the wider Muslim community in the UK but also sharpens the separation with the mainstream society. A recent government report focusing on the Somali diaspora has highlighted how Islamophobia is perceived to be a relevant issue within the community, particularly in terms of employment discrimination (Communities and Local Government, 2009: 33).

Language: Language proficiency is often used as a proxy for the level of inclusion and integration of ethnic minorities within the host society. As for religion, language marks out a dividing line between the host community and Somalis who are described by Mitton and Aspinall as “particularly linguistically isolated” (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010: 194). The large majority (63%) of Ghanaians speak English at home, whereas a remarkable 85% of Somalis use languages other than English. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that the official language of Ghana is English, mainly as a consequence of its colonial past, but Somalia established Arabic and Somali as its official idioms following its independence from the colonial protectorate of Italy and Britain. Therefore, the better knowledge of English amongst Ghanaians may be a direct consequence of the diffusion of this language in the home-country. That being said, both
communities are characterised by the presence of numerous national languages. The Ghanaian government officially recognises ten languages, and among those Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagomba and Ga are the most widely spoken (Home Office, 2010; Mitton, 2011). Although Somali and Arabic are the main languages of Somalia, other minor idioms are also widespread across the country, such as Darod, Migaam and Bravanese (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). Particularly with regard to Ghanaians, it is important to underline that, despite English being extensively known within the community, the growing influxes of migrants arriving in the UK from other European countries, such as Germany or Holland, rather than directly from Ghana, is increasing the linguistic heterogeneity within the community. As underlined by Kesten et al. (2011), children belonging to Ghanaian families who have just recently moved to Britain are more likely to speak German, Dutch or even a local Ghanaian language than English.

Integration experience: Scholars have underlined the relevance of divergent integration patterns characterising the two communities, which has generally been measured by the level of employment and educational achievements (Mitton and Aspinall, 2011). Somalis appear to be remarkably more disadvantaged than Ghanaians and other African groups, such as the Zimbabweans. The level of unemployment within the community has been extremely high since the 1980s and does not seem to show significant signs of improvement (Harris, 2004; Mitton and Aspinall, 2010). Mitton and Aspinall (2010: 198) calculated that, on the basis of the 2001 Census, 25% of men along with 12% of women are unemployed, in contrast with 7% and 9% of Ghanaian unemployed men and women respectively. Levels of inactivity are also exceptional amongst Somalis, with 80% of women being inactive. Moreover, Somalis present a remarkably low level of educational achievement. Based on the 2008 National Pupil database, Mitton and Aspinall (2011: 4) showed that only 34% of Somali pupils attained 5 GCSEs at grade A–C*.

Other immigration-related factors: The Ghanaian and Somali communities are also remarkably different with regard to other cultural and immigration-related traits, such as the presence of internal tribal sub-groups and the experience of democracy in the home-country. Tribal sub-groups exist within both communities, which, however, differ in the degree of these internal separations. Ghanaians mainly belong to the Akan, Twi, Kwan,
Gur, Fante and Ashante ethnicities but these sub-groups are not regarded as “a significant source of difference or division within the British community” (Elam and Chinouya, 2000: 22). This low degree of internal fragmentation primarily derives from the weakness of tribal traditions in the country of origin as well as from the willingness of the diasporic community to reaffirm their national rather than their tribal identity in order to benefit from the unity as minorities in a foreign country (Elam and Chinouya, 2000). In sharp contrast, the Somali community is characterised by significant internal divisions shaped along both ethnic and geographical boundaries. In particular, the community comprises individuals coming from both the Northern and Southern regions of Somalia. The former is also known as Somaliland, a name that recalls the British protectorate established in the area between 1884 and 1960, and the great majority of its inhabitants belong to the Isaaq tribe. The first Somali immigrants that reached the British coasts as seamen in the late nineteenth century originally came from this region. In the early 1990s migrations from Northern Somalia were joined by immigrants – mainly belonging to the Hiwiya tribe – from the Southern region, formerly known as Italian Somaliland due to the Italian protectorate that was in place between 1889 and 1960. Whereas Northern Somalis were more familiar with the English system, culture and language due to the colonial link, individuals from the South have generally been seen as less adaptable. This internal diversity based on clanship has been described by Montclos (2003) as a factor that shapes community organisations, which become expressions of specific clans and hence create tensions within the community. For instance, the Anglo-Somali Society and the Somali London Community and Cultural Association are dominated by the Isaaq group, while the Somali Community Association is linked to the Darod clan (Montclos, 2003: 39). Furthermore, scholars have argued that these geographical and tribal divisions affect the ability of Somalis to achieve a shared identity, express collective needs and obtain stronger representation, visibility and thus more benefits (Hopkins, 2006; Montclos, 2003; Griffiths, 2000).

The experience of democracy is also expected to be notably divergent for Ghanaians and Somalis due to the contrasting political circumstances in the respective country of origin. Ghana went through a long period of political instability that was gradually resolved throughout the 1990s. In 1992 the new constitution was approved and the Fourth
Republic inaugurated (Arthur, 2008). Free and fair presidential elections have been held since 1996 and the Freedom House identifies Ghana as a ‘free’ country on the basis of its high scores in political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2010b). Somalia represents the extreme opposite of the continuum. The internal instabilities that started in 1991 continue to weaken the country, along with the exacerbation of tensions linked to religion (i.e. Islamic extremism) and between local clans and tribes (Freedom House, 2010a). In particular, the secessionist claims of the Northern region of Somaliland, which has a self-proclaimed but not internationally recognised government, have worsened the country’s unity and stability.

Although multiple differences between Ghanaians and Somalis have been identified, this does not imply that no within-group variations exist in the individual experiences of immigration and integration. For instance, more recent Ghanaian immigrants, along with Nigerians and other West Africans, are more likely to be over-represented in low-paid, unskilled jobs in London, regardless of the level of education acquired in the country of origin (Datta et al., 2006; Herbert et al., 2006). Some difficulties in speaking English fluently have also been recorded especially amongst those migrating from rural areas in Ghana where local languages and dialects are widespread (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010: 196). Similarly, the language difficulties and other integration issues are much less common amongst well-established groups of Somalis who migrated to the UK through family reunification in the 1960s and 1970s and were entirely socialised in the country. The study does not ignore these intra-group complexities, which will emerge and will be acknowledged throughout the analysis. However, it identifies in the national origin a dimension that is relevant in shedding light on the heterogeneity of Black Africans as a community and its effect on the relationships of interest (Maxwell, 2012: 5).

### 3.3.3 The fieldwork context: London

The selection of the fieldwork setting was guided by the need to investigate the cases of interest, i.e. Somalis and Ghanaians, within contexts where their co-ethnics are highly
concentrated. This allowed the study to highlight the role played by different immigration, integration experiences and socio-cultural backgrounds of the two communities insofar as it creates a certain level of homogeneity in the context in which the groups are researched.

The area selection process was developed in two main steps. First of all, the high concentration area for Black Africans was identified, based on the information provided by the 2001 Census. There were just above 479,000 Black Africans in England and Wales and the overwhelming majority (about 379,000) was clustered in the London region. Both Somalis and Ghanaians were also found to concentrate in this region, as reported in Table 3.8. In this regard, it is interesting to note how, as for Black Africans (see Chapter 2), the size of both communities has significantly increased in England and Wales between 2001 and 2011 but their clustering in the London region decreased by about 20% for Ghanaians and by just below 15% for Somalis. Having said that, based on the data available in 2001, London was deemed to be the most suitable fieldwork setting to capture the processes taking place in ethnic enclaves.

Table 3.8: Ghanaian- and Somali-born living in England & Wales and London – 2001 and 2011 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001¹</th>
<th></th>
<th>2011²</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>London (%)</td>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>London (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaians</td>
<td>55,537</td>
<td>46,513 (84%)</td>
<td>93,846</td>
<td>62,896 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>43,373</td>
<td>33,831 (78%)</td>
<td>101,370</td>
<td>65,333 (64.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics © Crown Copyright – Commissioned Table C0115a (Mackintosh, 2005: 149-152).

Secondly, having established London as the main focus of this research, the information provided by the 2001 Census about country of birth was utilised to identify the London area selection took place in 2010, when only the data for the 2001 Census were available. The data for the 2011 Census were published in late 2012, so the information could be used exclusively to update the statistics for Black Africans, Ghanaians and Somalis but not to select the area of study.
boroughs where Ghanaians and Somalis are highly clustered. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the distribution of the two ethnic groups across London boroughs and highlight the areas of high concentration (in black), which is calculated as the percentage of Somalis or Ghanaians over the total population in the borough. It is important to underline that, due to the unavailability of data specifically referred to Ghana as country of birth, the variable “Born in Africa: Central and Western Africa: Other Central and Western Africa” was adopted to measure the concentration of Ghanaians. The count in this variable does not include individuals who were born in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo. Therefore, it is expected that Ghanaians represent the majority of individuals included in this category.

Figure 3.6: Residential concentration of ‘Other Central and Western Africans’ in London boroughs – 2001 Census

Source: For the borders (2001 Local Authority – England), this work is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material which is copyright of the Crown. For the percentage of Somalis and Other Central and Western Africans at the Local Authority level: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics – Country of Birth Table UV08 © Crown Copyright.
Based on this data, the borough of Newham in East London was originally identified as a fieldwork setting as both communities are highly clustered. More accurate information showed that, in 2001, just above 3,700 Ghanaians (1.5% of the borough population) and 3,100 Somalis (1.3%) were living in the borough (2001 Census, Commissioned Table C0413).

The selection of a specific borough for the fieldwork, however, did not just take into account the percentage of Somalis and Ghanaians but relied on other factors. The consultation of scholarly and policy literature focusing on Ghanaians and Somalis in London, as well as conversations with researchers who had previously worked with the two communities, significantly contributed to the definition of the fieldwork’s scope. Furthermore, significant difficulties were encountered in contacting ethnic organisations, both Somali and Ghanaian, in Newham and this would have hindered the sampling process that was expected to begin exactly from these formal networks (see Section
Further information was also gathered during the fieldwork about the areas that are considered to be the ‘hubs’ of the community.

As a consequence, based on all these different sources of information, the final fieldwork setting did not only include the objective clustering of Somalis and Ghanaians as defined by the Census data, but was expanded to include the following London boroughs: Tower Hamlets and Newham in East London and Haringey and Hackney in North London (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8: Fieldwork setting – London boroughs

The borough of Tower Hamlets was identified as a fieldwork setting for Somalis. The community is highly clustered in this area, where it represents the second ethnic group after Bangladeshis which make up about one third of the total borough population. Previous empirical literature also described the borough as the “mother of the Somali community in London” (Options UK, 2010: 31). This is due to the presence of a long-established community descending from the seamen who arrived in the country in the
early nineteenth century, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the significantly large number of Somali businesses and community organisations. The first contacts with community organisations were indeed established with Somali groups in this borough. The area in which the community groups, businesses and informal networks were settled and developed was fairly narrow and this facilitated the study of close-knit relationships in a high concentration context.

As with Tower Hamlets, Haringey was identified by other researchers as a focal point for Ghanaians, primarily due to a significantly high concentration of co-ethnics and the considerable presence of shops and businesses, such as hair salons, grocery stores and shipping stores, directly linked to the community. Unlike Somalis, however, Ghanaian organisations were not as visible and it was extremely difficult to identify and get in contact with them. Religious institutions, on the contrary, provided a much more accessible starting point for the study. The contact with churches brought the fieldwork to Newham. From there the study gradually expanded back towards North London and more specifically Haringey and the neighbouring borough of Hackney due to the recruitment of community members who were living in these areas.

Although these boroughs represent the main areas where data were gathered, a flexible approach was adopted for the recruitment of participants. Individuals who were first contacted through formal networks such as voluntary organisations and religious institutions based in Newham, Tower Hamlets, Haringey or Hackney but were resident in other London boroughs were also included in the study. Therefore, a few interviews were realised outside the area illustrated in Figure 3.8 (see Section 3.3.4). This flexible approach to the fieldwork was crucial and necessary in order to capture the adaptability of the process of socialisation (Simons, 2009: section 1). Individuals do not always live and socialise in the same neighbourhoods and this had to be acknowledged and explored by the study. Similarly, the way in which communities and individuals shape their social networks and how these networks consequently operate was not expected to be limited to physical spaces that are defined by administrative boundaries such as the London boroughs.
3.3.4 Sampling, data collection and data analysis strategies

The qualitative fieldwork adopted a snowball sampling strategy, which implied an initial contact with a group of individuals through which it was then possible to get in contact with other individuals and hence increase the sample size (Bryman, 2008). As pointed out by Faugier and Sargeant (1997), the main assumption of this approach is “the existence of some kind of ‘linkage’ or ‘bond’ with other people in the sample population” (1997: 792). For that reason a snowball sample was deemed to be an effective strategy in order to identify how people from the same national group connect with each other in areas where there is physical proximity due to high co-ethnic concentration. The snowball sampling strategy has been traditionally applied to the study of ‘hidden’ populations and sensitive topics, such as drug abuse, criminal activities or sexual identity (Browne, 2005). Although this study does not address behaviours that are conventionally recognised as ‘deviant’, ‘stigmatised’ or even illegal, the adoption of a snowball sample was also seen as advantageous for reaching the ‘heart’ of social networks that are developed within the close circles of national groups.

The sample was initially set to include community members (aged 18 and above) and ‘community leaders’ who were born in Somalia or Ghana or were of Somali or Ghanaian descent. During the fieldwork, the decision was made to include local and possibly national public officials in order to capture their perception of the level of political and community engagement amongst Somalis and Ghanaians in the specific borough as well as to shed light on the party’s mobilisation and inclusion strategies targeting the two communities.

As regards the recruitment of community members and leaders, the starting point for the snowball sample was represented by community organisations, namely voluntary groups that specifically cater for Ghanaians or Somalis and are led by community members. The recruitment of participants through the initial intervention of such formal social networks was crucial in facilitating the process of acceptance and trust-gaining. It also enabled the researcher to reach community leaders and gain a valuable insight into

---

31 Community leaders are here identified as chairs or directors of community organisations, religious leaders, and activists who concentrate on community issues
the structure and action of these networks, which in this study represent both recruitment channels and objects of investigation.

Community organisations were initially identified via the Charity Commission for England and Wales online database[^32] as well as through conversations with researchers who had worked with Somalis and Ghanaians in London. The sampling process developed amongst Somalis considerably differed from the strategy adopted with Ghanaians, primarily as a consequence of the significantly divergent ways in which the two communities shape their formal and informal networks.

With regard to Somalis, community organisations were selected in the borough of Tower Hamlets and, after a much more challenging search, in Newham. Through these channels it was possible to recruit community members and leaders and capture their formal and informal networks. Some voluntary work was also carried out within these organisations to achieve a close and more regular contact with the community, support the recruitment process and undertake participant observation. Despite this effective cooperation with community organisations, it was not possible to directly access local ethnic mosques primarily due to the researcher’s gender, which made gaining access to the religious space very difficult. Nonetheless, the role of religious institutions, either specifically linked to the community or serving a mixed and broader public, was investigated through interviews with respondents who took part in religious activities.

The sample of Ghanaians was generated through a different process. Identifying community organisations in Haringey, Hackney and Newham proved to be an extremely challenging task, particularly in the very early stages of the fieldwork. This was mainly a consequence of the different function that voluntary groups have in the community and their different internal structure. As discovered during the research, Ghanaians tend to organise themselves in a much less formal manner than Somalis, mainly by forming groups of individuals who come from the same village or region in Ghana and promote social activities on a monthly or annual basis, or by organising support for community activities.

[^32]: The database can be accessed at the following address: http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/. Additional databases were used to find organisations and religious institutions or to double check their location and status: GuideStar UK, Mosque Finder, Newham Voluntary Sector Consortium. The search included keywords such as ‘Somali’, ‘Somalis’, ‘Somaliland’, ‘Somalia’, ‘Ghana’, ‘Ghanaians’. 
members through the numerous Ghanaian churches or Ghanaian groups attending mixed churches. For these reasons, difficulties were encountered in finding organisations that were visible, open to the public, operating on a daily basis or that were willing to take part in the research. Therefore, unlike the research that was carried out with the Somalis, the snowball sampling began from religious institutions and followed the informal networks that extended way beyond the boroughs of interest, towards South-East and North-West London. This process produced a smaller sample compared to the Somali community, but allowed the researcher to include a great variety of individuals, from community members to religious and community leaders, settled in both high and low concentration areas in London.

Table 3.9 reports the main demographic characteristics of the Somali and Ghanaian participants.\(^3\) The two samples present various significant dissimilarities both in terms of size and demographic characteristics. First of all, more Somalis than Ghanaian were recruited and interviewed. This primarily depended on the accessibility for Somali formal networks. Having the first contact with respondents in a trusted environment helped the process of recruitment, as was also noticed in the case of the Ghanaian church.

The contact with Somali organisations was, however, more regular and prolonged than with Ghanaian religious institutions. Furthermore, as previously pointed out, the research conducted amongst Somalis was concentrated in one borough where very dense connections between community members and leaders allowed the researcher to access the community in a fairly straightforward manner. In addition, the active participation in organisational activities and community events facilitated the contacts with Somalis. On the contrary, the widespread networks detected within the Ghanaian community and the difficulties in finding organisations rooted in a specific area and open to the public hindered the recruitment processes. Previous research conducted amongst Ghanaians highlighted similar difficulties in recruiting participants due to the lack of visibility of

\(^{3}\) In some cases age, year and age of arrival are only approximate measures of actual demographics as this information was not systematically collected and in some cases respondents did not provide such details.
formal networks and the relevant spatial dispersion of community’s networks (Salway et al., 2007: 5).

Table 3.9: The qualitative sample - Demographic characteristics of Ghanaians and Somalis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Somalis</th>
<th>Ghanaians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36–45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46–55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total sample</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences in the respondents’ demographic profile are a direct consequence of the difficulties encountered in the recruitment of Ghanaians. The support received by Somali voluntary community groups led to the possibility of refining and diversifying the sample. Consequently, it was possible to achieve a more balanced sample in terms of gender, age and generation. For Ghanaians, in contrast, more men than women were recruited, and the majority of participants were aged 36 and above and belonged to the first generation. Despite this unbalanced sample, it is important to underline that generally the Ghanaian community is older than the Somali group, as pointed out in Section 2.6.1, and the sample could therefore be seen as representative of the community as a whole.

---

34 Generational status is measured as in the quantitative analysis (see Appendix A): (first generation) individuals who were born abroad and migrated after the age of 13; (1.5 generation) individuals who were born abroad and migrated between the age of 6 and 12; (second generation) individuals who were born in the UK or were born abroad but migrated before the age of 5.
Nonetheless, the absence of younger participants is a weakness that could be overcome and that limited the analysis of cross-generational differences.

Table 3.9 does not report information about the socio-economic status of participants as this was not recorded systematically. However, both samples are composed of a wide range of socio-economic profiles which were described in more or less detail during the interviews.

With regard to public officials and party representatives, the sampling strategy did not follow a snowball approach. Names and contact details were identified through the local authorities’ website and the first contact was made by email. The initial target was to recruit at least one local (councillor) and one national (Member of Parliament) public official in each of the boroughs of interest. This approach would have given the researcher the opportunity to gather data about Somalis and Ghanaians separately in Tower Hamlets and Haringey respectively, and a comparison of the two communities in Newham. This target was partially met, as three councillors and one Member of Parliament were interviewed. The contacts established with local party representatives were unsuccessful.

The data were primarily gathered through face-to-face, semi-structured interviews which took place in the premises of voluntary organisations or places of worship; in other public venues in the local area (e.g. cafes, restaurants, market stalls); only in a few cases at the respondent’s private address (the interview guide can be found in Appendix D). Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and two hours and were audio-recorded only with the respondents’ authorisation. If this was not obtained, notes were made by hand. On one occasion, an interpreter had to be recruited amongst community workers in a Somali organisation in order to interview a participant who could not speak English fluently. In other cases, interviews had to be cancelled due to the difficulty of communicating with participants and the unavailability of interpreters. For this reason, it was not possible to conduct focus groups, which were included in the initial data collection strategy. Language barriers did not represent a problem amongst Ghanaians.

The fieldwork also gathered data through participant observation. This activity was facilitated by the voluntary activities carried out within Somali organisations.
Amongst Somalis the observation focused mainly on community organisations, community events and political initiatives (e.g. public events or more restricted meetings) promoted by ethnic leaders often in cooperation with political parties in the local area. Amongst Ghanaians, the main observation was carried out in the church, which was visited three times during the Saturday service. Evidence of other community events, such as dinners and parties, was found through leaflets gathered in shops and markets. However, it was not possible to attend those events due to difficulty of booking tickets.

No reimbursements, incentives or other benefits were offered to participants, who were also asked to sign a consent form, which can be found in Appendix E.

All interviews were transcribed either fully or partially by selecting the most relevant parts of the conversation. For the interviews that had not been recorded, the notes made during the interview were used. All transcripts were anonymised through a system of codes that were assigned to participants, names of organisations, religious institutions and, in some cases, to locations. The anonymised transcripts were coded and analysed with NVivo 9.
CHAPTER 4. Residential Concentration and Political Participation

This chapter focuses on the direct relationship between ethnic residential concentration and political involvement, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, hence addressing the first research question:

RQ1. Does residential concentration affect political participation of Black Africans in Britain?

Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 – Hypotheses tested

The existing empirical research about the impact of ethnic residential concentration on political engagement has been organised by Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008a, 2008b) into two competing strands. The first one highlights the negative effect of ethnic density (i.e. marginalising hypothesis) whereas the second one points out the positive processes taking place in ethnic enclaves (i.e. mobilising hypothesis). This study adopts the same frameworks and tests both arguments.

On the one hand, it has been argued that ethnic minorities tend to concentrate in highly deprived areas (Massey and Denton, 1993, 1989). This socio-economic
disadvantage not only deprives ethnic minorities of politically relevant resources but also leads to a social and political withdrawal from the societal mainstream. The infrequent contacts with the mainstream society and the stronger inward-looking solidarity (i.e. bonding social capital) represent other arguments in support of the negative effect of concentration on political integration (Lien, 1994; Cohen and Dawson, 1993). Close-knit connections with co-ethnics are deemed to support the creation of particularised rather than generalised trust, with the latter being the most beneficial for widespread social cohesion and sense of civicsness that stimulate political participation (Putnam et al., 1993).

The marginalising hypothesis is applied to this study as follows:

**H1** – Black Africans living in areas characterised by high concentration of co-ethnics are less likely to be involved in political activities than those living outside those areas.

In sharp contrast, some scholars have lent support to the hypothesis that ethnic residential concentration has a positive impact on political participation (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008b). Firstly, spatial proximity with co-ethnics is expected to enhance group consciousness, which is a strong predictor of ethnic political participation (Shingles, 1981; Schlichting et al., 1998; Miller et al., 1981). Secondly, it favours the creation of ethnic leaders and ethnic candidates who can promote mobilising actions among community members (Uhlaner, 1989). Thirdly, some scholars have suggested that mainstream political actors are more prone to invest resources in targeting larger, more visible and hence more politically relevant ethnic minorities (Leighley, 2001; Cho et al., 2006). Finally, a positive relationship has been found between residential concentration and the creation of ethnic-based social resources, such as ethnic associations and ethnic religious institutions, which have been linked to higher levels of political mobilisation (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Tate, 1991; Verba et al., 1995). This study formulates the mobilising hypothesis as follows:

**H2** – Black Africans living in areas characterised by high concentration of co-ethnics are more likely to be involved in political activities than those living outside those areas.

British scholars have presented empirical evidence in support of the mobilising hypothesis for the Asian community (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Cutts et al., 2007). So far, however, little attention has been given to the effect of residential
concentration on electoral and non-electoral engagement among Black Africans. There are reasons to believe that the results highlighted by the American literature, which remains the main point of reference, in support of both the mobilising and marginalising hypotheses may not be directly applied to the African group in Britain. Firstly, the level of co-ethnic concentration characterising not only the Black African but also other ethnic communities in the UK is lower than the one recorded in the US, despite recent evidence suggesting an increase in the size of ethnic enclaves in Britain (Johnston et al., 2002a).

Secondly, the history and intensity of racial discrimination suffered from the Black community in the US is hardly comparable to the immigration and integration experiences of Black British communities. Through the Civil Rights movement, the African American community has built much stronger and more politicised social networks, such as community organisations and religious institutions, which have been often described as the ‘missing links’ between ethnic concentration and political participation. These resources might not be as relevant and strong among Black Africans in Britain. Drawing on these observations, some support for the null hypothesis is likely to emerge when focusing on the British context. Recent studies have indeed suggested that the percentage of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood does not significantly influence the likelihood of ethnic minorities to participate in politics (Heath et al., 2011).

Nonetheless, relevant factors can be identified to suggest that local ethnic clustering may well play a role, either positive or negative, in the integration process. First of all, the African community in the UK is rapidly changing. Its size has risen by about 130% between 1991 and 2001, and further growth is expected in future decades. Consequently, the group is likely to become progressively more salient in the political arena, as it has been argued for Indians (Saggar, 2001). Secondly, Black Africans have been described as one of the most clustered communities in the country, along with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. According to the 2001 Census, just below 80% of Black Africans concentrate in the inner London area where they represent the second largest ethnic group after Indians. Not only is the community growing in size, but it is also concentrating in the main urban areas, with London being the main region of settlement, hence potentially increasing the degree of co-ethnic concentration. Both factors could suggest that contextual factors, such as the neighbourhood ethno-religious composition,
may be relevant forces in the political engagement of Black Africans, as they are for South Asian communities.

Whether the effect of residential concentration would be negative or positive for Black Africans could depend on various factors. Based on the existing literature, it could be argued that as Black Africans tend to concentrate in the most deprived neighbourhoods, like other ethnic minorities (Phillips, 1997; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008b: 533), and also suffer from a socio-economic disadvantage at the individual level (Li and Heath, 2008), the impact of ethnic density is likely to be negative due to the detrimental effect of socio-economic deprivation on various integration outcomes, including political engagement. However, it has been suggested that ethnic communities can overcome the negativities brought about by high levels of individual- and aggregate-level deprivation by creating, developing and effectively utilising ethnic-based resources to mobilise in the political domain (Maxwell, 2012; Bloemraad, 2006b). If these resources and opportunities are not activated, co-ethnic clusters are far more likely to further isolate and impoverish communities that already lack individual socio-economic resources and thus negatively impact on their political behaviours (Massey and Denton, 1993). Therefore, if a relationship between ethnic enclaves and political participation is found, its direction is likely to depend on the extent to which Black Africans have been able to develop co-ethnic institutions, helping them to compensate for socio-economic disadvantages.

In order to provide a wider context to the analysis of the impact of residential concentration on political participation, this chapter presents findings for Black Africans and four other ethnic communities, i.e. Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The analysis, however, does not deal with the possible within-group variations stemming from the internal diversity of Black Africans, as the qualitative findings about Somalis and Ghanaians will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. However, it could be anticipated that the relationship between ethnic enclaves and political engagement is likely to vary between African national groups that have generally experienced successful long-term integration (e.g. Ghanaians) and more recent migrant groups suffering from more challenging and disadvantaged conditions (e.g. Somalis).
Section 4.1 provides descriptive statistics of the level and modes of political involvement by each ethnic group. Section 4.2 focuses on the regression analysis carried out for the three variables measuring political involvement, i.e. voting in general elections, voting in local elections, participating in non-electoral activities. As for the descriptive statistics, the regression models refer to Black Africans as well as Black Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

4.1 Political participation of Black Africans: descriptive findings

Prior to considering the impact of residential concentration on political involvement amongst Black Africans, it is important to describe the ways in which the community is involved in politics compared to other ethnic minority groups as well as, where possible, the White British majority.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the self-reported vote and the final variable that is utilised as outcome for the regression analysis that will be presented in the following section. The six ethnic groups differ significantly in their electoral participation when the self-reported vote is considered. Black Africans present the lowest turnout rate in the 2010 general elections compared to both other ethnic communities and the White British majority. Only 64% of Africans declared to have voted, in contrast to the 78% of Bangladeshis, 76% of Indians and 76.5% of Pakistanis. Overall, the South Asian groups appear to be more similar to the White British group (78.5%) than to the Black minority communities. The marginal electoral participation of Africans, as well as the consistently high voter turnout of the South Asian communities, have been pointed out by other studies analysing voter turnout in the 1997 and 2010 general elections (Heath et al., 2011; Richards and Marshall, 2003; Saggar, 2001; Bird et al., 2011; Anwar, 2001).

The final variable that will be used as outcome in the regression analysis, takes into account individual eligibility to vote, as well as the validated turnout for those who agreed for their vote to be checked against the electoral register. The integration of these two variables allows adjusting the level of self-reported voter turnout for the information
provided by the electoral register. This is particularly important due to tendency of individuals to over-report turnout, as in the case of Asians in the UK (Heath et al., 2011).

Figure 4.2: Voter turnout by ethnic group (%)

![Voter turnout by ethnic group (%)](image)

Source: EMBES 2010 and BES 2010. Design weight applied (separate weights for BES and EMBES). Self-reported & validated turnout of White British is corrected for validated non-eligibility only as self-reported non-eligibility is not available in the BES. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (self-reported) White British=2,760; African=503; Caribbean=584; Indian=576; Pakistani=636; Bangladeshi=263; (self-reported&validated) White British=2,751; African=477; Caribbean=580; Indian=565; Pakistani=635; Bangladeshi=260. Chi²: (self-reported turnout)=95.5 (5 df), p<0.001; Chi²: (self-reported&validated)=43.9 (5 df), p<0.001.

At the same time, it is important to note that the variable for validated turnout could not be used as main dependent variable because of the large number of missing values deriving from the high proportion of EMBES respondents who refused the validation (i.e. 1,350 respondents over 2,787: 48.5%). Respondents are coded as (1) voters or (0) non-voters if their vote was validated accordingly or, when the validated vote was missing, they declared to have or not to have voted (self-reported turnout). Individuals who were found to be non-eligible to vote by validated turnout or self-reported non-eligibility were excluded from the analysis (see Appendix A for more detailed information.

---

35 The missing category for validated turnout includes those who refused validation as well as individuals who are not eligible to vote, those who are not registered at the address where the interview took place, and those whose details were not sufficient to be identified on the electoral register.
about variable coding).\(^{36}\) The analysis of the frequencies for this variable is reported in Figure 4.2 and reveals a slight decrease in voter turnout particularly for the White British, Indian and Caribbean groups. Nonetheless, Black Africans are still the least engaged community and the Asians the most engaged and these between-group differences are statistically significant.

A possible explanation for the marginality of Black Africans in electoral activities could be the fact that a higher proportion of Africans were not eligible to vote in 2010 compared to other ethnic groups. Based on the EMBES data, the percentage of non-eligible Black Africans is just above 7%, while for the other five communities it is below 3%.\(^{37}\) It is important to point out that whereas the great majority of Caribbeans and South Asians are likely to be eligible to vote in both general and local elections by virtue of their citizenship of Commonwealth countries,\(^{38}\) a smaller proportion of African immigrants can benefit from this status. This could be a plausible cause of the lower proportion of eligible individuals.

Besides electoral engagements, non-electoral political participation is investigated. Figure 4.3 illustrates the individual participation in at least one non-electoral activity (among protests, petitions, boycotting and giving money to political causes),\(^{39}\) which represents the main outcome variable for the regression analysis. The engagement in non-electoral activities is low across all five ethnic minority groups, with the percentage of

---

36 Respondents who declared to be non-eligible to vote (self-reported eligibility) were excluded only when the information about validated turnout was missing.

37 Non-eligibility was identified by adding the information provided by the validated vote, which included the option “not eligible to vote” for those who could not vote in general elections (e.g. European citizens), with the self-reported non-eligibility. In the EMBES 2010, respondents who declared not to be registered were asked to clarify the reason why their name was not on the register. A multiple-choice answer was allowed, including the category “I am not entitled to” (q160_1). A second, prompted question was asked to those who answer “don’t know” and the option “I am not entitled” was provided (q160a). The weighted percentages, calculated over the total Ns, for non-eligibility are: BA=7%, BC=1%, I=2.6%, P=2%, BAN=1.2%.

38 Commonwealth citizens qualify to register and vote in both local and general elections providing that they have a valid leave to enter or remain in the UK, fulfil the age requirement and do not have any other legal incapacity (Electoral Commission, 2012).

39 The BES survey did not entail questions about participation in non-electoral activities but only a question on the likelihood of getting involved in such modes of political engagement. Therefore, it was not possible to present figures for the White British group.
individuals who participated in at least one non-electoral action varying between 21% for Black Africans and 29% for Pakistanis.

Figure 4.3: Participation in at least one non-electoral activity by ethnic group (%)

![Bar chart showing participation in non-electoral activities by ethnic group.]

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: BA=524; BC=597; I=586; P=667; BAN=270. Chi²=9.6 (4 df), p>0.10.

The intensity of non-electoral engagement is also marginal, as the great majority of respondents did not take part in any non-electoral activity. Figure 4.4 shows that non-electoral participation is slightly less ‘intense’ amongst Black Africans. Just 5% of community members engaged in more than three non-electoral activities, compared to 15% of Pakistanis and 12% of Bangladeshis. In contrast, the great majority (70%) of Black Africans who engaged in non-electoral activities participated in only one non-electoral action. These differences are not statistically significant.
In contrast, the types of activities individuals engage in significantly diverge between groups. As shown in Figure 4.5, signing petitions is by far the most widespread action across the five communities, although Black Africans are the least engaged in this mode of participation. Similarly, they present the lowest involvement in protests, boycotting and donating money. The only statistically significant differences, however, are those related to protests and boycotting. In both cases, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis present the highest degree of engagement. These findings suggest that not only do Black Africans not participate as actively as other ethnic minority groups in electoral politics, but they do not seem to turn to less formal non-electoral modes of participation either. Similarly, however, Asian communities, and particularly Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, tend to be active in both electoral and non-electoral participation, hence the suggestion that these two modes of engagement could be complementing rather than substituting each other.
Figure 4.5: Type of non-electoral participation by ethnic group (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of non-electoral activity (%)</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotting</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving money</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (protests) African=523; Caribbean=593; Indian=584; Pakistani=665; Bangladeshi=270; (petitions) African=520; Caribbean=592; Indian=579; Pakistani=665; Bangladeshi=269; (boycotting) African=522; Caribbean=593; Indian=581; Pakistani=664; Bangladeshi=269; (giving money) African=523; Caribbean=593; Indian=582; Pakistani=664; Bangladeshi=269. Chi² (protests)=12.7 (4 df), p<0.10; Chi² (petitions)=7.4, p>0.10; Chi² (boycotting)=33.2 (4 df), p<0.001; Chi² (giving money)=2.2, p>0.10.

To sum up, the descriptive findings highlight that the level of non-electoral engagement is as low among Black Africans as it is amongst other ethnic communities. Nonetheless, the intensity of this engagement (i.e. the number of non-electoral activities in which individuals participated) appears to be slightly lower for Africans, especially when compared to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Community members also seem to be less engaged in protests and boycotting than these two Asian groups. The Black African electoral turnout in the 2010 general elections was found to be significantly lower than among other ethnic communities and the White British majority. The higher rate of non-eligibility among Africans might be influencing this low turnout.
4.2 Residential concentration and political engagement: the regression model

The regression analysis presented in this section aims at shedding light on the direct relationship between residential concentration and political participation and, more specifically, at testing the marginalising (H1) and mobilising (H2) hypotheses.

As pointed out in the previous section, political participation is defined as both electoral and non-electoral engagement. Residential concentration is defined as the percentage of co-ethnics in the LSOA and is measured through a set of three dummy variables corresponding to the quartiles derived from the original continuous variable.\(^4\) The first quartile is omitted as reference category. Since the division into quartiles differs across ethnic communities, the specific categories for each group are reported in Table 4.1. The level of concentration differs across groups, with Black Africans and Black Caribbeans reaching lower levels of concentration, respectively 43.62% and 28.19%, compared to the higher percentages of Indians (68.94%), Pakistanis (86.39%) and Bangladeshis (63.17%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quartile</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 1</td>
<td>0–1.35</td>
<td>0–2.97</td>
<td>0–4.06</td>
<td>0–6.06</td>
<td>0–4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 3</td>
<td>5.40–10.30</td>
<td>6.79–12.39</td>
<td>10.27–23.12</td>
<td>17.42–45.27</td>
<td>10.90–25.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. The quartiles were calculated for each ethnic group.

\(^4\) A more detailed description of the operationalisation of co-ethnic density is presented in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).
Through bivariate descriptive analysis it is possible to explore the relationship between political engagement and residential concentration. Figure 4.6 focuses on Black Africans and shows a contrasting pattern between electoral and non-electoral participation within areas characterised by a different level of co-ethnic density. The percentage of Black Africans who declared to have voted in general elections increases from 57.5% to 73.5% and, in contrast, the percentage of those who engaged in at least one non-electoral activity decreases from 28% to 15% between the lowest and highest quartile. Figures 4.7 to 4.10 report descriptive findings for all other ethnic groups and suggest that the positive pattern highlighted for Black Africans is also found amongst Indians. This would provide some support to the empirical evidence presented with regard to South Asians communities in the UK (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b).

Figure 4.6: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Black Africans by percentage of Black Africans in LSOA (quartiles) (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (voter turnout) quartile 1=121, quartile 2=114, quartile 3=120, quartile 4=122; (non-electoral) quartile 1=134, quartile 2=128, quartile 3=131, quartile 4=131. Chi²: (voter turnout)=8.5 (3 df), p<0.10; Chi²: (non-electoral)=9.5 (3 df), p<0.10.
Figure 4.7: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Caribbeans by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles)

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (voter turnout) quartile 1=146, quartile 2=148, quartile 3=148, quartile 4=138; (non-electoral) quartile 1=150, quartile 2=149, quartile 3=151, quartile 4=147. Chi²: (voter turnout)=1.6 (3 df), p>0.10; Chi²: (non-electoral)=11.3 (3 df), p<0.05.

Figure 4.8: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Indians by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%) 

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (voter turnout) quartile 1=141, quartile 2=149, quartile 3=142, quartile 4=133; (non-electoral) quartile 1=147, quartile 2=153, quartile 3=143, quartile 4=143. Chi²: (voter turnout)=13.4 (3 df), p<0.001; Chi²: (non-electoral)=17.2 (3 df), p<0.05.
Figure 4.9: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Pakistanis by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (voter turnout) quartile 1=156, quartile 2=164, quartile 3=156, quartile 4=159; (non-electoral) quartile 1=167, quartile 2=174, quartile 3=160, quartile 4=166. Chi²: (voter turnout)=4.5 (3 df), p>0.10; Chi²: (non-electoral)=2.9 (3 df), p>0.10.

Figure 4.10: Voter turnout and non-electoral participation of Bangladeshis by percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (quartiles) (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentages calculated over valid Ns: (voter turnout) quartile 1=64, quartile 2=65, quartile 3=66, quartile 4=65; (non-electoral) quartile 1=68, quartile 2=70, quartile 3=66, quartile 4=66. Chi²: (voter turnout)=4.4 (3 df), p>0.10; Chi²: (non-electoral)=14.0 (3 df), p<0.05.
The regression analysis further explores these relationships through two models for each outcome and ethnic group: Model 1 includes the variables describing the bivariate relationship between the percentage of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood and the outcome of interest. Model 2 controls for: immigration-related factors, which entail English fluency and generational status; socio-economic factors including age, gender, social class and qualifications achieved either in the UK or overseas.

Table 4.2 presents the results for voter turnout. Living in the least and most concentrated areas significantly affects voter turnout of both Black Africans and Indians, as already suggested by the bivariate descriptives. Whereas among the former what seems to count is the comparison between the least and most concentrated neighbourhoods, amongst Indians the significant and positive relationship emerges for both the second and fourth quartile (Model 2). The probability of voting in general elections increases from 60.3% for Black Africans living in the least concentrated neighbourhoods (0–1.35%) to 75.5% for those settled in high concentration areas (>10.31%). For Indians, there is an increase of about 20% in the probability of voting (from 52.2% to 71.6%) between the least (0–4.06%) and most (>68.94%) concentrated areas, but an even more remarkable rise (from 52.2% to 82.5%) when considering the second quartile (4.07–10.26%). In contrast, no significant effect of residential concentration is observed among Black Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

When looking at immigration-related factors, being proficient in English is not a significant predictor of voting in general elections for all groups, hence confirming previous findings about the weak relationship between host-country language proficiency and voter turnout (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Heath et al., 2011). Generational gaps are detected only among Indians, with second generations being more likely to vote than first generations (Heath et al., 2011).

---

41 The variable age-squared is added to the models in order to account for a potential curvilinear relationship between age and political participation.

42 The predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all the control variables at the weighted mean (design weight) and then allow the variable of interest to vary from its minimum to its maximum.
Table 4.2: Residential concentration and voting in general elections for Black Africans and other ethnic minority groups – logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African M1</th>
<th>Black Caribbean M1</th>
<th>Indian M1</th>
<th>Pakistani M1</th>
<th>Bangladeshi M1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (ref: Quartile 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 2</td>
<td>.08(.31)</td>
<td>.15(.32)</td>
<td>.01(.31)</td>
<td>.69(.31)**</td>
<td>.44(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 3</td>
<td>.27(.30)</td>
<td>.26(.33)</td>
<td>.26(.31)</td>
<td>.58(.32)*</td>
<td>.45(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 4</td>
<td>.72(.30)**</td>
<td>.71(.33)**</td>
<td>.08(.33)</td>
<td>.94(.37)**</td>
<td>.30(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.18(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.91(.105)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.04(.04)</td>
<td>.68(.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.56(.40)</td>
<td>.70(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.27(.36)</td>
<td>.80(.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration-related factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English proficiency (ref: not proficient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficient</td>
<td>.37(.35)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.76(.29)</td>
<td>-.50(.32)</td>
<td>.48(.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-.87(.105)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.89(1.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (ref: 1st)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-.09(.47)</td>
<td>-.17(.52)</td>
<td>.87(.36)</td>
<td>-.14(40)</td>
<td>.55(.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.08(.36)</td>
<td>.56(.40)</td>
<td>4.87(1.51)**</td>
<td>.22(.29)</td>
<td>-18(.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.21(.43)</td>
<td>1.15(.76)</td>
<td>.54(.38)</td>
<td>.47(.77)</td>
<td>-35(.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.10(.04)**</td>
<td>.07(.04)**</td>
<td>1.07(.05)</td>
<td>.03(.04)</td>
<td>.04(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-square</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)**</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)</td>
<td>.99(0.00)</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: male)</td>
<td>.11(.23)</td>
<td>.18(.24)</td>
<td>1.13(.27)</td>
<td>.25(.22)</td>
<td>.17(.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (ref: Working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salarit</td>
<td>.13(.34)</td>
<td>.27(.36)</td>
<td>.80(.27)</td>
<td>-.44(.35)</td>
<td>.16(.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>.37(.31)</td>
<td>.35(.33)</td>
<td>.70(.28)</td>
<td>.47(.29)</td>
<td>-.54(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-.03(.39)</td>
<td>-.34(.40)</td>
<td>.77(.49)</td>
<td>.05(.37)</td>
<td>-.26(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification (ref: no qualification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>-.17(.43)</td>
<td>.68(.44)</td>
<td>.82(.34)</td>
<td>.19(.38)</td>
<td>-.29(.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>-.64(.41)</td>
<td>.32(.36)</td>
<td>.86(.37)</td>
<td>.24(.32)</td>
<td>-.90(.49)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.41(.65)</td>
<td>.57(.52)</td>
<td>.66(.47)</td>
<td>.13(.49)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.07(.75)</td>
<td>.11(.104)</td>
<td>1.20(1.56)</td>
<td>.45(.59)</td>
<td>.23(.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.30(.21)</td>
<td>-2.19(1.01)**</td>
<td>.68(1.19)***</td>
<td>.53(21)**</td>
<td>.16(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-300.23</td>
<td>-284.01</td>
<td>-239.77</td>
<td>-413.22</td>
<td>-368.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>6.47(3)</td>
<td>33.06(18)</td>
<td>45.55(16)</td>
<td>8.64(3)</td>
<td>72.43(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. The standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. No estimation of 'English at home' is shown for the Black Caribbean group as all respondents either speak English at home or are fluent in English. The same variable is introduced as a binary variable for Indians and Bangladeshis as the dummy ‘Unknown’ was dropped as it predicted success perfectly. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
The results shown for socio-economic factors generally lend some support to the claim that the traditional SES (i.e. socio-economic) theory applied to mainstream voter turnout does not seem to be as effective when investigating electoral behaviours of ethnic minorities (Verba et al., 1995; Heath et al., 2011). Despite this observation, it is important to notice the significant and positive effect of age on voter turnout of Black Africans and Black Caribbeans. In the former case, age-squared is also significant and negative, therefore suggesting a quadratic relationship between voting and age. In other words, the probability to vote increases with age until it reaches its peak during adulthood and then declines during old age.

Overall, the evidence gathered on the impact of ethnic residential concentration and electoral participation supports the mobilising hypothesis (H2) for Black Africans and Indians. This is in line with previous empirical studies focusing on Asian communities, although the positive effect only relates to Indians (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008b). These are at odds with evidence presented about Black Africans in the UK, which did not find any significant relationship between the percentage of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood and voter turnout (Heath et al., 2011). The null hypothesis is confirmed for the other three ethnic groups (i.e. Black Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis).

The results of the logistic regression carried out for non-electoral participation are reported in Table 4.3. Co-ethnic residential concentration significantly predicts participation in at least one non-electoral activity among all groups with the exception of Pakistanis. Unlike voter turnout, this relationship is negative among Black Africans and once again the main effect is shown when comparing the least and most concentrated areas. Moreover, it is interesting to note how the statistical significance of the coefficient of the third quartile increases between Model 1 and Model 2 (p-value from 0.103 to 0.045).
# Table 4.3: Residential concentration and non-electoral participation for Black Africans and other ethnic minority groups – logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of co-ethnics in LSOA (ref: Quartile 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 2</td>
<td>-0.09(0.37)</td>
<td>0.12(0.41)</td>
<td>-0.05(0.28)</td>
<td>0.01(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 3</td>
<td>-0.55(0.34)†</td>
<td>-0.78(0.39)**</td>
<td>-0.63(0.30)**</td>
<td>-0.56(0.31)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 4</td>
<td>-0.81(0.39)**</td>
<td>-0.77(0.42)*</td>
<td>-0.58(0.31)*</td>
<td>-0.45(0.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration-related factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English proficiency (ref: not proficient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficient</td>
<td>.48(0.55)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.04(0.39)</td>
<td>.86(0.32)***</td>
<td>-0.67(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.07(1.19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.82(1.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (ref: 1st)</td>
<td>1.02(0.52)**</td>
<td>1.04(0.56)*</td>
<td>0.11(0.49)</td>
<td>0.00(0.44)</td>
<td>-0.13(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 and 3plus</td>
<td>.89(0.33)**</td>
<td>.97(0.41)**</td>
<td>.98(0.32)**</td>
<td>.95(0.26)*****</td>
<td>.99(0.53)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.33(0.55)</td>
<td>-16(0.88)</td>
<td>.07(0.68)</td>
<td>-46(0.70)</td>
<td>1.64(0.70)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Socio-economic factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.06(0.03)*</td>
<td>0.12(0.05)***</td>
<td>-0.01(0.04)</td>
<td>-0.09(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-square</td>
<td>-0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)*</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)**</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: male)</td>
<td>.04(0.29)</td>
<td>.35(0.26)</td>
<td>-0.59(0.25)**</td>
<td>-0.15(0.21)</td>
<td>0.27(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (ref: Working)</td>
<td>1.31(0.39)**</td>
<td>.72(0.34)**</td>
<td>0.40(0.38)</td>
<td>-16(0.32)</td>
<td>2.06(0.64)*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat</td>
<td>1.05(0.40)**</td>
<td>.18(0.36)</td>
<td>.66(0.41)</td>
<td>-16(0.31)</td>
<td>1.43(0.49)*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>1.24(0.48)**</td>
<td>-0.66(0.46)</td>
<td>.68(0.55)</td>
<td>-33(0.35)</td>
<td>-0.06(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification (ref: no qualification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>.86(0.61)</td>
<td>1.35(0.52)*****</td>
<td>0.91(0.48)*</td>
<td>1.69(0.37)*****</td>
<td>0.95(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.55(0.62)</td>
<td>.90(0.54)*</td>
<td>.09(0.52)</td>
<td>1.24(0.34)*****</td>
<td>1.41(0.59)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.29(0.76)*</td>
<td>.81(0.72)</td>
<td>.69(0.68)</td>
<td>2.15(0.59)*****</td>
<td>0.07(1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.26(0.91)</td>
<td>2.07(1.07)*</td>
<td>-0.41(1.14)</td>
<td>-74(1.05)</td>
<td>1.19(0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.94(0.25)***</td>
<td>-3.06(1.24)**</td>
<td>-1.62(0.88)</td>
<td>-1.32(0.23)***</td>
<td>-0.84(0.21)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-263.46</td>
<td>-239.51</td>
<td>-248.92</td>
<td>-222.42</td>
<td>-444.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>6.02(3)</td>
<td>51.13(18)</td>
<td>9.10(3)</td>
<td>44.51(16)</td>
<td>11.92(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. Standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. No estimation of ‘English at home’ is shown for the Black Caribbean group as all respondents either speak English at home or are fluent in English. The same variable is introduced as a binary variable for Indians and Bangladeshis as the dummy ‘Unknown’ was dropped as it predict success perfectly. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10, †p=.103
This result is puzzling as the level of significance would be expected to decrease when adding control variables. Further analysis did not detect any specific issue of multicollinearity, which could have been a possible explanation for this change in the p-values.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the finding could be attributed to the artificial cut-offs of the categorical variable or perhaps confounding effects with the main variables of interest when these controls are added.

The probability of engaging in non-electoral activities decreases from 12.60% in quartile one to 6.20% in quartile three and 6.27% in quartile four. A similar negative relationship is observed among Black Caribbeans in Model 1, while only the comparison between the first and third quartile remains significant at the 10% level when controlling for socio-economic and immigration-related factors in Model 2. These results point towards the marginalising hypothesis (H1) for both Africans and Caribbeans. There is evidence of a mobilising effect for Indians and Bangladeshis, which persists in Models 1 and 2.

The analysis of immigration-related and socio-economic factors included in Model 2 reveals a much more consistent picture than the one highlighted for electoral engagement. Generational status is a significant predictor of non-conventional engagement amongst all five groups with second-generation individuals being more likely than first generations to take part in petitions, demonstrations, boycotting or to donate money for political causes. This positive generational change has been highlighted by previous literature (Martinez, 2005) and could be stemming from a process of generational ‘assimilation’ which makes individuals who were born in the UK mobilise through unconventional modes that are widespread in the mainstream society. As regards socio-economic factors, it is important to highlight that gender becomes significant for the first time. Indian women are less prone than men to be involved in non-electoral activities. In contrast with voting, class and education play an important role in influencing non-conventional political participation. This effect is in line with the expectation of a positive effect exerted by higher socio-economic status (Wrinkle et al.,

\textsuperscript{43} The collinearity diagnostics showed that the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value for Model 2 was 1.53 and the condition number 14.9, well below the threshold, suggesting a serious issue of multicollinearity (mean VIF>5 and condition number>30).
1996). Whereas class is particularly important for Black Africans, education appears to be more relevant for Caribbeans and Pakistanis. Interestingly, the effect of class and education emerges amongst those groups who are generally described as less socio-economically integrated, such as Bangladeshis and Caribbeans, whereas Indians, one of the most well-established and successful ethnic communities, show much fewer relevant effects.

The evidence presented about the Black African group provides support to the marginalising hypothesis (H1) for non-electoral participation and to the mobilising hypothesis (H2) for voter turnout. The effect of concentration is visible when comparing the least (0–1.35%) and most (>10.31%) concentrated areas. Black Africans living in highly concentrated neighbourhoods are more likely to vote but less likely to participate in non-electoral activities than community members settled in low concentration areas. This reverse effect is puzzling. On the one hand, proximity between co-ethnics seems to offer Black Africans a positive stimulus to become more engaged in electoral politics. This stimulus could be represented by various factors that have been identified by previous literature, such as mobilisation from mainstream parties (Leighley, 2001); access to political information through ethnic social networks (Uhlaner, 1989); or the enhancement of psychological resources such as group consciousness (Miller et al., 1981). On the other hand, non-electoral engagement does not seem to benefit from ethnic density. This finding is particularly surprising as it could be argued that non-electoral engagement is more likely to target ethnic-based issues and home-country politics (Morales and Pilati, 2011; Waldinger et al., 2012). Protests, petitions, donations and political consumerism are channels through which these topics can be addressed. Ethnic enclaves with their potential to enhance ethnic social networks and resources, as well as a sense of ethnic identity and group consciousness, could be seen as a fertile environment for a stronger involvement in unconventional activities (Leal, 2002). The reverse effect of ethnic density on voting and non-electoral participation is observed amongst Black Africans but not amongst other ethnic communities, where the main variations relate to the level of statistical significance across modes of participation (e.g. Bangladeshis and Caribbeans).
The analysis presented in Table 4.3 revealed that amongst Black Africans, generational status and class are individual characteristics that significantly influence involvement in non-electoral activities. Second and 1.5 generations as well as intermediate and upper salariat social classes are more prone to participate beyond the ballots. The residential distribution of individuals with these characteristics may affect the relationship between ethnic density and non-electoral engagement. However, this possibility is ruled out by Model 2 which controls for these individual-level factors. There could also be a different explanation to this declining level of non-electoral participation in ethnic enclaves. It has been argued that non-electoral engagement is more negatively affected by area-level deprivation as well as individual socio-economic status than voting (Electoral Commission, 2005: 9). Verba et al. (1995: 48, 191) suggests that protesting activities are modes of participation requiring not only time but also specific skills that are more readily available to individuals with higher socio-economic status. This is partly confirmed by the analysis carried out amongst Black Africans by the significant results for social class status.

Nonetheless, to make better sense of the negative effect of ethnic density on non-electoral engagement, the role played by area-level deprivation is investigated as this is the main factor on which the marginalising hypothesis is based. The EMBES dataset includes the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score for England and this is used to measure deprivation at the LSOA level. A higher IMD score corresponds to higher levels of deprivation (see Appendix A for more details about this index). As the IMD score for England, Scotland and Wales cannot be compared, the analysis only refers to England (N=519). This means that some cases have to be dropped and the sample size is consequently reduced to 519 Black Africans. The reduction in sample size justified the exclusion of the IMD score from the main regression models.

Table 4.4 reports the bivariate regression analysis for deprivation and the two modes of political participation and shows that area deprivation significantly depresses the level of non-electoral participation but does not affect voter turnout. This is in line with Verba et al.’s (1995: 189) claim that voter turnout, despite being positively influenced by socio-economic status, is more ‘egalitarian’ than activities like protesting, which require individuals to have more resources such as education and income. The
binary variable measuring non-electoral participation also includes ‘giving money for political causes’ and this is an activity than could be even more linked to socio-economic status and economic resources.

Table 4.4: Political participation and area-level deprivation (2007 IMD score) for Black Africans – bivariate logistic regression (England only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMD score</td>
<td>.01(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.22(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-300.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>1.57(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. Standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.

So deprivation and non-electoral participation are negatively correlated. Figure 4.11 shows that area-level deprivation and ethnic residential concentration are also correlated: the higher the concentration of Black Africans in the LSOA, the higher the level of deprivation. The mean IMD score indeed increases from 32.72 to 43.79 from the first to the fourth quartile. These bivariate findings seem to suggest that the negative effect of residential concentration on non-electoral participation amongst Black Africans may be due to the fact that ethnic clusters correspond to the most deprived areas and living in the latter predicts lower levels of non-electoral engagement.

44 The Pearson’s r coefficient for the correlation between IMD score and the continuous measure of co-ethnic concentration (for Black Africans) was equal to 0.32 (p-value<0.01), hence suggesting moderate positive relationship between concentration and deprivation. The same test was carried out for all other ethnic groups and it was found that, although the correlation is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) for all groups, the relationship is stronger for Pakistanis (r=.67) and Bangladeshis (r=.46) than for Caribbeans (r=.29) and Indians (r=.14).
This suggestion is tested in table 4.5, which focuses exclusively on non-electoral engagement. Model 1 in Table 4.3 referred to the whole Black African sample (N=524), whereas the analysis with the deprivation score requires the cases from Scotland and Wales to be excluded (N=519), so the model is re-run with the Black African sample for England only.

The effect of concentration (without controls) is presented in the first column of Table 4.5. The results are not considerably affected by the slightly lower sample size. However, it is important to note that, whereas in the original model both the third and fourth quartiles were significant, in Table 4.5 only the highest level of concentration exerts a significant effect on non-electoral engagement.\(^{45}\) The second column simply reports the same results shown in Table 4.4, namely the negative significant impact of deprivation (IMD score) on non-electoral engagement. When adding both concentration (as quartiles) and the IMD score, along with all the control variables used in Model 2 (see

\(^{45}\) This changed in the level of significance is determined by a slight drop in the coefficient for the third quartile (from $\beta = -.55$ to $\beta = .54$) as well as a minor increase in the variable standard error (from $\sigma = .34$ to $\sigma = .35$).
Tables 4.2. and 4.3), deprivation loses statistical significance and only the third quartile exerts a negative and significant influence on non-electoral engagement (see third column in Table 4.5). This effect is also captured when measuring residential concentration through a continuous variable, as shown in the fourth and final column where deprivation, concentration and other controls are added to the regression model.

Table 4.5: Non-electoral participation by residential concentration and area-level deprivation (Black Africans, England only) – logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Concentration (without controls)</th>
<th>Deprivation (without controls)</th>
<th>Deprivation &amp; Concentration (with controls)</th>
<th>Deprivation &amp; Concentration (continuous) (with controls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 2</td>
<td>-.09(.35)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.18(.42)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 3</td>
<td>-.54(.35)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.72(.38)*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartile 4</td>
<td>-.79(.36)**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.59(.43)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMD score</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.02(.01)**</td>
<td>-.01(.01)</td>
<td>-.01(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% co-ethnics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04(.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.95(.22)**</td>
<td>-.52(.39)</td>
<td>-.63(1.31)</td>
<td>-2.69**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-260.16</td>
<td>-260.95</td>
<td>-234.98</td>
<td>-236.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>5.65(1)</td>
<td>4.48(1)</td>
<td>47.98(18)</td>
<td>46.28(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>513**</td>
<td>513**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. Standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
¹ The drop in sample size is due to the exclusion of the variable for English proficiency-missing which was omitted by the software as the cases in the category predicted failure (γ=0) perfectly.

These results suggest that, although deprivation negatively impacts on non-electoral participation in the bivariate regression analysis, it should be seen as a partial explanation for the marginalising effect of concentration on non-electoral participation. Its impact indeed disappears when concentration and other control variables are added to the model.

46 The variable measuring social class and generational status continue to be significant predictors of non-electoral engagement, as in Table 4.3.
4.3 Conclusions

The analysis presented in this chapter sheds new light on the complex relationship between co-ethnic residential concentration and political participation not only amongst Black Africans but also within other four ethnic communities.

The evidence for Black Africans supports mixed findings, as clearly shown in Figure 4.12. The mobilising hypothesis is supported with regard to voter turnout, whereas the marginalising hypothesis applies to non-electoral engagement. These contrasting relationships emerge when focusing on the difference between the least and most concentrated areas, which were identified in the analysis by the first (0–1.35%) and fourth (>10.31%) quartiles. For non-electoral engagement the negative effect is also visible in the comparison between the first and third quartile (5.40–10.30%).

Figure 4.12: Residential concentration and political participation – hypotheses tested

The suggestion that can be drawn from this finding is that, amongst Black Africans, residential concentration makes a difference, either positive or negative, on political engagement when the level of ethnic density increases from its minimum to its maximum. This is particularly true in the case of voter turnout. However, the analysis of non-electoral engagement seemed to suggest that the effect of ethnic density becomes significant at a lower level of concentration, namely when the local Black population exceeds 5.40%.

The analysis does not clarify how residential concentration supports voter turnout. The mobilising argument relies on various possible explanations for this positive
link. Amongst both Black Africans and Indians, where the likelihood of voting was found to be higher in the most concentrated areas than in the least concentrated areas, ethnic density may be promoting group consciousness, ethnic leadership, political mobilisation from mainstream elites or the creation of ethnic-based social resources. Similar processes may be supporting the positive influence of concentration on non-electoral engagement amongst Bangladeshis and Indians. In this sense, Black Africans represent an interesting exception due to the reversed effect of residential concentration on electoral (positive) and non-electoral (negative) participation.

The analysis tested the argument that the negative effect on non-electoral engagement may be due to the fact that ethnic enclaves tend to be characterised by higher levels of deprivation. Living in highly deprived areas negatively impacts on non-electoral participation (Electoral Commission, 2005), as activities such as donating money to political causes may require more specific skills and economic resources than voting (Verba et al., 1995). Individuals with higher social status are more likely to be active in non-electoral activities, as shown by the significant and positive effect of individual social class on the non-electoral engagement of Black Africans. Huckfeldt (1979) also suggests that non-electoral activities are more prone to be influenced by contextual factors such as neighbourhood deprivation as they require a collective effort (i.e. ‘social activities’). However, the presence of a significant effect of ethnic concentration on both voting and non-electoral engagement challenges Huckfeldt’s argument in favour of Kenny’s claim that both activities, electoral and non-electoral, can be influenced by contextual variables as they are both developed through social contacts and collective processes of mobilisation (Kenny, 1992). The argument of deprivation being at the basis of the negative effect of concentration on non-electoral engagement was not fully supported by the empirical analysis. Although amongst Black Africans, as well as other ethnic groups, residential concentration is positively correlated to area-level deprivation and the latter predicts lower levels of non-electoral engagement, this negative effect disappears when both concentration and deprivation are introduced in the controlled model. Therefore, deprivation should be seen, at least in this case, as a partial explanation for the detrimental effect of ethnic enclaves.
Another possible argument draws on the social capital theory and the idea that social norms can depress or encourage political participation (Campbell, 2013: 43). It could be argued that ethnic enclaves facilitate the emergence of strong ethnic-based social connections (Uslaner and Conley, 2003) which in turn favour the preservation of political values and norms that are collectively accepted within the close boundaries of the ethnic community (Coleman, 1988; Huckfeldt, 1979). Voter turnout may be regarded as the most appropriate mode of participation, perhaps as the expression of a strong civic duty, among all or some African national communities and this may be visible in the higher percentage of individuals who voted in ethnic enclaves (Campbell, 2013; Campbell et al., 1960). Furthermore, there may be some support for the claim that residential concentration isolates ethnic communities from the mainstream society and makes them less likely to acquire modes of participation that are more widespread within the mainstream, such as non-electoral participation. It is interesting to note how all these possible explanation for the negative effect of residential concentration should be addressed with regard to the specific case of the Black African community. In the case of Bangladeshis, indeed, residential concentration exerts a positive effect on non-electoral engagement.47

The main conclusion highlighted by this chapter with regard to the direct relationship between residential concentration and political engagement of Black Africans is that making bold statements about the desirability of ethnic clustering for political participation seems to be a challenging task. Indeed, two main elements of diversity emerged. Firstly, it is important to consider both electoral and non-electoral participation as the effect of ethnic density varies greatly across different modes of involvement (Lien, 1994; Morales and Giugni, 2011a), at least amongst Black Africans. So far, however, previous literature in the UK has focused on voter turnout only (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Heath et al., 2011). Secondly, extending the analysis to other ethnic groups has revealed that co-ethnic concentration plays a different role across different ethnic communities. These between-group variations highlight the need for investigating the

47 Explaining in detail the effects of residential concentration on political engagement of Bangladeshis goes beyond this study’s scope. However, it is important to point out how within this community ethnic density emerges as a mobilising force despite Bangladeshis being generally regarded as a deprived group clustering in deprived areas.
extent to which the processes linking residential concentration and political participation differ between African national groups.

The following empirical chapters take into account the internal diversity of the Black African community while further exploring the relationship between residential concentration and political participation by attempting to shed new light on politically relevant processes taking place in ethnic enclaves. Ethnic-based social networks represent the main point of reference of this analysis.

Chapter 5 will investigate the impact of residential concentration on ethnic-based social networks and Chapter 6 will concentrate on the relationship between ethnic-based social resources and political participation. As the main focus of this study is the Black African community, the following empirical analysis will only be addressing this specific group.
CHAPTER 5. Residential Concentration and Ethnic Social Networks

The chapter investigates the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic-based social networks. The following research question is therefore addressed:

RQ2. To what extent and how does residential concentration influence ethnic-based social resources within the Black African community?

Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 – Hypotheses tested

This represents the first part of the two-step analysis focusing on the process that links residential concentration to political participation, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Three main social resources are researched: voluntary organisations, religious institutions and informal networks. The ‘ethnic’ nature of these resources is determined by the fact that they are created within the close circle of ethnic communities. Some scholars have referred to these ethnically dominated networks as ‘bonding social capital’ so as to highlight their inward-looking character and their ability to nourish particularised trust and hence reinforce exclusive identities (Putnam, 2000: 22-23).
Traditionally, residential concentration is deemed to be a naturally fertile environment for these close-knit networks and strong ties. Spatial proximity is indeed expected to facilitate regular and exclusive contacts between co-ethnics (Cinalli and Giugni, 2011; Putnam, 2000; Vervoort, 2012; Vervoort et al., 2011; Bouma-Doff, 2007; Fong and Isajiw, 2000). Although scholars have presented evidence about both the beneficial and damaging effects of ethnic residential concentration on various integration outcomes, there is general agreement about this positive impact of ethnic enclaves on ethnic-based social networks and about the fact that they primarily tend to bind “families and individuals to an interlocking networks of ethnic relations” (Zhou, 2005: 155). The third hypothesis to be tested is hence formulated as follows:

\[ H3 \rightarrow \text{Co-ethnic residential concentration supports and enhances ethnic-based social resources represented by ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks.} \]

The analysis also seeks to investigate the effect of immigration-related factors on this relationship, as stated by the fourth research question:

RQ4. How do immigration-related factors influence the relationship between residential concentration, ethnic social networks and political participation?

Previous literature has highlighted that Black Africans should not be treated as a monolithic group as this category is composed of numerous national communities. Ghanaians and Somalis have been identified as two groups that, despite belonging to the general Black African community and being amongst the largest African groups in the UK, effectively represent this internal diversity. What differentiate the Ghanaians and Somalis are their immigration histories, integration experiences as well as linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds (i.e. immigration-related factors).

Ghanaians are generally described as an example of a long- and well-established community that was able to successfully integrate in the host society. This was primarily due to their pre-existing knowledge of the British system and language, derived from the colonial experience and the membership of Ghana in the Commonwealth, as well as their specific immigration history, rooted in the pursuit of higher education and professional training. In contrast, the great bulk of Somali immigrants reached the country in more
recent years primarily to seek asylum. The community as whole, perhaps as a consequence of this specific immigration history, generally suffers from a significant socio-economic disadvantage. It is plausible to expect that, in virtue of these dissimilar immigration and integration experiences, Somalis and Ghanaians have developed social networks that serve different functions and operate in different ways. Existing literature shows that Somali voluntary organisations are primarily aimed at providing basic support to newcomers and vulnerable community members, as well as at directly tackling specific issues by implementing community projects and cooperating with local authorities (Griffiths, 2000; Options UK, 2010). In contrast, Ghanaian organisations are described as primarily aimed at organising recreational activities and supplying mechanisms of mutual support that are very similar to rotating credit unions (Krause, 2008).

With regard to places of worship, the main difference is represented by the fact that Somali are predominantly, if not exclusively, Muslim, while Ghanaians are largely Christian. This will link them to places of worship, respectively mosques and churches, which might have different functions within the community. Finally, informal networks amongst both groups are expected to be based on clanic and tribal affiliations that reproduce the societal structure of the country of origin (Krause, 2008; Harris, 2004). However, this clanic fragmentation is expected to be more influential on how ethnic informal as well as organisational networks are developed and shaped amongst Somalis than Ghanaians. Previous literature has indeed identified the strong presence of clans as a limit to the creation of strong and effective Somali organisations (Harris, 2004; Griffiths, 2000; Hopkins, 2006).

The ways in which communities organise is deemed to be crucial in understanding the extent to which these networks are dependent on ‘location’ and more specifically on spatial proximity between co-ethnics. The main point to investigate is whether Ghanaian and Somali ethnic networks in London are in fact structured in a different way and serve a different function and whether this affects the role played by residential concentration. Due to the lack of literature focusing on ethnic-based social resources and the role played by residential concentration in their development amongst Black Africans on one hand, and how these varies across African national groups, on the
other, the information gathered through qualitative fieldwork amongst Ghanaians and Somalis will be addressing the following non-directional hypothesis:

H6 – Immigration-related factors that characterise the various national groups within the wider Black African category are deemed to influence the relationship between co-ethnic residential concentration, ethnic-based social networks and political participation.

The chapter comprises three main sections which examine each ethnic-based social resource of interest (i.e. voluntary organisations, religious institutions and informal networks). Each section presents findings drawn from both the quantitative and qualitative enquiries. The former investigates the Black African community as a whole, whereas the latter focuses on the specific cases of Somalis and Ghanaians in London. Overall conclusions are presented in the fourth and final section (5.4).

5.1 Ethnic organisations

This section addresses the effect of residential concentration on ethnic organisations. The quantitative study exclusively focuses on individual participation in ethnic voluntary groups, but the qualitative enquiry provides information about both participation in (i.e. individual level) and creation of (i.e. aggregate level) associational networks. The section is organised into sub-sections which present the findings for the individual (5.3.1) and aggregate level (5.3.2) separately. Sub-section 5.3.3 attempts to make sense of the findings by focusing on the structure and function of Ghanaian and Somali organisations and briefly summarises the main results.

5.1.1 Individual participation in ethnic organisations

The EMBES dataset captures individual participation in voluntary groups that can be defined as ‘ethnic’ either on the basis of their function and objectives or their composition. Respondents were asked about their engagement in ‘ethnic or cultural associations or clubs’. In addition, those who participated in other voluntary groups were asked to state whether members of these groups where co-ethnics. If the answer given
was that all, most of or about half of the members were from the respondent’s ethnic background, the groups were coded as ‘ethnic’. The information about both types of ethnic associations was then combined into one variable, which represents the outcome of interest in this section (see Appendix A for more details about recoding).

The pie chart in Figure 5.2 reports the frequencies for this variable and shows that the majority of Black Africans in the sample (50%) did not take part in any ethnic organisation.

Figure 5.2: Participation in ethnic organisations – Black Africans (%)

A more detailed account of engagement in ethnic organisational networks amongst Black Africans is provided in Figure 5.3, which not only looks at exclusive and combined participation in ethnic and non-ethnic groups as well as inactivity, but also compares Black Africans to other ethnic communities. The most striking finding is the low associational engagement of Black Africans. Forty-five per cent of respondents did not take part in any voluntary group or club, regardless of their ethnic nature. The high level of inactivity of Black Africans, however, becomes less striking when the other four ethnic
groups are taken into account. In this comparative scenario, the proportion of inactive individuals is one of the lowest, and the community is second only to Indians but still far from the 61% of inactive respondents amongst Pakistanis. The exclusive participation in ethnic organisations for Africans (9%) is also in line with the general trend across ethnic groups, with the exception of Indians. In contrast, Black Africans present the highest rate of involvement in non-ethnic organisations only (13%). Overall, the community seems to be more similar to the Black Caribbean group rather than to the three South Asian communities with regard to level and mode of associational engagement.

Figure 5.3: Participation in voluntary organisations by ethnic group (%)

![Graph showing participation in voluntary organisations by ethnic group.]

Source: EMBES 2010. Weighted percentages (design weight) and accounting for clustering. Percentages calculated over valid Ns for the four-category variable: BA=513, BC=589, I=578, P=656, BAN=267. Chi²=99.2 (12 df), p<0.001.

The relationship between involvement in ethnic organisations and residential concentration amongst Black Africans is addressed through both bivariate descriptives and regression analysis. Figure 5.4 plots the variations in the percentage of Black Africans who have participated in ethnic organisations (i.e. mean for the binary variable and 90% confidence intervals) across the four quartiles defining the level of residential concentration. The proportion of community members engaging in ethnic voluntary
groups decreases by about 10% between the least (0–1.35%) and most (>10.31%) concentrated areas, hence pointing towards a negative relationship between concentration and ethnic associational engagement. Nonetheless, the overlapping confidence intervals suggest that this variation is not statistically significant.

Figure 5.4: Participation in ethnic organisations by residential concentration – Interval plot

The results from the bivariate regression analysis confirm this finding (Table 5.1). No significant association is, indeed, found between the percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood and participation in ethnic organisations both in the bivariate (Model 1) and controlled (Model 2) model. The quantitative evidence, hence, rejects the hypothesis that ethnic residential concentration exerts a positive influence on individual engagement in ethnic associations (H3).\(^\text{49}\)

\(^{48}\) The results for the full model including socio-economic and immigration-related factors (Model 2) are presented in Appendix B.

\(^{49}\) The relationship between participation in ethnic organisations and IMD score measuring area-level deprivation was also checked and no significant effect was detected in both the binary and multivariate regression analysis.
Despite the non-significant findings drawn from the quantitative analysis, it is important to understand whether and how the patterns of associational engagement and the influence exerted by residential concentration vary across African national communities. The qualitative evidence seeks to achieve precisely this objective. Furthermore, individual engagement in ethnic groups is addressed with regard to the modes, and not simply the level, of participation.

At the individual level, living in an area with a high concentration of Somalis was observed to have a positive influence on the involvement in Somali voluntary groups in two main ways. First of all, spatial proximity to community organisations allows those who cannot travel long distances, such as vulnerable community members, to attend organisations on a regular basis. This is particularly crucial in guaranteeing the access to drop-in advice sessions and other regular support services, as well as recreational activities (e.g. knitting and cooking groups for women, lunch clubs for the elderly and sport course for children) provided by Somali groups. The accounts provided by the Somali single mothers who frequently access the support and advice services highlight how living at a short distance from organisations is crucial for them in order to receive the support needed while carrying out their domestic day-to-day duties. In some cases, it was observed how the space provided by voluntary associations represents one of the

---

**Table 5.1: Residential concentration and participation in ethnic organisations – Logistic regression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Black Africans in LSOA (ref: 0-1.35%)</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.36-5.39%</td>
<td>-.05(.33)</td>
<td>.06(.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.40-10.39%</td>
<td>.04(.33)</td>
<td>.10(.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.31-43.62%</td>
<td>-.28(.32)</td>
<td>-.24(.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.27(.23)</td>
<td>-1.51(.58)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-341.42</td>
<td>-325.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$ (df)</td>
<td>1.12 (3)</td>
<td>29.76(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised coefficients (robust standard errors). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering (293 PSUs) and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
main, if not the sole, opportunity for women to socialise with each other while waiting to receive advice and this often becomes a regular, weekly appointment.

Secondly, the link between location and individual participation in ethnic associations was observed amongst those who are more actively engaged in these groups, such as volunteers and members of staff (e.g. community workers, directors and board members), rather than simply users of the services provided. Many of the participants interviewed in Tower Hamlets and Newham described how living in such close contact with their co-ethnics increased their awareness of the issues affecting the community and therefore made them more eager to provide support through voluntary activities and community work. This process is clearly described by a young Somali woman who is actively involved in a community group:

“When you see the needs taking place, it’s part of the process. If there’s no need obviously you won’t be able to continue doing it at all [actively engaging]. Without having that community, that issues that you see every day, obviously you’ll be living doing something else, but you wouldn’t so much focus on your job [...] By living in obviously the area where there are many Somalis made life easy for me, because if I hadn’t seen this kind of need or demand in the area I wouldn’t be getting involved in community projects.” (Somali woman, 16–25 years, second generation)

This quote clearly shows the stimulus that is provided by ethnic density primarily through the daily, personal experience of the hard reality faced by this community.

Spatial proximity not only makes problems and needs more visible but also promotes what is here defined as ‘informal volunteering’. This refers to the individual engagement in activities that closely resemble those normally carried out within community organisations, such as advice sessions and translation services, but without a formal involvement in voluntary organisations. This phenomenon was mainly pointed out amongst younger community members and those belonging to the 1.5 and second generation. These are the community members who are better equipped in terms of English fluency and knowledge of the host-country system (e.g. education, welfare benefits, and legal system) because either they were born in the country or they migrated at a very young age. They described how they had often been asked to act as interpreters
for co-ethnics they did not know personally, but they met only through family and friends or in the street. As explained by a Somali woman in her 20s:

“When we see other Somali persons, we say hello to each other, and if you see somebody that can help you, you will go and say ‘Oh hello! Can you come and help me?’. So from a very young age, this is what I’ve done myself, I was taken to interviews to interpret for people who I didn’t even know.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, second generation)

Similarly, a middle-aged, second generation Somali man declared:

“I could walk out, even at a young age, and would see somebody who is in need, somebody who is lost. There was a time when I took a disabled lady to an office and I was actually interpreting for different people [in the office], because there was a need!” (Somali man, 36–45 years, second generation)

This informal volunteering often translates into a progressively more intense and formal engagement in organisations that provide support to the community. In some cases, it becomes a long-term career plan. The process that has led from living in high concentration neighbourhoods to a career in community work within the Somali community is highlighted in the accounts provided by two young Somali women, both belonging to the 1.5 generation and actively engaged in an ethnic organisation:

“It [living in this area] has enabled me to develop, to further my career, to develop the community I live within. If this was another borough with no Somali community, then the existence of such an organisation would be very limited. But because the community is here and the need is here, I’m here.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, generation 1.5)

“When I finished my studies I volunteered for other organisations, just translating then I realised there is a large community, Somali community, that is arriving from Somalia that didn’t speak the language and needed assistance so it started as a voluntary things, it just moved up from there and then I realised that there’s a need in the community for translating [in] that encourages you to do more training more courses and move to help members of the community. (Somali woman, 26–35 years, generation 1.5)
So, not only close proximity with co-ethnics helped these two young Somali women realise what are the main issues faced by the community, and language appears to be one of the most relevant problems, but it also appears to be an essential condition for their community engagement and even for the existence of community organisations.

Despite the qualitative findings suggesting a positive relationship between residential concentration and active participation in ethnic organisations amongst Somalis, the evidence gathered for Ghanaians seems to suggest a different story. Ghanaian voluntary organisations were found not to be linked to the provision of regular advice services and they did not appear to operate in premises open to the public, as for Somali groups. Their main function, as already pointed out by previous literature, is socialisation as well as the preservation of cultural traits within the diasporic community.

Regular social gatherings are organised by these groups in privately rented venues, which tend to be located in high concentration areas such as Hackney, Southwark and Lambeth. This choice of location is mainly due to the higher availability of venues that are suitable for large gatherings or that simply have become regular points of reference for the community. Nonetheless, the individual attendance in these social events does not appear to be linked to location as strictly as for Somalis. Ghanaians described themselves as a very ‘mobile’ and flexible community whose members would travel long distances to join social gatherings. In one interviewee’s words:

“We know of other places, and we go to different places, it doesn’t really matter where, once you are invited you go.” (Ghanaian woman, 56–65 years, first generation)

The mechanism through which community members get to know one another, and hence are able to participate in these social gatherings, is word of mouth which, as a Ghanaian man said, is a powerful channel to mobilise Ghanaians:

“People were coming from North London, because there was an advert through the churches, though word of mouth. Word of mouth travels faster than air! So people came from all over.” (Ghanaian man, over 65 years, first generation)
Beside this social function, Ghanaian groups do provide support to their members. However, the support system very much resembles credit union rotation and mutual help schemes which are funded and maintained by the group members themselves. Participants explained that if a group member suffers from bereavement, for instance, other members would collect money in order to help the person organise the funeral. In one case it was also reported that a community organisation provided its members with a group life insurance.

Unlike Somali organisations, the organisational networks developed by Ghanaians appeared to closely rely on informal networks, as demonstrated by the examples of mutual support provided by community members. In this framework, location appears to be much less important than amongst Somalis. If an event is being held, community members will be informed through informal networks and churches, and individuals would travel long distances to be able to attend the gathering. When it comes to essential and emergency support, particularly in the case of personal difficulties, help is likely to be provided by group members on the basis of a mutual aid system or through informal networks. Interestingly, amongst Ghanaians those who manage or work for organisations do that mainly on a voluntary basis as they have a separate full-time career, rather than seeing community work as a full-time career, unlike amongst Somalis. These active members rarely live in the area where organisations are based or activities are organised. Therefore, the process leading from spatial proximity to active engagement in community groups was not observed amongst Ghanaians as clearly as amongst Somalis.

### 5.1.2 The creation of ethnic organisations

The second aspect that was possible to investigate through the qualitative enquiry is the relevance of residential concentration for the creation of ethnic organisations.
The maps in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show how the Somali and Ghanaian registered charities found through the Charity Commission website\(^{50}\) distribute across local authorities in England and London (Figures 5.7 and 5.8) following the residential concentration of Somalis and Ghanaians (i.e. percentage of individuals who were born in Somalia and Ghana over the total population in the local authority – 2011 Census).\(^{51}\)

Prior to commenting on these maps, it is important to underline that the location of ethnic organisations was identified through the information provided by the ‘Contact details’ page on the Charity Commission website, which reports the details (name, address and phone number) of the public contact for the charity. The latter does not always correspond to premises where the organisations operate from, that is to say venues that are visible and open to the public. In some cases, the contact provided is the private address of the director or the secretary or, particularly in the case of Ghanaian organisations, simply a PO Box where the charity can be contacted. This partly compromises the accuracy of the data presented, as it is not possible to know whether each charity operates from a specific address. In order to make the maps more reliable, exclusively the organisations that appeared as ‘registered’ were selected.

That said, the maps show that for both communities London is the primary area of concentration, not only in terms of residential distribution but also of organisational networks. However, Somali organisations seem to follow much more closely the community’s residential patterns, with ethnic associations locating in areas where Somalis concentrate, such as Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Leicester, Birmingham and Leeds. Ghanaian organisations appear to be more scattered across local authorities and are not necessarily located in medium- and high concentration areas. No ethnic organisations were, for instance, found in Milton Keynes and the local authorities surrounding London.

\(^{50}\) Ethnic organisations were identified through the Charity Commission website (http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/index.aspx) by selecting groups that were registered at the date of the research (January 2013) and had in their name at least one of the following keywords: Ghana, Ghanaian, Akan, Somali, Somalia, Somaliland.

\(^{51}\) The scale used in the maps is different from the one used for the analysis as the maps refer to Local Authorities which are a higher level of geography compared to LSOAs.
Figure 5.5: Somali organisations and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011

Figure 5.6: Ghanaian organisations and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011

Figure 5.7: Somali organisations and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011


Figure 5.8: Ghanaian organisations and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011

These patterns are reproduced in a similar way in London, where Somali organisations are visibly concentrated in East (e.g. Tower Hamlets and Newham), North (e.g. Islington, Haringey and Enfield) and West (e.g. Brent, Ealing) London, whereas Ghanaian charities, despite being present in high concentration boroughs (e.g. Lambeth, Hackney and Haringey), spread across medium-concentration areas. There seems to be a higher number of Somali organisations. Whereas for Ghanaians a maximum of about four organisations for each borough is observed, amongst Somalis, multiple community organisations co-exist in the same local area. In the borough of Ealing (East London), for example, it is possible to count at least nine organisations.

The data gathered though participant observation and face-to-face interviews help make sense of these maps and tell a very similar story to the one highlighted for the individual participation in ethnic organisations. The link between location and ethnic organisations was found to be more visible and stronger amongst Somalis than Ghanaians.

Firstly, as already pointed out, amongst Somalis spatial proximity makes organisations more accessible to users. The direct contact with community organisations in Tower Hamlets, for instance, confirmed that the great majority of service users come from the area where the group is based, with a few exceptions of individuals travelling from neighbouring boroughs such as Newham, Islington and Waltham Forest. Provided that these groups offer an effective service, a regular and substantial flow of community members utilising the services offered by organisations is likely to influence the long-term development of these groups, particularly when it comes to applying for funding.

Secondly, by being located in high concentration areas, Somali organisations tend to tackle issues, such as unemployment, mental health or youth crime, which are relevant within the community. Due to the high concentration of Somalis in specific neighbourhoods, these issues are not only specifically affecting the community but they become even more relevant as they impact a significant proportion of the local population. Consequently, it was observed how Somali groups, at least the most well-established, become a key interlocutor for local authorities as they strive to find effective solutions to these issues. This is primarily due to the knowledge of the community’s
needs, cultural practices and, even more importantly, language that voluntary groups achieve either through experience in the field or for the fact that the majority of staff and board members are Somali. Becoming a crucial point of reference in the local area facilitates the access to local resources (e.g. funding) and hence increases the chances of developing strong long-term associational networks, as with the particular case of the organisations observed in Tower Hamlets.

The evidence gathered amongst Ghanaians does not suggest that these two factors (i.e. higher number of users and access to local resources) link the creation and development of organisations to their location in high concentration areas. The way Ghanaian groups operate, as well as the ‘mobility’ of community members when it comes to individual participation in organisations, provides a fairly weak support to the hypothesis that residential concentration influences ethnic associations, even at the aggregate level.

Nonetheless, it is important to point out that spatial proximity between co-ethnics was mentioned by Ghanaian participants as a factor that facilitated the creation of community associations at the very beginning of this process, when small groups of newly arrived immigrants came together and organised in the 1960s and 1970s. In those years, the Ghanaian community was significantly smaller in number and those who lived in the same neighbourhood had the opportunity to generate the complex network of organisations that still exists today. Furthermore, the social gatherings that characterise the organisational life of Ghanaians take place in high concentration areas such as Haringey, Hackney and South-East London, which are often described as the ‘hob’ of the Ghanaian community. That said, once groups increase in size and become formal charities, new immigrants are informed about their existence through informal networks and join them based on their ethnic, regional and professional affiliations, for instance, regardless of where they reside. Similarly, as already noted, attendance in social gatherings does not necessarily depend on the place of residence. This suggests that the development and survival of Ghanaians’ organisational networks does not closely depend on their location in highly concentrated neighbourhood and goes well beyond geographical boundaries.
The fact that Somali organisations also appear to be more numerous and more scattered than Ghanaians groups (see in particular Maps 5.5 and 5.6) could be due to the tendency of Somali voluntary groups to operate independently rather than as part of structured networks and partnership, as in the case of the Ghanaians. This leads to a more fragmented but widespread presence of localised organisations ( Communities and Local Government, 2009: 53).

In spite of the more relevant role that residential concentration seems to play in the creation and development of ethnic organisations amongst Somalis than amongst Ghanaians, the fieldwork highlighted that this relationship can be significantly influenced by exogenous factors. It was indeed observed that despite being characterised by a similar level of residential concentration, the two neighbouring boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets present different Somali organisational networks. The latter appeared to be more well connected and well established than the organisations observed in Newham, where various community associations were identified through an internet search but many of them no longer existed or were not easily accessible. Participants were asked to suggest possible explanations for this difference and three main factors related to area-level (i.e. borough) characteristics other than ethnic concentration emerged.

First of all, the level of institutional support to ethnic-based organisations emerged as an influential factor (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008: 70; Maxwell, 2012: 165). The boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets implement different policies with regard to giving funding to organisations targeting specific ethnic and religious groups. On the one hand, Newham favours a community cohesion approach that avoids ethnic-specific support. On the other hand, Tower Hamlets appears to be more keen on helping community-specific organisations (Options UK, 2010: 40; Wales, 2011). This element of institutional support, which recalls the concepts of political opportunity structure (Stromblad et al., 2011; Koopmans, 2004; Morales and Pilati, 2011) and instrumental support (Bloemraad, 2006a, 2006b) emerged numerous times when participants were asked why Somalis in Newham had not been able to create solid organisational networks:
“Tower Hamlets has a lot of Somali communities that are engaging in the community. In that borough the council helps the community so they are well-established. They get the advice and the provision that they are supposed to get. It’s difficult to get the provision here [Newham], because the policy is different.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

The second exogenous factor is the level of ethnic diversity. The borough of Tower Hamlets is characterised by an extremely polarised ethnic composition, with Bangladeshis and Somalis dominating the area in terms of population size. This creates more friction between these two groups with regard to the ability to access local public resources, such as venues for community centres or funding. On the contrary, in Newham the ethnic population is much fragmented and diverse, as highlighted by a young Somali man:

“Over there [Newham] Somalis are on their own, but over here [Tower Hamlets] there are a lot of communities [organisations], only Bengalis and Somalis live here.” (Somali man, 26–35 years, first generation)

What emerges from this account is the association between the number of community organisations and the fact that Tower Hamlets is predominantly inhabited by Somalis and Bangladeshis. Furthermore, there is the reference to the Bangladeshi community. Several Somali interviewees in Tower Hamlets expressed their eagerness to follow the example of the Bangladeshi community, which is described as a group that has been able to achieve a prominent position in the borough due to their ability to act in a united way, advocate for the community and thus obtain greater support from local authorities (Maxwell, 2012: 119). Somalis now demand public and formal support by virtue of their status of being the second largest population in the borough. The following interview excerpts show how Bangladeshis are seen as a role model for Somalis:

“Here [Tower Hamlets] you have the Bengali community, already advanced. Maybe the Somali community has taken the Bengali community as a role model in terms of campaigning for policies, for example. It helps when you’ve got another group who is already established and have got already fighting for policy changes, you can then use those campaigns as an example and you can get support in order to get that. That doesn’t exist in Newham, for example.” (Somali woman, 25–36 years, first generation)
“What’s also different in Tower Hamlets is that we have a huge Bangladeshi community who dominates the borough. Also there’s always that sense of unity, they must have organisations to represent them, they must be together, you know, that’s the fantastic thing about the Bangladeshi community, whereas other ethnic minority, particularly Black communities, there isn’t.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

The comparison with what is accomplished by Bangladeshis is a motivation for Somalis to organise in more structured and effective way so to give continuity to groups that otherwise would not be able to play that public, policy-oriented role.

The final exogenous factor is the tribal or clanic composition of a specific area. The great majority of Somalis in Tower Hamlets migrated from the Northern region of Somalia, i.e. Somaliland, and mostly belong to the same clan, whereas the community in Newham is much more fragmented and includes more recent immigrants from South Somalia, as well as Somalilanders. Clanic affiliation represents a crucial element of the social life in Somalia and consequently plays a significant role in shaping formal and informal networks within the diaspora (Bloemraad, 2006b: 77-78). Despite more recent attempts to overcome this fragmentation, ethnic organisations tend to be created along clanic lines (Griffiths, 2000; Hopkins, 2006). The fact that the population in Tower Hamlets, for instance, is more homogeneous than in Newham can reasonably facilitate the creation of stronger networks and more resilient organisational networks.

5.1.3 Function and structure of ethnic organisations

Despite the influences of external factors, the qualitative findings shed new light on the different roles played by residential concentration on ethnic organisations, both at the individual and aggregate level, amongst Somalis and Ghanaians. Somali organisations seem to benefit from being located in high concentration areas more than their Ghanaian counterparts. It can be argued that this derives from the different structure and function of organisational networks, which in turn are the product of the dissimilar immigration-related characteristics of the two communities.
As highlighted in Section 3.3.1, Ghanaians and Somalis are often brought as examples of, respectively, well-established and new immigrant communities. Somalis tend to suffer from more deprived socio-economic conditions, mainly due to the significant inflow of asylum seekers, and are more culturally, religiously and linguistically divergent from the mainstream society. In contrast, the integration experience of Ghanaians is generally less problematic, in particular due to a better acquaintance with the host-country stemming from the British colonial domination over Ghana, which is still part of the Commonwealth, and the better knowledge of the English language that is the country’s official idiom (Arthur, 2008). The majority of Ghanaian immigrants also arrived in the country as students and professionals rather than asylum seekers, although a small number of refugees arrived during the 1980s.

Consequently, Ghanaians and Somalis have developed different associational networks. On the one hand, Ghanaian organisations are formed by community members on the basis of shared characteristics, such as the professional category they belong to (e.g. nurses, doctors and dentists, students), their Ghanaian village or region of origin, the school they attended in Ghana, their ethnic group (e.g. Akan, Ga) or the area in which they have settled in London (e.g. East or North London). The majority of these community organisations were created in the 1970s and 1980s by small groups of Ghanaian migrants with the aim of creating a system of mutual support and facilitating contacts with co-nationals. Evidence of this organisational structure has been presented by previous studies (Krause, 2008; Arthur, 2008), but also emerged from the interviews conducted in London. When asked about the type of organisations they were part of, regardless of the intensity of their involvement, interviewees described the groups as follows:

“The associations...for example one was my old school in Ghana association. There are many of us here who attended the same secondary school in Ghana [...] Then we have tribal groups, associations, I joined one of them from the Eastern part of Ghana.” (Ghanaian man, 46–55 years, first generation)

“What we tend to have a bit more is the kind of organisations and associations that emanate from the tribal groupings, and the community organisations that we belong to back home [...] We have the [name of organisation] who is people who are from the Ashanti kingdom, back home in Ghana, we have people from
Belonging to these groups appears to be a ‘natural’ step to take after migration. The dense network of ethnic organisations has three main purposes. First of all, they assist Ghanaians in tackling issues linked to the immigration experience, but also personal circumstances, such as illness and bereavement, through a support system that has already been described (Arthur, 2008: 86). Secondly, they actively contribute to the development of Ghana through projects and donations. During a few interviews conducted at the participant’s house it was possible to observe large piles of clothes and other equipments, primarily books, stationeries and toys for schools, which had been collected while awaiting the next trip to Ghana. Thirdly, ethnic associations are important for maintaining close connections within the diaspora community. This social role is mainly played through collective recreational events, as mentioned earlier, primarily dinners and parties but also funerals and similar religious events, such as weddings and christenings, which gather community members on a regular basis. The celebrations for the independence of Ghana, which occurs on 6 March, also give Ghanaians a common occasion for socialising. Evidence of these celebrations was found not only in the interviewees’ accounts but also in Ghanaian shops and markets where leaflets are distributed to advertise the events, as well as on internet websites targeting the diaspora. Due to this close and strong link with the homeland culture, particularly when engaging in celebrations that are directly linked to Ghana, community groups often function as channels to maintain and reproduce the Ghanaian identity and heritage (Arthur, 2008: 86).

Directly deriving from these functions is the structure and organisation of community groups. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Ghanaian associations proved to be difficult to locate and access, with the exception of the main umbrella-organisations, mainly due to the lack of premises open to the public. The focus on socialisation and forms of support that do not necessarily rely on the provision of regular, face-to-face services, such as weekly advice sessions, lead to a less visible and physical presence of community groups in the local area. The majority of the meetings regarding the
organisations’ activities (e.g. development projects in Ghana or systems of support for members such as insurances and funds) are held in private premises and exclusively gather the groups’ members. Similarly, larger social gatherings, such as dinners, parties, funerals or weddings, are advertised through leaflets in Ghanaian businesses and markets, announcements in Ghanaian churches or on radios.

On the other hand, community organisations amongst Somalis pursue different objectives and thus operate differently. As already emerged in previous sections (5.3.1 and 5.3.2), their first and foremost aim is to assist Somalis in dealing with issues spanning from social housing and employment to well-being and immigration status. Due to the high proportion of community members, in particular newcomers and the elderly who do not fluently speak English, voluntary organisations offer daily or weekly advice services during which users can bring letters or official documents to be translated and advisers can assist their clients by making phone calls on their behalf. Besides these advice sessions, Somali associations implement projects targeting the most vulnerable in the community, such as youngsters and women. They also tackle very specific socio-economic issues affecting the community as a whole, such as unemployment and high youth crime rates, *khat* consumption,^52^ forced marriages and female genital mutilation. The words of an interviewee who created and developed community organisations during the past decade clearly express what objectives these groups seek to achieve:

“I saw many difficulties with Somalian people, most of them don’t speak English, people of my age, they came to this country it was difficult for them to integrate. So they had to endure a lot of difficulties. Even me, I was put aside because people couldn’t understand the accent, things like that. Then I found that young people have more difficulties because they don’t integrate too well and because they feel their sense of belonging is not there. They have no feelings of self-confidence because they can see where their parents came from. So I

---

^52^ *Khat* is a plant growing mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Arabic Peninsula. *Khat* chewing is a widespread activity in countries like Yemen, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and its consumption has become increasingly common within diaspora communities in Europe and America. Since *khat* contains amphetamine-like stimulants, an increasingly controversial debate has arisen in host-countries including the UK about the long-term effects of its consumption. Numerous medical studies have been carried out and have linked *khat* to physical and mental health issues and the plant has been banned as an illegal drug in the US, Canada, France, Germany and other European (the latest one being the Netherlands) countries with the exception of the UK. *Khat* consumption has become a relevant issue amongst the Somali and Yemeni communities in the UK particularly due to the role it plays in issues such as unemployment and domestic violence.
decided to open this organisation specifically to target the young people, to encourage them, to help them so that they can integrate well, they can develop their self-esteem, they can stand up and fight for their rights, they can share the resources that are available for them [...] I know a lot of other organisations decided to work with the families. I [became] involved with other organisations before starting with this one, interpreting, helping them with the welfare system, helping them with medical issues, issues of migration.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Although both Somali and Ghanaians organisations provide advice and support in relation to issues deriving from the migration experience, the services offered by Somali groups seem to be more intensive, visible and, to some extent, more formal than the Ghanaian associations.

Furthermore, in order to effectively contribute towards the advancement of the community and challenge its disadvantaged position, Somali organisations tend to liaise with local authorities. On the contrary, there is not an evident public engagement and advocacy function emerging from the Ghanaian associational networks. The interview with a local councillor clearly captures the element of advocacy and public engagement that characterises Somali organisations, in contrast to the less visible Ghanaian groups. The councillor describes how Somalis organise in the local area and the relationship between the council and the community:

“There’s a Somali forum which we kind of helped and supported in the set-up, which brings together all the Somali groups, because there are a lot. There’s a whole range of things. Every year the Somali groups put on a big national football tournament [...] That’s very strong and very good in terms of engaging the young people in the community. We have done quite a lot of work with the Somali forum around educational attainments and Somali pupils because again that’s a sort of issue, the community wants their children to do well. Statistics show that for various reasons they are not [...] We used to organise what we call ‘access to services days’, like an open day with stalls from everything like libraries, nurseries, health and [...] if there was a need for interpreters we’d have them all there. So we’ve done that for the Somali community in the past.”

(councillor)

With regard to Ghanaians, the councillor explains:
“They have kind of Ghanaian welfare societies [...] On one of their housing estates [where Ghanaians concentrate], there is a community centre which is open for general use and that’s been very popular with the Ghanaian community so they do hold quite a number of events there which draw people in across London.” (councillor)

The interviewee confirms that divergent immigration and integration experiences represent a possible explanation for the different ways in which ethnic organisations operate and interact with the local environment:

“They [Ghanaians] have their own identity but I don’t know that as an identity as Ghanaians, they don’t use that in demanding services [...] Very broad generalisations: Somalis tend to be poorer ... both communities would have larger families on average. I get the impression that more Ghanaians women would be working than Somali women, better educated, more likely to speak English. These are generalisations, not all Somalis or all Ghanaians by any means, but just broadly speaking. For the Ghanaians there is more ability to get into work and kind of opportunities and anticipation and I think Somalis struggle much more.” (councillor)

To sum up, it is suggested that the impact of residential concentration on both the individual participation in and the creation of ethnic organisations varies between Somalis and Ghanaians primarily by virtue of their dissimilar immigration and integration experiences. The latter significantly influence the function and structure of organisational networks and, more specifically, their embeddedness in the local area. The development and survival of Somali organisations appears to rely on the presence of large Somali communities in the local area more closely than Ghanaian groups, although other area-level characteristics can hinder this relationship. These findings certainly lend support to the hypothesis that immigration-related factors influence the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic organisations (H6). This leads to a more complex answer to the question about the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic organisations. The hypothesised positive effect of concentration (H3) is rejected by the quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, the qualitative evidence does add more details as to the ways in which, within two African national groups, different associational networks are developed and how they are dissimilarly affected by the ethnic composition
of the area they are located in. Consequently, the hypothesis (H3) should be supported for Somalis but not for Ghanaians.

### 5.2 Ethnic places of worship

The second resource analysed is represented by ethnic religious institutions, which in the quantitative analysis are captured by a binary variable measuring individual participation in places of worship where at least half of the members are from the respondent’s ethnic background (see Appendix A for more details about coding). Figure 5.9 shows that just over half of the Black African sample included in the EMBES declared to have attended ethnic mosques and churches.

![Attendance in ethnic places of worship - Black Africans (％)](source)

Source: EMBES 2010. Weighted percentages (design weight) and accounting for clustering. Percentages calculated over valid N=498.

As for voluntary organisations, a closer look is taken at the attendance in places of worship across ethnic groups in order to compare Africans to other communities (see figure 5.10). First of all, the percentage of individuals who are not religious is strikingly
low amongst all groups, with the exception of Caribbeans. Similar patterns are detected for those who declare to be religious but do not attend places of worship. When focusing on the ethnic character of religious institutions, it is possible to observe that the majority of Black African respondents (55.5%) reported attending churches or mosques where the majority of worshippers are co-ethnics. This is a much lower proportion compared to the three South Asian communities, where participation in ethnic places of worship reaches values between 73% and 82%. At the same time, it is higher than the trend shown by Caribbeans (38%). Finally, the two Black groups are once again comparable in the percentage of people who attend non-ethnic religious institutions, which is significantly higher than amongst Asian communities.

Figure 5.10: Attendance in places of worship by ethnic group (%)

Source: EMBES 2010. Weighted percentages (design weight) and accounting for clustering. Percentages calculated over valid Ns of the four-category variable: BA=498, BC=567, I=562, P=634, BAN=254. Chi²=517.7 (12 df), p<0.001.

What is the effect of residential concentration on this ethnic social resource? Figure 5.11 shows that, unlike ethnic organisations, there is a significant relationship between the percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood and the level of engagement in ethnic places of worship. In the least concentrated neighbourhoods (0–1.35%) 49% of
individuals declared attending an ethnic church or mosque. This percentage increases to 66% (+20%) in the most concentrated areas (>10.31%). It is important to point out that, despite following a pattern that is very close to linear, the only statistically significant across-category difference is between the least and most concentrated neighbourhoods.

Figure 5.11: Attendance in ethnic places of worship by residential concentration – Interval plot

![Interval plot showing attendance in ethnic places of worship by residential concentration](https://example.com/attendance_plot.png)

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).

Table 5.2 reports the results for the logistic regression for the bivariate (Model 1) and controlled (Model 2) models. Although residential concentration was not found to be a significant predictor of participation in ethnic organisations, it does positively and significantly predicts attendance in ethnic places of worship. The probability of worshipping at a church or mosque where the majority of members are co-ethnics increases from 52% in the least concentrated areas (0–1.35%) to 71% in the most concentrated areas (>10.31%). This positive relationship remains even in the controlled model (Model 2: see Appendix B for full tables).

---

53 The relationship between attendance in ethnic places of worship and IMD score measuring area-level deprivation was also checked and no significant effect was detected in the binary and multivariate regression analysis.
This result suggests the existence of a relationship between residential concentration and ethnic religious networks and hence lends support for the hypothesised positive effect of residential concentration (H3). What is particularly interesting is that, as for voting and partly for non-electoral participation, the association between ethnic density and attendance in ethnic places of worship emerges when comparing the least and the most concentrated neighbourhoods rather than the intermediate levels of concentration.

How does the quantitative finding hold up across African national communities? This question can be effectively answered by the qualitative evidence, which also provides a valuable insight of the function served by Ghanaian churches and Somali mosques.

### 5.2.1 Church and mosque: beyond worship

For Ghanaians, the church is an exceptionally important establishment. It represents an essential component of everyday life and it is often the only activity Ghanaians participate in, besides work and family duties. In the words of one interviewee:
“Ghanaians love church very much, if not too much! They go to church every day! Twenty-four hours a day! I think that’s the core of their socialisation activities.” (Ghanaian man, 46–55 years, first generation)

This religiosity is part of the wider African culture. As argued by Arthur (2008: 94): “Africans are deeply religious people. Religion permeates the entire fabric of African societies and communities”, and Ghanaians are not an exception. Although there is a minority of Muslim community members, Ghanaians are overwhelmingly Christian and are split into numerous denominations, as highlighted in Chapter 3 and confirmed by the EMBES data (Figure 5.12).

In London and in the UK more generally, a number of Ghanaian churches have been created in the past two decades to accommodate the specific needs of this community, in particular with regard to Christian traditions that are less widespread in the British mainstream, such as Seventh-Day Adventism and Pentecostalism.

These co-ethnic churches serve two main functions, besides their spiritual and religious role: socialisation, on the one hand, and support and advice on the other. As for
community organisations, Ghanaian places of worship provide their members with numerous occasions to socialise through the frequent weddings, funerals and other religious events, as well as through the weekly services that for some denominations can last for a whole day. Direct observation carried out in a Ghanaian church captured this intense socialisation which is developed throughout the service, the collective lunch in the church hall and the afternoon activities. Additional events, including singing and study groups especially targeting the youths, as well as more formal meetings involving the church elders, are organised during weekdays. On average, it was found that Ghanaian families could attend church about four times a week. Throughout the duration of the religious service several announcements were made about births, deaths and weddings both in Ghana and the UK either to invite people to participate in the celebrations or to contribute with donations. The Ghanaian men and women interviewed describe this social role as follows:

“There are other activities as well. Socialisation is one of them. The way we do our things as Ghanaians is not compared to nothing here at all, and the reason why I’m saying this is that we are very closely knit together. The way we conduct our funerals, weddings, christenings and child education is so much unique, that you don’t have it in England.” (Ghanaian man, 46–55 years, first generation)

“We choose to go to a particular church because of family, because of friends we share food together, we share some ideas, it’s a place where you can discuss some family issues. I have chosen to go there because family and friends are there. We go on Saturdays, Wednesdays and Fridays.” (Ghanaian man, over 65 years, first generation)

What certainly emerges here is the importance of socialising with co-ethnics in the church, hence the decision to attend a specific church where family and friends gather. But there is also a sense of uniqueness that characterises Ghanaian churches. Only in these ethnic-specific spaces it is possible to reproduce cultural practices that are typical of the homeland, as if the church was ‘home away from home’.

The second function of churches is providing support for the community, a role that in other communities such as Somalis, is predominantly served by voluntary organisations. Ghanaians very often turn to religious institutions when in need of advice
or support. The church makes supporting members its own mission where possible. Otherwise, informal networks linked to the church intervene and provide the support needed. Two participants effectively explain this point:

“The church foundation is laid to look after its members, bring its members together, to help them sort their problems, but the problems are many and the members are many and the money is less. So at times it’s difficult. Otherwise we do support one another as much as we can.” (Ghanaian woman, over 65 years, first generation)

“Yes we have a welfare in the church and everybody contributes and we are planning to start a credit union for the welfare so everybody contributes monthly. So when someone dies we get some funds out of it to support towards costs.” (Ghanaian man, 46–55, first generation)

These accounts reveal how Ghanaian churches operate very much like community organisations in their attempt to help and advise the community, especially those who are more vulnerable such as new immigrants or individuals who suffer from illnesses and bereavement, for instance. It therefore appears that the role generally attributed to ethnic organisations is played by religious institutions.

The mosque represents a very similar point of reference for Somalis, who are mostly Muslim, when it comes to receiving support (Communities and Local Government, 2009: 10). Somali interviewees described mosques as places where individuals are given advice on various matters or can more informally discuss about issues they are facing:

“They [both mixed and Somali mosques] are like an institution open to the community; so it’s open 12 hours a day, between 12 o’clock to midnight. People come in to do their daily prayers, but also to discuss with others about access services, getting information, getting help with other matters they might have: housing, there’s advice going on, there’s employment search going on.” (Somali man, 35–46 years, first generation)

The mosque, like Ghanaian churches, also fulfils a social function as described by a Somali man:
“The mosque is like a club. Everybody comes there, people listen to the news, if you want to campaign we come there, everybody gets information from the mosque. For example, Fridays and the weekends and Saturdays, they are always large groups of Somalis who stay there.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Finally, one of the interviewees argued that the mosque has become a point of reference for local authorities when implementing actions aimed at tackling specific issues that affect the Somali and, more generally, the Muslim community:

“More importantly it becomes a focal point for local institutions like the police, local service providers who contact the community. If the council is trying to do anything [...], the first thing they think about is the mosque; this is where people come if they want to do a consultation, this is the first place they send the papers to.” (Somali man, 35–46 years, first generation)

This evidence suggests that Somali mosques and Ghanaian churches play a very similar role in their communities and primarily provide a space of socialisation and support.

5.2.2 Ethnic mosques and churches: the role of ethnic clustering

How does residential concentration impact on these important religious institutions? At the aggregate level, the evidence gathered suggests that presence of large Somali and Ghanaian communities is likely to positively influence the creation and availability of ethnic churches and mosques. As visualised in Figures 5.13 and 5.14, Somali and Ghanaian places of worship closely follow the residential patterns of the two communities, even more visibly than ethnic organisations. Unlike the latter, this link between residential concentration and ethnic religious institutions is common to both national groups and is further confirmed when focusing on the London region (Figures 5.15 and 5.16), which show how Ghanaian churches can be found in South London and Somali mosques, in East and North London.

54 The information about Somali mosques was gathered through the ‘Mosque directory’ website (http://www.mosquedirectory.co.uk/) and mosques were selected if the criteria ‘management’ included the word ‘Somali’. Ghanaian churches were mainly identified through the ‘Black Majority Churches UK’ online directory (http://www.bmcdirectory.co.uk/) as well as a more generic search conducted through Google.
Figure 5.13: Somali mosques and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011

Figure 5.14: Ghanaian churches and residential concentration (England) – Local Authorities, Census 2011

Figure 5.15: Somali mosques and residential concentration London – Local authorities, Census 2011


Figure 5.16: Ghanaian churches and residential concentration London – Local Authorities, Census 2011

The interviews conducted with Ghanaians confirmed that some ethnic churches had been created in the 1960s by small groups of immigrants who had met in either majority-White or Caribbean churches located in areas where the Ghanaian diaspora was concentrated (e.g. Haringey and Hackney). During the fieldwork more recent cases of congregations that were created from groups of Ghanaians who were previously attending a mainstream church were also found. Spatial proximity seems to provide both Somalis and Ghanaians with the necessary starting point for the development of well-established religious institutions, primarily because it facilitates accessibility and guarantees visibility.

Amongst Somalis it was also observed that by being located in high concentration areas, the ethnic mosque can benefit from the presence of well-established ethnic businesses and existing informal social networks, which might reinforce the function fulfilled by the ethnic place of worship.

As explained by a young Somali, by socialising with co-ethnics in the proximity of a mosque, it is possible to carry out the regular prayers when required:

“It’s like the mosque is the centre of the community, which it’s like the shops are a bit around where the mosques are, cafes, businesses they are all built around the mosque [...] When I do go socialise is usually being a cafe or restaurant that’s close to a mosque. I mean it’s for a variety of reasons, because my closest friends are in [the area], also because of my religion it’s good to be near a mosque because you have to pray many times a day.” (Somali man, 26–35 years, second generation)

This closely intertwined relationship between ethnic religious institution and other ethnic informal networks was more evident amongst Somalis than Ghanaians, although Ghanaian churches created in highly concentrated neighbourhoods generally co-exist with ethnic businesses through which community members socialise, as will be explained in Section 5.3.

At the individual level, it could be argued that due to the availability of Somali mosques and Ghanaian churches in highly concentrated areas, community members should be more likely to participate in these rather than non-ethnic religious institutions.
Although this is certainly true for some of the community members in both national
groups, the data collected through interviews suggest a more complex description of the
relationship between residential concentration and individual involvement in Ghanaian
churches and Somali mosques.

Particularly amongst Ghanaians, it emerged that community members living in
different boroughs commute long distances to attend a specific Ghanaian church, as
pointed out for ethnic organisations. The fact that the great majority of the participants
recruited in a church located in a highly concentrated borough actually lived in different
areas, even outside London, provides support for the claim that in some cases attendance
in ethnic places of worship is not linked to the place of settlement. The interview with a
first-generation Ghanaian man confirms this point:

“Many of the church members here come from North London. We have some
from [outside London], even though there is a church [there], and a church
[nearby], some still prefer to come there [...] You go wherever you want to go!
And some people in the East also go to North.” (Ghanaian man, 56–65 years,
first generation)

One of the main factors driving this ‘spatially flexible’ approach to worshipping is the
sense of belonging to a specific ‘church community’ that is often composed of close
friends and family members. In some cases, these social connections were established in
the 1960s and 1980s when the church was still an informal prayer group and its members
have personally experienced its growth and development into a formal church. The
account given by a Ghanaian man about the creation of the church he belongs to
effectively describes the way in which people become members of a Ghanaian church
and clarifies how this process hardly depends on location:

“From the history of the church, the group actually started somewhere in the
1960s, very informal, it was a kind of Ghanaian [denomination] student group. There
were people who were studying here, who were [denomination] back in
Ghana and decided to come together and have a fellowship together. But, by the
1980s when I started coming to the group, it had developed to such an extent
that they were meeting once a month, in the house of one of the elders. I wasn’t
coming frequently [...] But occasionally I came here to meet up with the group.
The group developed, more people joined, and those who joined were mainly
those who just came from Ghana and who were introduced to the group, and those who were here and didn’t know there was a group but who had now found out. [By the end of 1980s] the group had become quite sizeable [...] It was a huge group and we asked for it to be organised into a church.” (Ghanaian man, 56–65 years, first generation)

Whereas the creation of these churches seems to be influenced by spatial proximity, which can provide the first direct contact with co-nationals, the individual choice of participating in the group appears to be linked to informal networks (Datta et al., 2006: 21-22). The latter go well beyond spatial boundaries and create a strong attachment to the religious establishment, as explained by one interviewee:

“The church is about forty minutes to one hour from where I live, but I go there every Sunday. Because we’ve got to know ourselves and we are like friends.” (Ghanaian man, 46–55 years, first generation)

A similar account of the attachment to a specific place of worship was provided by a young Somali man who migrated to the UK as a teenager about ten years ago. When asked why he still attends the same Somali mosque, despite moving to a different neighbourhood, he replied:

“Because when I came to the country that’s my first mosque I have been to. Because all my friends had been there, I helped them as well, especially during Ramadan. All the people know me there and when they don’t see me they tell me, ‘Oh where have you been?’” (Somali man, 26–35, first generation)

This account remains an exception amongst Somalis, as not many participants reported commuting to attend a specific mosque due to the fact that the daily prayers require worshippers to attend the mosque multiple times during the day and mosques located near the house or the workplace are preferred. The main occasions in which people are likely to commute are the Friday prayer and the Eid celebrations (i.e. end of Ramadan).

Besides the informal networks created by individuals within co-national churches and mosques, the linguistic and cultural specificities of these institutions contribute to making them strong points of attraction. Socialising, receiving advice and worshipping
with co-nationals who share cultural practices and speak the same language is for many a necessity called for by a scarce knowledge of English, particularly amongst Somalis. In other instances, it creates an environment that ‘feels like home’, especially for first generation and recent immigrants. A first-generation Ghanaian man in his early 40s talks about the experience of worshipping in a Ghanaian rather than in a mixed church and points out the importance of worshipping and socialising with his own community, despite his fluent English and appreciation for culturally mixed environments:

“The basics [of worshipping] are the same, but naturally, because of the cultural orientations we have…sometimes you find that we are a bit more … let me put it this way: I find it easier to adapt in the Ghanaian set-up than in the mixed bit… but, don’t get me wrong, it’s also sometimes a refreshing experience if you go to where the mixed communities are […] I can speak English […] but I’m a bit more comfortable sometimes with the English, because it makes the service shorter and simpler, and also you have the experience of other nationals and ethnic groups. So sometimes it’s refreshing that you change a bit, but I still stick to my roots in the basics! So … it’s a bit of everything and the experiences sometimes, as adventurous as I am, I want to have a bit of home, if that makes sense.” (Ghanaian man, 36–45 years, first generation)

In other instances, the choice of where to worship transcends the religious institution’s ethnic character and individuals may decide to become members of local non-ethnic churches and mosques.

The factors that seem to shape this decision vary between Ghanaians and Somalis. Amongst the latter group, gender and generational status seem to play an important role. Numerous women interviewed explained how the local Somali mosque only has very limited spaces reserved to women in contrast to the much more spacious facilities of the local Asian-led mosque. The latter is also preferred by young Somalis (i.e. 1.5 and second generations), particularly women, due to their extensive offer of services such as study groups, training, sport and children’s activities. Younger generations and more specifically individuals who were born in the UK or migrated at a young age described themselves as being ‘more used’ to a mixed social environment and less attached to the cultural, clanic and linguistic particularism of Somali mosques. This gender and generational gap was not observed amongst Ghanaians, where church
attendance emerges as a weekly activity in which the whole family participates. The churches observed during the fieldwork organise youth groups and women take part in the organisation of church services and activities.

The decision to worship in mixed or White-majority churches generally stemmed from belonging to denominations that are widespread in the mainstream society, such as Catholic, Protestant and Methodist. In this regard, it is important to point out that Ghanaians might be more likely than Somalis to get involved in co-ethnic (i.e. Black African) rather than ‘co-national’ (i.e. Ghanaian) places of worship, on which the fieldwork focused. Whereas numerous African-led churches have been created in the past decade (Van Dijk, 2004), African-led mosques are much less widespread as the overwhelming majority of mosques are Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-led (Naqshband, 2013; Communities and Local Government, 2009). This indirectly limits the possibility of Somalis to participate in co-ethnic, rather than simply co-national, mosques. The EMBES data show indeed that 70% of Ghanaians but 53% of Somalis declared attending a place of worship where the majority of members are co-ethnics (see Figure 5.17). If respondents classify Black Africans as individuals ‘with the same ethnic background’ Somalis would be less likely to participate in ethnic mosques. The graph also suggests that the differences between Ghanaians and Somalis may just be a reflection of the significantly lower level of attendance in ethnic places of worship amongst Muslims in general compared to Christians.

---

55 Generational gaps were not thoroughly investigated within the Ghanaian community due to the difficulties encountered in recruiting individuals aged between 18 and 25 years. Therefore there might be generational variations in the preference for ethnic churches that have not been captured by this study.

56 Somalis may be likely to classify themselves as ‘Arabs’ (category which was added to the 2011 Census but was not present in the 2001 Census) or ‘Black Other’, primarily due to their affiliation to the Muslim community and closer affinity with the Arab community.
Figure 5.17: Attendance in ethnic places of worship – Somalis and Ghanaians, Christians and Muslims (%) 

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Percentage calculated over valid Ns: Somalis=63, Ghanaians=59, Christians=339, Muslims=124. Chi² (Ghanaians and Somalis)=2.11 (1 df), p>0.10; (Christians and Muslims)=5.4 (1 df), p<0.05.

To sum up, the availability of ethnic Somali mosques and Ghanaian churches can certainly benefit from the presence of large Somali and Ghanaian communities. Their creation and development is justified by an increased demand of ethnic places of worship in the local area or, as in the case of Ghanaians, they are likely to emerge from mainstream religious institutions where groups of co-ethnics self-organise into nationally homogenous prayer groups. In this regard the qualitative evidence provides further support to and makes sense of the positive relationship between concentration and participation in ethnic places of worship found by the quantitative analysis (H3). Nonetheless, there is qualitative evidence that questions this finding. The individual choice of where to worship often prescinds from the presence of ethnic religious institutions in the area and individuals decide to participate in local non-ethnic mosques and churches or to attend religious institutions that are not local but do have an ethnic character. The factors shaping the choice of which church or mosque to attend seem to differ amongst Somalis and Ghanaians. Gender and generational gaps play a more relevant role for Somalis, while the availability of African-led churches and the belonging to mainstream Christian denominations are more relevant for Ghanaians.
Therefore, unlike ethnic organisations, the two communities appear to be generally similar in the function served by ethnic places of worship as well as the impact of concentration on the creation of and, only partially, the individual participation in ethnic religious institutions. However, it is possible to argue that immigration-related factors may still exert a significant influence on the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic places of worship as Ghanaians appear once again to be more ‘mobile’ when it comes to attendance in ethnic churches. Furthermore, the factors influencing the choice of where to worship also diverge. Overall, it could be argued that the hypothesised effect of immigration-related factors (H6) is much less strongly supported than for ethnic religious institutions than for ethnic organisations, but it is not entirely dismissed.

5.3 Ethnic informal networks

The last social resource to be analysed is the embeddedness in informal social networks that are primarily composed by co-ethnics. The EMBES dataset captures these networks through a binary variable codes as (1) if all, most and at least half of the respondent’s friends are from the same ethnic background (see Appendix A for more details about coding).

The percentage of people who primarily socialise with co-ethnics is significantly high amongst all ethnic groups and it fluctuates between 73% for Black Africans and 80% for Pakistanis (see Figure 5.18).

---

57 This coding follows the coding used for ethnic places of worship and ethnic organisations. The decision not to code the category ‘half of them’ as (0) and maintain only ‘most of them’ and ‘all of them’ as a measure for ethnic informal networks is based on the fact that the variable does not provide an absolute measure of this construct. Indeed, the information provided refers to the proportion of co-ethnic friends in relation to the actual size of individual informal networks, which is unknown. So it seems sensible to define as ‘ethnic’ networks where, for example, the category ‘half of them’ refers to 1 friend over 2 rather than including this case in the ‘non-ethnic’ category.
To what extent do ethnic enclaves influence such an important ethnic-based social resource? The bivariate descriptive and regression analysis provide support for the hypothesis that living in highly concentrated areas has a positive effect on socialisation with co-ethnics. As shown in the interval plot in Figure 5.19, the percentage of Black Africans whose friends are primarily co-ethnics rises from about 65% in the least concentrated areas (0–1.35%) to 79% in the most concentrated neighbourhoods (>10.31%). An even more noticeable variation can be observed between the first and second (1.36–5.39%) quartiles. In the latter case, the percentage of Black Africans socialising mainly with co-ethnics increases to 83%, which means a slightly higher percentage than in the most concentrated areas. This trend is particularly surprising as it is not maintained throughout the remaining categories but decreases in the third quartile (5.40–10.30%) and finally increases in areas with more than 10.31% of co-ethnics.
It is not clear what causes these significant fluctuations, which are also confirmed by the regression analysis presented in table 5.3. Black Africans living in the least concentrated areas (0–1.35%) are 65% likely to have a majority of co-ethnic friends and this probability increases to 84% in the second quartile (1.36–5.39%) and to 80% in areas with more than 10.31% of Black Africans. This suggests the existence of a non-linear relationship between residential concentration and informal networks (see Section 3.2.3). As for ethnic places of worship, the association between residential concentration and ethnic informal networks emerges when comparing the least and most concentrated areas. The positive relationship is maintained in the controlled model (Model 2: see Appendix B for full tables).

---

58 The predicted probabilities are calculated by holding other variables (Model 2) at their weighted mean.

59 The relationship between involvement in ethnic informal networks and IMD score measuring area-level deprivation was also checked and no significant effect was detected in the binary and multivariate regression analysis.
Overall, it is possible to argue that the quantitative data provide some evidence to support the hypothesis that residential concentration reinforces ethnic informal networks (H3), especially when focusing on the significant difference between the least and most concentrated neighbourhoods.

The EMBES dataset also provide a helpful quantitative insight of the importance of ethnic informal networks amongst Somalis. As illustrated in Figure 5.20, both communities follow the same pattern as the Black African and other ethnic communities. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Somali and Ghanaian respondents declared that at least half of their friends are from the same ethnic background.\(^{60}\)

---

\(^{60}\) It is important to note that the question about ethnic informal networks refers to ‘ethnic’ rather ‘national’ background. Therefore, it does not allow a distinction to be made between Black African, Ghanaian and Somali friends.
5.3.1 Ghanaians and Somalis: between fragmentation and cohesion

Amongst both communities, informal social networks are influenced by tribal and ethnic affiliations that originate in the home-country. Somalia and Ghana are indeed characterised by the presence of several clans and ethnicities, which are often maintained in the diaspora community (Communities and Local Government, 2009; Griffiths, 2000; Arthur, 2008).

This clanic fragmentation is particularly significant within the Somali community. The community is indeed split along two main, often overlapping, lines: the tribes, on one side, and the region of origin, on the other (i.e. North and South Somalia). The claim for independence made by the Northern region, known as Somaliland, has further exacerbated these clanic divisions, has contributed towards the insurgence of frictions within diasporic community, and has been identified as one of the main factors negatively influencing the ability of the community to create strong ‘Pan-Somali’ networks in the host-country (Griffiths, 2000). These divisions are clearly described by a young Somali woman, who explains the strong role of tribal affiliation in defining individual identities:
“Yes, of course there is a division! Because there is Somaliland and Somalia ... some people rather than giving you a surname, would suggest the area where you are from or the tribe.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, second generation)

Another interviewee refers to clans as ‘a problem’ for the diaspora community, a system of power that creates damaging divisions amongst migrants:

“The biggest problem, I think, is the Somali community in general thinks that every clan has an obligation, and this means that you have to retaliate anyone committing any offences [...] Each clan wants supremacy, each one wants to eliminate the other one, there’s a supremacy challenge.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Despite acknowledging the existence of a tribal system, numerous participants expressed support for a more cohesive approach to informal networks and opposed the creation of fruitless divisions:

“I’m from Somalia, the South. All is Somalia, the North and the South, Somaliland is still Somalia. You see, all the people are Somali!” (Somali man, 26–35 years, first generation)

Other interviewees acknowledge their presence but minimise their importance, as in the case of this young Somali woman:

“Most of the residents in this area are from Somaliland and because I’ve grown up in this community I kind of perceive them as my family. I’m not from that school of thought about tribes and so on, because I don’t see the divide...because I don’t perceive a divide.” (Somali woman, 26–35, second generation)

Others attributed their existence of clanic divisions to the older generation, indirectly implying that younger generations are less keen on reproducing such fragmentation:

“[There are divisions] but it’s just if you go back to history. The older generation they kind of felt oppressed, it’s something to do with the war.” (Somali man, 26–35 years, second generation)
As for Ghanaians, ethnic fragmentation is present but appeared to be less influential on the life of the diasporic community in the UK. Particularly through the churches, Ghanaians tend to mix and overcome these differences, which extend to culture and language, in favour of a wider religious and national identity. The numerous events organised to celebrate public Ghanaian events, such as the Ghana Independence Day, are clear examples of this willingness to join forces and preserving the pride and essence of ‘being Ghanaian’ (Arthur, 2008: 87). Furthermore, whereas community groups created along ethnic lines do provide an ethnic-specific support to their members, the churches transcend this specificity and offer help to all Ghanaian, regardless of their linguistic, cultural or ethnic background, as explained by a Ghanaian man:

“There are levels. For instance, I’m from [Ghanaian ethnic group]. Even within [Ghanaian ethnic group] we have divisions. Within that area we have associations. There are a lot of people here [in the church] from that area and literally we are members of the same family. So it’s a bit closer, but within the church we go for the wider. The reason we do that, we know it’s quite sensitive concentrating on the area or the tribe you belong to. Because the church is a mixed one, people from all over the country. So in order to let everybody know that we are all one people and inclusive in everything we do, we do not do things for only one group, but for everybody.” (Ghanaian man, 56–65 years, first generation)

Regardless of the level of fragmentation, informal networks created between co-nationals function as systems of support amongst both Somalis and Ghanaians, especially in relation to issues directly stemming from the immigration experience. The interviews shed light on the importance of pre-existing networks of relatives and friends in the host-country to activate the ‘chain migration’ process. The great majority of Ghanaian participants reported arriving in the UK, primarily as students, and being hosted by members of their family who were already settled in the country. The concept of ‘extended family’ was also used to make sense of support received by co-ethnics through the various agencies described so far:

“We do have a culture, part of the Ghanaian culture; we have [an] extended family system and everybody is everybody’s brother or sister or uncle or auntie. So, if something happens to a person [...] as soon as we get to know of it, we
organise some kind of assistance to that person. So that is not a formal charitable activity. It's kinship assistance activity, put it that way. And we don't look upon it as charity or benevolence, we look at it as a duty, as part of our responsibility, as a community.” (Ghanaian man, 56–65 years, first generation)

Similar accounts were made by Somalis, amongst which ethnic informal networks were also described as sources of protection and safety:

“When you live in the same community and you see your people and other ethnics of the same sort of background you sort of feel that kinship and you feel safer, whereas when you go somewhere else you think that something is going to happen to you and you just feel a bit more isolated and a bit more weary.” (Somali woman, 16–25 years, second generation)

This evidence suggests that, as for ethnic places of worship and their function, Somalis and Ghanaians do present some similarities, despite the different circumstances characterising their immigration and integration experience.

5.3.2 Spatial proximity and informal contacts with co-ethnics: a complex scenario

Turning to the analysis of the impact of residential concentration on informal networks, the qualitative fieldwork highlighted a complex scenario.

On the one hand, evidence was found that living in close proximity with co-ethnics does encourage individuals to become involved in predominantly ethnic networks, as found by the quantitative analysis. The availability of spaces in which community members can gather and socialise increases the strength of these connections and tends to limit the social interactions to these ethnic-bounded circles. One of the Somali men interviewed described the extent to which physical proximity influences the ethnic character of informal networks as follows:

“When you are living in Tower Hamlets there is a Somali cafe, the restaurant is Somali, mosque is Somali, wherever you go it’s Somali! And automatically you get friends in your community.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)
Through direct observation it was possible to notice how ethnic restaurants and shops mentioned by the interviewee are widely diffused in neighbourhoods where Somalis concentrate, generally locate around the Somali mosque and effectively represent crucial channels of social interaction. An analogous function is fulfilled by Ghanaian businesses, e.g. food shops, restaurants, hair salons and shipping shops, which flourish in highly concentrated areas such as Haringey, Hackney and South-East London (Fong and Isajiw, 2000). The presence of these businesses is very visible even when walking through these areas, as Ghanaian flags are often displayed in their windows.

In these environments, both Somalis and Ghanaians are free to interact with their co-ethnics by using their mother-tongue, i.e. Twi or other local languages for Ghanaians and Somali for Somalis, rather than English and this creates an especially strong and exclusive bond. Whereas amongst Ghanaians, ethnic businesses represent a channel of socialisation for both men and women, who are often business owners, the two genders use these spaces differently amongst Somalis. Restaurants and coffee shops are generally used by men, while women tend to socialise in more private settings, such as friends’ houses, or through premises that they attend as part of their domestic duties, such as food shops, schools or ethnic organisations. By living in highly concentrated areas, women, and especially those who cannot or do not want to travel long distances to meet friends (e.g. single mothers and recent immigrants), can easily find occasions to socialise with co-ethnics, which often become important support networks.

Besides these gender-related differences, high concentration neighbourhoods with their offer of ethnic business and lively community life attract co-ethnics living in other areas of London and become the Somali and Ghanaian ‘social hubs’ where ethnic-based informal networks can be generated and maintained through the recreation of an environment that is very much ‘like home’. This suggests that ethnic enclaves do encourage bonding social capital but, at the same time, it is not strictly necessary to live in a high concentration area to be able to ‘produce’ and ‘utilise’ this capital, provided that individuals can be mobile. It could be then argued that, as Somalis were generally found to be more attached to localities, either by choice or because of the impossibility to commute, they would also be more likely to develop stronger ethnic networks within ethnic enclaves.
That said, during the qualitative fieldwork it emerged that this positive relationship between residential concentration and ethnic informal networks is not as straightforward as it may appear. The qualitative evidence, similar to that found for ethnic places of worship, challenges and adds complexity to the optimistic conclusions drawn from the quantitative enquiry. First of all, the evidence gathered revealed that despite living in high concentration areas individuals do mix with other ethnicities and the mainstream society through channels that link them to diverse networks, such as employment or education. A Somali man effectively captured this process by pointing out how being unemployed and living in Tower Hamlets can become the perfect recipe for strong ethnic-based networks:

“Spatially, if you don’t have a job, you are more concentrated in your community. But if you have a job, it’s different: it gives you the opportunity to be in different communities.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

The informal ethnic mixing was mainly described by younger community members and those belonging to the 1.5 and second generations, who are also those with a better knowledge of English, were mainly educated in the country and are more likely to have experienced university education.

Secondly, ethnic enclaves are not exclusive places where individuals maintain contacts with their co-ethnics. Somalis and Ghanaians living in high concentration areas do not restrict their ethnic social networks to those developed locally. Participants described the ways in which they regularly liaise with relatives and friends in different parts of London or the country, in particular when these networks are shaped by shared clanship and tribal affiliation. Ghanaians equally go beyond physical boundaries when it comes to maintaining connections with the ‘extended family’ that is often constituted by individuals belonging to the same tribe or ethnic group. The social gatherings described in sub-section 5.1.1 are an effective example of this spatial mobility.

Thirdly, clanic and tribal affiliations are likely to generate fragmentations within ethnic enclaves, hence restricting social networks that appear to be homogenous. Within the Somali community, indeed, it was found that clanship influences the process of chain
migration and favours the settlement of clans in specific areas in London. The case of Tower Hamlets and Newham is, for instance, discussed as follows:

“People tend to live in terms of community. Somalis are clan-based and family-based. So it’s good to live around your family or your community. Newham is cosmopolitan, there’s no specific group. But in Tower Hamlets, there’s a specific group that dominates there.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

This means that, although Somalis do live close to each other in areas like Newham and Tower Hamlets, it does not necessarily mean that they would socialise with the whole community, but their local informal networks are likely to be selective and include only those who are recognised as part of the exclusive circle. This, to some extent, creates ‘enclaves within enclaves’. Although ethnic fragmentation amongst Ghanaians is less visible, the use of specific languages and dialects can be linked to ethnic divisions. In both cases, these differences generate fragmented ethnic enclaves where social interaction between co-ethnics is driven by factors that cannot simply be reduced to shared national or ethnic identity.

To sum up, residential concentration certainly promotes occasions of regular and exclusive interaction with co-ethnics, and this is visible in the significant and positive impact of residential concentration on ethnic informal networks, as highlighted by the quantitative analysis (H3). The qualitative evidence suggests that this relationship is not as straightforward and it is influenced by various factors. Firstly, ethnic enclaves do not hinder the ability of Somalis and Ghanaians to mix with other ethnic groups and the mainstream society. The ethnic mixing is generally guaranteed by interactions taking place through employment and educational activities. This is particularly true for younger generations of Somalis, for instance, and for those who can in fact maintain this ‘spatial flexibility’.

Secondly, ethnic informal networks go often beyond geographical boundaries. Although some individuals do socialise with co-ethnics, it is not always necessary to be settled in ethnic enclaves to connect with co-ethnics. Thirdly, clanic and tribal affiliation is likely to generate divisions even within homogenous ethnic enclaves. As for ethnic places of worship and in sharp contrast with ethnic organisations, the immigration-
related characteristics of Somalis and Ghanaians do not seem to remarkably impact either on the structure and function of social networks or on the effect exerted by ethnic enclaves (H6). Nonetheless, some significant differences emerge particularly in the ability of community members to actually overcome geographical boundaries to connect with co-ethnics. In this regard, Somalis seem to be more prone to socialise in the local area while Ghanaians appear to be more mobile. Consequently, the role played by ethnic density in nourishing ethnic informal networks may be more relevant amongst Somalis.

5.4 Conclusions

The chapter addressed the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic-based social resources, i.e. ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal networks. The findings from both the quantitative and qualitative enquiries were presented. The former investigated the impact of concentration on the individual involvement in ethnic-based networks amongst Black Africans, whereas the latter focused on the Ghanaian and Somali community and widened the analysis to the effect of ethnic enclaves on both the participation in (i.e. individual level) and creation of (i.e. aggregate level) ethnic resources.

The chapter tested the hypothesis of a positive relationship between spatial proximity with co-ethnics and ethnically dominated networks (H3). Based on the quantitative findings, this hypothesis should be rejected for participation in ethnic organisations but supported when considering individual attendance in ethnic places of worship and embeddedness in informal networks. These results are summarised in Figure 5.21.

The qualitative evidence investigated the hypothesis that the immigration-related factors characterising Somalis and Ghanaians influence the relationships described by the quantitative enquiry (H6). By doing so, it provided a nuanced and detailed description not only of the relationships of interest but also of ways in which the two national communities develop and participate in formal and informal social networks.
As regards ethnic organisations, spatial concentration was found to positively impact on individual participation amongst Somalis in two main ways. Firstly, it facilitates the access of users to the services provided by organisations (i.e. passive participation). Secondly, living in close contact with co-ethnics appeared to increase the awareness of the issues faced by Somalis and to promote forms of ‘informal volunteering’, which in turn lead to a more active involvement in ethnic organisations motivated by the eagerness to actively support co-ethnics. This positive effect was not clearly observed amongst Ghanaians. At the aggregate level, the creation and development of ethnic associations was also found to be facilitated by co-ethnic spatial proximity, once again more evidently for Somalis than Ghanaians. By being based in neighbourhoods where the Somali community concentrates, ethnic organisations become more accessible for users and more important for the local authorities as they tackle relevant local issues.

The different impact of residential concentration on ethnic organisations, both at the individual and aggregate level, was primarily attributed to the function fulfilled by Somali and Ghanaians organisations. Somali groups generally provide regular advice services, develop community projects and often liaise with local authorities to represent and advocate for the community. In sharp contrast, Ghanaian organisational networks mainly operate ‘in the background’ and provide space for socialisation and mutual support by primarily relying on informal networks rather than fulfilling a public advocacy function. For these reasons, organisations and their members rely much less on spatial proximity and location. Support can be received, activities can be attended and
community groups can be managed without necessarily being settled in close proximity with co-ethnics.

These findings point out the importance of taking into account the immigration-related differences existing between African national groups, therefore lending support to the hypothesis tested (H6). Different needs stemming from divergent immigration and integration experiences can translate into different ways of developing and ‘using’ organisational networks (Sardinha, 2009; Maxwell, 2012). Ultimately, this affects the extent to which community organisations are influenced by and rely on ethnic residential concentration. Perhaps, a community like Somalis, facing a more challenging process of integration, is likely to benefit more from ethnic enclaves. That said, the between-area variations observed in the strength and effectiveness of Somali organisations suggest that additional contextual factors, such as the level of institutional support (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008) and ethnic diversity and clanic or tribal composition of the area, can hinder or modify the relationship between concentration and organisational networks.

It is with regard to ethnic religious institutions and informal networks that Somalis and Ghanaians, despite preserving some degree of dissimilarity, tend to converge. At the aggregate level, it was observed that Somali mosques and Ghanaian churches are mostly established in areas where these communities concentrate. Nonetheless, the individual participation in such ethnic establishments did not appear to be necessarily affected by this heightened availability. Ghanaians and Somalis can choose to attend local mixed places of worship or to commute to take part in an ethnic church or mosque, with the latter option being more widespread amongst Ghanaians. The positive effect between ethnic concentration and participation in ethnic places of worship highlighted by the quantitative analysis (H3) might be capturing the portion of co-ethnics that actually ‘utilise’ the ethnic-based religious resources available in the local area.

Similar reflections can be made with regard to informal networks. Spatial proximity does encourage regular interaction with co-ethnics (Vervoort, 2012; Vervoort et al., 2011), particularly through ethnic businesses (Fong and Isajiw, 2000). However, ethnic enclaves do not exclude the possibility of mixing with other ethnic groups through
channels such as employment or school and university education. Clanic affiliations also introduce a further level of complexity and fragmentation in these informal networks, which might not as homogenous and strong as expected. This evidence matches the findings presented for the Black African community as a whole and suggests that the concerns about the detrimental effect of ethnic enclaves on informal heterogeneous networks should be reviewed, as also argued by other studies (Drever, 2004; Esser, 1986; Sigelman et al., 1996).

The two communities still differ in their ability to transcend geographical boundaries when it comes to both attendance in ethnic places of worship and ethnic informal networks. Ghanaians do appear to be more mobile and ‘spatially flexible’ than Somalis. Several participants reported commuting to attend social gatherings and Ghanaian churches. In contrast, only some individuals amongst Somalis seem to be more exposed to ethnic mixing and ‘spatial flexibility’, that is to say, those who have the skills and tools to actually go beyond the safe boundaries of ethnic enclaves. For instance, younger generations who can speak English or have been to school and university appeared to be the ones who refer the most to mixed social networks. However, more vulnerable community members, e.g. single mothers, the elderly or unemployed people, may have fewer opportunities to socialise outside their local area.

What conclusions can be drawn from the results presented? First of all, it is difficult to unconditionally support the hypothesis that ethnic enclaves always result in stronger ethnic social networks, either formal or informal (H3). On the one hand, informal inter-ethnic mixing does happen through networks that go beyond the places of residence and close relationships with co-ethnics can be maintained regardless of the spatial proximity (Zelinsky and Lee, 1998). In the same way, participation in formal organisational and religious networks does not necessarily rely on spatial proximity, as individuals can be settled and worship or volunteer in different areas. Moreover, individual- and area-level factors can significantly reduce the relevance of ethnic concentration. On the other hand, however, a beneficial effect of residential concentration is observed when spatial proximity promotes exclusive interactions between co-ethnics, reinforces the role played by ethnic organisations or facilitates the creation of ethnic religious institutions. In most cases, and particularly with regard to
voluntary organisations, the rejection or acceptance of H3 depends on the national community that is being investigated.

This leads to the second conclusion: it is important to recognise and take into account the internal heterogeneity of Black Africans as this might remarkably affect the extent to which spatial proximity influences ethnic social resources (H6). In spite of some similarities, the qualitative fieldwork shed new light on how Ghanaians and Somalis have developed different organisational networks in order to tackle the different issues affecting their community. Consequently, the two groups diverge in the way in which they anchor these networks to the local area and therefore in the role played by residential concentration in supporting ethnic-based resources.

With regard to how these findings feed into the overall aim of this study, i.e. the investigation of the link between residential concentration and political participation, the main implication of the quantitative results is that the hypothesis of a mediating effect of ethnic social resources is, at this stage, supported exclusively for ethnic places of worship and informal networks. Nonetheless, the qualitative enquiry, suggests a more nuanced answer to this matter and points out the need to focus on between-group variations in the social processes and institutions that link concentration to political engagement.
CHAPTER 6. Ethnic Social Resources and Political Participation

This chapter focuses on the final step of the analysis, that is, the effect of ethnic-based social resources on political participation, and hence it addresses the third research question:

RQ3. To what extent and how do ethnic-based social resources affect political participation of Black Africans?

Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 – Hypotheses tested

The study focuses on the three ethnic social networks investigated in Chapter 5, i.e. voluntary organisations, religious institutions and informal networks, and investigates the extent to which these ethnic-specific networks hinder or support political participation.

As for the relationship between residential concentration and political participation, the political role of ethnic-based networks has been defined as both negative and positive by previous studies.

On one hand, some scholars have argued that the exclusive nature of social connections created amongst co-ethnics hinders political engagement. Unlike ‘bridging’
social capital, which produces the generalised trust that is needed for sense of ‘civicness’ and political engagement to flourish, ethnic-based connections support particularised trust. Consequently, they do not promote a more general engagement in the host-country’s political and civic life. Strong ethnic ties and socialisation within the boundaries of ethnic communities are expected to foster involvement in people’s own community (Morales and Morariu, 2011) and possibly lead to political isolation and withdrawal from the societal and political mainstream (Uslaner and Conley, 2003: 333). In support of this argument, empirical evidence was found about the more beneficial effect of cross-ethnic voluntary organisations (Van Londen et al., 2007; Stromblad and Adman, 2009; Stromblad et al., 2011).

On the other hand, however, scholars have suggested that ethnic-based networks can still produce positive effects on political participation, regardless of their ethnic nature. Both ethnic places of worship and ethnic voluntary organisations were found to facilitate the acquisition of civic skills (Myrberg, 2011; Harris, 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001) and the exposure to political stimuli and political information (Tate, 1993; Harris, 1994), as well as providing opportunities for political recruitment and mobilisation (Leighley, 2001). Furthermore, formal ethnic networks can generate the social trust that, regardless of its ‘particularised’ nature, is so valuable for political engagement (Jacobs et al., 2004; Tillie, 2004; Morales and Pilati, 2011; Van Heelsum, 2005; Fennema and Tillie, 1999). They can also reinforce group consciousness, which is one of the strongest predictors of immigrants’ political participation (Wilcox and Gomez, 1990; Tate, 1991; Jamal, 2005). Finally, formal networks help ethnic leaders emerge, assume the role of community representatives primarily, and cooperate with mainstream political elites to politically mobilise ethnic communities (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Bloemraad, 2001; Johnson, 1991).

So far, less research has been carried out about ethnic informal networks. In general, interpersonal connections have been found to benefit political engagement especially when more active individuals mobilise less active individuals (Passy and Giugni, 2001; Tillie, 2004). Political knowledge and acquisition of political expertise are other advantages of informal political discussion (Bennett et al., 2000; Meclurj, 2003; Abrams et al., 2005; Toka, 2010; Holbert et al., 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991). In
contrast to this positive argument, ethnic-based informal networks could hinder participation if the individuals involved lack political expertise or could limit the scope of political engagement if co-ethnics primarily debate homeland or ethnic-related politics.

Based on the contrasting evidence about the impact of ethnic-based social resources on political participation, two competing hypotheses will be tested. Due to their ‘bonding’ and exclusive nature, ethnic social networks could be hindering political participation by isolating ethnic communities from the mainstream. In turn, this would deprive them of politically relevant resources and focus their political engagement on ethnic- and homeland-related issues. Consequently, the negative hypothesis is tested:

\[ H4 \] – Ethnic-based social resources are expected to \textit{negatively} influence political participation.

In contrast, ethnic-based social networks could benefit political participation by functioning as mainstream social networks, regardless of their ethnic character, and providing politically relevant resources such as civic skills, political information, mobilisation and recruitment, group consciousness and ethnic leadership. The positive hypothesis is therefore tested:

\[ H5 \] – Ethnic-based social resources are expected to \textit{positively} influence political participation.

Previous evidence has shown that different immigration and integration experiences shape the organisational networks of ethnic communities so to adapt to the community’s needs (Sardinha, 2009). This claim was supported by the evidence presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, scholars have found remarkable between-group variations in the impact that ethnic-based social resources, in particular ethnic voluntary organisations, have on political engagement (Jacobs et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2004; Togeby, 2004). Therefore, the relationship between ethnic-based social networks and political participation is analysed in the light of the differences between Somalis and Ghanaians (RQ4) and, as in the previous chapter, a non-directional hypothesis is tested:

\[ H6 \] – Immigration-related factors that characterise the various national groups within the wider Black African category are deemed to influence the relationship between co-ethnic residential concentration, ethnic-based social networks and political participation.
Based on the findings highlighted in Chapter 5, it is expected that the relationship between ethnic organisations and political engagement considerably varies between African national groups. Somali organisations appeared to be more advocacy-centred than Ghanaian voluntary groups, and the community expressed a more evident eagerness to engage in the public political arena in order to pursue collective goals. This chapter will shed light on the extent to which these different organisational and informal networks influence political participation. Furthermore, a valuable insight will be provided into the ways in which Ghanaians and Somalis perceive and approach political engagement, including their transnational practices.

The first three sections present the quantitative and qualitative findings for each ethnic-based social resource and Section 6.4 provides some conclusive remarks.

### 6.1 Ethnic organisations and political engagement

The relationship between individual participation in ethnic voluntary organisations and political participation within the Black African community as a whole is firstly addressed through descriptive bivariate analysis.

The interval plots reporting the mean in 90% confidence intervals for voter turnout (Figure 6.2) and non-electoral participation (Figure 6.3) suggest that the political role played by involvement in ethnic organisations varies depending on the mode of participation considered. No significant difference in voter turnout is indeed observed between Black Africans who do and do not take part in ethnic voluntary groups. In contrast, the percentage of Black Africans who engaged in at least one non-electoral activity is 13% amongst those who do not take part in ethnic organisations and increases to 34% amongst respondents who do participate in these voluntary groups.
Figure 6.2: Voter turnout by participation in ethnic organisations among Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).

Figure 6.3: Non-electoral engagement by Participation in ethnic organisations among Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).
These results are confirmed by the bivariate regression analysis presented in Table 6.1. Participation in ethnic voluntary organisations increases the odds of engaging in non-electoral activities by a factor of 3.57 when controlling for other immigrations-related and socio-economic factors in Model 2 (see Appendix C for full tables).61

Table 6.1: Political participation and ethnic-based social resources – Logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting in general elections</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in ethnic organisations</td>
<td>0.16(.23)</td>
<td>0.23(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.59(.13)**</td>
<td>-2.06(.10)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-298.36</td>
<td>-280.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>0.48(1)</td>
<td>25.46(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised coefficients (robust standard errors). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering (293 PSUs) and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.

Overall, the quantitative analysis focusing on the Black African community as a whole supports the hypothesis of a positive effect exerted by ethnic organisations on political engagement (H5) but not on voter turnout, with regard to which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Stromblad and Adman (2009) highlighted a similar non-significant relationship between voter turnout and participation in ethnic organisations, but also concluded, in contrast with this study, that no significant effect is also exerted over various types of electoral (i.e. contacting and party activities) and non-electoral (protests and political consumerism) modes of engagement.

The different effect of ethnic organisations on electoral and non-electoral participation remains puzzling. Berger et al. (2004) highlight similar results: ethnic voluntary groups were found to have a null or negative effect on political attitudes (i.e. interest in German politics) but a positive impact on non-electoral participation. The scholars suggest that this differential effect may be derived from the fact that non-electoral participation remains puzzling. Berger et al. (2004) highlight similar results: ethnic voluntary groups were found to have a null or negative effect on political attitudes (i.e. interest in German politics) but a positive impact on non-electoral participation. The scholars suggest that this differential effect may be derived from the fact that non-electoral participation remains puzzling. Berger et al. (2004) highlight similar results: ethnic voluntary groups were found to have a null or negative effect on political attitudes (i.e. interest in German politics) but a positive impact on non-electoral participation. The scholars suggest that this differential effect may be derived from the fact that non-
electoral participation is more likely to focus on ethnic-related, rather than mainstream, issues and home-country, rather than host-country, politics. This ethnic-specific type of engagement would therefore benefit from the bonding character of ethnic organisations. This could explain why participation in ethnic organisations does not affect voter turnout, which could be seen as a less ethnic-specific activity due to its focus on mainstream political debates.

In order to understand the extent to which the positive effect in non-electoral engagement derives from the ethnic-specific character of ethnic organisations or whether it could be more generally attributed to associational engagement, the EMBES dataset is utilised to investigate the relationship between participation in non-electoral activities and various types of voluntary organisations. Table 6.2 presents the bivariate correlation coefficients describing the relationship between non-ethnic as well as overall organisational membership and political engagement, both electoral and non-electoral.\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting in general elections</th>
<th>Participation in non-ethnic organisations</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=468</td>
<td>N=513</td>
<td>(\chi^2=0.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in any organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\chi^2=1.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Statistical significance level: \(***p\leq.01\), \(**p\leq.05\), \(p\leq.10\).

\(^2\) Respondents were asked whether they had taken part in organisations other than ethnic and cultural clubs and associations (i.e. ethnic organisational membership). Those who answered 'yes' were asked to identify the proportion of group members that were from the same ethnic background. Organisations with a few of or no co-ethnics were classified as non-ethnic. Non-ethnic organisational membership: (0) participated in organisations with a majority of co-ethnics or did not participate in any other organisations (1) participated in non-ethnic organisations. Overall organisational membership: (0) did not participate in any organisations (neither ethnic-cultural nor other), (1) participated in either/both ethnic-cultural or/and non-ethnic organisations.
The bivariate analysis shows that participation in both non-ethnic organisations and all types of voluntary groups, regardless of their ethnic character, is positively linked to non-electoral participation but no impact on voter turnout. The proportion of Black Africans who participated in at least one non-electoral activity is remarkably low due to the general disengagement from non-electoral politics (see Chapter 4, section 4.1). That said, the percentage of individuals who participated in non-electoral activities is higher amongst those who were involved in non-ethnic organisations (16%) as well as in any voluntary organisation (18%). This suggests that ethnic organisations may not be different from other forms of organisational membership in their political role. As for the lack of a significant relationship between organisational engagement and voter turnout, it is interesting to note that this seems to regard all forms of voluntary participation rather than ethnic organisations only. Heath et al. (2011) highlighted very similar results. They found that the level of organisational engagement (i.e. not at all, a little, somewhat, very active in any voluntary organisations) was not significantly correlated to voter turnout amongst ethnic minorities, although a positive effect emerged for the White British majority.

Based on this evidence, the ethnic nature of organisations does not seem to make sense of the differential effect on non-electoral (significant and positive) and electoral (non-significant) engagement. It could be argued that these variations are linked to the fact that the resources developed through organisational membership relate more to non-electoral activities, such as protests and petitions, than to voting (Verba et al., 1995). To some extent, some of these actions are naturally related to the ways in which voluntary groups operate. For instance, if they carry out an advocacy function, the use of petitions or demonstrations could be seen as effective channels. Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that other, more relevant factors could be influencing ethnic minorities’ voter turnout, such as eligibility to register and vote.

The differences in voter turnout between individuals who participated and did not participate in non-ethnic and any other voluntary organisations are not statistically significant ($\chi^2<0.10$) whereas the positive variations for non-electoral participation are significant at the 1% level.

In this regard, it is important to point out that the binary variable measuring non-electoral engagement does not include the following item: “Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs?” This question was excluded and only four items were used to create the final measure as it is likely to be correlated to the concept of organisational engagement.
The qualitative fieldwork sheds some new light on the mechanisms that may be linking ethnic associational and political engagement. Evidence of this relationship was found among Somali voluntary groups with regard to both electoral and non-electoral participation.

Electoral participation appeared to be linked to Somali organisations in various ways. To begin with, there is a direct and visible relationship. During the regular advice sessions, users are given information about how to register and vote and are helped to translate political materials received by post, such as letters about registration on the electoral register or political leaflets distributed by parties and candidates particularly during pre-election campaigns. This was confirmed by one of the community workers interviewed:

“They [community members] come here sometimes, we register them if they are not registered, they bring the papers here and we help them in terms of making sure they are registered to vote in the right address.” (Somali woman, 36–45 years, first generation)

Because of the remarkable difficulties that some community members face due to language barriers, this service provides a crucial ‘gateway’ to political awareness and the ability to comprehend and participate in the host-country political system.

Somali organisations were also found to be indirectly associated with electoral participation. Firstly, they influence individual participation in ‘conventional’ political activities, e.g. campaigning and engaging in party activities, which are closely linked to voter turnout. Secondly, they promote the acquisition of resources that are generally expected to positively impact on electoral participation. This indirect effect was primarily observed among those who are actively involved in the management and development of ethnic voluntary groups, i.e. directors, board members, community workers and volunteers.

As hinted in Chapter 5, participants who personally and directly engage in community organisations, and for whom this involvement often represents a full-time or part-time employment, seemed also to become more aware of the issues afflicting the
community. A Somali woman actively involved in a voluntary organisation provides an effective account of this process:

“Previously, I was not that much connected to the Somali community, it’s only when I joined [a community organisation] that I became more aware that in terms of the Somali community, there’s more of a need than other communities.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, generation 1.5)

Participation in ethnic organisations corresponds to the acquisition of knowledge, through practical experience, of the community’s needs. Moreover, the Somali community is perceived as more in need, more disadvantaged than other ethnic communities.

It was observed how this close relationship with and knowledge of the community developed by active members of Somali organisations frequently translated into a more active political engagement. Participants described how their increased awareness and actual experience of the specific issues affecting the community led them to see the political arena as the place where these issues can be effectively addressed. This is where decisions are made, resources are allocated and policies are created and implemented. Some of the interviewees refer to their willingness to assume a more openly political role in order to be able to ‘enter’ the political arena and voice the community’s needs. In the words of a young Somali woman:

“I would love to be a councillor because this is where decisions are made and the budget is set, problems discussed, that’s where it happens! We lack that now, that’s where I would make sure that I voice the needs.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, generation 1.5)

Similarly, another Somali woman active in community work refers to her personal political engagement to underline how community organisations should engage with politics in order to influence policies and voice collective needs:

“I used to go to council meetings, because I believed that anything can help you achieve your targets; as an organisation to be politically active [is important], going to these people who make policies, who can change policies and can
support organisations achieve their objectives.” (Somali woman, 18–25 years, second generation)

The process described recalls the definition of group consciousness given by Miller et al. (1981: 495) as “a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests”. The ‘group’s relative position’ emerges when Somali community activists describe the problems faced by their co-ethnics as more pressing and widespread than for other ethnic and national groups. This particularly refers to issues such as social housing, mental health and well-being, youth crime and unemployment. Not only are these serious issues, they also require a specific and targeted action to be solved, particularly when it comes to tackling language barriers. The political elements of ‘political awareness’ and ‘collective action’ emerge from the eagerness to use the knowledge and experience acquired through community work to bring these issues into the local or national political arena. Politics then becomes the channel to help the community overcome its disadvantage and to contribute to its advancement in the integration process.

In some cases, this enhanced group consciousness and the commitment to an advocacy role led to an even more active political involvement, namely the candidacy in local elections. From this derives the second indirect political benefit of ethnic organisations, which is to give community workers who want to engage more actively in politics the opportunity to be supported by community members. Participation in ethnic organisations provides the candidates with a valuable source of electoral support. Although ethnic organisations cannot deliver political messages in favour of specific candidates or political parties (Charity Commission, 2008: 18), this support is guaranteed informally, outside office hours, when colleagues team-up to carry out door-to-door leafleting or organise meetings to promote the candidacy. Some interviewees described how participating in a colleague’s electoral campaign represented their first experience of active political involvement and potentially the beginning of a long-term engagement. The passage from detachment to political engagement is effectively described by a Somali
woman who got increasingly involved in politics through her work within ethnic organisations:

“To begin with I was never interested in politics, electoral or anything [...] But I got involved into politics when I started with the Somali community here [ethnic organisation]. It was the last general election and I really got involved, and helped in the campaign of registering people in the electoral register [...] A candidate that was standing, I was doing [their] campaign manager so for that I became quite involved. I held workshops [for community members], I did events for them, giving lectures, basically telling them options, so telling them that you can decide when you go to vote but at least you need to be aware of what’s available to you and what candidates are on offer.” (Somali woman, 36–45 years, first generation)

So, ethnic organisations indirectly affect individual participation in electoral politics by strengthening informal networks amongst co-ethnic community workers who are, or have become, politically active and support one other, as for instance during political campaigns. Their voluntary or paid work in ethnic organisations provides them with the experience and knowledge of the community’s needs as well as, in some cases, the initial stimulus to participate in politics.

However, the actual political participation takes place outside these formal organisational networks. As demonstrated in the above quote, the political skills and information acquired through personal political participation and interest are utilised to inform co-ethnics about the electoral process and the contents of parties’ manifestos. Ethnic organisations therefore appear not only to function as channels to create and improve civic skills and political knowledge (Verba et al., 1995), they also promote contact with the mainstream and hence blur and cross-cut boundaries between ethnic communities and the outside society (Ramakrishnan and Lewis, 2005).

The positive impact of ethnic organisations on informal networks does not only relate to community workers and activists but also to the community as a whole. By working in regular connection with community members and providing them with advice and support, Somalis who engage in ethnic organisations build up a strong relationship with their co-ethnics. This makes them ‘insiders’ to be trusted in light of their knowledge...
of and commitment to the community. This, in turn, could lead to political support in the case of a local candidacy, for instance. This is what emerges from a Somali community worker’s account which shows the links:

“Politically, people would see a good figure: you work in the community and they see what you’re doing [...], people always see you a very strong, active person, because they see you active with the community. If you are not active in your own community, obviously you won’t be active politically. So obviously they link! They go together [...] by involving the community you know what’s going on in everyday life, what’s going on back home, what’s going on locally.”
(Somali woman, 36–45 years, first generation)

These words suggest that political support from the community is often rooted in the intense, regular and passionate work carried out within the community through ethnic organisations. To some extent, by formally engaging in the community, individuals acquire legitimacy to represent the group politically and are hence more likely to be supported by co-ethnics in the event of a political candidacy, for instance. This provides support to the claims that ethnic organisations can facilitate the emergence of ‘ethnic leaders’, i.e. individuals who are exceptionally active in advocating for the community and represent it within the mainstream society and the political arena (Bloemraad, 2006b).

These activists are often creators, board and staff members of ethnic organisations. The latter emerge as channels for ethnic leaders to acquire the appropriate political skills and knowledge as well as the ‘authority’ to act as representatives of the community. This expertise and recognition can then be utilised to create closer relationships with political parties and to pursue a political career outside the formal boundaries of ethnic organisations. The distinction between the role that ethnic leaders play within ethnic organisations and their engagement in party activities is particularly crucial as the great majority of Somali organisations are registered charities and, despite being allowed to engage in advocacy actions to influence public policies (Charity Commission, 2008: 18), cannot take part in openly political actions supporting specific parties and candidates (Charity Commission, 2008: 3). Therefore, a careful balance has to be maintained between personal political engagement, the role as community representatives, and the direct involvement in community organisations. That said, ethnic
organisations certainly represent places of legitimation and personal growth which support a more formal involvement of ethnic leaders in the political domain. What is more important, through their active role in ethnic organisations, Somali leaders tend to become a medium between the community and the mainstream political system. Not only can they mobilise community members by virtue of their political expertise and experience, but also they can make the community more visible and hence more relevant in the mainstream arena and, more importantly, within its official political channels, i.e. the political parties. An example of the ways in which parties and ethnic leadership are becoming more visibly intertwined is the creation, in 2011, of the ‘Somali Friends of Labour’ group, a platform within the Labour party which is specifically aimed at the Somali diaspora (Rushanara Ali MP, 2011).

In spite of this observed beneficial effect, the resources provided by ethnic organisations might not be sufficient to increase voter turnout or other forms of conventional engagement (e.g. party membership, presence of ethnic candidates) due to the influence of external factors. A great number of Somalis, for instance, are likely to not be eligible to vote due to their more recent migration and the lack of citizenship status. Table 6.3 shows that the Ghanaians’ voter turnout in 2010 was higher than the Somalis’. However, the data also shows that a greater proportion of Somalis declared to not be eligible to vote.

Table 6.3: Voter turnout and eligibility to vote – Ghanaians and Somalis (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ghanaians</th>
<th>Somalis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported and validated turnout¹</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not eligible to vote (self-reported)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Weighted percentages (rounded and calculated over the total sample size). ¹Self-reported turnout used when validated turnout is missing; non-eligible respondents (either self-reported or validated) are treated as missing. Pearson’s $\chi^2$: self-reported/validated turnout=10.9***, self-reported eligibility=7.2**. Statistical significance level: ***$p \leq .01$, **$p \leq .05$, *$p \leq .10$.  

183
These individual circumstances have to be added to other macro-level factors, such as the parties’ electoral strategies and the openness of the political system to ethnic candidates. Maxwell (2012: 117), for instance, argues that if the community presents, or is perceived by parties as having lower voter turnout, as it could be the case for Somalis or Black Africans in general, mainstream political parties will be less likely to engage with these communities and their leaders (see also Bloemraad, 2006a).

The political role of Somali organisations is not limited to electoral participation, but it extends to non-electoral involvement in a twofold way. Firstly, the regular contacts between co-ethnics who attend community organisations, both as users and workers, facilitate the communications about initiatives such as demonstrations and petitions. Ethnic organisations are not only service providers but they also represent spaces of socialisation, where community members meet up and have the opportunity to connect with co-ethnics. This is particularly true for women, who tend to be solely responsible for domestic duties and are hence more likely to seek advice from ethnic organisations and to attend their premises more regularly. Observation showed how waiting for their turn to be assisted by advisers represents a rare occasion for women to socialise outside the domestic environment. It is in this circumstance that information about political initiatives can be circulated and political matters discussed. An example of this process was observed during the fieldwork when the women who met during an advice session in a voluntary organisation were also seen attending a meeting organised by the local branch of a political party. The information about the event had been spread through informal networks that were built within formal organisational environment.

Ethnic organisations could be positively influencing non-electoral participation also through their leaders. It was noticed that those who promote non-electoral political initiatives tend to be also actively involved in ethnic organisations. This provides a direct contact with the community and the possibility of using informal networks to mobilise community members. As for electoral engagement, strong and regular contacts with other community members, as well as the trust and status acquired through ethnic organisations, provide ethnic leaders and community workers with a solid platform to politically engage co-ethnics. However, it is important to point out that based on observation carried out during the fieldwork, the main topics that these activities focus
on relate to home-country politics (e.g. independence of Somaliland) and ethnic-based issues (e.g. *khat* use). In particular, with regard to the latter, the advocacy function fulfilled by Somali organisations indirectly supports the link between organisational membership and non-electoral participation, as voluntary groups are more likely to tackle issues that are very much specific to the Somali community and non-electoral channels, such as petitions, are often preferred in the attempt to influence policies and political debates.

The qualitative enquiry shed light on a remarkably different scenario when investigating Ghanaian organisations. These were described by their members as a-political and not at all focused on increasing the voter turnout of Ghanaians, mobilising them politically or improving their representation in local and national political politics. What seemed to be much less visible, if existent at all, was the advocacy function observed amongst Somalis. This is reflected, for instance, in the different ways ethnic leaders emerge from and rely on organisational networks. The creation of ethnic leaders is undoubtedly linked to ethnic organisations for Ghanaian as much as for Somalis. Those who chair and lead ethnic organisations acquire prestige and authority and are well known amongst co-ethnics as they assume the role of representatives of the diaspora community. They would be the ones meeting Ghanaian politicians during their tours of the UK and liaising with Ghanaian authorities in the country (i.e. Ghanaian Embassy in London).

The main difference, however, with what was observed amongst Somalis is the lack of a visible political role attributed to Ghanaian ethnic leaders, particularly with regard to the British political arena. Their role within community organisations is voluntary and temporary and determined by periodic internal elections. More importantly, no evidence was found of the open and explicit interplay between ethnic leadership and mainstream political elites observed amongst Somalis.

To sum up, the two communities appear to differ considerably when considering the political role played by ethnic organisations (H6). A direct link between Somali ethnic organisations and electoral political participation was observed with regard to the role they play in informing co-ethnics about the host-country’s political system (e.g. how to
register, how to vote and parties’ manifestos). Ethnic organisations also appeared to indirectly affect political engagement, firstly, by reinforcing informal networks between co-ethnics which can be utilised to further mobilise in the political arena and can be linked to the emergence of ethnic leaders. Secondly, community work provides a stimulus to political engagement primarily aimed at advocating for the community. Thirdly, it provides active members with opportunities to improve their political knowledge and civic skills. Non-electoral participation seems also to be linked to Somali organisations through their ability to create occasions of informal contacts that ease the dissemination of information about non-conventional political initiatives. On the contrary, no evidence was found of an open political role played by Ghanaian organisations.

6.1.1 Ghanaian and Somali organisations: a different political role

How can we make sense of the different political roles played by Somali and Ghanaian organisations? Two main explanations are here suggested.

First of all, as clearly highlighted in Chapter 5, ethnic organisations fulfil different functions amongst the two communities. Ghanaian organisations lack the advocacy mission and sense of collective engagement aimed at contributing towards the community advancement that, in sharp contrast, characterises Somali groups. The fact that the latter are seen as platforms to voice and effectively tackle the community’s need, makes them more likely to assume a public, ‘political’ role. Despite primarily concentrating on ethnic-related issues, voluntary groups utilise channels provided by the British political system in order to achieve a collective goal. By participating in ethnic organisations, some individuals have the opportunity to develop civic skills, reinforce group consciousness, improve political awareness and through these resources become more active in politics. The political mobilisation taking place, directly or indirectly, within Somali organisations could be seen as a ‘natural’ expression of the advocacy function they serve.
The second factor identified is closely linked to the function served by ethnic organisations and therefore to their political role. The qualitative fieldwork highlighted the different approach of Ghanaians and Somalis to political engagement.

The eagerness to mobilise as a community to become more visible in the political arena, as this is where the community can effectively voice its issues and obtain more favourable policies, clearly emerges amongst Somalis. In this perspective, the collective dimension of political participation is emphasised. The community should act in a united way in order to articulate collective claims and advance in the process of integration. Ethnic organisations are the most suitable entities to channel these claims as they operate in and for the community; are often linked to influential ethnic leaders who are well connected to the mainstream political elites; and their advocacy function is officially recognised (Charity Commission, 2008: 5).

This community-oriented approach to political participation is not as evidently and strongly articulated amongst Ghanaians, who tend to describe electoral participation as a personal, individual choice that is hardly influenced by community issues. The apparent lack of collective claims may be linked to the idea, expressed by several participants, that the Ghanaian group is less ‘problematic’ and ‘special’ than other communities, as highlighted by the following quote:

“There’s not much special about Ghanaians to be catered for. We come here, we blend in. Somalis, a lot of them have language problems as well, but we come in and straight English, we blend in and we get on with our life.” (Ghanaian woman, 46–55 years, first generation)

The lack of an urgency to address issues affecting the community as a whole, which is on the contrary very much present amongst Somalis, could be at the basis of the lack of a visible advocacy function of Ghanaian organisations as well as of a collective dimension of political engagement.

It could also be argued that what stimulates collective claims and a sense of political unity is not the reference to the ‘Ghanaian’ identity. Indeed, when collective claims surfaced during interviews with Ghanaians, the main element that seemed to
justify them was the sense of belonging to the wider ‘Black’ community (Werbner, 1991: 29-30). This, rather than the more specific Ghanaian group, seemed to be the category to which issues of discrimination, racism and general socio-economic disadvantage were attributed and for which a call for ‘unity’ and ‘collective mobilisation’ was made. When a second generation Ghanaian woman was asked whether her decision to begin to vote and to support a specific party after a period of political disengagement was motivated by her belonging to the Ghanaian community, she replied as follows:

“I’m not sure if it was specifically for Ghanaians but it was more the attitude towards Black people in general, and ... at that time the party, you know, I voted for I felt that they were [...] more interested in making an impact, making a change, bringing about a change to Black people, but not so much Ghanaians specifically.” (Ghanaian woman, 36–45 years, second generation)

These words highlight the relevance of the Black community as a whole in the political choices of Ghanaians and hints at a collective dimension to political engagement. This was also visible in the accounts of some participants who lamented a lack of political representation for the Black community and pointed out that more Black representatives would be needed to addresses these issues. Only when explicitly asked about supporting a Ghanaian candidate, some participants expressed their support to Ghanaian representatives in the local and national arena, provided that the person belongs to the ‘right party’ (primarily Labour) and they approve their political agenda, as pointed out by the conversation with a Ghanaian man.65

“QUESTION: If you see a Ghanaian person, would you vote for that person? ANSWER: Not necessarily! Because ... if it is that ... you are in the borough and ... you are not competent enough and you want me to vote for you because I’m Ghanaian, I would have ... insulted my conscience, because you can’t do it! [...] So, necessarily I wouldn’t vote a Ghanaian because he’s a Ghanaian, but I would vote for a Ghanaian because he would be able to do it.” (Ghanaian man, 36–45 years, first generation)

65 This would confirm that ethnic minorities tend to vote “on party lines and not on ethnic lines” (Anwar, 1991: 52)
Although this distinction between the support to a co-ethnic candidate and loyalty to a party was also made by Somalis participants, the necessity to increase the number of Somali representatives appeared to be much more cogent and important for the advancement of the community. This is what emerges from an interview with a Somali young woman:

“There’s so much that could be done for the Somali community if there was somebody that we could speak to. So we are definitely aware that if there was somebody there [in the political arena], this would make the life of people a lot easier.” (Somali woman, 18–25 years, second generation)

It is important not only to have Somali representatives in the local and national political scene, but also to create connections with political parties as a guarantee that needs are voiced, as another Somali woman explains:

“I think it’s very important [to have links with political parties], because unless you are heard or seen or known then your needs are not going to be met. Unless people give you the opportunity to voice your needs, then you would not be heard. If you have someone from your own community, I don’t have to consult all the Somali women, I know them! I can say what they want and need. But if we are not involved either physically or have someone who speaks of our behalf, this is probably why the Somali community are more deprived than other communities, because they don’t have political positions. [...] Being in a political position you can make people accountable for their actions. You have a sense of power, you could be the voice.” (Somali woman, 26–35 years, generation 1.5)

Somalis also showed a more politically savvy approach to their relationship with political parties, which are again seen as ‘tools’ available to increase the community’s visibility in the political domain, as stated by a Somali man:

“Well, what can a party give you? Representation! It’s a machine: you use that machine for your advantage, for the advantage of other people, you know, if you are involved in the party you are open to information, you deal with issues, you are representing what you believe are matters to local people.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)
Amongst Somalis, even homeland participation becomes an opportunity to voice collective concerns and liaise with the mainstream political domain. By utilising the ‘tools’ provided by the British democratic system, Somalis once again reassert their political identity as a community. The sensitive issue of the independence of Somaliland (i.e. the Northern region of Somalia that is a self-declared state, internationally recognised as an autonomous region but not as a state), represents a very effective example. During the fieldwork, numerous respondents described their involvement in public demonstrations held every year on 18 May (i.e. Somaliland Independence Day) in support of the Somaliland’s cause. These rallies are generally organised in locations such as 10 Downing Street and Westminster to give visibility to the cause and to request support from the British government. The issue for Somaliland has also presented opportunities for ethnic leaders to create contacts with mainstream parties and to advocate for the support of Britain to the independence cause (Hansard House of Commons Debate, 2010-12).

Similarly, one of the main objectives of the Somali Friends of Labour group is to bring the pacification and reconstruction of Somalia to the attention of the Labour party and, more generally, the British government.66 Another example of this reliance on collective mobilisation, even when it comes to homeland or ethnic-related issues, is the campaign carried out by ethnic leaders in cooperation with mainstream political parties in favour of a ban of khat in the UK (BBC, 2013). In contrast, the data gathered amongst Ghanaians do not show a similar process linking home- and host-country politics. Although visits of Ghanaian politicians to the UK occur regularly, especially before elections, these events remain purely limited to the ‘homeland’ domain.

The idea that the Somali community suffers from specific issues that require specific solutions; the perception of political engagement as a channel to achieve collective goals; and the eagerness to provide the community with effective political representation are deemed to be part of a similar way of participating in politics which highlights the benefit of mobilising together and ‘acting in a united way’. In contrast, what emerges amongst Ghanaians is a more individualistic approach to politics that rarely refers to the national community as a point of reference. This could be linked to the less

---

evident emphasis on community-related issues to be addressed in the political arena or, perhaps, to the different, more general categories of personal identification (i.e. the ‘black’ community) on which political mobilisation relies. The different political role played by ethnic organisations, either directly and indirectly, could be seen as a product of these divergent perceptions of what political participation is expected to achieve and which actors (i.e. individuals or communities) should be at the centre of political actions.

6.2 Ethnic places of worship: between religion and politics

The findings that have been highlighted with regard to ethnic organisations seem to lend some support to the hypothesis that ethnic-based social resources benefit the process of political integration. To what extent does this apply to ethnic places of worship?

The analysis carried out with the EMBES data suggests a much less optimistic answer. The interval plots in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, as well as the bivariate logistic regression analysis in Table 6.1, show that Black Africans participating in ethnic places of worship are not significantly different from those who do not attend ethnic-based religious institutions.

These results cast a shadow over the possibility to support the hypothesis of a positive impact of ethnic-based social resources on political engagement (H4). The variable measuring attendance in ethnic places of worship does become significant in Model 2 (when adding the socio-economic and immigration-related controls) but this result is puzzling. It does not seem to depend on collinearity issues (condition number=15.3, mean VIF=1.47).
Figure 6.4: Voter turnout by attendance in ethnic places of worship among Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).

Figure 6.5: Non-electoral engagement by attendance in ethnic places of worship among Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).
The possibility of age, class and qualification being suppressor variables was also investigated, given that the variable for place of worship becomes significant when adding these variables to the model.\(^{67}\) However, no significant bivariate correlation was found between attendance in ethnic places of worship and the three socio-economic measures (Pearson r, p-value>0.10). Consequently, this result should be interpreted carefully. It could be argued that it does not validate the claim that the ethnic nature of religious institutions negatively impacts on the process of political integration (H4). However, it does not provide strong support for the positive argument (H5) either.

The absence of a significant political effect of religious institutions is at odds with the findings highlighted in the US literature, where ethnic places of worship, particularly Black churches, have been found to be channels of political mobilisation among African Americans (Tate, 1991; Harris, 1994). This suggests that there may be remarkable differences between the UK and the US context in the political role played by ethnic mosques and churches, perhaps partly due to the different characteristics and integration experiences of British Black Africans and African Americans. Based on the quantitative

\(^{67}\) The suppressor variable (Tzelgov and Stern, 1978; Maassen and Bakker, 2001; Darmawan and Keeves, 2006) is defined as a predictor “that in isolation correlate weakly (or zero) with the outcome variable but are strongly correlated with one or more predictors that are correlated with the outcome variable”. (Pandey and Elliott, 2010: 29). The presence of a suppression effect entails a strong and significant correlation between the main predictor and the suppressor variable, despite the latter not being significantly correlated with the outcome, as this would explain the positive effect of adding a suppressor variable to a model (Meehl, 1945).
evidence, it is difficult to prove that ethnic places of worship can produce the virtuous circle of civic skills, political knowledge and political mobilisation that promote political engagement (Eggert and Giugni, 2011; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001).

The qualitative enquiry reveals very similar findings based on evidence gathered primarily through interviews and, although for Ghanaians only, direct observation of ethnic places of worship.68

The political role of both mosques and churches did not emerge as clearly as for ethnic organisations. One of the factors highlighted as a possible explanation for the absence of a visible link between religious institutions and the political participation is the problematic relationship between religious and political domains. Respondents pointed out the difficulty of mixing these two activities and, more importantly, to allow the political realm to enter the religious and holy space of a church or a mosque. When asked about the ways in which politics and religious institutions overlap and interplay, some respondents strongly reaffirm the division, as in the case of a first-generation Somali man:

“QUESTION: Do you normally talk about politics in the mosque? 
ANSWER: No! Only because, you know, religion and God, mosque [...] You pray only! Mosque is mosque!” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Another respondent also highlighted how religious leaders tend to discourage politics to enter the mosque:

“The mosque is not political [...] there is some individuals who try to use the mosque to campaign but most of the ulama don’t like it.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

---

68 In the case of Somalis it was not possible to carry out direct observation in a Somali mosque due to the difficulties encountered in gaining access to ethnic religious institutions, whereas non-participant observation was conducted in a Ghanaian church by attending three Saturday services.
Similar accounts were provided by Ghanaians about churches:

“QUESTION: Do you know if your church has got contacts with local councillors?
ANSWER: No, the church is absolutely different. It’s got nothing to do with that ... sometimes we volunteer ourselves to go for evangelism. We don’t talk about politics.” (Ghanaian man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Another Ghanaian man vigorously reiterates this point:

“The church is not partisan, so we do not involve ourselves in politics. If you want to involve in politics, you must disassociate it from the church activity! You can be a MP, councillor or something, but this is different from your involvement in the church.” (Ghanaian man, 56–65 years, first generation)

In some cases, respondents even pointed out that being religious does not reconcile with being active in politics, hence suggesting that religious institutions might have a negative influence on political activism:

“Christians think that to be a politician is something not called for ... the church doesn’t encourage it, this is the reason why most Africans, for what I know, are Christian and Christianity preaches not to get involved. Most of them are not interested.” (Ghanaian man, over 65, first generation)

Despite this apparent absence of a direct relationship between religious institutions and politics, the qualitative enquiry unveiled hints of a possible indirect political effect. Some respondents, indeed, indicated that informal discussions about politics do happen generally before or after the religious service. Amongst Somalis, for instance, mosques promote regular and well-attended social gatherings, which can become an occasion for political campaigning or political messages to be delivered as well as politics to be informally discussed, while the religious function is clearly separated. Although this process could apply to all mosques, the ethnic character of Somali mosques allows worshippers to discuss politics and disseminates political information in their native language, i.e. Somali. This is particularly relevant due to language barrier that affects a great number of Somalis.
Based on the qualitative enquiry, political informal discussion in ethnic mosques is more likely to focus on ethnic-related issues and home-country politics, as for ethnic organisations. For instance, during the fieldwork some interviewees referred to a petition to ban *khat* which they had signed in the local ethnic mosque.

The mosque also becomes a point of reference for political mobilisation. A Somali interviewee, who is active both civically and politically, describes how political parties’ candidates, but also community organisations, use the mosque and the regular gatherings of worshippers to campaign and promote initiatives:

“We do campaign in the mosque. Not inside the mosque, though, it’s outside that people campaign: it’s not allowed inside. So we do it outside and talked to people, give out leaflets in there on Fridays and other week days, outside the mosque. That’s what everyone does. Local communities sometimes, you know, find out where the events are, give out the leaflets.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

As regards Ghanaians, it was more difficult to capture this informal and indirect political effect of religious institutions. In the church observed (i.e. a Protestant denomination), only few respondents confirmed that political discussions does happen within the church, although in a separate space from religious services:

“QUESTION: So politics is outside the church?
ANSWER: No, people talk about it, people talk about their political affiliation, but me personally don’t do that. I’m not the type who goes around talking politics.” (Ghanaian man, 36–45 years, first generation)

Discussion of political matters before or after collective religious services is not forbidden and often does happen:

“We don’t use the church for political issues. But political matters we can discuss.” (Ghanaian man, over 65, first generation)

As for Somalis, the primary focus of this political discussion is homeland’s politics, which was also found to be the main channel through which politics enters Ghanaian-based churches. On the occasion of national elections in Ghana, for example, the network of
Ghanaian churches would promote community gatherings and collective prayers in favour of free and democratic elections. Members of Ghanaian political parties were also hosted, although respondents pointed out that churches remain neutral in this debate and only provide a platform for political authorities to update the diaspora community about the socio-political situation of Ghana. This political link between churches and homeland was also observed by Arthur (2008: 99) with regard to Ghanaian churches in the US.

It is possible that the church and mosques observed are not representative of the numerous Somali and Ghanaian religious institutions in the UK, which could be approaching both home- and host-country politics in different ways. This is particularly true for the Ghanaians who belong to numerous denominations. Overall, however, it could be argued that ethnic places of worship are likely to exert an indirect influence on individual political participation, primarily by facilitating political discussion and information.

To sum up, the relationship between religious institutions and political engagement seems to work in a similar way for both Ghanaians and Somalis (H6). Mosques and churches primarily fulfil a religious function that has to be kept separate from the political domain, at least based on what could be observed and emerged from interviews. In this sense, the collective approach to political engagement highlighted for Somali organisations does not appear as influential for Somali mosques, which do not seem to take on the same role of ‘community’s representatives’. That said, places of worship are indirectly linked to political participation through their tendency to provide opportunities for the creation of informal connections between co-ethnics which ease the delivery of political messages, facilitate political discussion, political information and, in some cases, political mobilisation.

6.3 Ethnic informal networks: discussing politics

The political effect of informal networks is also investigated ‘outside’ the formal environment of religious and voluntary organisations. As for attendance in ethnic places of worship, the quantitative enquiry focusing on the Black African community as a whole
does not detect any relationship between the composition of informal networks and political participation, both electoral and non-electoral. The bivariate descriptive (Figures 6.6 and 6.7) and regression analysis (Table 6.5) suggest that there is no significant difference in the political engagement of Black Africans who do and do not socialise primarily with co-ethnics.

Figure 6.6: Voter turnout by ethnic informal networks among Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. Design weight applied. Confidence coefficient=1.645 (90%).

Figure 6.7: Non-electoral engagement by ethnic informal networks among Black Africans – Interval plot

Once again, the hypothesis of a positive impact of ethnic-based resources on political participation (H5) is not supported but, at the same time, it is not rejected in favour of the competing claim suggesting a detrimental effect (H4).

Table 6.5: Political participation and ethnic informal networks – Logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting in general elections</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic informal networks</td>
<td>-.27(.26)</td>
<td>-.37(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.81(.22)***</td>
<td>-1.41(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-294.78</td>
<td>-278.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>1.08(1)</td>
<td>26.77(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised coefficients (robust standard errors). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering (293 PSUs) and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.

The qualitative evidence presented vis-a-vis ethnic organisations and ethnic places of worship has already highlighted some of the possible associations between ethnic informal networks and political engagement. Amongst Somalis, informal connections between co-ethnics developed through ethnic organisations were found to support and facilitate the political role played by these formal institutions. Indeed, they not only facilitate political information and mobilisation, but also appeared to support the emergence of ethnic leaders (including ethnic candidates) who then, in most cases, become crucial political actors.

Ethnic places of worship, informal contacts before and after religious services were found to be linked to political discussion and information amongst Somalis and Ghanaians, as well as to political mobilisation primarily for Somalis. Overall, it could be argued that, for both communities, ethnic informal networks represent the natural context in which ethnic religious institutions and ethnic organisations are rooted, the condition sine qua non for their existence. However, it is mostly amongst Somalis that formal and informal networks seem to evidently interplay to generate political
participation in particular when it comes to ethnic organisations, due to their political and advocacy function.

The qualitative evidence also provided a valuable insight into ethnic informal networks independently from ethnic organisations and places of worship. Among both communities, local ethnic businesses represent one of the main environments where co-ethnics interact, as it was pointed out in Section 5.3. In these environments, politics, and particularly homeland politics, is a common topic of discussion amongst both Somalis and Ghanaians. By walking through markets where numerous Ghanaian businesses are located, it was possible to capture the ways in which co-ethnics interact with each other and make comments about Ghanaian politics. Shop owners and customers engage in animated discussions, often in one of the Ghanaian languages, about elections and political parties in Ghana as well as political affairs in the UK, although the former appeared to take over conversations. At the time of the fieldwork, the Ghanaian general elections that were expected to take place in December 2012 were one of the main topics of discussion.

For Somalis, a very similar situation was observed in restaurants and cafes where community members gather. As highlighted in Section 5.3, these ethnic businesses are closely connected to the local Somali mosque. Whereas amongst Ghanaians it is not unusual to see women taking part in these gatherings since they often own the businesses where political discussion takes place, Somali restaurants and cafes are predominantly, if not exclusively, attended by men. As highlighted in Sections 5.1 and 5.3, women tend to meet each other through ethnic organisations or while running errands. These are the main occasions when they can discuss politics and evidence of this discussion, which once again primarily happens in Somali (i.e. language), was gathered during the fieldwork. Men would socialise in cafes while waiting for the next prayer and would normally attend the local mosque together. One of the Somali men interviewed provides a valuable description of how political discussion develops in these informal environments and highlights that homeland politics is, also in this case, the main focus of this discussion:

“Every time you go to the Somali restaurant they have TVs and they are always on Somali channels talking about politics in Somalia. I think a couple of them have a channel for Somaliland.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)
Beside the gender gap already underlined, a generational gap emerges. Younger community members are described as being generally less interested in and passionate about homeland politics and therefore less likely to get involved in political discussions taking place in ethnic businesses, where the main focus remains Somalia’s political affairs:

“In the restaurant, all the people focus and while you are having your tea or coffee you can see all the man watching [the TV]. But I would say that middle age or young people, no, not at all. No connections at all.” (Somali man, 36–45 years, first generation)

In one of the businesses observed this generational gap was evident in the fact that those interested in homeland politics, who would be visibly older, were found to sit in one room where all the televisions were tuned to Somali channels addressing the tragic events of Somalia and Somaliland and they would be talking about this news exclusively by using Somali language. In another room, a younger crowd would watch football matches, hardly bringing any politics into the conversation.

Disagreements and contrasting opinions often characterise political discussion between co-ethnics. Amongst Somalis, these frictions are generally linked to the issue of the independence of Somaliland. Section 5.3 explained how Somali informal networks are characterised by significant divisions between clans and how these are mainly rooted in the separation between the Northern (i.e. Somaliland) and Southern regions of Somalia. Political discussion simply reflects these internal divisions, especially because its focus is homeland politics, which is inevitably affected by clanic and regional rivalries. These disagreements were observed in particular between those who do and do not support Somaliland’s quest for independence. This matter has become increasingly relevant within the community even in an areas characterised by a relative tribal homogeneity like Tower Hamlets, where the great bulk of the participant observation was carried out. Despite the generally shared tribal and regional origins, the independence of Somaliland was still found to spark heated debates, particularly between Somalilanders and Somali (i.e. originally from South Somalia) and between individuals belonging to different generations. In this regard, age seemed to be more relevant than generation, as defined by the country of birth and year of arrival in the UK. Younger
Somalis belonging to either the 1.5 and second generation appeared to show a much weaker attachment to the issue of Somaliland and homeland politics more generally, whereas middle-aged, second-generation individuals would still express a stronger connection to these issues. British politics generally appeared to generate fewer animated debates amongst Somalis due to either a lack of interest (and hence discussion) or a more general agreement about the political party (i.e. Labour) and the policies supported.

As for Somalis, homeland politics is similarly linked to divergences amongst Ghanaians, although for different reasons. Tribal and ethnic affiliations seem to play a less relevant role in political discussion, whereas heated debates generally oppose supporters of different Ghanaian parties. A clear example of this phenomenon is provided by one of the Ghanaian grocery shops visited to carry out interviews. The shop’s backroom provided the space for community members to gather and socialise daily. On the door leading to this room a sign had been affixed inviting guests not to discuss politics and to avoid ‘political’ arguments. When questioned about the sign, the shop owner explained that the great passion of Ghanaians for homeland’s politics had often led to intense confrontations between supporters of different parties, especially amongst women. It is interesting to notice that amongst Ghanaians, affiliation to specific Ghanaian party often coincide with membership in or support to the correspondent British party. Therefore, unlike Somalis, not only homeland but also host-country politics can become object of passionate discussion.

Despite the strong focus on homeland politics, this is not the sole topic addressed within ethnic informal networks. The process through which home-country politics enters interpersonal connections between co-ethnics was, once again, more visible amongst Somalis. It has been shown that Somali leaders and representatives, and particularly those linked to ethnic organisations, generally express an eagerness to make the community a valuable and relevant actor in the mainstream political domain. The actions of political mobilisation carried out to achieve this goal also utilise informal

---

69 Political parties in Ghana are often linked to specific ethnicities so it is possible that party membership also corresponds to ethnic or tribal affiliation, although this did not clearly emerge from interviews.

70 The National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, which is the current ruling party in Ghana, has developed linked with the UK Labour party (Modern Ghana, 2006), whereas the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is linked to the UK Conservative party (Modern Ghana, 2010).
connections within the community, as explained at the beginning of this section, as well as in previous sections addressing formal ethnic networks.

During the fieldwork it was observed that information about political events, such as meetings with political parties or local public officials, did circulate through informal networks in ethnic restaurants and cafes, for men, and grocery stores or ethnic organisations, for women. The main promoters of these political information and mobilisation activities are community members who are more actively involved in politics or who have a close connection to ethnic leaders. This connection often helps develop an even stronger political interest and willingness to mobilise other co-ethnics. In some cases, the mobilisation of co-ethnics was found to be carried out in cooperation with political parties. If, for example, an event is organised by the party’s local branch, ethnic leaders would be asked to try to involve community members in the event. The direct observation of some of these political meetings and events revealed that a significant number of participants had been invited by or had heard about them through friends.

No similar evidence was gathered amongst Ghanaians. The more individualistic approach of Ghanaians to political engagement, highlighted in Section 6.1.1, could be seen as the main explanation for this apparent detachment between ethnic informal networks, particularly when it comes to British politics. If the process of deciding whether to vote or sign a petition or which party to vote for in the host-country hardly depends on collective claims and mobilisation, perhaps ethnic social networks lose some of their mobilising potential and tend to concentrate on homeland politics.

It could be argued that this between-group difference is represented by the non-significant result highlighted by the quantitative results. As different African groups perceive political participation and use ethnic informal networks differently, when considering the community as a whole the positive and negative effects are balanced out. However, the support to the null hypothesis derived from the quantitative analysis could also be due to the fact that political discussion, information and mobilisation developed within ethnic informal networks are not as effective in spilling over into heightened levels of electoral or non-electoral participation. Even amongst Somalis, where this link between informal networks and participation seemed to be more visible, political
involvement could be limited to the attendance of some political events but may not translate into a long-term, regular engagement. Despite the presence of politically knowledgeable individuals, such as ethnic leaders, the majority of co-ethnics interconnected through informal networks may still be lacking political expertise (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998).

The emphasis on homeland politics could also be brought as an influential factor for the weak mobilising effect of informal networks. Although no detrimental effect of ethnic informal networks was highlighted by Table 6.5, the passionate discussions about Ghanaian and Somali politics may be shifting the communities’ attention from host-country to homeland political affairs, hence reducing the positive impact that interpersonal connections could exert on the former. Although establishing the extent to which home- and host-country interplay and influence one another goes well beyond this study’s scope, the EMBES dataset provides the opportunity to investigate this phenomenon at least through descriptive analysis. The questionnaire indeed shows a measure of interest in homeland and British politics. Although political interest does not correspond to actual political behaviours, these measures provide a valuable opportunity to look at the possible relationship between engagement in home- and host-country politics.

Figure 6.8 reports the level of interest in British politics by the level of interest in homeland politics respectively for Ghanaians (blue and light blue), Somalis (yellow and red) and the whole sample of Black Africans (light and dark green).

The interval plot shows that for both Ghanaians and Somalis, the percentage of individuals who are interested in British politics is higher amongst those who are also interested in homeland politics. This positive pattern is ultimately statistically significant when the Black African sample is addressed. Overall, this suggests that individuals who express interest in home-country political affairs are generally more likely to be interested in host-country politics.

71 The two variables [bq1 and eq56] asked respondents about their level of interest in British and homeland politics. The four-category variables were recoded into binary variables as follows: (0) not very much and not at all interested; (1) somehow, quite a lot, a great deal interested.

72 The lack of statistical significance for Somalis and Ghanaians could be due to the very small sample size.
Figure 6.8: Interest in British politics by interest in home-country politics amongst Ghanaians, Somalis and Black Africans – Interval plot

Source: EMBES 2010. The question about interest in homeland politics was asked to individuals who were born abroad only. Total Ns: Ghanaians=56, Somalis=56, Black Africans=429.

This would suggest a re-evaluation of the concerns about the negative effects of transnational political practices. However, this interpretation should be extremely cautious as the measure of political interest does not fully and effectively capture the extent of transnational practices and certainly does not necessarily represent actual political behaviours. It is important to note that the qualitative enquiry provided some evidence of the positive interplay between homeland and British politics amongst Somalis. Section 6.1.1 indeed described how Somalis tend to make home-country and ethnic-related politics objects of non-electoral and electoral participation in the British system.

To sum up, as for religious institutions, the differences between Ghanaians and Somalis in the political role played by informal networks appear to be less striking that those highlighted for ethnic organisations (H6). Political discussion is undoubtedly the main feature of ethnic informal networks. The regularity and intensity of this discussions is a shared characteristic for both Somalis and Ghanaians, as it is the use of languages
other than English (Somali for Somalis and Twi for Ghanaians), which is particularly valuable to overcome language barriers and facilitate communications. Ethnic businesses play a relevant role in providing adequate spaces for political discussions to be carried out by co-ethnics. Another common element between the two communities is the strong emphasis on homeland rather than host-country politics. For Somalis, this specific target leads to significant frictions amongst community members that belong to different tribes and regions.

These reflections do not imply that between-group differences were not observed. Amongst Somalis, informal networks between co-ethnics were found to be linked to processes of political information and mobilisation in host-country politics. Evidence was presented of the ways in which ethnic leaders and, more generally, ethnic organisations, rely on strong, informal connections amongst community members to spread information about and stimulate participation in political activities, often in cooperation with mainstream political parties. This interplay between organisational and informal networks to achieve political goals did not clearly emerge amongst Ghanaians. This could be, once again, linked to the more individualistic approach to political participation expressed by Ghanaians and the generally different function that organisational networks serve within this community (See section 6.1.1).

6.4 Conclusions

This chapter addressed the relationship between ethnic-based social resources and political participation by presenting the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative studies.

As summarised in Figure 6.9, the quantitative analysis of Black Africans lent some support to the positive hypothesis (H5) with regard to ethnic organisations. Individual participation in these ethnic-based resources was indeed found to be positively and significantly linked to non-electoral engagement, but not voter turnout. However, the null hypothesis is supported for ethnic informal networks and only a weak support can be landed to the positive hypothesis for attendance in ethnic places of worship.
Overall, no evidence of a negative (H4) impact of ethnic social capital on political engagement was found (Morales and Pilati, 2011).

It is interesting to note how, in contrast with some previous studies (Togeby, 1999), participation in ethnic organisations does not predict voter turnout, whereas it significantly and consistently influences non-electoral participation (Berger et al., 2004; Heath et al., 2011). The fact that the positive effect of involvement in voluntary groups was also reported when taking into consideration non-ethnic and overall organisational engagement suggests that ethnic organisations may be operating exactly as other voluntary associations. Therefore, they could be linked to processes that are generally associated with participation in voluntary groups, such as: the acquisition of civic skills that can be transferred into the political realm, as well as acquisition of political knowledge and political information (Verba et al., 1993; Verba et al., 1995); opportunities for political recruitment and mobilisation (Leighley, 1996; Teorell, 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993); and the development of social trust which spills over into a sense of civicness and political trust (Putnam et al., 1993).

The qualitative enquiry found evidence of these processes amongst Somali organisations. With regard to non-electoral participation, ethnic organisations create occasions of informal contacts between co-ethnics that facilitate the dissemination of information about non-electoral activities such as demonstrations and petitions, and
therefore support processes of political mobilisation. The scenario appears more nuanced for electoral engagement. The main advantage for passive users, namely community members who access the services provided by Somali organisations but do not necessarily take active part in their activities, is the provision of political knowledge. During advice sessions, individuals are provided with valuable information about how to register and vote or are assisted in the translation of political materials.

Active and direct engagement in ethnic organisations also appears to be linked, although perhaps less evidently and directly, to political participation. Voluntary or paid community work was indeed found to promote the development of a closer relationship with the community, a deeper knowledge of its issues and needs and an eagerness to contribute towards the community’s advancement. These in turn translate into enhanced group consciousness and social trust amongst co-ethnics, which ultimately lead to heightened levels of political interest and participation. The role of Somali organisations in supporting the emergence of ethnic leaders who then play an important part in processes of political mobilisation was also highlighted.

That said, it is possible that these beneficial resources and processes do not produce an actual increase in political participation, especially with regard to voter turnout and other electoral modes of engagement, due to the influence of external factors such as lack of citizenship status, parties’ electoral strategies and the openness of the political system to ethnic candidates (Bloemraad, 2006b). These factors could make sense of the null effect of ethnic organisations on voter turnout reported by the quantitative analysis. As the latter represents the Black African community as whole, the non-significant relationship may also represent the final result of variations in the political role of ethnic organisations across African national groups. Indeed, the qualitative study did not point out clear and strong evidence of links between Ghanaian associations and political participation. Organisational networks within this community were found to be generally ‘a-political’. It was suggested that this variation in the political role played by ethnic organisations could be linked to the dissimilar function served by these groups amongst Ghanaians (i.e. socialisation and mutual support) and Somalis (i.e. advocacy) as well as the different ways in which the two communities perceive and
engage in politics (i.e. emphasis on the collective versus individualistic dimension of political participation).

The political role of churches and mosques was much more difficult to research and capture through the qualitative enquiry. No visible direct links between ethnic religious institutions and political mobilisation were observed for both communities. Somali mosques and Ghanaian churches appear to concentrate on their religious function which, based on interviews with worshippers, is kept strictly separated from the political domain. This sharply contrasts with the explicitly political function taken by Black churches in the American context, for example (Harris, 1994; Tate, 1991).

It was, however, observed that politics does enter ethnic places of worship through the informal connections that are regularly developed between co-ethnics outside the place of worship. Informal political discussion as well as political information and mobilisation activities take place before or after, rather than during, the religious service. It could be argued that the lack of an explicit political role of places of worship depends on the fact that not all churches or mosques are ‘political’, that is, religious institutions that openly address politics and political mobilisation with their members (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). Another possible explanation that could be given with regard to Ghanaians is the fact that churches have the tendency to gather worshippers who do not reside locally but come from different neighbourhoods, as highlighted in Section 5.2. Maxwell (2012: 121) observes a similar pattern amongst Caribbean churches and suggests that, as “church members live in electoral wards dispersed across the city, there is less incentive for worshippers to act together on local political affairs”.

Informal networks emerged as valuable channels of regular political discussion, information and mobilisation. As for ethnic places of worship, Ghanaians and Somalis did not remarkably differ in the ways politics enters informal connections between co-ethnics. Ethnic businesses represent the main spaces where co-ethnics socialise and discuss politics often through a shared language. For both communities, the main topic of discussion remains homeland politics. It is in particular when analysing the interplay between formal organisational and informal networks that Somalis and Ghanaians appear to diverge (H6). Indeed, amongst Somalis the more politically active organisations rely
more visibly on interpersonal relationships between co-ethnics to carry out actions of political information and mobilisation, with regard to both electoral and non-electoral engagement in the host-country, rather than only in homeland politics. The presence of politically skilled and informed community members, i.e. ethnic leaders, aiming at making the community more visible in the political arena represents an additional factor reinforcing the idea that, at least amongst Somalis, ethnic informal networks may contribute towards individual political participation. This lends some support to the claim that the political expertise of those comprising informal networks is crucial for the political efficacy of these connections (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998).

That said, the qualitative enquiry leaves a question mark as to whether the political discussion, information and mobilisation activated within informal networks, either within or outside organisational networks and religious institutions, lead to actual, long-term political participation. The null result obtained by the quantitative analysis perhaps provides an answer to this question. Despite ethnic informal networks being regular and intense (Mcclurg, 2003; Leighley, 1996) and often composed of politically knowledgeable members (Tillie, 2004; Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Bloemraad, 2006b), other factors may be hindering their potentially beneficial effect on political engagement.

One of these factors is the strong emphasis of informal political discussion on homeland politics, which, according to some scholars, could distract ethnic minorities from engaging in host-country politics. It is not entirely clear the extent to which these transnational political practices affect the process of integration into British politics and exploring this phenomenon in detail goes beyond the study’s objectives. However, the descriptive statistics drawn from the EMBES dataset show a positive correlation between interest in home and host-country. Evidence gathered amongst Somalis show that homeland politics and ethnic-related issues often translate into a more active engagement in the host-country political arena, either electoral or non-electoral. This suggests a mobilising, or at least a non-detrimental, effect of transnational political practices (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990).

To conclude, the chapter shed new light on the importance of taking into consideration both variations across modes of participation as well as African national
groups when addressing the relationship between ethnic-based social resources and political engagement of Black Africans. No clear evidence of negative political effects of ethnic networks was found by either the quantitative or qualitative enquiries, hence providing some ground for the rejection of the negative hypothesis (H4). There certainly is a relevant impact on interest and participation in homeland’s politics and ethnic-related issues, but it is not clear to what extent this should be considered as negative for political integration. Overall, the study suggests that ethnic social networks, and particularly ethnic organisations, have the potential to become valuable resources for political participation, in particular for African communities that, like Somalis, suffer from a disadvantaged socio-economic status and perceive politics as a channel to voice collective needs and promote community advancement.

The political function of ethnic places of worship remains less clear. Although the analysis seems to suggest a detachment from religious institutions and direct political mobilisation, this could be due to the type of churches and mosques considered in this research.
CHAPTER 7. Conclusions

Ethnic residential concentration has become an increasingly relevant subject of research in the UK, particularly after the 2001 riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnley and the terrorist attacks that took place in London in July 2005. In the aftermath of these events, clustered residential patterns of ethnic minorities were associated with negative patterns of alienation of ethnic minorities from the mainstream society and a consequent loss of community cohesion and shared sense of Britishness (Phillips, 2005). In general, these negative circumstances, including ethnic enclaves, were described as failures of the multicultural integration policies which had granted ethnic communities the right to maintain and foster ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic specificities (Cantle, 2001). As a consequence, an increasing number of studies have been published about the effect of ethnic density on various outcomes of the integration process. With regard to political participation, so far, little empirical research has been carried out in Britain and although some scholars have started investigating this relationship (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b), virtually no studies have explored what lies beneath this direct connection between ethnic enclaves and political engagement (Bilodeau, 2009).

This thesis examined the relationship between residential concentration and political participation of Black Africans in Britain and addressed the mediating role of three ethnic-based social resources, i.e. voluntary organisations, religious institutions and informal social networks. Furthermore, the study focused on the internal diversity of the Black African community, which primarily stems from the diverse immigration and integration experiences of African national communities. The relationships of interest were researched in light of these immigration-related factors.

A mixed-method approach was adopted. The quantitative enquiry focused on the Black African community as a whole and drew on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). In order to capture the experiences of African national groups in high concentration neighbourhoods, a qualitative study was conducted and data were collected through interviews and participant observation among Ghanaians and Somalis.
in North and East London. The two communities, which are amongst the most numerous African groups in the UK, were identified as particular cases representing the internal diversity of the Black African group due to their divergent immigration histories, integration experiences and cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds.

The empirical analysis was carried out separately for each of the three main relationships of interest (see Figure 7.1). Chapter 4 focused on the effect of residential concentration on political participation (RQ1). Chapter 5 addressed the impact of residential concentration on ethnic-based social resources (RQ2) by presenting both quantitative findings about the Black African community and qualitative results for Ghanaians and Somalis in London (RQ4). Chapter 6 explored the last part of the process, namely the influence of social resources on political participation, once again by compounding quantitative and qualitative enquiries.

Figure 7.1: The main relationships of interest

This final chapter presents a summary and discussion of the key findings about the relationship between concentration and social resources (Section 7.1) and between the latter and political engagement (Section 7.2). Section 7.3 sums up the processes linking ethnic concentration, social resources and political participation. Section 7.4 focuses on the main relationship of interest: residential concentration and political participation, in the light of both quantitative and qualitative findings. Finally, Section 7.5 reflects on the main contributions and limitations of this study and suggests some recommendations for future research.
7.1 Residential concentration and ethnic-based social resources

Chapter 5 primarily focused on the effect of residential concentration on ethnic social resources (RQ2). As the findings from both the quantitative analysis about Black Africans and the qualitative fieldwork amongst Ghanaians and Somalis in London were presented, the chapter also tackled the impact of immigration-related factors and internal diversity of Black Africans on the main relationship of interest (RQ4).

Ethnic enclaves have generally been described as a fertile environment for the creation and enhancement of social connections between co-ethnics (Putnam et al., 1993; Zhou, 2005; Vervoort, 2012; Zhou, 2009; Breton, 1964). This argument was tested (H3) and confirmed by the quantitative evidence presented for ethnic religious institutions and informal networks. As would be expected, Black Africans living in the most concentrated neighbourhoods are more likely to attend ethnic places of worship and be embedded in ethnic informal networks. However, no significant relationship was found between ethnic concentration and involvement in ethnic organisations. This finding is puzzling: why would spatial proximity be relevant for some social resources but not for others? The qualitative enquiry provided some potential answers to this question but also shed light on how this result may be linked to the internal diversity of Black Africans.

A positive influence of residential concentration on organisational networks was observed among Somalis. Due to their public function and the provision of regular advice services and community projects, Somali organisations were found to rely more closely on location (Communities and Local Government, 2009). Proximity with community members not only facilitates the access of users to the services provided and the acquisition of local resources (e.g. funding) by ethnic organisations due to their role in tackling relevant local issues. It also contributes towards the enhancement of a sense of attachment and commitment to the ethnic community. This, in turn, spills over into more active forms of associational engagement. However, this appeared to be a process very specific to the Somali community and its organisational networks and was not observed within the Ghanaian groups, which appeared to be much less dependent on location.
These between-group differences were linked to the different immigration histories and integration experiences of the two national communities. The more recent Somali community suffering from remarkable socio-economic and linguistic disadvantage, on the one hand, relies on organisations that provide regular advice and translation services tailored to the community’s specific needs. On the other hand, the organisations created by the long-established and generally well-integrated Ghanaian community primarily provide opportunities of socialisation and function as mutual aid societies (Mitton and Aspinall, 2010, 2011; Daley, 1998). Based on this different function, access to users and embeddedness in the local area becomes more relevant for Somali organisations.

The fieldwork also highlighted intra-community variations, as the strength and stability of Somali organisational networks appeared to differ across local areas with similar levels of co-ethnic density. It was suggested that there might be other external factors likely to influence the positive impact of residential concentration on Somali organisations, particularly with regard to their creation and development (i.e. aggregate level). Boroughs characterised by a higher level of institutional support to groups catering for specific ethnic or religious communities, lower ethnic diversity, as well as greater homogeneity in the tribal composition of the local Somali community, appeared to have stronger, more well-established organisational networks (e.g. Tower Hamlets).

The importance of institutional support granted to ethnic organisations has been pointed out by previous literature as part of the national ‘political opportunity structure’, i.e. the openness of the host-country political system to the integration of ethnic minorities (Berger et al., 2004; Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). Multicultural systems like the UK are generally deemed to be more prone to recognise and actively support the right of ethnic communities to rely on ethnic-specific resources (Stromblad et al., 2011; Koopmans, 2004). This study cannot address the national dimension as no cross-country comparison was carried out. However, the main contributions of such a localised approach is that it sheds new light on the significant variations in the level of institutional support to ethnic organisations across local authorities, rather than urban areas (Morales and Giugni, 2011b: 11; Van Heelsum, 2005), even in a context of multicultural integration policies (Maxwell, 2012). It is important to note, in this regard, the
importance of national policies in shaping the local authorities’ approach to integration and to the provision of support to ethnic-specific organisations. In the past decade, social cohesion and attention to shared rather than particularised interests (Cantle, 2001; Home Office, 2005) has become part of the national agenda and the position adopted by some London boroughs, such as Newham, simply reflect this change (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2009: 31).

The other two contextual factors identified, that is to say the level of ethnic diversity and tribal fragmentation, are related more to the ability of communities to mobilise than to the ability of the host-country system to integrate them. In particular, the issue of clanic and tribal cleavages that hinder the ability of communities to organise effectively has been highlighted by previous literature (Bloemraad, 2006b: 77), even with regard to Somalis (Hopkins, 2006; Communities and Local Government, 2009).

These findings challenge the expectation that ethnic concentration inevitably corresponds to stronger and more effective ethnic organisations due to the differences in the structure and function of ethnic organisations of African national groups, as well as the impact that other contextual and community-related elements have on organisational networks.

Mixed findings about the positive effect of ethnic enclaves on ethnic-based social networks also emerged when researching ethnic places of worship and ethnic informal networks. Ethnic clustering undoubtedly creates regular opportunities for bonding social capital to be created amongst co-ethnics (Vervoort, 2012; Vervoort et al., 2011) and for ethnic- and national-specific religious institutions to be established. The qualitative fieldwork showed how ethnic businesses concentrate in ethnic enclaves for both Ghanaians and Somalis, as traditionally recognised by scholars focusing on the value of ethnic density for economic integration (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Zhou, 2004). This extensive presence of ethnic restaurants, cafes and shops create familiar spaces of regular interaction between co-ethnics which often translate into a greater embeddedness in ethnic informal networks. Similarly, living in areas where co-ethnic religious institutions are available facilitates the involvement in these networks. This would explain the positive and significant quantitative results.
Nonetheless, it was observed that, among both Somalis and Ghanaians, individual choices about what church or mosque to attend and which level of connection to maintain with co-ethnics could also not be dependent on being settled in high concentration areas. Evidence was found of Ghanaians commuting from low- to high concentration areas to attend a specific Ghanaian church, as Maxwell pointed out for Caribbeans (Maxwell, 2012: 121), or Somalis in East London choosing to worship at an Asian-led mosque rather than at the local Somali mosque. Similarly, close informal contacts with co-ethnics would be maintained well beyond physical distances and boundaries through the phone or the Internet and mixed social networks would be generated by connections with other ethnic group and the mainstream society through the workplace, university or school.

What this evidence shows is that there certainly is a positive relationship between residential concentration and ethnic social resources (H3). However, this association is not inevitable and ethnic enclaves do not always unavoidably correspond to closer or exclusive connections with co-ethnics (Drever, 2004; Esser, 1986; Sigelman et al., 1996). Although in the case of Somalis, ethnic enclaves seemed to represent the natural environment for organisational networks to grow and turn into ‘ethnic civic community’ (Fennema and Tillie, 2001) or achieve ‘institutional completeness’ (Breton, 1964; Zhou, 2009), the actual ability of these resources to develop effectively and act as community’s representatives could be hindered by factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to the community. Similarly, living with co-ethnics does not necessarily lead to social isolation either through interpersonal connections and attendance in places of worship. The ways in which individuals shape their embeddedness in social networks often transcend geographical boundaries. Whereas the differences between Ghanaians and Somalis are evident with regard to organisational networks, the two groups appear more similar when considering informal networks and religious institutions (H6).
7.2 Ethnic-based social resources and political participation

Having established the relationship between ethnic enclaves and ethnic-based social networks, Chapter 6 addressed the effect of the latter on political participation (RQ3). As for the previous chapter, both quantitative (Black Africans) and qualitative (Ghanaians and Somalis) findings were presented (RQ4).

The qualitative evidence showed that Somali ethnic organisations are linked to both electoral and non-electoral engagement through various channels. Passive users are given information about how to register and cast their vote and are provided with support in translating political materials (e.g. letters and leaflets). Similarly, information about non-electoral actions are easily spread through the informal networks developed within ethnic organisations. This influence on the process of political information and the level of political knowledge is integrated by an indirect effect exerted on other factors that are generally described as strong predictors of political engagement. Active participation in Somali voluntary groups was found to reinforce group consciousness (Miller et al., 1981; Mcclain et al., 2009; Shingles, 1981), promote the acquisition of civic skills that can be utilised in the political domain (Myrberg, 2011), and increase the level of trust among co-ethnics. This created opportunities for political activism and mobilisation and the emergence of ethnic leaders (Bloemraad, 2006b, 2001). The latter, in particular, are crucial resources for the community due to their active involvement with mainstream political elites, their ability to connect the community to the ‘outside’ society and bring ethnic-related issues into the political arena. This is in line with the previous literature that defined ethnic leaders as “‘insider’ bridges to co-ethnics, passing on information, mobilizing fellow immigrants, or serving as representatives to mainstream institutions” (Bloemraad, 2006b: 99).

The evidence gathered about Somali organisations strongly supports the claim that despite their ‘bonding’ nature, ethnic voluntary groups have the potential not only to produce ethnic-specific resources (Lane, 1959), such as group consciousness and ethnic leaders, but also to function as their mainstream counterparts and bring very similar
benefits to political participation (Verba et al., 1995). They also become formal, credible and effective institutions through which their advocacy function can be channelled.

Despite the support lent to the positive hypothesis (H5) by the study of Somali organisations, the evidence gathered amongst Ghanaians suggested, once again, a very different outcome. Voluntary organisations did not present the same clear link with political participation and in most cases were described as apolitical institutions primarily focusing on maintaining connections within the Ghanaian diaspora, developing projects to support the homeland and providing support to their members through mutual aid system. These groups and their leaders did not seem to pursue an advocacy function as amongst Somalis.

As pointed out in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.3), the two communities have different needs and their organisational networks have developed accordingly, becoming an expression of the communities’ integration and immigration experiences (Sardinha, 2009; Cordero-Guzman, 2005). Probably due to the same difference in the necessity for tackling very specific and relevant issues, the community dimension of political engagement did not emerge from Ghanaian participants. The latter generally described political behaviours, especially voting, as the result of individual choices rather than collective processes. The only mobilising force for Ghanaians seemed to be the sense of belonging to the wider ‘Black’ community, which suffers from racism, discrimination and socio-economic disadvantages. In contrast, amongst Somalis the main mobilising force is the co-national community and, in some cases, the Muslim group. In this regard, Somalis are more similar to the British Asian communities, particularly the Muslim groups, and their ‘vocal’ approach to politics (Maxwell, 2012: 115; Statham, 1999).

What, overall, distinguishes Ghanaians and Somalis, is that for the latter ethnic organisations could be described as the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Stromblad et al., 2011). They are vital in providing support to a community suffering from a lack of socio-economic resources by helping them overcome this disadvantage and stimulating political engagement (Verba et al., 1995; Leighley, 2001).

These qualitative findings were only partially visible in the quantitative results focusing on the Black African community as a whole. The regression analysis showed a
positive effect of individual participation in ethnic organisations on non-electoral engagement but a non-significant relationship with voter turnout. Heath et al. (2011) highlighted exactly the same finding when analysing the level of engagement in voluntary organisations, regardless of their ethnic nature (see also Eggert and Giugni, 2011). The scholars also showed that the absence of a positive link between organisational engagement and voter turnout only held for ethnic minorities but not for the White British majority, where associational engagement exerts a positive effect. It could therefore be argued that other external factors influencing voter turnout, but not as much non-electoral engagement, are likely to hinder the beneficial impact of ethnic organisations. In the Somali case, for instance, as the percentage of recent immigrants who are not eligible to vote is expected to be significant, the mechanisms of political mobilisation observed within ethnic organisations might not have produced an actual increase in voter turnout. The latter could also be dependent on the mobilisation strategies adopted by political parties to target sizeable and relevant ethnic communities. Maxwell (2012: 115), for example, argues that if mainstream political elites perceive the community as not being relevant to the electoral process, no real effort will be made to mobilise this community. Moreover, the potential of Somali ethnic organisations to serve as ‘weapons of the weak’ and create an effective ‘ethnic civic community’ which translates into higher level of political participation (Fennema and Tillie, 2001) could hindered by the same factors that weaken the stability of these networks: institutional support, level of ethnic diversity and more importantly tribal fragmentation (see Chapter 5).

In contrast with the evidence presented for ethnic organisations, what emerges from both the qualitative and quantitative enquiries is that attendance in predominantly ethnic places of worship and embeddedness in informal networks primarily composed by co-ethnics do not significantly predict the level of voter turnout or non-electoral engagement.73 This finding rejects both the positive (H5) and negative hypotheses (H4).

73 The relationship between attendance in ethnic place of worship and voter turnout becomes significant in Model 2, when controlling for socio-economic and immigration-related factors. This puzzling result was investigated in Chapter 6. No evidence of suppressor effect or multicollinearity was found so the finding is interpreted carefully.
The qualitative study, however, shed light on the more subtle political role played by these ethnic social resources and revealed that, unlike for ethnic organisations, Somalis and Ghanaians present much more visible similarities. Among both communities, churches and mosques primarily, if not exclusively, serve the religious needs of community members. In some cases, respondents suggested that a strict separation between religion and political engagement should be maintained. Consequently, the study did not capture the strong and visible political role described by American scholars when addressing Black churches, for instance, and the crucial mobilising function they had in the Civil Rights movement (Tate, 1991, 1993).

This literature has highlighted how ethnic-based religious institutions can, at least in the US context, significantly and positively impact political participation by reinforcing group consciousness (Olsen, 1970), promoting civic skills (Verba et al., 1993; Verba et al., 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001), furthering the processes of political mobilisation and recruitment (Cavendish, 2000; Eggert and Giugni, 2011) and providing political information (Harris, 1994). Why did this strong link which resembles the one observed for organisational networks not emerge within the African community in the UK? There are three plausible explanations.

First of all, the qualitative study was probably not conducted in ‘political churches’, that is, religious institutions that openly address political matters and mobilise their members (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). Secondly, in the American context the boundaries between religion and politics are much more blurred than in the British secularist framework, where these two domains tend to be kept well separated. Finally, the intensity of the social movements for racial equality, which might be at the basis of such politically powerful religious institutions among African Americans, is peculiar and does not replicate in the UK context.

That said, the qualitative findings are not all negative. The study found that politics is probably not part of religious services, but it certainly enters the informal discussions happening before the service, just outside the doors of churches and mosques. It is therefore suggested that informal networks play a primary role in
stimulating political discussion. Religious institutions provide the frequent and regular occasion, as well as the familiar environment in which these debates can be carried out.

Informal connections between co-ethnics were also analysed ‘outside’ religious and organisational institutions, within the spaces where they often occur, that is, in the streets where ethnic businesses are located. Political discussion undoubtedly represents a crucial component of informal conversations for both Ghanaians and Somalis. However, the two communities seem to diverge in the ways in which these informal relationships are utilised to politically mobilise the community. Community members who are more knowledgeable about and more active in politics, generally ethnic leaders linked to ethnic organisations, tend to rely on informal networks to deliver political information and involve co-ethnics in political activities. This recalls Uhlner’s theory about ‘relational goods’ as these mobilisation actions are often carried out in accordance with mainstream political elites (i.e. a candidate or a political party).

Ghanaians, in contrast, again apply a more individualistic approach to political participation, even when it comes to informal networks. That said, the lack of a significant relationship between ethnic informal networks and political engagement (quantitative analysis) suggests that the politically relevant processes observed may not be sufficient to make these connections mobilising channels, no matter their regularity and intensity as well as the level of political expertise of their members.

One of the main interesting findings about ethnic informal networks, both within and outside places of worship, is that political discussion predominantly focuses on homeland politics and ethnic-related issues, for both communities (Morales and Pilati, 2011). This might lend some support to the claim that bonding social capital promotes political activities with an ethnic focus rather than the engagement in mainstream or host-country politics. Consequently, forms of bridging social capital, i.e. cross-ethnic organisations and mixed informal networks, would be more beneficial to the process of political integration (Morales and Pilati, 2011; Berger et al., 2004).

With regard to the effect of transnational practices on the political participation in the host-country, previous studies found that the former can have a positive impact on a more general political activism among ethnic minorities due to a ‘spillover’ effect
(Morales and Morariu, 2011; Seo, 2011). Nonetheless, empirical evidence has also brought examples of how involvement in home-country politics distracts ethnic minorities from host-country political participation and the desirability of these practices is still cautiously supported (Morales and Morariu, 2011; Pantoja, 2005). This study only marginally addressed the consequences of a strong involvement in homeland politics. However, the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) suggested that Black Africans as well as Ghanaians and Somalis who are more interested in home-country politics, also present a higher level of interest in host-country politics. Furthermore, although non-electoral initiatives were found to primarily target international, home-country or ethnic-related political issues, what seems to matter is that the democratic institutions of the British system were utilised to tackle and discuss those issues, at least amongst Somalis. Therefore it could be argued that, regardless of their focus, these actions become valuable occasions to advance in the process of political incorporation.

Overall, the study did not provide any evidence of a detrimental effect of ethic-based social resources on electoral and non-electoral political participation. This relationship was found to be either positive, as in the case of ethnic organisations, or non-significant, as for ethnic religious institutions and informal networks. The main caveat remains whether home-country and ethnic-related interests do fit into the process of political integration and the extent to which ethnic social resources feed these potentially detrimental practices.

What also clearly emerged from the qualitative evidence, especially with regard to ethnic organisational networks, is that the impact of bonding social capital on political engagement is likely to remarkably vary across national groups and modes of engagement. This makes it difficult to establish general patterns that can be applied to communities presenting different immigration and integration experiences.
7.3 With a little help from my community: concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation

Based on the evidence presented, what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the process that leads from residential concentration to ethnic social resources and, ultimately, political participation?

Figure 7.2 shows the summary of the quantitative results presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Although the relationship between concentration and both ethnic places of worship and informal networks is statistically significant, these two resources do not significantly impact on political participation. Similarly, involvement in ethnic organisations affects non-electoral engagement but it is not affected by the percentage of Black Africans in the neighbourhood.

Figure 7.2: The link between residential concentration, ethnic social resources and political participation – final results
This suggests that the ‘missing link’ between ethnic clustering and political engagement might not be represented by ethnic social resources and, therefore, other avenues should be explored. Nonetheless, the qualitative study did present some valuable insights into how this process may be developing among different African national groups.

In the Somali case, ethnic clustering seems to provide crucial support to the creation of, as well as individual participation in ethnic organisations, which in turn were found to be closely linked to both electoral and non-electoral engagement. In contrast, Ghanaian organisational networks were found to be much less dependent on spatial proximity and much less engaged in political activities and mobilisation. It can be concluded that the process linking concentration to social resources and political participation may be relevant only for those groups that, like the Somali, experience significant disadvantage and are in need of very specific and targeted support (e.g. translation services). The resources developed are closely embedded in the community which they serve and aim at establishing a connection with the mainstream political arena where they can effectively tackle the community’s issues.

A ‘cultural’ argument could be also put forward to assert that the differences observed between Somalis and Ghanaians stem from their different perception of political engagement, as well as of how the community should organise itself and interact with the host society. The tendency of Ghanaians to rely on organisational networks that operate in the background and closely resemble the self-sufficient mutual aid societies present in Ghana (Arthur, 2008), contrasts with the public role played by Somali groups within the community and partly helps explain why contextual factors, such as ethnic clustering, is less relevant for Ghanaians. Similarly, the general perception of political participation as an individual choice among Ghanaians versus the community dimension stimulating political actions for Somalis would help make sense of the different involvement of ethnic organisations in politics. It is important to reiterate, however, that numerous other factors, such as the level of institutional support, tribal fragmentation and ethnic diversity, can still hinder these relationships amongst Somalis.

The two communities presented more similarities with regard to ethnic places of worship and informal networks. The interplay between cross-ethnic and ethnic religious
as well as informal social resources makes ethnic enclaves a much more flexible and open environment than the literature normally describes. The main element of dissimilarity is related to the ways in which informal and organisational networks are interwoven. Although for both Ghanaians and Somalis strong informal connections between co-ethnics represent a crucial basis for solid ethnic organisations, only amongst Somalis these two resources seem to interplay and support one another in the quest for more political visibility in the political arena.

Two main conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. First of all, the relationship between residential concentration and ethnic-based social resources is not as straightforward as expected. Both the qualitative and quantitative studies provide some evidence for the weakening of the traditional link between ethnic clustering and bonding social capital (Zhou, 2005; Putnam, 2000). This would consequently question the role of ethnic organisations, religious institutions and informal networks as ‘mediators’ or ‘missing links’ in the process leading from residential concentration to political engagement. Nonetheless, the fact that for some communities ethnic enclaves still represent important points of reference when seeking political representations makes these ethnic-specific networks crucial for the understanding of the process of political integration.

The second conclusion is directly linked to the first. The integration histories and immigration experiences of African national communities do significantly impact on the connection between concentration and social resources as well as between the latter and political participation. In particular, they influence the extent to which different communities rely on collective resources and aim at collective political representation. For this reason, the internal diversity of Black Africans should be considered when addressing these phenomena just as variations across ethnic groups should be expected.
7.4 Residential concentration: good or bad for political participation?

The core question of this study is whether ethnic residential clustering has to be considered as a mobilising or marginalising factor in the process of political mobilisation of Black Africans in the UK.

The quantitative analysis carried out about the Black African community as a whole provided mixed findings. On the one hand, the evidence lends support to the mobilising hypothesis (H2) when focusing on voter turnout. Individuals living in the most concentrated neighbourhoods are more likely to participate in general elections than those living in the least concentrated areas. This confirms the findings of previous studies conducted in the UK among the Asian community (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b) and in the US among African Americans and Latinos (Leighley, 2001; Schlichting et al., 1998). On the other hand, however, the marginalising hypothesis (H1) was confirmed for non-electoral participation.

Regardless of its sign, the quantitative analysis showed that there is a significant relationship between residential concentration and political participation, at least amongst Black Africans. This supports the idea that political engagement is influenced by contextual factors such as ethnic density. It also challenges the claim that this influence is exerted exclusively on political activities that are performed collectively (e.g. demonstrations) (Huckfeldt, 1979). Both electoral and non-electoral engagement are affected by neighbourhood ethnic composition, although in very different ways (Kenny, 1992). Voting and other electoral forms of participation can be socially shaped and based on joint ventures of individuals who mobilise for specific causes. This is the case of the collective dimension of political participation which emerged in the qualitative study of Somalis, for example. Although voter turnout remains an individual choice, this decision appeared to be developed as part of a community’s project of socio-political advancement.

Having ascertained the relevance of ethnic concentration as a contextual determinant of political participation, the analysis shed light on its reversed effect of the
two different modes of participation. Black Africans living in ethnic enclaves are more likely to vote (Cutts et al., 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Leighley, 2001; Schlichting et al., 1998) but less likely to engage in non-electoral activities. The investigation conducted in Chapter 4 found that high co-ethnic concentration is associated with high levels of area-level deprivation, not only amongst Black Africans but also the other four ethnic groups. The latter, in turn, is negatively related to non-electoral participation, but not voter turnout. It could be claimed that the actual responsibility for this marginalising effect is not ethnic density but deprivation, as suggested by previous literature which focuses on the strong correlation between ethnic enclaves and area socio-economic disadvantage (Massey and Denton, 1993, 1989). Some scholars have pointed out that when analysing outcomes such as social cohesion and health, the main focus should be on poverty and socio-economic inequalities affecting the areas where ethnic minorities live rather than the area’s ethnic composition (CoDE, 2013; Bécares et al., 2011).

Certainly socio-economic inequalities are likely to remarkably affect the process of political integration, especially for modes of participation that require skills and resources that derive from individual socio-economic status (Verba et al., 1995). Nonetheless, the positive results obtained for voter turnout suggest that neighbourhood ethnic composition is not always associated with marginalising effects but can also mobilise ethnic minorities (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b). Therefore, its negative effect cannot simply be dismissed as the effect of deprivation.

Other possible explanations refer to the strong bonding and exclusive social interactions nourished by ethnic enclaves. Less regular and close contact between majority and minority groups may be inhibiting the likelihood of Black Africans to adopt modes of participation that are widespread in the mainstream society, such as non-electoral activities. At the same time, the inward-looking nature of ethnic networks may be nourishing group values and norms that promote more conventional political behaviours, such as voting.

The qualitative study also offers a new perspective from which the reversed effect of concentration can be approached. In the case of Somalis, living in ethnic clusters
emerged as an important condition to develop ethnic organisational resources, which, in turn, proved to be linked to political participation through various channels. The positive effect on voter turnout that emerges from the quantitative analysis may be the reflection of this virtuous circle, which is present at least in some African groups, between ethnic density and ethnic organisations. The negative effect on non-electoral engagement, at the same time, could be representing the inability of communities like the Somalis to create organisational networks that are strong enough to compensate for the detrimental effect of deprivation both the area and individual level. The reasons why this does not happen (i.e. institutional support, ethnic diversity, and tribal fragmentation) have been highlighted throughout Chapters 5 and 6. A clear example of this process is the path that leads from ethnic density to political engagement through ethnic organisations. The quantitative findings show that there is no significant relationship between ethnic concentration and individual participation in ethnic organisations. However, the latter had a positive impact on non-electoral engagement. This means that organisational networks are potential resources but because they are not significantly affected by group size, ethnic enclaves continue to be linked to detrimental effects on non-electoral participation.

Overall, the quantitative findings suggest that concentration is relevant for political mobilisation. Deprivation does play a role although this is marginal and could be claimed only with regard to non-electoral participation. Both qualitative and quantitative enquiries show that ethnic-based social networks, and particularly ethnic organisations, could be utilised as resources to overcome the negative impact of deprivation and enhance political participation. What the qualitative study unveils is the extreme complexity of these phenomena. The impact of ethnic residential concentration (and ethnic-based social networks) is likely to vary remarkably across African national groups, and possibly across ethnic communities, which present divergent immigration and integration experiences. These factors, indeed, shape the needs of these communities and therefore the ways in which ethnic networks, especially formal institutions, are utilised to advance in the process of integration (Sardinha, 2009). In particular, the

---

74 The negative relationship between deprivation and non-electoral engagement becomes non-significant when the level of co-ethnic concentration is introduced in the model along with other control variables.
beneficial effect of ‘bonding’ networks should be more relevant for more disadvantaged communities who already lack socio-economic resources (e.g. Somalis and Congolese) (Cattacin, 2009; Bloemraad, 2006b). The extent to which these resources are actually and effectively utilised and therefore the way in which concentration ultimately affects political participation depend on other contextual and community-level factors which can determine variations across not only urban but also local areas.

This mixed evidence about an effect that seems to vary across national groups, localities and modes of participation makes it rather difficult to provide a clear-cut answer as to whether residential concentration is good or bad for political engagement. Perhaps this should not even be the main aim of studies addressing ethnic concentration. A more flexible approach aimed at capturing the politically relevant processes taking place in ethnic clusters would perhaps benefit much more the investigation of the mobilising and marginalising forces that impact on political participation of ethnic minorities. In the specific case of Black Africans, the answer to the question about ‘good and bad clustering’ cannot ignore the remarkable differences between national groups and the ways in which they can utilise ethnic enclaves as resources.

### 7.5 Main limitations, contributions and future research

The main limitation of the study is that the quantitative enquiry had to deal with a limited sample of Black Africans which did not allow a separate analysis of national groups, including Somalis and Ghanaians, to test the hypothesis of significant between-group variations. The small sample size also meant that some of the results had to be treated extremely carefully. Secondly, the unavailability of aggregate measures of formal ethnic resources, e.g. the number or type of ethnic organisations, meant that the analysis had to concentrate on the relationship between ethnic clustering and individual participation in ethnic social networks. The third limitation is represented by the lack of variables measuring various aspects of individual involvement in ethnic formal and informal networks. For instance, it would have been interesting to explore the intensity and modes
of engagement in ethnic voluntary groups, the frequency of the contacts with ethnic friends and the national, besides the ethnic, composition of places of worship.

With regard to the qualitative enquiry, the main weakness is the limited amount of data that was gathered about religious institutions. This is mainly due to difficulties in accessing small co-ethnic mosques and the recruitment of ‘gate-keepers’ in different Ghanaian churches. The recruitment of Ghanaians leads to a second limitation, which is the very low number of second-generation participants. This issue is primarily linked to the problems encountered in accessing voluntary organisations, which represented the main point of reference for the recruitment of Somalis. Furthermore, due to time and resources constraints, the qualitative fieldwork exclusively focused on highly concentrated neighbourhoods. It would have been beneficial to conduct the same research in low concentration areas. Nevertheless, the choice to recruit participants and organisations in various London boroughs partly compensated this limitation by providing data about how the same processes develop within different areas. Furthermore, especially amongst Ghanaians, participants living in low concentration areas were recruited and this helped to investigate the ways in which community members socialise in and out ethnic enclaves.

Despite these limitations, this study has contributed to the study of the impact of ethnic concentration on political participation in various ways. First of all, the research went beyond the direct relationship between concentration and participation to investigate the possible ‘missing links’, that is, the processes that could make sense of the mobilising or marginalising effects of ethnic enclaves. Few, if any, studies have attempted such an in-depth investigation. The application of the mixed-method approach allowed a detailed and extensive analysis of the ways in which politically relevant resources are created, or not, within highly concentrated contexts. The quantitative enquiry confirmed the actual relevance of ethnic concentration on political participation and established the general patterns of its effect. The qualitative fieldwork expanded the scope of the research to constructs that could not be measured through secondary quantitative data, such as, among others, the presence and role of ethnic leaders; the individual sense of ethnic identity and its links to political engagement; and the relevance of community-based processes to shape political mobilisation. Previous literature has addressed the
political impact of ethnic-based social resources, but rarely in such a broad perspective including various types of connections and resources and highlighting the extent to which they interplay.

The focus on Black Africans also represents a valuable contribution of this study, which added even more complexity to an already complex phenomenon. This community has been long under-researched despite its remarkable growth and extraordinary internal diversity. The analysis not only provided a much-needed insight of political participation and ethnic social resources of Black Africans in the UK, but also shed new light on the peculiar reversed effect that residential concentration has on electoral (positive) and non-electoral (negative) engagement within this group, a phenomenon that did not emerge amongst any other ethnic community (Chapter 4). Furthermore, the investigation highlighted the relevant intra-group variations stemming from the diverse immigration-related characteristics of African national communities.

As regards the main puzzle that originally motivated this study, namely the role played by ethnic enclaves on the political participation of Black Africans, this study’s main contribution was to show that ethnic concentration is a relevant factor that can either hinder or support engagement. Political participation emerged as a socially constructed activity, particularly for some African communities. As such, it is likely to be influenced by context and its social interactions (Kenny, 1992).

Given the importance of contextual factors to shape political engagement, the study highlighted that ethnic ties and therefore ethnic residential concentration could represent a beneficial support not only to political participation but also to a more general process of integration (Cattacin, 2009). This is not to say that the dangers and dark-sides of ethnic clustering should be ignored. The dangerous reality of social isolation and segregation and economic deprivation and their close relationship with ethnic density should not be underestimated as they are rooted in and incessantly reproduce socio-economic inequalities.

However, some level of ethnic residential clustering is likely, at least in the short term, to be a constant feature of urban environments as a consequence of systematic and increasing migration flows often linked to chain migration processes. This study suggests
that perhaps the pessimism and alarmist tones assumed by the debate on ethnic residential clustering, not only the UK but also across Europe, should leave space for a more neutral and flexible approach to the study of this phenomenon. More research is needed to grasp the complexities of the social processes taking places in ethnic enclaves and their negative as well as positive implications for political participation, as well as for other integration outcomes. This research should be aimed at understanding the extent to which individuals and communities actually rely on spatial proximity with co-ethnics to shape their social networks and to get involved in the host-country’s civic and political life. And in this quest for clarity, additional contextual (e.g. deprivation, institutional support, ethnic diversity), community-related (e.g. tribal homogeneity) and individual (e.g. socio-economic) factors should be taken into account.

The need to acknowledge ethnic clusters as an undoubtedly problematic but also, in some cases, valuable and to some extent inevitable realities is effectively expressed by Cattacin (Cattacin, 2009: 255):

“To try to combat or eliminate such places means to follow a romantic view of a harmonious multicultural - and unattainable - society. It means seeing cities in a way that ignores their continuous dynamic of migration and reorganisation.”

These words recall the link that this study indirectly has with the controversial debate about British multiculturalism and its support to ethnic-specific social networks and identities. The main conclusion that could be drawn in this regard is that, as Cattacin points out, ethnic ties and the search for ‘those who look like us’ are a reality that almost naturally stems from the process of migration. Ethnic enclaves are a physical signal of these phenomena. If these spaces represent channels to create resources that can be used to support individuals and their political, social, economic integration, then their positive role should be acknowledged. However, it is also necessary to guarantee that ethnic enclaves do not become traps of inequality and deprivation or ways of seeking protection from external discrimination. This should perhaps be the main focus of policymakers (Bécares et al., 2011).

Future research should examine the differential effect of residential concentration on electoral and non-electoral engagement, which remains an important caveat for this
study. Close attention should be paid to other possible ‘missing links’ that lie beneath the relationship between residential concentration and political participation. In particular, the role played by ethnic-based social resources should be investigated through more refined aggregate and individual measures of bonding social capital.

It would be also important to explore the ways in which residential concentration impacts on the strategies of mobilisation by political parties as well as the level of actual representation of ethnic minorities in the local and national political arena. These processes could be addressed from a ‘supply-side’ perspective which emphasises the role played by mainstream political actors, e.g. political parties, candidates and public officials (Leighley, 2001).

The extent to which residential concentration is linked to heightened political participation in homeland's and ethnic-related politics and how the latter relate to individual involvement in host-country politics should also be further investigated. Exploring the ways in which home- and host-country politics interplay, overlap and influence one another would be particularly important due to the relevance that home-country and ethnic-related political issues seem to have in political actions and political discussion taking place amongst co-ethnics. This ‘political transnationalism’ (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003) is likely to become even more important amongst Black Africans as a consequence of the growing number of new immigrants settling in the country.

Moreover, it is recommended that additional research be undertaken about the Black African community as a heterogeneous group composed by different national communities which should be acknowledged and researched. The mixed-method approach should be adopted to gather additional knowledge about the ways in which dissimilar immigration histories, integration experiences and cultural traits influence the ways in which the relationship between concentration and political participation across African national groups, but also more generally across ethnic communities. If it is true that Black Africans are spreading out from London towards other urban areas in the UK and are hence becoming less concentrated, as shown by the 2011 Census (Simpson, 2012), it would be important to investigate the extent to which the relationship between
marginalising effects on non-electoral participation of ethnic enclaves and deprivation will change in light of these different residential patterns.
References


Mason, J. (2006b) Six strategies for mixing methods and linking data in social science research - Working paper. [online] Real Life Methods - University of Manchester. Available at: [http://eprints.nrm.ac.uk/482/1/0406_six%2520strategies%2520for%2520mixing%2520methods.pdf](http://eprints.nrm.ac.uk/482/1/0406_six%2520strategies%2520for%2520mixing%2520methods.pdf) [Accessed 29 November 2010]


255
APPENDIX A. Variables coding

Residential concentration

- Percentage of Black Africans in LSOAs: LSOAs are utilised in England and Wales, whereas Scotland refers to Data Zones. There are 32,844 LSOAs in England and 1,909 in Wales, and 6,505 Data Zones in Scotland. Their average population size is 1,500 and the minimum is 1,000 inhabitants. The original continuous variable was divided into quartiles.

Political participation

- Voting in general elections: The self-reported vote was checked against validated vote and non-entitlement to vote (self-reported) in order to exclude from the analysis those who are not eligible to vote. (0) No – includes eligible individuals who did not vote [validated vote] and respondents who declared to not have voted [self-reported vote and missing validated turnout]; (1) Yes – includes individuals who voted in person, by post or by proxy [validated vote] and respondents who declared to have voted [self-reported vote and missing validated turnout]. Missing values include: respondents who were not eligible to vote [validated vote] or declared that their name is not on the electoral register as they are not entitled to vote [eq8a and eq9]. Missing values for validated turnout include: refused validation, missing data, name not registered at this address, name/address details not sufficient to identify on register.

- Non-electoral participation (binary): Participated, in the last 12 months, in at least one of the four non-electoral activities listed: participating in protests, signing petitions, boycotting, giving money to political cause or advocacy organisation. Missing values include cases where all four activities were missing.

Ethnic social resources

- Ethnic organisations: Participation in ethnic or cultural clubs (“Have you taken part in the activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club in the past 12 months?”)
and/or involvement in other organisations or clubs ("Have you taken part in the activities of any other kind of association or club in the past 12 months?") where the majority of members are from the same ethnic or religious background ("How many members are from the same ethnic or religious group as you?" 0-a few, none of them/1-all, most, about half of them): (0) did not participate in any ethnic/cultural group and/or the majority of groups members are not co-ethnics, (1) did participate in both or at least one of these ‘ethnic’ organisations. Missing values include respondents who did not provide any information about their involvement in ethnic or cultural clubs as well as about the ethnic compositions of other ethnic groups they participated in.

- **Ethnic place of worship**: “As far as you know, how many of the people at your church or place of worship have the same ethnic background as you?” (0) a few, none of them, (1) all, most and at least half of them. Those without religion and those who do not attend the places of worship, despite being religious, are coded as (0). Missing values include don’t knows and refused.

- **Co-ethnic friends**: “As far as you know, how many of your friends have the same ethnic background as you?” (0) a few, none of them, (1) all, most and at least half of them.

**Control variables**

**Immigration-related factors**

- **Proficient in English**: (0) respondents who do not speak English as main language at home and reported their level of English knowledge to be ‘fairly good’ or ‘below average’ or ‘poor’, (1) respondents who do speak English at home or who do not speak English at home but reported their knowledge of English of be ‘very good’.

- **Generation**: (1) first generation – those who were born abroad and migrated aged 13 and above, (2) generation 1.5 – those who were born abroad and migrated between 6 and 12 years of age, (3) generation 2 – those who were born in the UK and those who were born abroad but migrated between age 0 and 5. Missing data include
respondents who were born abroad but did not specify when they migrated to the UK as well as individuals who did not provide information about country of birth and age of migration. This definition of generational status was devised so that members of generation 1.5 are represented by those who migrated during their primary education, hence retains some link with the homeland but had also gone to school in the UK; some members of generation 2, despite being foreign-born, were entirely educated in the UK; members of generation 1 only partially, if at all, experienced the British education system. This would distinguish between socialisation processes that were more (generation 2 and 1.5) or less (generation 1) embedded in the host/British society (Muttarak and Heath, 2010; Zhou, 1997).

**Socio-economic status**

- **Gender:** (0) males; (1) females.

- **Class/occupation:** (1) Salariat - including professional, managerial occupations; (2) Intermediate – including clerical jobs, sales and services, supervisors, and small business owners; (3) Working – including skilled, semi-skilled and non-skilled manual; (4) Unknown – including never worked, don’t know, refused and other. Where possible, respondents with missing data (don’t know, refused or other) are assigned to the class of their spouse.

- **Qualification:** The variable is created on the basis of the highest qualification achieved either in the UK or overseas: (0) No qualifications – neither British nor overseas; (1) Other qualifications – British [commercial qualifications, apprenticeship, training certificates and other qualifications] and/or overseas [commercial, professional, other qualifications]; (2) secondary – British [A-levels and GCSEs] and/or overseas [below of at university entrance level], (3) tertiary – British [postgraduate or first degree, nursing and teaching qualifications, HNC/HND, City&Guilds level 3, NVQ/SVQ 3] and/or overseas [first or higher degree]; (4) Unknown – includes missing values.
Area-level variables

- *Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score.* Index identifying the most deprived areas across England by combining various indicators of deprivation (income, employment, health, education, skills and training, barriers to housing, crime and disorder, living environment) into a single score (higher scores correspond to higher deprivation). The index is calculated at the LSOA level. The variable is based on the 2007 IMD for England.
APPENDIX B.  Tables Chapter 5

Table B.1: Ethnic-based social networks and residential concentration (full models) – Logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic organisations</th>
<th>Ethnic places of worship</th>
<th>Ethnic informal networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Black Africans in LSOA (ref: 0-1.35%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.36-5.39%</td>
<td>-.05(.33)</td>
<td>.06(.33)</td>
<td>.05(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.40-10.30%</td>
<td>.04(.33)</td>
<td>.10(.33)</td>
<td>.21(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.31-43.62%</td>
<td>-.28(.32)</td>
<td>-.24(.34)</td>
<td>.72(.33)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration-related factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English proficiency (ref: not proficient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficient</td>
<td>.28(.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.31(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2.00(99)**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.88(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (ref: 1st)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.86(.46)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.22(.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-.13(.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.18(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-.38(.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01(.01)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03(.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: male)</td>
<td>-.39(.21)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.30(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (ref: Working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat</td>
<td>-.04(.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.23(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>.40(.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.45(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.17(.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.83(36)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification (ref: no qualification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>.52(.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.67(.38)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.44(.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.31(.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.02(.59)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.85(.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-.53(.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.51(.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-.27(.23)</td>
<td>-1.51(.58)**</td>
<td>-.05 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-341.42</td>
<td>-325.22</td>
<td>-329.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>1.12 (3)</td>
<td>29.76(17)</td>
<td>5.53(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. The standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. The variable for age-squared was dropped as it did not significantly contributed to the models. Statistical significance level: ***,p≤.01, **,p≤.05, *,p≤.10.
APPENDIX C. Tables Chapter 6

Table C.1: Voter turnout and ethnic social resources (full models) – logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic organisations</td>
<td>.16(.23)</td>
<td>.23(.24)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic place of worship</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.35(.23)</td>
<td>.51(.23)**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic informal networks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.27(.26)</td>
<td>-.37(.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration-related factors**

**English proficiency (ref: not proficient)**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proficient</td>
<td>.36(.37)</td>
<td>.46(.37)</td>
<td>.29(.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-.69(.89)</td>
<td>.03(.89)</td>
<td>-.64(.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Generation (ref: 1st)**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-.28(.48)</td>
<td>-.18(.47)</td>
<td>-.08(.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01(.36)</td>
<td>-.02(.35)</td>
<td>-.02(.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.28(.50)</td>
<td>.92(.55)*</td>
<td>.30(.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Socio-economic factors**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.11(.05)**</td>
<td>.09(.04)**</td>
<td>.09(.05)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-squared</td>
<td>-.00(00)*</td>
<td>-.00(00)</td>
<td>-.00(00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: male)</td>
<td>.10(.24)</td>
<td>.14(.24)</td>
<td>.06(.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (ref: Working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat</td>
<td>.22(.34)</td>
<td>.24(.34)</td>
<td>.19(.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>.38(.31)</td>
<td>.50(.32)</td>
<td>.41(.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.08(.40)</td>
<td>.11(.39)</td>
<td>.00(.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Qualification (ref: no qualification)**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>-.28(.44)</td>
<td>-.12(.43)</td>
<td>-.17(.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>-.64(.44)</td>
<td>-.41(.43)</td>
<td>-.59(.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.56(.63)</td>
<td>-.15(.67)</td>
<td>-.39(.66)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.08(.76)</td>
<td>.18(.79)</td>
<td>-.08(.72)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.59(.13)**</td>
<td>-2.06(1.10)*</td>
<td>.49(.16)**</td>
<td>-.214(1.1)**</td>
<td>.81(.22)**</td>
<td>-1.41(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-298.36</td>
<td>-280.54</td>
<td>-279.91</td>
<td>-263.59</td>
<td>-294.78</td>
<td>-278.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$ (df)</td>
<td>0.48(1)</td>
<td>25.46(16)</td>
<td>2.30(1)</td>
<td>29.89(16)</td>
<td>1.08(1)</td>
<td>26.77(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. The standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
Table C.2: Non-electoral participation and ethnic social resources (full models) – logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic organisations</td>
<td>1.26(.27)***</td>
<td>1.27(.29)***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic place of worship</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.04(.28)</td>
<td>.09(.29)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic informal networks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.01(.28)</td>
<td>.16(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration-related factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English proficiency (ref: not proficient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficient</td>
<td>.45(.51)</td>
<td>.49(.53)</td>
<td>.43(.52)</td>
<td>.52(.12)</td>
<td>.72(.12)</td>
<td>1.19(.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.74(.55)</td>
<td>1.12(.52)**</td>
<td>1.11(.53)**</td>
<td>1.19(.53)</td>
<td>1.12(.53)**</td>
<td>1.11(.53)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (ref: 1st)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.75(.33)**</td>
<td>.66(.33)**</td>
<td>.76(.32)**</td>
<td>.66(.33)**</td>
<td>.76(.32)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.14(.53)</td>
<td>.11(.52)</td>
<td>.04(.56)</td>
<td>.14(.53)</td>
<td>.11(.52)</td>
<td>.04(.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01(.06)</td>
<td>-.02(.06)</td>
<td>-.02(.06)</td>
<td>-.01(.06)</td>
<td>-.02(.06)</td>
<td>-.02(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-squared</td>
<td>-.00(.00)</td>
<td>.00(.00)</td>
<td>.00(.00)</td>
<td>-.00(.00)</td>
<td>.00(.00)</td>
<td>.00(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: male)</td>
<td>.17(.29)</td>
<td>-.07(.29)</td>
<td>.07(.29)</td>
<td>.17(.29)</td>
<td>-.07(.29)</td>
<td>.07(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (ref: Working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat</td>
<td>1.30(.39)***</td>
<td>1.19(.38)***</td>
<td>1.275(.39)***</td>
<td>1.30(.39)***</td>
<td>1.19(.38)***</td>
<td>1.275(.39)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>.89(.39)**</td>
<td>.83(.41)**</td>
<td>.93(.40)**</td>
<td>.89(.39)**</td>
<td>.83(.41)**</td>
<td>.93(.40)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.21(.47)**</td>
<td>1.12(.49)**</td>
<td>1.09(.48)**</td>
<td>1.21(.47)**</td>
<td>1.12(.49)**</td>
<td>1.09(.48)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification (ref: no qualification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>.53(.61)</td>
<td>.65(.60)</td>
<td>.64(.60)</td>
<td>.53(.61)</td>
<td>.65(.60)</td>
<td>.64(.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.31(.62)</td>
<td>.22(.65)</td>
<td>.24(.64)</td>
<td>.31(.62)</td>
<td>.22(.65)</td>
<td>.24(.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.84(.73)</td>
<td>1.09(.76)</td>
<td>1.12(.73)</td>
<td>.84(.73)</td>
<td>1.09(.76)</td>
<td>1.12(.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.59(.87)</td>
<td>.19(.90)</td>
<td>.00(.99)</td>
<td>.59(.87)</td>
<td>.19(.90)</td>
<td>.00(.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.89(.19)***</td>
<td>-3.5(1.38)**</td>
<td>-1.2(1.19)***</td>
<td>-2.87(1.4)**</td>
<td>1.3(2.3)**</td>
<td>-2.8(1.4)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-249.09</td>
<td>-228.34</td>
<td>-258.18</td>
<td>-237.58</td>
<td>-262.63</td>
<td>-239.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ² (df)</td>
<td>21.43(1)</td>
<td>62.80(16)</td>
<td>0.02(1)</td>
<td>39.21(16)</td>
<td>0.00(1)</td>
<td>46.74(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (unweighted)</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Unstandardised parameter estimates. The standard errors, in brackets, are adjusted for clustering and design weight is applied. Statistical significance level: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
APPENDIX D. Interview guide

This appendix reports the interview guide that was utilised for interviews with community members, ethnic leaders and community activists as well as local and national public officials. It is important to underline that this represented a point of reference but was not intended, and was not utilised, as a rigid and fixed set of questions to be asked. Interviews were shaped on the basis of the main topics that emerged during the conversation as well as the circumstances in which the interview was taking place (i.e. high or low concentration areas) and the characteristics and experiences of interviewees. Therefore, in some cases questions included in this guide were not asked whereas in other cases additional questions were added while the conversation was taking place.

INTERVIEWS WITH COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Personal information such as: country of birth, when migrated, parents’ country of origin, where living (in borough), job/main occupation

Possible follow-up questions: if family is in the UK, if have family in country of origin, citizenship status, reasons for migrating, for how long have lived in the area.

Ethnic social networks and residential concentration

➢ Participation in voluntary organisations

Do they or have they ever participated in any voluntary organisation?

If yes:

In which ways do they participate (volunteer, member of staff for example)?

How did they get to know the organisation?

Is the group ‘local’ (located where the person lives): if yes, how is location important? If not, why do they commute and they don’t participate ‘locally’?

Does the organisation focus on the Somali/Ghanaian community or on a more general public?

If the group is linked to the specific community, why is it important to participate in a community organisation?
If no:

Why is the person not active in voluntary groups?

Do they know any community groups (Somali or Ghanaian) or have they ever participated in their activities without being active members?

➢ Participation in religious institutions:

Does the person go to church/mosque?

If yes, how often church/mosque? If not, why?

Is the church/mosque, mixed or Somali/Ghanaian?

Based on the answer, why do they attend a mixed/ethnic church/mosque? Why is it important to worship with other Somalis/Ghanaians?

Where is the church/mosque located (where the person lives or in another area)?

If the church/mosque is ‘local’: why have they decided to go to a place of worship that is close to where they live? (follow-up questions about other members of the same church/mosque and to what extent they commute to attend services)

If the church/mosque is not ‘local’: why do they commute to attend religious services?

Do they participate in other activities linked to the church/mosque? Is the church/mosque only a place of worship or are there other social/recreational/educational activities, which activities?

➢ Informal networks

Composition of the person’s informal networks: is there a majority of Somali/Ghanaian friends or ‘mixed’ networks?

Where does the person socialise with co-ethnics (e.g. local area, other areas, university, work)?

Are there particular occasions to socialise with co-ethnics (religious events for example)?

If respondent lives in a high concentration area: Do they have friends and family members living in the area? Do they know friends or family members who travel to local area to socialise?

If respondent lives in low or high concentration area: Do they have friends and family members living in the area? Do they commute to other areas to socialise with co-ethnics?
Ethnic social resources and political participation

➢ Political engagement

Are they interested in politics?

How do they follow the news about politics (newspaper, TV, internet)?

Are they entitled to vote?

Did they vote? When and how many times? (Follow-up on why they did not/did vote)

Where did they get the information needed to register and vote when they first arrive in the UK?

Are they members of political parties? If yes, since when and how did they get involved? If not, why?

Have they ever been involved in non-electoral activities (demonstrations, petitions, boycotting)? Examples of political activities they have participated in, what were the issues addressed by these actions?

Are they interested in home-country politics? How do they participate in host-country politics? What is the level of interest in homeland politics amongst co-ethnics?

When they discuss politics with co-ethnics, does the discussion focus on home- or host-country politics?

➢ Organisations/places of worship and political participation

*If the respondent participated in organisations and goes to church/mosque:*

Tease out the connection between organisations/place of worship and political participation by asking about examples and descriptions of how they got involved in political parties, demonstrations, petitions, campaigning activities, contacts with local or national public officials.

Follow questions about the reasons why interviewees did or did not engage in political activities through organisations and places of worship.

What are the main topics addressed by political activities linked to organisations and places of worship?

*If the respondent does not participate / has never participated in ethnic organisations and does not go to church/mosque:*
Have they ever heard of political activities organised by ethnic organisations/ethnic places of worship?

Have they ever taken part in these activities, even just for curiosity? (follow-up questions about which activities they were involved in, what topics were addressed)

- **Ethnic Mosque/Church (more specific questions)**

Have they ever been engaged in political initiatives organised by the Somali mosque/Ghanaian church?

Do ethnic mosques/churches ever tackle political issues openly (during or beyond religious services)?

Do they discuss politics when they attend the mosque/church? (follow-up questions about how often the discussion takes place and which topics it generally focuses on)

- **Informal networks**

When they socialise with co-ethnics, does politics become object of discussion?

In which occasions is political discussion more frequent?

What are the main topics discussed?

---

**INTERVIEWS WITH ‘ETHNIC LEADERS’/COMMUNITY ACTIVITSTS LINKED TO ETHNIC ORGANISATIONS OR PLACES OF WORSHIP**

(including organisations’ board members and directors/members of staff and volunteers/religious leaders)

Information about the respondent - role in the organisation; for how long worked in the organisation; when became director/member of staff/volunteer/took charge of mosque or church; how and why did they get involved in community work.

Information about the organisation/place of worship and their activities - are members mainly co-ethnics; where do they come from; what are the activities developed; why it is necessary to work with the community.

- **Ethnic social networks and residential concentration**

Why the organisation/church/mosque was created in this particular area?
How, would you say, being located in the heart of the community has helped the development of this organisation?

For you personally, how important was it to be located/live in this area to develop your interest and active engagement in the community?

Why is this engagement important for you? (follow-up questions about engaging in other, more general organisations)

Do members come from this area or other boroughs? (follow-up questions about the importance of proximity for ‘users’)

Is the same org serving other areas/boroughs? If yes, are these areas high or low concentration for S/G?

Does the local council support your activities as an organisation that targets a specific ethnic group?

Do you cooperate with other voluntary organisations/churches/mosques in the area? Is there a network of organisations?

How about relations with other boroughs? Do you have connection in other areas too?

➢ **Ethnic social resources and political participation**

Would you say that this organisation/church/mosque has been involved or has involved its members in activities that can be defined as political participation? (distribute information about how to register and vote/campaigning materials/organised demonstrations, petitions, for example)

*If yes* Ask for examples, the reason why these activities were organised, what was the main target (British or homeland politics)

*If not* Reasons why organisation does/church/mosque does not engage in political activities

Have you been contacted by parties or candidates to become their supporters?

Have you decided to back up a specific candidate or party?

Are these candidates from the area?
Ask the same questions asked to community members about personal political engagement and political participation within formal and informal ethnic networks.

INTERVIEWS WITH ‘ETHNIC LEADERS’/COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS NOT LINKED TO ORGANISATIONS OR PLACES OF WORSHIP (including those who do not necessarily work in a community organisations/place of worship but are active and known within the community)

Information about the respondent – as for other ethnic leaders and activists

Information about their engagement/role in community: which activities do they carry out, why would they define themselves as ‘leaders’/representatives/activists (how do they contribute to the community), when and why they got engaged.

- The role residential concentration

Do you live in the area? Have you always lived in this area? (ask question if interview is carried out in high concentration areas)

How do you think living in the area (high concentration) helped and helps you develop your role in the community?

Do you cooperate with organisations/mosques/churches in the area?

How about contacts with other boroughs? Are these boroughs high concentration areas for the community?

- Political participation and community political mobilisation

How are you active in politics? (follow-up questions on when/why/how political engagement has begun)

What is your relationship with councillors and parties in the area?

Have you worked with them to involve the community in politics?

Was this cooperation more aimed at supporting a more general involvement of the community in the political process (information about how to vote, register, petition etc etc) or at supporting the specific party or candidate?
Do you think it is important to involve churches/org/mosque in these activities? Why?

Are you actively involved in activities aimed at encouraging political participation of Somali/Ghanaians? Can you tell me more about this involvement?

Would you say that this involvement focuses more on British or homeland politics? Why is that?

Can you give examples of initiatives that you have promoted in partnership with org/mosque/church or through other channels in the area to involve people in political actions?

**INTERVIEWS WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS**

Each interview will be adapted to the specific circumstances/characteristics of the interviewee (e.g. if MP or councillor, specific area they are related to, political party etc)

General points that should be addressed:

- They knowledge of the local Somali/Ghanaian communities (e.g. size, histories, main issues faced by the community)
- Perception of the level of political engagement of the two communities in local civic and political life (e.g. attendance in meetings, collective claims)
- Change of this involvement over-time
- Differences in the ways the two communities are perceived when it comes to their civic/political engagement and public/political role
- Role played by local ethnic organisations, if any (e.g. public/advocacy role, cooperation with local authorities, specific requests of support)
- Contacts with local ethnic leaders
- Role played by local ethnic places of worship
- Depending of the party affiliation of public officials interviewed:
  - Relevance of these communities for the party (local/national dimension)
  - Possible mobilisation strategies targeting the two communities
APPENDIX E.  Participant information sheet

This appendix reports the participant information sheet that was distributed to participants.

University of Manchester
School of Social Sciences
Participant Information Sheet

What is the title of the research?

Ethnic Residential Concentration and Political Participation of Black Africans in Britain: The Role of Ethnic Social Resources

Who will conduct the research?

Silvia Galandini, PhD Researcher at the Institute for Social Change (University of Manchester)

What is the aim of the research?

My research investigates the phenomenon of residential concentration, which is the percentage of people from the same ethnic group (i.e. co-ethnics) living in a specific neighbourhood, amongst Black Africans in Britain. In particular, it examines how high levels of residential concentration influence the creation of social resources in the ethnic community and how this in turn affects the level of political participation in the community. The term “social resources” refers to social networks that are created within the ethnic community through informal relationships, such as family and friends from the same ethnic group, or formal channels, such as voluntary associations or place of worship that work in and for the ethnic community.

This study concentrates on the Somali and Ghanaian communities living in East London.

The main aims of the research are:
To explore how residential concentration influence the creation of social resources, both formal and informal, within the Somali and Ghanaian community

To explore how social resource created within the community affect the level and the content of political participation amongst community members

To investigate what are the political activities community members are involved in and what is their focus

**Why have I been chosen?**

The research focuses on the Ghanaian and Somali communities in East London. Individuals who were born in either Ghana or Somalia, or have at least one parent or a relative who were born in these countries are invited to take part in the study.

I aim to interview approximately 40 community members, both men and women aged 18 and above, and 15 community leaders (i.e. chiefs and board members or voluntary ethnic organisations and religious leaders) amongst both the Ghanaian and Somali communities.

**What would I be asked to do if I took part?**

You will be asked to participate in groups of discussion with other members of your community, or in face-to-face interviews with the researcher. The maximum duration of each activity is approximately 2 hours. You might be invited to take part in more than one interview.

**What happens to the data collected?**

The data collected during this study will be used in my PhD thesis as well as articles to be published in specialist journals. The findings will be presented at academic national or international conferences.

In all cases, confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed.

**How is confidentiality maintained?**

All the information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. The only contact information required will be either a mobile phone number or email address. In order to guarantee confidentiality, all results will be anonymised and your name will not be cited in any published documents and interview transcripts. Any details which potentially could identify you will also be removed or modified. Therefore, it will not be possible to identify individual participants.
Moreover, your personal details will not be disclosed to anyone else other than me (the researcher) and the information you disclose during the research will not be discussed with other participants. My academic supervisors can exclusively access the anonymised transcripts (the supervisors’ details can be found at the end of this form).

**What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?**

Participation in the study is entirely voluntary. Thus, you can refuse to take part in the research or, if you decide to participate, it will be possible for you to withdraw at any time and for any reasons.

**What is the duration of the research?**

The research will be realised in approximately 7 months. However, your participation will only be limited to the group discussion or interview you have been asked to take part in. Generally, group discussions and interviews are expected to last for no longer than 2 hours.

It is important to remind you that you can withdraw at any time during the research.

**Where will the research be conducted?**

The research will be primarily conducted in the East London (in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, Hackney and Haringey).

**Will the outcomes of the research be published?**

Yes, the results of the research will be published in a final report (i.e. doctoral thesis) and in specialist journals and books. They will also be presented during international conferences.

**Contact for further information**

Researcher: Silvia Galandini: silvia.galandini@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

Academic Supervisor:

Dr David Cutts: david.cutts@manchester.ac.uk
APPENDIX F. Participant consent form

This appendix reports the consent form that participants were asked to read and sign.

School of Social Sciences

_Ethnic Residential Concentration and Political Participation of Black Africans in Britain: The Role of Ethnic Social Resources_

CONSENT FORM

If you are happy to participate please read the consent form and initial it:

I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.

I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service.

I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded.

I agree to the use of quotations that are anonymous.

I agree to take part in the above project.

Name of participant __________________________ Date __________ Signature ________________

Name of person taking consent __________________________ Date __________ Signature ________________