The ma(r)king of complex border geographies and their negotiation by undocumented migrants: The case of Barbados

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Natalie Antoinette Dietrich Jones
School of Environment, Education and Development
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................2

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................................7

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................8

DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................9

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT .........................................................................................................10

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..........................................................................................................12

THE AUTHOR ..........................................................................................................................14

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................15

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................16

Introduction .............................................................................................................................16

Three literatures, one narrative ..............................................................................................18

Methods ................................................................................................................................21

Research context .....................................................................................................................23

Key terms ...............................................................................................................................24

Chapter overview ..................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER 2: META-ETHNOGRAPHIES OF UNDOCUMENTEDNESS, BORDERS, AND AGENCY ...

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 30

Defining/[de]constructing the undocumented migrant .............................................. 32

Synthesizing the border discourse ............................................................................. 41

Integrating agency into the debate ................................................................................ 55

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCHING MIGRANTS’ EXPERIENCE OF THE BORDER ...

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 64

Critical realist approach to border studies ................................................................. 65

Fielding narratives ........................................................................................................ 73

Reading narratives/discourse ....................................................................................... 82

Reflexivity ....................................................................................................................... 86

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 91

CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING MIGRATION TO BARBADOS ...

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 93

Macro-Phenomena: A culture of migration ................................................................. 94
Heightened deportability ................................................................. 233

Conclusion ..................................................................................... 237

CHAPTER 7: LIVING WITH(IN) BORDERS OF IN/EXCLUSION ....... 241

Introduction ..................................................................................... 241

Embedded migrants and their informal inclusion in the labour market . 245

(Il)legitimate inclusion: Gaining access to educational spaces .......... 262

Counting the costs of in/exclusion in health care.............................. 274

The perils of inclusion in the housing sector ..................................... 284

Conclusion ..................................................................................... 291

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION ................................................................. 296

Introduction ..................................................................................... 296

Findings and contributions ............................................................. 297

Developments post-fieldwork .......................................................... 305

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE.......................................... 308

APPENDIX B: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW CODES ..................... 311

APPENDIX C: BIO-DATA ON PARTICIPANTS ............................. 312
APPENDIX D: MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY FOR BARBADOS DELIVERED BY PRIME MINISTER DAVID THOMPSON IN PARLIAMENT ON MAY 5, 2009 ................................................................. 317

APPENDIX E: MARITAL AND FAMILY STATUS OF INTERVIEWEES 320

APPENDIX F: BARBADOS IMMIGRATION ACT, SCHEDULE OF PERMITTED ENTRANTS ................................................................. 322

APPENDIX G: BARBADOS IMMIGRATION ACT, CAP. 190., SCHEDULE OF PROHIBITED PERSONS ................................................................. 324

APPENDIX H: EVERYDAY OBJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNMENTALITY OF SURVEILLANCE ................................................................. 326

APPENDIX I: MIGRANTS’ OCCUPATION ........................................................................................................ 328

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 330

78,965 words
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 3.1: Distribution of interviewees, by nationality and gender ............... 80

Table 4.1: Indicators of Intra-regional migration in CARICOM member states
........................................................................................................................................ 97

Table 4.2: Foreign born population in selected CARICOM member states, 2000 ........................................................................................................................................ 98

Table 4.3: CARICOM nationals resident in Barbados, by country of birth.. 106

Figure 5.1: GDP and construction sector growth, 2001-2007 ......................... 137

Table 5.1: Examples of hyperbole in the state discourse................................. 150

Table 7.1 Constraints, enablements and agency............................................. 294
ABSTRACT

Using Barbados as a case study, this thesis examines the relationship between agency, undocumentedness and borders. The relationship between these three concepts has been debated in a well-established European and North American literature; however, there is no similar body of work for the Caribbean, a space which since its genesis has been shaped by b/ordering practices.

Through a stratified view of the border, it explored the discursive and non-discursive (material) factors which constrained migrants’ existence, and migrants’ agentic response to these constraints.

The timing of fieldwork meant that the location’s geography, as well as migrants’ narratives, was marked by a recent amnesty exercise. In addition to ‘talk’ the research also relied on text, in the form of government and other legal documents relating to the management of migration. The research is therefore based on a combination of narrative and critical discourse analysis, espousing the methodological eclecticism that is encouraged in critical realist methodology.

The study makes an important contribution to the field of border studies, based on its exploration of the relationship between a complex border ontology and migrant agency. The principal finding is that borders create complex geographies, which operate at varying spatial scales. The thesis thus provides an enhanced theorization of border(s), in particular as it relates to conceptualizations of space, suspect status, governmentality, and agency.
DECLARATION

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THE AUTHOR

Natalie Dietrich Jones has a background in International Relations, having received her first degree in International Relations, Politics and Spanish from the University of the West Indies (Mona, Jamaica) in 2003. During her undergraduate studies she was introduced to a number of thematic issues related to small island developing states, which sparked her interest in the field of Development. In 2005, she was awarded a shared Cambridge-Commonwealth Trust Scholarship to read a taught Masters at the University of Cambridge in Development Studies. She returned to Jamaica in 2006 after completing her studies, and worked at her alma mater as a Teaching Assistant, while also serving in various research capacities with the Jamaican Government. In 2009 she commenced post-graduate studies at the University of Manchester, at the Institute for Development Policy and Management. There she has pursued research in the fields of migration and border studies. She has presented her work at academic conferences in the UK and Norway on issues related to spatialization of fear, managed migration and migrant agency. She currently teaches in the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BLP – Barbados Labour Party

CARICOM – Caribbean Community and Common Market

CFHA – Coalition for a Humane Amnesty

CSME – CARICOM Single Market and Economy

DLP – Democratic Labour Party
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There is an obvious need to theorize both boundary producing and reproducing practices in context. (Paasi, 2011, p. 30, emphasis mine)

Introduction

In this thesis I explore the extent to which the border – in its various manifestations – constrains undocumented migrants’ daily existence, and concomitantly examine migrants’ negotiation of these constraints. In this respect, I examine the connections between the border, undocumentedness and agency. I offer a theorization of the border, as suggested by Paasi (2011) above, which merges discussions of these three concepts across a range of social sciences disciplines.

‘Border studies’, within which this research is located, is now characterized by multi- and inter-disciplinarity, with scholarship spanning political geography, history, anthropology, political science, economics, sociology, and law (Wilson and Donnan 2012; Wastl-Walter, 2011; Paasi, 2011). In this thesis I focus on research undertaken in the fields of anthropology and geography. In the case of the latter, the border has primarily been the research domain of geographers (Wilson and Donnan 2012; see also Van Houtum, 2005) and I continue in this tradition. However, geographical studies of the border have engaged elements of social theory (from anthropology and sociology) and acknowledge that border making is a form of ‘spatial politics’ (Rumford, 2006; Van Houtum, 2011). Wilson and Donnan, who have called for an ‘anthropology of the border’ (1999) similarly indicate that ‘the anthropology of borders simultaneously explore[s] the permeability and permanence of borders by focusing on the adaptability and rigidity of
border peoples and states in their efforts to control the social, political, economic and cultural fields which transcend their borders’ (2012, p. 6). I thus also draw on anthropology to study socio-spatial border practices, which I see as a part of a larger process of b/ordering or bounding (Megoran, 2012).

As I emphasized in the quote cited at the beginning of this chapter, investigations into borders and border practices must take place ‘in context’ (Paasi, 2011, p. 30). This is required in order to enrich contributions to social theory (Paasi, 2011). I have chosen to undertaken research on the Caribbean, specifically the island of Barbados, in order to shed light on a region that has historically been shaped by b/ordering. Islands are interesting sites to explore the socio-spatial practices of b/ordering, for they are simultaneously source, destination, and transit points for a number of excluded migrants (Carling, 2007; Collyer, 2007; King, 2009). With respect to the Caribbean, movement of its peoples was first predicated on the (forced) transport of an othered (enslaved) population (Ferguson, 2003; Addy, 2003). In contemporary times, undocumented migrants experience the process of othering during social interaction, which sometimes culminates in their repatriation from host societies (see Olwig (2007, 1998) in respect of undocumented migrants living in the United States Virgin Islands and College of the Bahamas and International Organization for Migration/IOM (2005) in relation to Haitian migrants in the Bahamas).

My objective in undertaking this research was therefore three-fold. Firstly, I aimed to contribute to the canon on borders, by simultaneously examining
this object in relation to the concepts undocumentedness and agency.¹ Secondly, and in response to calls within the literature to engage in multi-disciplinary dialogue (Bauder, 2011; Newman and Passi 1998; Passi, 2005), I sought to employ eclectic methodological approaches (Danermark et al. 2002) in order to enrich theoretical understanding(s) of the border. Finally, I aimed to make an empirical contribution by providing data on border practices within the Caribbean, specifically at it relates to undocumented migrants’ experiences.

The remainder of this chapter provides a summary of the main elements of the thesis. I begin with a brief review of the literatures. In the next section I provide an overview of the methodology I employed to answer the research questions which guided this research. I then contextualize the study, providing a brief background to the research setting. In the penultimate section, I define the three key terms utilized throughout this thesis. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the content of each of the upcoming chapters.

Three literatures, one narrative

One of the key advances of border studies of the past few decades has been the widening of the ‘ontology and epistemology of borders’ (Van Houtum, 2005, p. 673). This widened ontology has entailed a shift away from interpretations of the border as a uni-dimensional concept, which varies according to one’s (sub-) discipline, to a multi-dimensional understanding (see Passi, 2005). The acceptance of a complex border ontology is now more

¹ Paasi (2011, 14) indicates that there are common keywords which suggest interdisciplinarity in border studies, such as inclusion/exclusion, which I also discuss in this thesis. Following my review of the literature I have identified undocumentedness and agency as two important concepts which have shaped border studies research.
common in the field of border studies, though there is still focus on particular dimensions of the border (Van Houtum, 2005).

A complex ontology allows us to appreciate the various manifestations of the border. It is the juridico-political border, which contains the territorial space of a nation state. It is also the symbolic border defined by the national identity, which is communicated by the, at times, overlapping concepts of citizenship, legal status, and social criteria such as race. Moreover, the border is not fixed, it as a site/zone within which belonging is contested and negotiated (Donnan and Wilson 1999). It ‘is a decidedly elastic construct, embodied in border guards and instantiated in fences, yet simultaneously often as mobile as the migrants it seeks to exclude’ (Herbert, 2009, p. 5).

In keeping with the above, Van Houtum et al. (2005) indicate that (to) border is an active verb which communicates the process of creating and maintaining socio-spatial differences (See also Van Houtum, 2005; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). The discussion of borders within the context of ma(r)king and maintaining difference, points to the relationship between borders and exclusionary practices. Within this literature, in particular among those who take an anthropological approach, undocumentedness is an exclusionary existence, shaped by political, social, economic and spatial exclusions (Coutin, 2000b; De Genova, 2002). This multi-dimensional disadvantage (Samers, 1998), results in differential exclusion in spheres such as labour, health, housing, and welfare (Engbersen and Broeders 2009; Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2007; Van der Leun, 2006; Hatziprokipiou, 2003; Iosifides and King 1998).

However, the literature suggests that even within these geographies of exclusion (Sibley, 1995) there are varying modes of being for the
undocumented (Willen, 2007b). Monforte and Dufour, for example, refer to exclusion in terms of a continuum, with the undocumented being the “excluded’ among the excluded’ (2011, p. 204). For Coutin, on the other hand, it is not a total exclusion, as migrants simultaneously occupy spaces of existence and non-existence (2000b). Khosravi (2010) similarly argues that migrants are incorporated into various spheres in society; however, this inclusion is characterized by ‘exception’ (evidenced by the possibility of deportation), such that a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion operates in the lives of migrants.

The contradictory tensions of inclusion/exclusion which characterize undocumentedness, what Chavez refers to as the ‘schizophrenic’ context of ‘illegality’ (2007, p. 193), is as much a product of states’ enforcement of b/orders as it is a reflection of migrants’ agentic capacity. To paraphrase Canning and Rose, who discuss issues of citizenship and subjectivity using a gendered lens, the undocumented are actors who appropriate their subject positions in order to ‘challenge, redefine, or honour the border’ (2001, p. 431, emphasis mine).

Thus Coutin (2000b) and Gomberg-Muñoz (2010) attribute migrants’ ability to create spaces of inclusion for themselves to agency. They suggest that agency is the ability to manoeuvre within and around conditions of constraint. I examine the various dimensions and degrees of agency utilized by migrants and in this respect discuss agency within the context of embeddedness, that is, as rooted in migrants’ day to day activities (Coutin, 2000b). Such an analysis perceives the limits posed by the border as ‘structural’ constraints and explores agency as strategy, examining the

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2 Monforte and Dufour (2010) take this term from Balibar (2002)
various decisions and activities undocumented migrants undertake when they encounter conditions of exclusion (re)produced by borders.

Together, these three literatures suggest that borders make and mark complex geographies in borderized spaces (cf. Van Houtum, 2011) and that migrants’ mode-of-being in the world (Willen, 2007b) is characterized by their ability to negotiate these geographies. Based on my review, I thus arrived at the following questions: (1) How are border realities manifested in migrants’ experiences of undocumentedness? (2) What mechanisms do migrants employ to negotiate these complex geographies? and (3) In what ways are migrants’ agentic strategies constrained or enabled by border realities?

Methods

Van Houtum et al. indicate that ‘a re-ontologization of ‘the border’ is called for, one that is attuned to the ongoing socio-spatial reproduction of borders in the world today while remaining open to their qualitative transformation as the site for a politics that cannot simply be read off the logics of state-centric spatialities’ (2005, p. 4, emphasis mine). I believe at the heart of this re-ontologization is the researcher’s own ontology, or view of reality. As I explain in Chapter 3, I adopted a critical realist ontology in undertaking this research as it enabled me to explore the various dimensions of the border (discursive/non-discursive, imagined/experienced), as well as the relationship between the constraints of border realities and migrants’ agentic capacity. Cox writes that ‘in human geography today, little is heard any more about critical realism’ (2013). However, I was encouraged by studies applying this paradigm in their research design and analysis (see for example, Falconer Al-Hindi, 1997; Hedberg, 2004; Hunt, 2008), as well calls
for application of this methodology (Bakewell, 2010; Isosifides, 2010). The above studies are located within the migration studies genre, which could be subsumed within border studies, given Wilson and Donnan’s assertion that migration is a key research subject of this discipline (2012).

Critical realism allows for the adoption of quantitative and/or qualitative methodologies. For this research I engaged in an intensive qualitative study (Sayer, 2000) as I was interested in migrants’ border experience whilst undocumented. I therefore collected migrants’ stories/narratives during five months of fieldwork between October and December 2010 and January and March 2011. I conducted semi-structured interviews and observation at various sites, including birthday parties, football games, work sites and public meeting places. A total of 30 migrants were interviewed. Approximately 76 per cent of the participants were Guyanese nationals, which is reflective of contemporary migrant flows to Barbados. The other interviewees were nationals of Eastern Caribbean islands in close proximity to Barbados – St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, and Grenada – as well as Jamaica. I was also able to conduct expert interviews, which were not (systematically) analyzed but were read instead to provide a better understanding of the Barbadian context.

I wish to point out that initially my overarching interest was in undocumented migrants’ ability to exercise strategic agency in conditions of constraint and not the border complexity. I thus commenced by undertaking a thematic analysis of migrants’ narratives. However, during this process a number of empirical themes emerged (Gibson and Brown 2009), relating to exclusion and borderisation, which encouraged further probing of official and public discourse on immigration. I therefore also conducted critical
discourse analysis, or CDA (see Wodak, 2003; Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak, 2001a, 2001b; Wodak et al. 1999) in order to highlight the political and economic factors shaping migrants’ narratives and thus to provide historical specificity to their stories (cf. De Genova, 2002). The use of (thematic) narrative analysis and CDA was a form of methodological eclecticism (Danermark et al. 2002), which enriched the research. The appeal of using these two qualitative methods resided not only in the existence of like data (talk and text), but also in the prominence that both methods give to agency (Riessman, 1993; Van Dijk, 2001).

**Research context**

In order to probe border realities within the context of intra-Caribbean migration, this paper used the island of Barbados as a case study. Barbados was an ideal site to undertake research for several reasons. In 2007, a mini-documentary had been released highlighting the experiences of the undocumented, which included social alienation, underpaid work, and vulnerability to sexual exploitation (On the map, 2007). Two years later, in June 2009, the Barbadian Prime Minister announced the intention of the government to implement a series of reforms in order to better manage migration (Thompson, 2009). The reforms were specifically targeted at undocumented Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) nationals, who had lived in Barbados for extended periods, but were in breach of immigration rules regarding stay and employment (Comissiong, 2009). The reforms followed the recommendations of a Cabinet Sub-Committee, which had also recommended the implementation of an (extraordinary) amnesty for undocumented migrants (see Chapter 4). Effective from 1 June 2009 to 1 December 2009, undocumented migrants who
had resided in Barbados for at least 8 years prior to 1 December 2005, who were gainfully employed and who had not had any record of criminal activity, would have been able to apply to regularize their status (Thompson, 2009).

Following this announcement a number of articles appeared in the Barbadian media, which provided accounts of the consequences of this shift for migrants, which had manifested in the immediate short-term in the form of immigration raids and detentions. The media provided voice to migrants at the end point of an exclusionary journey, which for some had culminated in deportation, or voluntary repatriation (Ferguson, 2009c; Herweg, 2009; Nation, 2009; Stabroek News, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). It was thus important to understand the quality of life of the undocumented in the periods preceding and following the government’s announcement. Thus part of the motivation to undertake the study was to bring clarity to an issue that has not been fully documented, but also to understand the dynamics of undocumentedness in a region (specifically the CARICOM sub-region of the Caribbean) where the principle of (hassle) free movement (no borders) is predicated on the belief in a regional identity – and thus a sense of belonging. Several other Caribbean countries undertook similar measures as Barbados (Melia, 2009) but the approach of Barbados was quite comprehensive for it sought to modify its existing immigration regime through a programme of comprehensive reform.

**Key terms**

I have throughout this introduction discussed borders, undocumentedness and agency. In order to provide greater clarity to the arguments I raise in the thesis, I provide definitions of each of these concepts.
I prefer, and use throughout this thesis, the word ‘border’, as against other terminology employed in the literature, such as boundary or frontier. Hočevar (2000) asserts that boundary is a semantically more effective term as it reflects the fuzziness of symbols, whilst border and frontier are more rigid. I disagree, because of the dynamism of the term border, which can function as both a noun and verb.3 As mentioned above, (to) border is an active verb which communicates the process of creating and maintaining socio-spatial differences (Van Houtum et al. (2005); see also Van Houtum, 2005; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). I thus define border as a site/zone within which belonging is contested and negotiated, as well as a socio-spatial process of defining and enforcing parameters for in/exclusion.

I define agency as the actions and decisions taken by migrants in response to border structures (cf. Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Culic, 2008). This definition differs from that raised in other literature, where agency is discussed primarily in relation to the decision to migrate (see Christou, 2008; see also Richmond, 1993 in respect of forced migration). I describe migrant agency as ‘strategic’ to highlight the fact that migrants’ decisions and actions, which were responding to the constraints and enablements of bordering practices, were designed for a purpose – to ensure the fulfilment of the migration agenda (see discussion in Chapter 2).

Finally, I acknowledge the existence of a ‘panoply’ of terms (Ghosh 1998, p. 1) - irregular, undocumented, unauthorized, clandestine and illegal – used to describe breaches of immigration law (see Düvell et al. 2008; Paspalanova, 2008; Koser, 2005 on the merits of each terminology). However, I use the

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3 Hočevar’s preference reflects a uni-dimensional conception which emphasizes the cultural or symbolic dimensions of borders.
word undocumented for ethical and methodological reasons. From an ethical perspective, the use of undocumented, versus illegal in particular, will not perpetuate the criminalization of migrants (De Genova, 2002; Khosvari, 2010). Throughout the thesis I therefore follow the practice of Peutz and de Genova (2010) who view ‘illegality’ as a reified status and thus use quotes in order to denaturalize the concept.

However, I believe such a stance is necessary not merely for ethical reasons, but also for methodological purposes. In empirical research and depending on the context ‘undocumented’ may best capture migrant status. Thus in a study on young migrants in the United Kingdom, Bloch et al. (2007, 2009) employ the term undocumented migration for it reflected the complexity and dynamism of the migrant process, specifically the see-saw nature of migrant ‘(il)legality’. Similarly, Khosravi (2010) who, in adopting De Genova (2002), eschews the word ‘illegal’. She uses the term undocumented as the migrants with whom she engaged rejected ‘illegal’ as a descriptor. The term undocumented is most appropriate since it adequately reflected the migrants’ status in Barbados and includes persons who engage in licit entry but who overstay or violate the terms and conditions of their entry and stay. I revisit these issues in the upcoming chapter.

**Chapter overview**

Following this introduction are seven chapters. In Chapter 2 I review the literature which informs the analysis underpinning this research. This review is organized into three sections. In the first, I draw on Willen (2007b) and explore the three components of undocumentedness, as articulated in the literature: undocumentedness as legal status, undocumented as socio-
political condition, and undocumentedness as mode of being. I discuss undocumentedness first in order to set the tone for the subsequent discussion on borders and agency. I then move on to a review of border studies scholarship. In this second section I explore a complex ontology of borders as presented in the literature, discussing the border as a socio-spatial process of othering, a site of control and zone in/exclusion. In the final section I discuss agency in migration studies. I highlight the relationship between structure and agency, using Archer’s thesis on reflexivity as a guide to my discussion on strategic agency.

I discuss critical realism as methodology in Chapter 3. I provide details on the methods I engaged with in the processes of data collection and analysis, as well as the rationale for same. Here I raise the issue of the benefits of iterative research, and show how the process of reflexivity enhanced data collection and analysis during the research process.

Chapter 4 gives context to the research setting, by providing a brief overview of historical migration within the Caribbean. This review helps explain the reasons behind contemporary trends, including migration to Barbados. It also provides statistical data on intra-regional migration, generally, and specifically to Barbados, based on most recent figures available. By way of a review of the Barbados Immigration Act, Cap. 190, I clarify legal status in Barbados vis-à-vis citizenship and permanent residence, and the positionality of non-nationals generally, and undocumented migrants specifically. This chapter is important, as it points to a hierarchy of statuses

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4 Willen (2007b) in fact uses the word illegality and not undocumented. She indicates that she prefers to use the word (though without quotation marks which problematize the concept) for three reasons: its applicability across contexts, its material consequences of such labeling for migrants, and its salience in migrants’ descriptions of their everyday experiences.
within Barbados. The final section entails a discussion of the current immigration regime in Barbados, in terms of the recent shift in policy, and the events which preceded and followed this change.

There are three empirical chapters in this thesis. Each chapter examines one dimension of border reality, or geography, in the lives of undocumented migrants living in Barbados. These three geographies include the discursive landscape (Chapter 5), the geography of fear (Chapter 6) and the geography of exclusion (Chapter 7).

Chapter 5, which is captioned *Defining the self and b/ordering others through discourse*, explores anti-immigration discourse within the Barbadian state. I begin with a discussion of the ‘foreigner’ subjectivity which distinguished migrants based on race and other criteria. The rationale behind this discussion is to demonstrate that the narratives articulated by the incumbent government drew on this public discourse. I then move on to discussing the evolving political rhetoric, highlighting three events, which I argue together acted to precipitate a shift in official rhetoric on immigration. Then, using discourse analysis I discuss the main features of this discourse and explain that the intention behind these strategies and devices was both to ‘other’ undocumented migrants, as well as to re-border the national imagination. I however disaggregate the immigration discourse in Barbados, discussing how the voice of other actors, especially migrants, challenged the dominant anti-immigration rhetoric.

In Chapter 6, *Space, object and bio-politics in a borderized context*, I discuss the geography of fear produced by objects and spaces associated with external and internal border control in Barbados. Drawing on arguments presented in Chapter 5 I show that undocumented migrants were suspect subjects. I
contend that migrants were subject to ‘deportability’ because of the suspicion with which they were viewed, not only when they tried to enter the island, but also once they began living in Barbados. The othering and ordering of migrants continued with the process of bio-social profiling by state officials and civilians. This surveillance, a form retroactive management of migration, created a geography of fear, which had implications for migrants’ socio-spatial practices.

Building further on the concept of geographies, I examine the geography of exclusion migrants encountered in Chapter 7, *Living with(in) borders of in/exclusion*. I review existing legislation and policy in order to clarify the legal parameters of inclusion which prevailed. I show that there was divergence between these legal parameters, and their implementation. This divergence, as well as migrants’ strategic negotiation of the constraints produced by these legal borders, resulted in parallel geographies of inclusion(s) and exclusion(s).

In the final chapter I revisit the main theoretical findings of the research. My aim was to provide a critical realist perspective on border realities in Barbados, and so contribute to theorization in border studies (Paasi, 2011). I was able to demonstrate through this research that borders are complex ontologically and produce geographies of varying scales in the lives of migrants living in Barbados. Although these borders were intended to other and order the undocumented, migrants were able to negotiate these complex geographies, through the exercise of strategic agency, which was embedded in everyday activities. However, I also show that migrant agency at times reproduced the very geographies which produced their exclusion.
CHAPTER 2: META-ETHNOGRAPHIES OF UNDOCUMENTEDNESS, BORDERS, AND AGENCY

...borders are still ubiquitous, are manifested in diverse ways and have various functions and roles....Such manifestations of borders affect people in their freedom of action and are perceived differently by different actors and groups. (Wastl-Walter, 2011, p. 2)

Introduction

This chapter is the product of an interpretive approach. The objective is to produce an account which, in effect, translates/reconceptualises three concepts engaged in the conduct of this research: undocumentedness/undocumented migration, border(s), and agency (Doyle, 2003; Britten et al. 2002). Therefore, to undertake this review of the literature I have drawn on ‘meta-ethnography’ (Noblit and Hare 1988).

Meta-ethnographies are systematic comparisons of cases which explore particular phenomena (Noblit and Hare 1988). According to Doyle, meta-ethnographies are accomplished not through exhaustive reviews, as is the case with (traditional) literature reviews, and/or random sampling as occurs with meta-analysis, but via purposive sampling (2003). Each of the above concepts cuts across a broad range of disciplines including sociology, politics, anthropology, geography, and philosophy. Though reference is made to each where appropriate, the majority of the discussion is concentrated in the fields of geography and anthropology. This was in keeping with my research interests to explore migrants’ experience with borders, and the depth of information available on the matter in each of these two disciplines.
It should be noted that this is not a neat synergy. As I explain later there is
tension between disciplines regarding the definition and thus approach to
the study of border phenomena (Van Houtum, 2005; Donnan and Wilson
1999). However, I rely on these two strands of scholarship by adapting and
merging definitions and debates within and across these literatures. Thus the
eclecticism which I discuss in Chapter 3 in respect of methodology first
surfaces here in relation to the conceptual framework I utilize throughout
this project.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. I first begin by
deconstructing the ‘undocumented’. Here I discuss the conceptualization of
undocumentedness in migration studies drawing on the three facets of
undocumentedness proposed by Willen (2007b) – legal status, socio-political
condition, and mode-of-being in the world. This section is important for it
qualifies the positionality of the undocumented, as well as justifies the focus
on the undocumented as a group for analysis. In this respect, it is important
to point out that lack of legal status does not necessarily have negative
implications for migrants (Willen, 2007b). This section highlights the
abjectivity associated with undocumentedness, and thus the reasons for
exploring the condition of undocumented migrants’ lifeworld in particular
contexts (De Genova, 2002; Willen, 2007b). Highlighting the variation in
undocumented migrants’ experiences also invites us to consider the lifeworld
of the documented. We see that the migrant experience is influenced by
factors other than legal status, and which relate to issues impacting their
social membership (cf. Anthias, 2010).

I then review the field of ‘border studies’, and highlight the divisions and
parallels within the discipline surrounding the definition of the term border.
I go on to emphasize the literature which discusses border as socio-spatial process, site of control and zone of exclusion. I explore these within contexts of the North and South, though I emphasize the literature on the United States and the European Union, where much of the writing (in English) has emerged (De Genova, 2002).

Thirdly, I tie the first two literatures together with a discussion on agency, the concept which first guided this research. I argue that (undocumented) migrants engage strategic agency to navigate the various borders, which create conditions of enablement and constraint in their lifeworlds (Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000, p. 170-171 cited in Hatziprokopiou, 2003, p. 1034).5

Finally, I conclude by providing a justification for the Caribbean as the setting for research. I elaborate further on this decision in Chapter 4.

**Defining/[de]constructing the undocumented migrant**

In her work on undocumented migration, Willen (2007b) has presented a tripartite model of undocumentedness. For her, it connotes a status, condition and modality, as it relates to a migrant’s legal position, socio-political and embodied experiences, respectively. With this conceptual framework Willen unifies the range of arguments in the canon which speak to undocumentedness. In the upcoming discussion I consider each of these three elements, revealing the constraints imposed on the undocumented.

**Undocumentedness as a juridico legal status**

When Couper and Santamaria asked, ‘What exactly is an illegal immigrant?’ the question had incorporated several subsidiary issues reflecting the

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5 ‘Lifeworld’ is a phenomenological concept which relates to everyday experiences and (Gregory et al. 2009).
complexity of the terminology and content of any such definition (1984, p. 487). Indeed, as I show below, this is not a consistent discourse. Within the literature there are differing approaches to defining an undocumented migrant.

For some, undocumented status can be seen within the context of three ‘violations’ of immigration law (Keely, 1977; Guild, 2004). These are (1) entering the country without inspection, that is, clandestine entry; (2) entering the country with fraudulent documentation; and (3) breaching the conditions of one’s visa. Guild (2004) in her definition of ‘illegal’ migration offers further clarity on what constitutes the breach of conditions of a visa. This includes staying beyond the period permitted for entry and residence, and/or working without a permit or in a manner inconsistent with immigrant status. Papademetriou (2005), on the other hand, locates undocumented migration within a range of ‘illegal’ acts of migration and defines the undocumented as those who enter a state undetected, through clandestine means. Similarly, the term can be used to refer to unrecorded entrants who avoid immigration controls, but may also describe those who do not have documentation, such as a passport (Koser, 2005). The common thread binding these distinct conceptualizations of undocumentedness is

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6 Couper and Santamaria (1984, p. 487) ask, ‘What exactly is an illegal immigrant? Someone who enters the country without a passport, someone who enters clandestinely avoiding control, but with a passport, a foreigner who is a threat to state security or who commits a crime?’. The extension of the term ‘illegal’ from simply a category of migrant status to broader questions of legal complicity leads their asking a third question, whether an ‘illegal’ immigrant is a foreigner who commits a crime. I return to the linking of immigrant status with criminal behaviour later in this section, as well as in Chapter 5.

7 Guild’s (2004) work appears in an edited volume entitled Human Rights and Irregular Migration, and though she acknowledges that irregular is a ‘less emotive’ term, opts for the nomenclature employed by the institutions of the European Union.
migrants’ juridical and political positionality in respect of immigration rules and procedures, that is, their non-conformity.

The above definitions are useful in so far as they orient the study of undocumented migration, distinguishing it from other (overlapping) forms of ‘unauthorized’ or ‘irregular’ migration, such as smuggling and trafficking, forced migration and asylum seeking. However, the rigidity of the complicity/non-complicity divide restricts the conceptualization of undocumentedness to that of an ‘end’ state (Bloch et al. 2009). Indeed, there is an emphasis on non-complicity, including non-complicity with other laws (see Engbersen and Van der Leun 2001).

Aligning undocumentedness solely with legal status, thus results in a discounting of the dynamic nature of migration. There is, however, scholarship which takes account of this dynamism. In this literature undocumentedness is not a fixed legal status, but rather a process. Nuanced articulations of undocumentedness as process are found in discussions of compliance. For example, Ruhs and Anderson (2006; see also Ruhs and Anderson 2010) posit that there are three forms of compliance: compliance (conformity with residence and employment conditions of stay), semi-compliance (conformity with residence but breach of employment conditions of stay), and non-compliance (breach of residence and employment conditions of stay). The latter two categories point to the complexity of undocumented status, highlighting the possibilities of ‘illegality’ within ‘legality’, which is not readily obvious in work that focuses on undocumentedness as an end-state (Bloch et al. 2007, 2009). The above also confirms, as has been highlighted in other research exploring the relationship between migrant (im)mobility and ‘(il)legality’, that undocumentedness is
not a static position as migrants shift between documentedness and undocumentedness throughout various stages of their migration trajectory (Schuster, 2005). This suggests that the line distinguishing the documented from the undocumented is blurred, further complicating research agendas.

**Undocumentedness as socio-political condition**

In addition to reifying undocumented status, studies which focus on ‘illegality’ as lack of conformity reproduce the discursive power of immigration law (De Genova, 2002, p. 423). Notwithstanding, one ought not to discount the significance of migrants’ positionality in relation to the law. To paraphrase De Genova ‘much of the time they [the documented] are undifferentiated from those [documented migrants as well as citizens] around them’, until ‘legal reality is superimposed on daily life’ (2002:422, citing Coutin 2000b, p. 44). Migrants’ differentiated legal status is characterized by two inter-related factors: differentiated rights, and differentiated socio-spatial environment. It is on this basis that research, in particular, the anthropological canon, has stressed the need to consider the socio-political implications of undocumentedness (Coutin, 2000b; De Genova, 2002; Willen, 2007b).

Migrants’ non-conformity with the law positions them as other, outside of *juridico* legal criteria of membership, that is, citizenship. Citizenship is used by the state to not only denote legal recognition, but also determine the benefits of such recognition (Menjivar, 2006). Thus those without legal status – the undocumented - are without rights normally accorded to those considered members of the state, occupying a subjectivity which is marked by exclusion. Indeed the improbability of citizenship is the epitome of exclusion from national membership for the undocumented (Ngai, 2004).
Monforte and Dufour (2011) concede that inclusion is granted not only to citizens, but other non-nationals, whom the state has legally recognized and has attributed (some of) the rights of citizenship. Documented migrants, like the undocumented, are thus differentiated - others, based on this variegated legal status (but also due to non-conformity with social criteria of membership, as discussed further below). Monforte and Dufour (2011) also note however, that the exclusion of the undocumented is not total exclusion from citizenship rights, since certain minimal rights are accorded to the undocumented by virtue of their being resident in a state, a reality I turn to later in my discussion on in/exclusion.

In keeping with the above, citizenship is inter-twinned with the concept of the state, for it is the state (the territorially bounded space) within which one is designated a citizen - with attendant rights (Arendt, 1968 cited in Bosniak, 2000) and wherein its authorities grant and recognize. Thus those who occupy territorial spaces unauthorized (sans documentation), inevitably find themselves outside of the formal citizenship regime which grants citizens social and political rights (Monforte and Dufour 2011). This is not to suggest as Bosniak (2000) argues that alternate forms of citizenship do not operate beyond the framework of the state. Coutin (2000a), who draws on Bosniak, and who writes in specific reference to undocumented migration, argues that alternate (or denationalized) forms of citizenship enable migrants to make claims upon the state although they exist outside of formal membership regimes.

The preceding argument underscores the role of the state in the legal production of ‘(il)legality’. De Genova (2005, 2002), who has provided one of the most detailed and nuanced articulations of this thesis posits that migrant
‘illegality’ is a legal construct, a by-product of a capitalist political economy which has historically been sustained by the revisions and reformulations of law in order to guarantee an exploitable work force. ‘Illegality’ is a construct devised by the state (and elites) to constrain migrants, who encounter constant surveillance and policing, though not actual deportation, as a result of their legal non-conformity. In this respect, illegality is a socio-spatial condition of heightened vulnerability for the ‘illegal’, on whom the state depends for cheap, and readily available labour.

Migrants’ socio-political condition is thus a reflection their economic position, as migrants from poor(er) countries, and the role that they play in the global political economy as sources of cheap and low-skilled labour (de Genova, 2005). Their position in local and global class hierarchies is reflective of a wider process of othering within the global mobility regime, where migrants are stratified based on skill sets, and where centre and periphery countries are distinguished by a transnational bordering of spaces (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). The valorization and commodification of migrant labour has resulted in categories of unwanted and wanted, corresponding to poor/low skilled and high skilled/rich migrants, respectively. In the case of the latter, the perception of centre (developed) countries as safe havens for members of periphery (developing) countries, results in the labelling of these as dangerous. This second point has implications for micro-processes of othering and the stratification of migrants – that is the unwanted versus the wanted, in particular as it relates to those seeking asylum. There is constant debate in destination countries over whether those who leave are legitimate asylum seekers or economic
migrants, and whether there is moral obligation to house these abject migrants (Lynn and Lea 2003; Black, 2003; Hier and Greenberg 2002).

Undocumentedness as mode–of-being in the world

Migrants’ socio-political position thus has consequences for their mode-of-being in the world, that is, their day-to-day practices and experiences. This is not always the case. Willen (2007b), like De Genova (2002), indicates that lack of legal status may have a small impact on migrants’ everyday lives. However, she encourages the exploration of the lived experience of the undocumented since lack of status in some contexts produces abjectivity for the undocumented, a factor which is especially reflected in migrants’ embodied experiences. In respect of the latter, Willen (2007b) argues that there is not much discussion of this phenomenological aspect of undocumentedness in the literature. Here, I discuss some of the works highlighted in her article (that is, the work of Coutin and De Genova), before moving to Willen’s own work, and other scholarship. I should note, however, that my discussion of the border as a site of control (see upcoming section) shows that there is a growing body of literature examining this dimension of undocumentedness.

The idea of ‘mode-of-being’ is explored by Coutin (2000b), who uses the concept of ‘existence’. She demonstrates that the undocumented simultaneously occupy (parallel) spaces of existence and non-existence. This duality is evident in migrants’ physical presence inside a territorial space, but legal presence outside of the ‘law and social body’, what she refers to as absence (2000b). It is also apparent in migrants’ paradoxical inclusion and exclusion from ‘common place actions as working, travelling and driving’ (2000b, p. 33). Interestingly, her focus on Salvadoran and Guatemalan
migrants seeking asylum in the United States reveals that this condition of non-existence precedes migrants’ arrival in the United States, since the repressive conditions they would have experienced in their home countries had already forced them into non-existence.

Scholars emphasize that this mode-of-being is often heavily racialized. The issue of race and its impact on migrants’ mode-of-being is not peculiar to the undocumented, though the lack of documentation may make the consequences of this more acute. As Chang and Aoki indicate, in their discussion of race in American national identity, ‘it [race] renders us [immigrants of Asian and Latin American heritage] suspect, subject to the violence of heightened scrutiny at the border, in the workplace, in hospitals, and elsewhere’ (1997, p. 1414). For them, it is racial non-conformity or foreignness, rather than ‘illegality’, which is the defining standard.

Thus, while ‘(il)legality is not visibly apparent, the differentiation of the undocumented becomes possible where race (and other socio-economic criteria) is conflated with ‘(il)legality’. Indeed, these characteristics are co-opted in the process of racialization, and other exclusionary practices, facilitating the surveillance, identification and deportation of the undocumented. Thus West African and Filipino migrants are targeted in Israel (Willen, 2007a, 2007b), Nigerians in China (Haugen, 2012), and Mozambicans and Zimbabweans in South Africa (Madsen, 2004; Rutherford, 2011).

In addition, migrants’ experience is shaped by the internalization of their legal status. For the undocumented, the self-imposition of a restricted socio-spatial existence is conditioned by the expectation of detention and/or deportation. Willen thus perceives of undocumentedness as an ‘embodied’
experience. In her work, she traces the shift in Israeli immigration policy which moved to criminalize undocumented migrant labour (primarily from West Africa and the Phillipines) in order to safeguard the local labour market in the 1980s to 1990s (Willen, 2007b) and in 2002 (Willen, 2010). This new aggression in immigration policy, which was marked by a number of deportation exercises, changed the socio-political position of migrant workers (documented and undocumented), shifting their status from valuable worker to criminal suspect. Willen argues that this resulted in constrained circumstances for migrants, as their lives began to be characterized by fear and anxiety, where even once private and safe spaces became susceptible to penetration.

Willen’s and De Genova’s research has influenced Khosravi, who points to the agoraphobic tendencies of the migrants she interviewed in Sweden. For her ‘spatially embodied fear’ was evident in migrants’ circumspect existence (in terms of their obedience of the law), as well as their avoidance of public spaces (2010, p. 99). This highlights the socio-spatial dimensions of exclusion, since migrants are confined to particular (safe) places, and are not free to move in those spaces where access is controlled or proscribed. The assertion that ‘[t]here is a direct relationship between our general sense of freedom and well-being with the choices open to us in our spatial practices’ (Madanipour et al. 2003, p. 82), is apt within the context of undocumentedness. Thus, literature reveals that keeping indoors to avoid detection by immigration officials is part of a suite of practices which migrants use to ‘police’ themselves. Madsen (2004), for example, highlights the chameleon-like tendencies of undocumented Mozambicans in South Africa, which they use in order to blend in. By adjusting their speech and
mode-of-dress migrants ensure that they remain undetected. With the exception of working without a permit, they rigidly observe other aspects of South African law and social behaviour. Breaches of these laws result in punitive measures by the community such that those who commit offences or are caught in wrong doing and draw attention to other undocumented migrants, are ostracised by the migrant community.

The foregoing discussion points to several possible avenues of differentiating the undocumented from the documented as a group of analysis: The first is that the undocumented have differentiated rights; the second is that they live in or experience differentiated environments; and the third and final is that they have differentiated bodies and embodiments. Making the undocumented the focus of analysis thus entails exploration of the condition[s] produced by undocumented status.

In the last two sub-sections, I have pre-empted the discussion on borders, in order to reinforce the point regarding the condition of ‘illegality’. As discussed above undocumentedness is not always an exclusionary existence, but it is an existence which is marked by the pervasiveness of borders. Before I discuss this relationship in further detail I highlight the resurgence of interest in border studies and thus qualify the importance of borders as an analytical concept.

**Synthesizing the border discourse**

There are a number of studies which comprehensively discuss the various ways borders have been defined and explored across a range of disciplines, notably Lamont and Molnár (2002) and Donnan and Wilson (1999). The purpose of this overview therefore is not to replicate these studies, but to highlight the commonalities within these pieces of scholarship.
The resurgence of border studies

The border has been a ‘key category in political science since the nineteenth century’ (Passi, 2005, p. 17) and has been central to the field of geography in relation to the issue of mobility, identity and economy (Bauder, 2011 citing Balibar 2002 and 2004). Questions regarding the genesis of the study of borders, reflected for example in Van Houtum’s (2005, contra Newman and Paasi, 1998) quite accurate assertion that the study of territorial and political borders predates later studies investigating modern states, merely underscore, rather than undermine its significance.

While many point to the resurgence in interest in border studies, they do not describe the prior status of this area of study. An explanation is found in the work of Anderson et al. (2002, p. 3), who indicate that the significance of the border diminished for quite some time, following the end of the second world war, when its study was ‘relegated’ to other sub-disciplines of social sciences. Citing Taylor and Flint (2000), they note that even in the sub-disciplines of political geography and geo-politics, which had long established traditions of empirical research, interest in the borders had all but disappeared. For them, this lull coincided paradoxically with the consolidation of the discipline of social sciences, which was unaffected (or uninterested) in (local) border incidents in ‘less important parts’ of Europe with the settlement of the global war.

Scholars concur that academic interest in borders resurfaced in light of academic and historical developments in the 1990s. This decade had been characterized by a pro-globalization discourse, which argued borders’ ineffectiveness to regulate the mobility of people, as well as (and especially) the mobility of capital and information. Border studies thus emerged to
challenge the rhetoric of a ‘borderless’ world (Newman, 2006a; Newman and Paasi 1998; Bauder, 2011; Wilson and Donnan 1998). Though these writers critique the globalization discourse, it should be noted that they have glossed over what is itself a divided narrative (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999). Moreover, a debate on the ineffectiveness of the border is not equivalent to a relegation of the border as a topic of interest, but merely an exploration of a different dimension of its functionality. As Van Houtum et al. note, and this view is supported by Anderson and O’Dowd (1999), the border holds ‘contradictory spatialities’ (2005, p. 3). That is they are instruments of control, but at the same time are transgressed by what they are meant to contain and/or exclude. Thus globalization is an inevitable component of border studies.

Scholars also suggest that borders became more significant with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which precipitated a number of political, social and cultural border changes, which impacted Europe. There seems to be ebbs and flows of interest in the discipline, with flows coalescing around events which spell significant change for the international border system. The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, and similar events in Europe, have prompted increased interest in border security in the field of geography (Newman, 2006; Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007).

Although borders have been a pre-eminent feature of geographical studies, as Alvarez notes, ‘in the past, anthropologists have been on the margins of border studies’ (1995, p. 462). In this field, the border was a natural or taken for granted concept in anthropological studies (cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999). However, the field of anthropology experienced a transition after which the border became both a site and topic of focus (Alvarez, 1995). The significance
of border studies in this field, in particular research into the US-Mexico border zone, has led to the assertion that anthropological studies ‘of borderlands’ constitute a genre in their own right (Alvarez, 1995; cf. Newman, 2011; Lamont and Molnár 2002). However, and as Alvarez also points out, the US-Mexico borderlands genre is located within a wider borderlands literature, within which other borderlands (such as ‘Fortress Europe’) occupy equal footing.

The above reveals a tension in the disciplines, which in large part stems from the concepts and definitions applied. According to Van Houtum, who briefly discusses differences in geography and anthropology, ‘confusingly, in anthropology, the definition [of boundary vs. border] is usually precisely opposite, here a boundary generally means the socio-spatially constructed differences between cultures/categories and a border generally stands for a line demarcated in space’ (2005, p. 672). Newman (2006b), who makes similar arguments, notes a division of the tangible versus the intangible in his overview of the distinct approaches in the fields of geography and sociology. For him, geographers have tended to focus on physicality, that is, what and how territorial borders demarcate and delimit (national) spaces. Sociologists, on the other hand, emphasize the abstract, focusing on the way borders create distinctions between peoples and groups (identities). Thus the ‘fences’, to use the words of Newman (2006b), of political scientists and geographers are traditionally the territorial boundaries of states. On the other hand, for anthropologists and sociologists, who tend to use the word boundaries, borders are the symbolic and social differences separating cultures and peoples (cf. Lamont and Molnár 2002; Van Houtum, 2005). Following from the above, borders take on a number of forms, and can be geo-political,
delimiting national space(s); functional, preserving national boundaries and also imagined communities/identities through the use of external and internal mechanisms; and symbolic, establishing the criteria which separates those who belong, from those who do not (See Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008).

The term ‘border studies’ is therefore apt for it conveys the multi-dimensional nature of border scholarship. Border studies remains ‘today…a “field” made up of many fields’ (Wilson and Donnan 2012, p. 4). Border scholars do not occupy unified positions. Alvarez, for example, indicates that border discourse is a ‘paradox of literal geo-political and conceptual’ boundaries (1995, p. 448, sic). Yet, post-the 1990s there has been an uptake in inter/cross-disciplinary dialogue, and several authors have pointed to the need for greater exchange on theoretical (Bauder, 2011) and methodological fronts (Megoran, 2006; Newman, 2006; Donnan and Wilson 1999). I believe the best signal of convergence has been the shift within the field of geography from the study of ‘boundaries’ to the study of ‘borders’. Drawing on Newman (2001), Van Houtum states that,

Where in the early 1960s the field of border studies was pre-dominantly focused on the study of the demarcation of boundaries, the lines, now the field of boundaries and border studies has arguably shifted from boundary studies to border studies. Put differently, the attention has moved away from the study of the evolution and changes of the territorial line to the border, more complexly understood as a site at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated (2005, p. 672)

His synopsis points to a transition in both the articulation as well as investigation of borders, though he later indicates that there is still a gap, as boundary and border studies remain distinct sub-fields. In the sections which follow, I discuss three main features of this (inter-disciplinary) border
discourse (see Newman (2011) for a comprehensive overview on current research agendas shaping border studies).

**Borders and the socio-spatial process of othering**

B/ordering extends beyond the mere geographical/political delimitation of national boundaries, to refer to a social process whereby nations and communities order and differentiate social groups (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Paasi, 2005). B/ordering is inherently an exclusionary process, since it involves the ‘securing and governing of the ‘own’ economic welfare and identity’ (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002, p. 125). In the subsequent sections, I discuss how this is accomplished within the context of migration, placing special emphasis on research which investigates undocumentedness. Here I wish to provide further details on the process of othering, linking it to a process of exclusion which is frequently referenced in migration studies – racialization.

B/ordering is constituted by spatial and discursive practices, that is, bounded spaces are created and maintained through narratives of belonging (Paasi, 2005). The study of rhetorical borders is a popular area in the field of discourse analysis, with scholars such as Wodak (2001), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Van der Valk (2003), and Flores (2003) for example, highlighting the role of immigration discourse in distinguishing outsiders from insiders.

Identity, in particular, national identity constituted by legal and social criteria of membership (Anthias, 2010), is crucial in the mutually enforcing processes of spatial and social differentiation. There is an inherent tension in
this process of creating ‘imagined communities’ \(^8\) since internal differences are camouflaged by the illusion of homogeneity, which is essential in identifying potential threats and risks to the nation (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Anthias, 2010). \(^9\)

Differentiation is accomplished through the twin process of positive and negative (re)presentation (Wodak et al. 1999), through the articulation of binary categories, examples of which include bogus/legitimate, in relation to asylum seekers (Black, 2003) or legal and ‘illegal’, as discussed earlier. These distinctions become the basis by which socio-spatial practices of differentiation are justified (Wilton, 1998). \(^10\) In fact, these binaries reflect differences in perceived value, and thus reflect asymmetries of, as well as contestations over, power (Gregory, 1995). In addition, they may be further complicated by more nuanced dichotomies. Thus Van Houtum and Van Naerssen contend that ‘in the post-modern performance game between places, others are welcome, but some others are more welcome than other others’ (2001, p. 129, emphasis mine). This suggests that the process of othering is conditionally exclusionary. Willen (2010) demonstrates this in her discussion of bio-politics of otherness in Tel Aviv, Israel. She shows how a 2002 campaign undertaken by the Israeli government to expel undocumented workers was underpinned by economic and racial arguments, such that

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\(^8\) This is a reference to Anderson’s articulation of ‘imagine community, which is to convey the sense of community - among members of the nation, which resides in shared nationality, even when those members do not know each other.

\(^9\) I should clarify that while for the purposes of this research I have highlighted othering at the national scale, this process occurs at a variety of inter-related scales (Wilton, 1998).

\(^10\) This is reminiscent of arguments put forward by Fassin (2001) who writing in the French context, notes that otherness is based not only on nationality, but on phenotypic features of differences, such that non-European origin is the basis of discrimination.
foreign workers (‘other’ others) were distinguished from Israel’s ‘real’ others – Palestinians.

As was previously discussed, and has been alluded to in the discussion of Willen’s work, race is one of the social categories that can be used to other migrants. It should be noted that racial distinctions, which have their basis in phenotypical variation are themselves based on ideas of racial variation, that is, they are constructions of variation (Wade, 2010; Dalal, 2010).\textsuperscript{11} This is to stress that these constructions of race are contextual and are mutable, based on shifting criteria of belonging dependent of time and space. Yet it is not racial non-conformity \textit{per se}, which produces the exclusion of migrants in host societies. Rather it is the process of racialization. Race is the product of a social process that is ‘used to create ranked social categories which are used to include and exclude’ (Wade, 2010, p. 13).

Thus, in environments where non-citizens must present proof of lawful status when citizenship is in doubt, as is the case in Australia, foreignness (evidenced by race, accent and poor language skills) is one of the factors influencing immigration status checks (see Weber, 2011). To paraphrase, as legal status is ‘not evident from an individual’s features [,] [fo]reignness then becomes a proxy for questionable immigrant status’ (Chang and Aoki, 1997, p. 1414). Though they emphasize the particular the distinction of Asian and Latin American racial identity in America, Chang and Aoki’s comment is relevant here for we see that it is physically identifiable (somatic and physiognomic) markers (Silverstein, 2005), which distinguish insiders from

\textsuperscript{11} There are different reasons advanced for the emergence of race as a social category. The argument that racial distinction is a feature of colonialist and imperialist agendas is especially relevant for this thesis, which deals with the implications of race in a post-colonial society.
outsiders. Indeed, it is the case that race is conscripted with other ‘diacritic[s]’ (Silverstein, 2005, p. 364) of social personhood, such as class, ethnicity, and generation (see McDowell, 2008) to other ‘undesirable’ migrants.

Islands are interesting places and spaces, which enable the exploration of this process of othering. Islands are simultaneously characterized by two binaries: openness and closure (Baldacchino, 2012). In island destinations dependent on tourism, King (2009) notes that there is often a tension between the welcoming reception meted out to tourists and wealthy migrants, but hostility to poor migrants, in particular the undocumented. In this respect, he asks three valid questions ‘Are islands unwelcoming places to outsiders who are seen as potential threats to established social orders and networks? Or perhaps some immigrant groups are welcomed, others tolerated and others rejected? How is the key triangular relationship between islanders, wealthy foreign settlers and poor labour immigrants played out?’ (King, 2009, p. 68). Islands are thus caught between protection of national boundaries, and the reception of outsiders who contribute to the development of their economies (Baldacchino, 2012).

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12 I disagree with the apparent homogenization of white and black America in Chang and Aoki’s work. The arguments they have made in respect of Asian and Latin American migrants could easily apply to other migrants racially defined as others, including black and white migrants.

13 Islands are characterized by a number of features which have implications for inward and outward migration. These include insularity, small size (limited land area), economic and environmental vulnerability, limited productive capacity and small internal markets, high population density and openness (Briguglio, 1995; King, 2009).
Borders as sites of control

The spatial dimension of othering is evident at the border(s) of nation states, where regimes of control are used to regulate migration. As a site of control the border becomes a locale at/wherein body politics is contested (Donnan and Wilson 1999). I use ‘site’ here to refer to the physical manifestation of the border, in particular, political boundaries, which can include walls, fences, and other structures such as airports. This is merely to underscore the distinction between the border and borderized spaces or zones, which are ‘defined and determined by the border, characterized by conflict and contradiction, material and ideational (Alvarez, 1995, p. 448; cf. Newman, 2011). Borders therefore become the means of control as immigration policy is designed to keep ‘unwanted’ migrants behind territorial lines. The ineffectiveness of borders – that is, poor border management and the resultant inflow of unwanted migrants, including but not exclusively the undocumented, has led some scholars to provide explanations for this deficiency. For example Joppke (1998) views this policy failure to be the product of the variance between the capacity on the one hand to make immigration laws, and on the other, to enforce such rules. In addition, Castles (2004a, 2004b) proposes a complex web of inter-connecting factors which he summarizes under three headings: social dynamics of the migration process; global inequality and the increase in migration from South to North; and political factors in sending and receiving states.

The discretionary powers of border officials who assess incoming migrants suggest that the arbitrary power of the state renders the border as a site of suspended rights, since the body must surrender to acts of intrusion, such as frisking and scanning (Donnan and Wilson 1999). In fact, the special
governmentalities in place at border sites, like the airport, characterize them as spaces of exception (Salter, 2008). This makes the border a potentially dangerous zone not just for undocumented migrants, but for other ‘undesirable’ categories (Shamir, 2005).

In discussing this danger to migrants, Heyman (1999) and Nevins (2002) report the heightened surveillance and security at the United States and Mexico border. Similarly, Carling (2007) and Collyer (2007), who discuss immigration control of the Spanish-African border, have pointed to the dispersed spatial practices of control as well as the sophistication of technologies, which include a range of military-like devices, such as radar and thermal imaging. Analyses which point to the significance of maritime border controls are important as they highlight not just the porosity of maritime borders, but also the associated difficulties of their regulation. Thus Carling indicates that ‘controlling a maritime border is fundamentally different and more difficult than a land border because it requires surveillance of an area, as opposed to a line in the case of land borders’ (Carling, 2007, p. 324).

In this literature the language utilized affirms the regulatory and often militaristic nature of the border, the most potent example being the concept ‘Fortress Europe’. Albretcht indicates that the fortress is meant to convey the ‘exclusion of risk and the pursuit of safety as well as preservation of economic and social stability’ (2002, p. 1). Although the border is recognized as a site of control, this status is at times ambiguous. Lax enforcement of immigration regulations beyond the physical

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14 Salter’s arguments draw on Agamben and Foucault and thus can be located within a broader discourse which examines the disciplinary power of the state.

15 Crush (1999b) also applies this concept of ‘fortress’, in his analysis of the formulation of immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa.
border, reveal that enforcement is concentrated on the periphery of the border zone. This ensures that the border remains a ‘revolving door’ enabling a steady inflow of migrant labour (De Genova, 2002, p. 433; See also Heyman, 1999). In this respect, the border can be said to maintain the guise of exclusion.

Finally, the border site can also be located on migrants’ bodies. Chang and Aoki (1997) argue similarly and suggest that the border is more than a ‘peripheral phenomenon’, that the migrant ‘carries the border with her’, further that ‘to be an immigrant is to be marked by the border’ (1998, p. 1397). Thus it is the case that migrants’ bodies themselves are heavily regulated, including through self-regulation (Khosravi, 2010; Haugen, 2012; Willen, 2007a, 2007b; Madsen, 2004).

Borders as zones of in/exclusion

One of the common themes of border studies is the border’s function as agent of inclusion and exclusion (Newman, 2011). With respect to the US, the borderlands genre explores exclusion of undocumented Mexican migrants living in the border zone of the US/Mexico divide, as well as in magnet cities (Gumberg-Munoz, 2010; Nuñez and Heyman 2007; Donnan and Wilson, 1999; Hagan, 1994). This discussion has been shaped by long-standing historical debates on race and national identity (de Genova, 2005; Flores, 2003; Chang and Aoki 1997). In Europe academic and policy discourse has been shaped by the expansion of the European Union, as well as heightened mobility into Europe of extra-regional migrants, in the wake of events such as war and natural disasters (Morawska, 2001b; Culic, 2008; Pijpers, 2006; Black, 2003). But what is in/exclusion?
As with the other concepts previously discussed its meaning is relative to disciplinary traditions, and also to national contexts (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007). Sibely (1995) with whom the concept ‘geographies of exclusion’ is associated uses the term in plural since it refers to the complex and multi-dimensional nature of exclusions encountered. Exclusion is a process of abjection, which seeks to expel those who are defined as (culturally) different, who threaten (established/fixed) boundaries, such as Roma in English culture. In articulating his arguments Sibley makes several valid points, which I draw on for this research. The first is that the enactment of boundaries results in exclusion and inclusion. The second is the establishment of boundaries and markers which distinguish others as different is inherently an exercise of defining the self. Finally, exclusion produces a contestation over ‘literal’ and metaphorical space, the separation of those who belong from those who have been labelled as abject (Sibley, 1998; 1995).

The discussion on exclusion thus links the two previous sections on the border as site of control and socio-spatial process of othering. The notion of zone of in/exclusion takes on an added dimension when we conceive of the border as a ‘representation of space’ (Cleaveland, 2011), as a space/zone defined by those in authority to include citizens, but to restrict migrants (in particular the undocumented), and maintained through various form of control. Thus municipal ordinances may restrict migrants from renting property or from congregating at corners to look for work (Cleaveland, 2011; see also Varsanyi, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2008).
I had mentioned aspects of exclusion earlier in the sections on undocumentedness as socio-political condition, and mode-of-being. However, I wish to reiterate here that the state and other agents use a range of legislative and policy mechanisms to exclude undocumented migrants from access to key resources, such as social services provided by the state. Indeed, it could be said that a distinct genre has evolved, which highlights the vulnerability of migrants in this respect (see for example, Khosravi, 2010; Monforte and Dufour, 2011; Abrego, 2006; Van der Leun, 2006; Romero-Ortuño, 2004; Berk and Schur 2001; Chavez et al. 1992). Broeders and Engbersen citing Engbersen (2001) therefore argue that the various measures designed to exclude undocumented migrants result in an environment or ‘factory of exclusion’ (2007, p. 1596). That these mechanisms have mixed results has been acknowledged by them as well as a number of scholars across a variety of contexts – See Van der Leun, 2003 and Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006 in respect of the Netherland Antilles, Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2007, Hatziprokopiou, 2003 and Iosifides and King 1998 in respect of Greece, and Rutherford (2011) in relation to South Africa.

A general theme running across this literature is that inclusion and exclusion operate dialectically, reproduced through both formal and informal social practices. Based on the above, inclusion and exclusion are not mutually exclusive processes. Chavez (2007) for example, indicates that this simultaneity produces a schizophrenic environment for the undocumented (this is similar to Coutin’s (2000b) discussion on existence and non-existence related above). Other scholars use terms reflecting varying degrees of in/exclusion of migrants, based on this dialectic understanding. Khosravi (2010) for example, refers to the undocumented as the ‘included but
excepted’. Similarly, Coutin (2000b) indicates that migrants occupy spaces of existence and non-existence. Finally Monforte and Dufour argue that the undocumented are ‘the ‘excluded’ among the excluded’ (2011, p. 7).

To conclude, the above confirms that the border, whether its physical manifestation in barbed fences and border patrols, or its legislative dimensions which define the parameters of inclusion, is an instrument of the state, a (legitimate) means to preserve national spaces. In this respect, borders can be interpreted as the ‘structures’ which shape migrants’ daily existence. Structures are ‘a set of internally related objects and practices’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 92; see Chapter 3). Exploring the border in the words of Crouch and McKenzie, therefore is to explore that ‘social milieu which is ontologically prior to both the respondents’ and the interviewers’ actions, and therefore causally related to them’ (2006, p. 486). Implicit in this argument is the role of agency, as migrants’ actions shape the conditions of their existence, that is, they shape the border realities – or geographies – which confront them on a day-to-day basis.

**Integrating agency into the debate**

Emirbayer and Mische (1998) suggest that arriving at a singular definition of agency has been difficult because agency has often been wedded to structure (See also Morawska, 2001a). I therefore begin this section by examining the concepts of agency and structure. I engage the works of sociologists Archer (2003; 1995) and Giddens (1984) in discussing the relationship between agency and structure, before settling on Archer’s critical realist approach. I discuss structuration theory as it has been very influential on migration studies literature (see Bakewell, 2010 and earlier work by Findlay and Li,
1999). However, I adopt the critical realist approach as it more adequately explains the structure-agency relationship, and also because of the stratified ontology that it presents (see additional discussions on the ontology of critical realism in Chapter 3). In this respect I add to migration scholarship that has applied critical realist theory to research design and analysis (Falconer Al-Hindi, 1997; Hedberg, 2004; Hunt, 2008).

**The relationship between structure and agency**

Within the body of literature which weighs the balance of human agency and structure, Giddens’s work is prominent. To counteract what he identifies as a dualism in social theory, regarding the division on the one hand between those that give primacy to the influences of social forces on the actions of individuals, and on the other hand, those who argue that human conduct is derived from internal processes which determine actions and meaning, he proposes a duality of structure thesis (Giddens, 1984). With his theory of structuration, Giddens argues that the social structures which influence actors are in fact shaped and reproduced by those very actors through space and time in their day-to-day activities. In this respect, his theory is important since it emphasizes the mutually enforcing interactions of agency-structure, as well as the reproductive and transformative capacity of agents. However, Gidden’s idealist ontology (Blaikie, 2000) is opposed to the critical realist ontology, in particular, one of its defining elements. This is that structures and mechanisms are not only enduring, but pre-existing, that is they pre-date social actors.

For critical realists, structure and agency are irreducible, although there is ‘interplay’ between structure and agency. Structures hold causal powers which influence actions, and actors also can transform structures via a
process of structural elaboration (Archer 1995). These three factors: (i) the pre-existence of structure; (ii) the inherent causal powers that structural forces exert; and (iii) the elaboration or reproduction of structure via social interaction (agency), constitute Archer’s morphogenetic approach (Archer 1995).

My conceptualization of agency is based on Archer’s arguments concerning the internal conversation, that is, the (third) process of mediation between structure and agency (Archer, 2003).16 Her arguments give primacy to agentic capacity, specifically the reflexive capacity of agents to negotiate the enablements and constraints which emanate from structural and cultural emergent properties. In fact, Archer contends that an articulation of this mediatory process is essential, since ‘explaining what people do....involves reference to agents’ subjective and reflexive formulation of personal projects-in the light of their objective circumstances’ (Archer, 2003, p.5). Archer (2003) thus reconciles the perceived gap by pointing to this personal power/property of agents.

Archer (2003) provides a detailed discussion on constraints and enablements, which enable us to fully grasp her notion of reflexivity. She argues that constraints and enablements hold potential causal powers, since their eventual influence as enabling of or constraining to the agent’s intended project, is in fact conditional. Though pre-existing, their generative power can only be activated in respect of an intended project with which there is

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16 Archer’s primary motive for elaborating her thesis on *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*, is to fill a theoretical gap she has identified in the realist literature concerning exactly how structures influence agents, and vice versa. She thus identifies a third process, *reflexivity* to fill this gap.
some relationship of congruity/incongruity. In addition, the agent undertaking the project must be receptive of these causal influences.

Thus for Archer, agency is inextricably bound up with reflexive activity. Agents engage in three levels of reflexive activity. These are: (i) an evaluation of the enabling and constraining structural (and cultural) factors; (ii) an identification of their interests; (iii) the design of a project which is appropriate to attaining their goals (Archer, 2003, p.9). It is crucial to point out that the agent is consistently engaged in a process of reflection, since the realization of a project entails interaction with, whether through fortitude or circumvention, of the various enablements and constraints they encounter. Reflexivity therefore requires foresight, in order to determine the potential obstacles or aides to a particular project, and the capacity to strategize in order to formulate an agenda to arrive at the best possible outcome. Archer concludes, and this view is endorsed, that ‘courses of action are produced through the reflexive deliberations of agents who subjectively determine their practical projects in relation to their objective circumstances’ (Archer, 2003, p. 141). Agency is thus the ability to act in response to enablements and constraints posed by various structural mechanisms, to attain an intended outcome (a project), and in so doing to shape one’s existence through deliberate and strategic actions.

**Strategic agency**

This theorization of agency has much significance for the border studies literature. Anderson and Ruhs contend that one effect of the literature which emphasizes ‘illegality’ has been to underestimate the role of migrant agency and they therefore argue that it is necessary to retheorize this relationship
(Anderson and Ruhs, 2010). I believe that agency needs to be retheorized – but for reasons relating to its definition and conceptualization.

I therefore propose a conceptualization of agency that is rooted in its strategic nature. The reflexivity discussed by Archer plays a crucial role in my articulation of a ‘strategic agency’, since migrants design strategies which are aimed at ensuring the fulfilment of their migration project(s). It is not merely that agency results in structural and cultural elaboration, but that it is intentional and goal-oriented. I thus conceive of migrants as strategic actors with the capacity to undertake goal-oriented and intentional actions and decisions, in response to border structures, which confront them. It is therefore possible to distinguish the exercise of agency from its outcomes, that is, the success of the projects carried out. The efficacy of agents rests not with the matching of intentions with successful (or unsuccessful) outcomes, but with the agent’s capacity to conceive and design a strategy towards the fulfillment of a project (Archer, 1995). My emphasis on the qualifier strategic is not to suggest that there is ‘non-strategic’ agency, but is to stress the intentionality and creativity of migrant behavior.

Such a conceptualization is important for migration studies. I contend that in the main, agency has been mis-represented in this literature. Agency has at times been conflated with rationality, autonomy, and consent, a move which equates agency with decision-making (see for example Christou, 2008 and Richmond, 1998). In addition, it has been loosely defined, if defined at all, a failing which I believe is attributable to substantive discussions of agency in the field of psychology, philosophy, sociology and development (see for

\[\text{Mantere (2008) offers a similar conceptualization of agency in his discussion of agency in relation to the application of organizational management strategies.}\]
example, Kabeer 1999; Long 2001; Bandura 2001; Loyal and Barnes 2001). Gomberg-Muñoz (2010) perhaps comes closest when she defines agency as ‘the human capacity to exert some control over the conditions of one’s existence’ (2010, p. 297). Although she describes her approach as a simplistic view of structure, agency and transformation, she amplifies the concept of agency given her emphasis on control, or what I interpret as migrants’ ability to shape the conditions of their existence.

Notwithstanding the above, there is existing scholarship which mirrors this conceptualization of agency as ‘strategic’. For example, Adler (2002) and Kothari (2008) point out that the meandering between statuses (that is, documented and undocumented) is undertaken by migrants on their own accord, and is employed as a strategy to ensure the success of the migration enterprise (cf. Schuster, 2010; see also Bloch et al. 2009). Though not writing on the subject of undocumented migration, Ley (2005) indicates that business migrants to Canada engage in strategic actions to negotiate the monitoring and enforcement practices of the state. Finally, Carnegie (1982, p. 11) speaks of ‘strategic flexibility’ exercised by Caribbean migrants. He proposes that strategic flexibility is two-fold, as it entails the capacity to ‘adjust rapidly’ to whatever comes along and to the ‘building of multiple options’. His conceptualization is important as it enhances the psychological components of agency. For Carnegie it is about exploring ‘emic ideas of a cultural system’ (Carnegie, 1982, p. 54). When applied specifically to the question of the relationship between borders, undocumentedness and agency, one begins to explore beyond the material to the psychological dimensions of agency, which are (re)produced in borderized spaces.
Van Meeteren (2012) disagrees with the approach to label migrants’ response to macro-structural factors as ‘strategy’. She further argues that migration studies ought to move past migrants’ ‘struggle to survive’, away from an exploration of the relationship between structure and agency. I disagree with Van Meeteren’s assertion that migration studies has exhausted the question of the relationship between migrant agency and structural constraints – note Bakewell’s (2010) claim for such analysis via the integration of a critical realist approach, and similarly Iosifides’s (2011) calls for such research. I note that there is in fact a distinction between methods of strategy (read agency) and survival. The question posed by Gomberg-Muñoz (2010) ‘When the concept of “agency” is applied to undocumented immigrants, who are highly circumscribed in their choices and activities, the question arises as to whether these workers are actually exercising their agency or are merely doing what they must to survive? (2010, p. 297, sic)’, thus serves as the point of departure for this study.

**Conclusion**

These above literatures – on undocumentedness, borders and agency, raise three poignant questions regarding the nature of the relationship between borders, agency and undocumentedness. These include: (1) What types of border realities are manifested in migrants’ experiences of undocumentedness? (2) What mechanisms do migrants employ to negotiate these complex geographies? and (3) In what ways are migrants’ agentic strategies constrained or enabled by border realities?

These questions have been answered at length in relation to developed economies in Europe and North America (De Genova, 2002). As shown above, there is also scholarship investigating these themes in developing
country settings (see Haugen, 2012; Rutherford, 2010; Madsen, 2004). But there are contexts where these questions have been given limited consideration, such as the Caribbean. Yet, this region is an intriguing investigative location, given historical and contemporary factors that have shaped its existence. Its slavery, plantation and colonial heritage has meant that the process of b/ordering remains prevalent in modern times. Social differences, which are rooted in class and racial hierarchies of differences, continue to shape social interaction (Henriques and Mayoni 1977).

The current operation of the framework for migration within the Caribbean (under the regional integration mechanism the CSME suggests that b/ordering practices are prevalent. As will explained in Chapter 4, only ten categories of professionals can move freely for work within the region. In addition, despite calls for hassle free intra-regional travel for CARICOM nationals, as at 2009 three countries (including Barbados) were yet to implement the six month definite entry approved by heads of government in 2007 (NY Carib News, 2009). The region could therefore be considered a chain of mini ‘fortresses’, with each island’s government exercising discretion regarding the enforcement of its borders.

In addition to the above, there are new patterns of movement, involving smuggled and trafficked individuals and though figures are hard to acquire, reputed increases in undocumented (labour) migration (IOM, 2005; IOM, 2008). Coupled with the fact that a number of countries are currently undergoing migration transitions (McElroy and Albuquerque 1988; See further discussions in Chapters 4 and 5) this suggests that b/ordering processes will continue to evolve in the Caribbean. The objective of the research therefore is to explore contemporary manifestations of borders and
border practices in the region. It will also explore how the border constrains (and enables) migrants and the mechanisms they engage to deal with these constraints (and enablements). As I indicated earlier, I engaged a critical realist methodology to explore these related concerns. In the upcoming chapter I examine the intricacies of this approach.
CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCHING MIGRANTS’ EXPERIENCE OF THE BORDER

There should be congruence between the object of study, the assumptions about society, and conceptions of how knowledge is possible, and one’s choice of design and method…’ (Danermark et al. 2002, p. 150)

Introduction

Borders are ontologically complex phenomena (Van Houtum, 2005). While it is possible to suggest that there is convergence in terms of the recognition that borders are multi-dimensional (Wilson and Donnan 2012; Bauder, 2011), there are still calls for greater dialogue amongst scholars of the border (Bauder, 2011; Newman and Passi 1998; Passi, 2005). There is thus need for an approach which utilizes cross-disciplinary and methodologically diverse analysis. In this vein, this study bridges the divide(s) within border studies through the application of critical realism.

I contend that the application of critical realist methodology, in particular its ontology, was most appropriate for the research as it enabled in-depth investigation and explanation of border structures and experiences in the Barbadian context. To understand these multiple borders and their implications for migrants’ daily experiences, to yield what Megoran calls a ‘unique optic’ into the process of b/ordering in Barbados (2012, p. 473), it was necessary to engage a variety of data. My ontological perspective thus required, and was simultaneously undergirded by, methodological pluralism. As I explain in upcoming sections, I adopted an intensive approach to the research, which included the use of distinct types of data, and methods of interpretation and analysis, located within a qualitative framework. This included narratives generated during interviews and non-
participant observation, as well as documentary data. In the upcoming sections I outline this approach in further detail.

This chapter is divided into four parts. In the section which follows this introduction I discuss two key features of critical realist methodology – its ontology and epistemology, linking these elements to the decision for a qualitative approach. Other elements such as abstraction and axiology are discussed later in other sections. I then provide specificities regarding the research context, and my engagement with data post-fieldwork. In the subsequent section I explain the approach to analysis, which included a merging of discourse and narrative analytical methods. In the final section I raise some concerns and limitations which arose during and post-fieldwork. This latter section is largely reflexive and is indicative of my attempt to consider my own positionality as researcher and how this impacted on the research process.

**Critical realist approach to border studies**

Critical realism is a philosophy of, as well as for science (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 51). As a philosophy of science it proposes an alternative to positivist ontology, while this understanding informs the rationale behind and conduct of research. It is important to note two things. The first is that critical realism is not homogenous (Danermark et al. 2002) and there is a rather active debate between proponents of this philosophy of science (see for example Archer et al. 1998). Secondly, the arguments of Bhaskar, the father of realist social science, are quite complex (Porter, 1998; Sayer, 2000) but have been elucidated by authors such as Collier (1994), Sayer (2000) and Iosifides (2011). It is primarily Sayer’s work which will be relied on in this chapter. Thus the design which is discussed in later sections is based on readings of
Sayer (2000), as well as a synthesis of border studies with a focus on undocumented migration.

**Complex ontology**

Critical realism is distinguished from other methodologies, but particularly positive science because of its proposal of a stratified reality. Critical realism identifies three layers/domains of social reality – the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1975). The latter two domains are concerned with events/phenomenon we experience, the empirical with all observed phenomenon, the actual with all phenomenon, whether experienced/observed or not. The real domain is constituted of structures and mechanisms which have causal powers to produce ‘tendencies’ (events or outcomes).

Bhaskar (1975) argues that the ‘flat’ nature of positivist ontology leads to a prioritization of either the actual or the empirical, or their conflation. This is because of the tendency to equate the observable (actual), or our experiences of the observable and unobservable (the empirical) with the real (Sayer, 2000). The failure to distinguish between the various layers of reality means that observed patterns are used to explain outcomes and events, with no consideration of the unobservable. However, the critical realist contention that the world is multi-dimensional (an open system) means that the latent powers of causal mechanisms are being acted on by a multitude of variables, which can produce any of a range events or experiences. In addition, similar mechanisms can produce different outcomes; conversely different mechanisms can produce similar outcomes. Thus, the critical realist does not fixate on the observable, but rather tries to understand the underlying (and unobservable) causes of events (Sayer, 2000).
Similarly, I reject the ‘flat’ nature of positivist ontology. The stratification of reality is important in a study of migrants’ experience of the borders, for as pointed out by Sayer, “Much of what happens does not depend on or correspond to actors’ understandings; there are unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions and things can happen to people regardless of their understandings” (2000, p. 20). These ‘conditions and things’ I refer to as extra- or non-discursive phenomena (see section on Methodological eclecticism). I therefore distinguish between various layers of border reality—the structure(s) of borders, the events they generate in the lives of migrants, and migrants’ experience of these events.

**Subjective epistemology**

Although distinct in its ontology, critical realism shares the epistemological framework of other (constructivist) research paradigms. On this basis, Guba (1990) indicates that there are several diverse theoretical perspectives which could be included in a critical realist framework, which all converge in their rejection of the positivist (and post-positivist) view regarding a value free science.

For critical realists, reality exists and acts independently of our knowledge of its constitution/existence, what is referred to as intransitivity (Bhaskar, 1975). It is therefore possible to advance competing views/explanations regarding ‘reality’. In light of the above, it is important to separate the essence of reality from our experience of it. Thus, the value of the critical realist approach is its non-empiricist epistemology (Cloke et al. 1991). This is the case as critical realism espouses a subjectivist epistemology, which views the origins and outcomes of social inquiry as mediated by the values of the researcher. In undertaking this research, I am therefore aware that the knowledge I
generate will be my experience of reality, and is but one of several explanations that could be advanced in respect of the phenomena under study.

In addition to being subjectivist, critical realism is also transactional. This is because the process of social inquiry is the product of interactions between the researcher and the researched – ‘the double hermeneutic’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 17). Migrants’ narratives and my interpretation of these, and other data, are constructed reality - migrants attach a multiplicity of meanings to the border, and I in turn read their experiences of the border based on my own positionality as a researcher. This constructivist approach is not incompatible with critical realism. Vestiges of an interpretivist ontology can be found in critical realist tradition, due to the latter’s adoption of a (weak) constructivist view regarding the social construction of reality (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 2000).

**Methodological eclecticism**

It has been suggested that critical realism has failed to provide ‘methodological guidelines for the study of people in society’ (Cox, 2013, p. 4). Similarly, it has been argued that critical realism lacks methodological rigour and that there is no pre-determined toolkit specific to critical realist social research (Yeung, 1997; Pratt, 1995; Harvey, 1990). However, Sayer (2000) and more recently, Iosifides (2011), provide guidance on how to conduct critical realist research. They emphasize that the strength of critical realism resides in its adaptability to a variety of social research methods. This is evident in studies which have applied critical realist methodology, such as Hedberg (2004), who uses a mix of statistical surveys and in-depth interview data in analysis of migration between Finland and Sweden, and Falconer Al-Hindi (1997), who in addition to interviews, uses time-space logs to explore
the impact of telecommuting on women. I saw this flexibility as an attractive feature of critical realism and as I explain further below, one that was apt to this study.

In this study, I have utilized two related categories of data (talk and text) and methods of analysis (narrative and discourse) which are located in the intensive qualitative framework (see below). I describe my engagement with these different types of data and tools of analysis as methodological pluralism/eclecticism (see Danemark et al. 2002; Findaly and Li 1999). Eclecticism typically refers to a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies; however, I use the term here because of my distinction between the types of data and subsequent analyses employed (cf. Teddlie and Tashakkori 2011).

Mixing methods is recommended for a number of reasons, which include providing depth to, and exploring, various dimension of an area under study, as well as strengthening methodological rigour of research (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2011). In this study, two factors influenced this decision. Firstly, and to return briefly to the discussion on ontology, critical realism lends itself to pluralism. A critical realist understanding of the nature of reality, that is, one in which events and our study of these events, occur in an ‘open’ system demands this pluralism in order to enrich analyses and conclusions drawn about the elements of this system impacting on phenomena under study (Danermark et al. 2002). Secondly, the adoption of a critical realist approach leads to the articulation of a complex border ontology which takes into account both discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the border. As Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) suggest critical realist research is inherently eclectic, given the mix of methods used to
gather data on the factors determined as having an extra-discursive ontology. Thus as mentioned earlier, critical realism was deemed as appropriate because it required the use of (mixed) methods which could effectively capture the ontological depth of a critical realist view on border reality (Danermark et al. 2002).

**Intensive inquiry**

Sayer (2000) distinguishes between two broad categories of critical realist research design, the extensive and intensive. The former, is more quantitative in orientation and is concerned with establishing patterns among or distribution of phenomena. Although I provide statistics in Chapter 4 in order to contextualize the wider issue of intra-regional migration, this research is not concerned with ‘counting the uncountable’ (Keely, 1977). Indeed, my quantification of empirical findings in subsequent discussions is merely a complement to the intensive approach adopted for this study.

Intensive studies are more aligned with the qualitative tradition. Qualitative research is utilized in contexts where issues of quality, depth and richness are paramount (Berg, 2007; Valentine, 2001; Mason, 2002). It is described as ‘naturalistic’ since it is undertaken in participants’ natural setting and is aimed at obtaining participants’ perspectives on phenomena experienced (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Migrants’ border experiences were best explored using a case study approach. Case studies are appropriate where there is interest in a particular context, in this case Barbados, and where there is

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18 Keely (1977) attributes the phrase ‘counting the uncountable’ to Lancaster and Scheuren, who wrote a similarly titled piece ‘Counting the uncountable illegals: Some initial statistical speculations employing capture-recapture techniques’, also in 1977.
interest in ‘human activity embedded in the real world’ (Gillham, 2000, p. 1). Gillham further indicates that case studies rely on multiple sources of data, what he calls ‘evidence’ (2000, p. 1-2), and thus underscores the importance of an eclectic approach.

For Sayer (2000) intensive studies aim to produce a causal explanation of experiences or events, taking account of the specific context within which the actions or relationship under examination are occurring. My approach does not seek causal explanations, and in this respect could be considered a departure from critical realism, but is rather an exploration of the context or structure of border realities, the geographies produced by these border realities, and migrants’ negotiation of these complex geographies.

Before I move on to discuss the fieldwork experience, I wish to make one final comment regarding the complementarity of the methods of analysis engaged for this research – narrative and discourse analysis. While both rely on ‘talk’ (which can include textual data) they are distinguished by their emphases. There are different types of narrative analysis, but in the main they are distinguished by their focus on the structure and (performative) elements of the stories presented by interviewees. This includes, for example, a review of the temporality or ordering of events (De Fina, 2003; Riessman, 2001, 1997). Discourse analysis on the other hand focuses on speech acts and devices, which characterize discourse, such as Manichean and metonymic devices (Wodak et al. 1999) and devices such as hyperbole, topoi, and actor description.

It is interesting to note that the distinction is sometimes difficult to determine, since discourse and narrative are used interchangeably. In this study I use narrative in relation to accounts or stories provided by migrants.
Discourse, in contrast, relates to linguistic social practices which communicate a particular perspective and thus contributes to the building of knowledge in the context in which it is elaborated (Wodak, 2001; Van Dijk, 2001 citing Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Narratives are personal, and are themselves embedded in discursive realities which are essential to the reproduction of society (Van der Valk, 2003). Thus narrative analysis implicitly or explicitly requires an analysis of the contextual features of talk (Wiles et al. 2005).

Riessman indicates that there are parallels between discourse and narrative analysis (1993). However, she suggests that narrative analysis is distinguished by its interpretive emphasis, specifically how protagonists interpret their experience. Agency is thus central to her understanding of narrative analysis. However, agency is also central to discourse analysis since it explores the relations between those with the power to produce knowledge, and those who do not. Powerful actors produced discourse, but those who are subordinated by this discourse can also resist these master narratives by the production of their own counter narratives (Delgado, 1989).

For this reason, I believe there is a synergy between discourse and narrative analysis, and have incorporated both types of analyses into this research.

The ontological foundation of critical realism rests on the belief that reality not only exists, but is shaped by the (pre-existing) structures and mechanisms. Structures and mechanism which predate social actors are reproduced and transformed through a continuous process of interplay (Yeung, 1997). This dualism between structure and agency, the objective and the subjective, is a fundamental feature of critical realist ontology since structure and action are held to be related but autonomous entities (Archer,
2003, 1995; Porter, 1998). The view that structure and agency are irreducible or distinct categories, as well as the view that structures and mechanisms possess causal powers, anchor realists arguments regarding the pre-existing nature of structures and mechanisms (Archer, 2003).

Thus, critical realist methodology is not merely concerned with the meanings social actors attach to phenomenon, but extends the concept of human agency by exploring the influence of social structures on their actions, and vice versa (Yeung, 1997; Houston, 2001). My research is therefore influenced by the view that various structures and mechanisms shape (cause) the behaviour of social actors, and conversely actors shape structure (Guba and Lincoln 1994).

Fielding narratives

Having described the factors influencing the design of the research with my review on critical realist ontology and epistemology, I now move on to discuss the processes of conducting research and preparing data for analysis. I commence with details on the fieldwork site, before explaining the methods used to gather data. During the data gathering process, I drew on Sayer (2000) in the adoption of methods typically employed in intensive studies, such as interactive interviews and ethnography. While I do not stress the issues which typically confront researchers who interact with undocumented migrants (see Van Liempt and Bilger 2009), I do take some time to discuss the matter of accessing a hard to reach population. In the penultimate section I provide some details on the participants with whom I interacted. Finally, I raise the issue of transcription, discussing decisions taken related to manual and verbatim transcription.
The research setting

Over a five month period between October to December 2010 and January to March 2011 I undertook fieldwork in Barbados. Within the Caribbean there were several possible sites given new and established migratory patterns between the islands; however, lack of data on undocumented trends in the Caribbean narrowed the options to two possible fieldwork sites: the Bahamas and Barbados. In the case of the former, there is a growing body of literature on Haitian migration to the Bahamas, as well as to the Dominican Republic (Marshall, 1979; Ferguson, 2003; IOM 2005). With respect to the latter, there have been recent policy debates and initiatives regarding the impact of undocumented migration (see Chapter 4). In order to determine the suitability of either location, an analysis was done which matched methodological considerations in each locale with the researcher’s knowledge and strengths.

Barbados was selected as the more favourable site for fieldwork, based on a number of practical considerations. With the change in government and evolving policy context, I thought it would be beneficial to have the study undertaken in parallel with the current policy debate on immigration reform. This would provide a rich contextual background and enable me to interact with migrants who would have a range of border experiences. In addition, I was motivated by the fact that there is a mix of nationalities represented among the undocumented migrant population in Barbados all of which have English as their first language. There was thus no need for translation services, as would have been the case in the Bahamas, where the dominant migrant group is Haitian, and speak French creole.
Constructing border experiences

My primary interest was to gather narratives of border realities among the undocumented. These accounts would essentially be retrospective even those which were rooted in the ‘present’. The narrative approach has undergone criticism regarding the validity of data obtained, since narratives are essentially reconstructions of experiences and events, as opposed to (verifiable) facts (Squire, 2008; Vandsemb, 1995; Miles and Crush 1993). Rather than argue against this criticism, I embrace the view that narrative is reconstruction as opposed to mere ‘excavation’ (Mason, 2002). In fact, an important part of the research process will be continuous reflexivity to examine not only how my own preconceived notions affect the interpretation of the data obtained (Mason, 2002), but also how context shapes the stories narrated (Dahinden and Efionayi-Mäder 2009).

Most experience-centred narrative interviews are semi-structured, with the level of rigidity dependent on the nature of the information sought (Squire, 2008, p. 48). I had opted for semi-structured (face-to-face) interviews for two reasons. The first is that this type of interview is composed of open-ended questions, which is advantageous to both the interviewee and interviewer. In the case of the former, there is a high level of autonomy/control over the interview since the respondent determines how to shape the discussion. This feature is appealing, in particular, for a study that explores agency. Secondly, this type of interview is beneficial to the interviewer since it encourages extended responses to each interview question/topic (Barbour, 2008).

To structure the interviews I adopted an approach that is close to that of Scheibelhofer (2008), who combines narration and topic based interviewing. With this approach I was able to privilege migrants’ narrative, but was also
able to accommodate my own interpretations of empirical and theoretical literature in the type of themes and topics explored during a single interview. I had prior to undertaking fieldwork, compiled a draft interview schedule (see Appendix A). This schedule was amended throughout various stages of fieldwork, in light of changes to research interests, but also in response to comments made during the interviews. The qualitative framework encourages an iterative, as well as a cumulative research design, and I was able to use information gathered from previous interviews to amend and/or formulate questions for subsequent interviewees, and where the opportunity had been possible, with earlier interviewees (Cornelius, 1982).

I had obtained migrants’ oral consent to undertake the interviews. With the exception of one participant, all interviewees consented to the recording of their interviews. These recordings were supplemented by written notes, as some interviewees became more talkative after recorded session had ended (they had been aware, and had agreed to my taking notes). Although I had hoped for some migrants to be interviewed a second time, this was difficult, as their extensive working hours made future interaction difficult. Also, the majority of the interviews were conducted at work, during the participants’ lunch break. In addition, in order to accommodate interviewees’ schedules, three group interviews were undertaken. I believe that during these sessions migrants were a bit more candid about their experiences; however, as I explain in Chapter 5, these interviews tended towards vilification of the Barbadian immigration system.

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19 There is one interview during which the recorder was accidentally paused, and therefore notes had to be written after the interview had been completed.
While the majority of narratives relied on data which arose during the interview context, I obtained additional narratives through my engagement in participant observation at various sites, including birthday parties, football games, work sites and public meeting places. These experiences were recorded in a diary, and it is essentially these notes, and co-constructed stories of migrants’ border experiences that form the basis of the narratives analyzed.

My interactions with participants increasingly became a critical component of data collection, as it enabled me to observe the location, the positionality of interviewees vis-à-vis the latter, and the ‘micro-geographies’ of social relations amongst interviewees, as well as between them and other individuals (Elwood and Martin 2000 p. 649). This was particularly the case with one migrant, Paul, whom I had befriended and would visit quite regularly, helping him to sell goods from his stall near to a prominent hang out spot in Bridgetown. I also spent a lot of time with one group of migrants who worked with an independent contractor. My visits there facilitated my making connections with another group of migrants, two of which consented to being interviewed. Although I had approached them independently, I believe further access was facilitated via my endorsement to them by one of the migrants from this first group (Leighton was one of my main key informants and had facilitated multiple meetings). What was interesting was that my access was possible despite the fact that these migrants, due to their similar work fields, were merely acquaintances and were not a close knit network.
Access

As a Jamaican/CARICOM national, I had anticipated that shared Caribbean identity would have made it less difficult for me to gain access to migrants. However, the sensitive nature of the topic of undocumented migration meant that in order to gain entrée I had to be facilitated by key informants. These individuals were involved with migrant associations locally, and/or provided assistance to migrants in completing applications for amnesty.

Associations existed for Guyanese, Jamaican, St. Lucian, and St. Vincentian and Grenadian migrants living in Barbados. However, attempting to reach migrants through migrant associations was not fruitful. For example, a former executive member of the St. Lucian migrant association indicated that they knew nothing about undocumented migration and were not sure they would be able to provide any assistance. I had gotten a similar reaction from a Guyanese executive member who eventually did speak to me in Barbados, but on condition of anonymity. I did, however, attend a large BBQ put on by the Guyanese association, which was attended by Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals resident in Barbados, towards the end of my fieldwork. The reactions by these members confirm the negative perceptions attached to undocumented migration, as well as possible stratification amongst migrants based on class, as these associations were largely comprised of professional migrants with more entrenched roots in Barbados.

In her work with undocumented migrants in Sweden, Khosravi indicates that she ‘had no other choice than to use personal networks through the ‘snowball method’, that is, being directed towards undocumented migrants by informants (2010, p. 97). This approach is quite common in research with the undocumented (see for example Bloch et al. 2009; Markova, 2009; Staring,
Thus it was through gatekeepers, and subsequently snow-balling, that I made contact with participants. This became even more crucial as I had arrived in the island in the post-amnesty period, during which time a number of migrants had voluntarily returned home.

Snowballing was not successful at all times. There were a few instances when potential interviewees refused to participate. In most of these instances migrants were undocumented and feared being exposed to immigration officials. There was also one instance where I encountered an individual fortuitously after visiting a friend. He claimed not to be undocumented, which was quite possible given that he worked in the agriculture sector (where migrants were able to obtain work permits much easier than in other sectors); yet he refused to participate, despite assurances of anonymity.

The participants

I had limited my scope to CARICOM nationals who had past experience of living and working in Barbados without adequate documentation, that is, who had over Stayed the time allowed and/or otherwise worked without a permit. This was because the 2009 amnesty had directly targeted this group of migrants, but also because there are claims (though there is no statistical evidence to substantiate this), that CARICOM nationals constitute the majority of the undocumented population. In addition, I had intended to focus on migrants who had recently applied to regularize their status following this most recent amnesty, but had remained flexible and also interviewed migrants who would have been granted residency following previous regularization exercises. However, I also interviewed a few migrants (four in total) who had remained undocumented, as well as those
who had never been undocumented. This enabled me to examine additional dimensions of border experiences.

A total of 30 individuals were interviewed. While I had aimed to have some level of representativeness based on statistics relating to the nationality of non-Barbadians, the bulk of the participants (76 per cent) were Guyanese (see Table 3.1 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominance of Guyanese mirrors migratory trends to Barbados. But it is also an effect of snow-ball sampling, as migrant networks were tight-knit and I was thus introduced to compatriots. In addition, thirty per cent, or nine, of the interviewees were female. This does not correspond with current statistics regarding the distribution of male and female migrants in the Guyanese population. In 2000, 57% of the Guyanese population in Barbados were women (Barbados Statistical Service, 2002). I discuss the possible implications of this ‘bias’ later on in the sub-section on Insider status.

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20 Guyanese migrants would have thus constituted 50% of interviewees (15), with the other nationalities represented as follows: St. Vincent and the Grenadines (4), Trinidad and Tobago (4), Jamaica (3), St. Lucia (2), and all other CARICOM countries (2).
The median age of participants was 35 years, and the youngest participant was 21 years old. A significant portion of the interviewees (male) were construction workers, primarily masons and painters. Though women also worked in construction, they were concentrated primarily in services industries - care work, tourism and the sex industry (See Appendix C).

A number of interviewees (seventeen of thirty migrants, or fifty-seven percent), indicated that their initial purpose for migration was to earn a better living. Underlying this economic motive, however, was the intention to accumulate savings in order to remit money back home to undertake projects such as starting a business, caring for children or purchasing real estate.

Transcription

I opted to manually transcribe all the interviews without the services of a transcriber. I was motivated by confidentiality reasons, and the possibility of inaccurate transcription, as the interviewees spoke in a local dialect. These dialects are largely based on the English language but have some deviations depending on nationality. For this reason, I also did not rely on transcription (voice recognition) software. All elements of speech may not have been recognized by the software, resulting in gaps in the transcript.

I wish to point out that the excerpts included in this thesis are not the (verbatim) transcriptions analyzed. For readability some excerpted interviews include the English parallel. Further, manually transcribing the interviews had the additional advantage of proximity to the data. I was able to return to the scene of the interview, which helped later with

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21 I should note here that I experienced challenges whilst conducting the interviews based on some of the terminology used by the migrants. With time I came to be familiar with these words, which made it easier to interpret the transcribed passages.
interpretation. Similarly, the interviews were not transcribed in their entirety. Sections where persons meandered from the main themes of the research, and/or where sensitive information was provided (such as the recounting of a traumatic experience not related to migration), were omitted from the transcriptions. I do not believe that this undermined the underlying philosophical/methodological approach to the research (contra Halcomb and Davidson 2006, p. 40).

As interviewees were promised anonymity, all names have been replaced with pseudonyms. In addition to the pseudonyms, migrants are identified by a code comprising nationality, gender and date of interview (See Appendix B). This is in order to retain referential information without revealing sensitive information (cf. McLellan et al. 2003).

**Reading narratives/discourse**

In this section I describe how I ‘arrived at the border’ as a researcher. Implicit in this discussion is the fact that the process of data analysis was iterative. Critical realist research typically commences with the process of abstraction (Yeung, 1997). The objective of this process is to identify a single concept of an object, and to reveal that object’s internal relations in order generate a theory of causation (Hedberg, 2004). As I indicated above, my objective is not to devise a theory of causation – though I do seek to provide insight into the social conditions which have causal powers (see Iosifides, 2011). Moreover, my use of data derived from narrative and discourse meant that my research extended beyond abstraction to interpretation (Sayer, 2000). In the sections which follow, I discuss how I went about reading-interpreting - narratives and discourse, highlighting the role that context played in the decision to incorporate discourse analysis into my research.
The interviews

Although I had considered using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, I decided to manually analyze the data. The main advantage to using these types of software is the organizational function. As the codes would be generated by me during the process of sorting the data, I foresaw it as an unnecessary (and time consuming) step.  

The interviews were analyzed using thematic coding, that is, I examined the data for similarities, as well as noted differences and relationships between the text of the interview transcripts (Gibson and Brown 2009; Gibbs, 2007). A priori codes had been selected for exploration during the first review of the literature (Gibson and Brown 2009), and included decision-making, experiences of exclusion, and acts of agency (activities to circumvent or defy constraints produced by undocumentedness). However, following several readings of the interview transcripts, a number of empirical codes emerged. These related to border experiences, (representations of) the state, regional identity/feelings of belonging, and the real versus the imagined. Together, these six themes were used to organize migrants’ narratives.

Documentary data

In addition to the narratives obtained during interviews and participant observation, I collected media reports, as well as government speeches and policy documents. Collection of documentary data commenced from the

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22 I had attended a training workshop on using one such package (NVivo), and came to this decision after the course, as well as after review of various writings on the issue (see for example Lewins and Silver 2009; Gibbs, 2007). I had already stored audio and text data in an encrypted file.

23 Or what Gibbs (2007) refers to as concept driven codes. He also uses data-driven rather than empirical to describe those concepts which emerge during data analysis.
initial stages of the research project, peaking in the period preceding fieldwork, as I gathered information on potential sites. I had also continued collection of documentary data during and after the completion of fieldwork. In the beginning of the research most articles were acquired through online searches. Once in Barbados, I visited the local library, where I looked at photocopies of articles that the staff had complied. This list was not very comprehensive, but did provide additional (pre-2009) material, which I was not able to locate previously online. I also examined microfilm but this did not yield any results. In addition, I had visited the offices of The Nation newspaper (one of the main print media outlets in Barbados); however, their database was limited to a particular timeframe, which restricted a thorough search. I did not engage a more systematic approach as this data was to be complementary to migrants’ narratives, and state discourse.

I started first with the interviews given my emphasis on migrants’ narratives, and later commenced the analysis of documentary data. However, I soon found that the process of data analysis was enriched where the two processes were undertaken simultaneously. I therefore engaged in comparison within and across the two sets of data (Gibbs, 2007). In respect of the latter, the main documents referenced in the study, in particular Chapter 5 and 7, are the Green Paper on immigration reform, the Prime Minister’s 2009 June speech announcing the amnesty, as well as the Immigration Act, Cap. 190 (see Appendix D for the Prime Minister’s speech).

I had examined the Immigration Act, to ascertain the legal basis of exclusion of the undocumented in Barbados, as well as the Green Paper, to identify possible avenues of heightened exclusion in proposals for immigration reform. However, the recurrence of the theme of the state (in talk about the
government and its role in immigration policy) led me to further explore this subject. A rereading of the Green Paper and the Prime Minister’s speech on immigration reform, in conjunction with media reports, revealed a discourse of exclusion among state elite. Thus, in addition to exploring the narratives of those on whom immigration regulations are ‘imposed’, I also looked at the narrative of those who determine the shape of immigration policy. It was during the conduct of this analysis that the link between borders, undocumentedness and agency became more apparent.

For my review, I draw on the discourse-historical method (see Wodak, 2003; Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak, 2001a, 2001b; Wodak et al. 1999). This type of analysis is layered, and examines three dimensions – the language of discourse, the makers (forces) of the discourse, as well as the events which shaped the evolution of discourse. I thus not only examine the linguistic components of discourse relating to the new approach to management of undocumented migration, but also the various forces shaping discourse, distinguishing between public and political discourse.

The historical-discourse analysis method was conducive to the research as it can be applied to both spoken text, in this case the Prime Minister’s speech (and other utterances by the Prime Minister, as well as other state officials documented in the media), and written text (the Green Paper on Immigration reform). To conduct this analysis, I read the documents in order to determine the frequency of linguistic strategies occurring in discourse (see Van der Valk, 2003; Lynn and Lea 2003; and Mehan, 1997). I determined that there were four main types of strategies and devices – actor description (negative other representation), hyperbole, topoi, and the counterfactual used by the state. I also examined the counter narratives articulated by
migrants and determined that they relied on actor description (positive self-presentation and negative other representation). This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

**Reflexivity**

I have in the above sections outlined the methodology informing the conduct of this research, and the methods applied. In the remainder of this chapter I discuss some issues which arose before, during and post- the conduct of fieldwork, including their impact on the research process, as well as the steps taken to remedy the limitations they posed. The section is the product of a reflexive exercise, where I consider the importance of my positionality as researcher. I focus in this section on positionality, based on my earlier discussion of epistemology.

**‘Insider’ status**

In research on undocumented migration, the challenge of gaining access can be mitigated with ‘insider status’. Shared characteristics with participants, such as gender, ethnicity, or similar experience of the phenomenon under study, can facilitate access and enable the building of rapport (see Staring, 2009; Markova, 2009; Birman, 2005; Cornelius, 1982). I had anticipated that my Caribbean heritage would have provided me with partial insider status but had been cautious that other traits, in particular my age, gender, and educational background, at least initially, would have acted as barriers (Winddance Twine, 2000).

My gender and ethnicity did play a critical role, but in a positive way, as both traits granted me social capital, and thus enabled access to the network
of migrants with whom I interacted (cf. Winddance Twine, 2000). I had not anticipated interacting primarily with male respondents as the most current statistics available suggest that intra-regional flows are dominated by women. Working in a male-dominated fieldwork setting can pose challenges for female researchers (see for example, Green et al. 1993; Gurney, 1985). Notwithstanding, I was treated as a relative, with respondents being protective of my safety, as well as respectful in behaviour and speech. For example, while visiting a work site, the men would remind each other that I was present and thus coarse joking and expletives were discouraged. This may have limited openness, however, as the men’s restraint may have resulted in omission of other details which may have been useful. The one instance of harassment was at a location I had sought to explore as an observation site, but after an unwelcome advance, I avoided there for a period, before subsequently returning.

The dominance of males may have impacted on the type of narratives generated. Chamberlain (1997) notes, for example, among Caribbean migrants travelling to England, that men provided narratives of autonomous migration, whilst women’s stories reflected their reliance on networks. However, this was not the case in my research. I found that both genders acknowledged the role that networks played in the decision to leave, arrangements for travel, as well as in assistance with settling on arrival. Finally, the preponderance of male interviewees makes it difficult to draw comparisons between male migrants and their female counterparts. However, where it was possible to apply gendered lens to the analysis, I did

24 In the main, my educational background seemed to be an asset with the elite interviews conducted. I was, however, unable, based on my status as researcher, to obtain interviews with immigration officials.
so. This is the case in sections dealing with borderized family and entrapment in Chapter 8.

In terms of ethnicity, I believe my own light brown colour facilitated entrée among migrants. With the exception of one participant that was of Indian descent, and another with Ameridian heritage, the majority of participants were dark skinned Afro-Caribbean. Within this racialized context, where colour grants access, not only were migrants responding to the racial cues which dominated Barbadian society, but they were also responding to racial (and indeed class) structures which dominated their own societies.

In addition to enabling access, my own experiences with skin colour stratification, privilege and prejudice, have influenced my interpretation of data. My insider status was ‘important in bringing internal division within an imagined […] community to the fore […] to understand reasons for such difference” (Ganga and Scott 2006, p. 3). This ‘insider epistemology’ has thus shaped the interpretation of data included in Chapter 5, where I emphasise the importance of race to Barbadian society, and suggest that the legacy of slavery and colonialism has left an indelible impression on Barbados national psyche, shaping contemporary relationships between local Barbadians and migrants populations.

**The exodus and the evolving policy context**

I arrived in the island approximately a year after the application period for the amnesty had closed. A significant number of migrants, in particular Guyanese migrants, had returned home voluntarily, or by force (deportation). This limited the number of possible interviewees and may have contributed to sampling bias, which can arise if sampling relies on
specific (inter-related) networks (Markova, 2009). I was able to minimize this by selecting from several groups of networks (through diverse gatekeepers) so that different segments of the undocumented population could be reached.

It may also have impacted on the type of stories obtained. The majority of the interviewees had remained in Barbados because they had already been regularised, or were awaiting the outcome of their application for status or an appeal. Migrants who had returned home may have haven woven different narratives and identities, as a result of conditions which led to their departure, though it is hard to say what type of stories would have been produced.

Undertaking research in the post-amnesty period had both disadvantages and advantages. While I was not present for the unfolding debate on immigration reform, I was able to examine the subsequent impact of this political rhetoric and how it had begun to shape Barbadian society. In addition, I was able to do research in parallel with the evolution of the regularization exercise and thus interacted with migrants who were at various stages of the regularization process, and who consequently would have a range of border experiences.

**The challenge of critical realist research**

Adopting a critical realist epistemology, ontology and axiology were not without its challenges. During the process of data collection, interpretation and analysis, there arose the issue of reading/ascribing agency to migrants. The concept of agency is an *a priori* theme derived from the literature (see Gibson and Brown, 2009). Migrants did not describe their actions as agentic;
rather their discussions of ‘agency’ were subsumed in narratives of their everyday experiences of exclusion. In this respect I have ascribed migrants with agency based on my own preconceptions (epistemology), as well as formulations found in the literature. I foresee this as a problem if migrants were to challenge this summation, which would only arise from migrants’ evaluation of my analysis - a feature which is not built into this research. I believe this reading ‘down’ is compensated for by the ‘matching’ of theory with (my interpretation of) reality. Although the literature does discuss agency as ‘maneuvering’ (Coutin, 2000b) my engagement with this concept arose from migrants’ portrayal of the activities they undertook when faced with conditions of constraint.

Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) raise a similar concern as that mentioned above regarding the role of the researcher in distinguishing between discursive and non-discursive factors. They identify this as a critique of the critical realist approach, which they adopt, and thus propose a ‘systematic’ method for identifying discursive and non-discursive ontologies, two elements of which I drew on for this study.25 The first is a multi-level analysis of discourse, which I treat with in Chapter 5; and the second is ‘an examination of embodied, material and institutional practices …considered to have extra-discursive ontology’, which I address in Chapters 6 and 7 (Sims-Schouten et al. 2007, p. 107). These I determined through an examination of the literature, which concerned principally migrants experiences of in/exclusion as undocumented migrants, how status and other material constraints

25 Their approach also includes Foucauldian discourse analysis, which is appropriate for their discipline of psychology. I do not apply Foucauldian discourse analysis systematically in this research, but do draw occasionally on his arguments regarding power and knowledge.
influenced their experiences, and the role of immigration policy and the enforcement of the immigration regime on creating and perpetuating the b/ordering of migrants.

Finally, Porter (1998) and Easton (2010) argue that the ‘critical’ prefixed to Bhaskar’s realism stems from the approach this philosophy has towards the use of knowledge, that is, its axiology. For Bhaskar (1975) the axiology of critical realism is inherently emancipatory, since new knowledge is used to effect change in the structural organization of society. Although I had hoped to bring clarity to the issue of borders within the Caribbean context, within the academic community, it was not my intention to carry this information further, that is, to government officials to effect policy changes. However, I do present the ‘language of power’, of those who were othered through the process of bordering, in my discussion of agency (Lynn and Lea 2003, p. 431).

**Conclusion**

In the preceding sections I have discussed the rationale behind the adoption of a critical realist methodology. The principal reason lay in its ontology – a stratified view of reality - which enabled exploration of the undoubtedly complex phenomena of border experiences.

I have also discussed the types of qualitative methods used for data collection (interviews, participant observation, documentary data) and analysis (thematic and discourse analysis) and have demonstrated the rationale and workings of a methodologically eclectic approach. I have shown that such flexibility is desirable given the complex nature of phenomena under investigation.
In the latter part of the Chapter, I focused on the concerns which arose during the context of fieldwork. It was important for me to constantly reflect on these issues, a process which was enabled during fieldwork, with the maintenance of a journal, and which continued in subsequent discussions with my supervisors and other academics. In studies on the experiences of the undocumented, researchers stress the challenges inherent in working with hard to reach populations (See for example Bilger and Van Liempt 2009; Van Liempt and Bilger 2012). It is not that I did not face these challenges – one of which included the passage of a fair amount of time before gaining access to interviewees; however, I found that there were other concerns relating to my positionality as a researcher. It was important for me to highlight these limitations and the steps I took to reconcile the challenges they posed based on the relationship between objects under study (the border) and my conception of how knowledge is possible, that is my subjectivist epistemology (Danermark et al. 2002).

Finally, the research findings relate to two important theoretical contributions concerning agency and the ontology of borders. I am aware that my own biases may have resulted in the construction of particular arguments relating to these two themes. However, I am encouraged by the congruence of my arguments with existing scholarship, to which I hope to contribute with my research.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING MIGRATION TO BARBADOS

Despite the significance of migration to the region, current accounts of contemporary Caribbean migration practices are rare…” (Addy, 2003, p. 382)

Introduction

In Chapter 3, I had indicated that it was important to delineate the factors which may contribute to migrants’ discursive and agentic practices. One way of doing this is to provide an overview of the historical and contemporary context of migration to Barbados. The objective of this chapter therefore is to locate migrants’ narratives within the wider social context, as ultimately migrants’ interpretation of their border experiences is shaped by the environment in which these experiences take place.

The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first adopts a macro-approach and provides an overview of intra-regional migration within the Caribbean. The section thus includes data (where available) on intra-regional trends and most importantly, outlines the legislative framework which governs the movement of peoples in this regional space, with an emphasis on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). This overview is important as it outlines the framework which would have established parameters for intra-regional documented and undocumented migration to Barbados.

In the second section I explore immigration within the Barbadian context. I examine the rules regarding citizenship, permanent residence and immigrant status in order to facilitate an understanding of undocumentedness in Barbados. I also discuss contemporary efforts (circa 1995 to present) at the management of undocumented intra-regional migration through the use of
implicit and explicit policy agendas. In this respect, I focus on the 2009 amnesty in Barbados and compare the approach of the incumbent administration with that of the previous government. This section thus attempts to capture the transition of the immigration policy environment in Barbados, which has influenced significantly undocumented migrants’ status and residence in Barbados.

The chapter raises several key issues. Firstly, it demonstrates that intra-regional migration is a well-established, though evolving pattern of migration in the Caribbean. The perception of a shared regional space and identity fuelled intra-regional migration, of which undocumented migration is but one element. Secondly, it shows that there were parallel geographies governing documented and undocumented status at the regional (CARICOM) and national (Barbados) level. The openness espoused by architects of the CARICOM legislative framework clashed with immigration policy (towards intra-regional migrants) in Barbados, which became more restrictive in the post-recession period. I explore these two issues further in Chapters 5 and 7.

**Macro-Phenomena: A culture of migration**

**Trends in intra-regional migration**

Prior to the nineteenth century, the Caribbean was characterized by various types of unfree movement, for purposes of slavery and indentureship (Ferguson, 2003). With the abolition of slavery in the 1830s, the process of intra-regional migration was accelerated by migrants who travelled among

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26It is important to point out that the definition of the Caribbean being applied is the insular Caribbean, which includes the chain of islands washed by the Caribbean Sea and the mainland territories of Suriname, Guyana and Belize (Figure 2).
the island and mainland territories to work on sugar plantations (Brown, 2005). The contemporary period of migration is primarily distinguished by movements within and between Anglophone islands (as well as from Haiti to the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic). There are also movements from the Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries, such as Colombia, to Anglophone countries, some of which constitute instances of trafficking (IOM, 2005; Thomas-Hope, 2005). In addition, intra-regional migration in the Caribbean consists of a range of trajectories, including return, seasonal and circular migration. This is attributable to the fact that intra-regional migration flows are primarily constituted of labour migrants (IOM, 2008). This view is endorsed by Pizarro and Villa (2005) who argue that high unemployment levels in sending countries, as well as high levels of growth in the productive sector in receiving countries (and attendant improvements in social equality), fuel migration movements within the region (see also Addy, 2003). Thus migrants are typically concentrated in those areas of the economy experiencing growth, for example oil in Trinidad, and tourism in the Eastern Caribbean (Thomas-Hope, 2001). Similarly, migration behaviour varies among nationalities. Thomas-Hope (2005) distinguishes between settlement and mobile communities. For example, in respect of migration to the Eastern Caribbean, Guyanese and St. Kittians demonstrate long-term agendas; however, Jamaican migrants have a practice of seasonal and return migration.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below provide data on change in stocks of immigrant populations in selected countries, and source and origin of immigrants, respectively. Table 4.2 is particularly relevant as it shows (for the period prior to 2000) that the percentage of foreign-born population originating
from the Caribbean is highest in Antigua and Barbuda (80%), The Bahamas (75%), Trinidad and Tobago (65%), and Barbados (60%), and that Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Jamaica are three major source countries for intra-regional migrants.
Table 4.1: Indicators of Intra-regional migration in CARICOM member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>STOCK OF MIGRANTS ('000)</th>
<th>ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (%)</th>
<th>SHARE OF POPULATION (%)</th>
<th>% EMIGRANT STOCK RESIDENT IN LATIN AMERICA &amp; THE CARIBBEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP (2009, pp. 143-146)
Table 4.2: Foreign born population in selected CARICOM member states, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Foreign-born population</th>
<th>Foreign-born population from the Caribbean</th>
<th>Main countries of origin, with % of total foreign-born population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>19,425</td>
<td>15,574</td>
<td>Guyana, Dominica, Jamaica, Other Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>36,195</td>
<td>27,432</td>
<td>Haiti, Jamaica, Turks and Caicos, Trinidad and Tobago, Other Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>23,485</td>
<td>15,190</td>
<td>Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>34,274</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>6,825</td>
<td>3,549</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>9,451</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>25,233</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>6,264</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Guyana, US Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Antigua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>10,525</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>4,589</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>34,933</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>41,753</td>
<td>27,340</td>
<td>Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Guyana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on CARICOM Secretariat (2009a-m)

n/a – data not available
Most data on intra-regional migration in the region relates primarily to licit migration with the result being that there are relatively few studies on undocumented migration. Thus figures on undocumented migration are virtually non-existent. A notable exception would be undocumented migration from Haiti (Achieng, 2006; College of Bahamas and IOM, 2005). Achieng (2006) indicates that between 500,000 and 700,000 Haitians reside in the Dominican Republic, while another 40,000 to 50,000 reside in the Bahamas.27

There have, however, been attempts to explain the sources of undocumented flows and to quantify the number of undocumented migrants moving through the region (Thomas-Hope, 2003, 2002; IOM, 2008). With respect to the latter, Thomas-Hope (2005, 2003, 2002) has attempted to fill the gap by reporting figures of persons interdicted at sea, asylum seekers and persons entering without inspection and subject to deportation. However, this merely provides a partial view of the volume and composition of undocumented flows to the region and is specific to particular countries. Another weakness relates to the definition and categorization of the undocumented migrant. Thomas-Hope (2003, p. 5) writes ‘...the movement of irregular migrants is of the materially poor from the poorest countries to other nations within the Caribbean region’. This type of labelling has a double effect – emphasis is placed on migrants who have a survival agenda, particularly migrants from Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Conversely, migrants with other types of migration aspirations, but who travel in an undocumented fashion are excluded from analyses. In fact, as indicated above, the data utilized (for

27 Similarly, Nation News (2009) reports that 70,000 undocumented migrants primarily of Haitian, Jamaican and Guyanese origin, live in the Dutch Caribbean. The report does not indicate the source of these statistics.
example, migrants interdicted at sea) means that persons who (can afford to) travel by other means (such as by air), are overlooked.

Notwithstanding this paucity of data, some key themes run throughout the literature. Undocumented migration can be both short-term and long-term mimicking larger trends in the diverse process of Caribbean migration (Thomas-Hope, 2003). Secondly, it is suggested that labour movements comprise the bulk of undocumented intra-regional migration in the Caribbean (IOM, 2008). Pienkos (2006) contends that there is a distinction between formal and informal sectors of activity, and that it is likely that the majority of undocumented migration is concentrated in the latter category. This sector is typically comprised of low skilled migrants including construction workers, domestic service providers, itinerant traders, farm workers and commercial sex workers (Borland et al. 2004). In terms of the types of undocumentedness, Caribbean migrants can fit into either of three categories: legal entry with false documentation; legal entry and overstay; and illicit/clandestine entry. Finally, well-established migrant communities help facilitate movement and settlement.

**Regionalism and migration**

As stated above, intra-regional migration is a well-established element of Caribbean consciousness and culture (Maingot, 1982; Marshall, 1982; Thomas-Hope, 1998). However, since the 1980s, such movements have taken place within the context of the CARICOM, and most recently the CSME. The sections which follow outline the history behind this regional architecture, and the legislative framework which now governs intra-regional migration.
Regional integration in the Caribbean has its roots in the West Indies Federation (WIF) of 1958, a failed attempt by the British government to facilitate a transition to collective administration of its colonial territories. There were several issues which influenced its demise, one of which was Trinidad’s reservation regarding the free movement of labour from lesser developed countries (Wallace, 1962). Burns (1955) suggests that there were similar reservations in British Honduras and British Guiana, which had opted to remain outside of the union. In 1955 a conference was held to settle the matter and Trinidad agreed to ease restrictions on fifty-three categories of migrant workers (Burns, 1955; Rohlehr, 2001). Notwithstanding, scholars emphasize the fact that the union did not include provisions for the free movement of labour (Maingot, 1982; Springer, 1962 cited in CADRES, 2004). Prompted by the withdrawal of Jamaica, one of the more politically and economically powerful members, the WIF imploded (Wallace, 1962).

The next attempt at regional integration, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) of 1965, was focused on trade and thus the movement of goods, and did not include any provisions for free movement of labour. In 1972 at a meeting of the Heads of Government of CARIFTA, the decision was taken to transform Free Trade Association into a Common Market, and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)

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28 Using Trinidad as a case study, Maingot (1982) indicates that ‘illegal’ immigration was not a major concern within the region until the period of the WIF. Yet, the absence of provisions for free movement under the framework of the Federation did not curtail migration to the island, which was a popular destination for nationals from the Windward Islands (Wallace, 1962). Citing the then Prime Minister of Trinidad, Eric Williams, Maingot indicates that ‘the expectations of an open door into the island were widespread and had created pressures which were “formidable and intolerable…”’ (1982, p. 16). The Government had thus decided that the solution was managed (planned) migration.
was formally established in 1973.\textsuperscript{29} It should be noted that the original Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established the Caribbean Community also did not promote the free movement of peoples. Indeed, it placed no obligation on contracting parties and implied the right of member states to restrict free entry of CARICOM nationals. Specifically, Article 38 reads, ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as requiring, or imposing any obligation on, a Member state to grant freedom of movement to persons into its territory whether or not such persons are nationals of other Member States of the Common Market’. Thus it was not until 1989, with the Grande Anse Declaration that free movement of peoples became a fundamental part of the integration process. An inter-governmental task force was established to revise the original Treaty, and their work resulted in nine protocols which together comprise the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (The CARICOM Secretariat, 2011b).

The Revised Treaty, which established the CSME, makes explicit reference to free movement of Community Nationals in Articles, 32-37 and 45, and 46.\textsuperscript{30} These relate to rights of establishment and free movement of skilled nationals, respectively. Rights of establishment enables self-employed CARICOM nationals the right to move within the region, for the purposes of creating and managing business enterprises. The arrangements for the free movement of skilled nationals (CARICOM skilled nationals/CSNs), enable nine categories of skilled nationals, including University graduates, media

\textsuperscript{29}CARICOM currently has 15 members, including Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Haiti, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago (The CARICOM Secretariat (2011c)

\textsuperscript{30} To date, the goal of a single economic space has only partially been realized with the formal implementation of the Single Market (The CARICOM Secretariat, 2011).
personnel, sportspersons, artists and musicians, teachers, nurses, artisans, persons with associate degrees and domestics, the right to live and work in another CARICOM territory without the need for a permit.

As I discuss later in Chapter 6 and 7, there was a tension between the rules relating to freedom of movement, and migrants’ interpretation of those rules such that parallel geographies were created with the Caribbean. The selectivity of the categories of persons who could benefit under the provisions related to the freedom of movement of skilled professionals and self-employed individual means that the majority travelling to CARICOM territories for the purposes of work have to obtain a work permit in light of existing discretionary migration policies (MacAndrew, 2005). The framework governing intra-regional migration within the context of CSME is thus at odds with the deeply embedded culture of intra-regional migration, an issue which becomes more apparent with the apparent conflation of the (inherent) right to mobility and freedom of movement under the CSME. Thus a section of the CSME website includes the following blurb and explanatory paragraphs (The CARICOM Secretariat CSME Unit, 2013):

Free Movement of Skills is not a Right to Permanent Residency or Citizenship!
There are currently no rights regarding free movement solely for purposes of residency or permanent naturalization or citizenship. If a person wishes to migrate from one CARICOM state to live in another, he/she must still apply for residency or citizenship, in accordance with the laws of the host country.
The persons who are eligible for Free Movement of Skills / Labour must be engaged in some kind of legitimate economic activity in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy as either a wage earner or a non-wage earner.
The above quotes imply that there is significant movement within the region which is spurred by existing rules regarding free movement, but which falls outside of the designated categories, and is thus undocumented – migrants require permits but work without one. As was intimated earlier, undocumented migration within the region is not a new phenomenon. In more recent times, countries, such as The Bahamas, have experienced high volumes of undocumented intra-regional migration and has a regular practice of detention and deportation (Singh, 2011b). In the wake of the 2009 global recession, several countries in the Caribbean have expressed concern over the numbers of undocumented migrants and their nation’s ability to adequately ‘manage’ immigration (Melia, 2009). Barbados was one of the islands which took steps to implement a more restrictive immigration regime following the onset of the recession. There, the government has conducted raids and deportation exercises, implemented an amnesty, and proposed a series of comprehensive immigration reforms (British Broadcasting Corporation/BBC, 2009; Carter, 2009; Stabroek News, 2009a).

The subsequent section thus explores recent attempts to manage migration in the island of Barbados. As a précis to the discussion of the legal parameters governing documented and undocumented status in Barbados, I provide a brief overview of this small island state. The purpose of this summary is two-fold. On the one hand, it clarifies the socio-economic environment within which migration to Barbados took place. On the other hand, it also sets the context for the subsequent discussion on changes in the political economy, discussed further in Chapter 5, which preceded the shift in immigration policy.
Micro-phenomena: Immigration to Barbados

Barbados is the eastern most Caribbean island, located on the periphery of the Leeward Islands of St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. At just 430 square kilometers, and with a population of approximately 270,000, Barbados easily falls within the United Nations classification for small-island developing states (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries Landlocked Countries and Small Island Developing States/UN-OHRLLS, n.d.). Notwithstanding, the island is consistently ranked as a country of very high human development. For example, in 2011 it was the only English-speaking Caribbean country included in the very high human development category, with a ranking of 47. This placed it fifth among other countries in the Americas, such as the United States, Canada, Chile and Argentina, which were ranked 4th, 6th, 44th and 46th, respectively (UNDP, 2011, p. 127).

A popular destination

In 2000, Barbados was one of five countries receiving the most intra-regional migrants (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/ECLAC, 2006a). A number of factors contribute to Barbados’ popularity as a regional destination. As aforementioned, migratory patterns mirror development trends in the region, with countries experiencing expansion and growth attracting large numbers of migrants (ECLAC, 2006b). This, in conjunction with its proximity to other less developed states with the Eastern Caribbean, such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia, has encouraged migration from these islands. As it relates to Guyanese migrants in particular, seasonal migration between the two countries in the immediate post-emancipation period has led to established ties between the two.
countries (Brown, 2005). Guyanese migrants now constitute the majority of intra-regional migrants to Barbados, representing just fewer than 50% of CARICOM migrants to the island (Barbados Statistical Service, 2002).

**Table 4.3: CARICOM nationals resident in Barbados, by country of birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2 529</td>
<td>4 349</td>
<td>6138</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>3 279</td>
<td>2 805</td>
<td>2075</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>3 635</td>
<td>3 791</td>
<td>2924</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1 829</td>
<td>1 730</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CARICOM</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CARICOM countries</td>
<td>13 488</td>
<td>15 190</td>
<td>14610</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Barbados Statistical Service (1990 and 2002)
* Preliminary, provided by the Barbados Statistical Service

There are no official estimates available for the number of undocumented migrants resident in Barbados. Figures available for the number of applications submitted after a period of undocumentedness (reside and work status) only provide a glimpse of true circumstances. Since 1999, the number of reside and work applications submitted declined from a high of 357 in 2001 to 102 in 2008. However, this figure would include applications for renewal, but exclude a number of migrants who would have opted to remain undocumented for the duration of their stay.

**Migration categories**

The framework regulating the status of non-nationals in Barbados is primarily based on legislation, specifically the Barbados Immigration Act, Cap. 190. In this section, I outline the three main categories of status for non-
nationals - permanent residence, immigrant status, and reside and work status, and following from this discuss undocumentedness within the Barbadian context.

Reside and work status

Permanent residence and immigrant status are the main forms of documentedness for non-nationals identified in the Barbados Immigration Act. The legislation makes no provision for reside and work status, yet it was the main route to documentedness for a number of migrants interviewed. The application forms for both Immigrant Status and Permanent Residence (Forms A and A1, respectively) include a list of the schedule of prohibited persons – this list includes undocumented (‘illegal’) migrants (See Appendix F and G) - and expressly indicate that persons who fall within any of these categories are ineligible for such registration. Individuals in breach of the Immigration Act would thus be ineligible for any other form of (higher) status in Barbados.

Notwithstanding the above, a de facto policy had arisen in Barbados whereby individuals who had resided in Barbados for a minimum period of five years could apply to regularize their status. According to the Green Paper, though not referenced specifically in legislation, such a practice arose from provisions outlined in Section 13 (7) of the Barbados Immigration Act, which states that ‘without limiting or affecting the operation of this section, the Minister may grant to a person special permission to remain in Barbados on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit’. It is my reading that they may also have their root in the transitory provisions outlined in Section 32 of the Act, which allowed persons who had lived for five years or more in
Barbados at the time of the passage of the Act to apply for permanent residence.

Thus under the *de facto* policy the discretion of the Minister was applied to grant ‘reside and work status’ to individuals who were formerly undocumented. With this status permit holders are able to live and work in Barbados for a period of three years, after which, an application must be submitted for renewal of status (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009). As indicated above and elaborated further in Chapter 8, this was the principal route to documentedness for migrants who had lived in Barbados undocumented. Their knowledge of this policy and information from past beneficiaries thus encouraged migrants to pursue this avenue.

It was also possible to obtain reside and work status through marriage, which would have been one rung on the ladder to citizenship. However, this proved to be a circuitous route. The proposed amendments to provisions relating to marriage in Barbados between nationals and non-nationals were grounded in the belief that migrants were merely engaging in marriages of convenience (Davidson, 2009; Melia, 2009; Nation News, 2010b). Alleyne in Hoyte (2007) suggests that such arrangements are burdensome and can be difficult to maintain with the vigilance of the Immigration Department. This did not seem to be a popular alternative for migrants. Among the migrants interviewed, only two were married to Barbadian nationals, though they did make reference to the experiences of others.

*Immigrant status and permanent residence*

The preamble to the Barbados Immigration Act defines an immigrant as ‘a person who seeks to enter or is within Barbados for the purpose of
permanent residence’ (Immigration Act, Cap. 190, Section 2, emphasis mine). Within the Act (Section 6 (1) a-d), persons who wish to reside in Barbados, persons with businesses or who wish to establish businesses, as well as persons who wish to live in retirement in Barbados, as well as their dependants, are eligible to apply for immigrant status. It should be noted that this status is granted to persons who are financially self-sufficient (Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, 2012; Barbados Immigration Department, 2012). Stability of finances is a key requirement for individuals must furnish proof of employment or in the case of those establishing businesses, proof of finances and funds brought to Barbados.

Applicants seeking immigrant status are expected to complete an Application for Immigration Status and Non-national Registration. Details regarding the duration of the application process are not available within the Barbados Immigration Act, or in the section outlining requirements for such an application on the website of the Immigration Department (Barbados Immigration Department, 2012). However, the website of the island’s investment promotion agency, which provides details on work and other immigration-related matters to prospective investors, indicates that approval can be obtained six to twelve months after submission of the application. The length of the application process means that individuals may have to seek an extension to their stay, in order not to become in breach of immigration procedures by overstaying the time originally allowed on entry (Business Barbados, n.d).

As non-citizens of Barbados, persons with immigrant status do not qualify for benefits accorded to higher status individuals – citizens and permanent residents. The main advantage to immigrant status is permission by the
Minister of Immigration to reside permanently, and in most cases work, in Barbados, as well as travel to and from the island without impediment. Immigrant status is the first tier of documented residence status in Barbados. As indicated in Section 5 (a) i of the Barbados Immigration Act a person qualifies for permanent residence after having been granted immigrant status, and thereafter, resides for a minimum period of five years as an immigrant.

Undocumentedness

The First Schedule of the Barbados Immigration Act explicitly prohibits entry of a number of individuals, including those who intend to ‘enter Barbados illegally’ (Barbados Immigration Act, Cap. 190, Paragraph 5 c). The Barbados Immigration Act clarifies this condition of illegality in Sections 10, 11, 13, and 17 inter alia. Section 10 indicates that persons who wish to enter the island must do so at a port of entry and must not disembark without the consent of an immigration officer. Section 11 further clarifies that appearance before an immigration officer is to enable examination to adjudge suitability for entry. In Section 13, which discusses the category of ‘Permitted entrants’ the Barbados Immigration Act indicates that those who enter Barbados must receive a permit which stipulates the duration of stay in the island. For visitors, this period is not more than six months (Section 13 b), but there are other categories of persons identified in the Second Schedule, to whom the immigration officials may grant a maximum stay of three years. Section 13

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31It should be noted that there is explicit provision against the employment of retired individuals, without a work permit. Section 17 (6) of the Immigration Act reads, ‘For the purposes of this section, the expression “immigrant” dose (sic) not include a person to whom permission has been granted by the Minister to become a permanent resident on the ground mentioned in paragraph (d) of section 6.’
also stipulates that individuals who have been granted entry must seek permission to extend a permit, should they wish to remain in the island for a period which exceeds that initially approved by the immigration officer on entry. Non-nationals are not permitted to work without a permit, which is to be applied for in advance of arrival to the island. This provision is outlined in Section 17 of the Barbados Immigration Act.

On the basis of the above, individuals can happen into undocumentedness by failing to enter at a port of entry and be examined by an immigration officer; breaching the conditions of stay by exceeding the time indicated within the permit and/or not applying for an extension in such an instance; and working without a permit. Within the context of this study, the latter two categories were relevant. All the migrants interviewed had travelled via air and had entered Barbados at the island’s only airport, the Grantley Adams International Airport.32 I therefore did not encounter any individuals who had failed to enter Barbados at a port of entry, though it is likely that such persons do exist. Also, according to Section 29 it is an offence to seek to use fraudulent documentation, including passports, permits and other documents, to enter in or remain in Barbados. One migrant admitted to an attempt to procure false documentation for work purposes, whilst another admitted to taking steps early in his arrival to ‘regularize’ himself without clarifying what those steps were; however, the use of fraudulent documentation did not seem to be a practice among those interviewed.

32Though there was one individual who had previously entered Barbados at a seaport.
Management of migration

The Barbados Immigration Act thus takes into account the various possibilities for undocumentedness and in Sections 7(6), 8(3), 13(6), 14(b), 16(b), 20, 21, 22 and 24 outlines the procedures relating to the detention and deportation of such individuals. As explained above, it was possible for migrants to rectify their status by application for a reside and work permit, in keeping with the de facto amnesty policy. According to Symmonds (2008) and Comissiong (2009), it was the practice of the government to grant amnesty to individuals who had resided continuously without papers for a period of five years. Whilst Comissiong dates the origin of this policy to 1995, Symmonds (2008) indicates that it emerged during the 1970s.33

In conjunction with this de facto amnesty regime, the Immigration Department conducted ad hoc raids, some of which were the result of information received from third parties (Davis, 2009a). This retroactive policing is a reflection of its poor management capacity, as well as practicalities of the border. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the openness of the Barbadian border to nationals from CARICOM member countries (a feature of regional integration) meant that many migrants who had been able to enter the country through licit means eventually overstayed the time allowed. The Department indicates that limited manpower constrains its efforts to adequately monitor and track undocumented individuals. It is the intention of the Department to increase its human resources, so as to improve its ability to undertake its duties (Barbados Immigration Department, 2009).

33 There does seem to be some convergence in the arguments, as Symmonds (2008) indicates that the most recent exercise took place in 1995, prior to the 2009 amnesty.
The *de facto* amnesty is generally associated with the political administration which governed Barbados between 1995 and 2008, the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) (Brathwaite, 2009; Comissiong, 2009). However, following national elections in 2008 the opposition party, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), assumed office. This government established a Cabinet Sub-committee on Immigration in June, six months after entering office (Thompson, 2009).

One of the recommendations made by the Sub-Committee was the implementation of an (extraordinary) amnesty for undocumented migrants. Effective from 1 June 2009 to 1 December 2009, undocumented migrants who had resided in Barbados for at least 8 years prior to 1 December 2005, who were gainfully employed and who had not had any record of criminal activity, would have been able to apply to regularize their status (Thompson, 2009). Thus the extraordinary amnesty effectively changed common practice placing more extraneous requirements on migrants with respect to the duration of their residence, that is, from 5 (under the de facto policy) to 11 years. The timeframe thus excluded individuals who would have resided for a significant period of time, but would not qualify for regularized status because they had been resident for less than 11 years (Comissiong, 2009). Based on the strict time frame, and the attendant repatriation initiatives that have taken place following (unsuccessful) applications, it is felt that the Government is being unnecessarily strict and has underestimated the role of the undocumented migrant population in Barbados, which is an important contributor to Barbadian economy (Davis, 2009a).34 Scholars have noted the

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34At time that fieldwork was conducted, applicants for amnesty were awaiting responses to their application. If unsuccessful, applicants were able to appeal, with the opportunity to
importance of migration to the region, and the apparent bias against CARICOM nationals, since non-CARICOM nationals were not asked to participate in a similar exercise (Brathwaite, 2009; Girvan, 2009). The Government has, however, emphasized the national imperative to manage migration, and while acting on this imperative to still meet its commitments to various international treaties and initiatives, including the CSME (Caribbean360, 2010).

Following the announcement of amnesty, a number of articles appeared in the Barbadian media, which provided accounts of the consequences of this shift for migrants, which had manifested in the immediate short-term in the acceleration of immigration raids and detentions (Ferguson, 2009c; Herweg, 2009; Nation, 2009; Stabroek News, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).

**The Green paper and proposed reforms to immigration policy**

As a comprehensive proposal for immigration reform, the Green Paper included a number of recommendations concerning the management of migration to the island. The key proposals relating to the management of undocumented migration included: (1) for persons deported, the increase from a one year to three year bar on returning to the island; (2) the implementation of a guest worker programme targeting workers in the construction and agricultural sector; (3) implementation of a ‘qualifying’ period for marriages of non-nationals to nationals; (4) refusal of citizenship to children born to non-nationals who are not immigrants, permanent extend the right to remain in Barbados, until the appeals process is complete (Comissiong, personal communication, 2010). Since returning from fieldwork, the appeals of a migrant couple from Guyana were not approved, and they have since returned to Guyana (See Chapter 6).
residents or citizens; (5) the increase in penalties for the harbouring of undocumented migrants, including employment (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009); (6) the revocation of reside and work status for persons who fail to meet the terms and conditions of their immigrant status; and (7) the elimination of the award of reside and work status as a condition of amnesty. Town hall meetings were held to receive feedback from the public on the proposed reforms. Following these meetings, the Green Paper should have proceeded to White Paper status, becoming official policy (Caribbean360, 2010).

I should note that there has been a pause to the activities to institute the reforms following the death of the former Prime Minister, David Thompson (See Chapter 5). Although the Green Paper has not been legislated, it appears that institutions, such as the Barbados Immigration Department and the health clinics, have been acting on these and related measures, aimed at further excluding the undocumented. This, as I discuss in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, suggests that the environment of exclusion will become even more exacerbated in the post amnesty period.

Conclusion

This Chapter has provided an overview of intra-regional migration to Barbados. By providing details on the wider context of migration to the Caribbean, it helps explains contemporary patterns of migration to the island. It thus locates migration to Barbados within a ‘culture’ of migration,

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35 Prime Minister Thompson died in October 2010 and has been succeeded by Freundel Stuart. The intensity of immigration rhetoric has declined with his passing, however, the administration remains committed to the mission of reform.
particularly labour migration to destinations with a high demand for labour (and which also enable higher standards of living).

The Chapter also detailed the nature of the immigration regime, again starting with analysis of the migration framework at a regional level, before focusing on the legislative framework in Barbados. This accomplished a number of things. It shed light on CARICOM and the CSME, establishing the parameters for licit migration within the region, that is, the free movement of skilled nationals. It is this framework which, in conjunction with Barbados’s national policy, specifically the Barbados Immigration Act, which governed mobility to the island, and which distinguished licit, from illicit forms of migration.

Together, these two sections point to the importance of non-discursive factors in shaping migrants’ interactions with the border. As I indicated in Chapter 3, these non-discursive factors are part of a more complex ontology shaping migrants’ every day experiences. In the Chapters which follow, I therefore examine the dimensions of this stratified ontology. Drawing on Sibley (1995), I use the concept of ‘geographies’, to explore migrants’ experiences of the various layers of discursive and non-discursive reality. In Chapters 6 and 7, I explore in further detail the non-discursive ontology, when I discuss the geography of fear, and the geography of in/exclusion which impacted on migrants (embodied) experiences of undocumentedness. In the upcoming chapter, I emphasize the discursive ontology which shaped migrants own discursive and non-discursive strategies for negotiating these geographies.
CHAPTER 5: DEFINING THE SELF AND B/ORDERING OTHERS THROUGH DISCOURSE

National borders are the largest means of socio-spatial exclusion [...]. In the national space enclosed within these boundaries, narratives of nationalism have been employed to legitimize the exclusion of others beyond these boundaries. Indeed, exclusionary narratives, which determine how ‘we’ are different from others, are often essential in binding individuals together as a group. (Madanipour et al. 2003, p. 82)

Introduction

Madanipour et al.’s (2003) assertion that ‘narratives of nationalism’ are exclusionary narratives is a recurrent theme in analyses of immigration discourses. Research has shown that narratives of nationalism are influenced by and shape the public’s perception regarding the inclusion of migrants in national spaces; that these narratives, in (re)defining the nation, identify certain categories of migrants as excluded ‘others’; and also that these narratives may emerge in order to justify exclusionary practices (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006; Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al. 1999). Indeed, such narratives become the vehicle through which power and privilege are maintained. The criteria of ‘belonging’ are defined and perpetuated by those in power - politicians and policy makers (Menjivar and Kil 2002; Van Dijk, 1993). In this chapter, I extend these analyses to the case of Barbados.

While I explore two scales of discourse – public and political – I concentrate on how the rhetoric articulated by the incumbent political party in Barbados, ‘enacted, reproduced and legitimized’ (Van Dijk, 1996, p. 85) the othering of undocumented CARICOM migrants.
Here I employ the terms discourse and rhetoric interchangeably. Discourse refers to both talk and text. Rhetoric is a stylistic dimension of discourse, which has as its core objective the persuasion of audiences via the use of particular speech devices such as hyperbole, metaphor and irony (Van Dijk, 1997; Van der Valk, 2003). I am interested in rhetoric as it is principally engaged on political platforms, as a type of ‘instrumental discourse’, where it is geared towards influencing an audience for specific outcomes (Gill and Whebdee 1997, p. 157). I therefore analyse the talk and text surrounding the introduction of a regime to manage (undocumented) migration to Barbados.

A significant portion of the analysis is derived from government documents, and examines the content and consequence of immigration discourse for the undocumented; however, discourse analysis is as much about revealing ‘ideological positions and relations of power’ (Lynn and Lea 2003, p. 432), as it is about demonstrating contestations of such power. I therefore discuss forms of resistance demonstrated by migrants in their own narratives about life in Barbados. I show that despite the potency of rhetorical strategies and devices used by the state, migrants exercised agency by devising their own genres on immigration and identity during the interview setting (cf. De Fina, 2003; Eastmond, 2007).

I should note that in my discussions of the role of politicians throughout this and subsequent chapters, I refer frequently to ‘the state’. Gregory et al. (2009) propose that a singular definition of the state is inadequate because the nature of states has varied across time and space. According to Mann, the ‘state is undeniably a messy concept’ (1984, p. 187). Following Weber, he identifies four elements of the state, but concentrates on the role of centralized institutions and their staff (state elites) in his thesis on power.
Nevins seems to draw on Mann, and defines the state as ‘a set of institutions that wield effective power over a territorially delimited political entity while claiming and seeking to achieve control over whom and what enters and leaves national territory’ (2002, p. 9). I do concede that the state is not a unitary actor, and to present it as such is not only a form of reification but an inaccurate reflection of a reality where different actors are involved in the formulation, implementation and enforcement of policy, such as that related to immigration (cf. Vignerswaran, 2008; Van der Leun, 2006). However, this acceptance does not deny that the state has ‘identifiable behaviour of its own that sets it apart from other actors with whom it may cooperate or spar’ (Colburn, 1988, p. 490).. I therefore adopt Nevins’s definition because it enables me to examine immigration rhetoric of the institutions of government (see also Painter, 2006, 1995), while distinguishing between those actors which challenged the power of the state.36

DLP party officials, a designated Cabinet Sub-Committee, and the Immigration Department articulated an exclusionary discourse which used several linguistic devices and strategies to strengthen their arguments. This discourse presented the undocumented as a threat to Barbadian national space; thus discourse constituted a rebordering exercise, which sought to affirm who belongs within the national community. Accordingly, I distinguish between the state, or rather state apparatus, and the nation. In this thesis, the nation is a geographically and imaginatively constructed entity, which contains a community, within which inclusion is heavily contested through the enforcement of borders (Gregory et al. 2009).

36 This articulation obtains throughout the thesis.
The chapter is organized into three main sections. Before I discuss state rhetoric on immigration, I first examine the framing of a foreigner subjectivity which resulted in the alienation of (undocumented) CARICOM non-nationals. I emphasize that this foreigner subjectivity was a well-established feature of Barbadian society. I therefore argue that the anti-immigration rhetoric articulated by the incumbent party drew on this extant public discourse. I then move on to a nuanced examination of the rhetoric constructed and articulated by the Barbadian state, detailing the strategies and devices used by political actors. In keeping with the discourse-historical method I first discuss the contextual factors shaping the evolution of this discourse. I reference three key events or ‘instances’, which created social anxiety about migration (Pijpers, 2006; Mehan, 1997). After summarizing these events and I discuss the logic behind state discourse, arguing that its ultimate purpose was to re-border the national imagination by defining Barbados as space which was off limits to the undocumented, but open to Barbadians and elite classes of migrants. However, I show that the discursive landscape, while dominated by the rhetoric of political elite, was also being shaped by a number of actors in civil society, who articulated what I refer to in this thesis as a ‘benevolent’ rhetoric (Menjivar and Kil 2002, p. 160). In the final section, I discuss how migrants responded to the exclusionary discourse of the state.

The ‘foreigner’ subjectivity

As I argue above, there was a discursive shift in the political discourse concerning undocumented migration to Barbados. However, the evolution of this discourse took shape against, and indeed was supported by, an existing public discourse concerning non-nationals, specifically CARICOM nationals.
Within Barbados intra-regional migrants were sometimes referred to as ‘foreigners’, a consequence of a discourse which positioned migrants as racialized and criminal subjects. It should be noted that the use of terminology to denote migrants as an out-group occurs elsewhere in the Caribbean. For example, Maurer (1995) highlights the use of ‘belonger’ (which had a legal basis) and ‘non-belonger’ to refer to non-citizens in the British Virgin Islands. Similarly, Olwig (1998) mentions the use of the term ‘garret’ (a type of bird which steals from others’ nests) to refer to non-nationals (including the undocumented) in the United States Virgin Islands.

As will be shown below, the term ‘foreigner’ has a complex etymology in the Barbadian context.

In 2006, local attitudes towards ‘foreigners’ was reflected in an opinion poll conducted by the Nation newspaper and the Caribbean Development Research Services (CADRES) in September of that year. It is interesting that the word ‘foreigner’ emerged in responses to an open-ended question to identify issues of concern to Barbadians, and was therefore not prompted by pollsters. However, only 0.6% of Barbadians cited ‘foreigners’ as a major concern (The Nation/CADRES, 2006). It was not among the top ten items, which included inter alia, issues such as the cost of living, crime, as well as roads and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{37} I believe this low result is reflective not of the importance of immigration \textit{per se}, but of its weighting relative to these other issues at the time of the poll.

These negligible statistics belie locals’ perception on intra-regional immigration, which was revealed in another survey question. Respondents

\textsuperscript{37} Notably the poll did not identify a relationship between foreigners and crime, as is discussed later, but this may be a reflection of how the survey’s questions were structured.
were asked whether they supported the PM’s (Owen Arthur’s) attitude towards the influx of Guyanese labour (his attitude was pro-regionalist and thus in favour of inward migration for economic development).\textsuperscript{38} Approximately 49\% of the respondents said no. This reveals that intra-regional immigration, in particular, immigration of Guyanese nationals to Barbados, was a primary concern. It should be noted, however, that this lack of receptivity did not apply to all non-nationals. As I show below, the discourse regarding inward migration was divided, with welcome reception for third party (non-CARICOM) nationals, reflecting the stratified social order in Barbados.

\textit{Tourist vs foreigner}

Migrants had routinely commented about being labelled ‘foreigners’ by Barbadians, and had noted that this was different from being seen as a tourist – a non-CARICOM national.\textsuperscript{39} Foreigner was thus a demeaning nomenclature, and is a particularly nuanced concept as it has racial dimensions. The tourist – non-CARICOM national, was used in reference to white European/Americans, who travel to the island for holiday. In this respect, Valkeners (2007) notes that ‘tourist’ is an ethnic category in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{38} I clarify this point further in an upcoming section Arthur’s pro-immigration stance.
\textsuperscript{39} This thought echoes comments in a focus group informing a study on free movement, where participants had raised this apparent division as a concern in the session \textit{Attitudes of Caribbean people to each other} (CADRES, 2004). This distinction would have had implications during migrants’ daily existence, but also would have affected their entry into Barbados. Respondents in the referenced study had expressed disappointment that their status as CARICOM nationals did not afford them preferential treatment and access at ports of entry. Although they indicated that the requirement to queue in special (CARICOM) lines and to be processed at immigration meant they were not treated differently from non-CARICOM nationals as expected, the feedback from migrants interviewed suggests that this treatment was indeed a mode of differentiation/segregation (cf. Silvey 2007). I discuss this further in Chapter 6.
\end{footnotesize}
Barbadian context. In order to understand the significance of this distinction, it is important to revisit the island’s demography and political economy.

Henriques and Mayoni (1977) and Potter and Dann (1987) indicate that contemporary social structure of Barbados is a reflection of the island’s historical past. From the seventeenth century, when Barbados was colonized by the British, it relied heavily on imported labour from Africa to support the development of an agricultural and largely monocrop economy (based on sugar). The large African population was ruled by a white (European) plantocracy, which after the end of slavery still retained significant control of land in Barbados, as well as African labour which for a period was tied by contract to plantation land. The control of the majority African population by a white plantocracy even after emancipation was itself reflected in tense social relations of domination and subordination. This led to the inculturation of inferiority among Blacks and the attendant belief of superiority of the white population. Race still holds much salience in this post-emancipation (post-colonial) state, especially as the minority white population has exercised significant control over Barbados’ economic and political life even in the post-independence era (Lewis, 2001; Potter and Dann 1987).

To a large extent racial divisions are still reflected in contemporary social relations. This is manifested most blatantly in the economy of tourism, which is a major contributor to GDP in Barbados. Valkeners (2007) indicates that a number of tourists opt to remain in Barbados and are able to open and

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40 Scholars argue that this leads to ‘white bias’ and the tendency for Blacks to aspire for whiteness (see Fanon, 1967 on this argument). The coloured population (mixed race descendants of the white and black population) held some amount of privilege in society, and mediated between the two racial categories.
operate businesses, in light of their access to capital, an opportunity that is not as readily available to local (Black) Barbadians. Tourists and expatriates are thus routinely accepted by locals based not only on the criterion of whiteness, but also on other related criterion such as membership in an elite business class. Their citizenship in ‘supposedly industrialized, rational, organized and advanced’ societies and their contribution to the local economy in the form of revenue from tourism and business ventures (Tzanelli and Yar 2009, p. 474) thus grants them access to a quite stratified society. The joint criteria of race and wealth would have largely excluded the CARICOM national, as the majority was of African and Indian descent, and from relatively poorer neighbouring countries.41

DAVID: I mean Barbadian people, the people in Barbados country. They treat you, they treat you like, like you doan [don’t] deserve to be in the same country as them.42

SADIQ: Well half the time I learn to doan hear, the negative comments. I decide to doan hear becau’ everyday you hearing something bad about Guyanese, Guyanese. So you know, you get accustomed to it. You just get accustomed to it and just [block] you ears and go ‘long.43

In this public discourse therefore, the classification ‘foreigners’, constituted a form of racialization, which was premised on boundaries of racial as well as class boundaries. The label thus pointed to inter- and intra-racial tensions between afro-Barbadians and other non-nationals of African descent, as well as afro-Barbadians and non-nationals of Indian descent. Indeed, as I will show later, with the evolving migratory patterns, racial tensions may have

41 As mentioned in Chapter 4, this issue of migration from less developed to more developed states within CARICOM has long plagued attempts at regional unity.
42 Int2_LM_29.10.2010
43 Int18_GM_23.02.2011
been escalating as the ethnic composition of Barbados would also have been experiencing some changes in respect of the growing number of persons of Indian descent (Niles, 2006). This explains the probing of the Prime Minister in respect of a perceived targeting of Guyanese, and indo-Guyanese in particular by the Immigration Department (Ferguson, 2009a). These issues deserve mention for they show another dimension of racial tension in Barbadian society, which is typically defined by white-black and black-black interaction, the reality of which is overlooked nationally in order to project racial harmony (Potter and Phillips 2008; Lewis, 2001).

Undoubtedly, this has implications for social structure in Barbados. As Potter and Dann point out, there is evidence of covert structural inequality in Barbados. They indicate that ‘a tacit allocation of space exists’ which is based on racial divisions (1987, p. xxv). Whites enjoy the benefits of luxury accommodation, elite entertainment, and high paying jobs, with the converse being true for the majority of the Black population. I should point out however, that the control of the political sphere by the Black population, as well as the emergence of a Black business class, and their very visible representation in other crucial professions, is reshaping the structure of Barbadian society (Lewis, 2001; Henriques and Mayoni 1977).44

It is therefore possible to suggest that public discourse regarding intra-regional migration drew on embedded social (racial) hierarchies in Barbados. In addition, local perceptions regarding structural inequalities may have been exacerbated by the perception of higher volumes of CARICOM migration, a point I elaborate on later in the discussion.

44 Interestingly, Henriques and Mayoni (1977) indicate that the Black exclusion is a myth which further perpetuations their subordination in society.
This analysis points to the importance of the construction of race and its relationship with nationals’ perception of, and receptivity, to migrants in contemporary Barbadian society. Potter and Phillips (2008) show that black (British born) second-generation migrants who relocate to Barbados also experience alienation on the basis of their skin colour. These migrants point to the division not just between white and black, but also gradations of skin colour and its impact on social interaction. Interestingly, they also highlight the fact that these second generation migrants ‘are regarded as embodied strangers by the majority indigenous Barbadian population’ (Potter and Phillips, 2008 p. 124, emphasis mine). This juxtaposition is important, for it highlights that in conjunction with the issue of race, there is also the issue of national identity, which is tied to the idea of being born in and spending one’s life in Barbados. Hoyte (2007, p. 14, emphasis mine) expresses this connection when he states the following,

...Barbadians who have never lived overseas, who think the world begins and ends at the borders of Barbados, and believe they are the genuine Bajan item, tend to reserve “Bajan” for sons and daughters of the soil who have never lived “over in away” (overseas), and therefore are not extraneously “contaminated” by foreign ways of life, and especially those speaking with accents of other countries

This quote obtains even more significance when compared with an excerpt from David’s interview,

And then a friend of mine, a cousin, we were playing football, and we spoke some creole after, and the guy said, ‘Why all these foreigners coming and speaking all kind of

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45 ‘Baje’ and ‘Bajan’ are apocopation of Barbadian.
language that we can’t understand. Why don’t all you guys go back to your own country?" 

To be branded a foreigner was thus to be considered non-indigenous, based on a number of criteria for Barbadian social membership including race, language and other aspects of culture.

However, it is important to distinguish this public discourse. Not all local Barbadians held anti-immigrant sentiment, or participated in the construction of this foreigner subjectivity. Indeed, migrants themselves distinguished the public discourse by noting that Barbadian returnee migrants, who had the opportunity to travel, and who may have themselves experienced exclusion in other countries, were more receptive to migrants. This is also implicit in Hoyte’s excerpt.

Given the evidence of race as privilege, and the suggestion of inclusion of Barbadians/tourists but exclusion of non-Barbadians/non-white ‘foreigners’, the main question is not necessarily who is Barbadian, but who within Barbados has access to spatial and social resources?

**Threats to the boundary**

Beyond the dimension of race, the word ‘foreigner’ also signalled a perceived threat. This stemmed from the view of scarcity in Barbados, with the corollary that migrants posed competition for highly valued resources (Comissiong, 2009). This included competition not just for employment, but for potential spouses.

A recent cartoon which appeared in Jamaican print media, the publication of which followed the detention of a Jamaican migrant who had tried to reunify...
with her husband, graphically depicts this argument. Though a comical piece, it speaks volumes regarding what is the battle within a small space for scarce resources, as well as the preservation of collective identity.

Source: Clovis, 2012

Note 1: Bubble reads: First you take our men, next you marry them, why don’t you leave some for us?!

Note 2: Newspaper heading ‘Barbados concerned about Jamaicans coming for marriages of convenience’

As McLaren and Johnson (2007) note, attitudes towards migration may not be motivated directly by individual self-interest, but rather protection of group interests, of those within the in-group who may face such competition from migrants (outsiders). They add further that, ‘these individuals are seen as newcomers who threaten jobs and benefits of established native born citizens’
(McLaren and Johnson 2007, p. 715, emphasis mine). Stephanie’s quote best encapsulates this view,47

I don’t know if is because of bad experience or what, but we all carry the same name, or they categorize us under this one category that….. we are always there to do something that … the women, they do not like us because they feel that we are here to take their men, and the men, they feel that we are here to take their job.

A number of other migrants voiced similar concerns, and in one group interview I was asked how I had been received by Barbadians. Their explanation is instructive; for in it migrants indicated that I was welcomed in Barbados because I was a student, and as one not seeking employment, was not perceived as a threat. One migrant, Ray, with a history of intra-regional migration, including an extended period in Barbados, indicates that this reference to ‘foreigners’ was a fairly recent phenomenon.48 However, discussions with other long-standing migrants suggest that this was not the case.

In addition to the above, the discourse on ‘foreigners’ was also framed within the context of threat of physical harm. Thus to be labelled as a foreigner was also to be criminalized. The criminalization of CARICOM migrants was two-fold. On the one hand, as demonstrated in the quote below, they were associated with particular criminal activities such as drug trafficking and prostitution,

While others blame migrants for taking jobs, taking local men/women, squatting, polluting the nation’s water, committing crimes, smuggling drugs, engaging in

47 Int8_GF_21.11.2010
48 Int16_GM_07.02.2011
prostitution and burdening our nation in their thousands.
(Davis, 2009a)

On the other hand, the conflation of ‘foreigner’ identity with Guyanese nationality led some to fear the importation of violent racial tension into the island (a view which was popular on radio airwaves and online chat rooms, such as Barbados Underground). Several individuals lauded the amnesty as a pre-emptive move by the Prime Minister, which would have prevented the emergence of violence between indo- and afro-populations, as was the case in Guyana. In this respect the potential escalation of crime and violence was associated with migration of non-white populations (cf. McLaren and Johnson 2007). Of course, underpinning this rationale was the view that there was racial harmony (a point which was disputed earlier) within Barbados, but also that these migrants did not share the law abiding principles of Barbadians. This is demonstrated with a specific example where one government official in his discussion of a particularly gruesome crime attributed responsibility to ‘foreign’ perpetrators.

The robbery and firebombing of a clothing store in the city centre had resulted in the death of six persons in September 2010 (Slinger, 2010). Understandably, the crime produced public outrage; what was not as anticipated was the backlash this produced against the CARICOM migrant community, given that two overseas students, one Guyanese and one St. Vincentian, had perished in the incident. In one group interview migrants made specific reference to the impact this had on their interactions with Barbadian colleagues, stating that they were blamed for ‘everything bad’.

SEAN: Because I had experience where I working with people, and then there’s things that they say to you, or questions. For instance, when they had the ah, killing,
LEIGHTON: Oh, with the fire.
SEAN: Everybody saying that is Guyanese.
CYNTHIA: Everything bad.
SEAN: Even the people that you working with, gonna say that is Guyanese.
CYNTHIA: Robbery, robbery, everything bad. You know.
SEAN: And you as Guyanese, you feel bad about it.
CYNTHIA: Even the Prime Minister’s illness. They say is a Guyanese did something bad to him.\textsuperscript{49}

Their claims were not unfounded. We see above that ‘foreigners’ were labelled as criminals, a view which soon was amplified on the international stage when the Minister of Culture and Community Development issued remarks which merely echoed general public sentiment. The Minister had travelled to New York, where he made comments regarding the (suspected) identity of persons who had carried out the crime. He stated,

\begin{quote}
I don’t want to be presumptuous in saying exactly who the perpetrators are likely to be. \textbf{But it is certainly not the kind of crime that is perpetrated by Barbadians. It is very foreign...This is something that is extremely foreign to the Barbadian norm} and I am just hoping that the Royal Barbados Police Force will be bringing the perpetrator (or perpetrators) to justice shortly (Blackett cited in Best, 2010, emphasis mine)
\end{quote}

The effect of this actor description is that it labels ‘foreigners’ as criminals, whilst implying that Barbadians do not commit crimes, or at least, crimes of a certain magnitude. It also assumes legitimacy as it is articulated by the Minister of Culture, who ought to have authority on matters related to Barbadian culture. This scape-goating was no doubt to preserve the safety and sanctity of Barbadian space, as it was made on an international platform, and thus targeted prospective visitors to the island (see Baldachinno, 2010 for

\textsuperscript{49} Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
a discussion on attempts at reclaiming space in a fragile island state – Prince Edward Island, Canada.\textsuperscript{50} Importantly, however, by labeling the criminals as ‘foreign’ it added to the already contentious debate regarding the rising level of crime and (CARICOM) migrants’ contribution to these levels. When tied to other rhetoric surrounding the ‘illegality’ of undocumented migration (discussed in the upcoming section), such views would have had even greater rhetorical force.

Based on the foregoing, ‘foreigner’ was thus a value-laden term which functioned to exclude CARICOM migrants based on their race/ethnicity and class. While use of the concept could converge with discourse on ‘illegal’ migration, which I argue it did later with the shift in immigration rhetoric, it need not be the case. In fact, in the Barbadian context the dimensions of foreigner identity were linked to criteria outside of legal status. This point is of significance, for scholarship (including my own) has tended to problematize the use of the word ‘illegal’ to characterize undocumented forms of migration. However, in emphasising the ethical and political dimensions of this terminology on a macro-level, such logic has overlooked other words which have more weighting in specific contexts (see Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006 on the case of Switzerland). Only Cynthia and one other migrant described themselves by using the word ‘foreigner’; the term was usually mentioned in discussions relating to the exclusion experienced at the hand of locals, in particular when making threats of detention. We therefore see here the linguistic (illocutionary) force of the word ‘foreigner’ in the imaginative and material worlds of migrants, where ‘meaning develops

\textsuperscript{50} The perpetrators turned out to be Barbadian nationals.
through the strategic application of discursive practices and strategies’ (Mehan, 1997:251; see also Lynn and Lea 2003).

**Rhetoric of exclusion: deconstructing political discourse on immigration**

Having framed the public discourse, I now move to the political rhetoric on immigration, in particular that which was articulated around the period of the 2008 election. My interest is in how the Barbadian government used particular speech devices in talk and text to seek to convince the Barbadian populace of the need to reduce undocumented migration via a managed migration policy, as framed within a nationalist narrative. I contend that this discourse was clothed in the guise of nationalism for two principal reasons. On the one hand, the discourse had its foundation in the incumbent party’s 2008 Manifesto, which was entitled a ‘better Barbados’ and which appealed to national sentiment about what was required to improve the country’s positioning. On the other hand, it was a ‘defensive’ discourse, which labelled the undocumented as threats to Barbadian’s well-being and identity.

As Van Houtum and Pijpers assert, the fear of losing community stems from three inter-related concerns: fear of losing economic welfare; public security; and (collective) social identity (2007, p. 291). Each of these concerns are mirrored in the political discourse examined.

My review of political discourse entailed an analysis of government documents, in particular the Prime Minister’s speech which announced the government’s intent to implement immigration reform and the ‘Green

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51 The opposing party’s manifesto was entitled ‘Only the Best’ for Barbados. The examination of the rhetorical strategies employed by the contending parties during the course of campaigning would itself make interesting discourse analysis.
Paper’, which documents the proposals for reform.\textsuperscript{52} Within the discursive landscape these two documents were key texts which not only signalled the position of the incumbent government but also consolidated local public opinion regarding the need to manage migration. Scholars have emphasized the role of political parties (Van der Valk, 2003; Rojo and Van Dijk 1997), and political elites (Pijpers, 2006) in instigating and articulating immigration discourse. I view the former Prime Minister, David Thompson, as a key actor and like Pijpers (2006) identify him as a moral entrepreneur, who capitalized on the social anxiety surrounding immigration during election campaigning, and after assuming office.

\textit{The social and political framing of the discursive}

In this section I build a narrative of factors influencing the evolution of the political discourse on immigration by relating three key moments in its trajectory – a change in government, the onset of the global recession, and a change in migratory patterns. With the exception of the latter, which occurred over a ten to twenty year time span, the first two incidents occurred in close proximity to each other. These three events created social anxiety surrounding the levels of undocumented migration to the island. Moreover, these events precipitated a shift in the political discourse surrounding undocumented migration.

\textit{The 2008 election}

In January 2008 the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) defeated the Barbados Labour (BLP), which had had fourteen years in power, in national elections.

\textsuperscript{52} The parallel in the talk of the Prime Minister and Immigration Department are no doubt a reflection of the shift in responsibility of the Ministry to the Office of the Prime Minister, after the change in government.
The change in government represented a transition not merely of administrations but of political agendas and ideology. The BLP and the party leader Owen Arthur, has traditionally been supportive of CARICOM/CSME and an open migration system. According to Comissiong (2009), under the BLP, a ‘laissez-faire’ migration regime operated in Barbados though it should be pointed out that retroactive management in the form of raids and deportation did take place under the BLP administration. In keeping with this framework, the BLP had included proposals for immigration reform related to the introduction of a Guest Worker programme and the development of a policy framework to ensure the protection of migrant workers’ rights (Barbados Labour Party, 2008).

On the other hand, calls for a managed migration regime had emerged as early as 2006 at the DLP’s annual conference (Niles, 2006). In its 2008 manifesto the DLP had pledged to ‘introduce policies to manage immigration in the interest of the local labour force and the foreign worker who may otherwise be subject to exploitation’ (Democratic Labour Party, 2008, p. 35). Indeed, interactions with migrants confirm that immigration reform was a central pivot of the DLP campaign. The vociferousness with which the party approached the issue post-elections, in particular, the summary deportation of undocumented migrants detained during raids, made rights to mobility a contentious issue in intra-CARICOM relations (Singh, 2011b). It should be noted that though the campaign manifesto was quite vague, the inclusion of the concept of ‘managed’ migration was diametrically opposed to the more open system as operated under the BLP. This reflects the view, which had emerged during campaigning, that the BLP had not effectively managed migration to Barbados, a perspective which
would again be repeated after elections, specifically in relation to the backlog in applications for regularization resulting from the *de facto* amnesty policy (Stabroek News, 2009b).

*The global recession*

The DLP’s party ethos was thus informed by its stance on immigration, but its motivations regarding reform were concretised by financial constraints, as the new administration assumed office during a recession. Barbados has historically had a fairly stable economy and until the recession of 2008, the island had experienced moderate but consistent levels of growth averaging just over 2% between 2000 and 2007 (ECLAC, 2009). Between 1991 and 2000, the annual rate of growth averaged 1.4%. After recovering from a fall in GDP precipitated by a decline in tourism after the events of September 11, 2001, the economy grew on average 3.6% between 2003 and 2005. Whilst tourism contributes significantly to the island’s performance, developments in the non-traded sector, such as construction, have helped fuel growth in GDP (see Figure 4.1). A number of public sector initiatives including road infrastructure projects and the expansion of the Grantley Adams International Airport, tourism developments, and the rebuilding of the main cricket grounds in preparation for the hosting of the Cricket World Cup, ensured that the construction sector yielded positive returns, peaking in 2005 (Central Bank of Barbados, various years).
In anticipation of the recession, the Barbados Central Bank had forecasted a slowing of the economy to 1.8% in 2008, and then a rebound to 2.8%. However, there was a severe contraction in the economy to -0.2% and -5.7% in 2008 and 2009, respectively (Worrell, 2010). The announcement of the amnesty thus took place halfway through the economic contractions in 2009 and is a reflection of the governments’ inability to come to terms with local demands on social services, and its commitment to provide these free of cost (at least to Barbadian nationals and permanent residents). In this regard, the Green Paper also notes the changing demographic profile of Barbadian population, in terms of an increase in the aging population, which was expected to place additional burdens on the island’s social services (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009).
**Immigration patterns**

The economic reality was also influenced by the social milieu, which was evolving in response to changes in migratory patterns. The changes related to increasing rates of inward migration, and within those movements, the increase in number of Guyanese migrants, in particular, those migrating with families.

At the end of slavery, and with the demise of the sugar industry, external migration was encouraged in the later nineteenth to early twentieth century in order to ease population growth on the island (Roberts, 1955 cited in Potter and Dann, 1987). Since then Barbados has remained a labour exporting country. However, recent statistics suggest that Barbados may be experiencing a transition (see McElroy and Albuquerque 1988 for a discussion on other Eastern Caribbean countries). While its net migration rate is -0.9%, it has high levels of inward migration, equivalent to about 10% of the population in 2005 (ECLAC, 2006).

As discussed in Chapter 4, historically Barbados had tended to attract intra-regional migrants from other Eastern Caribbean countries, in particular St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. However, post-1999 intra-regional migrants to Barbados were increasingly Guyanese nationals. As is reflected in Table 4.3 (page 89) Guyanese migrants were the largest growing migrant cohort between 1990 and 2000 and 2000 and 2010. Moreover, between 2000

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53 Islands are typically sources, rather than destinations for migration, based on a number of internal pressures; however, financial success and perceptions regarding island life, have made some islands attractive destinations for immigrants (Royle, 2001). Islands are thus recognized as intimately connected to global mobility patterns in light of their role as destinations for tourism, returnee, and retirement migration.
and 2010, save from Jamaica, it was the only foreign born population which increased in size.

While earlier patterns of migration were of seasonal or semi-permanent migration of young adults (Barbados Statistical Service, 2002), migrants soon began to relocate with families or to send for family members residing in their home countries (Holder, 2009b). My own research does not support this assertion, but given the number of respondents it is difficult to make definitive remarks. The migrants who had had families before migrating maintained them in their home countries. What seemed to be on the rise, was an increase in number of families constituted by a mix of undocumented and undocumented parents and/or siblings, which was the result of undocumented migrants starting families in Barbados.\textsuperscript{54} Fifteen (or half) of the migrants interviewed had dependents residing with them in Barbados, which included children born in Barbados (Appendix E).

There is an additional dimension to contemporary migration patterns, which relates to the change in ethnic composition of the Barbadian population. As previously mentioned, Barbados is a predominantly afro population. In 1990, nearly 92% of the population identified as Black. Less than 0.76% identified as East Indian.\textsuperscript{55} However, in 2000, 93% and 1.03% of the population identified as Black and East Indian, respectively CARICOM (2009). This represents a 37% increase over the figures reported for 1990. Evidence suggests that these numbers may have increased with migration, the result of the dependence on migrant labour from Guyana in the agricultural sector,\textsuperscript{54} Mixed immigrant families are a phenomenon well-documented in the United States (see for example, Abrego (2006)).

\textsuperscript{55} 3.19% of the population identified as white in 2000. The other ethnicities represented in the survey included Chinese (0.05%), Arab (0.03), Mixed (2.62%) and Other (0.08%) (CARICOM, 2009).
which is dominated by persons of Indian descent. In addition, the perception may be fuelled by the concentration of Indian populations in the Greater Bridgetown area (Potter et al. 2007).

The change in migratory patterns as evidenced by the increase in inward migration, the change in nationality of migrant groups, as well as the family reunification practices of migrants, helped create local panic about migration. This is reflected in the publication of a number of articles in local media, some of which included ‘reasoned’ arguments for controlling inward (especially undocumented) migration (see Holder, 2009a, 2009b).

The fore-going sections demonstrate that a confluence of economic, social and political factors worked to shape the rhetoric on immigration in Barbados, as advanced by the political elite of the DLP administration after 2008. These events precipitated a shift in immigration policy from ‘laissez-faire’ to restrictionist (Comissiong, 2009). As Lynn and Lea opine, ‘immigration policy is never static. As political administrations change or economic cycles wax and wane, so immigration policy is altered’ (2003, p. 428). Whilst these factors worked in concert, I believe the change in government was the principal catalyst for the change in discursive, and eventually policy, practice regarding the undocumented.

Six months after entering office the Cabinet established a Sub-Committee responsible for reviewing and reforming Barbados’s immigration policy in June 2008. In a statement delivered to Parliament in May 2009 the Prime Minister revealed that undocumented migration had been identified as an area of priority by the Sub-Committee. This speech reflected a discursive shift, which had commenced during election campaigning and which became consummate when the Democratic Labour Party assumed office. The
immigration discourse of the BLP was distinct from that of the DLP in several ways. The first is that it comprehensively spoke to the composition of the undocumented migrant group, noting the presence of other nationalities other than Guyanese, the most dominant migrant cohort. Secondly, though it acknowledged the existence of an undocumented migrant population, the former government had been accommodating of non-nationals, who brought new skills to Barbados and contributed to the development of its economy. Finally, the BLP administration had indicated that undocumented migrants did not place any pressures on the nations’ social services (Carib News Now, 2005). As will be shown below, the DLP constructed discourse which rebutted each of these claims to substantiate its ideology of limited migration.

**B/ordering the undocumented through discourse**

Van Dijk (1997) argues that one of the difficulties in defining discourse stems from the inability to draw the boundaries of discourse. This is so as talk extends throughout time and can be comprised of compound discourses. In Barbados the ‘rhetoric of exclusion’ was shrouded in wider discourse of ‘managing migration’; further this rhetoric was characterized by two interconnected themes: one that ‘othered’ the undocumented, with a sub-theme that b/ordered migrant flows, and another that exaggerated the extent of their presence (and the consequences of same for Barbadian society). In articulating the discourse on managed migration, the political elite collectively acted to produce a ‘rhetoric of exclusion’ (see Wodak, 2003). The representation of the undocumented was explicitly negative and drew its efficacy from the exclusionary language engaged by the new political directorate. These devices consisted of negative actor description, hyperbole,
topoi and the counterfactual (see Van der Valk, 2003). I discuss these devices within the context of the two dominant themes emergent in the discourse.

The ‘others’: ‘Illegal’ immigrants

Wodak et al. (1999) indicate that a variety of strategies are used to form national identity. They propose a four-tiered taxonomy detailing the types of strategies employed to construct national identity, including constructive, perpetuation, transformation, and destruction strategies. Dissimilation/exclusion, a sub-strategy of the constructive discursive strategy, emphasizes personal and spatial differences (1999, p. 33-38). In Barbados, the government emphasised difference based on legal status. The undocumented were thus classified as ‘them’, an ‘outgroup’, and discussed within a negative frame of reference (Wodak, 2003). I should note that the term ‘illegal’ signified migrants’ outsider status in two respects. The first is that the Thompson administration took pains to emphasize in subsequent pronouncements that those who had emigrated from Barbados had done so legally, under guest worker programme and other schemes (Bennett, 2010). The use of the word therefore distinguished law abiding Barbadian migrants from immigrants to Barbados who were in breach of Barbadian immigration regulations. On the other hand, and this is the matter I explore further, ‘illegal’ migration was used to describe low-skilled and undocumented intra-regional migration to the island.

The speech and the Green Paper both describe undocumented migration as ‘illegal’. Thus the Prime Minister’s speech refers to ‘the problem of illegal

56 These speak to the creation, maintenance, change and dismantling, respectively, of rhetoric surrounding national identity. This rhetoric is framed by those who belong to the nation state.
immigration” (Thompson, 2009, p. 1) and the Green Paper to the ‘labour migration problem’, the ‘problem of “overstayers”’ and the ‘problem of illegality’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, pp. 2, 12 and 16).57 The collective use of these two words – ‘illegal’ and ‘problem’ - accomplishes two things. On the one hand, as discussed in Chapter 1, the word illegal has the effect of criminalizing such movement, and dehumanizes the participants by robbing them of fundamental rights because of their status (De Genova, 2002, 2005; Koser, 2005). On the other hand, by labelling undocumented migration as a ‘problem’ it paints undocumented migration as an issue that needs to be resolved (Rojo and van Dijk 1997). I will return to the exact nature of this ‘problem’ in the upcoming section on Visible effects. In this section I will highlight the naming of the ‘problem’ constituents.

Who were the ‘illegal’ migrants? As previously mentioned the BLP government (in the person of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs Mia Mottley) had indicated that CARICOM nationals were not the only group of undocumented migrants resident in Barbados. One newspaper article, which detailed Minister Mottley’s comments on

57 However, it should be noted that there is inconsistency in the governments’ use of terminology to describe the undocumented. Both the terms illegal and undocumented migrants/persons are used in official text. With the exception of one instance in the Green Paper the term undocumented is used solely in reference to CARICOM nationals. A simple explanation could be that the policy makers failed to distinguish the nuances between the terminologies, and thus used them interchangeably. It could also be argued that the variation reflects hesitancy on the part of the government to classify CARICOM migrants as ‘illegal’ within the context of the regional framework governing free movement. This does not however explain those cases where the term ‘illegal’ is used in reference to intra-regional (CARICOM) migrants. Finally, it could also be the case that the discussion of undocumented migrants using pejorative language of ‘illegal’ was to associate the actors with the activity, both to ‘other’ and criminalize migrants. In keeping with arguments which follow in upcoming sections, I lean towards the latter view.
immigration matters during a televised programme, was captioned ‘Guyanese, British and Americans among illegal immigrants living in Barbados’ (Carib News Now, 2005). Thus it was acknowledged by the former government, and had been broadcast in the public domain that the undocumented migrant population was diverse. However, while the incumbent government employed rather broad and non-specific terminology in discussing the ‘illegal’ migration problem, the only migrants included in the amnesty arrangements (and indeed by the majority of the proposals for review of immigration policy) were undocumented CARICOM nationals.

Thus after briefly discussing the ‘problem’ of illegal migration in his speech, the Prime Minister announced an amnesty as follows,

> With effect from 1st June, 2009, all undocumented CARICOM Nationals who entered Barbados prior to the 31st December, 2005 and remained undocumented for a period of eight years or more, are required to come forward and have their status regularized.

No reference is made to nationals of third-party (non-CARICOM) countries who were living undocumented in Barbados. It is likely that they would have been in the minority, third-party nationals constituted the bulk of applications for work permits in Barbados, and thus would have been documented. For example, between 2000 and 2010, approximately seventy-five per cent of the 85 000 work permits issued by CARICOM member states went to nationals of third-party countries (Skerrit, 2011). Disaggregated statistics are not available for CARICOM member states. However, as Barbados was one of the first states to implement free movement within CARICOM, it was likely to have the most number of skilled professionals (The New York CaribNews, 2009). However, this figure raises questions
regarding the stratification of migration flows – as such migrants are likely to be highly skilled, and undocumented migrants routinely commented about the difficulty of acquiring a work permit for their sectors of work.

Although the comment referenced above and the government’s own affirmations seem to confirm that most undocumented migrants originated from CARICOM member countries, the reluctance/inability of the government to publish data on the level and constitution of the undocumented population leaves this point moot. The failure of the government to take account of the presence of other undocumented nationals thus resulted in a conflation of the problem of ‘illegal’ migration with undocumented CARICOM nationals. Further, in specifying that the amnesty was for CARICOM nationals, the government was also able to target Guyanese nationals, the largest CARICOM migrant group in Barbados.

The emphasis on the ‘whom’ points to a deliberate effort on the part of the government to solve the problem of undocumented migration through the differentiation (b/ordering) of migrant flows. In so distinguishing the undocumented, the political discourse implicitly represented the ‘legally’ resident Barbadians, that is, the Barbadian citizen, as the legitimate occupier of national space(s). In this instance, an emphasis on difference was ultimately an articulation of self (Lynn and Lea 2003; Sibley, 1995).

While citizenship was the first order status, there was stratification of labour flows such that highly skilled migrants were also incorporated into Barbadian society in the DLP government discourse. A major thrust of the proposed reforms was geared at attracting a high calibre of migrants in order
to help support the transformation of the local economy, and concomitantly reduce the undocumented population.

Successful participation in a highly competitive global economy dictates that Barbados must enhance its attractiveness as a destination of choice in which to conduct business. Part of this attractiveness rests on having a readily available pool of highly qualified and skilled human resources on which businesses can draw. A flexible and creative immigration policy which understands and responds to the dynamics of business and the international market place is a critical element in achieving the desired level of competitiveness.... Government’s policy, therefore, must enable it to attract and retain the requisite numbers of highly qualified and skilled immigrants in enough time to make a critical difference to the country. (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 14)

At first glance the text above seems innocuous. In these statements the DLP indicates the justification for reorienting immigration policy, which has medium- and longer-term goals. On the one hand, the government wishes to encourage business/foreign direct investment in order to enhance national development through the earning of foreign exchange. On the other hand, the intention is to cultivate a high skilled labour force to facilitate the transition to a knowledge-based economy. The new immigration policy would thus feed into broader development objectives, and in this light appears to be divorced from politically charged discourse regarding the exclusion of unwanted immigrant flows (read undocumented migrants). However, while the incumbent government indicated that the main rationale for reorienting its immigration policy is to attract highly skilled migrants, a further reading of and between the lines reveals other underlying issues.
The first is that by positioning highly skilled migrants in the national development discourse, it valorizes this migrant category for its anticipated contribution to the development of the nation. Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) discuss this issue of selectivity within the context of the EU. Drawing on Morris (2002) and Joppke (2005), they argue that ‘stratification’ of the labour market is tantamount to commodification. They note, however, that policy measures which have selectivity as their bases inadvertently generate the very types of migration, including ‘illegal’ migration that they aim to control (see also Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002 on the tension between the processes of b/ordering and othering). As I show below, this same reasoning went into the formulation of the Barbadian government’s proposals for reform.

The converse thus holds that stratification devalues migrants who are involved in low(er) skilled sectors, especially the undocumented. This is evident in the following statement, ‘The problem of illegality is likely to be more prevalent for persons at the lower end of the skills distribution, such as agriculture, construction, or domestic services’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 16). What is interesting about the above quote is that the sectors identified are key contributors to the Barbadian economy (see Chapter 4). I therefore suggest that in seeking the encouragement of highly skilled migrants the Barbadian state sought to discourage low skilled (including undocumented) labour migration.

Secondly, not only had the state valued the category of ‘highly’ skilled labour, but it also implied that this type of migration was a form of legitimate movement. This is implicit in the following statement, which speaks to the benefits of the introduction of a guest worker programme, ‘The
system proposed would on the one hand, allow for, and even encourage, the movement of genuine skilled labour in the region’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 77, emphasis mine). In the section in which the reference to ‘genuine’ skilled labour is included, there is no explanation provided for this terminology. However, the contradistinction between this statement and the follow-up sentence that the twin objective of a managed migration system is to ‘serve as a means of protecting the social services of the country’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 77) suggests that the undocumented constituted non-genuine labour flows since, as argued above, this category was labelled as a burden on Barbadian social system. When framed within discourse of rights to mobility, such rationale takes on an added dimension. Through its emphasis on a ‘highly skilled’ migrant population the government was speaking to the desirability of potential migrants.

The ‘visible’ effects of the undocumented

Further dissection of the discourse is required in order to understand why the undocumented were perceived as undesirable migrants. In addition to negative other representation discussed above, the government also used hyperbole to convey the magnitude of the ‘problem’ of undocumented migration. Hyperbole is one of several rhetorical devices (including irony and metaphor) used to make arguments on undocumented migration more persuasive (Van der Valk, 2003; Wodak, 2003). According to Van der Valk (2003, p. 330) ‘hyperbolical style is used, in particular, where […] MPs aim to emphasize immigration numbers, immigration costs, the negative consequences of immigration’. In this section I discuss how the DLP administration sought to validate its arguments by the use of hyperbole
when discussing the extent and impact of undocumented migration, referred to in the Green Paper as ‘visible effects’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 76).

In his speech the Prime Minister indicates as follows, ‘As part of its discussions, the Sub-Committee focused attention on the level of illegal immigration in Barbados. The Sub-Committee agreed that current levels are unacceptably high, increasingly difficult to control and pose potentially negative socio-economic challenges for the country’ (Thompson, 2009, p. 1). Aside from a sense of urgency, the PM’s speech was characterized by contradictory imagery of the undocumented, as they were painted as both contributors to and burdens on the Barbadian economy, which is not in anti-immigration discourse (Flores, 2003; Coutin and Chock 1996).

The second sentence of the above quote though concise is quite dense and requires deconstruction. In the first instance, the Prime Minister does not quantify the number of undocumented migrants; he uses non-specific but alarmist adjectives to describe the level of undocumented migration to the island – ‘unacceptably high’ and ‘increasingly difficult to control’. Concomitant with this rhetorical device is the reliance on the authority of the Sub-Committee to legitimate his claims (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). A similar approach was adopted in the Green Paper, with a number of synonyms used to refer to the ‘high’ level of undocumented migration (see Table 5.1 below).
### Table 5.1: Examples of hyperbole in the state discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXCERPT</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF HYPERBOLIC STYLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>It is recognized that the efficient enforcement of existing legislation will require the enhancement of monitoring mechanisms and a strengthening of the Enforcement Division in the Immigration Department <strong>to counter the increasing incidence of persons remaining in the island illegally.</strong> (pg. 12)</td>
<td>The continuous tense (increasing) suggests that there is a pattern of undocumented migration that is further on the rise.</td>
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<td>The Department proposes to strengthen the Enforcement Section of the Immigration Department, <strong>to counter the increasing incidence of persons remaining in the country illegally.</strong> (pg.40)</td>
<td>A surge is a high wave of water which can be extremely destructive, and in this case is a metaphor which is used to invoke danger (Santa Ana, n.d.). ‘Water’ metaphors are common in alarmist discourse on migration (Van der Valk, 2003). Here hyperbole also works in conjunction with negative other representation as visitors (the undocumented) are discussed in terms of violations of the law, and contrasted with those who are legally resident.</td>
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<td><strong>In recent years, Barbados has experienced a noticeable upsurge of applications</strong> on behalf of both skilled and unskilled workers. A significant number of visitors to the island overstay the time granted without seeking an extension and proceed to engage in employment, biding their time until they can approach the Immigration Department to legitimise their status without fear of being asked to leave.** (pg. 16)</td>
<td>There is negative other representation as non-nationals are painted as perpetrators; the reference to ‘added significantly’ exaggerates the claim for the problem was previously referred to only as ‘several… attempts’.</td>
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<td>The Immigration Department has encountered several crude attempts, <strong>mainly by non-nationals</strong>, to forge the Barbados passport in order to enter certain developed countries. Many of them were thwarted by Immigration Officers and other frontline personnel and the culprits denied entry.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXCERPT</td>
<td>PURPOSE OF HYPERBOLIC STYLE</td>
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<td>Nevertheless, the Department has noted a significant upward trend in persons attempting to enter and exit with false documentation. (pg. 22)</td>
<td>Breaches of the law are discussed solely in reference to undocumented status. There is a suggestion that there are a high number of requests, without qualifying those requests, which are also aligned with criminal activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Once these deficiencies have been remedied, the Department will be better able to deal with ingrained abuses of the system, examples of which include: continued violation of laws governing applications for work permits, which more often than not are sought after arrival in country; numerous requests for changes in status by persons who have entered as visitors. (pg. 42)</td>
<td>The reference at the end to ‘original’ problem that has been aggravated suggests that the practice is increasing. It also implies that Barbadians should be concerned as non-nationals only wish to marry Barbadians for expedience.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Department is particularly concerned about the number of obvious marriages of convenience, where non-nationals marry Barbadians in order to gain entitlement to citizenship or permanent residence....There are several examples of non-nationals who obtain a divorce from their non-national spouses in order to get married to a Barbadian and at the earliest opportunity obtain a divorce from the Barbadian in order to remarry their previous spouse. ...The original problem, therefore, has been compounded by the sheer increase in numbers and needs to be addressed immediately. (pg. 48)</td>
<td>The use of the continuous tense (growing) conveys an issue of present and future concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>There are a growing number of cases</strong> where persons who were granted immigrant status, permanent residence and citizenship, are themselves found to be engaged in activities that are in</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXCERPT</td>
<td>PURPOSE OF HYPERBOLIC STYLE</td>
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<td>breach of the legislation. Many of them are assisting persons without status: to enter the country illegally, e.g. by presenting false documents; to remain in the country illegally and; to bring their families into Barbados in order to obtain medical attention and; to go to school without permission and without paying for such services and, to work without obtaining work permits. …However it is clear that a more permanent form of penalty is required in order <strong>to reduce this activity that has added significantly to the number of persons who overstay and engage in employment illegally</strong>. (pg. 59)</td>
<td>Uses grave language (suffer) to communicate severity of problem. Reiterates consequences of undocumented migration, which had been also been discussed in previous sections.</td>
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<td>As it stands the <strong>social services of Barbados stand to suffer from this upsurge of illegal immigration</strong>, along with a policy that facilitates migration. (pg. 76)</td>
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</table>

Source: Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration (2009)

It should be noted that the majority of these examples occurred in the section regarding proposals for legislative reform, which addressed various elements of citizenship and immigrant status. The examples of hyperbole used above convey a loss of control of immigration (Van der Valk, 2003). Pijpers indicates that ‘political decision-making with regard to sensitive migration issues is grounded in and caused by fears of becoming ‘flooded’ by mobilities of an uncertain size and impact’ (2006, p. 101).

The use of hyperbole is not unusual and occurs in other locations where there are data constraints and the government wishes to pursue restrictive migration policies. Crush therefore notes, in relation to post-apartheid South
Africa that, ‘The migration debate...is obsessed with the unanswerable question: “How many?” But neither the ... state nor researchers have developed the capacity to produce defensible estimates’ (1999a, p. 127).

Mehan (1997) notes in his discussion of the opponents and proponents of Proposition 187 in California, that those in support of legislation relied on anecdotal evidence to convince voters of the significance of the measure. He argues that both sides relied on ‘scientific’ evidence but that the presentation by the proponents of the motion were successful as they appealed to the personal experience of voters. He further notes that voters defied experts on whom they would have traditionally relied to provide information for decision-making. A similar situation obtained in Barbados for although the government was not able to substantiate its claims, it used vague language which drew on local sensitivities surrounding CARICOM nationals/’foreigners’.

Secondly, the government used topoi - agreed standards on which arguments are founded - in this case topoi related to undocumented migration, to justify its stance (Anscrombe, 1995 cited in Van der Valk, 2003; see also Wodak, 2001). By indicating that undocumented migration could pose negative socio-economic challenges for the country, the DLP administration relied on ‘common’ knowledge regarding the likely impact of large numbers of undocumented immigrants, in a densely populated space where the government is the main provider of social services.58 The Green Paper contains several examples, the most telling of which is cited below,

58 The quote also includes two water metaphors (upsurge and overflowing) to exaggerate the impact of undocumented migration.
As it stands the social services of Barbados stand to suffer from this upsurge of illegal immigration, along with a policy that facilitates migration. The schools, for example, are overflowing with the number of non-national children seeking entry. In addition the Ministry of Education has advised the Department of many cases where school fees are not being paid. There is a limit to the suitable housing available in this country as can be evidenced by numerous examples of squatting, and sometimes in protected, water zones. The hospital too is seeing an increase in cases where money is owed for services rendered and a general abuse of the system is on the increase. (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 76-77)

The above quote seeks to contextualize the existing problem, and is suggestive of what could happen in the future if the ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ migration is left unchecked. Note, as mentioned above, that such discourse contrasted with the views of the previous (BLP) administration which had indicated that undocumented migrants posed no ‘strain because citizenship or permanent residence [are] necessary to access these [social services]’ (Carib News Now, 2005). In fact, the position of the incumbent government challenged this view, as it suggested that it was precisely the breach of procedures whereby the undocumented access, free of charge, services that would normally only be available to citizens and permanent residents, which in turn produced these ‘negative socio-economic conditions’ (see Chapter 7 on this matter). In effect, by constructing the argument in this fashion, the government located itself within discourse which vilifies the undocumented (Demo, 2005; Bigo, 2004, Flores, 2003).

An independent though supporting argument regarding the volume and impact of the undocumented migrant population thus related to the small size of Barbados. The Green Paper makes two explicit references to small
size, in the quotes listed below (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 3),

The early years of the twenty-first century have presented small states with unparalleled opportunities and significant challenges for meaningful participation in the new world order. For Barbados, this means that areas like Immigration have been brought to the fore as creative responses are crafted to ensure continued prosperity and sustainable growth, while maintaining peace and security.

Proposed policies will continue to be cognisant of the difficulties caused by geographic and natural resource constraints, labour market dynamics and population density. Issues such as migration patterns and the country’s carrying capacity will be closely monitored, given the pressures they can exert on established social services, social safety nets and overall development. The public policy option must always be available to the Minister to justify denial of entry to the country and refusal of permanent status in Barbados.

Both quotes are incorporated in discussions regarding the need for a change in immigration policy, that is, to justify the shift to a ‘managed’ migration regime. The latter, in particular, uses language which stresses the challenges of inward migration, and indicates that where volumes are unsustainable it should be within the purview of the Minister to restrict entry. It is worth mentioning that there is no reference to outward migration streams. This is especially significant in the Barbadian context, for the island has historically had high volumes of outward migration.59 This omission was not missed by migrants. In fact, they noted that a number of Barbadians have travelled overseas for work purposes and therefore suggested that on this basis the

59 Between 2000 and 2002 the emigration rate was 29.8% (UNDP, 2009).
Barbadian government ought to have been more tolerant in its response to intra-regional migrants.

While small size is not mentioned in the Prime Minister’s speech, at the final town hall meeting held to discuss the Green Paper, he notes how size exacerbates a number of socio-economic issues.

We have simply, as in other areas of national life... not acted and spouted a lot of rhetoric about commitment to things that we cannot make. We do not have the financial resources to do it, we do not have the physical space, we have housing challenges and we are having big health challenges in some areas because of squatting. I am not going to allow that to happen.”

In the quote above the Prime Minister is alluding to the nation’s commitment to CARICOM regional integration, in particular the principle of free movement. By including talk of the national size or capacity of the Barbadian state within immigration rhetoric, the Prime Minister was intensifying his previous position regarding the dangers of ‘illegal’ migration, heightening the illocutionary force of these statements (Wodak, 2003), and drawing on well established ‘topoi’ regarding the implications for small size for developing economies (see Briguglio, 1995; Streeten, 1993). Undocumented migration was thus framed as a multi-faceted problem that required urgent attention in light of its ‘visible effects’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 76). The Prime Minister had indicated that it (‘illegal’ migration) ‘can no longer be ignored’ (Thompson, 2009, p. 1). Thus in the Green Paper, the Ministry of Labour and Immigration indicates, ‘it is now time for the [Immigration] Department to go a step

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60 In Bennett, 2010.
further by taking a \textit{proactive} approach in controlling migratory flows, outlining a strategy initiative \textit{rather than responding to situations as they arise}' (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 76, emphasis mine).

In Barbados the political elite in the DLP administration articulated a discourse which stressed the outsider status of the undocumented, as well as the consequence of their presence there, which was in the main an economic argument. The rhetorical force of this discourse should not be underestimated given its source. Riaño and Wastl-Walter note the following: ‘The discourse of the political elite are particularly important, ‘‘because their legislative or policy making positions place them in the crucible of discursive power and influence, namely there were discourse is not merely empty words, but has the direct force of law and regulation’’ (2006, pp. 1-2, citing van Dijk, 2004, p. 15). This is particularly important in the Barbadian context, where the Green Paper has not passed through the required legal processes to become instituted as law, yet the policies enshrined therein seem already to be at work.

The emphasis on illegality in the discourse communicated by the incumbent government, both with respect to its definition and reputed effects, was to highlight the view that only Barbadian nationals, permanent residents, and (based on future plans) highly skilled nationals had legitimate access to the Barbadian space. Thus, as noted above, there was repeated reference to the ‘burden’ placed by the undocumented on national social services and infrastructure. The right to remain in Barbados, indeed the right to access employment, health and education, was thus contingent on one’s legal status. It should be noted that this was not a \textit{new} construction, but an articulation of extant provisions as enshrined in the Immigration Act and
other legislations (see Chapter 4 and 7). The emphasis on the boundaries between, citizen and non-citizen, legal and illegal are thus reflective of the new government’s attempt to reconstruct national imagination.

The immigration rhetoric in Barbados was in the main characterized by a repudiation of undocumented migration. This rhetoric was fuelled by the political elite of the incumbent DLP administration, specifically the Prime Minister, David Thompson, though there was undercurrent rhetoric within the public domain, which was fed by/reflected racially-motivated social practices. I propose that with the shift in political discourse on immigration, which was now framed in the rhetoric of migration ‘management’, there was a ‘convergence’ of these two spatial scales of discourse (Pijpers, 2006). Notwithstanding the above, there were a number of individuals, who voiced their concerns about the new approach to migration management. In the section below, I discuss the role of these actors which sought to influence perceptions about migrants, as well as the policy approach to migration.

A benevolent rhetoric

In this section, I wish to emphasize that this anti-immigration rhetoric was not representative of the Barbadian populace. As I will discuss further in Chapter 7, there were a number of local actors in Barbados which had tacitly endorsed undocumented intra-regional migration. In respect of the articulation of a discourse which challenged that advanced by the incumbent government, several actors sought to influence the discursive landscape on immigration, in particular, in response to the amnesty announced by the DLP administration. This ‘benevolent’ rhetoric (Menjívar and Kil 2002, p. 160), which was sympathetic to the experiences and positionality of migrants, emanated from members of civil society – several well-known
individuals and one non-governmental organization. I note that Menjívar and Kil (2002) use the term ‘benevolent’ to refer to the discourse of politicians. In their discussion, they examine the way rhetoric, which on the surface expresses concern for migrant-related issues, is actually designed to other migrants. I believe this term has much broader applicability, and thus explore it from the contrary perspective, that of the public, who are genuinely concerned about migrants’ access to society’s goods and benefits.

**John/Jane public**

Comments published in local and regional media suggest that there were some Barbadian citizens who were welcoming to the idea of inward migration, in particular because of the perceived value of the contribution to migrant labour to the Barbadian economy. In a BBC article, for example, one national is reported as saying, ‘I have no problem with the Guyanese who are genuine and want to make a living here’ (Niles, 2006). This comment suggests that there was not wholesale resistance to CARICOM intra-regional migration, though there may have been resistance to those who were undocumented (as I had argued previously, the state had equated these two categories). In evaluating these comments therefore, one needs to consider them in the light of the CARICOM regional integration project, a factor which also resonated with migrants, as I explain in the later discussion on counter narratives.

Comments which rejected the claims made by the incumbent government were dominated by several individuals who were well known in Barbados based on their political, cultural and/or academic roles. David Comissiong, who eventually formed the Coalition For a Humane Amnesty (CFHA),
deserves special mention here though I treat with his involvement in a separate section.

Excerpts from the writings of some of these individuals are provided below. I should note that I have excerpted here, persons who made repeated contributions to print and other types of media. These are therefore not the only views, which challenged the Barbadian government:

We might respectfully remind our leaders to adhere to the spirit of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, be cognizant of the human element within Treaty negotiations and be aware of the contributions of the region’s working people and their lived reality…
Where is the evidence of his [Thompson’s] commitment [to regional integration]? Is it in the raids at the bus stand and nightclubs where CARICOM nationals are handcuffed and deported? Or, as Rickey Singh asked, do we see a commitment to regional integration when CARICOM nationals respond to official notices, asking them to collect passports or attend interviews, only to be deported? (Davis, 2009a)

The alternative option, which is to remove those here illegally en masse, confronts the reality that illegal immigrants do make a substantial contribution to the economy and one can go as far as to argue that they are badly needed in Barbados. Although data is not available, the fact that illegal immigrations cannot access unemployment and other social benefits demonstrates that if these persons are here, there are likely to be working and as such are already making a contribution to the economy in some way. (Wickham, 2009)

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61 As an example, Former Commonwealth Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, was embroiled in controversy over remarks made in response to a newspaper editorial (Stabroek News, 2009c).

62 Annalee Davis is a visual artist, whose family owns and operates a dairy farm in Barbados.

63 Peter Wickham is a local journalist and academic researcher.
For the most part and without the Government providing empirical data to support its move, the implementation of the ‘amnesty’ rests on a greater reliance of the popular support that the Prime Minister and his administration receives from an emotive public. Accompanying ignorance and misinformation there is a garrulous in defence of Barbados’ accumulated spoils (i.e. social services and benefits, quality of life, and general stability in terms of currency and socio-political civility) against ‘unwanted’ and undocumented immigrants from within CARICOM. (Brathwaite, 2009a)

These individuals’ writings also included appeals for the incumbent government to reconsider the position taken on the amnesty, a charge which would later be led by the CFHA.

It should be noted that Prime Minister Thompson was heavily critical of these voices, and was reported in the media disparaging the views expressed by his challengers on several occasions,

I have had as much as I am willing to take as far as the unfair and unwarranted maligning of Barbados and Barbadians by those to whom we have extended a welcoming hand is concerned (Thompson cited in Stabroek News, 2009c)

However, I would like to warn of the harmful damage that is being done to this country by those who over dramatise and try to out dramatise each other in their opposition to the Government’s decision to tackle this issue in a meaningful way (Thompson cited in Cumberbatch, 2009)

This may partly explain why those who countered the discourse articulated by the incumbent government did not seem to gain much traction, in terms of their influence on policy directives. This is despite the fact that they

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64 George Brathwaite is a doctoral student undertaking research on migration issues in the United Kingdom. He is affiliated with the BLP.
sought a platform outside of Barbados to air their views, appearing on radio programmes in other islands, such as Jamaica (Brathwaite, 2009b; Davis, 2009; Girvan, 2009). In addition, several of these individuals had gathered a lobby group of sorts, which functioned through online media on the website on a well-known academic, Norman Girvan. Girvan hosted a number of articles which characterised this benevolent rhetoric, and the availability for further online commentary allowed for the airing of additional supporting and dissenting views. The blog of Annalee Davis, director of the film On the map, also served a similar purpose.

Another explanation for the lack of traction rests with the overall public opinion regarding the policy approach of the Thompson administration. In a 2009 poll, 70% of respondents indicated that they were in support of the Prime Minister’s stance on immigration (CADRES, 2009). However, in the same poll, 30% of Barbadians did not support the decision of the Prime Minister to grant an amnesty (53% were in support of the amnesty), while 55% did not believe that the 8 year period for the amnesty should be extended. These divergent statistics suggest the complexity of public opinion on the issue of immigration in the island.

The most potent example of sentiments in support of the rhetoric articulated by the incumbent government was a series of articles appearing in print media written by Lindsay Holder. In one article Barbados - A cost benefit analysis of immigration, Holder mirrors directly the sentiments expressed by political elite:

65 Girvan is a former professor of Development studies and Director of the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute for Social and Economic research at the University of the West Indies.
Across the length and breadth of Barbados CARICOM immigrants, primarily Guyanese, have taken up residence. When compared to the official data on the number of work permits granted annually, including renewals, it is inconceivable that all of the immigrants living in communities across the island could have been granted legal status. Rather, the evidence tends to support the statement that the bulk of CARICOM immigrants living in Barbados are undocumented. (Holder, 2009a, emphasis mine)

As an economist working in academia, Holder’s comments excerpted here (and those encapsulated in other articles) would have given credence to the government’s rhetoric.

The opposition party

In the political realm, views regarding the openness or restrictive nature of immigration policy are often indicative of deeply entrenched party ethos (see for example Van der Valk, 2003). This was the case in Barbados, where, as I explained above, the parties’ views regarding regional integration influenced their rhetoric on immigration. It is not surprising therefore that the BLP challenged the position of the incumbent DLP administration.

After the amnesty, and reports in the media regarding the alleged mistreatment of non-nationals being deported from Barbados, opposition leader and (then) head of the BLP party, Mia Mottley, made the following comments to the media.

A government is entitled to implement strong policies. These policies, however, must be applied consistently, fairly and humanely...

Moreover, for a country where people's standard of living depends on people visiting our shores, any reputation of
Barbados being inhospitable to visitors will affect our economy.
The focus must be simply those who have arrived and who have never been documented. Further, when people are asked to leave that they are given the time to pack up their belongings and leave in a manner that does not reduce them to feeling like criminals,” the opposition leader added.
(Mottley cited in Ferguson, 2009b)

Another party representative, Rev. Joseph Atherley, an outgoing Member of Parliament, stated at a nomination meeting for the incoming candidate of his constituency that,

This government is treating immigration like a political football, where they are playing on the sympathies and anger of Barbadians against our brothers and sisters
(Atherley cited in Springer, 2009)

The rhetoric of the BLP thus challenged the DLP policy approach in a number of ways. It first suggested that the approach was excessively harsh, and in some instances inhumane, a view which opposed directly the Prime Minister’s insistence that there was no ill-treatment of non-nationals in the detention campaign which ensued subsequent to the amnesty (Stabroek News, 2009a; 2009b). Secondly, it also questioned the logic of the approach, since it was felt that its restrictive nature would have a negative impact on the image of Barbados/Barbadians in the regional and international community, retarding prospects for the island’s main sector, tourism. Finally, it sought to malign the BLP by highlighting the manipulative undertones of the new policy, since it was alleged to exploit existing anti-immigrant public opinion in the island.
In addition, the party also sought to repair its own reputation, which the DLP had (allegedly) damaged when it suggested that the ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ migration had been the result of mismanagement by the BLP administration. At the nomination meeting mentioned above, another party representative indicated that proposals for a managed migration regime were featured in draft policy that the BLP had prepared before the 2008 elections. Thus managed migration was not new (Springer, 2009). Without specifics, however, it is difficult to predict the shape of this policy and thus to say definitively whether the BLP’s proposed approach would have been radically different from that undertaken by the DLP.

The claims regarding the gravity of the potential impact on the Barbadian economy continued when an incident of mistreatment of non-nationals (Jamaicans) was reported in the media. Mottley is reported to have stated that,

> As Barbadians we can no longer bury our heads in the sand to the perception that others have of us that Barbados does not treat its Caribbean brothers and sisters and people of African descent fairly and with respect...

> I do not have all of the facts, but if this is the perception of us, we need to deal with it. If not, our social and economic well-being as a people will be affected, as we warned when government’s immigration policy was introduced two years ago. If we are being wrongly accused in the region, then we must correct that perception (Walker, 2011)

While the BLP may have been performing the role of the opposition in being critical of the incumbent government’s approach, the motive behind the rhetoric may well have been benevolent. In the comments excerpted above, members of the BLP have referred to CARICOM nationals as ‘brothers and
sisters’, an explicit reference to migrants’ regional identity, which carried with it the expectation that these migrants ought to have been afforded more humane treatment. However, it should be noted that the BLP was well aware of the rhetorical effect their talk may have had on public opinion and may thus have been engaged in political games (Lynn and Lea 2003, p. 429).

The Coalition for a Humane Amnesty

David Comissiong, an attorney-at-law by profession, and leader of the People’s Empowerment Party (a minor political party in Barbados), was quite vocal in his challenge of the approach taken by the DLP administration. In 2009, he established the Coalition for a Humane Amnesty (CFHA), which he described as a non-governmental organization comprised of individuals of CARICOM nationality desirous of campaigning against the new immigration policy (Comissiong, 2009).

Through various letters and communiqué, including an open letter to CARICOM heads of government, which was published on Girvan’s website, Comissiong made appeals to the DLP to reconsider the amnesty. Comissiong aggressively petitioned the DLP, and in an article to the Nation Newspaper (A message to migrants), he reported to have successfully lobbied for more humane treatment of amnesty applicants, which included the right to remain in Barbados while their application for amnesty was being considered. Comissiong also participated in the Town Hall meetings held to discuss the proposed immigration reform, highlighting principal areas for reconsideration by the incumbent government (Nation News,

2010a). The advocacy role of the CFHA became particularly important after the passing of the Honorary Consul for Guyana, Norman Faria, who had also been engaged in the issue as an intermediary between the governments of Barbados and Guyana.

The above demonstrates that there were a number of individuals leveraging their position in Barbados to seek to influence the debate on migration. Notwithstanding their minimal influence on the framing of immigration policy, however, these individuals presented an alternative viewpoint to that which dominated the discursive landscape in Barbados. I continue this theme in the section which follows. I discuss how migrants negotiated rhetorical borders by creating their own discourse as a counter to that articulated by the incumbent government. I argue that this can be seen as a form of agentic activity, which was an attempt to balance the discourse constructed by the state.

**The emergence of counter narratives**

The Barbadian government occupied a place of pre-eminence within the local discursive space with the vocalization of the ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ migration. These representations placed migrants outside of political and social membership which characterized Barbadian identity. As an out-group the undocumented thus occupied a marginal space, both with respect to their legal status, as well as their ability to shape political discourse on matters affecting their own daily existence. I argue that migrants contested anti-immigration (and anti-foreigner) rhetoric in their narratives during the process of interview. In this way, migrants joined other voices shaping the rhetorical landscape in Barbados.
The taxonomy of Wodak et al. (1999) referenced in previous sections, refer to the discourse articulated by insiders.\textsuperscript{70} Whilst, their reference is to strategies engaged by nationals in the Austrian context, it begs the question, ‘What types of strategies are employed by non-nationals?’ In particular, for those who have lived for extensive periods in one location when undocumented, what is their response to discourses which directly place them outside of national boundaries? I therefore adapt this schema by adding a fifth category of ‘inversion’ strategies.

Delgado argues that out-groups use stories and counterstories to challenge the ‘received wisdom’ of ‘conventional discourse’ (1989, p. 2413). He states further,

...stories and counterstories can serve an equally important de-structive function. They can show that what we believe is ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand when it is time to reallocate power. They are the other half - the destructive half - of the creative dialectic (sic).

While I take issue with Delgado’s emphasis on the destructive\textsuperscript{71} – I use the term ‘inversion’ in reference to migrants’ ability to create narratives that rival anti-immigration and anti-foreigner discourse - I support his thesis regarding the role of counterstories. I draw on this argument that narrative can be employed as an agentic tool to challenge if not shift rhetorical borders constructed by those in power. While Delgado (1989) writes in the field of

\textsuperscript{70} Their four-tiered taxonomy includes constructive, perpetuation, transformation and destructive strategies.

\textsuperscript{71} Delgado’s reference to the destructive appears to differ from the conceptualization proposed by Wodak et al. as the narrative is devised by the out-group rather than the in-group, and thus stands in contrast to the creative (or Wodak’s constructive strategy).
(critical) legal studies, scholars within migration studies have made similar observations. Eastmond (2007), for example, contends that where migrants are not given ‘explicit voice’ they nonetheless speak through memory and telling of alternative stories which challenge the ‘official version’ of events. Though her discussion relates to the context of forced migration, there are clear parallels in the exercise of collective agency (though she does not refer to it in this way) in the story-telling of forced and undocumented migrants.

I therefore argue that migrants are not passive recipients of discourse. Rather, they demonstrate agency in the articulation of their own discourse, which provides a counter narrative. Migrants’ articulation of counter narratives is part of a related process wherein they seek to refute the arguments (and their logic), which other the undocumented. I contend that in these narratives migrants also engaged literary devices and strategies, the principal being negative and positive actor description. Interviewees simultaneously produced narratives which negatively represented local actors within the Barbadian space, but painted positive images of migrants. The reversal of ‘other’ status is thus an inversive strategy. Not only did migrants contend with the “facticity” of arguments posited by the DLP administration (Gregory et al. 2009, p. 371) but in doing so they also confronted the identity of the ‘undocumented’ painted by the incumbent government. They articulated narrative identities which fit with existing (universal) topos regarding the diligence of migrant workers both with respect to their work ethic and positive contribution to economies, which governments may concede but do not (always) account for in the framing of migration policy (Lipman, 2006; Chavez, 1991).
Legally illegal

The Barbadian government had used pejorative terminology - ‘illegal’ - in order to lend credibility to the labelling of the undocumented as an out-group in rhetoric regarding the need for immigration reform. In addition, the government had drawn on migration topoi, which classified migrants as a ‘problem’, in light of their breach of immigration regulations, and the burden it was argued that they placed on society. I address the counter narrative response to the latter in the upcoming section. Here, I focus on the issue of breach of immigration regulations. In order to understand migrants’ narratives, it is necessary to briefly review immigration regulations and the options available to migrants before their migration to the island.

Migrants’ CARICOM status enabled them unrestricted access (for a maximum duration of six months) to any CARICOM member state.\(^2\) Thus, CARICOM nationals travelling (solely) for the purpose of visiting, and with valid passports and proof of funds, are usually allowed entry into that member state. As discussed in Chapter 4, and later in Chapter 6, this requirement was not unconditional, as immigration officials could exercise discretion regarding the entry of ‘undesirable persons’.\(^3\) Indeed, the national airport was a ‘dangerous place’, making ‘easy’ entry difficult. I should note that regional provisions regarding entry made other destinations as likely an option as Barbados. However, economic conditions in Barbados, as well as the local policy regarding the regularization of undocumented migrants, also

\(^{2}\) This was merely in principle. As at 2009 Barbados was one of a few countries in CARICOM which was yet to implement this provision, granting three months stay instead of six (NYCarib News, 2009).

\(^{3}\) The definition of the ‘undesirable’ is unclear; however, the additional condition that entry could be denied persons who would become a charge on public funds suggests that exclusions were based partly on economic determinants (see Appendix D).
contributed to migrants’ decision-making. Thus, when entering Barbados, migrants were responding to enablements and constraints, regarding lack of visa requirement on the one hand, and the need for work permits on the other (see Chapter 7). Barbados was thus a preferred destination for migrants as the lack of requirement for visa meant that entry into the island would have been much easier than would be the case had they travelled to extra-regional destinations which require such documentation, for example, the United States or Canada, where some migrants also had family members residing.

Though it was not necessarily so in all cases, a number of migrants travelled to Barbados with the express intention to overstay. Notwithstanding, the ‘illegality’ of overstay was not lost on migrants. Rodriguez notes (in respect of Mexican border crossers) that migrants ‘do not perceive its moral significance as deviant’ (1996, p. 23). The migrants interviewed did not perceive their overstay as ‘deviant’ given the prevalence of the practice of overstay, as Ricardo notes below,\(^\text{74}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NDJ: So you would have had work permit before?} \\
\text{RICARDO: Never had work permit before.} \\
\text{NDJ: But you were working?} \\
\text{RICARDO: Yeah, everybody come and work without a work permit. That ain’t true?}
\end{align*}
\]

Migrants rationalized their breach by placing it within a broader culture of overstay – and implicitly the culture of informality which encouraged such activity. This was the case as migrants were often aware of, and at times had been encouraged by, other migrants (and in some instances their employers) who had remained for extended periods in Barbados in breach of

\(^{74}\text{Int6_GM_14.11.2010}\)
immigration rules. Thus Paul’s uncle, who had influenced his decision to travel, had himself been undocumented, and had worked without status for some time before applying for regularization. Migrants thus became ‘legally illegal’, since Barbadian entry requirements, and culture surrounding their integration into the Barbadian economy, enabled their subsequent undocumentedness.

In addition to the ‘normalization’ of undocumentedness, migrants discussed their decision for undocumentedness within discourse of legality, by making reference to the fact that they ‘stayed out of trouble’. While this appears to be the result of self-regulating mechanisms to prevent detection by immigration authorities and the police (explored in Chapter 6), it also speaks to migrants’ respect for and obedience of laws. Charles states as follows,\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{quote}
CHARLES: …it’s unlawful for [you] to be in a country undocumented, but yet still that’s the only law I is brukking [I am breaking] in Barbados, no other law. I never get into confrontation with the Police at all. I always try to live a quiet and peaceful life.
NDJ: Define quiet and peaceful?
CHARLES: Well good. My motto is from in the morning I get up, it’s straight to work. From work, back in. I don’t be out on the road less I need something. I don’t be in a rum shop and all. If I want couple beers I bring it home, and I’ll drink it.
\end{quote}

The latter portion of Charles’s excerpt is echoed in a number of interviews. Such comments regarding circumspect lifestyles suggest tacit observance of the law, and contrasts with political representation of the undocumented as criminal.

\textsuperscript{75} Int3_GM_03.11.2010
Migrant ‘illegality’, however, was not a dominant theme and was raised in only six of thirty interviews. What punctuated nearly all the interviews were stories related to exploitation by employers, as well as stories which vilified the Barbadian Immigration Department, the latter being more popular in group interviews. In the case of the former, migrants noted issues such as the misappropriation of tax contributions, non-payment of wages, and undue termination. Such narratives resonate with arguments of morality put forward in other contexts by the undocumented. Gomberg-Muñoz (2010) for example notes that undocumented Mexican migrants use narratives which emphasise their strong work ethic juxtaposed with the abuse they encountered in work environments, to counter stereotypes of the undocumented as criminal. These stories not only counter dominant discourse, but invert the roles of protagonists, for it is now those in positions of power who are cast as criminal. This was especially the case for narratives regarding the regulation of external and internal borders by immigration officials in Barbados. In twenty-three cases migrants narrated their own stories, or those of other migrants, relating incidents which they interpreted as miscarriages of justice. In such narratives they downplayed their own role in the decision for undocumentedness, and instead noted the severity of measures employed by immigration officials. In two instances, migrants went as far as suggesting that legal status was itself insecure since Immigration officers had the power to ‘make you undocumented’ as was stated by Leighton.76

These stories often referred to the intensity of interrogation relating to the verification of claims on entry, summary detention and deportation, as well

76 Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
as the refusal of claims for amnesty, the latter two holding special significance following the 2009 amnesty period. The example of Maya, who recounts her experience at having been turned away at the airport on her first attempt to travel, is particularly poignant.\(^{77}\)

... So they turned me back, yeah and they just keep you in this ignorant cold, cold room, that is so damn cold, extremely cold, for what reason I don’t know. It was like a pain, because you...ok, you getting turned back, tell me why. You know? Tell me the reason why, let me know when I’ll be leaving, let me know where you going be. [They] just have in this room and then next thing I know you come and tell me alright, come. 
... Cause even if I can’t come in tell me a reason why, fine. Give me a reason why. And then, let me know, ‘Well m’am, we securing a plane, a flight for you to get back out.’ But don’t got me sit down there, you hungry, you ain’t eating nothing, pregnant women, women with children, and -
... Yes, and only Guyanese going in this room. So I find this very prejudiced, yeah, if you ask my opinion. Very, very, prejudiced, ‘cause only Guyanese go into this room. For what reason I don’t know, what point they trying to prove?

In the latter half of her narrative Maya makes one principal point which ties back to arguments made earlier regarding the content of the rhetorical borders articulated by the state. This relates primarily to the targeting of Guyanese nationals. In Maya’s opinion, only Guyanese were being unduly detained by the state. She seems to go further by alluding that the repatriation activities employed were unwarranted despite the fact she intended to overstay. Thus Maya’s narrative and the stories of other migrants also consisted of negative other representation, which shifted the blame for their undocumented status to Barbadian immigration officials,

\(^{77}\) Int5_GF_12.11.2010
who were portrayed as unjust in the execution their activities to monitor and regulate immigration.

However, there was one instance where an interviewee seemed to justify the ‘othering’ of non-nationals, in particular Guyanese migrants. In his narrative, Ricardo indicates that Guyanese migrants engage in several underhanded activities (including criminal behaviour) which encourage the negative perception (re)produced in Barbados. Whilst this narrative is inconsistent with that produced by the majority of migrants, ultimately it supports the less dominant narrative regarding illegality as Ricardo indirectly points to the need for observance of the law (especially) by the undocumented. He further indicates that -

...within it all there is some Guyanese that made contribution here, and continue to, and living a decent life. But they might not want to paint that picture. They want to paint it as though everybody bad. So I feel is more gotta do with government policies and how they deal with Guyanese, not only, but people from the wider Caribbean, you know.

Through the quote above Ricardo succinctly argues that there is a deliberate agenda to other undocumented CARICOM nationals, as was previously discussed. What is also clear is that in their every day existence migrants live lives which directly negate images presented by members of the political elite, as was discussed earlier. Like Ricardo, other migrants sought to emphasise this alternate existence through other forms of positive self-presentation relating to their contribution to the Barbadian economy.

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78 Int6_GM_14.11.2010
Better for Barbados

The most vivid illustration of positive self-presentation among migrants was reference to the work ethic of the undocumented. Recall Gomberg-Muñoz’s assertion, mentioned above, regarding the work ethic of undocumented Mexican migrants (2010). She argues that they have cultivated a social identity as ‘hard workers’, but that this has negative consequences including subordination within the local labour market, which is also seen in the Barbadian context. Thus lack of job insecurity, as well as competition in the market place, both compelled migrants to work for extensive hours.

I believe migrants’ reference to hard work had additional explanatory power. On the one hand, they concretized migrants’ claims regarding the goal-oriented nature of their migration project. Hard work was essential in order to be able to remit money to their families and for the longer-term to contribute to savings which would lead to the realization of projects in their home country, such as investment in mining operations, or the building of a house. Also, hard work was necessary because of the high cost of living in Barbados. Several migrants mentioned not anticipating the magnitude of expenses, which resulted in their extending the migration project to periods well beyond their original intentions. Stephanie’s narrative reveals the complexity of personal demands and those made by employers:79

... I’m working in construction, and you have such a hard time, because I mean we are at work, and the Bajans have like, they doan [don’t] want to work, they will come to work and just like, lyme (socialize) and whatsoever, I mean that those that are illegal and those that are on work permit, they know that if they doan work, or if they doan perform like how they supposed to perform, they couldn’t

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79 Int8_GF_21.11.2010
actually lose their job. So, I mean, you have to work. Or they (Barbadians) might ask you to work on like Saturdays or Sundays, they (Barbadians) say they doan want to work, but you now you know that you have bills, and you have family at home to send things to, so you have to work, you understand. So when you work now, it will create a problem.

However, reference to the work ethic of migrants also highlighted the *raison d’être* of non-nationals. Local employers needed (undocumented) non-national workers because local workers were not industrious. This is alluded to in Stephanie’s quote, but is also referenced in the narrative of other migrants. For example, Leighton in a group interview opines as follows, ‘We doing better work, we could work more, we working Sunday to Sunday, where they doan work we work till 6:00 in the night, they work 4:30, ‘cau [because] they doan waan work overtime….’.

An interview with an expert in the trade union movement confirmed migrants’ narrative.

When highlighting their importance within the local labour market, migrants also discussed their contribution to nation building. This was explicitly mentioned by two migrants, one which made direct reference to the contribution of nationals from his home country, the other who spoke using quite specific language regarding his personal contribution (work on key infrastructure projects). As discussed above, migrants’ role in the development of Barbados was noted by the Prime Minister in his speech, but this lost its significance when contrasted against the ‘burden’ placed on Barbadian social services and economy by non-nationals. In one group interview migrants reclaimed this space by pointing to the dependence of the Barbadian economy not just on migrant labour, but on the purchasing power

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80 Int_11_GM_GM_GM_22.01.2011
of non-nationals, noting the negative impact that a decline in demand attributed to (forced) return migration was having on the food and transportation sectors.

However, there was another component to this narrative, which was not as clearly expressed by migrants, but was implicit in statements made. Ironically, it is with this theme that migrants directly confronted the anti-immigration rhetoric articulated by the Barbadian government. Migrants indicated that they did not (always) benefit from social services provided. With respect to health specifically, migrants indicated that they sought attention from private doctors. Where they did seek attention at public facilities migrants paid for these services, and expressed concern over the high cost of care. One migrant, who suffered from a chronic illness, lamented not having access to medical attention (and other benefits such as unemployment), despite the fact that she paid taxes. Indeed several other migrants indicated that they paid income tax and national insurance whilst undocumented.

Discourse relating to the payment of taxes was one mechanism employed by migrants to counter the narrative of migrants as burden on the public purse. The payment of taxes was meant to convey not just migrants’ right to social services, but also to rhetorically include them within the parameters which revolved around Barbadian citizenship. Migrants’ countered both the

81 The National Insurance Scheme is a contributory scheme allowing individuals to make claims for social security benefits in the case such as illness, injury, or old age (Barbados National Insurance Scheme, 2013). An interview with a high level executive of the National Insurance Scheme confirmed that all contributors irrespective of immigrant status could claim access to benefits. It is likely that Joy, the migrant in this example, as well as other migrants, did not claim such benefits for fear of detection. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.
rhetorical and practical realities of their exclusion by stressing the similarities between their responsible citizenship, and that of tax-paying citizens, as expressed in David’s comment below.

...I pay my national, my NIS and Income tax, [tax] for my car and stuff. So you could say that there isn’t anything that, the only difference with Barbadians right now, and me is that they born here, that’s the only thing....Is still another country, but everything else I’m doing. They pay national insurance, I pay the same thing too. They pay tax, I pay the same thing. That’s the only difference that they born and come from this country.

Indeed, as suggested above, not only were migrants not a drain on social services provided by the state, but they also contributed to economic stability with the payment of taxes. Moreover, by highlighting their contribution, and not the burden of their presence, migrants suggest that it was ‘better for Barbados’ that they remain there, thus contradicting the view expressed by the DLP during their electoral campaign (and subsequent administration) that it would be better for Barbados if undocumented migration be reduced significantly.

Refusing Bajan identity and nationality

Examination of migrants’ discourse surrounding (national) identity reveals that they rejected Barbadian identity, and the prospect of obtaining citizenship. According to Landau and Freemantle (2010), this refusal to acknowledge aspirations of assimilation or permanent settlement is a rhetorical strategy. Landau and Freemantle (2010) discuss the experiences of migrants residing in Johannesburg but there are parallels between their work, and my own research. When asked about their future plans, migrants

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82 Int2_LM_29.10.2010
routinely indicated that they would return home, and that even if they were able to regularize their status, would always consider themselves nationals of their home countries. Migrants thus engaged a rhetoric of self-exclusion.

At the initial stages such admissions were difficult to come to terms with. A discussion with Leighton, Cynthia and Sheldon, helped clarify migrants’ rationale.³³

LEIGHTON: .... With the amount a cry last year with everybody door that get knock down, and sent home, with everybody saying it wasn’t true, and my neighbour getting the same problem and the TV and media saying is not true that no Police wasn’t coming at what time and I telling you that they was there. So you telling me if them things happening I can’t stay. And I put it so. There is people living here, Jamaican friends that I have who in their seventy and eighty year who travelling back home. This is... the car that I have, the fellow give me from St. Lucia. He was here, for over how much, forty-seven years, and he return. Pack everything, and just pack one day and tell me drop him to the airport and take the car. He return [home]. So I can’t make a difference. So I won’t come and fool myself. And even see if I buy or do something, is for business, and is for a time. But my home is Guyana, believe me.

CYNTHIA: I normally say that, I say, Guyana does always be my home.

LEIGHTON: All the time. No matter if I fool myself.

CYNTHIA: At the moment, let me tell you if I get, that is how it, so bad, that if I get... I play the lottery and I win tomorrow. Believe you me,

LEIGHTON: Is home.

CYNTHIA: I am on the next flight, even if I get ten thousand, twenty thousand....

LEIGHTON: Home.

CYNTHIA: The next flight is home (claps hands).

³³Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
The excerpt above emphasizes the psychological dimension of the othering migrants experienced, which propelled them, even after an extensive period of time in Barbados to return home. The comment by Leighton is particularly instructive, for he indicates that it is foolhardy for migrants’ to expect to be integrated into society, and thus the journey to Barbados is inherently transitory. Therefore, as Landau and Freemantle (2010) argue, the rhetoric of self-exclusion is a tactic employed by migrants to negotiate restrictive immigration regimes and xenophobia which they encounter.

Kozlowska (2010) offers a similar argument, noting that migrants’ rhetoric takes the form of dual exclusion. On the one hand it stigmatises nationals (in her case British and by extension European nationals were othered by Poles). On the other hand, her interviewees also constructed a negative identity of the migrant. By referencing the suffering experienced by migrants, interviewees underscored the inconvenience of being a migrant. It is important to note that it was not a negative representation of their nationality, but a reflection of migrants’ experience as foreigners in a strange country.

In a continuation of the discussion between Leighton, Cynthia and Sheldon, Cynthia notes the following, ‘….Barbados will never be home for me. I will always be a foreigner. And a migrant’. Like Kozlowska I believe that this rhetoric was a strategy employed by migrants to cope with their positionality in Barbadian society. Migrants did not necessarily aspire to have Barbadian nationality. In fact, the preferred option was to persist in undocumentedness with migrants choosing to regularize only where this furthered their migration aspirations.

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84 Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
Another interesting feature of this rhetoric of rejection is the imputing of Barbadian identity to Barbadian non-nationals. Migrants would ironically refer to fellow migrants whom they felt had betrayed or mistreated them as ‘Baje’. According to Hoyte (2007), it is generally considered an accolade when visitors are so described. He indicates that ‘if you are ever told “you is jes like a Bajan” [you are just like a Barbadian], that is meant to complement you for your Bajan-like manner and conduct’ (Hoyte, 2007, p. 13). Interviewees adopted this saying but used it as a critique, which signaled that they largely associated Barbadian nationals with behaviours which were negative. As indicated above, this emerged in discussions regarding Barbadians’ poor work ethic. It also emerged in narratives referencing the inhospitable nature of Barbadians who espoused anti-foreigner sentiments, which was in direct contrast to the welcoming and open demeanour reportedly extended by Guyanese to intra-regional visitors to their country. Interviewees argued that this disposition was in keeping with visitors’ shared humanity and regional identity.

**A regional identity**

The narratives further reveal that migrants’ concept of identity was broader than Barbadian citizenship. For the interviewees, identity was based on shared regional identity, which stemmed from migrants’ understanding of regional politics.

The notion of a shared identity was as much a part of the political and historical landscape as it was of the literary culture (if indeed the two can be separate). Rohlehr (2001) provides various examples in music where calypsonian artists issue calls for a regional framework. The chorus of Stalin’s *Caribbean Unity* (Stalin, 1979 cited in Rohlehr, 2001), which draws on...
ethno-historical components of Caribbean identity, that is, the shared experience of slavery and plantation economy, vividly captures this idea,

Dem is one race  
De Caribbean man  
From the same place  
De Caribbean man  
That make the same trip  
De Caribbean man  
On the same ship  
De Caribbean man  
So we must push one common intention  
For a better life in the region  
For we woman  
And we children  
Dat must be the ambition of the Caribbean man  
De Caribbean man, De Caribbean man

Migrants no doubt would have been exposed to this music – this genre of music is especially popular in the Eastern Caribbean - and this in conjunction with their contemporary experiences of regionalism, through migration, shaped their views on regional identity. Thus elements of Stalin’s ballad are mirrored in migrants’ narratives where racial and regional identities were interwoven. This is reflected in the excerpt below, 85

SEAN: They are pointing about unity, CSME…  
CYNTHIA: That dead.  
SEAN: It will neva happen. It will neva happen. CSME will never happen. And black people just, we just fighting against each other. And the people that hitting we and hurting we, is black people just like weself. And just because you from a next country you get treated worse…. And your country lower than my country.

85 Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
Yet, this perception of a shared regional identity was as much an expectation as it was an ideal. For example, Ray, indicated that he wished for the day where ‘the Caribbean is one and people are able to travel with just a national ID card and nobody doan [don’t] ask when you coming or going’.\textsuperscript{86} Such sentiments mirror the intentions of the framers of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the legislation governing the establishment of the CSME. There is thus evidence that there is distance between the regional and national policy frameworks governing migration. Further, there is evidence that migrants may have conflated the rights to mobility under the CSME, and thus entry into Barbados, with full rights to the Barbadian space.

Sadiq’s narrative sheds some light on this argument,\textsuperscript{87} I mean, people spend [their] money to come right, and work, right and, if you not getting into problems, and you working honestly, I mean it doesn’t give you the right to be in a man country illegally, right, what I saying is that this is the Caribbean, and all a we as Caribbean people and black people, ... But I mean, the Caribbean very small, and we need each other.

Sadiq’s narrative implies the need for migrant labour, though this is grafted into a broader goal of regional development. Interestingly, Saqid’s narrative also implies the need for a universal rather than stratified approach to migration management, as had been proposed by the incumbent government. In particular, it confronts the differentiation and stratification of the Barbadian society, a feature of which was the exclusion of ‘foreigners’.

In articulating a shared regional identity migrants thus extended the social geography of Barbados. In this new geography Barbados becomes terrain

\textsuperscript{86} Int16_GM_07.02.2011
\textsuperscript{87} Int18_GM_23.02.2011
that is open to the entry and residence (and all this would entail) of black Caribbean citizens. I suggest that this not only explains why undocumented nationals opted for Barbados, but also why migrants engaged in behaviour, which would be categorized as unlawful, such as working without documentation.

This strategy of inclusion which draws on a common identity is of course not peculiar to Caribbean migrants. Landau and Freemantle (2010) in their explanation of ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ suggest that migrants to South Africa make claims to membership by appealing to a mix of Pan-African (and other liberation) philosophies. For Landau and Freemantle (2010) this brand of cosmopolitanism is not transnational for the migrant is not bound to a particular locale, but rather seeks to gain access to multiple cities, and thus remains open to multiple identities. Given the history of intra-regional migration within the Caribbean this form of cosmopolitanism is central, though I would add, based on previous discussion, that migrants still cling to their national identities irrespective of their place of ‘settlement’. Migrants’ espousal of a regional identity is thus strategic in so far as it facilitates their migration to, and integration in, host societies.

Before I conclude this section, I would like to emphasize that there is evidence that migrants drew on this regional identity because of the circumstances of exclusion which shaped their migration experience. Thus, interviewees also employed exclusionary rhetoric in discussions surrounding access by migrants in their own home countries. David provides a rather vivid illustration.88

88 Int2_LM_29.10.2010
NDJ: Do you think that if the situation was in the reverse that you would treat them like that, so if you were in St. Lucia and they came to work there?
DAVID: Wow. That’s a big one. I don’t know, maybe I would treat them the same way. That question is pretty tough. Thinking like somebody come from overseas come into your country and get your job, and you’re jobless, to me, I think I would treat them the same way.
NDJ: So, you think that if you are a national of a country then that you are more entitled to the, to the benefits of that country ..?
DAVID: Yah
NDJ: So you should get priority over somebody?
DAVID: You should get priority first.
NDJ: Really?
DAVID: Yeah.
NDJ: Ok, Why is that?
DAVID: Why? ‘Cause you’re a citizen of that country, you supposed to get before anybody. You supposed to get what the country has to offer. ‘You were born in that country, so you have to get whatever that country has for you, you have to get it.

David is a rare case for the majority of the interviewees indicated that had the situation been in reverse they would have been hospitable to non-nationals, including Barbadians. It is difficult to say, however, how sincere these claims were. Migrants had stressed the conditions of exclusion (prompted by intra-racial inequalities), which had prompted their leaving Guyana for Barbados.89 In a tense environment with scarce resources, migrants may well have argued as David did above.

Conclusion

In this chapter I analyzed the public and political discourses on immigration and thus provided details of the pretext and the linguistic dimensions of

89 See UNCHR (2009).
exclusion in Barbados. This review indicates that in the main the Barbadian government and populace constructed and articulated rhetorical borders based on race, national identity and legality. Together, these discourses were marked by Manichean and metonymic divisions (Wodak, 2003), which can be grouped into a number of overlapping categories: citizen/non-citizen; tourist/foreigner; legal/illegal; Barbadian/non-Barbadian; and white/afro; white/indo; afro/indo.

I also showed that the rhetorical landscape was marked by contestations of power, between the government and some elements of civil society, as well as between the government and the undocumented, emphasising the latter. I argued that the undocumented were not passive recipients of anti-immigration discourse. Rather, they exercised agency by producing their own narratives, which had circulated within their communities (Delgado, 1989) and which they sought to take to a wider platform in the interview setting. Such ‘inversion’ strategies, suggest that agency is present among migrants, even in instances where the discursive, policy and social practices of more powerful actors does not seem to be transformed.

I therefore posit that an examination of migrants’ narratives is equally as important as a discussion of public and political discourse on the subject. This is so, as narratives not only reflect points of contestation, but also reflect migrants’ own attempts at identity-making in places and spaces of exclusion. In this regard, migrants devise ‘imaginative counter-geographies [which] are deliberate attempts to displace, subvert and contest the imaginative geographies installed by dominant regimes of power, practice and representation’ (Gregory et al. 2009, p. 369). With such narratives, not only do migrants articulate a narrative that is counter to dominant anti-
immigration rhetoric, but they also articulate a narrative that legitimates their claims to national spaces. Migrants were able to do so by justifying their presence in Barbados, by emphasizing their respect for the law, their industriousness and contribution to Barbadian economy, and by espousing a regional identity.

A major contribution of this Chapter has been the recognition that discursive othering of migrants can be shaped by references other than those which surround their legal status. In Barbados the public had constructed a subjectivity which had racialised foreigners, and which perceived them as threats to the well-being and identity of local Barbadians. This finding is in keeping with existing research, which emphasises the racial dimensions of exclusion (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006; De Genova, 2005; Lynn and Lea 2003; Flores, 2003; Black, 2003; Hier and Greenberg 2002; Chang and Aoki 1997). It confirms that undocumentedness ought to be examined in conjunction with other bases of exclusion. In Barbados this included migrants’ origin from poorer countries within the region. In this respect the research contributes to the debate on symbolic exclusions by jointly analysing two spatial scales (Pijpers, 2006) within which such discourse operates. Although the identities of ‘foreigner’ and ‘illegal’ converged to create a single category of the excluded, the rhetorical force of foreigner, had significant weighting in migrants every day experiences. Migrants experienced othering in social relationships, being constantly reminded by their foreigner status with ‘threats of detention’. Further discussions of how foreigner status impacted on migrants’ experience of undocumentedness are raised in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6: SPACE, OBJECT AND BIO-POLITICS IN A BORDERIZED CONTEXT

The immigrant may learn after crossing the border that she has not left it behind, that the border is not just a peripheral phenomenon. She may learn, through the juridical and extrajudicial policing of the border, that she carries the border with her. Indeed, to be an immigrant is to be marked by the border. (Chang and Aoki 1997, p. 1397)

Introduction

In Chapter 5, I discussed the varying spatial scales within which discourse was produced, examining the range of actors which ‘talked’ about immigration in/to Barbados. This discussion was thus focused on the symbolic dimensions of the border (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008), exploring how non-nationals generally, and the undocumented specifically, were treated in migration discourse. In this chapter, I continue with the analysis of spatial scales within which borders operate by emphasizing the ‘polyvalent’ or diffuse nature of governmentality (Walters, 2006).

I argue that there are varying scales of governmentality in respect of the management of the island’s external and internal borders (cf. Himestra, 2010). I discuss the role of immigration officials and members of the general public in the differentiation (viewing migrants through a lens of suspicion), as well as surveillance of non-nationals, in order to demonstrate that the activities of suspicion and surveillance produced a geography of fear. I therefore continue the discussion regarding the embodied experience of ‘suspect’ status, showing how migrants’ daily interactions were characterized by a heightened sense of ‘deportability’ (De Genova, 2002;
2005; see also Talavera et al. 2010; Nuñez and Heyman 2007; Willen, 2007a; 2007b; 2010).

In my arguments I draw on Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Foucault defines governmentality as ‘techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour’ (Foucault cited in Rose et al. 2009, 1). Governmentality is a form of power which relies on various strategies to manage/regulate citizens. I merge my understanding of governmentality with the concept ‘geography of fear’ from feminist analyses (see Valentine, 1989) and the commonly utilized theme of ‘deportability’ found in migration literature (see De Genova and Peutz, 2010). This is not an unusual approach for several anthropological studies have highlighted the psychological implications, in terms of fear and anxiety generated amongst migrants who reside in ‘dangerous places’ - heavily policed border spaces. The examination of ‘deportability’ in conjunction with the concept of ‘geography of fear’ enables an exploration not merely of the formal and informal mechanisms of regulation and control (Madanipour, 2003), but also of migrants’ mental mapping of these geographies (Valentine, 1989). We are therefore able to see how migrants are socialized into fear and develop coping strategies in these constrained environments (Haugen, 2012; Nuñez and Heyman 2007; Madsen, 2004). In this respect therefore, I also continue the discussion on the relationship between geography/ies and agency. I contend that migrants’ responses to this geography of fear are reflective of strategic agency. However, while I argue that migrants’ activities were (to a large extent) successful in concealing their foreigner (and undocumented) status, I propose that these also contributed to the reproduction of the geography of fear.
To do this, I trace the progression of this geography of fear along the migration trajectory. The chapter thus begins with an examination of routine methods of surveillance at the main port of entry – the Grantley Adams International Airport. I show that immigration officials, in the discharge of their duties, supported the government’s aim to manage migration, through activities which included intense interrogation and detention. Beyond the border, routine surveillance was conducted at popular public spaces, where migrants were known to congregate. In my discussion of these management practices, I highlight the use of ordinary objects in the production of a geography fear. Everyday objects, such as a bench or white van, became instruments of control, representations of the state.

In addition to the modes of control being effected by immigration officials, members of the general public also ‘collaborated’ in the regulation of migrants through threats of detention. The identification of ‘foreigners’ took place in everyday interactions between migrants and locals. I note, however, that the threat to report migrants was not necessarily intended to result in migrants’ detention and deportation, and thus cannot be construed as a deliberate mechanism of governmentality. As was indicated in the discussion in the preceding Chapter, such threats of detention also underscore the weighting of ‘foreigner’ status over undocumentedness, since migrants were targeted based on their nationality, with/without evidence of undocumented status.

I also discuss the various techniques which migrants engaged to negotiate the geography of suspicion and fear which shrouded their existence. Elusion was a key component of migrants’ strategic agency, as they refused to speak in public or contained their activities to those which were deemed essential,
such as going to work, buying groceries. I show that this was the case for the majority of migrants, but I present a case study, which in effect represents an exception to the rule that migrants responded to the fear of deportation through self-regulation.

Finally, I discuss the impact of the amnesty. My interest is in the heightened sense of deportability conveyed to me by migrants during interviews. Although I find that the geography of fear reduced the likelihood of gathering in public spaces, it did not result in the disintegration of networks of social interaction, as was the case in Willen’s research (2007b).

**Marking ordinary objects**

The airport is a site designed for enforcement of the mobility regime. Immigration officials must decide who gets in, who in essence is ‘licensed’ to move (Shamir, 2005, p. 197-201). This determination is made during monitoring and interviewing of incoming (and outgoing) traffic at ports of entry, a process often wrought with intensity, and which can involve bodily scrutiny (Shamir, 2005; Gilboy, 1991; Chalfin, 2008). However, it is the case that a ‘paradigm of suspicion’ informs the decision-making of immigration officials. ‘Suspect’ subjects are heavily policed, encountering a number of border tactics aimed to protect the state from unwanted immigrants, based on elements of their physical and social (bio-social) identity (Shamir, 2005).\(^{90}\)

Governmentality is concerned with matters related to the wealth, health, welfare and prosperity of the population. In respect of deportation as a feature of immigration policy, the state employs deportation to expel

\(^{90}\) Shamir argues that this paradigm of suspicion extends beyond impressionist judgment, but rather is part of a complex system of collection and verification of bio-data. However, my focus here is on the process of interviewing and is thus centered on the link between impressionist judgment and the ‘foreigner’ subjectivity discussed in Chapter 5.
undesirable (othered) individuals for social and economic purposes (Walters, 2010, p. 84). Within the Barbadian context, governmentality – in this case, the processing of immigrants at the airport, the conduct of routine raids and immigration policing in public spaces, and later the detention of undocumented migrants following the amnesty, was employed by state officials in order to reduce the number of undocumented migrants present in Barbados, as well as to further deter undocumented migration to the island. This chapter thus shows how the ‘not-so-hidden hand of the state’ (Nevins, 2002, p. 119) legitimated the discursive and non-discursive border rituals which othered the undocumented in social spaces.

Agnew has suggested that the airport is a ‘frequently neglected site of control’ (2008, p. 184). There are, however, a number of studies which analyze the policing of the movement of bodies and commerce as a form of governmentality (Chalfin, 2008; Salter, 2007; Gilboy, 1991). Notwithstanding, Agnew’s work is important as it emphasizes that ‘security functions of airports are part of what can be called ‘territorial regimes’, constituting a wide range of state-based inclusionary and exclusionary practices’ (2008, p. 184). It should be emphasized that in the case of Barbados the regime of control is contained to a representation of the border - the airport – as well as other spaces within the island of Barbados. Thus the preoccupation of this research is not with spatial practices of control related to a maritime border, but with those related to regulation of migration into and within a rather confined territorial space.

Taking this reasoning as a point of departure, I explore how objects within the airport are engaged to perpetuate the exclusion of ‘suspect’ categories in the Barbadian context. Studies traditionally focus on the threatening
characteristics, and accompanying physical violence of border spaces and objects (see Nevins, 2002 and Heyman, 1999). However, here I detail how seemingly mundane objects can be transformed by bordering processes into objects of control. These objects I argue produce a geography of fear, which makes travelling to Barbados a dangerous activity. I examine this in relation to three objects located within the Grantley Adams International Airport, hereafter referred to as the airport: processing lines, waiting rooms and seating. These are named, based on migrants’ narratives discussing border practices at the airport, special lines, the cold room, and the Guyanese bench, respectively.

This discussion centres on the experiences of CARICOM migrants travelling to Barbados. As discussed in Chapter 5, CARICOM migrants thought themselves ‘insiders’, based on their regional identity/citizenship. This insider status ought to have enabled them ease of entry into Barbados and a period of stay of six months. However, migrants’ narratives suggest they were treated as outsiders at the airport, with instances of intense interrogation and summary repatriation. Migrants’ narratives suggest that that it is the suspicion regarding the intention to overstay, influenced by the ‘foreigner’ subjectivity, which resulted in the methods of control engaged by Barbadian immigration officials towards intra-regional travellers.

**Special lines**

Although CARICOM nationals have the privilege of unrestricted entry into CSME member states for visiting purposes, entry into Barbados does not appear to be a simple exercise. On entering the airport CARICOM nationals are expected to join special lines designated for CARICOM nationals, which are separate from the lines for nationals of third party countries. The
implementation of common processing lines at the airport is to facilitate the principle of hassle free travel intended to make border crossings easier (hassle free) for intra-regional travellers (The CARICOM Secretariat, 2011a). However, migrants’ narratives reveal that this facilitative mechanism results in the othering of CARIOCM nationals.

Leighton, for example, recalls that on his return from a trip to another Caribbean destination there was a ‘special line’ for the processing of Guyanese and Jamaicans at the airport. There were other narratives which suggested that there was active profiling of migrants from particular countries. Kimberly thus describes one instance where an entire flight of Guyanese nationals was not allowed to disembark. ‘Can you imagine...the first time you coming to Barbados?...a man coming to visit with his wife? Everybody turn back just so’. The latter seems to represent an extreme example of an exclusionary tactic employed by the border officials, but is worth mentioning here since it conveys the extent of power held by immigration officials at the airport.

In her discussion of how the Indonesian government regulates return migrants, Silvey (2007) reveals how the othering of nationals, or those who might belong, can be practised at the border. She writes that, ‘the workers are separated, drilled, and monitored in myriad ways that underscore their difference...’ (2007, p. 77). The practices she describes are no different from that which ‘outsiders’ may undergo. Though that is precisely her point - the regulation of return migrant workers distinguishes them from general passengers. This takes the form of segregation from other travellers in the specially created ‘Terminal 3’, which she argues is designed to renationalize
and reterritorialize returnees. In this respect, the special lines for CARICOM nationals can similarly be thought to ‘territorialize’, distinguishing Barbadians from non-Barbadians, and tourists from ‘foreigners’.

Though not the intention of the framers of CARICOM, therefore, the integration of common processing lines into bordering practices at regional airports has excluded, rather than included intra-regional travellers. Though not speaking in reference to travel within an intra-regional context, the observation of Chang and Aoki (1997) is relevant. They indicate that ‘the properties of the border change depending on the contingent features of who or what it is trying to get in or get out’ (Chang and Aoki, 1997, p. 1411; see also Balibar, 2002). This is the case in Barbados as migrants note that the special lines are later used as a ‘sifting’ mechanism to target suspect overstayers. There is some error in this logic, as the lack of common processing lines may not eliminate targeting of non-nationals, especially where based on bio-social profiling. However, I accept the reasoning that the concentration of CARICOM nationals into common processing lines makes it easier for immigration officers to engage in this form of bio-social profiling (see further below).

It could also be argued that the special lines result in a form of ‘social distancing’ which distinguishes desirable (tourists) and undesirable (intra-regional migrants from poorer countries) travellers (cf. Shamir, 2005). The gap between those who can and those who cannot travel becomes even wider, when migrants who do not manage to raise sufficient funds to cover the duration of their stay (show money) are turned away at the airport. Another point to note is that the separation of migrants according to nationality contributes to heightened surveillance, ‘subjecting the relatively
discreet social action [of intra-regional travel] to public scrutiny’ (Shamir, 2005, p. 213). This is especially so when migrants are visibly removed from the main immigration hall and sent to the cold room, or placed to sit on the ‘Guyanese’ bench.

The ‘cold room’

Processing at the airport could at times be wrought with intense interrogation and lengthy delays. If officials were not satisfied with responses to questions regarding the intended purpose of the visit, migrants would be asked to sit in an enclosed waiting room, a request which sometimes provided officials time to verify details, for example, by contacting the person with whom migrants intended to stay. During the interviews, officials aimed to obtain answers which formal questions included on the disembarkation form cannot capture. Exploring in depth migrants’ assertions regarding the duration and purpose of visit was thus an attempt to detect the intention to overstay. As revealed in the foregoing chapter overstay was viewed in negative terms, which included potential risks to the well-being of the country. Interrogation at the airport was thus a mode of observation of (potential) risk, with immigration officials trained to determine levels of risk (cf. Shamir, 2005; Parsley, 2003; Gilboy, 1991). In this respect, it should be noted that the ‘paradigm of suspicion’ was also directed at other ‘suspect’ migrants. The Schedule of Prohibited Persons (Appendix G) appended to the Barbados Immigration Act included a number of ‘undesirable’ migrants, with ‘illegal’ migrants just one of eleven categories of prohibited entrants.

92 Common embarkation and disembarkation forms, like common processing lines, are a feature of hassle free travel.
Latoya, for example, indicates having been aggressively questioned for a number of hours before finally being allowed to leave the airport. Lack of clarity with responses suggested to officials an ulterior motive and an unsatisfactory interview with an immigration official could result in summary repatriation, as was the case with Maya below:

... So they turned me back, yeah and they just keep you in this ignorant cold, cold room, that is so damn cold, extremely cold, for what reason I don’t know. It was like a pain, because you...ok, you getting turned back, tell me why. You know? Tell me the reason why, let me know when I’ll be leaving, let me know where you going be. [They] just have in this room and then next thing I know you come and tell me alright, come. ... Cause even if I can’t come in tell me a reason why, fine. Give me a reason why. And then, let me know, ‘Well m’am, we securing a plane, a flight for you to get back out.’ But don’t got me sit down there, you hungry, you ain’t eating nothing, pregnant women, women with children...

As Maya indicates, this detention in the cold room constitutes psychological violence as migrants are rarely provided with explanations during the period of their detainment. Thus the uncertainty surrounding their possible repatriation places a heavy burden on them. The lengthy period of detention without food, and in an excessively cold environment, further adds to migrants’ desperation.

It should be noted that migrants are detained on suspicion that they will overstay, though there have been cases, where migrants are detained and denied entry due to prior history of undocumentedness. A relevant example is a case which received some attention in the media of a Jamaican woman (Shonae Proverbs) who returned to reunite with her Barbadian husband, and

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93 Int5_GF_12.11.2010
who had been detained on the grounds that she had previously overstayed during her last visit to the island. Her description of the detention room is harrowing, possibly because the narrative was mediated (Bradshaw, 2012), but confirms the stories of maltreatment by immigration officials related by other migrants:

Proverbs said she was most shocked by the behaviour of the Immigration officials.
“They would come into the room and laugh at us and taunt us. One of them said to me, ‘I saw you stripping in the club’.
I told her I was not a stripper.”

Fear is thus generated by environmental conditions of the room, the duration of detention, as well as intimidating and demeaning treatment of migrants by immigration officials during the course of stay, all exclusionary practices aimed at othering ‘foreign’ non-nationals. In extreme cases, this intimidation can include physical violence. Another recent case of the detention and aggressive bodily search of a Jamaican female on her first trip to Barbados, which was well-documented in the media, substantiates these claims (Walker, 2011).

Migrants related in their narratives that there was evidence that immigration officers engaged in social profiling based on gender. Marcus, Kimberly, and Maya thus note in their interviews, for example, that Guyanese women were labelled ‘prostitutes’ (also note the reference by Ms Proverbs in the newspaper excerpt above), and that it is difficult for single women travelling alone, and dressed in a ‘flashy’ manner, to gain entry into the island.\footnote{The Shanique Myrie case had highlighted the strong suspicion of Jamaicans as drug mules. This form of profiling is undergirded by profiling based on race and nationality, which I discuss later in sections on the Guyanese bench and the Green book.}
likelihood of being placed in the cold room therefore, would have been
greater based on the degree of risk assigned by the immigration officer,
especially in cases where migrants were unable to answer questions about
their stay in the island.

The Guyanese bench

As outlined in Chapter 4, Barbados was viewed as a favourable destination
by intra-regional migrants in light of its stable economy and level of human
development. Indeed, and as explained further in Chapter 5, it is this
knowledge and the need to preserve the benefits of such stability for
Barbadians, which produced the rhetoric of exclusion surrounding
undocumented migration in 2008.

The prevailing view that Guyanese migrants constituted the majority of
undocumented CARICOM migrants meant that there was resistance broadly
to Guyanese migrants. Guyana is classified by the World Bank as a Heavily
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), and has a very high cost of living. The lack of
opportunities for social mobility is exacerbated by the racial division in the
country, where opportunities are allocated based on ethnicity, primarily to
persons of Indian descent (McDougall, 2009; Sanders 2011). Thus bio-
social profiling is supported by the view that migrants from poorer countries
should be denied ‘licence to move’, and thus one of the markers that is used
to engage in such profiling, in addition to gender mentioned above, is
nationality. At the airport this was reflected in the profiling of Guyanese
nationals. The latter part of the lengthy excerpt from Maya cited above,
signals this point.95

95 Int5_GF_12.11.2010
... Yes, and only Guyanese going in this room. So I find this very prejudiced, yeah, if you ask my opinion. Very, very, prejudiced, ‘cause only Guyanese go into this room. For what reason I don’t know, what point they trying to prove?

The geography of fear specific to Guyanese migrants related to their being placed to sit on a bench. Migrants’ narratives suggest that this approach was standard treatment for Guyanese, hence the moniker, the ‘Guyanese’ bench. A CADRES focus group which explored ‘myths’ related to regionalism, in particular issues related to travel, highlighted the following,

Some groups felt that the infamous “Guyana bench” was a consequence of the Guyanese travellers “who brought this upon themselves” since many entered Barbados for vacation and did not return to their homeland. Most respondents felt it was inhumane to be treated as a criminal on entering a strange country and felt it was degrading to the visitor. One respondent felt that the “Guyana bench” derived its name because most persons who enter under questionable circumstances are Guyanese, but it is the bench reserved for would-be illegal immigrants, and should be more correctly referred to as the “deportation bench”. The groups felt that all countries have a system and a place reserved to process persons entering their country under suspicious circumstances. It is noteworthy that non Barbadian respondents were not familiar with the “Guyana Bench” myth. (CADRES, 2004, p. 51)

Though a lengthy excerpt, I include it here for it raises a number of points made earlier including: (1) the ‘paradigm of suspicion’ which characterizes the management of migration; (2) the flexible nature of suspect categories, such that the label included not merely Guyanese migrants, but all persons suspected of holding the intention to overstay; (3) the normalization of deportation as a mode of governmentality, such that non-suspect categories endorse this type of ill-treatment, which conversely is seen as inhumane by
some individuals; and finally (4) the view that those who transgress rules are seen as deserving of the exercise of certain modalities of power by the state.

What is also interesting about this excerpt is that it is framed within the context of a ‘myth’, with which non-Barbadian migrants, whom I interpret here to mean non-nationals of third party countries, are not familiar. This is so, as they would have had no experience with the ‘bench’. However, among intra-regional it would have been well-known, and was thus a popular reference in migrants’ narratives based on direct experience or second-hand information.

Another reference which gives credence to migrants’ narratives regarding the profiling of Guyanese, though it is not repeated as often as stories about the cold room or Guyanese bench, is the ‘green book’. This referred to the colour of the Guyanese passport, which was a ready identifier of migrants’ nationality. Thus Marcus indicated, for example that immigration officials ‘don’t like to see the green book’, and it is likely that he was placed in the cold room because he held Guyanese nationality. This suggests that Barbadian nationality and documentation is prized, such that Barbadian nationals do not experience this geography of fear. This is substantiated by another narrative of a Guyanese migrant who through marriage had become a Barbadian national. She indicates that she was accosted by immigration officials at the airport after going through customs, and that it is only when she was able to furnish her Barbadian passport (a ‘blue’ book), that she was allowed safe passage through the airport (see Appendix H). Thus one’s

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96 Int9_GM_04.12.2010
passport represents a signifier of hierarchies within the global mobility regime shaping one’s border experience (Agnew, 2008, p. 184).

As I show above, the Barbadian airport is characterized by a geography of fear, within which everyday objects were co-opted to reinforce the distinction of foreigners, and the power of the state to regulate ‘unwanted’ migrants. It should be noted that this geography of fear transcends space as potential migrants become socialized into fear when other migrants relate narratives of their experience of detention at the airport (cf. Willen, 2007a). Marcus for example, indicates that he was initially unwilling to travel to Barbados because he was aware of instances of maltreatment at the airport (in particular that meted out against Guyanese) and only decided to travel to the island after weighing the pros and cons of other destinations. He commented that he had just ‘prayed that he would get through immigration’. Willen argues similarly, and though she writes in respect of narratives of arrest after a period of residence (in Israel), her analysis is instructive. She contends that such narratives reverberate through the migrant community and thus help to perpetuate the geographies of fear as ‘they reinforce the techniques of othering, exclusion and criminalization already in play’ (2007a, p. 171). It is difficult to say how effective this psychology of fear was in deterring migrants. As shown in the upcoming section such narratives sometimes served to migrants’ advantage for they took lessons to improve their own chance of entry.

What is also interesting about this geography of fear is that for migrants who wish to work and reside in Barbados, an encounter with this geography while not inevitable cannot be avoided if it is to occur. Valentine (1989) notes

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97 Int9_GM_04.12.2010
that women typically avoid dangerous places based on their personal experience or in keeping with secondary information passed on by others. However, where migrants passed through the airport they faced the possibility of an encounter with this geography and would have no choice but to endure it once detained. Indeed, there were cases of migrants interviewed who had encountered this geography several times, and who had made more than one attempt at entry before eventually being granted permission to enter the island. Migrants’ mental mapping of fear thus entailed the design of strategies to avoid the possibility of detention. This point is borne out further in the sections below.

Eluding the border

As discussed above, in order to manage incoming migration, officials at times denied migrants’ entry. Migrants were hard pressed to secure entry into the island, as this had a significant role in the success of their migration agenda, and encouraged their use of a number of strategies. These included purchasing tickets of short duration, having show money, and arranging pick up by Barbadians or documented non-nationals. I discuss each of these strategies in turn.

The ticket

Immigration officials’ discretion extended to the decision regarding the duration of migrants’ stay in the island. Thus in reality, the time usually allowed migrants was less than the six month window provided for under CARICOM requirements, sometimes significantly so, and was recorded in a stamp placed in migrants’ passports. This stamp had multiple purposes, as it not only delimited the period of stay, but essentially was intended to
proscribe any plans which were outside the stated purpose of travel, such as work.

Migrants’ awareness that the discretion of the immigration officials would impact on their ability to cross the border, influenced their decision to purchase tickets of short duration, which were well-within the maximum six month limit. This was in order to affirm their visitor status, and betray their true intentions to overstay. 98 Thus Paul, whose original intention was to stay and seek work in Barbados recounts his arrival experience: 99

Well when I come the person ask me how long I want? And I didn’t have no problem with them. ‘Cause I did buy the ticket for a month, so I tell her I want three week. I tell her I want three week. I think it was 21 days on it. I think it was 21 days. ‘Cause I was to go back, I think is the second or the third of June, or something like that.

Similarly, Kimberly indicates that her ticket was for a four week period, but she was only given permission to stay in the country for two weeks.

This practice of maneuvering within the constraints of immigration policy is paralleled in research on intra-regional migration within the European Union. Kosic and Triandafyllidou (2004), for example note that Polish migrants, who engage in a form of ‘seasonal’ migration between Poland and Italy, pretend to be tourists in order to take advantage of the three month window provided to Polish nationals. They emphasize that migrants deliberately intend to circumvent immigration policy and thus try to convince immigration officials that they visit for tourism purposes by

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98 It should be noted that not all migrants had the intention to overstay before travel, as a number of those interviews held a variety of motives for visiting Barbados. However, this section focuses on those with the intention to overstay.

99 Int10_GM_17.12.2010
dressing/acting like tourists. Kosic and Triandafyllidou (2004) thus raise an important point about ‘performance’ at the border, from the perspective of migrants. This role of performance is further demonstrated when migrants try to convince immigration officials about their relationship with their Barbadian contacts.

Legitimate connections

As part of the process of satisfying the immigration official that one’s stay constituted a level of minimal risk to the island, non-nationals were expected to be received by nationals of Barbados, or documented nationals. Migrants could be denied entry if the person who was named to receive them was not appropriately documented, or where migrants could not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the individual named. Thus Marcus, whose contact was a non-national and required a work permit, was asked to wait in the cold room for several minutes whilst Immigration checked the status of his friend. Similarly, in the case of Latoya, her extended wait in the cold room was due to her inability to answer questions about the aunt who was to collect her at the airport.100

LATOYA: Oh, (chuckles) that was like a police interrogation, coming through the airport with the immigration officer. They asking the same questions, over and over again and getting me angry.

NDJ: What [did] they ask you?
LATOYA: Alright, they was asking, “Who you going to?” They ask me that more than one time. “What the person name?” “How long have you seen her?” “How long has it been since you last spoke to her?” “What her children name?” “How much children you have?” All these things.

As I said, the woman is my aunt. Obviously I wouldn’t

100 Int24_JF_17.03.2011
know all these things. They want to tell me that I am lying. They literally trying to tell me that I lying. So I got angry. I quarrel. I curse. So I tell them, let me go back. Then my aunt came there, she talk to them. She was upset too. Then they said ok, they let me go. But it was very confusing…. I doan know how to describe it that night. It got me really angry and frustrated with the officers.

Where migrants did not already have family who were well-established and legally resident in Barbados, they had to rely on Barbadian acquaintances of their (transnational) network; though as Maya demonstrates, this was not always successful.\textsuperscript{101}

Especially if you’re coming from Guyana they’re more stringent on who is coming for you and who is the person, how you know the person. Like for instance, even if I get a Barbadian to go and collect them, they will ask the individual questions like how you know this person, you know and if they doan correspond, you will still, you will still eventually not, they will get turned back. …well I had a friend down here and he was sending for me. He was illegal also, so he asked a Barbadian to go and collect me. But obviously I never met her and she never met me, right, so we were just going on the little information that we had. So when they had asked me questions about her I could not say, right. And when they asked her questions bout me she couldn’t say. So they would know already that well she was doing the favour for someone.

This practice of elusion was most apparent when the children and siblings of undocumented migrants were to visit Barbados. As was previously mentioned, immigration officials would verify the status of non-nationals who were receiving visitors. Aware of this practice, and in order to avoid detection, migrants would rely on their social network (family members and

\textsuperscript{101} Int5_GF_12.11.2010
friends, who were established in Barbados, or their acquaintances) to receive their children at the airport. The children would thereafter pass the time in Barbados with them.

_Show money_

Migrants would also have been informed of the necessity for proof of funds by other migrants and made the appropriate preparations. Where this was not the case, migrants faced the possibility of being denied entry, as both Kimberly and Joseph indicated. The experience of Joseph is provided below.102

JOSEPH: (Chuckles) Well, at the airport, I nearly get turned back.
NDJ: Why?
JOSEPH: People didn’t explain everything to me, to me, you know, before I came here. So I decide just to walk with $100, right and then. And as the custom, the immigration officer ask me how much money I have she decide to put me on the bench to sit down. But after that, she went outside and interview the people who came to receive me and then she came in back and called me up and stamp my passport and let me go.

Possession of show money supported migrants’ admissions regarding their ability to cover the incidentals associated with their stay whilst in Barbados and thus was meant to suggest a low level of risk.

Two things should be noted based on the above examples. In eluding entry controls migrants used ‘legal’ means to secure their entry. Thus they merely circumvented existing regulations governing the entry (and stay) of

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102 Int21_GM_15.03.2011

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CARICOM nationals. Secondly, and contingent on the foregoing, in the case of Barbados undocumentedness did not commence as a clandestine project. Immigration officials’ awareness of this practice, I believe, is what influenced the intensity of interviewing at the border, but also their efforts to retroactively police the border by actively engaging in surveillance at crucial points throughout the island. In the Green Paper, the Immigration Department had indicated that ‘[i]t is recognized that the efficient enforcement of existing legislation will require the enhancement of monitoring mechanisms and a strengthening of the Enforcement Division in the Immigration Department to counter the increasing incidence of persons remaining in the island illegally (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 12). These efforts were to complement existing mechanisms in place, which sought to identify and detain the undocumented.

**Beyond the border**

The policing of the border is not contained to the external border and increasingly internal mechanisms are being relied upon (Rutherford, 2010; Engbersen and Broeders 2009; Varsanyi, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2008). Thus, the state also engages its resources to monitor mobility within the border. Immigration officers are not passive responders to policy directives of government officials (Fassin, 2011). Rather, they act based on their own moral evaluation of these directives. On this basis, it can be argued that immigration officials who engaged in surveillance beyond the border were more than aware of the instability and uncertainty that this created for migrants and were willing actors in the process of (re)producing a
geography of fear, based on what they viewed as their responsibility to contain risk.

In the upcoming section I show how policing is effected through the use of another everyday object, the white van. A popular mode of transportation, these vans were symbolic of the possibility of detention since immigration officials also used these to transport detained migrants. I therefore discuss how surveillance was undertaken through the verification of documented status during travel in and around Barbados.

I also show that the surveillance efforts of the Immigration Department (with the assistance of members of the island’s security forces) were supported by those of the general public, who monitored ‘foreigners’. I argue that some Barbadians were complicit with the regulation of the state (that is the detection and deportation of ‘unwanted’ migrants) since they were willing to report ‘suspect’ migrants to the Immigration Department. This threat of detention, however, at times had no basis, as it was issued on the grounds of ‘foreigner’ identity, and not undocumented status. It should also be noted that while the detention of undocumented migrants contributed to the state’s efforts to manage migration, members of the public were not necessarily actively engaged in the process of surveillance for the purpose of migration management. It was usually the case that these threats of detention were made in anger. However, the epithet ‘I going call immigration on you’ contributed to the production of a geography of fear for those who were in fact undocumented.
*The white van*

In Barbados the government-operated bus service is complemented by a route taxi and bus system commonly referred to as ZRs (pronounced Zed-Rs). Owned and operated by private individuals, ZRs are a popular form of transportation as they run more frequently and travel at much faster speeds than government-operated services (Totally Barbados, 2013). Another unique feature about ZRs is that they are easily identified. Apart from loud music played inside the buses, the vans are typically white (there are some which are a bold yellow). There are thus a significant number of white vans which traverse up and down Bridgetown and other parts of Barbados offering transportation services.

However, immigration officials also travelled around town in a white van, which was what was used to transport detained individuals. The use of white in official vehicles is not uncommon among government agencies in the Caribbean. The colour of the vehicle thus made it indistinguishable from those driven by private providers of transportation (save for the licence plate, distinguished by ZR). However, the tendency of immigration officials when policing bus terminals, to park the van away from other buses, as well as the wearing of uniforms by immigration officials, would have distinguished them from the operators of ZRs.

Many migrants travelled to work via public transportation in government-operated buses or in ZRs. In the latter case, a common object, used by migrants in their day to day travel, came to be associated with danger – that is the threat of detention. Narratives reveal that immigration officials routinely visited bus terminals, or flagged down buses and cars to search for non-nationals. As Hugh’s narrative below demonstrates, immigration
officials stopped vans in order to verify the documentation of passengers on board:103

But when I get stop, I get stop in the bus, I had my papers. So I just show it and then they let me off. But they keep on doing regular searches. I was in town….when the other night? Actually, and I just find somebody slap me on my chest. So I jump and when I look, there is a soldier with a long gun asking me, ahm “Show me you ID”. So I took out my ID and show him my ID, and then he say….well ahm my Grenadian ID. And he say, “You have work permit?” And I say, “Yes”. But he didn’t ask me to show him. He just only ask me and I say yes. So he say, “Straight?” [documented] And I say, “Yes”. And he say get outta here, just so. He didn’t ask me to show, but he just only ask me, but because I told him yes, you know, he just let me go. But usually I get stopped with ahm…in vehicles….I had a partner used to live with me, and he had a vehicle too. So they end up stopping he, [and] check. But once they see that you straight, and you, you keeping out of trouble, when you straight, they doesn’t really bother you. People does mark you right, they actually remember you, so when they see you, “That man straight”.

Hugh’s narrative raises three interesting points. The first is that surveillance was done in and around the vicinity of bus terminals. It is thus important to highlight that the regulation of travel and the placement of immigration officials at bus terminals, in particular, was a deliberate strategy on the part of the state. Migrants engaged in spatially-based networking (Iosifides and King 1998) and routinely congregated at bus terminals, which also had adjacent sites which facilitated socializing – bars for obtaining food and drink, as well as seating. Migrants congregated in these spaces, especially in the evenings and on weekends, not only to socialize, but also to obtain key
pieces of information related to job openings, procuring documentation, and even upcoming raids, as Camille pointed out during her interview. In the pre-amnesty period these were popular places for migrants, the knowledge of which informed the surveillance practices of immigration officials. I return to this point later, but the presence of immigration officials within, or in proximity to bus terminals, would have contributed to undocumented migrants’ fears about travelling to/from and socializing in these public spaces.

Secondly, migrants’ documented status was verified during the process of raids. Thus while all travellers would have been surveyed by immigration officials, it is the inability of the undocumented to produce documentation, which would have resulted in their detention. Although in Hugh’s case he is not detained despite his inability to produce evidence of his status – a work permit. I believe his experience reveals, as had been discussed above, that ‘different bodies are experienced as differentially vulnerable’ (Willen, 2007a, p. 186). As one migrant noted, Jamaicans commanded respect and were less likely to be hassled. Similarly another migrant noted that detention of migrants from other countries did not always result in deportation, though the detention of Guyanese almost certainly did. Thus while all foreigners were suspect, Guyanese nationality was a more suspect category. This is borne out in the example of one migrant, who was documented and reported having been accosted by an Immigration official, who had immediately ordered her into a van after hearing her (Guyanese) accent. She indicates that she was allowed to go free when another official who was aware of her status, questioned her on spot detention.
The final point is that migrants were ‘marked’ by immigration officials. Thus the frequency of raids would have made some migrants more visible, or known, to immigration officials, one consequence of the small size of the island. Those who were not known, therefore, were more likely to be accosted. It was important, therefore, for undocumented migrants to remain undetected by officials, which some were able to do, having received alerts whilst in transit or in advance of their travels.

CAMILLE:...I mean, you on the van a morning and then you phone ring and somebody telling you, “Hey, hey! These people on the road, they tekking people off the vans”.

ANTHONY: I got some friend used to call me, and telling me, “Doan [don’t] go to work today because, doan [don’t] go to work because they stopping bus, (names place)....or they stopping bus... but I never really buck up [happened on] in it. One time, I was, I was coming in town and then like some people running and say, “Doan go round there, doan go round there! Immigration round there doan go round there!”. And me just drift off and ting, and then me hear pon the news how much people, get, get carry way and all kind of thing like that”.

Such narratives reveal that by and large Barbados was characterized by a geography of fear for the undocumented, since significant uncertainty surrounded the possibility of an encounter with an immigration official or security officer. Paasi affirms this when he argues that the diffuse nature of borders have made ‘whole countries into borderlands’ (2011, drawing on Balibar, 1998, p. 22). This point becomes even clearer in discussion of migrants’ negotiation of public spaces which I discuss later.

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104 Int17_GF_19.02.2011
105 Int23_JM_GrM_17.03.2011
For undocumented migrants the possibility of detention was a hindrance to their free movement. Affecting not only migrants’ daily travel plans, an encounter with itinerant immigration officials could result in the premature termination of the migration enterprise. Moreover, it reduced the prospect of re-migration as deported individuals were not allowed to re-enter before the one year period customarily stipulated in deportation orders, which were stamped in migrants’ passports (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009).

The above also emphasizes the role of governmentality in transforming everyday activities and ordinary spaces. Travelling for work, and other forms of mobility, may become criminal acts due to the possibility of detention. Hiemstra (2010) who highlights that surveillance is a mode of governmentality, which ultimately is geared at reinforcing geographies of exclusion makes this point in relation to Mexican migrants living in Colorado. She also discusses the way migrants manage their behaviour when they meet upon Immigration and Customs Enforcement vans (also white).

This discussion brings together scholarship which views securitization of immigration as containment of risk (see Bigo, 2002) on the one hand, and on the other that which examines undocumented migrants’ integration into ‘imagined communities’. Governmentality, through surveillance, of the suspect (undocumented) migrant, incorporates a range of actors (state and non-state), which have vested interest in preserving the national polity, of excluding those who do not belong. To quote Butler, ‘…the tactics of governmentality operate diffusely, to dispose and order populations, to produce and reproduce subjects, their practices and beliefs, in relation to specific policy aims’ (2004, p. 52 cited in Hiemstra, 2010, p. 77). In the
upcoming section I discuss how the bio-politics of otherness was expressed by non-state actors’ (local Barbadians’) treatment of the non-nationals in their day-to-day interactions.

**Threats of detention: ‘I going call immigration on you’**

In order to understand the role of the public in surveillance activities, it is necessary to revisit the idea of ‘foreigner’ subjectivity. CARICOM nationals encountered discrimination based on race and a number of other social signifiers which pointed to their outsider status. As an outsider it was not easy for me to distinguish ‘foreigners’ from Barbadians, without more obvious signs such as accent. However, Hugh suggests that these distinctions were quite evident among locals:

...people in Barbados does know when you is a foreigner. From they see how you dress. And they listen to you to see how you does speak. But they mightn’t treat you different, but they might watch you all the time.

Hugh’s narrative is interesting for it points to the intensity of the public gaze which was quite adept at detecting outsiders. Moreover, he suggests that this gaze was a consistent scrutiny of CARICOM non-nationals. As Hugh points out, their identification as ‘other’ did not necessarily result in ill-treatment by nationals. However, locals were vigilant on the basis that these migrants were perceived to be threats to the Barbadian national space (as discussed in Chapter 5).

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106 One day, whilst out with a Guyanese University student this point was played out. We were riding the bus and though no one was speaking (one of the easier way to detect distinctions) the student was able to identify other Guyanese nationals in the bus, he said by way of dress. This emphasized to me that there are other quotidian dimensions to identity, which are more evident to insiders, than outsiders.

107 Int23_JM_GrM_17.03.2011
The marking of non-nationals as suspect meant that both documented and documented CARICOM migrants would have been subject to scrutiny. However, there were cases where migrants’ status made them especially vulnerable to the warning ‘I going call Immigration on you’, as Camille indicates below:

And I mean here, the first thing, when people know that you illegal and you slip up, the first thing that does come out they mouth is they going call the Immigration, you understand.\(^{108}\)

This exposure was highly likely in cases where migrants’ status was known to the person issuing the threat, such as an employer, or even a close friend.

The geography of fear was more palpable for the undocumented, who faced the prospect of detention and deportation if persons did make good on their threat to report them to the Immigration Department. At times the threats were superficial, mere expressions of anger which did not in fact result in migrants being detained. As a result, migrants were not always able to determine the seriousness of intent behind these warnings, the uncertainty merely adding to their heightened sense of fear.

CYTHIA: But our neighbour across the road, sometimes, you know, you look at her, so we would sit on the patio looking out, and you look at her too strong, she might, she might come to her window and say, “See dem?! I going call Immigration on them!” You know, and bad word and all that kind a ting. But you know she is not stable. But then you doan [don’t], you know, she can do it. Because sometimes she does call Police on people and say all sorts a tings. So you just doan know. Even though you does tell her morning, [and] you not getting [in] any trouble with her because she can just say that. And she would, even she,

\(^{108}\) Int17_GF_19.02.2011
a mad (senile) person, would know that she can call Immigration on you.\textsuperscript{109}

Based on the above quote, it does not seem to be the case that locals scrutinized non-nationals as part of an active project to regulate the undocumented. However, marked migrants could become victims of threats of detention, an activity which contributed to the larger project of the state to identify, detain and deport, ‘unwanted’ (undocumented) migrants.

Cynthia’s narrative is interesting for a sense of fear is communicated by her although at the time of the interview she was on extension, awaiting the outcome of her application for amnesty. This reveals the instability of this in-between status for migrants. Cynthia’s narrative also demonstrates that the constant surveillance by neighbours creates a high level of mistrust amongst locals and non-nationals, as threats had become a social practice engaged in by local Barbadians so much so that it was engrained in the psyche which informed Barbadians’ interaction with non-nationals.\textsuperscript{110}

Migrants’ everyday experiences with threats, and their knowledge that information was passed on by locals to officials resulting in the detention of the undocumented, thus contributed to the geography of fear for the undocumented, as well as for those who were on extension. In migrants’ narratives, the Barbados Immigration Department was often diminutively referred to ‘The Immigration’ or ‘Immigration’ and the spectres of immigration officials and the prospect of detention held a prominent place in migrants’ narratives. This was exacerbated by the circulation of a ‘myth’ that immigration officials were rewarding the provision of such information

\textsuperscript{109} Haugen (2012) points to the difficulties these posed for fieldwork, a reality which influenced my own research, as I discussed in Chapter 3.
relating to the whereabouts of undocumented nationals. Migrants told of the award of sums of cash of between $75 to $90 BDS (US$37 to US$45) by the Immigration Department (On the map, 2007).

ANTHONY: ...at that time they was saying like you get $90, if you get somebody get send back .. you get $90 for them. So if a man see you now, and he hear you talking, he say, “Wait, that’s a quick $90 there”, you know. So people used to do it just for money. They just hunt down people because they know seh [that] they will get $90.111

The ‘rumour’ of the payment of a bounty by the Immigration Department, intensified with the additional enforcement procedures undertaken following the change in government in 2008. The stories of detention helped give credence to the ‘myth’ of the bounty, which would not have been a feature of the legal framework. The bounty functioned to commoditize migrants by placing a value on their capture, and also suggested that migrants’ presence was illegitimate, and thus that their detention was a form of meritorious service. Like the white van, it also represented the threat of return.

The above suggests that both documented and undocumented CARICOM nationals were heavily scrutinized, but for undocumented migrants this surveillance resulted in a geography of fear. The psychological violence that they experienced on a daily basis was heightened by the prospect of detention. As I had intimated earlier, this ‘general condition of “deportability” constitutes a disciplining force in migrants’ lives, and influences how they use and experience urban space’ (Haugen, 2012, p. 3). In the sections which follow I discuss how interviewees strategically

111 Int23_JM_GM_17.03.2011
negotiated this geography of fear through the regulation of their speech, mobility, and visibility (Hiemstra, 2010; Khosravi, 2010; Willen, 2007a; 2007b; 2010).

The life of subterfuge

Geography is a useful tool for examining bio-politics, since it makes it possible to explore connections along different scales of power (Schlosser, 2008). In the foregoing section, I discussed a ‘macro’ perspective of power, by examining the policing of the border by immigration officials at the airport and at various sites beyond the border. I had therefore concluded that public spaces, where heavily scrutinized, can become geographies of fear, further that special zones can be created within these spaces for the containment of suspect populations, and finally that a geography of fear need not be created and reproduced with instruments of force, but rather can be instantiated through everyday objects and practices. In critical realist parlance, one could consider the geography of fear a structural phenomenon, constraining the lives of migrants.

Migrants’ narratives therefore revealed that their socio-spatial practices are regulated by this geography of fear. I therefore continue this discussion in the sections which follow, by exploring the micro-level of power. Drawing on Willen (2010, 2007a, 2007b), I examine how suspect status and the fear produced by the possibility of detention, shapes migrants’ subjective experience. I focus on how suspect status shaped migrants’ daily existence in migrants’ embodiment (speech) and negotiation of space (mobility and visibility), exploring how migrants’ internalization of fear lead to self-regulation shaped by the geography of fear.
I argue that these techniques of subterfuge were reflective of migrants’ agentic capacity. Their objective was to conceal migrants’ ‘foreigner’ and undocumented status, to avoid the paradigm of suspicion. However, the socio-spatial practices in which migrants engage perpetuated the geography of fear they sought to circumvent. This resulted in morphostasis (or reproduction) of the environment of fear (cf. Archer, 1995).

I should note that my emphasis is on the activities of undocumented migrants, since the objective of the instruments of governmentality was to deter and detect undocumented migration. I do, however, stress the relationship between foreigner status and undocumentedness. Bio-social profiling by immigration officials during surveillance exercises made it difficult to sift undocumented from the documented, without probing of ‘foreigner’ identity (see Weber, 2011 in respect of policing practices of non-citizens in Australia).

Moving in silence

Migrants’ perception of being branded as outsiders, of being deportable, leads them to ‘attempt to become invisible in response…even if there is nothing extraordinary about their actual appearance’ (Talavera et al. 2010, p. 171). In the Barbadian context this invisibility was complemented with silence, since migrants were easily detectable because of their accents.

JOSEPH: When I’m in the public I hardly speak a lot, because sometimes is better for you to keep silent, because some people as soon as they hear your accent they you know, have some queer things to [say]you know, and look at you funny and these kind of things, all of these things I see so I just decide to use wisdom. So I….
NDJ: You don’t talk?
JOSEPH: When I say don’t talk, like ok I’m travelling on the bus, or standing in the bus terminal, right, where people queue up right, the best thing to do is you know, is to, hmm, stand there and not to say anything. Because they have some people, some, right, they just, how I, what I will say? People feel threatened, because if you come in someone country to work, people will see you as, some people will see you as a threat now for you to open you[r] mouth and start talking by the way, it brings a feelings. So I prefer just to keep it down, yeah. (Joseph)

As Joseph indicates migrants’ refusal to speak stems from their being marked by locals as threats. This likely stemmed from the perception that migrants were taking jobs and other key resources which ‘belonged’ to Barbadians, as had been advanced in rhetoric by the incumbent government.

Being labelled as a threat based on one’s speech is reflective of the bio-social profiling of non-Barbadians, since one’s accent is a critical identifier of one’s nationality. Indeed, one’s accent can grant one ‘licence to move’ in Barbados – enabling entrée into zones of exclusion, much the same way that ID papers for the ‘right’ country can grant unhindered access through immigration (cf. Agamben, 2008). Thus, Potter and Phillips (2008) note that young Black Bajan-Brits who otherwise may have been excluded on the basis of race, are included in Barbados because they speak with an English accent, which results in an ‘automatic symbolic lightening of skin colour’ (Potter and Phillips 2008, p. 139) – a view which substantiates the racialization of ‘foreigner’ identity discussed in Chapter 5.

Migrants’ motivations for containing their speech was thus connected to their reluctance to be labelled as foreigners, since this invited further

112 Int21_GM_15.03.2011
scrutiny, and was likely to involve suspicion regarding undocumented status.

**STEPHANIE:** **Oh it was, it was scary.** ‘Cause everybody now, they tell you that, ahm, don’t let people know that you’re not straight [documented]. And don’t speak when you’re in a bus. And ahm, you can’t go here. It was like ...I remember one time I saw a customs officer and I swear it was an Immigration [officer], and it was like...she was there speaking to me, and I just can’t speak ‘cause I was afraid that if I speak, and she find out that I am a Guyanese, that...so...she was there speaking to me ...I was in (names store)...and she was there speaking to me and I was like, just smiling because I was afraid to speak.\(^{113}\)

Silence for some is therefore a coping strategy for some, and for others an instinctive response. As Stephanie’s narrative indicates, undocumented status is so anxiety-ridden that migrants become nearly paralyzed by fear when faced with the prospect of detention.

It should be noted that blending in by keeping silent was not a strategy available to all migrants. Indo-Guyanese were a more readily identifiable group due to physical features such as their hair. Further, it is on this basis that migrants of Indian ethnicity were policed, since racial profiling was a method used by immigration officials to target suspected undocumented migrants. In order to avoid detection, male (Indian) migrants would typically be clean shaven and wear caps in order to blend in with afro migrants. In this way suspect status was embodied in ‘disguise’ since such migrants attempted to hide their outsider status from local Barbadians (see Willen, 2007b).

\(^{113}\) Int8_GF_21.11.2010
Restricted mobility

The spatialization of fear in the public domain was an overarching phenomenon, such that beyond limited speech, migrants also engaged in restricted mobility in their day to day living. In this regard, their movements were confined to specific activities - travel for work, shopping, and church (for some). Migrants would sometimes explain this constrained mobility as a product of their reserved personality, or tie it to successful completion of the migration project, for example by emphasizing the need to save. Yet its prevalence in the narratives of the majority of migrants, suggests a deeper underlining motive, which some of the migrants were hesitant to express.

CYNTHIA: We don’t really socialize. Like before, like when I think we just came we used to go out. But there is no social life. You know, because sometimes you might go socializing and you don’t know who is going to come into the ahm... Because you’ve heard about cases where people in parties and Police, because the Barbadians with the drugs, you know they smoking and, you know, Police raiding parties, these dances and whatever. And the first thing they going to push out, is -
LEIGHTON: Hold is you...
CYNTHIA: Is foreigners...
LEIGHTON: Right, so before you get into that you best stay out.
CYNTHIA: You best not socialize. Because you don’t know, you gonna get into trouble. Like, you were not the first trouble maker, but you can get into trouble by just being there. You know, so ahm, we spend a lot of time at home.  

Migrants thus chose to avoid (large) social gatherings in public spaces and specific locales where migrants were known to congregate and which were

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114 Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
targeted by immigration officials during raids. For example, Ricardo indicates that he was warned by a high-ranking immigration official to avoid particular destinations, stating “‘These are the places you must not go. You must not go to Baxter’s Road, Fairchild Street, ahm Nelson Street and…’” You know, I guess those are the places that they frequent, you know they run [raids]’.\textsuperscript{115} I should note that migrants did not forsake socializing altogether. Migrants did engage in leisure activities, but these were limited to engagement with compatriots and usually took place in/around their neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Hiding in plain sight}

The fear of detention was such that migrants spent a significant portion of their time at home. Such was their physical entrapment that they rarely socialized with neighbours, as is illustrated further below in Stephanie’s narrative.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{quote}
NDJ: So, then…’cause you said that people told you like not to talk on the bus…
STEPHANIE: My aunt, yes
NDJ: So did you like stay inside all the time or ?
STEPHANIE: Yes, I mean you could not tell if I was at home or not. My neighbours never knew if I was at home or not, cause I always had my windows closed and there was fans going all the time. But when I’m in, I’m in and I don’t play music. If I’m listening to the TV it’s low and in the night, my light is like, you only use the light that you need. If you here in the bedroom you turn on that one light. Otherwise the house is in darkness and nobody knows if
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115} Int6_GM_14.11.2010
\textsuperscript{116} Thus during the course of fieldwork I attended one birthday party, a BBQ and was able to accompany migrants for drinks after the work day. I also attended two football matches for a local league that was dominated by migrant players.
\textsuperscript{117} Int8_GF_21.11.2010
you in or you out. And it was like that until I get myself sorted out.

Stephanie’s narrative paints an extreme picture of migrants’ attempts to avoid detention, for she took excessive measures to remain ‘hidden’ from the outside world – turning off all the lights, not playing music. This was also a practice she maintained even after becoming documented, further evidence of the enduring nature of the geography of fear in migrants’ lives.

The fear migrants experienced was thus not limited to their negotiation of public spaces. This is substantiated in research by Willen (2007a), who in discussing the intensification of policing of the undocumented in Israel notes the tendency of agoraphobia among undocumented migrants. The possibility of being found out by immigration officials or reported on by neighbours led migrants to engage in a number of methods designed to conceal themselves – such as covering a shutter-less window.

While other migrants did not report similar practices, the words they used did convey this sense of hiding, since they lived a rather circumspect existence. By ‘laying low’, as migrants often described it, migrants ‘policed’ themselves to prevent detention and deportation in order to preserve their undocumentedness. As Anthony indicates, ‘since me come and ting people always tell me like lie low, keep out of trouble and ting like that. They say nobody no come and look for you so just take it easy and no get involved and ting like that. So me kinda keep pon a low profile, right’.118 What Stephanie’s and Anthony’s narratives, though different, both reveal is that migrants received an undue amount of attention, and that as far as was

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118 Int23_JM_GM_17.03.2011
within their power, they sought to monitor their behaviour to ensure that they avoided detection.

Madsen (2004) reports a similar mechanism amongst undocumented Mozambican migrants in South Africa. Though for her the strategy was a collective effort of undocumented migrants which not only entailed exclusion of offenders by community members, but sanctions (in the form of alienation) for those who brought undue attention to the undocumented community. Haugen (2012) makes a similar observation in her discussion of Nigerians in China. She writes, ‘my Nigerian informants commonly described their own demeanour as “quiet” and “honest”, and contrasted this with the disruptive behaviour of some migrants. Undocumented migrants are especially careful not to attract attention...’ (Haugen, 2012, p.4). Within the Barbadian context, whilst it could be said that self-policing was a common strategy, recommended to undocumented migrants by their network, there does not seem to be evidence of a concerted or communal effort, as policing involved self-regulation, and not monitoring and sanctioning of other members of the community.

This idea of hiding as a state of being is again evident in the story of one migrant, June. Immigration officials had turned up at her home one day to detain her. As she had not yet arrived there she was able to escape detention (having been warned not to come home by a relative) but remained haunted by the prospect of being detained at a later date. Thus, notwithstanding migrants retreat indoors, migrants’ homes, or private spaces, were not ‘safe places’. The conduct of raids by the immigration department, in particular at night, meant there was a possibility of being detained at home, which heightened migrants’ sense of deportability. Thus even with migrants’ best
efforts to avoid detection, there remained the possibility of detention by immigration officials. Sadiq narrates how such detention was likely to take place,\textsuperscript{119}

I know of one woman was renting a room, right. So... they rent out the building by rooms. So the... I doan know how the, how the Immigration receive information, but they went and raid, they raid the place. So they find a few people in some of the rooms, and this one woman, she didn’t want to open the door, so like they kick the door down and when they went in they couldn’t find she ‘cause she was under the bed, a very low bed. Yeah, so, she say that when they get she fi come out from under the bed, she was trembling so bad cause she was so scared right, she was trembling so bad one Immigration woman, tell one of the Immigration officers, ‘Man, loose the woman, ‘cause she might just dead. She might fall down and dead pon we, just loose she’ – the way how she behaving right, nervous, trembling...

The latter portion of Sadiq’s narrative paints a very vivid picture of the fear which attended migrants’ detention. In fact, this state of being was characterized not just by fear, but by vigilance. Undocumented migrants could never unwind at home as they always needed to be prepared should immigration officials turn up.

MAYA:...So the guys used to say you gotta sleep with your shoes by your bed, you know, and because you don’t know when Immigration going come and you can never be safe...‘cause when I came here first I heard a lot of myth...\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{119} Int18_GM_23.02.2011
\textsuperscript{120} Int5_GF_112.11.2010
CAMILLE:...You sleep in your sneakers. You tuck your passport in your underwear. You know, you always prepared to move... 121

Maya’s reference to ‘myth’ underscores the point made earlier regarding the circulation of stories among the migrants community about surveillance and detention of the undocumented. Interestingly as pointed out by Camille, such preparedness meant trying to preserve what little documentation one had as it was likely that immigration officials would confiscate one’s travel documents.

**Strategic immobility**

As indicated above, repatriation from Barbados after a period of undocumentedness meant that individuals could not return to the country within a minimum period of a year, if allowed re-entry. Thus repatriation placed constraints on migrants as it cut short their stay and limited the possibilities of return, jeopardizing the entire migration project. Aware of this restriction to re-entry for those who had overstayed, migrants engaged in *strategic immobility*, by remaining in Barbados for the duration of their migration project, and/or until they were regularized. On the one hand, this immobility was evidence of migrants’ agentic capacity, as it was an option employed by migrants to maximize their stay in Barbados. Yet, it also demonstrates the limits to their agency, as the border placed constraints on migrants’ free movement. This had negative effects for some migrants, like Jonathan, Joy, and David, who could not be present for momentous occasions in their families’ lives. David explains:122

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121 Int17_GF_19.02.2011
122 Int2_LM_29.10.2010
The only challenge I had was before, when I was illegal. For five years, I couldn’t, I couldn’t leave the island, cause if I left the island I couldn’t come back. So that was pretty tough on me ‘cause my parents got married, I couldn’t enter the wedding. My aunt got married, I couldn’t attend. My grandmother passed away and I couldn’t go to her funeral. So for me it was a great challenge, very hard.

The experience of David is replicated in other literature regarding migrants’ resistance to external travel once undocumented (Van Meeteren, 2012; Schuster, 2010). Schuster notes for example that the undocumented migrants she interviewed identify the award of documentation as the event with the most impact in their life, because it enabled them to travel overseas and visit family and friends (2010). I also note the award of papers as an important event in migrants’ trajectory, as it enabled migrants’ external and internal movement.

This enhances the argument posited by Kothari (2003) who, though referring to the pre-migration phase of decision-making amongst the poor, suggests that staying put is the product of constraints which make migration an impossibility. It also adds to arguments concerning rights to mobility. In the stories above, it is apparent that though borders are designed to keep people out (Pecoud and de Guchteneire 2006; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002), they also keep people in, where exit is detrimental to fulfilment of the migration project.

**The exception**

Thus far I have painted a picture of the Barbadian space as characterized by a geography of fear, produced and perpetuated by heavy policing undertaken by the immigration officials (and security officials) as agents of the state, the local populace and migrants themselves. I wish to note, however, that there
were exceptions within this geography of fear. I use the case of Paul who was undocumented, and who seemed to negotiate the urban space without restrictions, to demonstrate that there are limits to the power of the state and that the governmentality of surveillance (and deportation) must be appropriated by migrants in order to be effective in modifying migrant behaviour.

Paul had arrived in Barbados in 2006, and had travelled to Barbados on the advice of his uncle. As a carpenter in Guyana, Paul had difficulty earning a consistent income and thus took to operating buses, which generated a more sustainable livelihood. Paul was encouraged to travel to Barbados as his uncle had convinced him of the ease of obtaining work in Barbados, which would be remunerated on a more profitable basis than similar work in Guyana. Having travelled to Barbados, with time Paul was able to remit a portion of savings to Guyana, which he started to do on a regular basis, sending money home to his partner. However, he eventually discovered that his partner had squandered the remittances. Disappointed Paul had to restart the process of savings, and began sending money home to his mother, who also cared for his children. The betrayal was a significant setback as the loss of savings meant that he would have to remain in Barbados for longer than he had intended. In addition, the high cost of living in Barbados, which was much more than anticipated, put a dent in his ability to save. Paul lost another US$800 trying to procure a work permit through fraudulent means. His bad luck was compounded when he could no longer find work on construction sites, and he resorted to street vending in order to earn a living. Paul’s undocumentedness, and thus ‘illegality’, was exacerbated by the fact that he vended in an area that did not allow this activity. One day Paul came
to me excited that he would appear in the local paper and joked that he stood right by the sign which read ‘vending illegal’ to take a picture for the reporter who was writing an article on this subject. Paul’s decision to live ‘on the margins’ could be viewed as resilient behaviour. Through a number of disappointments he had opted to remain in Barbados undocumented. His routine expression was ‘you gotta do what you gotta do’.

I use Paul as a case study since he operated nonchalantly within a space, which other migrants tended to negotiate with a heightened sense of fear. His case is interesting in several respects. As mentioned before, Paul vended in a zone in which vending was prohibited. This ought to have attracted the attention of the police who if they probed would have ascertained his undocumented status. In addition, this area was routinely patrolled by the police as it was in close proximity to the main cruise ship port. I had observed him on occasion, greeting police officers, and when I asked if he was not afraid to do so, his response was that his activities did not cause any harm and so he need not be wary of police, as they were only concerned with ‘bad’ people. He therefore interestingly, placed himself outside the category of suspect subjects. In addition, Paul gained access to shops which required national identification – the presentation of which could entail the discovery of undocumentedness, independently, and sometimes with the assistance of a Guyanese friend who possessed a Barbadian ID card.

Thus unlike other migrants who appropriated the governmentality of the state, and thus adjusted their spatial practices, Paul moved around with much freedom in public spaces. Two things should be noted. The first is that Paul represents an extreme example of spatial practices. As mentioned earlier, migrants were highly selective in their avoidance of public spaces,
but Paul frequented these spaces in order to make a livelihood. Secondly, on the face of it, Paul’s approach was cavalier, and seemed to disregard the power of the state. However, Paul also avoided zones targeted by immigration officials, such as Fairchild Street. He indicated that he was put off by rowdy behaviour, which attracted the attention of police and immigration officials. This suggests at least some concern for his safety and an admission, if even a small one, of the fear of detention.

There is another component of Paul’s story, which parallels comments made by other migrants. He had grown accustomed to greeting police officers, which suggests some level of acquaintance with them. As Ricardo had indicated earlier, he was friends with a high ranking immigration official who had warned him of places to avoid and similarly Dominic had recalled having been giving advice by immigration officials, whilst undocumented, on regularization of his status. On the face of it, this may seem to contradict earlier arguments regarding the existence of a paradigm of suspicion – note Anthony’s earlier comments that ‘…nobody no come look for you…’ unless you got into trouble.123 However, what they reveal is inconsistency in the immigration management system, which is indicative of the agency of those directly responsible for instrumentalizing (and institutionalizing) the governmentality of surveillance.

**Heightened deportability**

In the main undocumented migrants lived in subterfuge in order to negotiate the geography of fear. This is even more evident in the post amnesty context. Before I conclude this chapter I wish to discuss the impact of the amnesty on the geography of fear. The post-amnesty period was characterized by an

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123 Int23_JM_GrM_17.03.2011
increase in raids, detentions and deportations, stories of which would have circulated amongst migrants, and have been reported in the media (Ferguson, 2009b, 2009c; Stabroek News, 2009a, 2009b). These stories further contributed to the efficacy of the governmentality employed by the state as they heightened migrants’ feelings of deportability. However, beyond the psychological violence produced, the amnesty had a tangible impact on migrants. Willen (2007a) suggests that this impact can be seen at the individual and collective level as migrants’ experience of time, space and their bodies is profoundly affected. Their subsequent isolation, which is a reflection of their attempt to negotiate safe and unsafe places, results in the disintegration of networks, as migrants shun social activities which were based on communal and network interaction.

In the case of Barbados, this is evidenced in the number of migrants who voluntarily left the country in the post-amnesty period. The level of return was so high, in particular among Guyanese that migrants pointed to the relative desertion of popular venues for socialization.

SADIQ: I could testify to it because where all the Guyanese gather, where most, most gather, on Fairchild Street, right, and there is one reason is because that if you need to see someone, if you need to find a Guyanese person that you know, some old friend or relative, if you go on Fairchild Street ( Interruption ) ...So at one point before the amnesty, Fairchild Street used to, a lot, a lot of Guyanese, especially on Fridays and Saturdays. Right, that is where, every Guyanese normally gather, most of them in fact. So now when you pass, when you pass there now when you see the gathering, the gathering very meager. Well, and when you ask ‘I ain’t seen this person?’ ‘The person went back
While I note the importance of the impact of psychological violence on migrants, I do not wish to attribute the exodus of migrants solely to the increased detention and deportation activities undertaken by immigration officials in the post-amnesty period. This is so for a number of reasons. The first is that several migrants had voluntarily repatriated rather than pay the exorbitant fees associated with regularization. The fee for a work permit was BDS$200, similarly the fee for a student visa. This did not include the payment of back taxes where migrants were delinquent, as well as monies for medical exams, and possibly lawyers’ fees where they did not file independently. In addition to the above, voluntary repatriation was a strategy employed by migrants to avoid the stamping of a deportation order in the passport. Thus their eventual return would not be proscribed by a one year period.

However, as was raised in Chapter 5, the amnesty period coincided with a decline in the Barbados economy. There were thus some migrants who were encountering difficulties finding work; rather than remain in Barbados for an indeterminate period and endure the high cost of living, several chose to return home. Finally, migrants had indicated that the geography of fear was heightened not necessarily amongst migrants, but among prospective employers who feared bearing the consequence of paying a hefty fine for hiring undocumented workers. This was the case although the requisite legislation to amend the law and increase the fine from $5000 to $50,000 had

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124 Int18_GM_23.02.2011
not yet taken place. Leighton indicates that hiring migrants was perceived as a risk and there was fear among employers of being found out.

LEIGHTON: Before this two years ago, before government change. You could have get any work before. So you could have been working...even though they used to send you home the same way, they never bring a law that you could be charged five hundred or what
CYNTHIA: Five thousand.
LEIGHTON: Five thousand. So if you do that you telling them doan give them fellows work. It’s easy. It’s a maths.
NDJ: They fine the people who hire undocumented?
LEIGHTON: Right
CYNTHIA: But, I think, I don’t think that law has been passed.
LEIGHTON: But it ain’t passed. But look at it. It ain’t passed but people do it. Because I will tell you this here, nobody take you on unless that man is a small man and he need to get a job done.  

CHRIS: They gonna charge you a lump sum of money and if you caan pay the money they gonna lock up the contractor. You know so they make you scared that if certain things not right for you you caan go out to work.
HENRY: And some of them pack up and run home.
LEIGHTON: Hundreds  

The above suggests that the amendment to the Immigration Act was a strategy used by the government to regulate not just undocumented migrants, but the persons who were likely to hire undocumented migrants. This indicates that there was also a geography of fear for local Barbadians who harboured undocumented migrants.

125 Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
126 Int11_GM_GM_GM_22.01.2011 (Leighton also sat in on this interview)
Based on the foregoing, whilst the practice of detention and deportation escalated in the post amnesty period, contributing to a ‘growing climate of fear’ (Willen, 2007a, p. 182), other factors influenced the exodus of migrants from Barbados. Irrespective of the reasons, however, it should be noted that the exodus may have reduced the numbers of visible undocumented migrants in Barbados, but it did not result in the disintegration of networks. Based on my observation, it strengthened the bonds between migrants, which were even more necessary in the constrained environment produced by the amnesty. The findings therefore suggest that the geography of fear placed heavy constraints on migrants’ exercise of agency, but did not totally constrain their agentic capacity.

Conclusion

The threat of detention and deportation was quite palpable, leading to the production of what I referred to throughout this chapter as a geography of fear. Migrants, both documented and undocumented, experienced this psychological violence which was effected by immigration officials, acting as agents of the state. This was the case as they belonged to a suspect category, a designation which was tied to their status as foreigners, but also to their status as residents from high risk/undesirable countries (Shamir, 2005).

This discussion raises two inter-related points which contributes to the existing debate on deportability. The first is that deportability is a condition which impacts migrants not only for the duration of their stay in Barbados, but from the moment they attempt to enter the country. Secondly, this study has shown that physical violence need not define such regimes, but rather that mundane everyday objects can be engaged by the state to engender a geography of fear.
With respect to the latter, this chapter has demonstrated that borders are experienced and imagined by migrants in different ways (Alexandrova and Lyon 2007). Mundane, or everyday objects, are representational of the state, and it modes of control, and it is important that explanations of migrants’ (phenomenological) experience of undocumentedness (Willen, 2007) be extended to their imagining of such objects in relation to the border. In their accounts of migrating, participants use a range of symbols to refer to the Barbadian border and its policing: the bench, the cold room, the white van, and the bounty. These symbols are reflective of the ubiquitous presence of the border in migrants’ everyday living and were constant reminders of migrants’ intended or actual state of undocumentedness. As indicated above in the reference to Chang and Aoki’s work, the border is not just a peripheral phenomenon as migrants continue to encounter it even after crossing the physical border (1997). This discussion thus reinforces that border apparatus is ‘spread throughout the territory’ (Painter, 1995, p. 33). Indeed, this suggests the construction of another type of geography/ies – ‘prosaic geographies of stateness’ (Painter, 2006). In Barbados, this is reflected in the pervasiveness of surveillance of the suspect.

This chapter also noted that governmentality is not essentially a system of governance by the state.\textsuperscript{127} As I argued above, governmentality operates on a range of scales, and is effected by a range of actors (Hiemstra, 2010). What I wish to emphasize here is that the governmentality of surveillance feeds into a larger project to control populations for the well-being of the nation (Walters, 2010). In this respect, it serves the interest of a territorial power,

\textsuperscript{127} Indeed, Foucault in his articulation had suggested various ‘strategies, technologies, programmes and techniques of governance (Walters, 2006, citing Barry et al. 1996).
and becomes part of the regime of control that is orchestrated and managed by officials of the state, and nationals who support these regimes (Bigo, 2002).

In discussing the various scales of power which operate to police migration I distinguished between macro- and micro-level scales of power (Schlosser, 2008). In terms of the former, the state relied on policing of its external and internal border by immigration officials, whose work was at time supported by the surveillance of foreigners undertaken by citizens. Such a strategy was necessary for the government was aware that it was impossible to detect and deport all suspect migrants on entry, and that the condition of ‘illegality’ often arose when those who had successfully gained entry at the airport overstayed the time allowed in their passport (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009). However, at the micro-level migrants regulated their own behaviour through being silent in public spaces, using dress to conceal phenotypic characteristics, engaging in minimal social engagement, as well as limiting their mobility. These experiences of the condition of undocumentedness as embodied and spatial support a growing body of literature, which examines the impact of psychological violence on migrants’ daily activities. I do however present a counterfactual in the case of Paul, whose story indicates that for the geography of fear to be effective migrants must internalize the fear associated with their undocumented status.

Finally, I discussed the impact of migrant agency in perpetuating the geography of fear that shaped migrants’ existence. I argued that although migrants were able to strategically utilize a number of techniques of subterfuge to prevent their detection, that such methods (ironically) fuelled the geography of fear. This was evident, for example, where narratives of
surveillance, detention and deportation circulated throughout the migrant communities (cf. Willen, 2007a). I continue this argument on migrants’ role in enabling the very conditions which other them, in the next chapter in my discussion of geographies of exclusion.
CHAPTER 7: LIVING WITH(IN) BORDERS OF IN/EXCLUSION

Relied upon but unwelcome, among us but uninvited, undocumented workers labor on the border of inclusion and exclusion…(Núñez, 2010, p. 819, sic)

Introduction

The preceding chapters have included a discussion of the interplay between structure and agency in the lives of non-nationals resident in Barbados. In keeping with critical realist ontology, this chapter continues to explore the link between structure and agency, in particular, how migrant agency reproduced or transformed conditions of their everyday existence, resulting in their inclusion in and/or exclusion from Barbadian society.

In Barbados, there were extra-legal parameters of inclusion which revolved around race and ‘foreign’ identity. While interviewing one group of migrants, a view was shared that endorsed this conceptualization of life for non-nationals in Barbados. The quote echoes a common theme which emerged in my interviews and other interactions – that Barbados is the exclusive domain of the Barbadian national and privileged (non-suspect) foreigners, and that within this domain non-nationals experience exclusion(s).

HENRY: But what I find in Barbados right, like different nationality ain’t welcome in Barbados at all. Barbados is for Bajans. That what me think
CHRIS: And the white people.
RAJEEVE: Yeah

This chapter will deconstruct this proposition that ‘Barbados is for Bajans’. Rather than examine the dimensions of race and identity previously

128 Int11_GM_GM_GM_22.01.2011
discussed, I take as my point of departure the legal criteria of exclusion of non-nationals in Barbados. My argument is advanced through a ‘dialectic analysis of incorporation’ (Hatziprokopiou, 2003, p. 1034) – simultaneously examining migrants’ experiences of incorporation and exclusion. By employing this dialectic I am able to capture the plural and diverse geographies (within) which migrants navigate on a daily basis. We are able to see that the processes of in/exclusion are not static, but are driven by ‘forces, reactions and mechanisms pushing immigrants towards exclusion’, and ‘strategies...which facilitate integration’ (Hatziprokopiou, 2003, p. 1054).

It is useful here to clarify the relationship between exclusion and citizenship. There is consensus in the literature that citizenship is used by the state to not only denote legal recognition, but also determine the benefits of such recognition (Monforte and Dufour 2011; Menjívar, 2006; Coutin, 2000b). Thus Menjívar argues that, ‘[c]itizenship as legal status – whom the state recognizes as a citizen and the formal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the individual in the state – shapes the immigrants’ membership in society and their understanding of their place in it’ (2006, p. 1003). This distinction needs to be clear for we will see within the Barbadian context that the legal criteria of inclusion is grounded in citizenship and permanent residence status, and thus exclusion (of different degrees) would have been experienced by all non-nationals, who fell outside these categories. However, my focus on undocumentedness is due to ways in which this liminal status heightened the possibility of migrants’ exclusion.

This chapter is divided into four main sections, each relating to one of four spheres of migrants’ lifeworld - work, education, health care, and housing. These areas of focus emerged in migrants’ discussions extemporaneously, or
followed my line of questioning relating to life in Barbados. For each section, I discuss the relevant legislation and/or policy, which outline the parameters of inclusion. In the language of critical realism, the pieces of legislation and/or policy documents which codify the parameters of inclusion, distinguishing the rights-bearing from the rightsless (Herbert, 2009, p. 5), are objects which have structures. These parameters thus have causal powers to produce the exclusion of non-nationals, but only under certain conditions. My concern here is the extent to which these structures created conditions for migrants’ exclusion, and the ways migrants strategically negotiated these constraints through the exercise of agency. I demonstrate how the migrant experience was marked by moments and spaces of exclusion and inclusion, which resulted from the interplay between structural factors and migrant agency. I also show that migrants’ strategic negotiation of these constraints placed limits on the exercise of agency, ultimately exacerbating the conditions of their exclusion.

Before I commence the discussion, however, I would like to clarify a few issues concerning the ‘structure’ of Barbadian society. It should be noted that these features are not unique to Barbadian society; but it is important for me to elucidate in order to contextualize the discussion which follows.

In addition to the legal criteria of inclusion previously mentioned, there were a number of structures in Barbados. I have elaborated to different degrees on these structures in other sections of the thesis, which include: (1) a stable macro-economy that was supported by migrant labour; (2) the existence of established migrant networks in Barbados; (3) an anti-foreigner culture among local Barbadians; and (4) a laissez-faire policy regime that operated in tandem with a restrictive legislative environment, prior to the 2008 election.
As pointed out in the aforementioned chapters, these structures were transformed by the agency of migrants, and the impact of external structures. In the case of the macro-economy, for example, the downward shifts in the global economy resulted in contractions in the Barbadian economy, which together with a more restrictive policy regime created an environment that was less receptive to migrant labour. In this Chapter, I examine how the interaction of these internal structures, as well as their interplay with (migrant) agency (re)produced the conditions of in/exclusion in migrants’ everyday existence.

Secondly, and contingent on the latter point, these structures can function either as constraints or enablements to migrants’ inclusion in Barbados. My main argument is that these constraints and enablements were mediated by migrants’ strategic agency. I argue here, as in previous chapters, that the strategies employed by migrants are a reflection of agentic capacity because they were exercised in direct relation to the constraint(s) posed by legislative framework governing access to these four spheres, and were undertaken to ensure the longevity of the migration project. It is important to point out that while I emphasize migrant agency, the agency of other actors – landlords, employers, medical practitioners, and educational officers, is acknowledged. Through their actions they not only transformed exclusionary structures in Barbados, but in so doing, challenged the constraints that had been imposed by existing and new legislation implemented by the state. In this respect, this research is an exemplar of Archer’s thesis on morphogenesis and ‘double morphogenesis’, which agency which leads to structural and cultural elaboration (that is, transformation), ‘is itself elaborated in the process (Archer, 1995, 247).
The third, and final, issue concerns the division between the real and empirical domains. Several studies highlight that there is a distinction between the legal and policy framework and their impact, that is, their ability to create conditions of exclusion for which they are designed (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006; Van der Leun, 2003; Engbersen and Broeders 2009). As legislation does not always inform practices of exclusion I argue that it is important to juxtapose the parameters of inclusion against migrants’ narratives regarding their experiences of exclusion. The exclusionary potential of legislation and their consequent impact on migrants’ lifeworld is the subject of the ensuing discussions.

**Embedded migrants and their informal inclusion in the labour market**

This section discusses migrants’ relative incorporation into the Barbadian labour market. I show that prior to the implementation of the 2009 amnesty migrants were included in the Barbadian labour market, a fact which further encouraged migration to the island. However, they were largely accommodated in the informal labour market. I debate whether this incorporation is indeed a reflection of migrant agency, discussing the options available to migrants who did not satisfy the legislative criteria of inclusion. As all non-nationals would have required a work permit to work in Barbados, this section focuses on the incorporation of the undocumented migrant population, showing how the lack of documentation heightened migrant vulnerability, creating conditions of exclusion in an environment of inclusion.

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129 As discussed in Chapter 2 The empirical relates to all phenomena experienced, whether observed or not. My interest in migrants’ narratives regarding their experiences of exclusion leads me to emphasize the real domain, which relates to observable phenomena.
Permits, penalties and undocumentedness

The legal provisions relating to migrants’ exclusion from the (formal) labour market are directly tied to legal status. Regulations regarding the employment of non-nationals in Barbados are enshrined in Part III (Sections 17 and 18) of the Immigration Act. The act reads as follows,

A person other than a citizen, permanent resident or immigrant may not in Barbados engage in any occupation or accept employment without having first obtained a written permit for the purpose granted by the Minister.

There is also the converse stipulation that employers cannot engage the services of an individual unless such a person is in possession of a work permit. The Act later goes on to explicitly criminalize the hiring of non-nationals not in possession of a work permit, as well as working without a permit, with the penalty of a fine and/or imprisonment for persons found guilty of breaching the regulations. The possession of documentation granting the right to work thus legitimated migrants’ stay in Barbados. It also enabled them to acquire additional documentation (the national ID) which facilitated other everyday transactions.

In the Barbadian context, therefore, there were two key legal provisions governing migrants’ access to the labour market: the requirement for a work permit and the criminalization of the practice of working without a permit and employing migrants’ not in possession of a permit. As stated in Chapter 4 (see section on Regionalism and migration) the existence of a regional framework regulating the movement of CARICOM nationals only allowed free movement of ten categories of skilled nationals. Individuals which fell

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130 The current Act states a maximum fine of BDS$5,000 and/or a period of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months.
outside of these categories (as did the migrants interviewed) would therefore have been required to obtain a permit under the discretionary migration regime in operation in Barbados. The legislative provisions governing the labour market thus placed explicit constraints on undocumented (CARICOM) nationals.

Examination of the procedures regarding the application for a work permit reveals the various possibilities for undocumentedness. As the application for the permit is to be filed by the contracting employer and is to be obtained in advance of arrival to Barbados, migrants were undocumented once they commenced work without a permit.131 In addition, there was no guarantee that the application for a new work permit would be approved once the existing one had expired. Undocumentedness thus also occurred where migrants’ permits had lapsed or if they continued to work without the requisite documentation where their application for a new permit had been declined.

**Agents and agency in the informal labour market**

Despite the fact that employing non-nationals not in possession of a work permit, as well as working without a permit, both constitute offences under the Immigration Act, the private sector in Barbados has relied on the migrant population as a source of cheap and reliable labour (Walcott, personal communication, 24 November 2010). Guyanese migrants in particular were thought to play an invaluable role in the labour market - ‘If it were not for Guyanese labourers in this country doing work that Barbadians no longer seem to want to do, agriculture would have collapsed’ (Niles, 2006 quoting

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131 Short-term permits were granted for up to eleven months. Most interviewees who did hold work permits at the time of interview held short-term permits.
former Prime Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur). Periods of boom in Barbados, meant that jobs were readily available. The availability of jobs (and a culture of circular migration discussed in Chapter 4) thus encouraged migration to the island. Sadiq discusses economic conditions during the early stages of his arrival and prior to the amnesty:132

"Well ahm, well at the time, construction was booming in Barbados. So, finding a job was very easy. I mean like, you coulda [could] get a job today and you coulda [could] walk off the job the same day, and probably before the day out, another job offer come.

The quote above underscores that in the pre-amnesty period demand for labour outpaced supply, which facilitated the ease with which migrants could obtain work, without having a work permit in their possession. The above also suggests that the policy surrounding the hiring of the undocumented is ‘embedded in a social and institutionalized context that leads to a series of (officially) unintended outcomes’ (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004, p. 1436), as employers’ continued reliance on undocumented workers further encouraged undocumented work (and migration) to the island. In the formal work sector there was thus total exclusion of the undocumented; however, there was inclusion of the undocumented in the informal labour market. Constrained labour resources created a culture of informality, especially as migrants filled the gap left by the increasing number of the educated in Barbados, who shunned low-skilled professions.

In the construction sector, larger more established companies circumvented hiring policy by relying on subcontractors to engage workers. A ‘shadow
economy’ was therefore created (Walcott, personal communication, 24 November 2010). The scrutiny which thus accompanied entry into the island (discussed in Chapter 6) was not necessarily mimicked in hiring practices. Ray for example, who worked as a warehouse supervisor, indicates that although he had been asked to provide proof of a permit during his application for his current position, he never did produce one. However, several employers did not question migrants about their status. In addition, there were a few migrants (for example, female commercial sex workers), who operated in sectors which themselves breached other legislation in Barbados. It would not therefore have been practical for employers to require their workers to have permits as this would have drawn attention to migrants, as well as their establishment.

The above raises questions regarding the degree of agency exercised, that is, the extent to which working without a permit was a reflection of strategic agency on the part of migrants. It could be argued that migrants’ incorporation into the labour market was not contingent on their decision for undocumentedness. Theoretically, the legal framework would have excluded undocumented migrants from work in Barbados. However, strategy is reflected in migrants’ negotiation of those factors which both constrained and enabled their incorporation into the Barbados labour market. Thus, working without a permit is an indicator of migrants’ agentic capacity as the culture of informality acted as an enablement to migrant agency. Migrants exercised agency by working in those sectors for which a work permit was not required. This is the case especially in the construction and care work

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133 Thus, for example, sex workers are included in the list of persons prohibited entry into Barbados (see Appendix G).
sectors. Migrants gravitated towards these sectors, as they were most accommodating to the hiring of undocumented workers, and avoided those where their undocumentedness would have been a challenge, such as work in the government service since their lack of status would have prevented them from applying for more professional capacities.

And what I found too, well I don’t know ahm, I don’t [know] if ... but I think it’s difficult to work with the government as a non-national. To get an office job. That’s a no-no. You got to go in the private sector. So when I came, when I came at first, I well, I worked, I do work I never done before, and I would say thanks to my parents for, you know teaching me things around the house, so I went and you know work. I worked in people’s kitchen, you know. Ahm, in the first two or three years I worked with a ting, and then I left and did a little sewing and ting. But for the past four years, I have been a care giver. But, well, I think this is more where I would want to be. But I have to do what I have to do to survive. (Cynthia)\(^{134}\)

Again the extent of agency could be challenged since migrants would have been employed in sectors which matched their educational profile and experience (see Appendix I). For those who were employed prior to their arrival, this type of work did not result in de-skilling. This is not always the case in undocumented migration, where migrants must choose lower skilled jobs in the informal sector to conceal their undocumentedness (Hatziprokopiou, 2003). Further, if these were the only sectors which accommodated migrants and migrants were compelled to work in order to meet their daily needs and fulfil their migration aspirations, one must ask whether migrants are exercising agency or ‘doing what they must to survive’ (cf. Gomberg-Muñoz, 2010, p. 297).

\(^{134}\) Int7_GF_GM_GM_GM_14.11.2010
However, there was a further strategy employed by migrants, in particular in the construction sector, which supports the thesis of agency in negotiating constraints and enablements to the employment of undocumented workers. This entailed charging lower rates for services provided as pointed out by Ricardo, below. I should note that determining what these rates were was challenging. Migrants were reluctant to divulge information on income and the seasonality of labour meant that wages were not necessarily obtained on a monthly basis. It was also dependent on the type of work in which migrants were engaged. Thus, in construction for example, rates would have been determined by the market, but was also contingent on the nature of labour, whether an individual was contracted to a site for the duration of the project – the job rate - or whether they were contracted on a daily basis to undertake a specific exercise, for example, to build a wall. The level of remuneration received would, however, have enabled them to have a reasonable standard of living (provided they remained in employment), which covered expenses in Barbados, and allowed for the sending of remittances.

RICARDO: And you’ll reach a Black-Guyanese contractor or maybe a skilled worker and he’ll give you a price, and say hey man, I charge you seven hundred dollars to do this job, but the Indian now go come and say I going charge you four or say five. So, automatically, people have a bad perception, right, that yeah this is what they want that they want to take weh we job. But they don’t see black people much as a threat. They see the Indians, but because they’re

135 Local legislation only stipulates minimum wage for two categories of workers—shop assistants and domestic helpers (BDS$5 per hour). If one uses data from the quarterly Labour Force Survey, migrants worked on average BDS$200-$499 per week, the range of salary earned by most Barbadians in 2010 (Barbados Statistical Service, 2010).
all Guyanese, this term Guyanese is used mostly. But
Barbadians tend more to accept the Black people, right.136

Ricardo’s last comment elides the tensions between afro-Barbadians and afro-Guyanese, which was evident in the quote which forms the basis for this chapter.

Discussions with migrants surrounding the practice described above by Ricardo, revealed underlying racial tensions between afro- and indo-Caribbean migrants. The practice was typically associated with indo-Guyanese migrants, who were accused of undermining the viability of migrant labour by charging less for poor quality service. Migrants alleged that these migrants were not qualified to undertake the services for which they were contracted as they were untrained – most migrants in construction were trained, through apprenticeship and formal education as carpenters or masons, and the substandard labour dissuaded employers from contracting migrant labour for future projects. In these instances, the competition between workers of different ethnicities not only underscored the shifts in the macro-economic environment (as well as the reaction to the more stringent legislative environment), which resulted in a shrinking of work opportunities, but also pointed to reproductions of structural conditions of racial tension between the afro- and indo-Guyanese, which had been prevalent in Guyana.

However, migrant agency contributed to the conditions which heightened their exclusion. In times of boom, migrants exercised some flexibility in determining the rate at which they were contracted. However, as more migrants started to travel to Barbados and the labour marketed contracted,

136 Int6_GM_14.11.2010
migrants began to compete for jobs by demanding less than market rate for services rendered.

The above demonstrates that migrants’ incorporation into Barbadian society reflected the interplay between the forces that encouraged their inclusion – a stable macro-economy, a tight labour market, and contingently, the dependence of migrant labour to fill deficit of low-skilled professions, and their strategic agency – working with a permit in jobs which fit with their current skill profile, and which satisfied their financial needs. However, this incorporation was not without consequences. Migrants’ inclusion in the Barbadian market was characterized by a number of exclusionary practices which migrants experienced as a result of their lack of documentation.

**Conditions of exclusion in an environment of inclusion**

For some employers, the hiring of the undocumented went beyond the basic necessity of guaranteed labour, as it provided a means to boost profits through the exploitation of workers. Dominic, like other migrants suggests that one of the main avenues of exploitation was misappropriation of taxes deducted from employees’ salaries.

.. I go to work with a white fellow name (gives name). Oh my God, and now I ain’t got no papers, you wukking [working] for the money, right, they tekking [taking] out the tax and the NIS\(^{137}\). Listen, I never pay so much tax yet! One time I work fi [for] $1200, right, fi [for] one week. And I had to pay seven hundred and something dollars in income tax, you understand. I say no, no, no. So that time I stop wuk [work]. We used to work overtime and ting right, which is overtime money. You don’t supposed to tax overtime money. But the man just taxing it. We even

\(^{137}\) As explained in Chapter 5, National Insurance Scheme (NIS) is a contributory social insurance scheme, which allows contributors to make claims for a range of benefits.
ending up bringing in the tax people dem, right because the NIS… fi [to] realize they only tekking [taking] out di money, but the money is not paying.\textsuperscript{138}

As discussed in Chapter 5 the political discourse of the state was one which emphasized the strains that the undocumented placed on social services, such as health and education. One could argue that implicit in this assertion is undocumented migrants’ non-payment of taxes, for if migrants were contributing to the social welfare system, then such claims would have no financial basis. As indicated by Dominic above, migrants sometimes routinely paid NIS and income tax; however, these monies were misappropriated by their employers through practices such as taxing of non-taxable pay and the failure to remit the funds to the government.

Additionally, Stephanie indicates that there were some cases in which the undocumented did not, in fact, pay NIS.\textsuperscript{139}

\begin{quote}
STEPHANIE: Our company, now they not hiring people that’s illegal. But before, if you doan have a work permit, you doan get the time and a half, or the double, you get a flat pay.
NDJ: Even if you work on a Saturday or Sunday?
STEPHANIE: Yes…. Well what they’re trying to say is that if you doan pay tax or national insurance, they doan have to pay you for ahm, give you the time and a half or the double or bank holidays, they doan have to pay you for the bank holidays. But once you paying the tax and thing they will give you it.
NDJ: So they, when you’re undocumented, you doan pay any NIS or anything?
STEPHANIE: Nope….
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{138} Int13\_GM\_31.01.2011
\textsuperscript{139} Int8\_GF\_21.11.2010
The perception that the undocumented need not be taxed, or were ineligible for other types of benefits (such as pay for overtime work) appealed to employers, for the financial burden on the company would have been less in two respects: the employer did not have to make a contribution to NIS, nor did they have to satisfy legislative requirements regarding extra pay (time and a half) for extended work hours or work done on holidays (Business Barbados, n.d.); however, what is clear, is that those employers who deducted NIS from the salaries of their undocumented workers usually chose to evade the tax system and did not always pay the deductions over to the government.

The misappropriation of taxes was only one of the ways employers exploited undocumented labour. Other avenues included demanding extensive work hours and paying undeservedly low wages, as Camille and Ricardo explain below,

CAMILLE... you would encounter persons, like they will work you, and then they will tell you, “look, if you doan move from here I will call the Immigration”, you know. One time I went to the cleaning firm and it was like, three days, $75. And I mean hard work, you out there with a broom, and you rubbing and you scrubbing and I mean you work till, you gotta be scrubbing all dem little tings, sometimes you got these little scrape things, you know these scraper things clean off the stuff off the tiles and all a dat [that].

RICARDO: Once they find out you illegal, they gwan hire you to do this and that do, and when you come they doan want to pay you. ‘Cause they know there’s nothing you could do, right. And they will quarrel about you, they call

\[140\] Int17_GF_19.02.2011
immigration to get you back on the plane. So, these are some of the injustices that people face.\textsuperscript{141}

Camille’s narrative reveals the challenges migrants’ faced when undocumented, since they not only encountered difficult working conditions such as strenuous work for little pay, but could not seek redress from their employer (or the state) due to their legal status. This and other elements of their work life can be discussed within the context of entrapment, which refers to limitations placed on migrants in light of their positionality as undocumented (Núñez and Heyman 2007; see also Silvey et al. 2008). The most dominant mode of entrapment for migrants was entrapment to particular categories of work. The undocumented dominated low skilled sectors such as construction, agriculture and care giving (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009; Comissiong, personal communication, October, 2010). With the exception of two migrants (both males) – one worked in information technology, the other in graphic art services, interviewees were concentrated in low to semi-skilled areas of employment, primarily construction (dominated by men) and care-giving (women only) (see Appendices C and I).

As was mentioned previously, migrants’ assumed occupations in Barbados which did not necessarily result in de-skilling, as the majority worked in an area which utilized their existing skill set. Indeed for a few of the migrants the transition to the work world in Barbados could be viewed as a positive one, as it would have been their first employment opportunity. However, migrants’ occupation in low skilled sectors constituted entrapment, as migrants were confined to work in particular job sectors which did not

\textsuperscript{141} Int6_GM_14.11.2010
encourage promotion and social mobility. The prospects for promotion were less likely since migrants worked long hours and would not have had opportunity to upgrade their skills. This combined with the absence of a work permit meant that migrants’ were entrapped to working in these sectors. The further issue of lack of recognition of training qualifications received in their home country by their employers and which would have secured placement in higher order jobs, also resulted in their entrapment to particular job categories. One migrant, Leighton, constantly spoke of how this had retarded his job prospects in the construction industry.

Migrants were not only entrapped to particular sectors of employment, and within that employment, to particular positions, but also to their employers. Several employers did not question migrant ‘illegality’. Contrarily, and as discussed by Kosic and Triandafyllidou employers are at times aware of migrants’ undocumented status but refuse to provide assistance with regularization since it may make their workers ‘more powerful and less exploitable’ (2004, p. 1438). Employers’ refusal to file work permits on migrants’ behalf meant that they were entrapped to that employer, as well into undocumentedness, as it was also unlikely that another employer would file ‘papers’ on their behalf. My discussion with David yields some insight into this process of entrapment.142

DAVID: Yes, I met (names employers) in St. Lucia, and then he say I should come. So after I came here I call him, cause my cousin was here already. So my cousin call him and told him I was here and I got the job.
NDJ: And he knew that you were undocumented when he hired you.
DAVID: He knew that, yeah.

142 Int2_LM_29.10.2010
NDJ: And, so he just hired you without the work permit?

...  
DAVID: I told him that I would need a working permit to work here in Barbados. So he told me that he doesn’t go into all this trouble and all this stress is a lot of stress, like for Immigration.
NDJ: Ok
DAVID: So they might like fine him, or ask him why he employed a foreign national, when you have a lot of Barbadians not working here a lot of Barbadians who need jobs, why he is not employing a Barbadian. So he said that he is not doing it, I should just take a chance.
NDJ: And you took it?
DAVID: I took the chance and I know ‘bout the risks so I took the risk.

David frames his narrative within the context of risk. As discussed in Chapter 5, many migrants justified this risk as a necessary component of their realizing their investment aspirations. Employers’ knowledge that migrants were driven to earn an income, and that they were likely to accept any conditions which enabled them to realize their goals, contributed to the imbalance in power relations. Other migrants reported similar experiences. For example, Joy recounted her disappointment with and anger at her employer who refused to apply for a work permit on her behalf. Despite receiving poor treatment from this employer who refused to grant her leave after she received an injury on the job, Joy continued to work there. Entrapment thus explains why some persisted in undocumentedness, despite maltreatment. Yet, it should be noted that entrapment was possible even among the documented, since work permits were tied to their current employment. Expiry of a work permit, or worse loss of employment, without a subsequent renewal, could result in undocumentedness.
David’s situation was different from the majority, in that he had been approached by his employer in his host country, which is not the case for a number of migrants who were lured to Barbados by the success stories of relatives and other acquaintances. However, it was not an unusual occurrence among male and female migrants to be approached by prospective employers (or their agents) to work in the construction and sex industries, respectively. Camille and Kimberly were both recruited for sex work in this manner. Rajeeve, Chris and Dominic were also recruited (Rajeeve for work in a restaurant, while Chris and Dominic for work in construction) though Rajeeve and Dominic’s job opportunity did not materialize for different reasons. The situation of women demands special emphasis, for their entrapment was linked to the financial obligation to repay their employer who had advanced the monies to enable the purchase of airfare.

NDJ: so you came in ’98 .... somebody brought you over, you can describe to me how that work[s]?
CAMILLE: That is more like, ok somebody come to the country and – some people lie to you, some people tell you exactly what you getting involved in, and ahm, not having the money to buy the ticket...back then a ticket would have been between six to eight hundred dollars, depends on which airline you choose.
NDJ: That’s US?
CAMILLE: No Barbadian dollars, right. And when we get here depends on who bring you, you would either have to pay back two five to three thousand dollars, for that ticket, right. Other than paying back for the ticket you still have to pay back for the room that you in, which is $120 a day, a week, sorry. And if you decide that you going take a client to the same room, you still have to pay $10 out the money that you charge the client. Likewise if you work in the club is the same ting. So you would have to pay $10 per client. It
doesn’t matter if you use the club or the same room that you chose to dwell in.
NDJ: So you worked at a club then?
CAMILLE: Yeah, you work at a club, or you work from home. Based on what you client want because not everybody like the club scene.
NDJ: So how you felt about doing that, ‘cause you said you didn’t like it? Why do it then if you didn’t like it.
CAMILLE: Well, ok. It was like a situation whereby you end of owing for things in between. Cause sometimes you move away from that scene, as I tell you before, and you try to work for youself honestly and then you find that look, you illegal, you out here, people unfairing you, you can’t look after youself, so you have to go back right there because is faster money, you understand. You could make about $1000 per night or more, depends on the person that you nookie (have sex with).
NDJ: $1000?
CAMILLE: Or more, you understand. That’s if you can cope with what is coming you way. Ahm, I mean to me, if I had to do this again, to come to Barbados, it would be a ‘no’, a big ‘no’.\textsuperscript{143}

The gendered dimensions of these examples of trafficking and debt bondage ought not to be overlooked, since women’s entrapment included not just constrained rights and choices, but also loss of control over their own bodies. They were unable to leave the sex industry until their recruiter/employer was fully recompensed, a process which could take years, especially in light of the linking of this repayment for monies advanced, with payment of dues for on the job activities (cf. Chimienti, 2010). The men, who were employed before they left for Barbados did not have this added dimension of entrapment, since they either paid for their tickets from savings, or borrowed from family members.

\textsuperscript{143} Int17_GF_19.02.2011
Entrapment was especially pertinent in the post-amnesty period when the government accelerated efforts to penalize those who hired undocumented workers. This made it increasingly difficult for some migrants to find work, unless they had solid relationships with sub-contractors who were willing to hire them. The harsh labour environment in the post-amnesty period thus resulted in a mass exodus of the undocumented.

CHIRS: Because [the] change of government they had at one time was targeting strictly Guyanese... Guyanese alone, nobody else.
LEIGHTON: Everybody stop hiring you because they gonna charge you.
CHIRS: They gonna charge you a lump sum of money and if you caan pay the money they gonna lock up the contractor. You know so they make you scared that if certain things not right for you you caan go out to work.
HENRY: And some of them pack up and run home.
LEIGHTON: Hundreds.
HENRY: ....A whole heap a dem.

The quote above underscores the perception of bio-social profiling of Guyanese migrants. As argued in Chapter 5, these events buttressed an established anti-immigration rhetoric, which was in large part against Guyanese immigration to Barbados. It also highlights the changing structure of the Barbadian informal labour market. This structural change impacted on, and interacted with, other structural factors, such as the downward trending economy, and the more restrictive immigration regime (including harsher penalties for ‘harbouring’ undocumented migrants), to produce a labour market which limited the incorporation of undocumented migrants. These changes spoke to the transformation of the Barbadian informal labour market from one of inclusion to one of exclusion. Yet, as indicated above, there were migrants who were able to obtain employment in this restricted
environment. Their decision to remain in Barbados demonstrated agentic capacity, as they strategically included themselves by seeking work with individuals who were willing to operate in contravention of the increasingly restrictive migration policy regime. Thus, even within what on the surface appears to be an exclusionary geography, there was inclusion of the undocumented.

This inclusion highlights the interaction between structure and agency, with migrant agency reproducing the conditions of informality, which initially had led to their inclusion. It also emphasizes the heterogeneity of the Barbadian social geography. While on the one hand the incumbent government advanced anti-foreigner rhetoric, which was supported by the Barbadian populace, Barbadians who contracted labour routinely acted in opposition to this rhetoric by hiring undocumented workers. Thus, while the post-amnesty period acted as a constraint to the agency of local Barbadians, it did not totally prohibit hiring of undocumented workers. This latter point regarding the heterogeneity within the Barbadian state is critical for the inclusion of migrants in other spheres of Barbadian life highlight this very issue.

(II)legitimate inclusion: Gaining access to educational spaces

In addition to legal status, citizenship was a principal criterion in granting access to social services in Barbados, to which non-nationals have access but are not entitled to receive free of charge. Since the 1960s, there has been bi-partisan commitment to publicly fund the health and education sectors in Barbados, in keeping with the shift to universal access in the post-independence era (PAHO, 2008; Inniss, 2007; Barbados Ministry of Education, Youth Affairs and Culture, 2000). However, access to educational
institutions required the supply of additional documentation – a student visa and complementary forms, which was problematic where the parents themselves were undocumented.

**Visas (and other documents) as a mode of inclusion**

In the education sector, free schooling is provided up to the tertiary level (Barbados Ministry of Education, Youth Affairs and Culture, 2000; UNESCO-IBE, 2010). Although the Barbados Education Act indicates that education is free in all public institutions, local government and other policy documents link access to citizenship, indicating that education is free only for **Barbadian nationals** (Barbados Ministry of Education, Youth Affairs and Culture, 2000; UNESCO-IBE, 2010; Barbados Education Act, 1997, p. 28, emphasis mine).¹⁴⁴ For non-nationals, documentation in the form of a student visa was required prior to enrolment in a local Barbadian school. This documentation was to be applied for in advance of entry into Barbados, and was submitted by the educational institution on behalf of the student to the Immigration Department. The awarded entry permit was then shown to Immigration Officials on arrival into the island. As with the work permit, the student visa was tied to the applicant institution, and students were thus expected to advise the Immigration Department if they no longer intended to attend that particular institution. Additional demands were also placed on students to provide regular updates to the Immigration Department regarding their place of residence, as well as progress at school. Moreover, a student’s length of stay in the country was linked to the period of expiration of the visa, and thus created added complications where their stay exceeded this timeframe.

¹⁴⁴ Private schools and costs
Inspection of the H1 form – the certificate of eligibility for non-immigrant status - points to additional requirements, but on the part of the educational institution.\textsuperscript{145} Firstly, schools could not admit non-national students unless they had approval by the Immigration Department to do so. In addition, institutions were in breach of immigration procedures and faced the possibility of their approval being revoked if they failed to comply with the requirement that they make accurate and true filings of the H1.

Again, it is useful to mention the regulations regarding harbouring of the undocumented, for they include additional provisions relating to the inclusion of non-nationals. Section 29(d) of the Immigration Act prohibits anyone from providing assistance to individuals in contravention of the provisions of the Act. The Green Paper lists a number of activities which fall under the definition of harbouring including bringing family members to Barbados in order for them to attend school without permission, and without paying for such services (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, paragraph 64). The foregoing indicates that non-nationals have access to education but they (and their children) are not entitled to receive these services free of charge, moreover, that it was a criminal offence to seek to benefit from social services without the requisite documentation.

\textit{Creating space for migrant children}

The section below discusses attempts by the undocumented to secure access to education for their children in Barbados. I wish to note before I proceed that based on the provisions outlined above there was partial exclusion of all

\footnote{The H1 is completed by the approved educational institution. The H2, or certificate of non-immigrant student status, which solicits information such as bio-data, programme details and proof of funds, is completed by the student.}
non-nationals, who were expected to bear costs for services which were to free to Barbadian nationals. In this section, I focus on the undocumented since the experiences recounted to me were of persons who were undocumented, and as I later explain, the majority of the interviewees had left their children behind. Notwithstanding, a nuanced discussion of inclusion of the undocumented in education is important, as it enables continuity in the discussion regarding strategic agency and the geography of fear.

Undocumented migrants could not apply for student visas for their minor children as such an application required them to provide proof of their status in Barbados. In addition, unless the child was born in Barbados, it was highly likely that they were also undocumented, which meant double exposure of undocumented status. However, the parents of undocumented children were able to elude immigration controls by concealing the undocumented status of their child (and their own status), acting in complicity with a school official. Stephanie explains below,\(^{146}\)

> But the people at the school never knew he was illegal, because at the time he went to school – he started school two and a half, the Head there she was a Guyanese Head and she bury his documents, so it was like so..when I went to get the forms signed [in order to regularize his status] they said, ‘but we thought he was a Bajan!’. And I said, ‘No, he is a Guyanese’. But the Secretary she was real nice, ‘cause she used to drop him, bring him home and take him back to school. And she told me, ahm, don’t let it happen again, because that’s not supposed to be happening in school.

\(^{146}\) Int8_GF_21.11.2010
As Stephanie indicates, the shared national identity between her and the principal had produced collusion to conceal the identity of her son, in order to facilitate his enrolment. However, it need not be the case that school officials share migrants’ nationality. Some parents were able to enrol their children into private academic institutions, where officials turned a ‘blind eye’ to requirements for documentation. Based on the foregoing, this was a breach of immigration provisions regarding harbouring; however, some school officials were willing to do so because of the fees collected per student. Thus, while integrated into the formal public educational system in Barbados, these types of institutions operated on the borders of informality, in contravention of immigration rules regarding approval for the admission of non-national students.

For the parents of children enrolled in public institutions, this posed no onerous financial burdens, as public education is provided free of cost by the Barbadian government. However, for private institutions, the fees and additional costs, such as transportation, placed added burdens on parents, who may not have had stable jobs/salaries. The strategy of enrolling students in private institutions, however, undermined migrants’ capacity to fulfil their migration objectives, because of the relevant expenses. Camille’s experience is instructive.

CAMILLE: …but to maintain her, myself, pay for private school cause I had no documents, I had to send her back to her father, right.

NDJ: So she has proper papers now?
CAMILLE: My daughter has a student visa.
NDJ: Ok. But before when she was going to school, you said you had to send her to...
CAMILLE: Private school.
And that was like $800 every three months. Plus the van was like, ahm, $120 a week.\textsuperscript{147}

Camille for example, was at the time a single parent living on wages from sex work. She would have struggled independently to pay rent, buy food and other necessities, as well as finance this method of schooling. The huge financial burden had at one time resulted in her sending her daughter back home to Guyana before she considered herself resourced enough to resume the responsibility of caring for her in Barbados. Thus Camille’s strategic agency had negative implications since it heightened her vulnerability as well as that of her child. It is important to discuss these implications, though they may not have been the experience of the majority of migrants. Only two had taken their children with them to Barbados, sending for them from relatives who had cared for them in their home country after a period of settling. In addition, eight had had children since moving to Barbados (of this number, four also had minor children resident in their home countries). These children born in Barbados would have been documented and thus eligible for free health care and education.

This latter point recalls the issue of families constituted of both documented and undocumented parents and siblings, raised in Chapter 5. What I wish to emphasize is that even within families there were differing experiences of inclusion and exclusion. Up until the time of the amnesty\textsuperscript{148}, children born in Barbados of undocumented parents would have benefitted from social services to which their parents, and maybe other siblings, would have been denied access based on their undocumentedness. This also underscores the

\textsuperscript{147} Int17_GF_19.02.2011

\textsuperscript{148} Anecdotal evidence suggests that the possible introduction of more restrictive requirements for citizenship made it difficult for migrants to register their children and thus obtain the requisite national IDs.
complexity of the undocumented experience, since undocumentedness did not automatically result in the exclusion of one’s child(ren). As pointed out above, even when undocumented there was opportunity for inclusion. Also, the extent of inclusion widened not only based one’s legal status, but also on one’s citizenship.

Implicit in the stories of Stephanie and Camille is the rationale behind the circumvention of immigration requirements. This rationale was grounded in the fear of detection of suspect status. As pointed out in the preceding Chapter, the practice of bio-social profiling extended beyond the physical border in Barbados, creating a geography of fear for CARICOM nationals, in particular, the undocumented. There was thus not only exclusion from (collective) public spaces, but also constrained access to public services. Migrants’ strategic response was two-fold: to take advantage of the culture of informality which facilitated the enrolment of undocumented students; and to leave their children behind (discussed in the upcoming section). The former activity, which the state would classify as harbouring and thus ‘illegitimate’ (cf. Broeders and Engbersen 2007) was an enablement of migrants’ strategic agency, which was centred in activities geared at concealing their undocumentedness and lengthening their stay in Barbados. Thus, although there was constrained access to public services, migrants engaged the strategy of circumvention to secure access by other means, thus ensuring a degree of inclusion for their children.
Accessing education was not limited to children; however, there is only one instance from the group of migrants interviewed, of an adult migrant attending an educational institution whilst resident in Barbados.\(^{149}\)

NDJ: So what you read, what you did at UWI?
RICARDO: I did information technology, a diploma, in information technology.
NDJ: So you did that while you were, you were undocumented?
RICARDO: Yes.
NDJ: Were you registered?
RICARDO: Well, UWI policy is they doesn’t concern about that, because, all it is they does usually do is send a letter to Immigration and you get to student visa, right. That is all it takes. So no, I wasn’t undocumented at that point, no.\(^{150}\)

This case is also useful as it suggests gaps in immigration regulation – as the University would have submitted documentation to the Immigration authorities in order for Ricardo to be granted a student visa. It also suggests overlapping statuses, or simultaneous conformity and non-conformity (Ruhs and Anderson 2006; Ruhs and Anderson 2010). With possession of a student visa Ricardo would have been partially conforming (he had not met the stipulation of applying in advance of his arrival for a student visa) to immigration rules regarding student status. However, he also worked without a permit, which meant that he did not conform to regulations regarding employment. Ricardo’s example also highlights that although legislative provisions encouraged a geography of exclusion that there were

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\(^{149}\) Cynthia had expressed an interest in upgrading qualifications as one of her aspirations during her time in Barbados. Her narrative suggests that this was difficult due to time constraints produced by long work hours. She also seemed unsure of the legislative procedure required for obtaining the requisite documentation.

\(^{150}\) Int6_GM_14.11.2010
multiple, or rather, parallel geographies of inclusion and exclusion. The silos within the Barbadian immigration system – evidenced by Ricardo’s ability to obtain a student visa despite being undocumented - enabled inclusion despite undocumentedness. Thus, Ricardo’s simultaneous condition of conformity and non-conformity is in part a reflection of the structure of an immigration system that is overwhelmed and understaffed, a fact that is influenced by Barbados’ small size.

As indicated above, migrants’ narratives regarding inclusion in the sphere of education related primarily to their children. Their inclusion was facilitated by actors who provided spaces in both private and public institutions. This inclusion also reflects the heterogeneity of the social geography discussed in the section on the labour market, since Barbadians engaged in actions which contravened existing legislation concerning the harbouring of the undocumented, as well as challenged the anti-foreigner culture. However, this upcoming section differs from the discussion on the labour market, as it highlights the strategies of avoidance employed by migrants to ensure the longevity of their migration project. Rather than engage in the process to obtain documentation for their children, migrants left their children behind. In this respect, this section has parallels with the upcoming section on health care, as there I discuss how migrants’ strategic avoidance of public health facilities is a reflection of agency. I propose that this is both a reflection of agentic capacity to secure inclusion in the labour market, as well as a consequence of anti-immigration rhetoric in Barbados, which discouraged migrants from exposing their children to an exclusionary environment. The splitting of families which resulted had psychological implications for the undocumented, which added to the fear produced by their suspect status.
**Multi-local families: the consequence of informal inclusion**

Half the number of migrants interviewed – fifteen - had left their children in their home countries for the duration of their stay in Barbados (one of which had adult children). For those with minor children, the extensive time spent in Barbados meant that they endured significant periods of separation from their families. The consequences of this are explained by Sadiq,

.. I leave my son from when he, just over a year, and then come over here. And then right, I doubt that I ever spend, within his ten years, he gonna be eleven this March I say, I doubt I spend a year with he. With all the time that I went back to Guyana, you think that make a year I spend with my son, or one year the most. And at one time, one of the disadvantages of travelling and leaving children behind is that they get disconnected, real disconnected from you. Yeah, cause when my son did real small, when I go back to Guyana, he never want [to] come to me. Yeah, he see me, he look at me. Anybody ask he, ‘Who is he?’ ‘That is my father’. And I call he, he ain’t coming, he crying. Never want spend no time with me here, scared, running from me, and I used to feel real hurt you know. First child, and then you see like you child, and den [then] sometime you tell youself that you child doan [don’t] love you, and then, ‘member [remember] the child never spend much time with me.151

The extended periods of separation meant that children became distanced from their parents, which is most acute in the case of infants and in cases where migrants were unable to travel to and from their home country. I wish to note, before I proceed, that I do not wish to normalize uni-local families. As indicated earlier, multi-local family structures are a feature of migration within the Caribbean context (Crawford, 2003; Olwig, 1999). The point I wish

151 Int18_GM_23.02.2011
to emphasize is that b/ordering processes pose additional constraints on familial relationships for both genders, making mothering and fathering difficult.

What is interesting about Sadiq’s narrative is that he was very upset at the level of distance created by his departure, which he later rationalizes through a narrative of his desire to make a better life for his son since his own childhood experience was marked by adversity. Parreñas suggests that the loss of intimacy between children and their fathers occurs where men ‘do not reconstitute fathering to adjust to (...) temporal and spatial distance that defines transnational family life’ (2008, p. 1058). As a result, children experience heightened feelings of separation. Sadiq was not the only male expressing such sentiments. Chris briefly comments on his experience, merging his missing home with his longing to see his children.

...is long you [I] stay away from home, and I need to see home. So I just buy a ticket and say man I going travel and go home back, you know, because, is only one of the kids I have with me, a son. So the three back home, so I went and see them fi [for] the August holiday. 152

Based on the above, the men in Barbados were circumscribed by their restricted mobility in reconstituting their fathering role. However, in the case where men did travel home, this could be considered a (maternal) act, aimed at enhancing the performance of transnational fathering (Parreñas, 2008; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). This explains the strong emotions conveyed in men’s narratives.

The situation was somewhat different for women. Maya, June and Kimberly, ironically do not express such emotions when discussing their separation

152 Int11_GM_GM_GM_22.01.2011
from their children. However, their narratives are also couched in terms, which suggest that it is in the best interest of the children that they remain in their home country, rather than purely constituting a justification of the migration project. Joy, for example, was at pains to emphasize that her children understood her decision to migrate, though she did indicate that they believed that her migration led to the deterioration of her marriage. Also, although Maya’s situation had improved materially, she still held reservations about her son travelling to Barbados as she did not want him to encounter any negative experiences whilst in Barbados (cf. Hondagneu-Sotelo amd Avila 1997). Finally, Kimberly had indicated that she did not wish to rear her children in Barbados because parenting styles were different there. As she wished them to grow up “well-mannered” she preferred that they remain at home in Guyana. In instances such as these, it appears that the children were merely co-opted into their parent’s migration plans. Of the nine women interviewed, eight had children, and with the exception of Vanessa, whose children resided in the United States with their father, only two – Stephanie and Camille - had made arrangements to have their children reside with them in Barbados (Appendix E). These women’s narratives affirm, as postulated by Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997), that transnational mothers are transforming the meanings of (biological) motherhood. This transformation is costly and is attended by stigma and guilt associated with the transgression from societal expectations for biological mothering. The women’s suggestion that their children were complicit with their decision to migrate, as well as their emphasis on the ‘benefits’ of children remaining behind, are indicative of women’s attempt to rationalize their decision to leave, and to reconcile these negative emotions.
Undocumented status thus has an effect on migrants’ being-in-the world beyond the fear produced by ‘suspect status’. The separation of families that it engenders places additional psychological burdens on migrants, as well as their family members. Research has not ignored this dimension of psychological trauma produced by undocumentedness (see for example, Talavera et al. 2010; Hagan, 1994; Núñez and Heyman 2007). Finally, the strategy of avoidance which typified migrant behaviour reproduced the structure of multi-local families, but are transforming the gendered roles of mothering and fathering which characterize Caribbean families.

**Counting the costs of in/exclusion in health care**

In the sections above, migrants had sought inclusion in the Barbadian labour market and the educational sector (for their children). Migrants’ experiences of engagement with the public health sector, however, paint a different picture. To a significant extent migrants did not attempt to access health services, and when they did, they engaged the services of private physicians. This self-exclusion was the result of a combination of factors, which I discuss below. The narratives question whether access to public health services is essential for non-nationals; but conversely highlight that migrants are vulnerable in host countries that limit access to health services to citizens.

**IDs and rights of access**

The Barbados Health Services Act stipulates that the Minister of Health is responsible for ‘the promotion and preservation of the health of the *inhabitants* of Barbados’ (Barbados Health Services Act, Cap. 44, p. 4, emphasis mine). However, the current Ministry of Health website indicates that ‘the policies on health are predicated on the philosophy that health care
is a fundamental right of Barbadians’ (Barbados Ministry of Health, 2012, emphasis mine). For Barbadian nationals and permanent residents, free health care is available at local clinics and the main public hospital, the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH). The pharmaceutical sector is also subsidized, and drugs are provided free of cost to persons under 16, persons aged 65 and over, and individuals suffering from chronic diseases, such as hypertension and asthma (Inniss, 2007; PAHO, 2008). However, it should be noted that emergency medical services are provided free of cost to all individuals irrespective of immigrant status (Bradshaw, 2011). Non-nationals were thus expected when seeking services at public health facilities, to pay out-of-pocket and/or use private health insurance.

In the post-amnesty period, access to health care became a highly polemic issue, especially in light of tightening budgetary constraints in the post-recession period. In the first quarter of 2011, the local media in Barbados reported that the Minister of Health had announced a ‘new’ policy which precluded non-nationals from receiving treatment at public health facilities. It was also reported that this policy had had the effect of excluding even long-time permanent residents of Barbados (Singh 2011a; Bradshaw, 2011). The Minister of Health sought to clarify the government’s stance and was quoted as saying that “The policy of Barbados has always been and continues to be that health care in publicly owned institutions remains free at-point-of-delivery of service to citizens and permanent residents of Barbados only,” (Kaieteur News Online, 2011, emphasis mine).

Exclusion from the health sector, therefore, was not a necessary feature of the structure of the Barbadian health system, since non-nationals would have been able to access both public and private health facilities. It should be
noted that the public health sector is supported by a private health system (PAHO, 2008), which is accessed by both locals and non-nationals, including tourists. There is evidence of a greater uptake of private health services, which is reflected in the increase in private expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure in health, as well as an increase in number of health workers in the labour force (PAHO, 2008). Based on the legal and policy framework governing access to public health services, for non-nationals the main issue surrounding access to health care thus entailed inability to access services free of cost, and contingently the rate of expenditure for health services in private facilities.

Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that while IDs did not grant access that it was a requirement to provide a form of identification as part of the registration process to receive health care in the public health system. Verification of status was thus used to determine not only eligibility for services, but also to conduct surveillance of non-nationals. Also, while verification of status may have accompanied the process of registration in the public health system, it did not occur in the private health system, where doctors did not engage in this practice as they sacrificed surveillance for profit. This verification/lack of verification dichotomy which characterized the public and private health systems, respectively, acted as constraints and enablements to migrants’ agency. I discuss these points in the sections which follow.

**The practice of surveillance and exclusion**

As I had argued in previous sections of this chapter, there were parallel geographies of inclusion and exclusion, based on one’s citizenship and/or legal status, with migrants experiencing degrees of in/exclusion in the labour
and education sector. This was also the case in the public health sector in Barbados. Thus while the legal environment did not proscribe access to non-nationals wholesale, the requirement for proof of status created conditions for the exclusion of the undocumented from the public health sector. Joseph explains below\label{153},

The difference, the difference having the work permit and not having the work permit is that you more free having the work permit. You can move around freely, you know, and not be scared of anything you know, ‘cause you have a work permit, you have a work permit. Let’s say…or [like] when I tear the ligament in my knee, you know, I went to the hospital and you know, I went to the hospital and you know, I got treatment and so, is only late after they send me a bill, a bill to pay for the treatment, yeah. **But if I didn’t have the work permit, I doan even know if I could have gone there.**

Joseph’s quote confirms that non-nationals must pay for the services provided in public health facilities, as they would for private health services. However, Joseph also asserts that access is possible only with the work permit, or proof of legal residence in Barbados. Implicit in Joseph’s statement is that even though non-nationals were included, there was a cost to inclusion for undocumented migrants, because of the prospect of detention. The surveillance of non-nationals during the registration process was a secondary component of health servicing, a fact which increased the possibility of detention for the undocumented. Joseph’s quote thus demonstrates that migrants’ exclusion was bound up with the geography of fear. The above quote also emphasises that the experiences of in/exclusion are distinct within the category of non-nationals, given the possibility of
detention for the undocumented when seeking medical attention at public health facilities.

Migrants’ fear that their attempts to obtain access would result in detention would not have been unfounded. Migrants were aware, or had had direct experience, of attempts to detain the undocumented who had sought medical attention at public health facilities. Stephanie highlighted this possibility.154

I remember one time I had a girlfriend that came here and she was pregnant...she asked me to, ahm, take her to the hospital so I took her. But she was illegal and ahm, we were there sitting we were going to register her ahm, to get the baby. And we were there sitting, and the people, the people called Immigration...And the people took me into Immigration. I mean I was there until three the evening. Drilling and drilling. ‘We going take away your status because you can’t harbour illegal people’. I mean it was real disgusting. I didn’t eat anything for the whole day. Just get me in there from since about ten o’clock or nine-thirty the morning, till after three. That’s when they decide to let me out.

Stephanie’s long ordeal at the police station was an attempt by the police to coerce her into revealing the whereabouts of her friend, who had only narrowly managed to evade the immigration officials. Even amongst those who have become regularized, the geography of fear was so enduring that they would continue to avoid public health centres altogether. Again Stephanie provides a useful narrative.155

Actually, I caan remember actually getting sick, but things like going to the dentist and things like that, I normally go the dentist, just go private, still doan go to the hospital,

154 Int8_GF_21.11.2010
155 Int8_GF_21.11.2010
nothing, now, although that we actually get ourselves sorted out I still do not go to the hospital for nothing. Always try to do things, I always try to stay out of trouble...go private, spend your money...actually for me, I always try to stay away from certain things. If I see trouble that way – is the other side I go. There’s no guarantee what’s gonna happen...(Stephanie, Bankhall, 21 November 2010)

For those who were undocumented, as a result of this geography of fear, there emerged the practice among migrants of securing access through the use of falsified documents. There were reports in the media that indicated that undocumented migrants were fraudulently obtaining access to public health facilities. ‘It [unmanaged migration] has created a situation ...with people seeking to get false identification cards, with persons renting ID cards that don't carry photographs so that children can go and receive benefits in the polyclinic system’ (Caribbean360, 2010). The use of fraudulent documentation to procure health services can be subsumed in broader strategic activities to create and/or maintain undocumented status, such as clandestine entry through the use of fraudulent documentation or working without a permit. However, narratives revealed that while migrants did not employ this strategy, they did successfully negotiate access to health care through consultation at private health clinics as I discuss below.

The geography of self-exclusion

There were two realities of undocumented migrants’ health seeking behaviour. The first was a form of indirect exclusion produced by living and
working conditions which placed such excessive demands on migrants that it prevented them from seeking access when ill. As Maya notes -\(^\text{156}\)

> You gotta pray not to get sick, ‘cause if you get sick you gotta foot the bill. You understand me? You got to always work and you can never say you ain’t feeling good, because you bills always there to pay, rent gotta pay....

The loose labour market, which made unreliable migrant labour easily replaceable, coupled with the high cost of living made it difficult for migrants to request time-off from work to be able to visit a physician. Indeed, migrants’ own investment aspirations added to this reality, for they were so driven to accomplish their goals that they worked aggressive hours, sometimes at multiple jobs. This dedication to work helped fuel the ‘myth’ that migrant labour was more dependable than local labour, a view which is reflected in Stephanie’s narrative below.\(^\text{157}\)

> ... I’m working in construction, and you have such a hard time, because I mean we are at work, and the Bajans have like, they doan [don’t] want to work, they will come to work and just like, lyme (socialize) and whatsoever, I mean that those that are illegal and those that are on work permit, they know that if they doan work, or if they doan perform like how they supposed to perform, they could actually lose their job. So, I mean, you have to work. Or they (employers) might ask you to work on like Saturdays or Sundays, they (locals) say they doan [don’t] want to work, but you now, you know that you have bills, and you have family at home to send things to, so you have to work, you understand. So when you work now, it will create a problem.

\(^\text{156}\) Int5_GF_12.11.2010  
\(^\text{157}\) Int8_GF_21.11.2010
Stephanie’s quote suggests that migrants in some instances were ‘compelled’ to work for fear of losing their employment. They were also driven by material realities at home which made employment crucial. Thus, migrants did not routinely attend public medical facilities as they simply did not have the time to do so.

The other reality concerned migrants’ deliberate self-exclusion. The fear of detention was circumvented by migrants who sought health care at private health facilities (formal institutions operated by doctors in private practice). As June points out, private doctors were not concerned with patients’ immigrants status, ‘… they doan [don’t] mind. They want their money’.158 Thus rather than rely on the public health service, where they likely faced the possibility of detention, migrants took advantage of the existence of private health facilities.

However, visits to private doctors were costly - at the time of my trip a single visit was a minimum of BDS$80 (US$40), excluding the cost of medication. The costs were significant as migrants did not hold private medical insurance, thus all expenses associated with health care were paid for out-of-pocket. As Peter also explains, ‘when you doan have papers and you got the child, you got very much expense’.159 While the cost of health care for migrants would have been significant, it was usually a one-off payment. In rare cases were there repeated expenses – such as the filling of medication for a chronic illness in the case of Joy or treatment associated with an injury in the case of Chris (both discussed below). This likely would have impacted on migrants’ savings and the ability to remit money home.

158 Int1_GF_27.10.2010
159 Int22_LM_16.03.2011
In some instances, migrants’ relied on the benefaction of employers, who provided funds to cover medical expenses. Joy, for example, was able to purchase medication for high blood pressure, which was quite expensive when not subsidized by the government, with the aid of her employer. Chris explains how the lack of documentation and the high cost of care affected him when he received a work-related injury.\textsuperscript{160}

LEIGHTON: Stay away from the hospital.
RAJEEVE: Correct.
NDJ: Why is that?
RAJEEVE: I think is very expensive, is one of them.
CHRIS: The public, the public, you’d have to go there and sit down for hours.
RAJEEVE: And you can’t get the treatment and ting, from the time that this Guyanese ting
CHRIS: They taking long to...very long. Very, very long, and make it more worse that if you need papers, you understand. If you doan have that....they rather see you die. I telling you, they rather see you die... ‘Cause I was injured, you understand. But the boss man stand all the expense and what not right. So when I go into this clinic and stuff, every week, every week that I attend the clinic, I have to spend the fifty dollars. I have to get $50 to take there, just to change the dressing alone. And it take me a month, a month and a half, cause I fall down and a steel bore me right, yes. And if I didn’t get any help for me, I doan know what I wouldda do.
NDJ: You didn’t go to the hospital because you didn’t have papers?
CHRIS: Right. I didn’t have papers at that particular time. I didn’t have anything at that particular time. And if I did go into the hospital self you know, when it sum up now, the bill would have come home at me. And if I ain’t working, how could I pay the bill? So I just tell everybody thank God for that, that he was there, he couldda say, man, despite

\textsuperscript{160} Int11_GM_GM_GM_22.01.2011
you didn’t have papers, he would stand the responsibility and see me through. And I thank God for that. ‘Cause if it wasn’t for that I doan know what I wouldda do. I would probably have to jump on a plane and I couldn’t have that. So that was it.

The above also needs to be balanced against the frequency with which migrants attended at private health facilities. Indeed some migrants actually indicated that they had never been ill and thus had never had to visit the doctor. They said they were able to stave off illness by eating well (little processed food and home cooked meals). This is substantiated by migrants’ narratives, for they usually only consulted private doctors for an emergency, such as a work related injury, and other types of care (such as delivery of a baby). While I did not wish to evaluate the veracity of these claim, I found the assertions difficult to grasp especially for those who had been resident in Barbados for extensive periods. Whatever its truthfulness, it certainly contradicted the discourse perpetuated by the incumbent government that migrants were a strain on public health resources.

The change in government exacerbated the geography of fear, as verification became part and parcel of the process of seeking medical attention. Camille, and Leighton and Cynthia in a separate interview, explain below,

CAMILLE: Well, before this new policy was implemented by Mr…..who is the Minister of Health, you could have gone to the Polyclinic with an ID, so you had to go through the system, somebody put you on to somebody, but then you still wouldda have to pay the Barbados doctor which was for the medication. But now, you have to have residence papers, or go to a private doctor.161

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161 Int17_GF_19.02.2011
LEIGHTON: That is one of the reasons why the company too, woan hire a undocumented person anymore. ‘Cause any accident they will have to pay. They caan carry them to hospital. I inside a vehicle with a fellow, carry he to hospital lef’ he there, when we go back three o’clock he still there, nine o’clock the night we had to take him go and pay somewhere. We didn’t realize they wouldn’t look because…

CYNTHIA: Because the first thing they ask you now is for an ID card. The first thing. ¹⁶²

This segment of the discussion has pointed to the role of agency in securing migrants’ access to health services. This strategy, when employed had negative consequences for migrants, who would have to pay fairly high fees to obtain medical attention. Some migrants were offered some respite, as they were assisted by their employers who paid for their health care and/or medication. These employers, together with medical professional providing health care services, demonstrated agency in order to ensure that the undocumented were included in the health sector. This latter point also signals the importance of networks to migrants’ incorporation in Barbadian society, a reality that was most evident in the housing sector.

The perils of inclusion in the housing sector

There were known (marked) social spaces where migrants socialized and shopped (see Chapter 6). However, there was no enclave ‘community’ in Barbados within which migrants were centrally resident. A number of factors including spatial limitations and the high cost of real estate may have prohibited the consolidation of niche communities of non-nationals. The undocumented thus lived amongst other documented migrants, as well as Barbadian nationals, and in this respect could be deemed as integrated into

¹⁶² Int7_GF_GM_GM_14.11.2010
the local communities. However, this was a superficial mode of inclusion, as migrants encountered material exclusions in their living arrangements.

**Tacit exclusion**

Unlike the spheres of work, education and health, there are no explicit legal provisions defining who has access to housing in Barbados. However, as I explain below the policy has been to limit the provision of public housing to Barbadians. This tacit exclusion of non-nationals from public housing is for the undocumented exacerbated by prohibitions against harbouring of undocumented nationals.

The Government of Barbados has since 1936, through various mechanisms provided housing solutions to meet the demand for affordable housing in Barbados. In 1973 the National Housing Corporation (NHC) was designated with this responsibility. The NHC offers a range of low-cost housing solutions including rentals, rent-to-own, loans and purchases. However, as with other social services provided through the Barbadian government, beneficiaries of these services must be Barbadian. The mission statement of the NHC thus reads as follows ‘to be the best provider of quality and affordable housing solutions for every Barbadian’ (Barbados National Housing Corporation, 2011). I should add that it was unlikely for migrants to attempt to access public housing as their inability to provide requisite documentation, such as payslips and a national ID, would have drawn attention to their undocumentedness.

This reality must be juxtaposed against the structure of the private housing market in Barbados. In addition to the housing solutions provided through the Barbadian government, a number of private individuals rent
accommodation. The cost of living in Barbados is quite high, and this is reflected in high rental rates; however, the lack of sufficient housing, due to spatial constraints, as well as competition for accommodation amongst locals, non-nationals and tourists, also contribute to the pricing of rental accommodation. The Green Paper thus notes for example, that ‘there is a limit to the suitable housing available ...as can be evidenced by the numerous examples of squatting’ (Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009, p. 77). The structure of the Barbadian housing sector, the tourist-centred economy, as well as geographical realities, thus posed limits to migrants’ incorporation, though it should be noted that constraints would have been experienced by all individuals seeking accommodation in Barbados.

In addition to these structural conditions which limited housing options, legal status posed even further challenges for migrants. Part VI (Section 29d) of the Immigration Act reads,

A person who...
(d) without lawful excuse knowingly harbours or conceals-
any other person who is in Barbados in contravention of this Act, or
any other person who, having entered Barbados under the authority of a permit issued under section 13 (2), has contravened or failed to comply with any condition to which the permit is subject...
...is guilty of an offence.

Based on the phraseology it is likely that such assistance covered offers of accommodation, if one takes a literal interpretation of harbouring. Notwithstanding the above, migrants rented from private individuals, and it is on this basis that I focus on migrants’ incorporation into the private
housing market. As I show below, migrants’ incorporation resulted in their material exclusion, as well as heightened their deportability.

**Collective agency and the reproduction of suspect status**

The primary form of living arrangement among the undocumented was renting – some migrants were able to live with family members who had long been resident in Barbados. Such accommodation (usually a house) was jointly let to a number of migrants, including males and females. Migrants occupied dwellings in groups to enable cost-sharing, as well as to serve as a support mechanism for recently arrived migrants (cf. Isosifides and King, 1998). Maya describes this practise.

...some of them are strangers. But they just inter-related, like this body [someone] know this body [someone] and send for this body [someone else], and a friend send for this body [someone], and when this body [someone] come[s], this person come say man I got a friend, keep him until he get off on he footing, you know.\(^{163}\)

This reliance on networks (or ‘bodies’ of migrants) points to the significance of collective agency in enabling the migration project, not only at its inception but also for the period of its duration. This network provided invaluable information regarding opportunities for work, housing, and education. The existence of these networks can be construed as an enablement to migrant agency. Camille provides a useful description of their utility below,

from time to time you would go out on a Friday on the road, or on a Saturday, and you know you link, you ain’t necessarily got fi [have to] know them. But once you hear a accent, it on, you understand, and then you would know

\(^{163}\) Int5_GF_12.11.2010
well, ok, what going on with Immigration run. Somebody might have somebody in the system that straight, (...) that documented, and they would tell you that, “Hey, such and such body [someone] give me a wire we going get raids going down next such and such a place..."\textsuperscript{164}

The above highlights, as had been previously discussed, the role of other migrants in the negotiation of the legal and policy constraints that would have limited the inclusion of the undocumented, as well as those factors leading to their detection/detention. In respect of housing, these networks enabled migrants to circumvent the legal provisions against harbouring, and to incorporate themselves within a housing sector that was structurally constrained. Migrants were thus able to share accommodation with other compatriots, renting accommodation from landlords who already had non-nationals as tenants at their property.

Yet, a combination of factors impacted on migrants’ strategy to rent facilities with compatriots. Landlords charged high rates for overcrowded dwellings, with poor facilities. It was thus difficult to find suitable accommodation in Barbados. Sadiq’s narrative mirrors several of those reported by interviewees.

You couldda [could] hardly get a house to rent, you couldda [could] hardly get a house to rent. Mostly, because you know why, there was hardly any house to rent, and people end up with rooms. People start renting, they would get a house, with three bedrooms, and they rent it out by room. Maybe they got a shed at the back of the yard, they block it up, make it look like a room, and rent it, becau’ people just need a place to live, right. So living standards, for most of us, very poor, because most, some of the landlord just interested in making money. They doan

\textsuperscript{164} Int17_GF_19.02.2011
check pon the place, they doan see how you living, you know. They put you to live in certain conditions, and all, the only time you see them is when they coming for their money.\textsuperscript{165}

The above indicates that migrants’ exercise of agency was accompanied by material exclusion in the form of high rental fees and sub-standard facilities. Further, the above also indicates that migrant agency was circumscribed, as the strategy to engage networks to procure rental property was constrained by limited choice regarding available properties. Maya’s excerpt reveals similar sentiments, again with an emphasis on the material implications of these less than optimal dwellings.\textsuperscript{166}

I can remember one time when I move away from there I was renting a room for like $150 a week. A room! A room for $150 a week. So you can imagine a room for like $150 a week and this had like six rooms. $150 a week, look at that! For a landlord. And these were homes that were three bedroom homes, and that kind of thing, they turn into six bedrooms, you understand me? So I had to... that was because my back was against the wall, but I didn’t stay there for long because that one I could not do because it was one bathroom, one everything and I just could not deal with that one, but my back was against the wall and I had to go there at that time.

Thus although migrants were not confined to specific residential neighbourhoods, that is no “ghetto-like situations” produced by downgraded neighbours and the flight of locals – which is sometimes the case in communities in which undocumented migrants are concentrated, they did experience ghettoization in their living conditions, which is not a standard of living to migrants had grown accustomed in their home country.

\textsuperscript{165} Int18_GM__23.02.2011
\textsuperscript{166} Int5_GF_12.11.2010
MAYA: I grew up in a home with just myself, my father, my mother, my brother. So here you are, accustomed to living in a certain way, then all of a sudden you now come living, you know, like, gotta live with all kind of people, you can’t get your privacy....

According to Hatziprokopiou (2008), migrants’ place of residence is indicative of wider processes of social exclusion, an implicit reference to the impact of structural forces on migrants’ lifeworlds. However, I argue the option to rent and remain in substandard housing can be interpreted as a reflection of strategic agency, as it allowed migrants to circumvent the structural conditions which would have contributed to their exclusion in the housing sector. Thus, on the one hand, migrants endured unsatisfactory living conditions because the savings allowed them to live reasonably in Barbados, and to have the ability to remit money home. Migrants therefore viewed their unsuitable living arrangements as a temporary discomfort. On the other hand, migrants made do with these conditions, until they were able to move to less cramped facilities such as when Charles moved in with Ricardo to share a two bedroom flat after having lived in quite cramped facilities.

Yet, the limits to migrants’ strategic agency is reflected in another negative outcome for migrants’ lifeworld, which was the reproduction of the geography of fear. For the duration of their residence in crowded accommodation migrants lived shrouded by fear. Large numbers of residents attracted attention, which could result in raiding of dwellings by immigration officials.

167 Int5_GF_12.11.2010
MAYA: I know homes that had numbers of people, in this one home. Yeah, I know that. And that’s how Immigration would find you out a lot, because persons from the neighbourhood would now call them, so they would go and round up, so sometimes when you hear people get send back is like fifteen people one time.\footnote{168}

Migrants who lived with relatives who had resided in Barbados for extensive periods were sheltered from such conditions, as well as from the possibility of detention. This was so for two reasons. The legal status of their relatives discouraged suspicions regarding their own status. Also, as Ricardo points out, their residence in wealthier communities, made it unlikely that the Immigration Department would conduct raids. Thus the threat of detention was reduced. However, for the majority of undocumented migrants the threat of detention remained high. The concentration of large numbers of tenants in single dwellings enabled neighbours to report the presence of (suspected) undocumented migrants to the Immigration Department. In this respect, migrants’ use of joint tenancy arrangements was counter-intuitive since the presence of large groups of people brought undue attention. This possibility became more real in the period after the amnesty, when the number of raids on accommodation containing ‘suspect’ migrants increased.

Conclusion

In this chapter I deconstructed the claim ‘Barbados is for Bajans’, an observation expressed by interviewees, who suggested that in large part Barbados was an exclusionary society. I related migrants’ experience of in/exclusion in four spheres: work, health care, education and housing,
examining the interplay of the structure of each of these spheres, with migrant agency.

I have demonstrated that within the Barbadian context the parameters of inclusion, which were rooted in citizenship and legal status, created the potentiality for the process of othering of the undocumented. This was the case for a number of reasons, two of which I highlight at this point. The first was that the legal provisions concerned access to public goods and services provided and/or regulated by the state. Secondly, given the nature of the Barbadian economy, the state was not the sole provider, such that parallel markets and service providers existed, in some cases supplanting the need for services rendered by the state.

Where these parameters, enshrined in legislation and policy directives, excluded non-nationals they merely comprised the first stratum of the geography of exclusion in Barbados. This is the case as these parameters did not necessarily produce an outcome of exclusion. This finding is supported by that of other studies, which highlight that there is a distinction between the existing policy framework and their impact, that is their ability to create conditions of exclusion for which they are designed (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006; Van der Leun, 2003; Engbersen and Broeders 2009).

The additional factors relating to potential versus actual exclusion concern the structural conditions, which constituted Barbadian society. The nature of the Barbadian economy, the culture of migration and the culture of informality in Barbados, together worked to create conditions for the inclusion of the undocumented. I found that, notwithstanding the constraints placed on migrants’ inclusion by the legal and policy environment, the interaction of these structural factors facilitated migrants’ inclusion.
The experience of in/exclusion was thus a reflection of the interplay between these structural factors, and migrant agency. The decisions and actions of migrants and other actors – primarily the business class constituted by employers in the construction and other sectors, as well as private physicians, thus facilitated migrants’ incorporation in Barbados. Migrants engaged a variety of strategies as they circumvented the structures that constrained, and appropriated those structures that enabled, their inclusion.

I was able to demonstrate that migrants had the capacity to adapt to and accommodate forces which both enabled and constrained their agency. In fact, at times it is the exercise of agency which replicates the border in the lives of migrants, placing further constraints, which heighten their undocumentedness (suspect status), and concomitantly places limits on the exercise of their agency. In this way the border is performed by the migrants themselves since these constraints demonstrate the power and pervasiveness of the border in the lives of the undocumented (see Table 7.1).
### Table 7.1 Constraints, enablements and agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>HEALTH</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>HOUSING</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTRAINT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ENABLING</strong></td>
<td><strong>AGENCY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Permit required</td>
<td>▪ Free health restricted to nationals</td>
<td>▪ Free education provided to non-nationals</td>
<td>▪ Harbouring illegal</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>▪ Slack housing market</td>
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<td><strong>ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS PLACE ON THE EXERCISE OF AGENCY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ High demand for undocumented labour, in particular, the informal sector</td>
<td>▪ Private sector does not verify status when providing service</td>
<td>▪ Slack housing market</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Private sector charges differential fees for inclusion of undocumented students</td>
<td>▪ Established networks of compatriots</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Relatives at home to care for children</td>
<td>▪ Reliance on social network information and accommodation</td>
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| ▪ Working without a permit | ▪ Working within the informal sector | ▪ Accepting low wages | ▪ Undercharging for services provided |
| ▪ Avoiding public health facilities | ▪ Seeking care in private health facilities | ▪ Enrolling children in private institutions | ▪ Opting not to relocate children to Barbados |
| ▪ Concentration in low skilled areas of work | ▪ Entrapment to employers | ▪ Persistent undocumentedness | ▪ Vulnerability to exploitation |
| ▪ No health-seeking behaviour | ▪ High cost of private care | ▪ High cost of education (indirect impact on income and capacity to remit) | ▪ High rental rates (indirect impact on income and capacity to remit) |
| ▪ Heightened suspect status | ▪ Sub-standard housing |

In showing how the parameters enshrined in legislation created the conditions for exclusion of non-nationals, and the undocumented in particular, I therefore contribute to current debates on liminality (Menjívar, 2006). This debate largely perceives the undocumented to hold an
‘ambiguous’ existence— that is, in between places, included and yet excluded in host societies, as a result of their legal status. I add to this debate by discussing the simultaneous experiences of inclusion and exclusion, concluding that migrants (documented and undocumented) occupy a space that is ‘betwixt and between without being liminal’ (Vertovec, 2006, p. 3 cited in Landau and Freemantle 2010, p. 381), an experience which is in large part determined by migrants’ exercise of agency.

The experience of interviewees demonstrated that parallel geographies of both inclusion and exclusion shaped migrants’ lives on a daily basis (Sibley, 1995). Secondly, and contingently on the foregoing, the processes of inclusion and exclusion function within and between sectors, such that migrants simultaneously experience a constellation of inclusions and exclusions. For migrants, undocumentedness was thus not a cumulative experience of exclusion, but an experience of parallel in/exclusions. I attribute this ‘schizophrenic’ geography (Chavez, 2007, p. 193) to the interplay between structure and migrants’ strategic agency.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Any valid contextual theorization of borders should combine at least such processes, practices and discourses such as the production and reproduction – or institutionalization – of territoriality/territory, state power, human agency and human experience…. (Paasi, 2011, p. 30-31)

Introduction

At the beginning of this thesis, I had commenced with Paasi’s assertion that ‘there is an obvious need to theorize both boundary producing and reproducing practices in context’ (2011, p. 30). This research used the case of Barbados to explore three inter-related research questions: (1) How are border realities manifested in migrants’ experiences of undocumentedness? (2) What mechanisms do migrants employ to negotiate these complex geographies? (3) In what ways are migrants’ agentic strategies constrained or enabled by border realities? Therefore, by merging three analytical frames – borders, undocumentedness, and agency, this thesis is an illustration of the ‘valid’ theoretical analysis Passi describes above.

This analysis was accomplished via the adoption of a critical realist framework. I embraced this philosophy of science because of its ontological premise, which enabled me to study the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the border (van Houtum, 2005; Passi, 2005). My approach was underpinned by methodological eclecticism, which included both discourse and narrative analysis. This combination of what I argue to be complementary (though distinct) methods of analysis was important as it not only provided a means to explore the multi-dimensionality of the border (and border practices), but also the experiences of migrants.
The value of my theoretical contribution resides in my linking migrant agency with a complex ontology of the border, the various manifestations of which I characterized as ‘geographies’. I produced a critical realist theorization of the border, which distinguished between discursive and non-discursive border practices. These practices, I argued, were reproduced and transformed through the agency exercised by migrants (and other actors). I labelled migrants’ agency as ‘strategic’, since it was goal-oriented, designed to secure the fulfilment of the migration agenda, through a number of means.

In addition to the theoretical contribution above, it is important to note that the research has advanced the literature on contemporary Caribbean migration. There is a growing appreciation of the need to study undocumented migration in the region (IOM, 2008; IOM, 2005; Lesser et al. 2006). As an addition to this growing scholarship, this research has provided empirical data on undocumented (and documented) status within Barbados, information which has wider application to other CARICOM states.

My discussion has yielded a number of insights, some of which were consistent with current literature, whilst others present new understandings to existing debates. I elaborate on these findings in the upcoming section. In addition to this discussion, this final chapter also includes commentary on developments post-fieldwork and the implications for future research.

**Findings and contributions**

This research has connected a number of themes which are now topical in migration and border studies literature. My findings bring together a number of inter-connected debates in these literatures, including *inter alia* the identification of others, governmentality of migration, deportability, the
spatialization and embodiment of fear, discursive power, and migrant agency.

Existing literature has demonstrated the relevance of external borders in controlling immigration. In some contexts such as the United States, the state has created specialized organizations that are mandated with border enforcement responsibilities, in conjunction with an immigration administration. However, a similar level of militarization is not found in the Barbadian borderscape, which is a reflection of contextual factors. Barbados is an island which does not share territorial borders with another nation, though it is quite proximate to a number of small islands. Secondly, as a small island nation, it does not have significant resources to deploy to manage the border. In this respect, it is the discretionary powers of immigration officials, rather than physical demonstrations of power by specially designated border guards and machinery, which are primarily responsible for border management in the Barbadian context. With the interconnected nature of regimes of control, scholars are emphasizing the increasing sophistication of border management technologies (see Shamir, 2005); however, the Barbadian case suggests that there is need to explore border management practices in sites which are intimately connected to global migration patterns, but which do not have the technologically advanced resources to (effectively) monitor migratory movements. The case of Barbados also emphasizes the contextual nature of undocumented status, since undocumented status is a consequence of overstay, and not clandestine entry, which is the main difference between this borderized space, and the other sites previously mentioned.
In addition, though Barbados was an island, the issues pertinent to border management did not relate to the porosity of its maritime borders, which is a factor affecting Mediterranean states (Collyer, 2007; Carling, 2007). While not downplaying the fact that maritime geographies make the spatial practices of control more complex, I believe within the context of islands it is important to distinguish border issues which are land-based and those which are maritime in nature. In respect of island states, therefore, a detailed look at the various types of migration patterns deemed as problematic by the state, and thus the forms of control in which they engage, is required.

Writers such as Vigneswaran (2008) and Van der Leun (2003) have pointed out the increasing relevance of internal border controls in light of the ‘failure’ of external measures. What the Barbadian context demonstrates is that these ‘neo-corporatist’ approaches may also include surveillance activities by members of the general public. This does not suggest a ‘devolution’ of power by the state to the public, or the de facto management of immigration by local as against federal agents of the state, as occurs in some cities in the United States (Varsanyi, 2008), but rather that where the views of members of the public coincide with state policy, there is cooperation in border management activities. The co-opting of the general public into activities of border management is not a novel dimension of this research, however, as other scholars have highlighted the involvement of the general public, moved by perceptions of threat and other motives, participate in the identification and detention of ‘suspect’ migrants (see Haugen, 2012 in relation to China and Madsen (2004) in relation to South Africa).

In examining the impact of border enforcement, studies highlight the physical violence associated with this policing but also highlight its
psychological dimensions (Willen, 2010, 2007a, 2007b). What I noted in my exploration of the psychological is that everyday objects can be used by the state in the governmentality of immigration. Migrants fear encounters with these everyday objects – in this study a bench, a cold room and a white van, which are representative of state power and signal the possibility of deportation. This suggest that the border is instantiated not just by fences and border guards (Herbert, 2009), but by mundane (prosaic) objects and activities (Painter, 2006). It is therefore important that research seek to extend analysis of the psychology of fear, given the role of the mundane in the embodied experiences of migrants.

The research also contributed to discussions on bio-politics and the othering of unwanted migrants (Willen, 2007a, 2007b, 2010). I argued that the symbolic violence which produced the word ‘foreigner’ within the Barbadian context, worked in conjunction with the bio-politics of otherness, which sought to exclude CARICOM nationals, especially the undocumented, from spaces designated for nationals and elite migrants. I suggested that this ‘anti-foreigner’ mentality is firmly ingrained in Barbadian psyche, such that immigration officials reject migrants’ entry on the basis that they arrive with the intention to ‘steal’ jobs and other critical resources. The othering of ‘foreigners’ at, as well as beyond the border, meant that all CARICOM nationals were subject to suspicion, based on social characteristics such as modes of dress, as well as ways of speaking. This finding confirms that research investigating the condition of the undocumented must engage in scrutiny of other markers used to signify otherness. Studies which highlight the complexity of racialization do emphasize the multi-dimensionality of the process of othering (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993; Anthias, 2010).
Notwithstanding the above, the research has highlighted the significance of undocumented status in shaping migrants lifeworld, confirming that undocumentedness is an exclusionary experience (Coutin, 2000b; De Genova, 2005; Menjívar, 2006).

In addition, the geographical specificities of Barbados, including its islandic state, small size and high-population density, had influenced the construction of state discourse, though small size topoi was not its main feature. I found that the rhetoric of the Barbadian state is not very different from that invoked in other island nations (King, 2009; Baldachinno, 2010) as well as in other larger countries, as studies have shown that the tendency is for xenophobic and heavily racialised discourse (Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006; De Genova, 2005; Lynn and Lea 2003; Flores, 2003; Black, 2003; Hier and Greenberg 2002; Chang and Aoki 1997).

The analysis also revealed that although there were a range of actors shaping the discursive landscape concerning immigration, the political discourse which was advanced by the incumbent government, dominated imaginations. The research confirms, as is the case with other literature, that the power wielded by the political elite, shapes substantially conceptualizations of unwanted migrants (Pijpers, 2006; Van der Valk, 2003; Rojo and Van Dijk 1997). However, I also argued that this discourse converged with ‘everyday talk’ (Lynn and Lea 2003), which used symbolic borders to exclude the nonnationals on the basis of ‘foreignness’. In this respect the research has made a special contribution as it has added to the debate on symbolic exclusions, by analysing the various spatial scales (Pijpers, 2006) within which such discourse operates. Typically research has examined these scales separately focusing on political/elite discourse.
(Pijpers, 2006; Riaño and Wastl-Walter 2006; Van der Valk, 2003; Rojo and Van Dijk 1997); mediated discourse (Flores, 2003; King and Wood, 2001) or that of the general public (Lynn and Lea 2003). The findings therefore highlight the need for analysis which simultaneously examines discourse produced at multiple levels.

In addition to the above findings relating to bordering practices, this study has also contributed to current debates on migrant agency. Research has highlighted the role that agency plays in migrants’ ability to negotiate borderized settings (Engbersen and Broeders 2009; Van der Leun, 2003). Scholars in this subject attribute agency to state officials, private individuals, as well as to migrants. In this thesis, I focused on the latter. Migrants engage in a number of activities to regulate the body, in order to limit their identification as ‘other’, as well to prevent deportation (Talavera et al. 2010; Khosravi, 2010; Willen, 2007b; Madsen, 2004; Núñez and Heyman, 2007). Their fear of being detected thus meant no verbal engagement in everyday places, such as the bus terminal and market. This study has affirmed that such mechanisms of containment are deliberately chosen by migrants to prevent detention, and that regulation of the body can take rather extreme forms, if migrants become paralyzed by the geography of fear (Haugen, 2012; Núñez and Heyman, 2008; Willen, 2007a, 2007b; Madsen, 2004). In the Barbadian context, the geographical specificity of small size may have impacted on socio-spatial practices and placed additional constraints on migrants, limiting ‘safe’ places and heightening the geography of fear. Given that these peculiarities are not specific to Barbados but characterize all the island states in the Caribbean, and other locales in the global migration
regime, the relationship between space and scale in geographies of fear and exclusion needs to be probed.

Notably, migrant agency was evident not only in the things they did, but also in the things they said. Migrants produced counter narratives to the anti-immigration rhetoric which dominated the Barbadian landscape. These counter narratives, as well as the discourse of members of civil society revealed the contestations for power within Barbados (Lynn and Lea 2003). What is also significant about migrants’ narratives is the parallel between these expressions, and the tactical cosmopolitanism engaged in by migrants in South Africa (Landau and Freemantle 2010). Both groups of migrants drew on much larger frames of reference of belonging which related to their membership in a regional citizenry, which contrasted which the much narrower view of citizenship being posited by the state.

The research also sheds light on the evolving nature of agency, which responds to the constraints and is itself constrained by border realities. The key contribution of this project has been the exploration of agency in conjunction with a complex ontology of the border. Each of the three empirical chapters included a discussion of the role of agency in creating spaces of inclusion in otherwise exclusionary conditions. Though I should note that I also pointed out that migrant agency at times contributed to the conditions of exclusion migrants sought to navigate, such as in cases of immobility. There were two key observations in respect of the agency exercised by migrants. The first is that it was a strategic agency. For example, in advance of their trips to Barbados, migrants rehearsed narratives for possible interrogation by immigration officials, as well as collaborated with Barbadian nationals or permanent residents who would be able to secure
entry into the island. One migrant was actually quite specific about the time of arrival, travelling early to avoid lengthy immigration lines and the possibility of interrogation. Migrants were also strategic about their employment, working with employers, or opting for employment in sectors which did not demand proof of a work permit. Secondly, it was an *embedded* agency, as it through the undertaking of their everyday activities that migrants negotiated the exclusions they encountered. Thus, it is in activities such as working, shopping, and socializing that migrants exhibited varying degrees of agency (See Coutin, 2000b).

I was able to demonstrate that migrants had the capacity to adapt to and accommodate forces which both enabled and constrained their agency. This capacity to adjust is reflective of Carnegie’s notion of strategic flexibility (1982). Through this linking I was also able to show that migrant agency ebbs and flows in response to discursive and non-discursive border realities. In fact, at times it is the exercise of agency which replicates the border in the lives of migrants, placing further constraints, which heighten their undocumentedness (suspect status), and concomitantly placed limits on the exercise of their agency. In this way the border is performed by the migrants. These constraints demonstrate the power and pervasiveness of the border in the lives of the undocumented. Drawing on Archer’s (1995, 2003) concept of agency, and like articulations in the migration studies literature on (strategic) agency (Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2004; Culic, 2008; Coutin, 2000b), I have thus added to the debate by exploring the structure of border and how its forces are mediated through agency.

Based on the above, I have with this research contributed to a deepened understanding of the border, undocumentedness and agency, and the
relationship between these phenomena. The research yields new insight into the theorization of the border and undocumentedness, in particular as it relates to the governmentality of immigration, suspect status, and the spacialization of fear. In addition, it sheds light on the evolving nature of agency, which responds to the constraints and is itself constrained by border realities. Although I used Barbados as a case study, the theoretical findings will appeal to scholars with an interest in other borderized countries/regions. In addition, it suggests entry points for new areas of research, such as the implications of small size on bordering practices, discursive power, and the dimensions of migrants’ strategic agency.

**Developments post-fieldwork**

As indicated in Chapter 5, the evolution in migration policy vis-à-vis the translation of the Green Paper into law seems to have stalled with the passing of former Prime Minister David Thompson. This delay, however, has not impacted on the conduct of immigration enforcement, as is evident by the number of high profile incidents reported in the media. As migrants’ narratives revealed, employers were already acting on proposals outlined in the Green Paper in advance of its legislative implementation. What will be interesting to watch, and could serve as a possible avenue for future research, is the way local practices evolve in light of this vacuum, as well as how the new policy framework (re)shapes existing geographies.

In outlining its justification for a shift in policy, the Barbadian government did not provide any statistics to substantiate the claims that undocumented migration to the island ‘was excessively high’ (Thompson, 2009, p.1). It is likely that such statistics were not available, due to the nature of undocumented migration, but also as posited above is likely due to the lack
of data regarding contemporary flows. It would therefore be difficult to draw statistical comparisons of migration trends (among the undocumented) in the pre- and post-amnesty period. Yet, comparing these figures would yield some insight into the ‘effectiveness’ of restrictive border regimes. Will potential migrants become responsive and begin to formulate migration agendas which consider alternative destinations? Or will they continue to pursue migration through undocumentedness?

The possibility also exists for conducting research among those who had returned home in the period surrounding the amnesty, without having applied for amnesty or following the rejection of an application for amnesty. Studies on returnee migration suggest that these migrants face exclusions in their home country, as they are treated as ‘foreigners’ and not as ‘non-nationals’. They thus encounter problems integrating in a society in which they thought they would be welcome. It would be interesting to probe whether this is also the case for intra-regional migrants, as previous research has focused on migrants returning from the North (see Byron and Condon 1996; Gmelch, 1992; Potter et al. 2005).

Finally, there was a recent initiative by CARICOM to review migration within the context of the regional framework (the results of which had not been released at time of writing this thesis). While the study’s emphasis on the free movement of skilled nationals, the situation regarding the management of migration in Barbados suggests the need for a coordinated response to migration with the CSME. Also outstanding, are the findings of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which has reserved its decision in relation to the case of Shanique Myrie, who alleges violation of her rights to free movement under CARICOM (RJR News, 2013). The decision of the
Court could set a precedent regarding national governments’ treatment of incoming migrants, which also could have an impact on bordering practices and the experiences of intra-regional migrants travelling to, and residing in, CSME member states.
Appendix A: Interview Schedule

Section I

1. What do you think were the main reasons you left home?
2. What was your life like before you migrated?
3. How would you describe life in your home country?
4. What else would you like to tell me about your life back home?
5. Where does the rest of your family reside? (immediate/extended)

Section II

1. Had you thought about migrating before your trip to Barbados?
2. How did you decide to travel to Barbados?
3. How did family members or other persons influence your decision?
4. How did you prepare to arrive in Barbados?
5. How did you travel to Barbados?
6. Would this have been the first time you were leaving __________?
   What other times had you travelled from___________?

Section III

1. What timeframe did Immigration give you to stay in Barbados? (to visit, work?)
2. How long did you plan on being in Barbados?
3. What is the reason you have stayed this long in Barbados?
4. When did you decide to stay in Barbados?
5. Had you thought about what it would mean (in terms of you immigrant status) if you overstayed?
6. Was there anything that you tried to do to correct this before the amnesty, for e.g. getting married to a Barbadian national; having children here?

Section IV

1. What has life been like for you since being in Barbados?
2. Would you say you adjusted to living in Barbados?
3. If I were a migrant from ______ considering migration what would you tell me about living in Barbados?
4. I have heard that....is this true for you?
5. Have you been able to access government benefits (insurance, health, education, housing)?
6. (If negative) How does this affect your life?
7. What are some of the challenges you have experienced?
8. Are these similar to challenges you would have faced at home?
9. Did/Do you think about your immigrant status regularly
10. Did/Does it affect the decisions you make on a daily basis, *viz.* work, where you live, etc?
11. Can you provide an example of this?
12. If you were to use word(s) to describe your life in Barbados what it would be?

Section V

1. When did you regularize your status?
2. What were the reasons for regularizing your status?
3. What will you do if your application to regularize your status is unsuccessful?
4. When do you intend to migrate again?
5. To where will you migrate?
6. What kind of preparations have you made so far to enable this?
# Appendix B: Schedule of interview codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSEUDONYM</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>INTERVIEW DATE</th>
<th>INTERVIEWEE CODE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>09.10.2010</td>
<td>Int0_VM_09.10.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>27.10.2010</td>
<td>Int2_GF_27.10.2010</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>St. Lucian</td>
<td>29.10.2010</td>
<td>Int3_GM_29.10.2010</td>
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<td>Charles</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>03.11.2010</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>11.11.2010</td>
<td>Int5_GF_11.11.2010</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>12.11.2010</td>
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<td>14.11.2010</td>
<td>Int7_GM_14.11.2010</td>
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<td>14.11.2010</td>
<td>Int8_GM_14.11.2010</td>
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<td>14.11.2010</td>
<td>Int9_GM_14.11.2010</td>
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<td>Int23_GM_23.02.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hugh</td>
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<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>17.03.2011</td>
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## Appendix C: Bio-data on participants

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<th></th>
<th>PSEUDONYM</th>
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<th>AGE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>OCCUPATION IN HOME COUNTRY</th>
<th>OCCUPATION IN BARBADOS</th>
<th>YEAR OF ARRIVAL</th>
<th>IMMIGRANT STATUS/COMMENTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Malcolm</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reside and work status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Hotel worker</td>
<td>Graphic artist</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>On extension. Awaiting outcome of application for reside and work (applied 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>Construction worker (painter)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No work permit. Has not applied to regularize status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>Maintenance/Cleaning staff</td>
<td>Care giver</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Initial application for reside and work declined. Currently on extension and awaiting outcome of appeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maya</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Waitress/ Part-time student</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Granted indefinite leave to remain in 2010 but not</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Civil servant (clerical)</td>
<td>IT Technician</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Initial application for reside and work declined. Currently on extension and awaiting outcome of appeal.</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Civil servant (clerical)</td>
<td>Care giver</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Initial application for reside and work declined. Currently on extension and awaiting outcome of appeal.</td>
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<td>Sean</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason, all rounder)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Initial application for reside and work declined. Currently on extension and awaiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Work Status</td>
<td>Outcome of appeal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Stephanie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Construction worker (painter)</td>
<td>1995 Reside and work status (applied in 2000)</td>
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<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>1998 Reside and work status (applied in 2001)</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>1996 On extension. Has applied for reside and work status and is awaiting feedback.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Occupation 1</td>
<td>Occupation 2</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>Cleaner/sex worker</td>
<td>1998/2003*</td>
<td>Acquired reside and work status through marriage.</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>On extension, had reapplied for reside and work status, originally obtained through marriage.</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Carpenter/bus conductor</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
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<td>Student (recent high school graduate)</td>
<td>Construction worker (painter) 2007 No work permit. Previous application for immigrant status declined.</td>
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Appendix D: Ministerial statement on a new and comprehensive immigration policy for Barbados delivered by Prime Minister David Thompson in Parliament on May 5, 2009

On the 26 June 2008, the Cabinet agreed to the establishment of a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Immigration. This Sub-Committee has as its mandate the development of a new and comprehensive Immigration policy for Barbados.

The effort to exercise greater control over immigration has been heightened by:

1. The need to achieve an improved level of border security as the Immigration Department responds to the challenges posed by the freer movement of people, the globalization of terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime and drug trafficking;
2. The need to honour regional, hemispheric and international commitments with regard to the movement of capital and people which is critical to the effective promotion and strengthening of the services industry; and
3. The need to address and remove inconsistencies in the legislative framework governing immigration.

As part of its discussions, the Sub-Committee focused attention on the level of illegal immigration in Barbados. The Sub-Committee agreed that current levels are unacceptably high, increasingly difficult to control and pose potentially negative socio-economic challenges for the country.

While it cannot be denied that some of these persons have made and continue to make a contribution to the development of Barbados, the Sub-Committee concluded that the problem of illegal immigration can no longer be ignored. Consequently, the Sub-Committee made a series of
recommendations to the Cabinet of Barbados concerning a revision of the country’s treatment of illegal immigrants currently residing here.

Those recommendations were approved by the Cabinet and I now propose in accordance with the said approval to inform this Honourable House as follows:

With effect from 1st June, 2009, all undocumented CARICOM Nationals who entered Barbados prior to the 31st December, 2005 and remained undocumented for a period of eight years or more, are required to come forward and have their status regularized. Persons making use of this opportunity are expected to meet the following stipulated conditions:

- (a) An application for immigrant status together with all supporting documentation must be submitted to the Immigration Department on the prescribed form within six (6) months of the date of commencement of the policy, that is to say, before December 1, 2009;

- (b) The applicant must be able to substantiate his/her claim that he/she has been residing in Barbados for at least eight (8) years immediately prior to 31 December, 2005, i.e. before January 1, 1998;

- (c) The applicant must be currently employed and must provide evidence of his or her employment status;

- (d) The spouse or child of an employed applicant residing in Barbados with the applicant is eligible to apply under this new policy;

- (e) The applicant must pass a thorough security background check;

- (f) Applicants with three or more dependents will be considered but will not automatically qualify for status. Each case will be considered on its individual merit.
I must make it clear that after the qualifying period has expired, those CARICOM Nationals without lawful permission to remain in the island will be removed.

I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of this Government to the regional integration process and in particular to Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas which provides for the movement of skilled CARICOM Nationals within the CARICOM Single Market. These rights are enshrined in the Caribbean Community (Movement of Skilled Nationals) Act which was passed by Parliament in 2004.

It is my view that leaders in this region must work together to find solutions to the many vexing problems existing in our individual societies.

I thank you.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMIGRANT STATUS</th>
<th>MARITAL STATUS</th>
<th>FAMILY STATUS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>4 children</td>
<td>Wife and children back home in Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>Two children back home in Guyana, one born in Barbados, and resident there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td>Daughter born in Barbados and resident there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latoya</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>One child resident in St. Vincent, One son born and resident in Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>One born and resident in Barbados. Another born and resident in St. Croix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>Youngest child (son) born in Barbados and resident there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>5 children</td>
<td>Son on student visa and resident in Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Two daughters born in Guyana, one subsequently joined him to reside in Barbados. One son born in Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Married to a Barbadian citizen. Daughter on student visa and resident in Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leighton</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td>Wife travels between Guyana and Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td>Four children reside in Guyana. One born in and resident in Barbados?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>5 children</td>
<td>Two children back home in Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>Wife currently resides in Barbados (on work permit???)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajeeve</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td>Wife and children back home in Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>??? children</td>
<td>Daughter born in Barbados and resident there with Peter and girlfriend, who is currently undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Children reside in Jamaica with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMMIGRANT STATUS</td>
<td>MARITAL STATUS</td>
<td>FAMILY STATUS</td>
<td>COMMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>process of divorce)</td>
<td></td>
<td>husband and grandmother (maternal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Daughter born in Barbados and resident there with David and girlfriend, who is currently undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo</td>
<td>In relationship??</td>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>One daughter born and resident in Barbados. Other two (son and daughter) children remain at home in Guyana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>0 children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadiq</td>
<td>Married (separated)</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Born in and resident in Guyana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberly</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>? children</td>
<td>Children resident in Guyana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>One daughter resides in Guyana, and another in Barbados.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maya</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>Son resident in Guyana with grandparents (maternal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanessa</td>
<td>In relationship</td>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>In relationship with Barbadian citizenship. Children reside in the US with father</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F: Barbados Immigration Act, Schedule of Permitted Entrants

PART I

1. Persons who are duly accredited-
   (a) diplomatic or consular officers of a country other than Barbados; or
   (b) representatives or officials of-
      (i) the United Nations or any of its agencies or sub-agencies, or
      (ii) any governmental organisation in which Barbados participates,
   entering Barbados to carry out official duties or in transit, and members of
   the suites or families of such persons.

2. Persons entering Barbados to attend as students at-
   (a) an educational or training institution approved by the Minister for the
       purposes of this Act; or
   (b) a university or college authorised by law to confer degrees or to offer
       training in holy orders.

3. Persons entering Barbados for the purposes of employment, trade or
   business.

4. Persons entering Barbados for other purposes approved by the
   Minister.

PART II

1. Passengers in transit through Barbados.

2. Visitors.

4. Members of crews of vessels entering Barbados for shore leave or some other legitimate and temporary purpose.

5. Persons entering Barbados for the purpose of engaging in sport or in dramatic, artistic or other cultural activities.
Appendix G: Barbados Immigration Act, Cap. 190., Schedule of Prohibited Persons

1. Persons who are-
   
   (a) idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, persons of unsound mind or mentally deficient, dumb, blind, or physically handicapped to the extent of being unable to earn a living (unless they conclusively establish that they will not have to earn a living) or persons likely to become charges on public funds; or

   (b) paupers, vagrants or professional beggars.

2. Persons suffering from communicable diseases within the meaning of any regulations relating to such diseases made under the Health Services Act.

3. Persons who-
   
   (a) are prostitutes or persons whose behaviour offends public morality; or

   (b) seek to enter Barbados to engage in immoral sexual acts.

4. Persons who-
   
   (a) are addicted to the use of any drug;

   (b) are or have been at any time engaged or reasonably suspected of being likely to engage in the unlawful giving or using, the offering or exposing for sale, or buying of, or the trading or trafficking in, any drug, or

   (c) have been convicted of an offence under any enactment relating to dangerous or narcotic drugs.
5. Persons who-

(a) have been convicted of, or admit to having committed, a criminal offence which, if committed in Barbados, is punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year or longer;

(b) knowingly or for profit, aid, encourage or procure other persons who are not citizens of Barbados to enter Barbados illegally.

(c) are stowaways or seek to enter Barbados illegally.

6. Persons who are or have been at any time before or after the commencement of this Act advocates of-

(a) the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of Barbados or any other country or of all forms of law;

(b) the abolition of organised government;

(c) the assassination of any person or the unlawful destruction of property.

7. Persons who are or have been members of or affiliated to any organization which entertains or teaches any doctrine or practice specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of paragraph 6.

8. Persons in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are likely to engage in espionage, sabotage or other subversive activity directed against or detrimental to the security of Barbados.

9. Persons against whom deportation orders have been made.

10. Persons seeking to enter Barbados who are not in possession of a passport.

11. Any dependant accompanying a person who has been prohibited from entering, refused entry into, or deported from, Barbados.
Appendix H: Everyday objects associated with governmentality of surveillance

PICTURE 1: BARBADIAN ROUTE TAXI (ZR)

Source: Bajan Reporter (2010)
PICTURE 2 and 3: GUYANESE AND BARBADIAN PASSPORTS

Sources: Wikipedia (n.d.) and Barbados.org (n.d.)
# Appendix I: Migrants’ occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSEUDONYM</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>OCCUPATION IN HOME COUNTRY</th>
<th>OCCUPATION(S) HELD WHILE IN BARBADOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Craft artisan</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Hotel worker</td>
<td>Graphic artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(painter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>Maintenance/Cleaning staff</td>
<td>Care giver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maya</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Waitress/Part-time student)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Civil servant (clerical)</td>
<td>IT Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leighton</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(carpenter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Civil servant (clerical)</td>
<td>Care giver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
<td>(mason, all rounder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(painter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(carpenter)</td>
<td>(carpenter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajeeve</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Small business owner</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(jack of all trades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominic</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>Small farmer</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jonathan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>St. Vincentian</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Sailor</td>
<td>Warehouse worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Cleaner/sex worker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadiq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mason)</td>
<td>(mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberly</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Itinerant/mobile trader</td>
<td>Sex worker/bartender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEUDONYM</td>
<td>SEX</td>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>NATIONALITY</td>
<td>OCCUPATION IN HOME COUNTRY</td>
<td>OCCUPATION(S) HELD WHILE IN BARBADOS</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanessa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Itinerant/mobile trader</td>
<td>Small business owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Carpenter/bus conductor</td>
<td>Construction worker/Street vendor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Guyanese</td>
<td>Welder/Construction (mason)</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>St. Lucian</td>
<td>Unemployed.</td>
<td>Construction worker (form worker)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hugh</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Grenadian</td>
<td>Construction worker (form worker)</td>
<td>Construction worker (form worker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
<td>Construction worker (mason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latoya</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>Student (recent high school graduate)</td>
<td>Construction worker (painter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Data not available
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