Transnational (Dis)connections: Mountain Gorilla Conservation in Rwanda and the DRC

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

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### List of acronyms

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AoC</td>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWF</td>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCHIPS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Community Health Initiatives and Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Coalition pour la Défense de la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCoCongo</td>
<td>Committee de Coordination de Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCoSi</td>
<td>Committee de Coordination de Site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI</td>
<td>Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEEGL</td>
<td>Enterprise, Environment and Equity in the Virunga Landscape of the Great Lakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>Fauna and Flora International</td>
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<tr>
<td>FZS</td>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMP</td>
<td>Historically Marginalised People</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCN</td>
<td>Institut Congolaise pour la Conservation de Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP</td>
<td>International Gorilla Conservation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR-PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/ Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGNP</td>
<td>Mgahinga Gorilla National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGP</td>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGVP</td>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Veterinary Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Développement</td>
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<td>MRND(D)</td>
<td>Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Développement de la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORTPN</td>
<td>Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux</td>
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<td>PNV</td>
<td>Parc Nationale des Volcans (Volcanoes National Park)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNVi</td>
<td>Parc Nationale de Virungas (Virunga National Park)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
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<td>RDB</td>
<td>Rwanda Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDO</td>
<td>Rural Environment and Development Organization</td>
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<td>REMA</td>
<td>Rwanda Environmental Management Authority</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</td>
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<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UN GRASP</td>
<td>United Nations Great Ape Survival Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>Uganda Wildlife Authority</td>
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<td>WCS</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
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<td>WWHPS</td>
<td>Wyman Worldwide Health Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSL</td>
<td>Zoological Society of London</td>
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Abstract

This thesis uses a case study of mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC to explore how diverse connections and disconnections influence idea circulation and disseminate different forms of inclusion and exclusion of particular people and groups. It is embedded within a theoretical framework that brings together three bodies of literature on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational networks and ideational power to ask questions about network interactions and what they mean in terms of idea circulation. The thesis addresses three research questions: What do transnational networks look like on the ground; what do (dis)connections look like and what do they mean in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion; and (how) do transnational networks operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society?

This thesis presents results from a survey of the work of 281 conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa, which maps out the institutional context of mountain gorilla conservation and raises questions about the interactions, equality and inclusiveness of the sector. Having identified mountain gorilla conservation as a suitable case study for this research, the thesis explores the political and environmental history of the Virungas, looking at how the two interact and influence (dis)connections. Using data gathered from semi-structured interviews, this thesis introduces the key actors, structures and processes involved in mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC and explores the connections between them. It shows how connections based on perceptions of expertise, staff movement and the professional and social circles people move in cause certain ideas to be respected and circulated, whilst other people and their ideas are ‘accidentally’ excluded. At the same time ‘strategic’ disconnections, which result from personal and organisational conflicts, can prevent idea circulation and lead to project duplication in some areas and a lack of projects in others. The thesis also examines NGO and state claims that ‘the idea (for interventions) came from the community’. It argues that, with exceptions, in a context of ‘sensitisation’ of communities to conservation and a complex political history, NGOs and states often define community ‘ideas’ themselves and do not typically have processes in place to foster local ideas, potentially excluding some of the more marginalised groups in society.
Declaration of originality and copyright

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning

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Acknowledgements

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In terms of funding this research, I would like to thank my previous employer, Newcastle University, who funded a large part of my fieldwork expenses, as well as my French classes and provided a happy and comfortable environment for me to work on my thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Dan Brockington who used some of his ESRC grant on the social impacts of protected areas to fund the writing up of the NGO survey for publication.

This PhD was supervised by Dan Brockington and Rosaleen Duffy, the best supervisors I could have hoped for. Dan, despite all of my own doubts, your enthusiasm and support has been unwavering and has given me the confidence to see this project through to the end and continue on to secure my dream job. Your guidance and attention to detail has been invaluable and I have really enjoyed supervisions. Beyond supervising this research you have been a great source of personal guidance - probably without realising it - and I apologise now for subjecting you to so many unanswerable questions. Rosaleen, I would like to thank you for your ability to always see the bigger picture and guide me in the wider themes of the thesis. Your support in the final stages of writing through to submission has been invaluable. It has also been great to have a supervisor who shares my love of African wildlife.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 (Dis)connections and world conservation conventions

In September 2012, I was fortunate enough to have the opportunity to attend the IUCN World Conservation Convention in Jeju, South Korea, along with around 10,000 conservationists from around the world, as part of my work for Synchronicity Earth. At first this seemed untimely; I was in the final stages of writing up this thesis and my goal was to avoid all other distractions. However, far from distracting me in this endeavour, the conference helped to place my research findings in a wider context and understand their wider significance. For instance, why was I one of only two or three westerners attending sessions led by African conservationists, whilst at the same time sessions about Africa organised by westerners attracted few participants who looked like they were from Africa? And what did this mean in terms of the messages people took away from the lectures, seminars and discussion fora they attended? I realised that despite efforts to be inclusive (indeed various foundations and organisations had given financial support to ensure that people from developing countries, including indigenous peoples’ groups, could attend the conference); ideas were often circulating in very separate circles, or bubbles.

This scenario was not limited to formal events. I would arrange to meet a member of staff working for an African NGO for lunch and discover a whole new area of the conference site where Cameroonian participants socialised; I would go out in the evening and see a table full of Latin American NGO staff (from different NGOs) on one side of the room and British NGO staff (again, from different NGOs) on the other. This may be human nature, we circulate and talk about issues in a formal and informal setting with who we know, with who we feel comfortable with and it is also likely a result of language differences; but at the same time, it is easy to overlook the ‘accidental’ exclusions that this leads to. This is not a criticism of large international environmental events but, when such big ideas that could potentially impact on millions of people’s lives are under discussion, it is important that we understand how these connections and disconnections come about and what they mean in terms of whose
ideas are circulated and whose are not. This thesis tries to understand these issues in detail at the country and regional level and explore why they are important.

1.2 Transnational networks and idea circulation: understanding the role of connections and disconnections

Using a case study of Mountain Gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC, my thesis will explore how ideas about community interventions circulate through transnational networks and bring about different forms of inclusion and exclusion. It will bring together three bodies of literature to ask important questions about transnational networks. I will address these questions through four empirical chapters. I will explore what a transnational conservation network looks like by investigating the activities of the conservation NGO sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Then, taking a case study of mountain gorilla conservation, I will analyse the on-the-ground detail, introducing the different actors involved and the clear and blurred connections between them. I will then explore why people are connected or disconnected in particular ways and discuss what this means in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion, particularly of the more marginalised groups in society. I will then reflect on how these findings may help us to understand wider forms of inclusion and exclusion.

1.3 Research questions

The conceptual framework presented in chapter 2 informs the core aim of this research: to understand how transnational networks circulate ideas and what this means in terms of inclusion and exclusion of particular people and groups and their ideas within wider decision-making processes. This splits into three questions:

1. What do transnational networks look like (on the ground)?
2. What do (dis)connections look like and what do they mean in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion?
3. (How) do transnational networks (and specifically NGOs) operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society?
1.4 Main argument

My thesis argues that diverse connections, accidental and strategic disconnections influence (in different ways) how ideas circulate through a transnational network and cause certain people, organisations and their ideas to be included or excluded from important decisions about how things are done. Understanding these inclusions and exclusions at the local and national level can help to explain how and why various forms of global inclusion and exclusion come about.

1.5 Terms of reference

Ideas relate to understandings about the way things are, including views about the world and how its inhabitants should exist within it and relate to it. These ideas lead, in the contexts I am examining, to other ideas about what and how things should be done, played out through particular policies or projects. For example, employee health programmes, deworming interventions, mask wearing policies or briquettes as alternatives to charcoal would all be considered ‘ideas’ in this context. In chapter 8 of the thesis, I discuss ideas in their broader sense, considering how national and international views that inform who should and who should not be involved in shaping and implementing conservation in practice influence the discursive environment within which ideas about projects and policies originate and circulate.

I use the term transnational networks to refer to multiple actors working around a common theme across national boundaries to bring about change in political behaviour. I do not limit the term ‘political behaviour’ to the actions of government actors and their policy decisions, but widen it to include wider civic action, seeing civil society and NGOs as political actors themselves; and projects as another mechanism for influencing this behaviour alongside policy. As well as NGOs, in the context of this thesis, I consider state, community and private sector representatives as part of, rather than separate from, the network. Network activities may involve transnational flows of ideas, people and resources, but in this context they typically involve some form of human-human contact, be that face-to-face or through other modes of communication such as telephone or email.
I do not offer a singular definition of connections or disconnections, but instead offer a typology of the multiple and overlapping ways that this research shows how people and organisations are connected or not from each other (page 200). In the context of this thesis, I differentiate inclusion from exclusion, where people and organisations have the opportunity to share their ideas to influence decision-making about policies and projects. As I show in this thesis however, defining this type of inclusion is not always straightforward.

1.6 Chapter structure

Chapter 2, Transnational networks: circulating ideas and influencing political behaviour, will present the core argument for this thesis as a whole. I will bring together three bodies of literature to raise my research questions. I will begin by exploring the history of NGOs and NGO networks and unraveling some of the complex terminology surrounding them. I will explore their growth in size, remit and influence and discuss why they are important for further investigation. I will examine the literature on NGO-state-donor relationships and use it for asking important, critical questions about relationships within wider networks. I will then review the literature on ideational and hegemonic power to explore whether the circulation of ideas can provide a useful indicator of inclusion. Finally, I will explore the literature on transnational networks to identify the factors that influence ideational power and the inclusion or exclusion of particular people and groups and their ideas.

Chapter 3 will present the methodology for this research. I will begin by explaining why my PhD study was split between two time periods from September 2005 to August 2006 and from January 2009 to December 2012. I will describe the methods used to collect data on the conservation NGO sector in sub-Saharan Africa. I will then investigate suitable case studies for this thesis, justifying why I have chosen mountain gorilla conservation. Finally, I will describe the methods used during two fieldwork trips to Africa in October and November of 2009 and November and December of 2010. I will review the literature on these methods to explain why I chose them and will discuss my positionality and ethical issues.
Chapter 4 will investigate what a transnational network looks like at the sub-continental scale. I will explore the activities of the conservation NGO sector in sub-Saharan Africa. I will begin by presenting a typology of conservation NGOs in an attempt to highlight their diversity. I will then explore their basic patterns of geography in terms of where they are active and where they are not, as well as identifying where they locate their headquarters. I will highlight hubs and gaps in activity and explore how even the sector is in terms of its geographical focus. I will then investigate patterns of expenditure, identifying where funds are being spent and who is spending them. I will use these data to reflect on the evenness of the sector and what this might mean in terms of inclusion and exclusion.

Chapter 5 will explore the political and environmental history of the Virungas in order to provide the context for the proceeding empirical chapters. I will begin by introducing the political history of Rwanda and Burundi, starting with the German occupation and leading up to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. I will then discuss some of the contributory factors in the genocide and will examine the political situation in Rwanda today and its relevance to this thesis. In the second part of the chapter, I will explore the two Congo Wars from 1996-1997 and from 1998-2002. In the final part of the chapter, I will present the history of conservation in the region, introducing the current conservation model, the responsible governmental bodies and describing population demographics in the region. Throughout this chapter I will show where, how and why conservation today is linked to regional politics.

Chapter 6 will introduce the conservation actors involved in mountain gorilla conservation in the Virungas in order to provide important context for investigating connections and disconnections in later chapters. This chapter will predominantly address my first research question: what do transnational networks look like on the ground? I will begin by explaining what I mean by ‘on the ground’, before introducing the NGOs involved and the different interventions that they are involved in, alongside states, donors and local community groups. I will explore interventions relating to health; alternative energy; land; and agricultural and other commodities. I will investigate how actors work together and separately to support interventions and will begin to investigate what blurred state-NGO boundaries look like. In the final section of
this chapter, I will examine the government structures involved in mountain gorilla conservation and look at how they influence NGO activities.

Chapter 7, NGO (dis)connections, will develop discussions in chapter 6 to explore not just how connections and disconnections come about, but why they come about and why they are important. This chapter predominantly addresses the research question: what do (dis)connections look like and what do they mean in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion? I will begin by presenting a typology of connections and disconnections. I will then explore intra-organisational connections to understand whether and how field staff are connected to their headquarters and have opportunity to influence wider organisational decision-making. In the remainder of the chapter, I will explore inter-organisational connections, identifying the factors that influence connections and looking at what they mean in terms of ideational power and idea circulation, as well as inclusion and exclusion of particular people and their ideas in decision-making processes. I will end the chapter by investigating strategic disconnections (disconnections that result from more obvious conflicts and tensions), exploring why they are important in terms of idea circulation and exclusion.

Chapter 8, “the idea came from the community”, will address the research question: (How) do transnational networks operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society? I will begin by introducing the ‘community’, before presenting examples of interviewees claiming that the idea came from the community and will explore what they actually mean by this. I will then investigate instances of resistance to community interventions to shed light on the origin of what NGOs and states describe as community ideas. I will also explore how an approach known as sensitisation, combined with the cultural and political context in Rwanda, can create barriers to communities circulating their ideas. At the same time, I will discuss how a different set of barriers can also prevent communities from circulating their ideas in the DRC. I will end the chapter by examining some of the exceptions and looking at how some NGOs work to facilitate the circulation of community ideas.

In my concluding chapter, I will summarise the findings and key arguments of each chapter. I will then reflect on these arguments and determine to what extent they have addressed my research questions. I will also highlight the empirical and conceptual
contributions that this thesis offers. I will end the chapter by discussing the limitations of this thesis and suggesting areas for future research.
Chapter 2: Transnational networks: circulating ideas and influencing political behaviour

2.1 Introduction

This thesis is about how transnational networks circulate ideas. I argue that the way that ideas move through transnational networks and the forces that shape this movement can help to explain inclusion and exclusion of particular people, or groups, at the local and national level. Circulation of ideas is complex, involving multiple actors interacting across local, regional, national and international levels. I argue that idea circulation is determined by connections between people based on perceptions of expertise and reputation, as well as friendships and social circles. These connections create ‘accidental disconnections’, preventing other people from circulating their own ideas. Tensions and conflicts create further, more obvious disconnections that compound such exclusions. State structures, wider debates and political history all influence connections and disconnections and therefore have a major impact on idea circulation. The blurred-boundaries between actors mask these processes, making it difficult to understand who is influencing whom and what role different actors play in excluding others. I make these arguments using a case study of Mountain Gorilla conservation.

This chapter sets out the core argument of the thesis as a whole. I draw on several bodies of literature to unravel some of the confusing terminology surrounding terms such as transnational networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society and reflect on changes in meaning, remit, scale and influence over time. In the second section of this chapter I examine the literature on NGO relationships with states, donors and local communities. I argue that as NGOs work in increasingly transnational ways and link up with other organisations, issues of blurred-boundaries between different actors, legitimacy, accountability structures and impacts on other relationships become magnified and more confused. This is overlooked by much of the literature on transnational NGO networks but I argue that it can be used to interrogate networks and is therefore highly relevant to this thesis. I examine the relationship between NGOs and the state to explore how NGO networks can act as a mechanism for the state and other elites to influence others. I illustrate how, in the context of a network, states can
influence and use other relationships strategically to circulate their own ideas. This is perhaps easier for state employees to do with a network, than with an individual organisation because lines of accountability are likely to be more confused as NGOs scale-up into networks.

In the third section of this chapter, I use concepts of ideational power and hegemony to explain why investigating the flow of ideas through transnational networks can provide an important indicator of inclusion or exclusion. An investigation of ideational power, or rather how ideas influence political behaviour, be that policy directly, the construction of political problems, or wider political philosophy and assumptions, can provide a good indication of the ‘success’ of an idea and how that maps on to dynamics of inclusion or exclusion. Whilst the ideational literature does look at these flows, little of this is brought into discussions about NGO networks, which is a core subject of this thesis.

In the fourth section of this chapter, I explore how NGOs operate transnationally to circulate ideas. The debate on transnational NGO networks says little about ideational power and makes minimal reference to the literature on this subject. By bringing these two literatures together, I argue that the way an idea is portrayed publicly, the perception of expertise and representation, consensus and personal relationships all influence NGOs’ ideational power. I suggest that these factors not only influence who is able to circulate their ideas through the network, but also lead to ‘hidden’ exclusions, preventing certain people from circulating their ideas. There is a gap in the literature concerning these types of exclusions and their importance, as well as the exclusions and disconnections that potentially result from more ‘obvious’ conflicts.

In the final section of this chapter I move beyond the influence of ideas on policy and problem construction to explore how networks influence wider political philosophy, structures and norms. This is important because influence at this level informs the context within which interactions take place and ideas originate and circulate.
2.2 Classifying and defining transnational networks

In this section, I explore some of the different categories or types of network to explain how I arrive at the definition presented in the introductory chapter to this thesis. One of the most confusing things about drawing together insights from the literature on transnational networks is that it uses many terms to describe the same thing, or else it uses one term to describe many different things. The literature refers to many types of group that work transnationally: transnational firms and global production networks (GPNs); policy networks; transnational advocacy networks (TANs), global campaigns and transnational activist groups; epistemic communities; knowledge production networks; global development networks (GDNs); and global civil society. Diverse people from diverse backgrounds write about transnational networks and this can result in inconsistent classifications. I explore some of these classifications below, with emphasis on those networks working to influence political behaviour.

The literature on policy networks provides a good starting point for understanding different network typologies. According to Borzel “a ‘Babylonian’ variety of policy network concepts and applications can be found in the literature. Neither is there a common understanding of what policy networks actually are, nor has it been agreed whether policy networks constitute a mere metaphor, a method, an analytical tool or a proper theory” (1998). Rhodes synthesises some of these literatures and defines policy networks as “sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared interests in public policymaking and implementation. These institutions are interdependent. Policies emerge from the bargaining between the networks’ members” (2007: 1244; also see Rhodes 2006: 2; Henry 2011: 362; Enroth! 2010). Other actors include professions, trade unions and big businesses.

Policy networks represent a broad range of different networks along a continuum ranging from policy communities, through professional networks, inter-governmental networks and producer networks to issue networks (Dowding 1994: 62; Rhodes 2006: 4). At one end of this continuum, policy communities represent a ‘cohesion’ of actors
around an issue and at the other end, issue networks can constitute heterogeneous and conflicting interests and looser relationships (Rhodes 2006: 4).

Rhodes defines a policy community as having the following characteristics:

[…] a limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded; frequent and high-quality interaction between all members of the community on all matters related to the policy issues; consistency in values, membership, and policy outcomes which persist over time; consensus, with the ideology, values, and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; and exchange relationships based on all members of the policy community controlling some resources (Rhodes 2006: 4).

And an issue network as having:

[…] many participants; fluctuating interaction and access for the various members; the absence of consensus and the presence of conflict; interaction based on consultation rather than negotiation or bargaining; an unequal power relationship in which many participants may have few resources, little access, and no alternative (ibid).

Rhodes (2006; 2007) and others’ work in this field focuses predominantly on the British political system. However, it merits attention in this thesis as it begins to consider how networks might be used to govern and influence political behaviour beyond the role of the state. I return to this point later in the chapter when I discuss the growing remit of transnational networks and their increasing role in the governance of ‘global’ issues. In the context of this thesis, the most relevant types of policy network are those that constitute nongovernmental organisations and individuals that work transnationally to influence political behaviour, be that as a cohesive, tightly connected group of actors; or as a loser network of different actors working around the same issue. I therefore focus below on transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities.

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are usually made up of international NGOs. They work to define an issue, convince the target audience that the problem is solvable, prescribe solutions and monitor implementation (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 30). TANs typically form around shared principled ideas or values (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 30), which ‘provide criteria to distinguish right from wrong’ (Henry et al 2004:12-13, following Stone 2002). Claiming to be representative of the wider public, as well as
focusing around emotive and principled causes, means that these networks employ a range of different strategies to influence political behaviour. TANs will use a mixture of dramatic information, pictures and stories ‘to make sense of a situation that may be far away’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16-23). They will make moral and ethical arguments and hold powerful actors accountable (very publicly) for their actions (ibid). These tactics play on the emotive side of a campaign to interpret information in such a way that it will help to get both the public and policymakers on side. Equally though, it would be incorrect to assume that these networks only revolve around moral values. Like epistemic communities (below), transnational advocacy campaigns also use cause and effect analysis and scientific reasoning to suggest solutions similarly to epistemic communities. For instance, the Jubilee Debt Campaign uses raw data to demonstrate how debt worsens poverty (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2011).

Examples of TANs are apparent throughout the literature; written about in relation to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the US and Canada (Manno 1994: 71); the ivory trade ban and CITES regime (Princen 1994b); creation of a ‘World Park’ in Antarctica (Clark 1994); multilateral nuclear arms control, opposition to large dams and the international landmines campaign (Florini 2001); children’s rights issues (Lent and Trivedy 2001); International Environment conferences and summits (Dodds 2001); neoliberal oil and agrarian policy in Ecuador (Radcliffe 2001); and gender mainstreaming in policymaking (True 2003).

Epistemic communities are defined as “collections of individuals who share the same worldview (or episteme)” (Haas 1992a: 26). They share beliefs and notions of validity but can be from different disciplines and use different methods (Haas 1992a: 15). Members do not need to meet formally, but can become transnational over time through various modes of formal and informal communications (Haas 1992a: 17). They do not have to be large to influence policy, but focus heavily on using their expertise and consensual knowledge to influence policy (Adler and Haas 1992: 380; Henry et al 2004: 12). Epistemic communities can be short-lived in line with a particular problem, or

1 Some would disagree, for instance see Henry et al 2004; Stone 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Avant 2004
constant, working continuously to perpetuate particular beliefs and discourses (Stone 2002: 5, 13). Epistemic communities use similar strategies to TANs to influence policy: policy innovation; instigating policy; facilitating policy selection; and working to ensure policy persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375-384). Whilst expert knowledge is vital to the work of epistemic communities, consensual knowledge is equally as important (Adler and Haas 1992: 384; Haas 1989: 398; Peterson 1992). As with other transnational networks, studies show that epistemic communities are becoming increasingly important as more issues become ‘international’ (Haas 1992a: 12), including whaling (Peterson 1992); international food aid (Hopkins 1992); ozone layer depletion (Haas 1992b); marine pollution (Haas 1989); and arms control (Adler 1992).

In some ways, epistemic communities represent a subset of TANs, basing their legitimacy on technical and scientific expertise and focusing their efforts on influencing policymakers. Other transnational networks may use scientific or technical information, but they also rely on their legitimacy (see discussion later in the chapter) as representing ‘society’. Betsill and Bulkeley differentiate epistemic communities from transnational advocacy networks, suggesting that the former focuses on the less political activity of ‘information exchange’ and the latter involves more political activities such as value construction and defining problems (2004: 475). I would argue that epistemic communities constitute similar knowledge politics and also use their expertise and values to define what they think are the problems and solutions.

With both the TAN and epistemic communities approaches, the focus is on the nation state as the location of governance and the significance of actors is measured in terms of the extent to which they shape and change political behaviour (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004: 475). The global civil society and network governance literature move away from this approach (for instance see Betsill and Bulkeley: 2004; Wapner 1996; Rhodes 2006, 2007) and I discuss this broader role of transnational networks later in the chapter, particularly in the context of Wapner’s work on world civic politics (1996).

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2 I discuss the controversial role of networks in defining political problems and solutions later in the chapter
Comparing and categorising networks is often unhelpful; it focuses unnecessary attention on providing (inconsistent) typologies, when it is more useful to consider how networks operate more generally and the different strategies they employ for circulating ideas and influencing political behaviour. Even Rhodes himself, who has written extensively about different types of network, suggests that “typologies of networks have become deeply uninteresting” (2007: 1249). All of the networks discussed in this chapter share a common feature: they all circulate knowledge, ideas and values and define issues to influence political behaviour, be that directly to influence domestic or international policy and eventually behaviour and practice, or indirectly to influence wider political structures and norms, often bypassing policy to influence behaviour and practice. Typically, NGOs play a major role in these processes. The only real difference between these networks lies in the way groups claim legitimacy and the audiences they seek to influence. I do not attempt to categorise networks in this chapter and any apparent categorisation is due to terms used in the original literature to which I refer. I use the term transnational network as defined in chapter 1 (page 13) of this thesis.

It is important to explain how transnational networks have emerged and why it is important to understand them. NGOs play a central role in these networks, so I begin by exploring how their remit and influence have grown; how their meaning has changed over time; and how they have quickly formed complex and diverse connections with diverse interests at local, national and transnational levels. This understanding is pivotal to this thesis and it helps explain why complex relationships within transnational networks have come about.

2.3 The importance of understanding NGO networks

2.3.1 Evolving meanings and changing roles: the history of NGOs, civil society and transnational networks

The meaning of civil society has changed over time from its European roots in Enlightenment as embodying the bourgeoisie and the pursuit of individual interests (Cox 1999). During the Nineteenth Century it began to refer to ‘a variety of conflicting groups and interests’, including voluntary associations working for the common good, outside of the state and civil society (ibid: 5-6). In Europe, during the Nineteenth
Century, civil society merged with the state and became articulated through corporatism3; this extended post-World War II in the form of the Welfare State (ibid: 7). In the 1970s, capitalist ideology and interventions led to a reversal of corporatism and, since this time, economic globalisation has restructured society into a ‘three fold hierarchical structure’ where civil society is part of, separate from and provides a forum for challenging capitalism (ibid: 9).

Antonio Gramsci encapsulates the changing meaning of civil society and importantly helps to explain how state-NGO relationships have developed and been understood over time. Gramsci conceptualised civil society both as an extension of the state apparatus, or as the ‘function of hegemony’, used to spread the state’s dominant ideology, or hegemonic power; whilst at the same time acknowledging that civil society could act as a platform to unite disparate forces to challenge the state (Gramsci 1971: 12; 178; 257-263; 268). Thus to Gramsci, “civil society was the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also that on which an emancipatory counter hegemony could be constructed” (Cox 1999: 3, following Gramsci 1971). This dual meaning is important as it highlights a greater level of complexity in the relationship between the state and civil society than many current understandings would suggest. Many studies critique the close nature of relationships between the state and civil society today (for example Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Igoe and Kelsall 2005a), yet these links have always existed.

The term civil society is often used interchangeably with the term NGO in both the academic literature and in the sector itself. The number, remit and influence of NGOs has changed substantially in recent decades. In the 1980s and 1990s NGOs expanded across the globe, particularly in the Global South (Boris 1999; Fisher 1997; Salamon 1992; Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1995a; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 6). This growth can be attributed to a number of political and economic changes at the time

3 Cox explains corporatism in this context as being when “State leaders, perceiving the disruptive potential of class struggle in industrializing societies, sought to bring employers and organized workers into a consensual relationship with the state for the management of the economy and the support of state political and military goals” (1999: 7)
linked to the rise of neoliberalism. This created space for NGOs and grassroots organisations - synonymous with civil society - to emerge as separate from the state, as an alternative, or in opposition to the state (Harvey 2005: 78). The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to the rise of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and a renewed interest in democracy (Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 5; Ottoway 2001: 6). It opened up space for civil society to fill the roles previously fulfilled by government (Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 5; Harvey 2005; Hulme and Edwards 1997b: 276). In particular Structural Adjustment Programmes, with their focus on the roll back of the state and emphasis on civil society, created an increasing space for NGOs to operate and intervene in African countries and their politics (Ferguson 2006: 10-14) and even to intervene in world politics (Avant 2004: 361). These political transformations were accompanied by a growing belief that NGOs were a better vehicle for delivering democracy and development (Ebrahim 2003: 192; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Mackintosh 1992) and would set the foundation for a ‘global civil society’ (Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 5).

As the role of NGOs has scaled-up, they have begun to work transnationally and link with other organisations in developing countries. Until the mid/late 1960s, NGOs - at least in Africa⁴- consisted of largely Northern-based philanthropic action and advocacy organisations often linked with other funding and religious organisations (Bebbington et al 2007: 11). However, in the early 1980s, the notion of ‘alternative development emerged’ with an emphasis on local institutional development and NGOs began to collaborate with partners in the Global South, leaving behind more of a funding role for Northern-based NGOs (ibid). As NGOs grew in size they ‘re-established’ their in-country presence, typically keeping headquarters in the US or Europe, but establishing offices in the countries they work in and support local organisations to work in. As well as working through local organisations, international NGOs increasingly look to these groups to promote public support and gather ‘evidence’ to use in their campaigns. Equally, local groups increasingly act globally and challenge international institutions; collaborate across national borders; and promote rights offered to them by international agreements (Gaventa 2001: 276-7). However, transnational networks are not new. Ideas

⁴ India is perhaps one exception with a long history of Indian NGOs dating back to the late 19th Century (Asian Development Bank 2009)
about development have often flowed from the West into developing countries. Many NGO networks map onto colonial relationships, which have influenced aid, resource and idea flows (Bebbington and Kothari 2006: 853; Goldman 2005: 8; Jasanoff 2006: 276). What is new is the increasing complexity of networks, which now have greater ability to channel increasingly diverse flows of people, resources and ideas (Bebbington and Kothari 2006: 850). I discuss these roles later in the chapter.

There has been a move away from the state centric view of global politics towards a multi-centric system of different actors and power locations (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Ferguson 2006: 101-3; Duffy 2006: 732-3). Some describe this as a move away from ‘government’ towards ‘governance’ (Backstrand 2008: 74; Clark 2001: 20). This multi-centric global system allowed the power and influence of NGOs to grow and they have played a central role in this new form of governance (Ferguson 2006: 40, following Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Specifically, a growing literature has developed around the role of networks in governance. In the US in 1970s, literature emerged on ‘subgovernments’, ‘subsysterns’ and ‘iron triangles’- clusters of individuals working to influence particular policy decisions; whilst at same time people in the UK began to write about policy communities (Enroth 2010: 21). As critiques and research developed, policy networks came to be thought of as encompassing a broader range of networks along a continuum (see above) and the focus of much of the policy network literature began to move away from a focus on policy and government towards an understanding of network governance (Enroth 2010: 22; Rhodes 1996; 2006; 2007; Blanco et al 2011).

In the UK (as this is the focus of much of the policy network literature), Thatcher’s corporate management and marketization reforms sought to bypass nongovernmental groups delivering services, but this led to fragmentation of service delivery systems; pushed organisations to collaborate and form new networks; and increased membership of existing networks, incorporating the private and voluntary sector (Rhodes 2007: 1246). The literature on network governance refers to the changing role of the state following this fragmentation of the 1980s and joined up governance of the 1990s whereby governance took place with and through networks (Rhodes 2007: 1246-7). This has led to the “hollowing out of the state” from above (e.g. by international interdependence); from below (by marketization and networks); and sideways (by
agencies and different parastatal bodies) (Rhodes 2007: 1248).

Rhodes suggests that the growth of (network) governance reduces the ability of governments to act effectively; they become less reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy and negotiation (2007: 1248). An alternative view suggests a more hands-on approach to governing through the ‘steering’ of networks, which sees networks as an opportunity for greater central control (ibid: 1256; Rhodes 1996: 660). Steering may be carried out by states, potentially giving them greater control; or by actors within the network. For instance, in a study of climate change governance, Andonova et al suggest that “transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals.” (2009: 56). They argue that, in this context, networks must be trying to address a public goal; must involve intentional, directed steering; and must be recognised at authoritative by network members (ibid). I return to this point later in the chapter - and in later analytical chapters - to look at how networks can be used strategically by state actors to push their own agendas.

As networks have grown in size, remit and influence, they have increasingly been accused of spreading diverse forms of inequality, by strategically including and excluding particular people and places. This results in global forms of exclusion and marginalisation (for example see Ferguson 2006: 14, 41 on the capital flows of transnational networks in Africa, or Lewis 2000 on how transnational environmental organisations identify countries to work in based on the openness of political structures and presence of national NGOs). The exclusivity of some transnational networks can make it difficult for southern actors to participate on an equal footing (see Verkoren 2006: 34; Smith 2002: 520). International NGOs facilitate exclusion by focusing on international advocacy rather than properly including and empowering local and national level actors or addressing state-civil society relations (Edwards 2001: 8; Collins et al 2001: 144-5). The way that many NGOs ‘leapfrog’ to Brussels and Washington in their global advocacy attempts exemplifies this (Edwards 2001: 9-10). This highlights concerns about how global processes shape exclusion from a network, but it arguably says little about how this plays out on the ground or the interactions and processes (in between the local and the global) that lead to exclusion. Clearly a number of factors are
likely to structure otherwise flat networks at diverse levels of operation and identifying these factors and how they influence inclusion and exclusion of people and their ideas is important.

Turning to environmental issues, NGOs promote themselves as better placed to tackle transboundary environmental challenges (Princen, Finger and Manno 1994: 219). As more and more environmental issues are seen as international, interdisciplinary and intersecting, it seems that newer types of network are forming, which encompass a greater diversity of interests. These range from information sharing forums such as the Development and Environment Group of Bond⁵ which brings together humanitarian and environmental groups who recognise the need for a multi-disciplinary approach; to large scale project sharing networks, such as Oceans 5, a group of large philanthropic foundations working collaboratively to make targeted investments to address cross-disciplinary marine issues; to TANs and epistemic communities working around ‘global’ environmental issues and policies (see Manno 1994; Princen 1994; Clark 1994; Florini 2001; Dodds 2001; Radcliffe 2001; Peterson 1992; Hopkins 1992; Haas 1992b; Haas 1989). They also include small-scale, regional collaborations such as the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) formed by three international NGOs to facilitate transboundary conservation and community development between Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. This recognises that gorilla conservation must take place across gorilla habitat range, rather than being limited by political boundaries and at the same time needs to address both conservation and development needs. The changing ways that we understand environmental issues clearly shape existing networks and create the space for a growing number of connections, disconnections and diverse idea flows locally, regionally and internationally.

To understand network relationships more clearly and identify the different, yet overlapping roles that states and NGOs play in circulating ideas transnationally, we need to think differently about what constitutes a network. A ‘network’ simply means that these individual, or linear, relationships are scaled-up, more diverse and arguably

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⁵ Membership body for UK international development NGOs
more complex. Instead of seeing the state as separate from NGOs, or indeed communities as other distinct entities, we need to see them all as part of one network of multiple, overlapping and intersecting connections and disconnections. Many of the criticisms raised about NGO relationships could easily be used critically to interrogate network connections and disconnections in order to understand the detailed processes which shape the global forms of exclusion exerted by transnational networks. For instance, the NGO-state literature offers significant thinking on the reciprocity of state-NGO relationships and on how states and NGOs strategically use and influence each other. It highlights the blurred-boundaries between government and nongovernment and how this might produce confused lines of accountability. In the context of this thesis, researching NGO-state relationships can explain NGO activities in and relationships with local communities.

2.4 Critiquing NGO relationships

There is a large body of literature that critiques the autonomy and accountability of NGOs and their relationships with states, donors and communities. Investigating these relationships is important because they form lines of accountability between NGOs and the target populations of their interventions, with weak accountability having potentially important negative impacts, particularly on the poor. It can also help to explain how NGO relationships with some actors can have knock-on effects for relationships with other actors, potentially marginalising the latter and preventing them from having a voice. This also has implications for an organisation’s legitimacy. I address this in chapter 8.

2.4.1 NGOs and donors

Understanding the relationship between NGOs and donors is relevant to this thesis as it can explain the role NGO networks play in circulating donor ideas and the potential influence of donors over NGOs. This can impact the accountability of NGOs to local communities and the opportunities (or lack of) that such people have to share their ideas. Ultimately donors can influence wider connections, disconnections, inclusion and exclusion of other actors in the network.
Whilst NGOs have become the favoured vehicle for international donors to channel aid to developing countries, restrictions and measurable poverty targets placed on NGOs by donors have ‘mainstreamed’ them and pushed them away from their ‘radical roots’ which initially set them apart from other development policies (Ebrahim 2003: 193; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 17; Mitlin et al 2007; Banks and Hulme 2012: 14-19) and helped to build their legitimacy in the eyes of their international supporters (see below). In many cases this has pushed NGOs to focus more on Development interventions and projects, often depoliticising poverty solutions and moving away from efforts to empower and tackle the underlying causes of poverty such as social and political exclusion (Banks and Hulme 2012; Bebbington et al 2008). Acceptance of aid and donor conditions can decrease the diversity of NGOs, suppressing individuality and innovation, forcing them to conform to particular conditions and promoting upwards accountability to donor demands (Hulme and Edwards 1997c: 6-8; Mohan 2002).

Upwards accountability to donors is not necessarily a bad thing in itself; indeed it aims to ensure that NGOs are formally answerable and held responsible for their actions, but too much emphasis on meeting donor targets can stifle downwards accountability and result in values being imposed onto project recipients such as local communities. Maintaining a relationship with and being answerable to the poor, whilst at the same time meeting donor demands, can be challenging and being equally accountable to all groups at the same time can be difficult, if not impossible (Edwards and Hulme 1995a: 9-10; also see Hulme and Banks 2012: 16). Such criticisms make it important for this thesis to consider ‘external’ influences which could present barriers to NGOs trying to foster local innovation and idea generation.

This understanding of the impacts of NGO-donor-community relationships has significance for larger, more complex relationships, such as those encapsulated by transnational networks. Transnational networks could compound negative impacts, allowing donors to circulate their demands, or ideas more widely and impact a greater number of people targeted by NGO interventions. For instance, Goldman explores how the World Bank uses its relationships, professional collaborations and networks of carefully chosen ‘experts’ to mainstream its ideas (2005). This shows how a powerful donor carefully targets network members to spread its ideology.
Thus through accountability structures, networks will not only stifle local innovation as they are less answerable to the poor, but at the same time, they will play a role in spreading donor ideas. These issues are likely to become more intense as NGOs grow or where networks of many NGOs and donors exist. By becoming bigger, western NGOs risk becoming more accountable to official aid agencies and less answerable to the poor (Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 17). If donors come together to fund an NGO project or a donor funds a multi-NGO collaborative project, lines of accountability could become confused. We know little about complex accountability structures within transnational networks that link diverse NGOs to each other and to donors; but I propose that criticisms of large NGOs, who operate across many countries can be useful for understanding accountability structures within transnational networks of multiple organisations. It could be that, with more organisations involved, the complexity of accountability links may mask actual (un)accountability. This is important as a network’s legitimacy and influence is heavily informed by its ability to represent the communities it works with and its accountability to the stories it tells ‘from the field’ (see below). It is relevant to this thesis because such confusion makes it difficult to understand the origin of ideas and the specific involvement of different actors in circulating ideas.

2.4.2 NGOs and states

The relationship between NGOs and states and the level of autonomy that each has from the other is also heavily critiqued. These relationships are significant in transnational networks, particularly as the networks at the centre of this analysis are concerned with influencing political behaviour. Here I develop earlier discussions about the dual meaning of civil society as an extension of the state apparatus and as a separate entity used to challenge the state to suggest that the relationship between ‘states’ and ‘NGOs’ is rarely this explicit and typically encapsulates a mixture of the two. This blurs boundaries between actors and makes it difficult to understand the nature of the relationship, or indeed who is influencing whom (Brockington and Igoe 2006: 448). In the context of this thesis, this is important because it means negative impacts can come about as a result of ‘joint’ activities, but it is difficult to apportion responsibility to
either party. It also makes it difficult to identify the origin of ideas and the power
dynamics shaping whose ideas are circulated.

The perception of autonomy from the state is important to an NGO’s legitimacy. NGOs
were initially seen as an alternative to the state, as something new and different from the
state, yet it was soon realised that state-NGO relationships were far more complex, and
boundaries far more blurred than at first it may have appeared (Avant 2004; Hulme and
Edwards 1997c; Bebbington 2004). Whilst Hulme and Edwards question how closely
aligned state and NGO interests are (1997c), they essentially still view NGOs as
separate entities to the state. Using ‘organisation’ as a unit of analysis is problematic as
it assumes strict boundaries can be set between ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ NGOs
(Bebbington 2004: 729), as well as governmental and non-governmental, NGO and
donor. Yet these boundaries are rarely so explicit and in fact many organisations are
transnational and work alongside and in collaboration with states and other actors, as
well as being part of other institutions and social structures (ibid; Wapner 1996: 5-7).
Indeed, whilst recent NGO critiques such as Bank and Hulme’s (2012) paper have
prompted lively debate (see Green 2012) about the generalisability of NGOs, many
critiques such as this still unitise NGOs, states and donors, failing to consider more
closely the more subtle interconnections and blurred boundaries between them.

Following Mbembe (2001), Brockington and Igoe attempt to understand state-NGO
relationships, which they conceptualise as ‘mutually dependent’ (2006). Conservation
organisations and donors offer financial and other much needed resources to
impoverished and aid dependent states, but states “bring sovereignty- the means of
coercion that make it possible to gain advantage in struggles over resources traditionally
the exclusive purview of the state” (ibid, following Mbembe 2001: 78). However,
official dialogue which envelopes these resource negotiations can mask what is really
happening and make it difficult to determine the power balance between the concerned
parties (ibid). When such relationships are unclear, it removes culpability and
accountability (ibid: 448). This is clearly problematic as it allows both sides to spread
the blame if things go wrong (ibid: 449; Haas 1992a: 16). Lack of accountability
potentially increases the likelihood of negative impacts and makes it ever more
important to understand the intricacies of state-NGO relationships and the influence that they have over one another.

My thesis tries to unravel these relationships, influences and accountability structures by exploring relationships on the ground beyond ‘the state’ and ‘the NGO’ to understand how individuals, processes and structures all interact to create this blurring. The literature suggests a couple of ways to investigate these blurred-boundaries. For instance, Bebbington and Kothari suggest that ‘blurred-boundaries’ will become clearer when ‘considered as coherent networks that cut across different organisational forms’ (2006: 853). To date, little attention has been given to the fluidity of movement between NGOs, government ministries and the private sector (Mitlin et al 2007: 1702). This provides a useful methodological suggestion for this thesis to investigate the flows of people between state and non-state organisations. However, I develop this to understand what ideas are accompanied by this movement and use this to further understand the reciprocity of influence between states and NGOs.

To a certain extent, this task has already begun. Igoe and Kelsall (2005a) present a series of in-depth case studies examining these relationships and highlighting the governmental nature of NGOs in various countries (see case studies by Jackson, Temudo and Rawlence). Likewise, Sachedina’s ethnography of a conservation NGO examines how relationships with donors and the state have influenced the NGO’s values, accountability and transparency (2008).

Other research focuses at the network level and shows how states use their relationships with NGOs to push their agendas through NGO networks. For example, Katz examines how the US uses large organisations within global civil society to promote its neoliberal agenda (2006: 335) and Hagel and Peretz show how the Israeli government used transnational ‘non’governmental’ actors to change US policy on Jewish immigration (2005). The reciprocal nature of state-non-state relationships is often overlooked, particularly in transnational contexts (Hagel and Peretz 2005: 468). The policy networks literature shows how central states can ‘steer’ networks to achieve their own goals (Andonova et al 2009: 53; Rhodes 1996: 660-4; Rhodes 2007: 1256). These studies exemplify Gramsci’s vision of civil society as a mechanism used by states to spread their ideas (1971). It is relevant to this thesis because it shows the role that networks
play in circulating the ideas of a few dominant players, but at the same time raises important questions about whose ideas are not included as a result.

All of these cases illustrate the blurred-boundaries between states and NGOs, emphasising how this confuses lines of accountability, especially between NGO and state actors and affected communities, and suggesting how these issues become scaled-up and more confused when multiple states and NGOs interact within networks. They show how states use NGOs and NGO networks to circulate their own ideas. This again emphasises the importance of understanding ‘external’ influences on how NGOs circulate ideas, interact with others and include or exclude particular people and groups. It highlights the need to consider states as part of, rather than separate from, the network.

2.4.3. NGO Legitimacy

I make the argument in later chapters that it is important that NGOs use the ideas and values of local communities to inform decision-making around projects, not just for moral and ethical reasons, but because it is what they say they do and therefore it is what their legitimacy - and often their support from donors and the public - is based on. NGOs often “claim to be the spokespeople of global civil society, acting as much-needed representatives for disenfranchised groups such as the poor, the sick and the oppressed” (Collingwood and Logister 2005: 175). Despite some of the close relationships with states and donors discussed above potentially counteracting it, international NGO legitimacy often stems from claims made by these organisations that they give voice to and empower abused and marginalised groups in society (Collingwood 2006: 448). Here I discuss the literature on legitimacy to understand what this actually means and why it is important.

Much of the development studies literature considers legitimacy in terms of pragmatic or technical terms, suggesting that an organisation’s legitimacy depends on its (upwards and downwards) accountability and relationships with a variety of people and organisations (see above); transparency; performance and effectiveness; and assets such as trust, integrity and reputation (Collingwood and Logister 2005: 184-5; Slim 2002).
Whilst practical considerations can help to improve legitimacy in these contexts to certain audiences, questions remain about who an NGO is accountable to and how accountability should be measured that are not necessarily addressed fully in the development studies literature (Collingwood and Logister 2005: 186). A focus on the technical and procedural aspects of (il)legitimacy is important but it can mask deeper issues relating to questions such as ‘legitimacy to whom?’, ‘for what?’ and ‘how created?’ (Lister 2003: 175; Ossewaarde et al 2008).

The development studies literature also fails to consider the ‘multi-faceted nature’ of legitimacy; the importance of the legitimising environment; and the enhancement of legitimacy using symbols (Lister 2003: 183). Scholars have developed a typology of legitimacy to understand its different forms and its relevance to different stakeholders to try to address some of these gaps (Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Lister 2003; Ossewaarde et al 2008; see also Jepson 2005 for a discussion of how these types of legitimacy relate to environmental NGOs). They propose four key types of legitimacy: regulatory; pragmatic; moral, or normative; and cognitive (see Suchman 1995; Lister 2003).

Regulatory legitimacy relates to conformance with regulatory institutions and laws (Ossewaarde et al 2008: 44; Jepson 2005: 520). Pragmatic legitimacy relates to the self-interests of an organisation’s “most immediate audiences” (Suchman 1995: 578) and can be divided into three, sometimes overlapping, sub categories where support for an organisation is based on its policy’s value to a particular group of constituents (exchange legitimacy); its responsiveness to their wider interests (influence legitimacy); and whether it has certain characteristics that are in line with their values and have ‘their best interests at heart’ (dispositional legitimacy) (Suchman 1995: 578). Table 1 offers more detail and information about their application to development and conservation NGOs.

In contrast, normative, or moral legitimacy relates to whether the organisation is ‘doing the right thing’ (i.e. is it in line with wider societal values?), as opposed to being

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6 Recent developments equate regulative legitimacy with socio-political legitimacy and combine normative and cognitive legitimacy to create cultural legitimacy (following Archibald 2004).
directly in line with constituent interests (Suchman 1995: 579). Much of the literature proceeding Suchman’s study (and indeed Suchman’s later work) refers to moral legitimacy as normative legitimacy. Deephouse and Suchman suggest there is sometimes confusion between the normative legitimacy as described here (based on normative culture) and ‘normative isomorphism’, which explores conformance or congruence with the values and ethics of a particular professional body (2008: 53). They propose this should be a separate form of legitimacy, termed professional legitimacy.

Lister provides examples (Table 1) of how normative legitimacy might be relevant in the context of this thesis (2003). For instance, an NGO might achieve legitimacy to a range of stakeholders in its bid to reduce poverty and inequality; this could be in terms of poverty reduction outcomes; the way the organisation works to reduce poverty; or whether the organisation is essentially the right organisation to be reducing poverty. In the context of environmental NGOs, Jepson suggests that legitimating assets in relation to normative legitimacy include autonomy from the state, working for the benefit of, for example, species, the environment, or disadvantaged people; working for the social good and not profit (following Edwards 2004); and being located within, for example, the environmental movement- “a sector that society has come to see as important and worthy” (following Suchman 1995) (2005: 519). As I discuss above, many of these are characteristics that initially set NGOs apart from other actors and hailed them the best vehicles for delivering poverty reduction and better governance and are arguably the grounds upon which NGOs have built their legitimacy and international support. Yet in reality the closeness of relationships between NGOs, states and donors brings the assertions underlying this legitimacy into question.

Finally, cognitive legitimacy can relate to either the ‘affirmative backing’ or ‘mere acceptance’ of an organisation as ‘necessary’ or based on some ‘taken-for-granted’ values (Suchman 1995: 582-3). This legitimacy is based on ‘taken-for-grantedness’ where organisations “render disorder” manageable, but also change it into a set of “intersubjective givens”, i.e. it becomes common sense that the organisation should exist and be carrying out its work in a particular way. This ‘submerges the possibility of dissent’ and makes the alternatives unthinkable (Suchman 1995: 582-3).
Table 1: NGO legitimacy by type and audience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Regulatory</th>
<th>Pragmatic</th>
<th>Normative</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donor organisations – Bi/multilateral donor (DFID/EU)</td>
<td>Financial accountability</td>
<td>Service-delivery</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Operates within current development paradigm – partnership etc. South is good Culture of development Development Club. Uses right language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate governance</td>
<td>Links with Southern</td>
<td>Efficient organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charity status</td>
<td>organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private supporters &amp; wider public(via media)</td>
<td>Financial accountability</td>
<td>Opportunity for giving (with whatever motivation)</td>
<td>Helping the Poor Justice. Fighting poverty Ideological aspects (religious/Left)</td>
<td>Aid is good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charity status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of advocacy e.g. World Bank, WTO</td>
<td>Appropriate governance</td>
<td>Approval of NGOs leads to own (stakeholder) legitimacy</td>
<td>Likely to be conflictual relationship so little normative congruence/legitimacy</td>
<td>Representative Professionally skilled Uses right language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(legally constituted organisation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNGOs (partners)</td>
<td>Financial accountability</td>
<td>Funding Contacts Support</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Respectful relationship Consultative Equality Local experience ‘Empowering’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Registered in country</td>
<td>Training Technically skilled</td>
<td>Ideology Political view of development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern governments</td>
<td>Registered in country</td>
<td>Service delivery Funding</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Contextually appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training Technically skilled</td>
<td>Ideology Resource-bringing Non-threatening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Financial probity</td>
<td>Technically skilled Efficient service-deliverers Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Free from unwelcome political/religious overtones</td>
<td>‘Culturally appropriate’ assistance. ‘Empowering’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Financial accountability</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Ideology Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Language and practice common within development NGO circles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conformity to employment laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Lister (2003: 80-1)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cognitive legitimacy is highly relevant to this thesis and links closely with the literature on hegemonic power, discussed later in this chapter. In chapter 8 I consider how organisations and state actors are able to spread the hegemonic idea that they are best placed to be ‘doing conservation’. This means that it becomes common sense, not just to local community actors, but to a diverse range of donors, public supporters and other
state and non-state actors that outside intervention is necessary. I show how other factors, such as perceived expertise and relationships, feed into this process to build the legitimacy of the organisation to be the only obvious organisation to be carrying out conservation projects.

Different forms of legitimacy interconnect and overlap each other. Table 1 helps to explain how something like a conservation or development NGO might have different legitimacy demands from different audiences. For instance, the legitimacy demands of donors may be in conflict with the legitimacy demands of southern partners. Sometimes as a result of money and resources, organisations may end up working to achieve greater legitimacy in the eyes of Northern interests and values, at the expense of others. These stakeholders may have greater power to influence NGO agendas (Collingwood 2006: 449).

Conflicts can arise between normative and cognitive elements that produce legitimacy for one set of stakeholders but not another (Lister 2003: 185-7). Whilst Lister argues that the institutional theory literature can fill some of the gaps in our understanding of legitimacy left by the development studies literature, she suggests that even this literature fails to consider how power dynamics play out in the context of legitimacy (2003: 183). She draws on studies of ‘dominant discourses’ in anthropology to address this, where ‘discourse’ can equate to ‘taken-for-granted scripts, rules and classifications, as well as cognitive constructs and rational myths’ (Lister 2003: 188). These put “pressure on organizations from their environments and determine their legitimacy” (Lister 2003: 188). Organisational legitimacy thus depends on conformance with dominant discourses and those organisations that do not conform to this discourse will be viewed as illegitimate (ibid). Symbols used by organisations such as ‘The South’ or ‘local communities’ will be defined by dominant discourses, creating and perpetuating ‘rational myths’; the ceremonial activity that arises from discourses that set “the parameters within which activity with ritual significance is considered validating” and legitimacy is thus the mechanism through which discourses shape organisational practices (ibid).
In the context of this thesis, I use Suchman’s definition of legitimacy as it is informed by rigorous synthesis of the diverse legitimacy literature. Thus legitimacy refers to “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574). However, understanding the different forms of legitimacy and how they can overlap and undermine each other is important as it can help to explain the similarities and differences between what NGOs say they do and what they actually do in terms of their mechanisms for circulating and using ideas from local populations to inform their decision-making.

2.4.4. A question of scale?

The majority of criticisms about NGOs focus on large organisations (Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Bebbington and Riddell 1997; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b). This thesis investigates networks of diverse actors and it is important not to overlook the role that smaller organisations play in circulating ideas. The role of small NGOs is often romanticised. They are seen as more downwardly accountable, transparent and autonomous. Seen as less of a threat to the state, they may be left alone by it, unlike larger organisations (Anagwe 1995). Hulme and Edwards (1997c: 6-8) argue that smaller NGOs are not tied by aid agency conditions and so will therefore have less upwards accountability. The critical literature is largely silent on the role of small NGOs. Yet their autonomy may give them freedom to practise potentially harmful activities which go unnoticed, or their small size may give them less of a voice to challenge donors and the state. Understanding the role of small organisations within a network is therefore equally as important as understanding the role of larger organisations. Smaller organisations may be less accountable and their disconnections from the wider network may prevent them from circulating their ideas more widely; but at the same time this may give them space to act more independently, which could result in both negative and positive impacts. My thesis will develop this, by investigating how smaller, often national and local NGOs (i.e. those less likely to be supported by international donors) relate, or do not relate, to the rest of network of state-NGO-donor-community relationships. It will investigate who they are able to influence with their ideas and how they are influenced by others. Smaller organisations typically
constitute local staff with different qualifications, experiences and ideas and thus it is important to understand their involvement in circulating ideas.

2.5. Using ideas to research transnational (dis)connections

I look at how ideas circulate to understand the forces that shape network relationships and the role they play in including and excluding particular people. Ideas and the way they move is arguably a better indication of inclusion than practical involvement. Local involvement in projects could be ‘tokenistic’ to meet donor or organisational demands and says little about whether and how ‘participants’ have informed the project itself. Likewise, exploring the movement of people and resources through a network may indicate ‘involvement’, but it does not explain the depth of this involvement. I investigate how ideas circulate to understand which actors have a voice and how they influence the voices of others. For the purposes of this thesis, I use the term ‘ideas’ as defined in the introductory chapter to this thesis (page 13).

Previously, scholars have argued that little attention has been afforded to ideational power, or rather the influence of ideas on political behaviour (Hay 2002: 194-215). Influence has typically been given to material factors and a gap exists in our understanding of how ideas and the power over how they are channelled can influence political behaviour (Hay 2002). However, this is beginning to change and a rich literature is developing on the role of ideas in politics (Béland 2010; Béland and Cox 2011).

To understand how ideas influence political behaviour, we must identify how ideas influence policy, problem construction and wider political philosophy (Lukes 1975, 2005; Kingdon 1984; Mehta 2011). Considering how ideas circulate to influence political behaviour provides a good indication of successful inclusion. It goes beyond a subjective analysis of whether a person has the opportunity to circulate their idea to suggest a concrete, observable change as a result of including that person’s idea. There are clear caveats to this understanding, not least that the complex nature of relationships makes it difficult to ascertain the origin of an idea. However, I feel that it presents the best indication of inclusion available in this context.
A popular starting point for reading the ideational literature is Steven Lukes’ *Power: A Radical View* (1975; 2005). It provides a useful lens for interpreting the literature on transnational NGO networks and their attempts to influence political behaviour. Lukes develops the theories of several academics to propose three dimensions of power, relevant to understanding the role of ideas in politics. First, he draws on Robert Dahl’s work, which proposed that power could be understood through studying observed conflicts between different groups over political issues (1958). This constitutes the first ‘dimension of power’.

The second dimension of power is based on work by Bachrach and Baratz who propose ‘two faces of power’: the power to participate in the policymaking process and the power to affect decisions that will impact others (1962). They suggest that some potentially contested ideas may not necessarily generate observable conflicts and some issues are linked to ‘nondecision-making’ (*ibid*). Nondecision-making power refers to the power to influence community values and political procedures and norms so that observable conflicts about policy ideas are unimportant, or ‘indifferent’. The ‘winning’ party does not exert true ideational power as the issue was of little importance in the first instance and already pre-determined by the wider political structures within which the debate takes place. Thus, the second face of power constitutes the power to create or reinforce values which ‘limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous’ to the actors holding such power, whilst at the same time, preventing other actors from putting forward any issues that might challenge or be detrimental to such a person, or group’s preferences (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 948). In particular this dimension of power influences how political problems and solutions are constructed (Mehta 2011).

Nondecision-making power constrains people and their ideas from the decision-making process (Lukes 2005). It can be spread between multiple people, but what unites them is their ability to prevent certain sections of society from contributing. This is relevant to this thesis as it suggests that people act in a way that excludes others and their ideas from the policymaking process by affecting wider political structures, or agendas within which policy decisions are made. I return to this point later in the chapter.
Lukes critiques both dimensions and proposes a third, all-encompassing, dimension of power (2005). This relates to the power to secure compliance to domination and to prevent conflicts. It allows the dominated to be misled and to think they are acting in their own interests (Lukes 2005: 27). Power is based on a person or a group’s ability to change norms and beliefs, rather than an ability to change their actions through direct domination. Ideas can be used to ‘convince’ others of the need for reform (Béland 2010: 148) by redefining their interests and views. Power not only results through dominance, but through passive assent where people ‘believe the values which oppress them’ or where people ‘are merely resigned to them’ (Dowding 2006: 137, following Scott 1990). By establishing ‘false beliefs’, people take actions that they think are in their interests, but in reality are not; or else they act with the knowledge that it is not in their best interests, but do so all the same to ‘make the best of a bad job’ (ibid: 138; Dowding 1991: 30-46). This dimension is relevant to this thesis as it ultimately influences the way that ideas originate, affecting people’s thought-processes and the way they generate and articulate their ideas.

This third dimension of power reflects well Gramsci’s theory of hegemonic power. Gramsci explained how powerful states spread ideas, not just through rule or dominance, but also through filtering them through society into a place where they become the norm, or common sense (Morton 2010: 86-7, following Gramsci 1995: 360; Morton 2010: 113; Gill and Law 1989: 476; Cox 1994: 366; Burawoy 2003: 206; Agnew 2003: 136). It ‘filters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology’ (Morton 2010: 114) to achieve consent. This understanding of the ‘hidden’ circulation of ideas is equally as important for understanding how ideas circulate as investigating how ideas directly impact policy and problem construction through more obvious and open interactions between people and groups. It suggests that regardless of what ideas circulate on the ground, or between people in an obvious fashion due to explicit connections; these will undoubtedly be informed by a wider political philosophy. That is, people will make decisions and circulate ideas based on what they perceive as common sense. If powerful actors such as states are able to subtly influence this ‘common sense’, they will essentially influence the circulation of all other ideas. This prompts further investigation of the role of actors
who seemingly have little interaction on the ground, but nevertheless appear to influence how ideas circulate at this level.

Perhaps the greatest relevance of Gramsci’s writing becomes clearer in relation to his work on transnational hegemony, Americanism and Fordism. Gramsci explores how American economic policy about labour and mass production infiltrated other governments’ policies, illustrating that hegemony can filtrate across national boundaries and manifest itself internationally (Morton 2010: 98, following Gramsci 1995: 156-7; 1992: 259-65; 1996: 11-13; Bieler and Morton 2006: 16, following Cox, 1983: 171, 1987: 149-50). States are able to exert their hegemonic power through translating their own interests and way of doing things into policies that will be more readily accepted by other states, but in doing so are able to further their own interests (Morton 2010: 123, following Van der Pijl 1989: 12; 1996: 307).

This helps to explain how ideas move transnationally across borders and become applicable and accepted across a diverse range of contexts. It also shows how a particular state can influence the policies and politics of another. Civil society can also play an important role as the mechanism used by states for channelling hegemony across national boundaries. This is relevant to this thesis as it shows how powerful entities such as states can potentially use NGO networks, seemingly separate from the state, to circulate their ideas about how things should be done beyond their own national boundaries. It stresses the need to understand the different actors, connections and processes involved in circulating state ideas.

This theorisation is applicable beyond the state to other powerful actors such as large donors and NGOs; governing elites around the world can create hegemony (Morton 2010: 141-3; Agnew 2003: 10). Sklair’s work on the transnational capitalist class (1997), and Holmes’ work on the transnational conservation class (2009; 2010) both illustrate the relevance of hegemonic power beyond a single government, demonstrating the ability of transnational (non-governmental) elites to establish and channel hegemony. This expanded conceptualisation of international hegemony emphasises the need to investigate the role of northern NGOs and donors in influencing how ideas circulate on the ground in countries other than their own. It highlights a need to research the role played by international donors, headquarters of international NGOs and
northern states in influencing wider discourse and political and economic norms within which ideas in developing countries circulate. I explore this in chapters 7 and 8.

The ideational literature provides a useful starting point for reviewing the literature on transnational NGO networks, little of which attempts to understand how ideas circulate. It suggests the importance of exploring how ideas influence policy directly and indirectly by affecting problem construction and wider political procedures, philosophies and assumptions to set the political agenda within which people make decisions and other ideas circulate.

The literature on dominant narratives and received wisdom provides another useful lens for looking at how certain ideas come to dominate our thinking and inform the discursive environment within which problems and solutions are debated and defined. Specifically, an edited collection of cases studies (Fairhead and Leach 1996) offers useful insights into how dominant views about African peoples’ relationships with their environment have come about; how these inform conservation and development interventions; and why they are problematic and in many cases incorrect. This work reflects similar arguments made in the literature on hegemonic and ideational power. Its focus on local communities in Africa, the way they have been blamed for causing environmental degradation and the way their ideas are excluded from decision-making about interventions to address this degradation make this work particularly relevant for this thesis and some of the arguments that I make in chapter 8.

In its broadest sense received wisdom is “an idea or set of ideas held to be ‘correct’ by social consensus, or ‘the establishment’” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 6). Received wisdoms originate for a number of reasons including the scientific, and in some cases social science, methods used to collect the data that inform them. Data may have been collected at a single point in time, on a small-scale, and may be incorrectly extrapolated to represent trends or enduring states (Leach and Mearns 1996: 14-15). For instance, Brockington and Homewood challenge the dominant narrative that East Africa’s natural state is an unpopulated wilderness (1996). They show that when colonists arrived at the turn of the century, disease, conflict and slave trade meant that the population had been greatly reduced, giving a misleading impression of wilderness (1996: 92-3). Policies were then designed based on these misunderstandings (ibid: 93-4). Despite new
ecological studies challenging views about the lack of resilience of savanna ecosystems, received wisdom about African wilderness persists. Likewise, Fairhead and Leach show how historical data which use agro-ecological knowledge of local inhabitants challenge the received wisdom that Guinean forests were once more dense and have been destroyed by farmers; they offer a more plausible explanation of why forest savanna mosaics exist (1996).

Received wisdom about African environmental degradation persists as it is tied to the political and economic interests and values of powerful groups such as aid agencies, governments and scientists (Leach and Mearns 1996: 16; Leach and Mearns 1996: 28; Swift 1996). For example, in Nigeria, outsider/expatriate forestry methods for administration and management have been imposed on indigenous/insider/local structures (Cline-Cole 1996: 122). Despite a lack of evidence, outsiders accuse local agriculture and forestry activities of causing deforestation and environmental degradation (ibid: 125). This serves political and economic interests; forest administrators struggle to maintain authority and influence in an underfunded sector needing donor aid (ibid: 138). Another explanation for the persistence of received wisdom suggests that ideas and social commitments of different actors, including local people, converge at particular historical moments (Fairhead and Leach 1996).

The ten case studies try to unravel the dominant narrative that local people are the agents as well as the victims of environmental change (Leach and Mearns 1996: 2). Framing the problem this way suggests a particular set of solutions and interventions, often overlooking alternatives, particularly those that local communities and indigenous peoples might have (ibid: 3). This is problematic as dominant narratives then simplify complexities and assumptions underlying poverty to offer straightforward, universally acceptable solutions for policymakers (Roe 1991; Leach and Mearns 1996: 6-8; see discussion on Murray Li’s work below). The symbols, labels and images used by policy advisors adds ‘universal legitimacy’ to particular narratives, pushing policymakers to act in a certain way (Leach and Mearns 1996: 7, following Wood 1985; Hoben 1996). Such narratives and the way they are presented to policymakers embodies power relations in terms of more subtle, taken for granted forms (Leach and Mearns 1996: 8, following Milton 1993) allowing dominant ideas to be spread.
At the same time, local African innovations and ideas may be ignored. Local African inhabitants may participate in producing dominant narrative ideas, but they have less power to define the terms of the debate and there is little opportunity to express alternatives; and in some cases power relations may be such that they will just agree (Leach and Mearns 1996: 27). For example, despite empirical challenges to dominant ideas about rangeland management in Zimbabwe, these dominant ideas have persisted (Scoones 1996). Reducing complex problems down to straightforward technical solutions in this context is far more appealing to policymakers and herders’ innovative, adaptive behaviour and indigenous knowledge is ignored (Scoones 1996: 50).

The literature on dominant narratives provides another lens for understanding how ideas, particularly those about local peoples’ relationship to the environment and environmental change, come about and persist. It is relevant to this thesis as it shows how certain studies carried out in certain ways have simplified and misrepresented complex issues, which have in turn (mis)informed policymakers about the best solutions; often at the expense of local knowledge and ideas. Despite empirical challenges to these ideas, they have persisted as in many cases they are tied up with powerful donor, scientist and government interests. These dominant narratives inform the wider discursive environment today, influencing the terms of the debate; or rather which ideas about policy and projects will circulate in the first instance. If the dominant narrative suggests that local people are responsible for destroying their environment; NGOs, donors, scientists and policymakers will focus their attention on constructing policy and project solutions that address this ‘problem’. Any resistance from local populations will be seen as either poor implementation or that more work is needed to help local people understand how good the intervention is for them; it is less likely that resistance will be seen as weaknesses in the underlying assumptions about the nature of the problem.

2.6. Transnational networks and idea circulation: influencing policy and problem construction

As this thesis focuses on how transnational networks operate to circulate ideas and influence political behaviour, I am less concerned here about external material factors,
such as existing legal frameworks and policies, and how they influence the acceptance of particular ideas into policy. However, such factors are important for understanding some of the opportunities and barriers to networks circulating ideas. In chapters 5 and 6, I consider how various government policies and political structures determine, encourage and limit the circulation of particular people and ideas from the policymaking process.

2.6.1. The public portrayal of an idea

It is perhaps at their ‘narrowest conceptualisation’ that ideas directly inform policy solutions, but it is important to understand why ‘some ideas become policy and others do not’ (Mehta 2011: 28). Hall suggests that the intrinsic value of an idea for solving a problem is insufficient for its success (or acceptance into policy); an idea must also be administratively and politically feasible and have public or widespread backing (1989 cited by Mehta 2011: 28-9).

Whilst the intrinsic value of an idea may not be the only factor determining its acceptance as policy, the ability to portray this value often constitutes a strong element in TAN campaigns. The way that a network portrays this intrinsic value is equally as important. Many ‘advocacy’ networks form around shared principled ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 30), which ‘provide criteria to distinguish right from wrong’ (Henry et al 2004:12-13, following Stone 2002). They employ a range of strategies to influence political behaviour, including the use of dramatic information, pictures and stories; and they make moral arguments and hold powerful actors publicly accountable for their actions (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16-23). These tactics play on the emotive side of a campaign to interpret information in such a way as to gain support from the public and policymakers. This is relevant to this thesis as it shows that some types of idea, related to particular issues, may be more likely to be circulated than others. In particular, ideas concerning international development, human rights and environmental conservation lend themselves well to this and are more likely to be circulated and to achieve support from policymakers and the international community.

7 See Yee 1996 for a discussion on institutional factors
2.6.2. Perceived legitimacy and expertise

The perception of expertise is also important in a network’s ability to influence political behaviour. It helps groups develop legitimacy as ‘experts’ to explain problems and suggest solutions to policymakers. In some respects, this ‘expertise’ may mean particular organisations or networks are best placed to advise policymakers in such matters. However, this can be problematic. Perceived expertise is often based on scientific qualifications and means that certain issues are represented in western eyes. Thus, western solutions and ideas are more likely to be circulated. Equally, those without such perceived expertise are likely to be excluded from the policymaking process. Thus the perception of expertise is a key factor in determining whose ideas are considered and whose ideas are not.

The literature on epistemic communities explains how networks use their expert status to influence both policy and problem construction. Epistemic communities seek legitimacy and access to decision-making on the basis of their expertise (Henry et al 2004: 12) and their respect and influence, beyond their own discipline (Adler and Haas 1992: 380). Perceived expertise allows epistemic communities to interpret scientific and technical evidence; articulate it in the form of policy solutions; and in doing so build their legitimacy as experts in the eyes of policymakers (see Adler 1992; Haas 1992b; Clark 1994). This is relevant to this thesis, as it allows groups to influence policy and the construction of issues, even in subjects that they are not necessarily experts in. I explore this further in chapter 7 (page 215). At the same time it also prevents those without this perceived expertise from participating.

Epistemic communities are important in the face of uncertainty, often caused by a shock or crisis, where policymakers will increasingly look to ‘experts’ for advice (Haas 1992a: 14; Adler and Haas 1992: 381; Henry et al 2004: 12; Stone 2002: 4-5; Litfin 1994; Duffy 2006). Epistemic communities can generate ‘shocks’ by presenting data and framing a problem in such a way that it creates uncertainty and forces policymakers to look to experts for advice (Haas 1992a: 14). By ‘defining the state’s interests’ (following Haas 1992a), epistemic communities essentially create a space for themselves to work in. They reinforce their authority as ‘experts’ and perpetuate this seemingly self-legitimating process.
Tania Murray Li describes this process well, arguing that problem identification and solution availability are ‘intimately linked’ (2007: 7). She claims that “they co-emerge within a governmental assemblage in which certain sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions and techniques are available to the expert who is properly trained” (ibid). Following Ferguson’s (1990) work on planned development intervention in Lesotho, she argues that by ‘rendering’ an issue as ‘technical’, the need for expertise is confirmed and ‘boundaries’ are drawn between those that are able to define and solve a problem and those that are not and thus the issue becomes depoliticised (ibid).

In some cases, the ‘best’ interpretation of a problem and the ‘best’ solution may be found within the knowledge and ideas of such ‘experts’. However, respect for such people and their ideas risks favouring western and outside ideas and marginalising the ideas of ‘non-experts’, or national and local ideas (Radcliffe 2001: 26; Verkoren 2006: 53, following Stone 2005: 99). This means that “those who have the capacity, means, experience and legitimacy to impose their preferred solutions upon others determine to a large extent what happens in a network” (Verkoren 2006: 44). This raises concerns about whose values are represented and whose are not (for example, see Duffy 2008: 340, following Keller 2009; Ottaway 2001: 16).

Perceived expertise is therefore an important factor in shaping the way that ideas do or do not circulate and influence policy, the political agenda and ultimately what interventions take place on the ground. It allows transnational networks, or NGOs to become ‘policy entrepreneurs’, using their perceived expertise to create the space to use their ideas to make a policy and construct the problem to fit it (following Kingdon 1984: 29). This is clearly problematic; it is a self-legitimating process that compounds the groups’ status as experts. At the same time, other ‘non-experts’ will be disconnected, or excluded from the network and will increasingly be denied the opportunity to circulate their ideas. In some cases these ‘non-experts’ may be more suitable problem and solution constructors as they are often the ones on the ground experiencing the issue under discussion. In this thesis I aim to understand how these arguably ‘hidden’ exclusions arise and what they mean in terms of equality of voice within the network. I explore this further in chapter 7.
2.6.3. Representation: a different kind of perceived expertise?

The perceived legitimacy of the network to represent, or be seen to be working in the best interests of, the wider community - be that society generally, or a local village community – also influences the ideational power of a network. The success of a transnational campaign or policy intervention relates as much to a network’s ability to bring local needs into international decision-making, and link the local to the global; as it does to its ability to translate biophysical realities into political actions and link the technical with the political (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5). This ability to link the local with the global and provide a mechanism to circulate ideas and values of local communities begins to reflect Gramsci’s other understanding of civil society: as a platform for uniting disparate, subordinate groups and giving them the capacity and tools to challenge existing hegemonic powers such as their own government or international institutions (1971). The literature illustrates this through various case studies that explore how NGO networks link with local communities to lobby international, national and donor policies (see Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001).

These cases illustrate how transnational networks can circulate ideas from the local level up to the international level. However, they fail to interrogate critically the processes that facilitate this circulation. Transnational NGOs use local information to support their campaigns, but in doing so they interpret and narrate this information in particular ways in the international arena. This process is rarely questioned. Understanding the mechanisms that promote local communities to share their stories and ideas with NGOs could help reveal the extent to which proper inclusion takes place and whether or not NGOs influence how these ideas are circulated and used. I explore this in chapter 8 (see page 266-9).

To an extent, Keck and Sikkink have begun to address this by investigating the complex and multi-directional flow of information between local communities and international NGOs, which both ultimately aim to influence state behaviour (1998). They suggest that TANs challenge states through domestic organisations, which seek outsiders to help put pressure on their states; and through producing information that contradicts the state’s information (ibid: 36). Keck and Sikkink call this the ‘boomerang pattern’ as it refers to
the way that domestic actors, when blocked from accessing the state directly, will seek outside international allies to aid their cause; whilst at the same time international NGOs will bypass the state to work with domestic actors to bring about change where states are not listening (ibid: 12-13).

Keck and Sikkink illustrate this boomerang pattern through a series of case studies in ‘Activists Beyond Borders’ (1998). The studies allow for a better understanding of multidirectional information exchange and influence within transnational networks between the local and the international. They highlight a scenario where domestic organisations and international organisations alike may bypass the state to push their ideas at the local or international level. In some ways they use other actors within ‘the network’ to pursue their own agendas. Arguably, Keck and Sikkink’s work reaches a better understanding of the complexities involved in circulating ideas transnationally than many other studies as it begins to describe the multi-layered relationships that form a network, rather than focusing on the actions of NGOs lobbying states directly. However, whilst this conceptualisation does usefully highlight the complexity of actors involved in influencing and being influenced better than other studies, it still fails to capture the full detail of processes on the ground. It does not consider personal relationships, focusing instead at the organisational level, and typically at the international organisational level. It explores how communities connect to the international level, but it stays largely silent on the actors, disconnections and processes in between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’. My thesis addresses this gap through its ‘on-the-ground’ case study of a transnational network.

Despite hinting at how transnational networks operate to support the development of a counter hegemonic force (i.e. through uniting disparate, subordinate groups and bringing their voices to the international platform); the literature still focuses on policy change and is largely silent on the role of transnational networks in developing a force which will influence wider political philosophy and discourse. This is very relevant in terms of idea circulation as it suggests that whilst transnational networks might play an important role in circulating the ideas of certain people to influence the actions of policymakers, these will all take place within the existing hegemony and do not challenge it. I address this later in the chapter.
2.6.4. Consensus, conflicts and tensions

Consensual knowledge can be important in the influential abilities of transnational networks (Adler and Haas 1992: 384; Haas 1989: 398). However, less is written about what happens when consensus is not reached. The literature typically focuses on transnational networks whose members share values and ideas about how things should be done and work together to achieve this. Disconnections and conflicts could play a major role in preventing the circulation of ideas and I see this as an important gap in the literature, limiting our understanding of how transnational networks operate.

Keck and Sikkink argue that, unlike human rights organisations, environmental organisations are less likely to have a set of agreed principles and transnational environmental networks tend to be a site for negotiation around values and goals (1998: 121). The best way to address environmental issues is heavily debated and networks revolving around these issues are perhaps more likely than others to constitute conflicts. This is compounded as environmental destruction worsens and environmental issues are increasingly recognised as being of global concern, attracting diverse interests from diverse backgrounds.

Only a handful of examples highlight conflicts and tensions within transnational networks (for instance see Florini 2001: 31, 34-35; Collins et al 2001: 141-143; Duffy 2006: 743; Jordan and Tuijl 2000). A few examples explore the outcomes of conflicts. For example, tensions within the epistemic community of ceteologists meant they could no longer be seen to offer ‘consensus expert advice’ and other groups outweighed their influence (Peterson 1992). Other studies show how conflicts between organisations have led to project failure (Lewis et al 2003: 543), or prevented participation of particular people (Anand 2006). As these limited examples illustrate, the literature is largely silent on conflicts or ‘disconnections’ within transnational networks. Lacking more are the cases that identify the outcomes of these disconnections. But it is likely that they are important. In the cases described, disconnections have led to particular policies not being implemented, or project failure, suggesting that disconnections do play a role in the circulation, or lack of circulation, of ideas. Indeed, they represent another important force in determining the ability of a transnational network to influence policy.
Importantly, disconnections can mean the exclusion of certain people and their ideas. Available examples provide little detail about the particular people or organisations on the ground who may be marginalised or negatively impacted as a result of higher level connections and disconnections. If (dis)connections allow certain actors and not others to have their ideas circulated and diffused into policy, or to have their voices heard or not heard; it raises important questions about issues of exclusion. I consider these types of disconnection as ‘obvious’ disconnection. They differ from the ‘hidden’ disconnections described above, which result ‘accidentally’ due to the parameters (such as perceived expertise or personal connections—see below) that specify who is included in the network and whose ideas will be respected and circulated.

2.6.5. Personal relationships

The literature focuses on organisational politics and says little about personal relationships, yet it is likely that these can explain (dis)connections within transnational networks. Personal relationships and conflicts may add a further dimension to understanding how ideas circulate by explaining who is included and who is not included in particular discussions and who is more likely to have access to dominant players (such as policymakers) within the network.

Just two examples highlight the importance of such relationships. One focuses on how personal relationships helped secure donor funding (Bebbington and Kothari 2006) and the other shows how personal relationships helped strengthen advocacy efforts (Manno 1994: 109). Beyond these examples, we know little about the role of personal relationships and their impact on idea circulation. Yet it is likely that personal relationships could cause both hidden and observable disconnections or exclusions. For instance, personality clashes can mean that people are openly excluded from sharing their ideas in particular arenas. My data and own experience indicate that these are a regular occurrence in the world of NGOs, yet seemingly few studies attempt to understand what role they play. Equally, the social circles that people move in could ‘accidentally’ exclude people who do not move in such circles, perhaps for cultural or economic reasons, from sharing their ideas. Again, few studies try to understand these processes. Indeed, we are fairly ignorant about the types of arena that ideas are shared in. I address these issues in chapters 6 and 7.
2.7. Influencing political behaviour beyond policy

Much of the transnational networks and ideational power literature focuses on the nation state as the location of governance and the influence of actors in informing policy (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004: 475; Mehta 2011, Béland 2011). However, transnational networks also operate to influence wider political behaviour, norms and discourse, beyond state policy. For instance, international NGOs arguably dominate development discourse and natural resource governance (Mitlin et al 2007: 1703).

This is relevant to this thesis as it informs the wider environment within which policymakers make decisions, networks operate and all ideas circulate. This relates back to discussions in the ideational literature suggesting that observable conflicts illustrate nondecision-making power, or rather the power to influence which ideas will be discussed in the first instance. It also relates well to the ideational literature concerning the third dimension of power, as well as to Gramsci’s theorisation of hegemonic power. Both of these literatures show how powerful actors can influence wider political philosophy and ultimately filter their ideas into the common sense norms of everyday life upon which peoples’ decisions are based. In particular, Wapner (1996) investigates the actions that transnational networks take to do this, exploring how networks operate to influence interconnections and interdependencies between actors and therefore influence political behaviour beyond the realm of the state.

Wapner argues that when directly targeting governments to influence their behaviour does not work (environmental) activists practice ‘world civic politics’ (1996). They ‘identify’ and ‘manipulate’ ‘non-state levers of power’, working through social, economic and cultural networks outside the realm of the state to influence indirectly political behaviour. This work sheds light on how interconnections (between the local and the global level) can be targeted by myriad actors to bring about different forms of political change. This is relevant to understanding how ideas circulate as it shows how transnational networks influence the wider context in which policy decisions are made. This begins to explain how transnational networks work through various avenues to filter their ideas into society directly, bypassing the state to influence wider behaviour.
Wapner suggests three ways that transnational environmental activist organisations influence political behaviour beyond the realm of the state. The first method is to disseminate ‘environmental sensibilities’, sharing information about environmental injustices to change people’s understanding of the world and convince them to care about the environment. This process makes certain activities socially unacceptable, or morally wrong, ultimately influencing society, as well as policymakers by influencing constituents who then put pressure on their government to change policies (Wapner 1996: 57).

The second method is articulated through activism for environmental protection among the world’s poor. Conservation-development interventions aim to empower communities to engage with economic, social and state structures and ‘effectively shape widespread practices’ (Wapner 1996: 72-3). Perhaps a more critical analysis would question the organisation’s motive. As well as ‘empowering’ communities to resist the state, NGOs can also use this method to push their values, as well as other state and donor values. This relates back to discussions about the strategic use of NGO networks. The third method involves targeting strands of interdependencies, such as flows of money, information and people, as well as the multiple structures within which states are embedded and using this as ‘levers of power’ to influence state behaviour. For example, NGOs lobby the World Bank to change lending conditions and effectively influence borrowing state behaviour (ibid: 138; Keck and Sikkink 1998: 134-7).

Wapner conceptualises a ‘network’ with a wider range of people, organisations, structures and processes involved in the circulation of ideas that can influence and be influenced. This ‘network’ moves beyond the ‘local versus the global’ to explore the interconnections between, viewing actors outside the state as ‘political’. Additionally, it moves beyond viewing the network as a group of NGOs working to influence policy to theorise an all-encompassing network. Unlike previous studies, this work also relates more closely to Lukes’ third dimension of power and Gramsci’s work on hegemonic power; it reaches a clearer understanding of how transnational organisations influence the wider environment in which ideas circulate. It highlights the importance for this thesis to explore these wider connections and structures.
2.8. Conclusion

Transnational networks disseminate inequality through strategically including and excluding particular people and places. Yet we know little about the processes and interactions which take place on the ground to understand how this wider exclusion arises. This chapter reviewed the literature on transnational networks and NGOs to provide a framework for this thesis as a whole and raise the questions needed to understand how this inequality might come about.

This chapter claimed that the movement of ideas and ideational power can provide useful indicators for understanding inclusion and exclusion at the local and national level. Researching local involvement in a project could potentially be tokenistic and says little about whether and how participants inform projects. Researching movement of resources and people does not tell us anything about the depth of inclusion. Following discussions on ideational power (Lukes 1975, 2005; Kingdon 1984; Mehta 2011), I argued that researching how ideas move and influence political behaviour is the best indicator of the inclusion or exclusion of particular people and their ideas within a network. This research aims to understand how ideas circulate within a network and what this means in terms of inclusion and exclusion? This question can be broken down into several parts.

First, I argued that the transnational networks literature typically focuses on the role of transnational networks in linking local communities to international NGOs and international policy arenas (for instance see Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994). However, much of this literature is largely silent on the other players in between, such as different Ministries, regional government offices, local government offices, country and field offices of international NGOs and national and local NGOs and the role that they play in connections, disconnections and idea circulation. Likewise, the literature typically unitises these actors, often brushing over the likely interconnections and blurred boundaries between them. To an extent, Wapner begins to draw this detail out (1996), emphasising that these interconnections do exist and do influence the ideational power of organisations, but his study is an exception. Equally, whilst the NGO literature affords ample attention to critiquing the blurred boundaries between
NGOs, states and donors (Avant 2004; Hulme and Edwards 1997c; Bebbington 2004; Brockington and Igoe 2006), little of this understanding is considered within the literature on transnational networks. I suggested that this critical literature on NGO relationships, as well as the literature on different forms of legitimacy, can provide a useful lens for interrogating the diverse (dis)connections that constitute transnational networks and to understand their on-the-ground detail and complexity.

Understanding this detail is important. It can help to explain how NGOs are connected or not, in obvious and in more subtle or hidden ways. It can help to explain how ideas might, or might not, circulate and who is included or excluded from this process. This thesis seeks to address the question: What does a transnational network look like on the ground? That is, who is involved? How are they involved? How are they connected? Are connections clear or opaque? If connections are blurred, what does this mean? What do blurred boundaries between different actors actually look like? And why are they important in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion? I address all of these questions in chapter 6 where I demonstrate not only how mountain gorilla conservation NGOs are more obviously connected through their projects but also the more subtle connections that blur boundaries between them and other actors such as state departments. Understanding this detail provides important context for investigating connections, disconnections, inclusion and exclusion later in the thesis.

This chapter showed that a number of factors influence a network’s ability to influence political behaviour. These include the way that NGOs portray the intrinsic value of an idea, the perception of expertise (Kingdon 1984: 29; Henry et al 2004: 12; Adler 1992; Haas 1992b; Clark 1994), the perception of representation (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5), consensus (Adler and Haas 1992: 384; Haas 1989: 398 and personal relationships, although the literature is largely silent on the latter. I argued that all of these factors can help to determine whether a person or organisation is included within a network and whether their ideas are respected by decision-makers. At the same time I suggested that this inclusion creates hidden exclusions, or disconnections, as people and organisations without these characteristics are less likely to be able to circulate their ideas. Equally, I emphasised that the literature is largely silent on the role of more obvious conflicts, yet these may also play a role in
creating disconnections and preventing ideas from circulating. This thesis addresses the question: What do (dis)connections look like and why do they come about? (How) do they influence the circulation of ideas and ideational power? What do they mean in terms of exclusion and marginalisation? I address these questions in chapter 7 by exploring the relationships between mountain gorilla conservation NGOs and between mountain gorilla conservation NGOs and state departments and investigating what these mean in terms of whose ideas are circulated and whose are not.

This chapter highlighted the importance of understanding how transnational networks influence political behaviour beyond the role of the state. I suggested that wider political ideology, context and cultural norms all create the environment within which people and organisations interact, make decisions and circulate ideas (following Gramsci 1971; Lukes 2005; Béland 2010; Dowding 2006). Whilst I argued that more obvious factors, such as perceived expertise and personal relationships may impact ideational power, inclusion and exclusion, I also proposed that powerful NGOs and states can also impact wider contexts, which influence who is able to circulate their ideas. This thesis also addresses the question: (How) do transnational networks operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society? I address this question in chapter 8 where I investigate the opportunities for and barriers to (typically created by NGOs and states) local communities generating and circulating their ideas about conservation.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1. Introduction

My PhD research did not follow the typical thesis structure of reading followed by fieldwork, followed by data analysis and writing up. This chapter reflects this by presenting, in two stages, a story of how the research has developed and the issues that I encountered along the way. The thesis initially set out to research the conservation NGO sector in Malawi, where I had previous experience and where I intended to address my research questions. I began collecting these data in Spring 2006, but it quickly became clear that not only had no survey of conservation NGOs been carried out for Malawi, but also such data were lacking for Africa and indeed globally. This was an important gap as a rich literature exists critiquing all or parts of the NGO sector (in conservation and development fields separately), yet no large-scale study had been conducted to actually understand how it worked, or what it looked like as a sector. I began to collect data to address this gap and understand the activities of conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. In August 2006, for funding reasons, I left the University of Manchester as a student and took up a research post at Newcastle University. During this time I continued to work collaboratively with Prof. Dan Brockington, funded in part by his ESRC grant on ‘The Social Impacts of Protected Areas’ (see below for details of individual responsibilities). Over the next two years – and before returning to the University of Manchester to resume the PhD – we continued to analyse these data collaboratively and published it in various peer reviewed journals including *Conservation Letters, Antipode, the Journal of Modern African Studies,* and the *International Journal of African Historical Studies* (Brockington and Scholfield 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Brockington et al 2009). A further paper led by George Holmes makes more use of the financial data we collected (Holmes et al 2012). I returned to The University of Manchester as a part-time student in January 2009 with a clear idea of how this research could be developed into a PhD project and a case study identified. This chapter is split in two to reflect these stages. The first part describes the desk research conducted for the conservation NGO survey and the second part discusses the qualitative research methods used to investigate Mountain Gorilla conservation networks.
3.2. The work of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa

In terms of individual contribution to data collection for the NGO survey, I was responsible for identifying around 90% of the NGOs in the initial list of organisations and distributed it for comment to various discussion forums (see below). I collected the historical, geographical, project and financial information on all of these organisations where it was publicly available (see below). Dan was responsible for collecting data, especially financial data, from some of the largest organisations, for which he had existing contacts, such as the WWF, WCS and Birdlife International, but for which publicly available information was lacking. These account for a much smaller proportion of the organisations, but they also constitute the majority of expenditure (see Table 8, page 100, chapter 4). Dan was also responsible for researching the organisations identified on Conservation International’s (CI) I990 form (see below). In the few cases where no information was publicly available and we had no existing contacts (for around 30 organisations), we split the list in half and individually contacted these organisations.

As explained elsewhere (see Scholfield and Brockington 2008; Brockington and Scholfield 2009; 2010a; 2010b), we began building up a list of all NGOs that we could find working in sub-Saharan Africa. This started by taking the list of NGOs available on the ‘Save Amboseli’ website - a petition signed by a number of environmental NGOs against the downgrading of Amboseli National Park Game Reserve and The ‘African Conservation Foundation’ website also provided an extensive list of NGOs working on the continent by country. Additional organisations were identified using links from these organisations’ websites, Google searches, through personal contacts and in the published literature. We checked our initial list by sending it to two discussion forums: Environmental Anthropology and the African arm of the Society for Conservation Biology; as well as to every included NGO and to Prof. Brockington’s personal contacts within conservation and academia. We then composed our initial report (Scholfield and Brockington 2008) and made it available on a website, sending the link and summary to
our compiled list of contacts. This provided updates to our information and some useful additional comments.\(^8\) The final list names 281 organisations (see chapter 4, page 86).

As explained elsewhere, there are obvious limitations of these methods. The exercise limited findings to those NGOs with a web presence\(^9\), thus excluding the many local and community-based conservation groups active in Africa. We did not carry out any searches in French or Portuguese and so representation of Francophone and Lusophone Africa is likely to be limited. The diversity of South African conservation organisations, which includes many smaller and ‘Friends of’ National Parks organisations, is unlikely to have been captured in the database. The focus on conservation NGOs alone means that expenditure by governments; expenditure on research or research networks; and expenditure by bilateral and multilateral support to governments is excluded (some of this support may be indirectly included where it is channelled through NGOs).

As a final check we compared our list to CI’s 1990 form, which lists the organisations they give funds to. There were 138 organisations on CI’s list that had not previously been identified. However, some of these organisations did not work in Africa and so were not relevant. The 23 organisations that were included were receiving contributions averaging $378,000 from CI, whereas the 138 not included were receiving much smaller donations on average - $37,000, indicating that the more important players had been captured. A similar exercise was conducted using the list of organisations funded since 2001 by the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF). This listed 158 organisations and individuals and again, only 23 were on the original list. However, the majority of other beneficiaries were organisations such as research institutes, individuals and corporations, none of which were relevant to this study. The average donation to the organisations that were also on our list was $625,000, compared to $215,000 to those who were not.

This overview therefore provides an incomplete picture and likely misses a significant amount of the local conservation activity in Africa. Despite this, it arguably captures the important financial players and there are no other studies of the same scope or scale of

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\(^8\) See report website – [http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/africanwildlife/](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/africanwildlife/)

\(^9\) One or two organisations without a web presence were identified through the disseminating of the list to the Environmental Anthropology Discussion Forum
which we are aware. Moreover, we checked this list twice through our dissemination to the organisations included and it was checked a further five times during the peer review of publications arising from it. These checks identified very few new organisations.

For each organisation we attempted to establish:

- Location of head office
- Establishment date
- Country, general area and specific protected area of activity
- Expenditure by country for 2004, 2005 and 2006
- General focus of activities
- Sponsors
- Trustees, board members and patrons

We examined nearly 900 projects run by these organisations in order to identify where they are active and in particular which protected areas they worked with. As well as organisations’ websites, we used Charity Commission Forms and I990 forms\(^\text{10}\) to examine UK and US charities’ expenditure for 2004, 2005 and 2006 and identify which countries and projects the money was spent on. These sources also provided names of patrons, board names and sponsors. To fill in gaps, we emailed the organisations, initially requesting further information, and later asking them to clarify the information we had about them. We also spoke to some NGO staff by telephone.

The survey raised a number of important and unanswered questions about the way NGOs and the sector of which they are part operates, in particular about the political economy of interactions between them and others involved in conservation such as state departments, donors and communities. It also informed useful case studies for addressing these questions by highlighting hubs of activity and inactivity, as well as a vibrant range of projects and programmes.

\(^\text{10}\) Charity Commission Forms can be found at \text{http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/} and I990 forms at \text{http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990s/990search/esearch.php}
3.3. Mountain gorilla conservation as a case study

Chapter 4 shows that Conservation NGOs are established and justified for numerous reasons. Whilst on the surface they all share the stated common goal of conserving biodiversity, abundant definitions of conservation exist, as well as the means of achieving it. Some argue money is best spent on fundraising and awareness raising in the North, some lobby for animal welfare and an end to the bushmeat and ivory trade; some promote newer ideas of community-based conservation, eco-tourism and integrated conservation-development projects, whilst others argue for stricter, traditional conservation ideas to be enforced. Not only do ideas differ on how to conserve, but also on what should be conserved. For instance, the survey shows that some organisations focus their efforts on particular habitat types (wetlands, rainforest) and landscape concepts (wilderness areas, biodiversity hotspots), whereas others place great importance on protecting particular charismatic species from extinction. The case study for this PhD should concern a network of a mixture of diverse interests working around a particular conservation focus, either a geographical area, or a specific species or habitat, or a mixture of the three. Below I outline various possible case studies and discuss their relevance and feasibility.

One option would be to select an African region and the networks of state and non-state actors working on conservation in this region. Whilst West Africa is probably the least appropriate out of these four regions, due to its relatively low conservation NGO activity compared to other African regions, the high levels of activity and the expansive geographical spread of activity in other regions would make studying such large areas unfeasible for the scope of a PhD. Even at the country level, there is likely to be too much activity to study all existing conservation networks in a meaningful way. For example, whilst the diverse and complex nature of South African conservation activities would make it an interesting case to research, it is also too ambitious for this project. Similarly, countries such as Madagascar and Tanzania are hubs of international conservation NGO activity, but their networks are likely to be too vast to use as a case study for this thesis. These countries have also received ample academic attention to date (For instance, for Tanzania see Brockington 2002, Igoe 2003, Levine 2002 and Neumann 1995; for Madagascar see Balmford and Whitten 2003, Duffy 2008). Taking
this into account, if focusing geographically, the case study will need to concentrate on a smaller area such as a single protected area or specific habitat. Concerning the latter, examples could include rainforest, wetland, savannah or mangrove ecosystems. Again though, the majority of these cases would involve the study stretching across a larger geographical region than is feasible for this study.

The third option would be to base a case study on the conservation of a particular species or group of species. For this, the obvious choice would be to choose a charismatic species that receives a lot of attention and conservation effort from a diverse range of conservation actors; the greater the number of interests involved, the greater the opportunity for connections and disconnections. Charismatic species attracting high levels of NGO activity include Cheetahs, Elephants, Black Rhinos, Bonobos and Gorillas (see chapter 4, page 89). There are also a number of organisations focusing their work on a particular taxonomic group such as apes, monkeys or big cats. Some of these animals would make better studies than others on a number of grounds. A study of elephant conservation networks, for instance, would provide an interesting opportunity to research a network of diverse interests, including animal welfare organisations, inter-governmental groups involved in the politics of ivory trade, and those trying to resolve human-wildlife conflict. However, elephant habitat and range spans across much of sub-Saharan Africa and as such they present similar feasibility problems to those mentioned above.

Mountain Gorilla conservation perhaps provides the most appropriate case study for researching transnational networks. Every year, politicians and international celebrities flock to Rwanda to take part in Kwita Izina, the gorilla naming ceremony. The births and deaths of individual mountain gorillas have attracted international media attention, even during the genocide in Rwanda and on-going conflict in Eastern DRC (see chapter 5, page 135) demonstrating that mountain gorillas are very much a ‘global issue’. Rwanda attracts the greatest level of conservation NGO spending relative to its area across the whole of Africa (Holmes et al 2012) and much of this is likely directed towards Mountain Gorillas. Likewise the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) attracts large levels of funding and numerous NGOs, many of which are involved in Mountain Gorilla conservation (see chapter 4, Table 10, p.102 and chapter 6, Table 13, p.156).
The number and diversity of actors involved in mountain gorilla conservation indicates complexity, but also offers clarity as it provides multiple opportunities for researching (dis)connections between states, donors, NGOs and community groups and the movement of ideas between them. The variety of conservation ideas including strict protection, ecotourism, community development projects and disease prevention provide a case study for researching how diverse conservation values interact and conflict within one location. In the Virungas (as opposed to Bwindi where the other remaining population of Mountain Gorillas is found) the transboundary conservation structure provides another frame for understanding and comparing connections and disconnections and the circulation of ideas across and between national boundaries. Equally, the confined nature of the Virungas habitat makes Mountain Gorilla conservation a logical choice for the scope of a PhD project (see Figure 1)

**Figure 1: Map showing Mountain Gorilla Habitat in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC**

![Map showing Mountain Gorilla Habitat](image)

Source: Kalpers et al 2007: 328

Indeed, I found that even such a concise case study area begs greater research effort than this PhD could afford. I therefore made the decision, having interviewed several
NGO staff in Uganda in October 2009, to focus my research on conservation networks involved in protecting Mountain Gorillas in Virunga National Park (PNVi), DRC and Volcans National Park (PNV), Rwanda. Transnational conservation NGOs such as the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP), Mountain Gorilla Veterinary Project (MGVP) and Care International’s Environment, Equity and Enterprise in the Greater Virunga Landscape (EEGL) project base their headquarters in Rwanda and I was therefore able to interview staff associated with these organisations. The majority of Mountain Gorillas in the Virungas habitat live in DRC and Rwanda and population densities are lower in the Ugandan section of the Virungas habitat. I identified just two additional organisations that worked at Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP), but not the Rwandan and Congolese sections of the Virungas. I had no response when trying to contact one of them (Forest People’s Programme) and I conducted two interviews with staff from the other (Mgahinga Community Development Programme) although the conservation focus of the latter was predominantly Golden Monkeys and not Mountain Gorillas. Whilst these factors led me to discount MGNP, other factors made a strong case for including Rwanda and the DRC.

Large international NGOs such as Frankfurt Zoological Society and WWF (as an individual organisation, independent from IGCP) only work in the Congolese section of the Virungas. In fact, WWF’s work around PNVi constitutes its oldest project in Africa. Much of the history of Western involvement in Mountain Gorilla conservation in the Virungas took place in DRC or Rwanda. Declared by the Belgians in 1925, Albert National Park (now Volcans and Virunga National Parks) was Africa’s first national park (see chapter 5, page 136). George Schaller, Dian Fossey, Amy Vedder and Bill Weber all carried out their research in the Congolese or Rwandan sections of the park and Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International operates in the DRC and Rwanda only. It makes academic as well as logistical sense to focus on Rwanda and the DRC.

After the first stage of overseas fieldwork, I identified community projects as the most interesting and important interventions for this research to explore. In particular, these included health, agriculture, land and alternative energy (e.g. improved stoves and briquettes) projects. Other themes that ran through many of these projects included education, capacity building and access to clean water. Early interviews also considered
issues such as the orphaned, or confiscated gorilla programme, as well as practical park management activities such as patrols and gorilla monitoring. However, such interventions are likely to have a much lower impact on local populations who are not involved in implementation. This would therefore provide far less opportunity for investigating whether and how NGOs and states provide mechanisms for less marginalised groups to circulate their ideas. Equally, many park management activities were the domain of the state and less likely to present opportunities for researching interactions between diverse interests. Finally, community interventions typically capture a wider range of organisations, interventions and ideas as they combine both conservation and development, attracting interests from both fields. This provides further opportunities for studying connections, disconnections and idea circulation. For these reasons, a range of community interventions associated with Mountain Gorilla conservation constitutes the case study for addressing the research questions identified in chapter 1.

3.4. Researching Mountain Gorilla conservation networks

In this section, I discuss my approach to researching Mountain Gorilla conservation networks. I begin by describing what I did, including sections on my preparatory research, the case study site and overseas fieldwork. I then explain why I used the methods that I did, introducing and justifying the use of mixed methods and in particular, semi-structured interviewing. I pay particular attention to my positionality, as well as to issues of interpretation and validity of the data collected. Finally, I present a brief discussion of the ethical considerations of my research.

3.4.1. Preparatory research

The preparation for this fieldwork involved researching, identifying and contacting the people that I needed to interview in Rwanda; designing interview schedules (see Appendix 1); and researching the political history of the region to allow me to take a sensitive and well-informed approach to my interviews.

Prior to fieldwork, I had email and telephone correspondence with a number of key academics and NGO staff in the UK involved in mountain gorilla conservation. These
contacts resulted in further interview contacts in the UK and in Africa. In particular Kay Farmer, Chris Sandbrook, Dan Bucknell and Chris Ransom were very helpful in putting me in touch with numerous contacts and were instrumental in my fieldwork planning. One chance encounter resulted in an invitation to stay at Karisoke Research Center’s researchers’ house in Musanze, Rwanda (see Figure 2). This provided a good base close to many NGO offices and a short drive from park headquarters. This was an invaluable opportunity, which gave me greater access than I perhaps would have gained otherwise, although it meant I had to consider carefully my positionality both during fieldwork and in my analysis (see below). Before arriving in Rwanda in 2009, I had emailed and arranged interviews with around 30 people, providing a summary of my research and requesting suggestions for other interviewees.

**Figure 2: Virunga Volcanoes from Karisoke Research Centers’ researchers’ house**
3.4.2. What I did: Overseas fieldwork

I split my fieldwork in Rwanda into two stages for a number of reasons. Firstly, this worked practically; my research was carried out alongside a part-time job that funded much of the PhD and fieldwork took place during accumulated annual leave. Secondly, this gave me time in between research visits to code data and begin to analyse them so that I could identify the specific interventions that the thesis would focus on and the remaining people that I needed to interview. It also allowed me to meet with NGO staff in the UK to discuss my findings and seek their feedback and thoughts. It provided the opportunity to meet with people who I had missed or who were unavailable on the first trip and it gave me the opportunity to meet with some of my interviewees for a second time. The latter was important for several reasons. It allowed me to check that I had interpreted interviewee responses correctly and it allowed them to embellish responses and provide further examples. This built on a previous exercise where I had emailed copies of all notes and transcripts to the people I had spoken to; and it generated interesting discussions that were very much focused on the specific interventions I was investigating. For instance, my first field trip seemed to reveal that ideas were being parachuted in by NGOs, despite a state that was widely recognised for its top-down approach (see chapter 5, page 120-26). I was able to follow this up on the second visit and understand further the indirect role that the state was playing in influencing NGO interventions (see chapters 6-8). Had I not made a second visit and allowed time to reflect on interview data and revisit interviewees, I may have misinterpreted data. Ethically, a second visit provided the opportunity to share findings to date and thereby give interviewees some form of ownership of the data they had helped to create. Finally, the two trips meant that I could clearly see how people moved between organisations and roles within the space of a year (see chapter 7, page 221).
Figure 3: Map of Rwanda showing main fieldwork sites

Throughout fieldwork my time was split between Ruhengeri, or Musanze as it is now known and Gisenyi (see Figure 3). Interviews were also conducted in Kigali where many Ministries and NGO headquarters (for both Rwanda and for the Virungas region more generally) were based and field visits were made on several occasions to other districts around PNV to see some of the projects being implemented by NGOs.

Situating myself in Musanze gave me good access to park headquarters in Kinigi. I spent about a quarter of my time in Gisenyi during 2009 and 2010 fieldwork, which allowed me to interview staff working in the DRC, often based in Goma. I was unable to interview ICCN staff based at Rumungabo (see Figure 4) in person for visa and security reasons, so I took a mixed method approach and interviewed relevant staff by email.

Source: Nations Online 2011
On my first visit to Rwanda (and Uganda), I interviewed 37 people, went on three field visits to see NGO projects and kept a field diary throughout my research, including from my visit to see the Mountain Gorillas. On my second visit I interviewed 20 people (10 of whom I had previously interviewed); interviewed two others via email; attended one collaborative project meeting; and visited one project. This gave a total of 59 interviews, the data from which are presented in chapters 5-8). Interviews were semi-structured (see discussion below) and lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours (with the exception of email interviews) in line with recommendations for interviewing ‘elites’

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11 I visited a bamboo planting/ agriculture project with Batwa communities; a range of ecotourism projects run by IGCP and RDB; and an education/ orphanage project funded through ecotourism
(Ward and Jones 1999). I also followed other practical recommendations for interviewing elites, such as dressing appropriately and researching the interviewee’s background and career (following Richards 1996: 201). All interviewees were asked to sign a consent form (see below) and interviews were taped or notes taken, depending on interviewee preference. I typed up all interview notes and emailed them to interviewees, giving them an opportunity to edit and add information. Initially I coded data using NVIVO software which allows selection and separation of interview extracts by research theme. However, as my research progressed and I was able to remember who said what, when, it became easier to code manually by identifying and separating extracts into chapter documents under relevant headings. I used other methods where appropriate, triangulating my interview data with field visits to project sites, email interviews where distance prevented face-to-face interaction, and written documents collected in the field and online. Many of these documents are indicated in the text throughout chapters 5-8 and as I show in some cases, whilst formal reports often clarified what interviewees said and also gave me a further opportunity to assure anonymity for my research participants; there were occasions where interviewees contradicted, or moved away from what was reported in the public domain. For example, as I show in chapter 7 (page 231), there was a lot of bad feeling between NGO staff members about a report that had been published in the US by one NGO claiming responsibility for funding ICCN in 2007 following a crisis meeting as other NGO staff felt they had contributed the same amount and should have been recognised in the report. Equally, reports for IGCP (2012b) show in a positive light how the project was able to continue in the DRC, despite the conflict; yet interviewee accounts suggest IGCP was able to continue its work in part because of the conflict, due to controversial political connections (page 224-5). Another example shows how the WWF talks of ‘peaceful evacuation’ from parts of Virunga National Park, but other NGO interviewees commented on some of the negative impacts of this work that they too had been involved in (page 175-6). Thus, taking such an approach allowed me to corroborate interview statements on many occasions and assure interviewee anonymity, but it also highlighted discrepancies between the ‘party line’ and the reality on the ground, allowing me to probe some issues further. I highlight these instances throughout the text.
3.4.3. Why I did it: a discussion of methodology and methods

I see myself as a critical realist, believing that “behaviour and experience [are] ‘generated by’ underlying structures such as biological, economic or social structures” (King and Horrocks 2010: 9). I believe that the world is out there to be known about, independent of our existence, but our knowledge and understanding of that world is shaped by the political, social, environmental, cultural and economic context within which we exist. Such philosophical underpinnings inform a qualitative methodological approach in this instance (King and Horrocks 2010; Roulston 2010). That is, they are more suitable for investigating networks and trying to understand how and why people are connected or not connected and the different ways that they do or do not circulate ideas. Equally, such an approach does not discount quantitative methods where appropriate (ibid); indeed they constituted the most suitable methods for collecting the data required for the overview study discussed in the first half of this chapter. However, whilst various quantitative methods have been used for researching networks and relationships such as social network analysis; mapping; organisational analysis (see Yanacopulos 2007 for description and critique; see D’Andrea et al 2009; Pinheiro 2011 on social network analysis) and they are all perhaps useful methods for understanding who links with who, especially with large datasets; I feel that they fail to capture the intricacy and complexity involved in human relationships. They would be limited to providing answers to how people are connected and would fail to show why people are connected (or not). Ultimately, the detail of these relationships and networks can only be understood through a qualitative approach and through speaking to people. Through qualitative interviewing, I can talk to a diverse range of people, not to seek the ‘truth’, but to try to understand their relationships with others and the factors that inform them.

Whilst triangulation of interview data may corroborate findings, Schoenberger emphasises that ‘the truth is subjective’ and it is people’s experiences and subjective views on these experiences that are important in this research (1994: 180). Validity is not necessarily concerned with verifying the facts, but with validating the meanings (Kvale 1987; 1996). The validity of such methods pivots on whether an interpretation can be made of the reasons why an interviewee has said what they have said, as well as what they have not said. There will always be gaps and things that people forget or do
not see as relevant to the interview, but investigating reasons for any vagueness or ambiguity may be just as interesting as the detailed answers that research participants offer. It may indicate an interviewee’s unwillingness or inability due to other influences to talk critically of another person or organisation. Research participants may not remember ‘facts’ and in many cases will interpret them according to their values and experiences. This is important in the context of this research and can only be investigated by taking a qualitative methodological approach and using qualitative interviewing techniques.

3.4.4. A critique of semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews are based on the premise that “the interviewee is seen as a ‘participant’ in the research” rather than simply a respondent to ‘preset questions’ (Ward 2005, citing King 1994: 15). They allow the ‘why?’ and the ‘how’ questions to be addressed (Woodhouse 1997: 133) but perhaps more importantly, they aim to allow the respondent’s opinions and values to be expressed and explained (see below). They allow space and flexibility to follow up on complex issues. Further, pushing for clarification or additional detail following a response will compel the interviewee to contemplate their thoughts and not ‘fit’ their answers to set categories (Schoenberger 1994: 183). Semi-structured interviews offer far more flexibility than a formal structured interview but, in this context, are more suitable than unstructured interviews as they allow for a focused, yet open discussion within given time constraints, inherent in elite interviewing. Some structure also facilitates data comparison and analysis. As opposed to more rigid forms of interviewing, semi-structured interviews allow a space to be created for people to express and explain their opinions and experiences, as well as the opportunity for follow up on particular points of interest as they arise. This was particularly important on my first field visit to Rwanda, where unexpected topics arose, especially concerning those around health and great ape conservation, an area which I knew very little about prior to fieldwork and had not prepared detailed questions for. Equally, there were occasions where other types of interview were more appropriate. For instance, due to the lack of opportunity for face-to-face interviews with ICCN staff, interviews were conducted by email. This can be a useful qualitative research method when distance separates interviewer from interviewee (King and Horrocks 2010: 85-8).
On other occasions, more flexible, unstructured interviews were necessary, for instance, when opportunities arose unplanned, such as in a social situation or in the middle of a visit to see a project. In such cases notes would be made after, rather than during the interview and with the consent of the research participant.

Whilst this technique can lead to many vibrant discussions, it is important to consider the criticisms that this method attracts. First, the move away from a more quantitative and structured question and answer session towards a more open method of interviewing may violate situational expectations (following Flick 2002: 101). This could potentially affect the knowledge produced within the interview. To lessen this effect, I tried to establish a rapport by email with the interviewee before we met (following King and Horrocks 2010: 48-49) and emphasised the importance of their opinions to my research. Following O’Reilly (2005: 116-7), this aimed to encourage interviewees to be reflexive, contemplate their answers and ‘express their contradictory opinions’. Equally, recording equipment can impact on an interviewee and result in different knowledge being produced within an interview (Warren 2002) and I gave all interviewees the option of using or not using the voice recorder. Despite such practical considerations, embedded cultures and attitudes cannot be overcome fully in the short space of an interview and pre-interview communication and therefore considerations of positionality and ethics are important (see below).

Second, qualitative interviewing assumes that all individuals, from all backgrounds, have equal levels of skill in narrating and answering interview questions, when in fact, some interviewees may find it much harder than others to articulate their experiences. There were occasions when I had to constantly push for examples and encourage the interviewee to tell me more and other occasions where I felt that I was being ‘fed the party line’ rather than being given opinions. However, these examples are important in their own right. They show that other political, cultural and social contexts and characteristics influence how an interviewee reacts to particular questions in an interview. Far from being a reason not to use qualitative interviews to collect data, they show that they can be a useful tool for highlighting the different personalities of interviewees and emphasising the role of other influences and interconnections.
Third, specific criticisms relate to this method in the context of elite interviewing. In many cases, I interviewed people who could be considered ‘elites’, or ‘those actors who are in some way perceived to be more powerful or privileged than some undefined group’ (Woods 1998: 2101). Ward and Jones (1999: 303, following Hunter 1995) argue that elites are relatively understudied, perhaps due to their powerful positions and their ability to ‘readily resist the intrusive nature of social research’. Whilst I did not experience this often, one interview did reflect this view. The interviewee rejected my interview schedule, which he asked to see at the beginning of our meeting and explained that he would talk to me about the issues he thought important.\footnote{Interview with Gerrard, November 2009} Factual answers to many of my interview questions were available on the institution’s website so I was able to obtain some of the information I required. However, this interview was the exception and no other interviewee reacted in this way. With the exception of timing, I feel that many of the practical considerations regarding attitude and approach to elite interviewing should be adhered to regardless of whether the interviewee is considered an ‘elite’.

Finally, one of the major criticisms of semi-structured interviews is the level of influence that the researcher can, and does, have over the interview and the knowledge produced within it. Chambers (1997: 155) argues that to some extent the researcher can mitigate their influence over the research outcome through ‘personal behaviour’. He also suggests that we may need to actually ‘unlearn’ our own knowledge and ideas in order to allow others to share their knowledge (Chambers 2005: 3). However, I feel that the interview should be seen as a conversation or discussion, where the interaction between the researcher and the researched generates knowledge and to mask personal views completely and deny my own involvement in this process could prevent this from happening. Equally, following this advice can potentially eclipse the true power of the researcher; “multiple layers of power are mobilised and embedded in the research process” and these should be accounted for, rather than covered up (Simpson 2007: 165). In decentering the role of the researcher in an attempt to represent the research participants’ views and reduce influence over the research, there is a danger that the researcher’s interpretations and views can become obscured (Mellor 2007: 185). Mellor

\footnote{Interview with Gerrard, November 2009}
questions the extent to which the role of the researcher should be ‘neutralised’, especially where, as in many interviews, the knowledge is being created as part of the encounter (ibid). Mellor argues that the researcher should also be seen as ‘a knowing subject’ (2007: 186, Following Kirby and McKenna 1989: 28). That is, the interview is an encounter between two people and it is the views, discussions and knowledge that are generated from this process that are important.

This becomes even more prominent with this particular research topic, which explores how connections and encounters can generate or influence new ideas and projects. Some of my most interesting and thought provoking discussions arose after the formal interview questions had been asked and free flowing conversations began. It was interesting to see how even state staff with years of experience in their field were interested in what I thought of their work and whether I could offer any advice based my own experiences.\(^\text{13}\) One NGO interview led to a much wider discussion about conservation and development which helped me to think about my research from a different angle.\(^\text{14}\) These discussions meant I was constantly reflecting on and questioning myself as a researcher and the importance of my research, which I felt contributed in a healthy way towards the research process. In particular I was asked ‘how will your research be useful for the park staff to overcome NGO issues?’, ‘How can your research be useful to practitioners?’.\(^\text{15}\)

Criticisms all relate to the ability of qualitative interviews to identify the ‘truth’ in a neutral way without researcher influence. Doubts exist over the amount of factual evidence offered during an interview (Clark 1998: 83). If validation simply implies the verification of facts, then other methods could be used to corroborate or contest what a person has said. For instance, I used various government strategy documents and NGO websites to check some data such as dates, funding amounts and specific strands of a project. Using other methods can help to ascertain whether the person has offered the facts or not, but if they have not, they will not necessarily tell us why and as this chapter has already argued, addressing the ‘why’ questions are pivotal to this research. The

\(^{13}\) For example, interview with Jacques, November 2009
\(^{14}\) Interview with Richard, November 2010
\(^{15}\) Interviews with Peace, October 2009, November 2010
latter is important to this research and therefore whilst the criticisms identified in this chapter must be considered in interpretation and analysis of the research, they do not present a barrier to using such methods.

3.4.5. Interpretation of interview data

As well as crossing cultural boundaries, my interviews regularly transcended language differences, both in terms of French, English and Kinyarwanda and in terms of academic versus NGO language. The first I prepared for in advance, undertaking intensive French training to improve my French and meeting with a Rwandan friend in the UK to learn Kinyarwanda. However, the majority of interviewees stated they were happy to conduct the interview in English and French was only required for translation of some technical terms. On one occasion, my interviewee was running late and asked that I spoke to his secretary. This was the only occasion that the interview was conducted in French.\(^{16}\) I was also invited to a meeting between park and NGO staff held in Kinyarwanda about a project I was researching. On this occasion, participants used the odd English word so that I could follow the discussion to some extent and I was then able to follow up with questions after the meeting. As well as specific language differences, there were technical language differences and my academically informed interview questions were quickly replaced by ‘NGO speak’ asking people about ‘projects’ rather than ‘ideas’ and ‘challenges of working with the community’ rather than asking about whether members of a community had accepted/ rejected a particular project.

I gave all interviewees the choice of recording or taking written notes. The recordings had the advantage of allowing me to just sit and listen and think about my own responses instead of paying attention to writing everything down. However, they added a formal aspect to the interview and I suspect that interviewees perhaps talked more openly without the presence of the recorder in some instances. They provided rich data but also meant that a lengthy period of time following fieldwork (January-April 2010) was spent transcribing interviews, which in some cases was especially difficult where

\(^{16}\) Interview with Rashad, November 2010, although interview with Harvey, November 2010 conducted partially in French
strong accents and background noise made the recording harder to understand. There were also two occasions where interviewees did not agree with having a literal translation of their work presented, one would have preferred an interpretation which would have made it easier for them to read\textsuperscript{17} and the other spent a lot of time correcting grammar\textsuperscript{18} (this issue arose during the dissemination stage of my transcriptions). Typically though, there was less room for researcher misinterpretation when the interview was recorded than when I made written notes. Written notes had the advantage of being much quicker to write up following fieldwork. I also felt that in some cases interviewees were much more open when they were not being recorded.

3.5. Positionality, reflexivity and ethical considerations

My research was carried out under The University of Manchester’s ethical policy framework for PhD research which involved the completion of an eleven page form, which along with my interview questions and consent forms, was reviewed by the University’s Ethics Council. The consent forms gave me permission to use the data for my thesis and associated academic publications/ conference presentations, but anonymity was assured. Therefore, throughout this thesis, all my interview data have been coded using different names. Issues of confidentiality were carefully considered when writing up findings, especially due to the nature of this research- interviewing a select number of staff from well-known organisations, many working on unique projects. This inevitably made it harder for research participants to remain anonymous. In many cases, I therefore used website or document references instead of referencing an interview where things that interviewees said were also in the public domain. This prevents the reader being able to connect interviewees to particular organisations. However, ethical considerations concern much more than an ability to complete the proper forms or to think about issues of confidentiality; they are deeply interconnected and impacted by researcher positionality and reflexivity.

Positionality refers to the effect that the researcher has on the interview as a result of his or her position. Consideration of our position and the position of the respondent is vital.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Liz, November 2009
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Marcus, November 2009
throughout the research process (Rose, 1997). It is important that the relationship of the researcher to the research and the wider world is made clear in order to situate the knowledge that is generated within the interview (ibid: 309).

Coming from a white British background and indeed positioning myself as a social science researcher in what can, at times, be a largely left wing, outspoken academic world, it is easy to underestimate the political repression that people face in other parts of the world and my interviews could unintentionally assume that Rwandans would be willing and able to talk critically (to a researcher they have just met) about their organisation or their Government. Whilst I thought very carefully about this during the planning stage and adapted my questions accordingly, some issues still arose. For instance, a seemingly straightforward question asking: ‘please could you tell me a bit about your background?’ resulted in answers that began post-genocide/1994 and few people talked about what they were doing before this. The exception was perhaps those Rwandans who had grown up in other countries such as Uganda and the DRC and were more open in the way they spoke. It is illegal to ask people about their ethnicity in Rwanda, but asking where they were in 1994 can be an indirect way to access this information. Indeed, the RPF often used this line of questioning as they moved through Rwanda in 1994 to determine who had been involved in the genocide and answers arguably resulted in disappearances and murders (Human Rights Watch 1999).

Talking about particular topics could potentially put research participants in awkward or even harmful situations, in particular Rwanda’s role in and relationship with the DRC is a highly controversial issue and only one interviewee spoke of this openly during an interview. I made sure that I was fully conversant with the political history of the region before embarking on overseas fieldwork and remained reflective about the effects of questions I was asking on people both during and after I left the field. I also put the question into context for my interviewees, explaining that I was interested in what qualifications they had and the jobs they had previously held to understand how their own ideas had developed and moved with them through the different stages of their career. Whilst I had carefully worded my questions relating to people’s opinions about their government, I had not realised that this was more of an ingrained culture regarding talking about others, including colleagues, their own organisation and other NGOs, in a
negative way. I quickly learnt to adapt other interview questions in an attempt to overcome these issues. For instance, questions such as ‘were there any occasions where the project did not work out as you’d hoped?’ were changed to ‘were there any challenges with this project and how did you overcome them?’. I found this more open, positively angled approach to project ‘failures’ was far more fruitful in the responses it yielded.

Another aspect of my positionality within the research was the view by some that as a white westerner with money and influence, I could make a difference.\(^{19}\) One occasion in particular illustrates this well. I had agreed with an NGO to visit one of their field sites to look at some of its agricultural projects. This exercise was useful as it put my data in context, in particular showing me the process outsiders had to go through at the district office to visit remote rural areas, as well as very visually illustrating how close to the park some of the poorest communities in Rwanda live. However, after a two-hour journey by motorcycle to a relatively remote area, I was taken instead to meet the community the project was aimed at. There, without an independent interpreter, I was told stories of extreme poverty, where cultural differences between myself and these people were emphasised\(^{20}\) (see Howard 1994 who presents a similar scenario). It was explained that it would be very valuable to the organisation to have a ‘white patron’. Whilst not denying the obvious poverty I could see, the situation clearly raised issues about how my research participants perceived me and the changes that they thought I could bring about. Another interviewee was very keen, having explained the anonymity and consent forms, that I used the real name for their organisation, even writing to thank me for allowing them to participate in my research.\(^{21}\) On neither of these occasions was I asked for financial support, but both interviewees seemed to feel that I held an influential position which would give me the ability to raise awareness about their work and bring about positive change. Ethically, I felt I had an important responsibility to clarify to research participants my status and role in the UK as a research student. At the same time, confronting such visions of extreme poverty and not being able to ‘make a

\(^{19}\) This was seen as an issue by numerous PhD researchers working in developing countries who took part in a ‘doing fieldwork’ workshop at Newcastle University, UK in 2008
\(^{20}\) Interview with Davis, November 2009
\(^{21}\) Interview with Gracious, October 2009
difference’, especially in the face of such high expectations, was emotionally challenging.

Besides the perception that others had of me and the influence that this had on the research; my own positionality changed throughout the research process. In particular, it changed as I developed relationships with people in the field. Earlier in this chapter, I highlighted the importance of one particular contact and their organisation. This relationship evolved due to a chance meeting with Dr. Katie Fawcett in the UK, director of the Karisoke Research Center, based in Musanze, Rwanda. During this meeting, I was offered a room at the researchers’ house whilst carrying out any fieldwork in Musanze. As this ended up being where the majority of my time was spent on fieldwork, I quickly developed relationships with the other people sharing the house. Whilst this gave me a useful insight into the everyday workings of one of the key players in Mountain Gorilla conservation in Rwanda, it was also important to establish research boundaries and recognise that some discussions, however interesting, took place outside of interviews and were not for use in my research. This connection with DFGFI provided multiple opportunities: I gained access to many people at the organisation, who I may not have met otherwise; was given formal introductions to Ministry staff who I had previously been unable to get a response from; was provided transport to Kinigi park headquarters; and given ample opportunity for bouncing ideas and thoughts off experienced researchers based in the field. However, due to the nature of NGO politics in the region, and perhaps NGO politics more generally, as well as my professional need to take an unbiased approach, I tried to strike a careful balance between it being a positive opportunity for my research and reassuring other NGO staff that I interviewed of my independence. In fact, it is unlikely that as a researcher I was neutral and untouched by NGO politics (for example see Llewelyn 2007). Even within the space of interviews, it is hard not to empathise with people and their beliefs when they are talking so passionately about what they do. This issue becomes compounded when friendships are formed. Rather than trying to remove myself completely from NGO politics, it is more important to make my positionality clear throughout all stages of data collection and analysis and to reflect upon the impact that this may have on my findings.
3.6. Conclusion

This chapter has described the quantitative methods used for investigating the activities of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa; and the qualitative methods used for researching mountain gorilla conservation networks in Rwanda and the DRC. The first section described how, using a mixture of websites, phone calls, emails, discussion fora and annual financial reports; we collected data on the activities and expenditure of 281 conservation organisations implementing 900 projects. It also shows how the findings were disseminated widely within the conservation sector at various stages to ensure that they provide an account of the conservation NGO sector in sub-Saharan Africa that was as inclusive and exhaustive as possible. The second part of this chapter justified mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and DRC as the case study for this thesis.

The third part of this chapter justified a qualitative methodological approach and the use of semi-structured interviews for researching Mountain Gorilla conservation networks. It reviewed the critiques of semi-structured methods, but still justified them as the most appropriate tool for understanding transnational connections and disconnections. Finally, it highlighted and discussed the importance of considering issues of positionality and ethics throughout the research process from planning fieldwork through to analysing data.
Chapter 4: The work of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa

4.1. Introduction

This chapter begins to address two of the core aims of this thesis: to understand what a transnational network looks like on the ground and to understand the connections and disconnections that it constitutes. I do this by presenting an overview of one large transnational conservation ‘network’, providing an overview of the geography and activities of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst it does not show the on-the-ground detail, it begins to paint a picture of the diverse NGOs involved in transnational conservation networks and the potential for multiple interactions between them. It allows interesting case studies to be identified where multiple people and organisations are likely to interact and it allows important questions to be raised about how such organisations might interact. Specifically, this chapter addresses a weakness in the wider NGO and transnational networks literature, which typically talks about ‘NGOs’ or ‘civil society organisations’, failing to acknowledge or consider the specific heterogeneity and diversity of such organisations (Fisher 1997; Vakil 1997; Banks and Hulme 2012).

There has been much debate between scientists, academics, NGOs and states about how conservation should be carried out and who should be doing it, and what development considerations properly belong within the conservation domain (for instance, see Hutton et al 2005; Buscher and Dietz 2005; Brechin et al 2002). Despite this, little is known about how conservation networks of NGOs and other actors operate as a sector and indeed the connections and disconnections between them that make up their networks transnationally. I address this in this chapter by introducing a desk review of the activities of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst similar conservation-financial studies have been conducted on smaller scales (for example see Cracknell et al’s ‘Where the Green Grants Went’ reviews of UK environmental philanthropic giving (2007; 2009; 2012) and Castro and Locker’s (2000) review of conservation funding in Latin America and the Caribbean), this is the first attempted study of conservation organisations working in Africa of which I am aware. Essentially, the overview of the
sector attempts to begin to understand several key aspects of NGO work: who is involved, how they are involved, how their decision-making structures work, what ideas they support and how their activities are geographically distributed and financially supported.

I begin by presenting results from a survey of nearly 300 conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. I present an initial typology of the range of organisations working on the continent, before identifying where they are working (and not working), the different types of projects they are involved in and the location of their head offices. Finally, I examine financial flows to look at how NGOs are funded and how and where they are spending their money.

The chapter offers a clear picture of the distribution of NGO activity across the continent, as well as between different protected areas. It allows interesting and important questions to be raised about how the conservation NGO sector works and more specifically, about the potential interactions that it constitutes and the ideas that it supports and potentially circulates. It also highlights particular pockets of (in)activity and identifies the most appropriate case study for addressing my research questions. In this way it shows that investigating mountain gorilla conservation networks provides a suitable case study for addressing my research questions.

4.2. Conservation NGOs: a typology

The list of conservation organisations working in sub-Saharan Africa includes 281 organisations.22 There is a tendency in the NGO literature to talk about the large NGOs (BINGOs) and all the rest (following Bebbington and Riddell 1997; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b). This risks masking diversity (Fisher 1997; Vakil 1997; Banks and Hulme 2012). Some studies of development NGOs have attempted to address this (Bratton 1989; Korten 1990; Brown 1991), but there has been little attempt to map the geography of NGO activities and or the geographical unevenness of this activity at the global scale (Bebbington 2004: 728). These details have perhaps been overlooked in favour of trying to classify and make generalisations about the sector.

22 For a full list of these organisations see Appendix 2

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The same is true of conservation NGOs. Literary attention tends to focus on the large conservation organisations (see Chapin 2004; Dowie 2005, 2006). The typology below develops this literature and provides a more detailed categorisation of conservation NGOs based on their values and focus, operational scale, size, and who they were set up by. It gives an indication of the massive diversity of organisations involved in African conservation. This begins to suggest what a transnational network might look like, beyond a single transnational NGO. Not all categories are mutually exclusive and some NGOs, for example Birdlife International or Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International could fall into several categories.

4.2.1. Typology of Conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa

A. The largest NGOs, known elsewhere as BINGOs. Globally they are the WWF, Conservation International and Wildlife Conservation Society. In Africa the WWF stands out above the others, spending more than the next largest two combined.

B. NGOs which are slightly smaller than the BINGOs, but still spend millions of dollars a year. These are split into three categories in the financial analysis. The leading group (‘Very Large’) comprises the African Wildlife Foundation, Peace Parks Foundation, Conservation International and the Wildlife Conservation Society, which all spend between $7 and $18 million a year.

C. Charismatic animal orientated NGOs. They can range in size and origin. Examples include Save the Rhino International, the Mountain Gorilla Conservation Fund and WildiZe Foundation.

D. Charismatic conservationist centred NGOs. These are conservation organisations devoted to saving wildlife but whose appeal is focused on charismatic individuals. Examples include the David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation, the Jane Goodall Institute and the Wildlife Conservation Network.

23 We also developed an unpublished typology of NGOs which can be found in Appendix 3
E. Habitat focused NGOs. These are NGOs that focus on various habitat types across Africa. Examples include Wetlands International, Rainforest Foundation UK and African Mangrove Network.

F. Taxon focused NGOs. These organisations focus on groups of animals, for instance, big cats, primates etc. Examples include Project Primate, CERCOPAN and Born Free USA.

G. Bird focused NGOs. These are similar to Taxon focused NGOs, but they focus their conservation activities on birds. Examples include the International Crane Foundation, the Peregrine Fund and the Birdlife International Partnership.

H. Single protected area NGOs. These are usually smaller organisations and focus all their attention on one particular area. Examples include Project African Wilderness, Kasanka Trust and OlTukai Conservancy.

I. A number of organisations undertake conservation activities but they are secondary to other objectives. Typically these are organisations linked to hunting clubs or tourism organisations, where perhaps, conservation is the ‘secondary’ activity of the organisation. Examples include Safari Club International Foundation, African Impact and African Fund for Endangered Wildlife.

J. There are several small conservation organisations that were set up by local groups in Africa. Examples include Mazingira Bora Karatu, VokatrynyAla and Amboseli Community Wildlife Tourism Project (ACWTP).

K. Another set of organisations have been set up by groups of friends, predominantly students, who had previously travelled to the area and decided they want to make a difference and set up a conservation organisation. An example would be Tandroy Conservation Trust or Kesho Trust.

L. Memorial NGOs are named after (now deceased) conservation figures. Examples include the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust and the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International.
M. Research orientated NGOs have often grown out of, or been established alongside, research projects. Examples include the Brown Hyena Research Project, the Lion Conservation Fund and Lukuru Wildlife Research Project.

N. Volunteer and Expedition orientated organisations. These groups provide paying volunteers for projects and journeys. It is not always clear how much of the revenues of these groups go to conservation projects and how much to the organisation. Examples include African Impact and African Conservation Trust.

O. Finally there are Networks and Groups of NGOs. These are organisations that network other conservation organisations working in Africa, though not necessarily implementing their own projects. Examples include Wildlife Conservation Network and Global Communications for Conservation.

Although many organisations focus on particular species within specific projects, some organisations have a central focus on the conservation of a particular ‘charismatic’ mammal or bird. Organisations which focus more generally on habitat or wildlife conservation are therefore considered not to have a charismatic species focus. Just under a third (32 %) of organisations have a focus on a particular species. The species with the most attention were Cheetahs (mentioned 6 times), Elephants (mentioned 15 times), Black Rhinos (mentioned 10 times, although on eight occasions focus was also on rhinos in general), Bonobos (mentioned 6 times) and Gorillas (mentioned 6 times). This suggests that a species focused case study for this thesis would provide a good opportunity to capture a ‘network’ of multiple NGOs.

In fact five organisations identified in this survey focus either solely or predominantly on mountain gorilla habitat conservation (two of these – Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International and Gorilla Organization – more recently diversified to direct some resources to conserving Grauer’s gorillas). As I show in chapter 6, I identified a further six international NGOs (additionally to this survey) with a specific mountain gorilla focus. These were not identified in the survey for different reasons. At the time of data collection, Art of Conservation was just beginning operations in Rwanda and so few people, except those on the ground, would have been aware of its existence. Whilst the Zoological Society of London’s reputation as a conservation organisation has grown
substantially in recent years, at the time of the survey it was mainly known for its role as a zoo and is arguably the reason why we, and others who reviewed the list, missed it. Likewise Mountain Gorilla Veterinary Project has historically been a veterinary organisation and is likely missed as its (increasing) conservation role is less well-known. Wyman Worldwide Health Partners is a health NGO and it was only through interviews that the link with gorilla conservation came out. Gorilla CD and Gearing up 4 Gorillas have no ground presence, but instead act as a fundraising platform and a fundraising organisation respectively for Virunga National Park. Additionally, we deliberately excluded Care International from the survey because, although it spent about $5 million yearly on aspects of biodiversity conservation, we could not identify what the money was spent on or where (Scholfield and Brockington 2008). Eleven further organisations identified in the survey focus on mountain gorilla conservation as part of their wider work and I identified a further organisation (working in Uganda only that focuses all of its work on Mgahinga Gorilla National Park).

4.3. Establishment

Conservation NGO establishment in sub-Saharan Africa followed a similar pattern to that of international development NGOs (following Boris 1999; Fisher 1998; Salamon 1992; Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1995a; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 6; Banks and Hulme 2012: 4-5). Conservation NGO numbers began to grow in the 1960s following decolonisation, but numbers increased considerably in the 1980s and even further in the 1990s (see Table 2). From 233 conservation organisations working in sub-Saharan Africa that the establishment date is known for, 34% were established in the 1990s. This provides an interesting context to explore whether NGOs who have been established for longer are better able to influence political behaviour.

Establishment patterns of the NGOs that are involved in mountain gorilla conservation are in line with the overall basic history of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa, with 26% of mountain gorilla organisations and collaborative projects being established in the 1990s. Perhaps interestingly, three organisations were established pre- or early-1900s. This ties in well with Adam and McShane’s documented history (1996) of exploration in Central Africa and the discovery of the Mountain Gorilla by the West.
Table 2: Establishment dates of conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>No. of NGOs established</th>
<th>NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre 1900</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>281</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Basic patterns of geography

I identified headquarter locations for 278 of the 281 conservation organisations. Table 3 shows that 65 (23%) of organisations have headquarters in the US and 12% have headquarters in the UK. In total, nearly half of all organisations (48%) have Northern-based head offices. Sub-Saharan based head offices are in the minority and where they do occur, they are predominantly located in South Africa, although this figure is likely to be a substantial underestimate of actual numbers due to the many ‘Friends of’ National Parks groups and community based organisations that could not easily be captured in the data. Other African head offices are concentrated in Kenya and Tanzania. These results may miss small African and community-based NGOs who are unlikely to have a web presence. However, as I show in chapter 6, even with the inclusion of national organisations through fieldwork, British and American NGOs still dominate. This is particularly striking in the case of mountain gorillas conservation, where 15 of the 21 (international and national) organisations (Table 13, page 156) presented have US or UK headquarters (where WWF is included as UK due to its support for the International Gorilla Conservation Programme) and a further three NGOs have European based headquarters. This presents a particularly interesting case study for exploring the dynamics between the interests and ideas of these western-based
organisations with those of the national and local Rwandan and Congolese organisations identified in chapter 6 (Table 14, page 159).

These data suggest that many NGOs are circulating ideas beyond their national boundaries into various countries where they have field presence. Understanding how these ideas flow will develop the literature on transnational networks that argues that due to perceptions of expertise; western, external ideas are often favoured by political actors, whilst knowledge and ideas from local groups will be marginalised (following Radcliffe 2001: 26; Verkoren 2006: 53, following Stone 2005: 99). I return to this point in chapter 7 to explore how ideas are brought into African countries by western NGOs.

Table 3: Conservation NGO headquarter location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Head Offices</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Head Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Total 278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are relevant to this thesis. They identify hubs of activity and point to potential case studies for addressing my research questions. In particular, they indicate where greater numbers of (dis)connections are likely to exist and where greater numbers of ideas are likely to be supported and circulated. Table 4 shows how NGO activity is distributed across sub-Saharan Africa by country - it shows the number of NGOs working in each sub-Saharan African country. Distribution of NGO activity is highly
uneven and patchy across the continent, and generally sparse. With the exception of South Africa, for which data are most likely inaccurate, Kenya has the highest number of NGOs active in it (64). This is closely followed by Tanzania with 39 organisations and DRC with 29 organisations. West Africa is given the least attention out of all the regions of Africa. These findings are relevant to this thesis. They identify hubs of activity and point to potential case studies for addressing my research questions. In particular, they indicate where greater numbers of (dis)connections are likely to exist and where greater numbers of ideas are likely to be supported and circulated.

Table 4: Distribution of Conservation NGO activity within Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Africa</th>
<th>Central Africa</th>
<th>Eastern Africa</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Eq Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>S. Tome &amp;P’pe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very few countries have no active conservation organisations, just Djibouti, Comoros and Chad. Some organisations, for instance the Peregrine Fund and Rainforest Action Network, are said to be working in these places by the African Conservation Foundation, but there is no mention of current projects on the websites of the individual organisations. Whilst British organisations typically work in Britain’s former Empire, US organisations have some level of conservation activity in 75% of all countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This raises interesting questions about how ideas are circulated. For instance, do different ideas circulate in Anglophone Africa to Francophone Africa? And how do the ideas of US NGOs add to this dynamic? I return to this point in chapters 6 and 7.
Table 5: International Presence of NGOs working in more than 5 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organisation</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mountain gorilla conservation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Regional Programme for Rhino Conservation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Foundation for the Conservation of Wildlife</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Force</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetlands International</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Parks Foundation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation International</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Society for the Protection of Birds</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauna and Flora International</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Crane Foundation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Rhino International</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rhino Foundation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushmeat Crisis Taskforce</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Parks Foundation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organisation with the greatest geographical reach is WWF, whose activities cover 44 countries in Africa (see Table 5). However, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), SADC Regional Programme for Rhino Conservation, International Foundation for the Conservation of Wildlife and Conservation Force all work in ten or more African countries. The geography of activities does not necessarily reflect size. For instance, Fauna and Flora International (FFI) works in fewer countries than Conservation Force, yet is a much larger organisation. This indicates the preference of some organisations to spread their resources and activities across many countries, while others choose to focus their resources in particular places. Specifically, very few of the NGOs identified in Table 5 are involved in mountain gorilla conservation indicating that those NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation tend to be the ones focusing on fewer areas either because they are smaller or because they are focusing greater resources and efforts in fewer regions. Again this indicates the diversity of players and approaches involved in transnational networks. Understanding how these large organisations circulate their ideas and are connected to the wider network could contribute to our understanding of
the hegemonic power of conservation NGOs (following Holmes 2012). Therefore, defining a case study that encompasses such players, as well as other, much smaller organisations is important.

NGO projects affected 450 protected areas across sub-Saharan Africa. This probably underestimates the real extent of protected area coverage as many organisations may specify they work in a particular geographical area but not whether they focus on the protected areas included in that area. The difference between organisations that cover the entire area of a protected area and those that only work in a small part of it could not be captured in the data.

The distribution of NGOs supporting different protected areas shows some tendency to focus on well known protected areas, but is otherwise generally even. There are exceptions to the general rule of dispersion, Table 6 provides details of the more iconic protected areas that conservation organisations focus their work on. These data again identify hubs of activity and potential case studies for this thesis. For example Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Virunga National Park and Volcans National Park (all mountain gorilla habitat) all have at least five organisations active in their conservation. The number of NGOs is even higher than this survey suggests, as on the ground research reveals in chapter 6.

Different parks have different numbers of different types of NGO active in their conservation. For instance, Tsavo East and Tsavo West National Parks have numerous organisations active within them, but they are run by organisations of varying sizes, with generally only one of the larger organisations active. For example, Care for the Wild International is the only significantly large organisation working in Tsavo East National Park. However, not all organisations’ activities are distributed in this way. Table 6 shows that 12 organisations work in Kruger National Park, South Africa. Whilst these data may not show how many projects these organisations are working on, at least three of the bigger organisations work in the same area: Peace Parks Foundation, AWF and WWF International. Care for the Wild International and the Humane Society International are also relatively large organisations. In Amboseli National Park, both Born Free Foundation UK and AWF, two relatively large organisations, are active. This
suggests that careful identification of a case study is required to ensure that these types of players and their interactions can be captured.

It is unclear from the data whether organisations work closely together or run joint projects. For instance, three organisations work together as part of the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) in the Virunga Volcanoes region of Central Africa. However, this is a formal collaboration and it is likely that other less formal collaborations exist. Further, on the ground research will begin to unravel some of these less formal collaborations that create opportunities for idea circulation, as well as for others to be marginalised. I explore this in chapter 7.

Table 6: The Distribution of NGO support for different protected areas (PAs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of NGOs working in PA</th>
<th>Number of PAs</th>
<th>Specific PAs, with number of NGOs working there</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≥10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kruger (12), Tsavo East (11) and West (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Amboseli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kahuzi Biega; Chyulu; Laikipia Nat Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Caprivi Game Park; Eastern Caprivi Forest Reserve; Virunga; Mt Kenya, Volcans, Bwindi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, protected area coverage is rather slight and conservation NGOs are in fact absent from much of the continent’s protected area network (see Figure 5). Just under 14% of the protected area estate in sub-Saharan Africa receives some form of support from conservation organisations. Support favours the more strictly protected IUCN category 1-4 protected areas, 37% receive some form of support. Few countries have greater than 40% coverage of their protected areas, and some of these are notable for their small protected area networks. Countries with a greater then 40% coverage of their protected areas include the Republic of Congo, the DRC and Rwanda in Central Africa; Kenya in East Africa; and Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa in Southern Africa. There are no countries with this level of protected area coverage in West Africa, although Guinea has 38% coverage. Higher percentage coverage in Guinea, Swaziland and Rwanda is perhaps due to these countries having few and small protected areas. The majority of countries have less than 40% coverage. In many countries, for example, the
DRC, the Republic of Congo, Namibia, small NGOs cover a higher percentage of protected areas than the larger NGOs.

These data must be interpreted with caution as any form of support, regardless of the level, puts a protected area on the list and this is therefore not a list of protected areas that are adequately supported by conservation NGOs. However, these data are useful and relevant as they identify particular protected areas where diverse NGOs work and are likely to interact, thus identifying a number of potential case studies for this thesis to explore (dis)connections in greater detail.
Figure 5: Geography of protected areas and protected areas with NGO support

Source: Scholfield and Brockington 2008 (maps by Karl Hennerman)
4.5. Patterns of expenditure

This section identifies hubs of activity and in particular shows the dominance of a relatively small group of large NGOs across the continent. This raises questions about the dynamics that are likely to exist as a result of financial power between different NGOs and the potential power that these NGOs may be able to exert over whose ideas are circulated and how they are circulated. Specifically relating to conservation, this develops Chapin’s work, which suggests that a few large conservation players have the power to determine what happens in conservation globally, or at least to influence the actions of small NGOs (2004: 25).

Mean annual expenditure data were collected for 30% of the NGO sample (87 organisations) for some or all of the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Financial records for these organisations showed that they were spending $160 million ($US) per year (or $130 million per year not including overheads). Overheads refer to administration and fundraising costs. The breakdown of this expenditure by NGO is shown in Appendix 4 (see also Scholfield and Brockington 2008). To determine total expenditure for all conservation NGOs on the continent, predictions were made for NGOs where financial data were not available. The results of these predictions and the methods used to calculate them can be found in Appendix 5 (see also Scholfield and Brockington 2008).

Table 7 shows how expenditure is structured across the conservation NGO sector. This exercise gives an overall estimate of expenditure by conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa of just under $202 million per year (or $163 million not including overheads). The sector in this region is dominated by relatively few players. The largest is WWF, which spends more money on conservation in the continent than CI and WCS combined. Table 8 shows average yearly expenditure of the ten largest organisations. These organisations make up 83% of the organisations that financial data were collected for.

24 Whilst Halpern et al (2006) noted difficulties in collecting financial data, in this instance, the majority of NGOs were forthcoming with their financial records and appeared very supportive of the research.
25 All financial figures are expressed in 2006 US$ using exchange rates and the GDP deflator available at http://www.measuringworth.com
Table 7: Structure of the conservation NGO sector in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class Exp. inc overheads</th>
<th>Counted NGOs</th>
<th>Av. Exp. inc overheads</th>
<th>Predicted NGOs</th>
<th>Predicted total exp. inc overheads</th>
<th>Predicted Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7   Over $40 mil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$42,708,026</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$42,708,026</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6   $10 - $21 mil</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$15,559,663</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$62,238,654</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5   $4.2 - $6.2 mil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$5,467,690</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$27,338,451</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4   $0.8 - $1.9 mil</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$1,351,520</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$24,026,500</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3   $0.3 - $0.72 mil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$479,142</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>$21,913,962</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2   $0.1 - $0.3 mil</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>$200,090</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>$18,095,153</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1   Up to $0.1 mil</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>$54,927</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>$5,605,369</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>$201,926,116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sector as a whole, it is predicted that the top five organisations’ spending will account for more than 50% of this expenditure, 65% will be accounted for by the top ten (Table 8). The smallest and most numerous organisations account for just 3% of total conservation NGO spending, showing their relative minority compared to the large organisations. It also demonstrates the power of the large well know conservation NGOs. These data raise interesting questions about how ideas circulate in transnational networks. For instance, are these large conservation NGOs who dominate conservation spending able to dominate which ideas flow (and which ideas do not)? Are the smaller, seemingly less powerful NGOs able to have a voice and to circulate their ideas within this environment? I address these questions in chapters 7 and 8.

Table 8: The largest 10 conservation organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Average Expenditure</th>
<th>Average Expenditure including overheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WWF *</td>
<td>$35,212,994</td>
<td>$42,708,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation International*</td>
<td>$17,264,283</td>
<td>$20,247,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society*</td>
<td>$15,585,563</td>
<td>$17,321,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation*</td>
<td>$12,073,116</td>
<td>$14,614,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Parks Foundation</td>
<td>$8,392,335</td>
<td>$10,055,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Goodall Institute</td>
<td>$4,412,168</td>
<td>$6,120,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauna and Flora International*</td>
<td>$4,895,446</td>
<td>$5,947,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society*</td>
<td>$4,837,535</td>
<td>$5,895,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Parks Foundation</td>
<td>$3,246,610</td>
<td>$5,136,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International*</td>
<td>$3,497,692</td>
<td>$4,237,644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* involved in some way in mountain gorilla conservation

Table 8 shows expenditure of the ten largest conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. Of those organisations working in Rwanda and the DRC the proportion of expenditure on these countries varied from less than 10% (e.g. Fauna and Flora...
International and Frankfurt Zoological Society) to around one third (e.g. Africa Parks) and to 100% (e.g. Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International). It is not clear from these data what proportion of funds is directed to mountain gorilla conservation.

Table 9 shows that fundraising and administration costs are typically around 23% of expenditure. Levels of expenditure on these activities do not say anything about the organisations’ effectiveness or efficiency. However, they do give some indication of the way an organisation works, for example certain NGOs place more emphasis on fundraising and awareness raising in the West than they do on practical on the ground conservation activity in Africa. This suggests that it is important to look at intra-organisational NGO connections. In chapter 7 I explore how decision-making structures of international NGOs operate in an attempt to understand how ideas come in from the outside, but also whether and how field staff are able to influence wider strategy. In chapter 8 I attempt to understand what this information actually is, whether local communities are able to feed into this process and how this information is interpreted by field staff and integrated into organisational strategies and decision-making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Overheads and Expenditure (US$2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure + Overheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overheads (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows total expenditure (excluding overheads as looking at on the ground spending) by country for 2004, 5 and 6. This has only been calculated for organisations where data were available, i.e. it does not include predicted expenditure. These data show an increase in expenditure of about $31 million from 2004 to 2006. Expenditure is uneven, with most in Southern Africa, followed by Central and Eastern Africa jointly. Data show how relatively little is spent in West Africa. Expenditure is also uneven within each African region. South Africa, Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania, and the DRC have particularly high levels of investment targeted at them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>406,078</td>
<td>461,124</td>
<td>2,388,176</td>
<td>1,085,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>624,941</td>
<td>1,032,712</td>
<td>841,503</td>
<td>833,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>559,141</td>
<td>780,041</td>
<td>989,858</td>
<td>776,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>655,626</td>
<td>630,228</td>
<td>708,949</td>
<td>664,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>419,905</td>
<td>598,967</td>
<td>573,947</td>
<td>530,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>462,826</td>
<td>389,835</td>
<td>330,725</td>
<td>394,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>373,374</td>
<td>335,585</td>
<td>411,164</td>
<td>373,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>298,700</td>
<td>268,468</td>
<td>360,338</td>
<td>309,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>127,962</td>
<td>139,282</td>
<td>287,672</td>
<td>184,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>148,070</td>
<td>146,965</td>
<td>149,176</td>
<td>148,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>124,624</td>
<td>136,982</td>
<td>166,867</td>
<td>142,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>95,123</td>
<td>67,567</td>
<td>82,338</td>
<td>70,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>26,124</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,903</td>
<td>15,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>690</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Total</td>
<td>4,322,496</td>
<td>4,987,756</td>
<td>7,312,200</td>
<td>5,540,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>9,384,806</td>
<td>9,535,455</td>
<td>12,323,017</td>
<td>10,414,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>6,872,119</td>
<td>7,237,832</td>
<td>7,578,190</td>
<td>7,229,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4,386,044</td>
<td>4,274,580</td>
<td>4,512,220</td>
<td>4,587,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>3,876,587</td>
<td>3,916,258</td>
<td>4,522,295</td>
<td>4,105,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2,564,029</td>
<td>2,347,681</td>
<td>2,647,749</td>
<td>2,519,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1,644,820</td>
<td>1,526,849</td>
<td>1,765,739</td>
<td>1,645,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>462,288</td>
<td>627,337</td>
<td>643,235</td>
<td>615,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>316,840</td>
<td>294,215</td>
<td>402,619</td>
<td>337,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eq Guinea</td>
<td>316,840</td>
<td>294,215</td>
<td>402,619</td>
<td>337,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Tome &amp; P'pe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Total</td>
<td>29,691,396</td>
<td>29,928,843</td>
<td>35,204,509</td>
<td>31,608,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>14,098,275</td>
<td>14,269,435</td>
<td>15,098,477</td>
<td>14,488,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11,943,499</td>
<td>15,042,043</td>
<td>14,698,448</td>
<td>13,894,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3,773,223</td>
<td>4,217,608</td>
<td>4,566,565</td>
<td>4,185,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>911,807</td>
<td>1,351,362</td>
<td>2,451,045</td>
<td>1,571,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19,640</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>133,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>3,867</td>
<td>27,539</td>
<td>12,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3,955</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>3,769</td>
<td>3,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Total</td>
<td>30,735,610</td>
<td>34,905,878</td>
<td>37,225,842</td>
<td>34,289,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>12,790,986</td>
<td>13,666,533</td>
<td>14,525,828</td>
<td>13,661,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>8,306,275</td>
<td>13,140,413</td>
<td>10,391,355</td>
<td>10,612,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>5,077,136</td>
<td>5,356,143</td>
<td>6,052,733</td>
<td>5,495,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3,663,959</td>
<td>4,367,035</td>
<td>4,565,920</td>
<td>4,198,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2,972,415</td>
<td>5,162,083</td>
<td>4,152,798</td>
<td>4,097,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3,499,054</td>
<td>3,322,903</td>
<td>4,091,842</td>
<td>3,641,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2,157,621</td>
<td>1,949,885</td>
<td>2,491,359</td>
<td>2,199,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2,207,282</td>
<td>1,199,289</td>
<td>1,548,419</td>
<td>1,325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>457,438</td>
<td>627,337</td>
<td>640,935</td>
<td>575,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>457,438</td>
<td>627,337</td>
<td>640,935</td>
<td>575,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Total</td>
<td>40,609,606</td>
<td>49,435,091</td>
<td>49,102,323</td>
<td>46,382,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/</td>
<td>Africa General</td>
<td>6,639,175</td>
<td>6,285,464</td>
<td>14,148,417</td>
<td>9,024,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>111,998,282</td>
<td>125,543,032</td>
<td>142,993,292</td>
<td>126,844,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DRC receives the highest levels of funding of all countries in the Central African region. Whilst it is unclear how much of this is directed to mountain gorilla conservation; given that Virunga National Park is the most biodiverse park in Africa, it is likely that a substantial proportion of funds is directed here. At the same time, whilst Rwanda appears to receive significantly less funds than some of its neighbours, a follow
up study by Holmes et al shows that Rwanda has the greatest conservation NGO expenditure by area ($100.65/km²; compared to an average of $5.09/km² for all countries) and much of this is likely directed to the conservation of mountain gorillas (2012: 607). Rwanda also received the highest amount of spending per square kilometer of its territory designated as hotspots and High Biodiversity Wilderness Areas and the third highest for WWF’s Global 200 sites (ibid). Whilst WCS has a large programme at Nyungwe National Park, it is likely that the majority of funds are directed to mountain gorilla conservation. Table 11 shows percentages of total spending for Rwanda, DRC and Uganda. A relatively high average of 14% of total NGO expenditure was directed to these three countries from 2004-2006.

Table 11: Spending in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC as a percentage of Africa expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>9,384,806</td>
<td>9,545,240</td>
<td>12,323,017</td>
<td>10,417,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2,564,029</td>
<td>2,347,681</td>
<td>2,647,749</td>
<td>2,519,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3,773,223</td>
<td>4,177,616</td>
<td>4,566,428</td>
<td>4,172,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,722,058</td>
<td>16,070,537</td>
<td>19,537,194</td>
<td>17,109,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of all African countries</td>
<td>110,707,267</td>
<td>130,237,090</td>
<td>138,373,011</td>
<td>126,439,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% DRC</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rwanda</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Uganda</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage spent on DRC, Rwanda and Uganda of total African expenditure</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter provides an overview of the activities of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. It identifies the diverse interests involved in African wildlife conservation. It shows where these organisations are active and where they are not, and in particular, highlights their tendency to focus on particular regions, countries and protected areas. This is relevant to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that at the continental scale, networks operate in a patchy and unequal pattern. This reflects discussions in the literature that suggest that transnational networks operate in a way which strategically targets certain mineral rich areas (or in this case, charismatic species and places), but at the same time excludes and marginalises other areas. More
practically speaking, these data are important as they highlight suitable case studies for this research where interactions are likely to take place between diverse organisations. I discussed this in chapter 3 and these data contribute to the decision to identify mountain gorilla conservation as the most appropriate case study for addressing my research questions.

The data emphasise the dominance of UK and European headquarters of conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. This is important as it creates numerous opportunities for ideas to flow into African conservation from the ‘outside’, as well as for ideas to feed back up from the field to influence wider organisational strategy, visible fundraising material and international policy. I explore this further in chapters 7 and 8 and investigate how the dominance of some players, particularly those with western headquarters, may exclude other, local and national voices.

By presenting data on the patterns of expenditure of conservation NGOs active in sub-Saharan Africa, I highlighted not only the diversity of organisations involved in conservation, but also the dominance of a few key players. Indeed ten NGOs account for 65% of conservation NGO spending in African conservation. This suggests an uneven and unequal sector where some organisations are likely to have greater power to determine which ideas circulate. It also suggests that any case study used in this thesis should include a mixture of these large and small players to understand the power dynamics and interactions between them and what this means for idea circulation and inclusion and exclusion of particular organisations and their ideas.

Whilst this overview only provides basic findings about the work of conservation NGOs from afar, I know of no comparable study and it provides a clear insight into the overall workings of a considerably large sector, at a scope and scale, which has not, to my knowledge, been studied before. The information provided by such a study raises numerous questions about the work of conservation NGOs. Specifically relevant to this thesis, it highlights the need to understand the political economy of interactions between organisations, particularly in such an ‘uneven’ sector dominated financially by just a few key players. Addressing this will contribute to the core aim of this thesis to understand how diverse players are connected or disconnected, what this means in terms of idea circulation and ultimately what this means in terms of whose ideas are included or excluded.
Finally, as I explained in chapter 3 (page 65-6), the data presented in this chapter have highlighted a good case study for addressing my research questions. This chapter has shown that mountain gorilla habitat, including both Virunga National Park and Volcans National Park attracts multiple NGOs, including some of conservation’s largest, and potentially most powerful players. These organisations are spending significant proportions of this budget in the DRC and Rwanda in some cases. These countries also attract a lot of money from other NGOs. Indeed, the recent paper referred to in this chapter shows that Rwanda receives the highest level of conservation NGO expenditure for its area in Africa (Holmes et al 2012). This context offers an excellent case study for exploring how multiple, diverse and potentially conflicting interests interact and circulate ideas.
Chapter 5: The Virungas: a political and environmental history

5.1. Introduction

This chapter provides the context for understanding how transnational mountain gorilla conservation networks operate on the ground in the Virungas. In many ways conservation here has operated in a ‘bubble’; the transboundary protection of mountain gorillas has continued through years of conflict in the Virungas. Yet at the same time, it is clear that – not dissimilar to other places – conservation in the Virungas is rooted deeply within a complex local, regional and international political history. This mismatch is interesting and relevant to this thesis. It suggests that blurred connections exist between states and NGOs that allow conservation to continue despite conflict and that deeply influence the practices of NGOs on the ground and their wider relationships with communities. Yet at the same time, it highlights very clear boundaries and disconnections where collaborative conservation operates at the same time as conflict continues between states, rebel groups and NGOs. This chapter, due to the wide historical content covered, is necessarily descriptive. However, by investigating this history, the chapter unravels some of these links and explains the wider context within which mountain gorilla conservation networks operate.

I begin by presenting a timeline of political events in Rwanda and the DRC, alongside important conservation developments (see Table 12). I then discuss the political history of Rwanda from its German occupation up to and including the 1994 genocide. I explore some of the contributory factors of the genocide in Rwanda; how it influences the political and cultural situation in Rwanda today and how and why this is relevant to this thesis. In the following section of the chapter I discuss the political history of the DRC, investigating the two Congo Wars and ongoing conflict in the region today. I explore how this impacts conservation and suggest what it might mean for connections, disconnections and idea circulation. In the final section of this chapter, I examine the conservation history of the region, discussing the history of protection, the different people that have researched mountain gorillas and, perhaps the move from protectionist conservation towards collaborative, transboundary, community conservation, despite ongoing political instability in the region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Conservation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887-1916</td>
<td>German colonial rule of Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-1960</td>
<td>Belgian colonial rule of the DRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Belgian rule begins in Rwanda, made official by the League of Nations in 1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>At Karl Ackley’s suggestion, King Albert of Belgium grants protection for mountain gorilla habitat of Karisimbi, Visoke and Mikeno Volcanoes- King Albert Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>King Albert National Park, the first national park in Africa is created. It links Karisimbi, Nyiragongo, Muhabura, Gahinga, Mikeno and Biske Volcanoes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Mgahinga National Park (MGNP) downgraded to a Game Reserve covering 3,370 ha.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Two sectors of the current Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda, covering 20,700Ha, downgraded Kasatoro and Kayonza Crown Forest Reserves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>MGNP downgraded to a Forest Reserve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Kasatoro and Kayonza combined and expanded to cover 29,800Ha and named Impenetrable Crown Forest Reserve.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Impenetrable Crown Forest Reserve renamed as the Impenetrable Central Forest Reserve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Mgahinga Forest Reserve downsized to 2,330 ha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Up to 100,000 Tutsi killed by Hutus in Rwanda and thousands of refugees fled to Uganda</td>
<td>George Schaller’s year long study of Mountain Gorillas on Mount Mikeno, DRC (1959-1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>DRC granted independence</td>
<td>King Albert National Park split into two between Rwanda and DRC forming Volcans National Park and Virunga National Park. Batwa communities were evicted from Volcans National Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Three Tutsi guerrilla attacks from neighbouring countries followed by government retaliation, thousands of Rwanda Tutsis killed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Forest Peoples Programme 2010
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Rwanda and Burundi (formally Rwanda-Urundi) granted independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>New areas gazetted as part of Mgahinga and re-graded as a Game Reserve covering 4,750 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Two local forest reserves incorporated into Impenetrable Central Crown Forest Reserve increasing area to 32,080 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Dian Fossey begins research on Mount Mikeno. She later has to leave for security reasons and sets up Karisoke Research Center, between Mt. Visoke and Mt. Karisimbi, in September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Genocide of Hutu by Tutsi, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Habyarimana overthrows Kayibanda and becomes President ORTPN created. All unauthorised hunting throughout Rwanda is made illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Ian Redmond arrives at Karisoke to study intestinal parasites in apes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Digit, Dian Fossey’s favourite gorilla, is killed. The story receives international media attention. Dian Fossey sets up the Digit Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Amy Vedder and Bill Weber, from WCS join Dian Fossey at Karisoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Amy and Bill found the Mountain Gorilla Project, a collaboration of conservation NGOs to protect mountain gorillas in Rwanda Virunga National Park classified as a World Heritage Site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Habyarimana re-elected (only candidate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Dian Fossey murdered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>MGVP founded by Jim Foster with support from Morris Animal Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Habyarimana re-elected (only candidate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Digit Fund UK opens in the UK to support the US organisation. Gorillas inoculated against measles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>RPF invades Rwanda from Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>RPF invades Ruhengeri, Rwanda, coming through the Volcanes National Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Rwanda park headquarters attacked and all gorilla tourism stopped. Digit Fund renamed Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International and Digit Fund UK renamed Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>RPF and Rwandan Government sign the Arusha Accords and agree to a power sharing government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Habyarimana’s plane shot down (6th April 1994) and the Rwandan genocide begins. Around 800,000 are killed and over 1 million (refugees and genocidaries) flee to Zaire between April and August 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>More than 1 million Rwandan refugees and Congolese Tutsi return from Zaire to Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>First Congo War - the Zairian Government and international community refuse to separate genocidaires from refugees in camps of Eastern DRC and Rwanda (with support from Angola and Uganda) support Laurent Kabila to invade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Lauren Kabila and his army overthrow Mobutu and rename Zaire as the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The RCD is formed and members begin to create Local Defence Groups across the Kivus (until 2000). Kabila begins arming local groups (Mai Mai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>The Second Congo War. Banyalumenge and ex-FAR kill and are killed. Uganda and Rwanda ordered out of the DRC, but keep presence through proxy forces. Rwanda supports the RCD and Uganda supports the MLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>UPDF and RCD fight in Kisangani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Paul Kagame becomes the President of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Laurent Kabila assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila chosen by his allies as the new president of the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Rwanda begins to enforce a law against divisionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Rwanda Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Meeting in Goma with representatives from ICCN, UWA and ORTPN to form the Core Transboundary Secretariat; establish the Virunga Protected Area Network and develop a 10-year strategy (January) Construction of buffalo wall on DRC/Uganda border begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The three ministers responsible for protected areas sign Transboundary Ministerial Declaration in Goma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Joseph Kabila elected as President by the Congolese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Laurent Nkunda sets up CNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Nord-Kivu war. Fighting between CNDP and the Congolese army in North Kivu leads to the displacement of 200,000 Rwandan Constitution amended to include a law against ‘genocide ideology’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Nkunda arrested and detained in Rwanda after Joseph Kabila makes a deal with the Rwandan Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Paul Kagame re-elected as president of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Joseph Kabila re-elected as president of DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>The rebel group M23 forms and in December 2012 it takes Goma leading to further negotiations in Kampala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2. Political history

Understanding the political history of the Great Lakes region, specifically that of Rwanda and Eastern DRC, is relevant to this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, it highlights that from the time of German occupation, external ideas have flowed into Rwanda and values have been imposed upon its population from the outside. Secondly, whilst other contributory factors exist, the top-down nature of Rwandan government, coupled with a culture of obedience, arguably played a key role in the genocide. This situation continues today. Understanding this culture may explain barriers to supporting local populations to circulate their ideas and be included in decision-making processes. Third, understanding the genocide and post-genocide laws not only helps to explain how a culture of fear and obedience is still ingrained in Rwandan culture, but can also explain how state and NGO interventions may further marginalise already marginalised groups such as Batwa pygmies. Fourth, understanding the history of Rwandan intervention in the DRC helps to explain ongoing regional instability, but also helps to explain why conservation has been able to continue despite the conflict. This in turn helps to explain transboundary connections and disconnections, which are also relevant for conservation. Fifth, the history of conflict, instability and weak governance in the DRC may explain why certain ideas fail to circulate and why projects may have to be moved regularly.

5.2.1. The Rwandan Genocide

It is arguable that the 1994 Rwandan genocide had its roots in ethnic identities which colonising governments fostered and separated. It is therefore important to explore briefly this period and the different interests involved. From 1887 until 1916, Rwanda
was part of German East Africa (along with Burundi and Tanganyika, or mainland Tanzania). Figure 6 shows pre-World War One colonial boundaries.

**Figure 6: Map showing European African territories**

![Map of European African territories](image)

Source: Philatelic database

Under its occupation, German officials identified Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as distinct and separate ethnic groups (Meredith 2005: 158). From very early on, external parties began to divide and separate people across the countries now known as Rwanda and Burundi according to their views of ethnicity, leading, in this context, to the genocide.
In 1916, during WWI, forces from the Belgian Congo occupied German East Africa. The Treaty of Versailles divided it between Great Britain and Belgium, with the majority of Tanganyika going to the former and the western section going to the latter. Figure 7 shows colonial boundaries post-WWI. In 1924, the League of Nations formally granted control of the Belgian Occupied East African Territories to Belgium and it was officially named Ruanda-Urundi.

**Figure 7: Map showing post-WWI colonial boundaries in Africa**

Source: Maps Etc

During the 1920s, the Belgians introduced identity cards that began to identify citizens of Ruanda-Urundi by ethnic groups. In 1933, the Belgian administration organised a census and classified the whole population as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa based on facial features and cattle ownership (Melvern 2009: 14). Anyone of mixed origin was classed as no ethnicity (*ibid*).

Until 1923, Ruanda-Urundi was divided into *préfectures* led by *préfets*; communes led by *bourgmestres*; *secteurs* led by *conseillers* and tens of thousands of *sous secteurs* constituting small groups of households (Meredith 2005: 485). In the late 1920s, under Belgian rule, this system was replaced with one centralised structure; the multiple chief system was replaced, fusing three positions into one; and many Hutu chiefs were fired.
and replaced by Tutsi chiefs (Dowden 2008: 323; Prunier 2010: 37-38; Magnarella 2005: 807). Across Ruanda-Urundi, the new Belgian administration favoured Tutsis over Hutus. The Belgians simplified complex social structures into distinct, separate ethnic categories (Hintjens 1999: 249-251).

One important change made by the Belgians was the power it gave to the Church (Meredith 2005: 159; Prunier 2010: 34-5). After the Rwandan genocide, many journalists reported on the complicity of Church leaders in the genocide (for instance see Bedford 1994; Bonner 1995; Hammer 1995; Haugen 1995; Lourch 1994; Zarembo 1995). The Church played an important role in dividing and favouring different ethnicities. Any member of the new Rwandan elite created by the Belgians had to be a member of the Church, which also had a monopoly over education, and Tutsis, ‘the natural born chiefs’ and ‘future elites’, were prioritised (Prunier 2010: 34-5; also see Melvern 2009: 13; Jacobs 2011: 160). In the early 1950s, as more Rwandans, namely Tutsi, began to take positions in the Church, European Church leaders began to feel their power challenged (Prunier 2010: 43-44). Early European Church leaders, who typically came from upper class backgrounds, also began to be replaced by clerics from lower class backgrounds, who perhaps identified more closely with the ‘downtrodden Hutu’ (ibid). Combined with challenges to colonial rule from the Tutsi elite, the Church’s sympathies began to change towards supporting the Hutu (ibid). The Church began to support the education of a Hutu elite (Jacobs 2011: 160). In the late 1950s, in the run up to independence, Hutu intellectuals, with the support of the Church, began to produce various media, reporting their plight under the Tutsi; yet arguing to keep their separate identities (Prunier 2010: 46-47). This was the first time that the concept of ‘ethnic quotas’ was spoken of (ibid).

Political parties were created along ethnic divisions: in 1957 Gregoire Kayibanda created the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) which became the Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/ Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu (MDR-PARMEHUTU) in 1959; Joseph Gitera (a Hutu businessman) created the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA); and in 1959 the conservative Tutsi created the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), which was ‘hostile’ to the Belgians (Prunier 2010: 47-48). Political tensions rose and in 1959 when a PARMEHUTU activist was beaten by young UNAR members, Hutu activists retaliated,
attacking a Tutsi Chief and burning Tutsi homes (*ibid*: 48-49; Melvern 2009: 16). In 1960, the colonial government replaced its Tutsi chiefs with Hutu ones and organised communal elections in which PARMEHUTU, with Kayibanda as its leader, gained over three quarters of the votes (*ibid*: 51; Dowden 2008: 233).

Instability and massacres of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda in the 1960s contributed to Burundi’s push to become independent from it. Rwanda and Burundi formally became independent from Belgium and from each other in July 1962. A mass exodus of Tutsi from Rwanda to surrounding countries including Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, Uganda and Burundi began (Meredith 2005: 53-56). Despite great similarities in size, culture and ethnicities, two very different situations existed following independence: Rwanda as ‘a Republic under Hutu hegemony’ and Burundi as ‘a constitutional monarchy under the rule of the Tutsi minority’ (Lemarchand 2009: x). Tutsi exiles from all countries launched sporadic attacks in Rwanda and, in retaliation, thousands of Tutsi were killed (Meredith 2005: 53-56). Concerned about what was happening in Rwanda, Burundi’s leaders ‘resisted Hutu claims to power to the extent of repression’ which ultimately led to the genocide in Burundi in 1972 (Lemarchand 2009: xi).

The genocide in Burundi is arguably ‘the forgotten genocide’, yet between April and November 1972 between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus were killed (Lemarchand 1998: 6; also see Gasana 1997: 123). Lemarchand suggests that understanding this genocide can help us to understand the ‘anti-Tutsi backlash in Rwanda which paved the way for Major General Juvenal Habyarimana and his party, *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement* (MRND), to seize power’ (*ibid*).

In 1973, Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda and became the President of Rwanda. All Rwandans were required to be a member of MRND, even babies, and as the only candidate, he was re-elected in 1983 and 1988 (Meredith 2005: 489; Prunier 2010: 75-76; Melvern 2004: 11). Habyarimana kept Kayibanda’s ethnic quota policy in place (Prunier 2010: 75). Specifically, he limited the number of Tutsis in schools and

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27 Memories of the genocide might help to explain the massacre of around 20,000 Tutsis in Burundi following the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in July 1993 (Lemarchand 1998: 6). Equally, the following Tutsi army repression contributed to 300,000 Hutus fleeing across the border into Rwanda and to many of them joining the Hutu militia and the Interahamwe during the genocide in Rwanda (*ibid*: 7).
government to 10% (Melvern 2004: 12). He also championed the cause of the ‘little man’, or the herders and farmers and subtly blamed Merchants, Taylors and Intellectuals, the majority of whom were Tutsis, for the economic crisis that was occurring at the time (Hintjens 1999: 356-7).

In 1979, Rwandan (largely Tutsi) refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation (RRWF) “to help victims of political repression after the fall of Idi Amin” (Prunier 2010: 67). This became the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1980, with a greater focus on an eventual return to Rwanda. It changed its name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in December 1987.

Various resistance movements to the Ugandan President, Obote’s rule (1966-1971 and 1980-1985) had sprung up across Uganda in the early 1980s. Two Rwandan refugees, Paul Kagame (the current President of Rwanda) and Fred Rwigyema (deceased) had worked alongside Yoweri Museveni (the current President of Uganda), who they had met when fighting for The Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in the late 1970s and had remained friends since (Prunier 2010: 68). Under Obote’s rule, Rwandan refugees had been persecuted; in the 1980s, youth gangs harassed Rwandan immigrants and accused them of taking their land (Stearns 2011: 237). When Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) overthrew Obote in 1986, 3,000 of the 14,000 fighters were Rwandan (Prunier 2010: 70) and he put many Rwandans in good positions when he came into power in 1986 (Stearns 2011: 237; Melvern 2009: 33). Yet Museveni’s attitude towards the Rwandans changed quickly as land disputes increased and Ugandan resentment towards the number of Rwandans in the army grew, putting pressure on him and forcing him to demobilise many Rwandans in the NRA (Prunier 2010: 74; Stearns 2011: 237-8). This gave the push the RPF needed to start their return to Rwanda (ibid).

On 1st October 1990, the RPF, led by Major General Fred Rwigyema, Lt Colonel Adam Wasswa and five majors, including Paul Kagame, crossed the border into Rwanda (Prunier 2010: 93). France saw this attack as an Anglophone threat to Francophone Africa and backed Habyarimana (Prunier 2010: 100-107; Huliaras 1998), even providing artillery support for the counter attack (Melvern 2009 34). By the end of the month, many fighters had been killed, including Major General Fred Rwigyema, and many were forced to cross back to Uganda (Prunier 2010: 95-6). The RPF retreated into the Virunga Mountains, where many soldiers starved to death (Melvern 2009: 34-5).
The Rwandan government organised a ‘fake’ attack on Kigali on the night of the 4\textsuperscript{th}/5\textsuperscript{th} October 1990 to increase the perception of the threat; it began indiscriminately arresting educated Tutsi and ‘opposition-minded Hutu’ and radio stations broadcast announcements advocating listeners to ‘track down and arrest infiltrators’ (Prunier 2010: 102-9). Between 11\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} October, nearly 350 Tutsi were killed (Prunier 2010: 109). The Rwandan Army, the 	extit{Forces Armées Rwandaises} (FAR), began a mass recruitment drive, supported by France (Prunier 2010: 113-4). The RPF also continued to recruit and almost doubled their numbers to 12,000 between early 1991 and the end of 1992 (Prunier 2010: 117). On 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1991, the RPF came through the Virunga Volcanoes and attacked a prison in Ruhengeri, releasing many prisoners (Prunier 2010:120; Melvern 2009: 42-3).

In June 1991, a new constitution in Rwanda allowed multipartism and opposition parties began to register. Political struggle ensued and propaganda prompted a wave of massacres throughout 1991 and 1992, which, according to Prunier, would always be followed by meetings attended by ‘an important person’ from Kigali, ‘to drum into [local peasants] that the people they were soon to kill were 	extit{ibyitso}\textsuperscript{28}, i.e. actual or potential collaborators of the RPF arch-enemy’ (2010: 138). These massacres, compounded by terrorist attacks in Kigali, for which the RPF was always blamed, were arguably used to prevent democratisation (Prunier 2010: 143-4). On 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1992, a new cabinet was sworn in and the MRND(D)\textsuperscript{29} began to share power with opposition parties such as the MDR and PSD (Melvern 2004: 33-4; Prunier 2010: 145).

With the political reforms of 1991, a group of senior military and civilian officials emerged, centred around Agathe Habyarimana’s (the President’s wife) clan (Hintjens 1999: 259; Melvern 2004: 13). 	extit{Akazu}, or ‘small house’, began to organise politically and militarily and gained control over the president’s extensive networks, dominating central and regional government positions (Hintjens 1999: 259; Melvern 2004: 13). Importantly, it gained power over paramilitary youth groups who operated alongside the army at the local, regional and national level (Hintjens 1999: 261). The 	extit{Akazu} spread the message that democracy was a cover to allow restoration of the old feudal order that favoured Tutsis. It also revived the ‘Bahima Conspiracy’- rumours that Burundian Tutsi

\textsuperscript{28} Translates in Kinyarwanda as ‘traitors’, or ‘Tutsi sympathizers’

\textsuperscript{29} With the latter ‘D’ standing for ‘	extit{Démocratie}’ (Prunier 2010: 126)
were going to massacre many Hutus in order to win the election (ibid: 263, following Lemarchand 1996: 27-8). One of the key documents of the Bahima Conspiracy was the ‘10 commandments of the Hutu’, which amongst other things prohibited marriage between Hutu and Tutsi (Melvern 2009: 83; Hintjens 1999: 265). These were published in the tabloid newspaper Kangara, which arguably played an indirect role in encouraging rape of Tutsi women (Melvern 2009: 84).

In February 1992, the RPF almost reached Kigali and a ceasefire was called, with discussions held in Bujumbura, lasting through to March. However, at the same time, Habyarimana held contradictory discussions in Kigali with different members of all the same parties present at Bujumbura; the opposition doubted the RPF’s reason for invading was solely about refugees being able to return (Prunier 2010: 179-80). Some ‘hardline’ members of the MRND(D) and the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), a radical Hutu party with racist views, felt that Habyarimana was ‘selling out’ (Prunier 2010: 161). The CDR, which unofficially included the youth wing of the MRND(D) - the Interahamwe, as well as other army extremists, felt that Habyarimana had not reacted strongly enough to the RPF attack and included him on a list of ‘traitors’ who ‘deserved to die’ (Prunier 2010: 182). Violence escalated as the army supplied the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who began killing Tutsi and ‘old opposition sympathisers’ (Prunier 2010: 184). Whilst emphasising his reluctance, Habyarimana eventually agreed to a peace deal under international pressure and approved to the repatriation of refugees and a 40%-60% split of RPF and Rwandan government troops in the army (Prunier 2010: 186-7; Beswick 2009: 251; Rusagara 2012: 220). On the 4th August 1993, a peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, was signed in Tanzania and a broad-based transitional government (BBTG), consisting of various opposition parties, was established. The peace deal included provisions for UN military monitoring and UN support and in October and November 1993, UNAMIR (the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) sent troops to Kigali (Prunier 2010: 194-5; 204; Dallaire 2003; Melvern 2004, 2009).

In October 1993, the Burundian Hutu President Ndadaye was assassinated. This and ongoing ethnic violence in Burundi made it easier for the CDR to rally the wider Rwandan population (Prunier 2010:199-200). The Interahamwe began to broadcast the locations to which Tutsi were fleeing over their radio station, Radio-Télévision Libre
des Mille Collines (RTLM) (Kellow and Steeves 1998). The extremist network gained control of local government authorities and many supposed RPF sympathisers and Tutsi were killed (Prunier 2010: 201-3). In January 1994, the UN sent in a further 1,000 troops, but political tension and killings continued. The Interahamwe were now acting separately from the MRND(D) (Prunier 2010: 204-8). Failure to implement the Arusha Agreement led to international pressure on Habyarimana and on 6th April 1994, he flew to Tanzania to meet with other African leaders, from whom he received heavy criticism (Prunier 2010: 211). He left that evening and at 8:30pm his plane, which was also carrying other senior government officials and the new Burundian President, was shot down. It is still not known who was responsible, but this news sparked the Rwandan genocide.

Following the assassination, carefully targeted killings began, including of the Rwandan Prime Minister and ten UN soldiers that were protecting her (Prunier 2010: 230; Dallaire 2003: 255-8; Melvern 2004: 263). Roadblocks were set up and the killing spread throughout Kigali targeting Tutsi, Hutu members of democratic opposition parties, and those that appeared to be from a higher social class, for instance if they were well-dressed or spoke good French (Prunier 2010: 231; Melvern 2009: 140-142). At this point Belgium tried to intervene through the UN, but France opposed this (Melvern 2009; Prunier 2010: 234).

On the 7th April, the killing spread to the interior of Rwanda with orders passed down through local administration. With the exception of Butare, districts followed such orders. The massacres lasted six weeks, in which time, 800,000 people were killed and many more were raped and maimed. The majority of killings were carried out in villages using knives, spears and machetes. As the RPF invaded from the North, its soldiers also carried out revenge killings (Prunier 2001: 266; Human Rights Watch 2009a; Beswick 2012: 253). They reached Kigali on 11th April 1994 and a three-month battle for control of the capital began. Since this time the RPF has been accused of many other killings. For instance, it is accused of killing 5,000 unarmed Hutu in Kibeho in 1995 and many, many more in North Kivu since this time (Lemarchand 1998: 8). It is suggested that more than 100,000 civilians were killed by the RPF between April and November 1994 (Reyntjens 2004: 194; Prunier 1996: 427).
5.2.2. Contributory factors in the genocide

Hintjens (1999) suggests that there were three key contributory factors in the Rwandan genocide: external colonial and neo-colonial influences; domestic causes, including demographic factors and ethnic conflict; and psychosocial reasons such as presumed social conformation and obedience of Rwandans, combined with a top-down central state. Additionally, certain types of foreign intervention by some and a lack of foreign intervention by others, arguably contributed to and prolonged the genocide. Several of these factors are particularly relevant to this thesis.

Whilst debated by some (see Thomson 2009; Collins 1998), many argue that a culture of obedience amongst the local Rwandan population was a key contributory factor in the genocide (Prunier 2010: 57, 245; Paluck and Green 2009: 622; Republic of Rwanda 2002: 4; National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2004: 16; Hintjens 1999: 244-5: Prunier 2011: 23). A top-down state with strict laws and penalties facilitated this culture. For instance, farmers were told what to plant and when and were fined if they disobeyed (Hintjens 1999: 270). During the genocide, local authorities persuaded peasants to form groups of auto-defense-civile and made killing part of traditional community work, or Umuganda, even forcing husbands to kill their wives in some cases (Melvern 2009: 39). Understanding this context of a top-down state, combined with a culture of obedience and conformance is important as it explains how ideas typically flow within Rwanda and how civil society voice is likely to be stifled. This situation continues today in Rwanda. I return to this point in chapter 8 to explain why it is difficult for NGOs to support local idea generation.

Another reason why so many people were killed during the genocide was the lack of international intervention. Both the UK and the US - the latter wary after the recent deaths of its soldiers in Somalia - pushed the UN Security Council to reduce its peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda to 270 men (Dallaire 2003: 71, 240, 374; Melvern 2009; Dowden 2008: 237). David Hannay, British Ambassador to the UN, said they had a lack of information on what was happening in Rwanda, but it later emerged that they had access to first hand accounts of the March 1994 killings (Melvern 2009: 131). Despite the urgent pleas of UN General Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda, troops were reduced to just 400 (Dallaire 2003; Melvern 2009). The UK and US also tried to block the use of the word genocide as it would, by international law, have forced them to
intervene (Dowden 2008: 237). It took until 8th June 1994 for the UN Security Council to admit that ‘acts of genocide’ had been committed and even then they would not acknowledge that a genocide was taking place (Meredith 2005: 518-9; Dallaire 2003: 374; Melvern 2009: 203). In fact much of the support provided to Rwanda by foreign governments was to evacuate expatriates, with the exception of various individuals that ‘VIPs’ would contact Dallaire directly about (Dallaire 2003: 220, 275, 282, 286, 339; Melvern 2009: 161). Those Rwandans who boarded European convoys were taken off at roadblocks and killed (Melvern 2009: 162). In total 3,900 people of 22 nationalities were evacuated from Rwanda (Melvern 2004: 189). Foreign assistance did little to prevent the deaths of vulnerable Rwandans.

The World Bank refused a $140 million loan to Rwanda until it had repaid the $4.5million debt accrued by the previous government (ibid). At the same time, whilst it cost Rwanda $112 million to arm and equip the genocidaires, questions have been raised about how World Bank visits to Rwanda to monitor Structural Adjustment Programmes failed to notice this (Melvern 2009: 79). The World Bank requested that Rwanda reduce military spending but they simply reduced soldier rations and civil service salaries and continued to increase their defense budget (ibid: 80).

France in particular is accused of prolonging the genocide and further violence in the region. It provided equipment and training to the Gendarmerie Nationale, which was created in 1976 by French officers as part of military support (Melvern 2009: 27-8). In fact, from 1975 when a military cooperation and training agreement was signed with Paris, until 1990, France replaced Belgium as the most important form of military support to Rwanda (Melvern 2009: 29). Seeing attacks by the RPF as an Anglo threat to Francophone Africa led to further military support to Habyarimana’s army (Melvern 2009: 35). For instance, in October 1990, the Rwandan army expanded from 5,000 to 28,000, all equipped by France and Egypt (Melvern 2009: 36-7). France trained FAR soldiers before the genocide and when the genocide began it evacuated some of the ‘principal ideologues’ leading to accusations that it was trying to cover up the extent of its military support and that it might be responsible for Habyarimana’s assassination (McNulty 1997). In fact, France reportedly welcomed Madame Agathe, giving her and her family $40,000 meant for refugee assistance (Meredith 2005: 510). Even after the genocide, France actively blocked EU assistance of $200 million to Rwanda and failed

In June 1994, under international pressure, France approved ‘Operation Turquoise’ and sent 2,500 heavily equipped troops to Rwanda. It has been argued that this was more likely a response to the perceived Anglophone threat they felt from the English speaking RPF, than for humanitarian reasons (Meredith 2005: 493; Weber and Vedder 2001: 333-4). On arrival, the French were welcomed by the *Interahamwe* and the former government (Prunier 2010: 292). They left in August 1994, declaring their mission a success, yet they were often bystanders to the killings (Prunier 2010: 292; Weber and Vedder 2001: 334). At the same time as Operation Turquoise, it is suggested that France delivered arms to *genocidaires* who had fled to Goma (Meredith 2005: 519-520).

Though numbers are debated\(^3\), up to two million people, refugees and *genocidaires*, fled Rwanda during the genocide (see Figure 8 for map of movement). Around 600,000 of these went to Tanzania, 250,000 to Burundi and 1.2 million to Eastern DRC (Weber and Vedder 2001: 338; Meredith 2005). Refugee camps were set up in Eastern DRC, where *genocidaires* mixed with refugees. As such, the camps accommodated ‘intact militia structures [which] served to keep the civilian population under the control of the former government’ (Prunier 2010: 267; see also Prunier 2011: 25). Gang murders and robberies were a regular occurrence inside camps (*ibid*; Stearns 2011: 36-7) and some groups infiltrated Rwanda to kill Tutsi on a regular basis (Stearns 2011: 29). With the exception of *Medicine Sans Frontier* who left, many aid agencies reportedly turned a blind eye to what was happening in the refugee camps, continuing their support (Meredith 2005: 527).

For the new government in Rwanda, it was difficult to see how international players had failed to act and had allowed a genocide to occur in Rwanda, in some respects even facilitating it. It was perhaps even more difficult for them to see the international community pouring in aid to the camps that housed many of the perpetrators. The refugees in the DRC received far more international attention than the Rwandan

\(^3\) For instance, according to Stearns 2011, there were 750,000 refugees in total
genocide (Meredith 2005: 517). Rwanda’s history leading up to the events of 1994 was plagued by top-down foreign interventions, which arguably contributed heavily to the genocide. Yet pleas from the RPF and UNAMIR forces on the ground in the early stages of the genocide went ignored by the international community, allowing it to go ahead. Following the genocide the international community, or parts of it, were perceived to support the genocidaires, either through welcoming them into their country (such as in the case of France) or by sending international aid to refugee camps in the DRC. Combined, these factors arguably contribute to a wariness of outside intervention. This may be a contributory factor in the Rwandan government’s attempts to coordinate external players and their interventions today (see chapter 6, page 183-9).

Figure 8: Map showing Rwandan and Burundian refugee movement 1994-1999

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
5.2.3. Rwanda today

The political situation in Rwanda today is stable. The Government reintroduced Gacaca, a village level justice system that was abolished by the Belgians in 1924, for the victims and perpetrators of the genocide (Breed 2012: 29). From the outside, Rwanda is portrayed as a development success story. The government places strong emphasis on economic growth, seen through its Rwanda Vision 2020 document (Republic of Rwanda 2002) and it has “quickly risen as one of the modern stars of economic development” (Sodipo and Musiitwa 2012: 114). GDP growth has been around six to eight percent in recent years (Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012: 13). Rwanda is popular with Western countries as it supports US Foreign Policy and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is involved in African peacekeeping (Dowden 2008: 253). It has also greatly increased the number of women holding political power: women hold over a half of the seats in the National Assembly and nearly a third of the portfolios in the new government (Reyntjens 2004: 186; pers. comm. Dr. Shirley Randall, Centre for Gender and Development, Kigali). Importantly, Hutus hold 15 out of 29 positions in government and 13 out of 18 ministerial portfolios (Reyntjens 2004: 187).

However, concerns have been raised about human rights abuses following the murders of various opposition leaders in the run up the 2010 elections (McGreal 2010; Kinzer 2011; Grant 2010; Adamczyk 2012: 60, 67). Whilst the RPF may have achieved ‘rapid institutional reconstruction and relatively good bureaucratic governance’; according to Reyntjens, power and wealth are unevenly distributed and the government has ‘practised ethnic discrimination’ and has ‘eliminated every form of dissent, destroyed civil society, conducted a fundamentally flawed ‘democratization’ process and massively violated human rights at home and abroad’ (2004: 177). For instance, political leaders and journalists who have criticised the government have been threatened, imprisoned and forced into exile (Reyntjens 2004: 181-2). According to Reyntjens, the government has close ties with some factions of civil society, yet denounces others, preventing free political expression (ibid: 183-5). Whilst Paul Kagame was re-elected in 2003, Reyntjens suggests that his campaign involved arrests, disappearances and intimidation (ibid: 186). Even Gacaca has been criticised as charges and punishments are often decided based on subjective views from people with no
formal legal training and in many cases they have simply been used to address
neighbourly squabbles and grievances (Breed 2012: 32-38). People are forced to
participate in Gacaca, even if it means testifying against close family members
(Thomson 2012: 103).

Whilst the government promotes free speech, it limits this through many of its laws
(Cowell 2012: 50). By deconstructing Rwanda’s National Unity policy, Thomson shows
how the RPF has used various laws to control the lives of peasant communities (2012).
She suggests this is done through approaches such as reinterpreting pre-genocide
history; intolerance of political dissent; elimination of references to ethnicity in public
discourse; collectivism of Hutu guilt for the genocide (i.e. labeling all Hutus as
perpetrators); mandatory participation of the entire population in Gacaca community
level justice trials; and Ingando re-education camps for up to several months for church
leaders, ex prisoners, judges, ex-soldiers and university leavers to teach them about
Rwandan history and reconciliation (2012: 100-106).

Following the genocide, the RPF introduced the Genocide Law, which allowed them to
try perpetrators and those involved in the genocide.31 In 2008, the Rwandan government
made an addition to the Constitution of Rwanda, outlawing ‘Divisionism’ as an act of
promoting genocide. Divisionism is defined by the Rwandan government as:

> […] the use of any speech, written statement, or action that divides people,
that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising
which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination.
(Waldorf 2007: 407)

In a bid for national unity, the government has erased ethnicities, making everyone
‘Rwandans’ (Marijnen and van der Lijn 2012: 16). To question who is Hutu, Tutsi or
Twa is seen as divisionist by Rwandan law and can even be seen as promoting genocide
(Thomson 2012: 97; Dowden 2008: 252). The law is arguably rather vague, even some
judges do not understand what divisionist means (Cowell 2012: 58, following research
findings by Human Rights Watch in 2008). This vagueness begins to instill fear in the
population as people are unsure what they are allowed or not allowed to say and are
scared they could say something incorrect (Cowell 2012: 58). Such fear compounds a

31 Whilst Rwanda was signed up to the International Genocide Convention pre-1994, this had not been
incorporated into national law
culture of obedience. Beswick suggests that this culture of fear ‘narrows perceptions of political space’ and shuts down political debate, particularly about certain issues (2010; also see Cowell 2012). One civil society group, LIPRODHOR, spoke out about human rights abuses in Rwanda and was accused of supporting divisionist ideas (Adamcyzk 2012: 67-8). Indeed, one government official, Protais Musoni (Ministry of Local Government) said in 2006 that the government prefers NGOs to have a service delivery rather than a civil society empowerment role to challenge the government (ibid).

As a result of Rwanda’s divisionism law, Batwa communities are referred to as historically marginalised people, or HMP, and there is a strong focus on ‘socially integrating’ them into society (see chapter 6, page 177). One NGO interviewee reported that his organisation is trying to work towards “recognition for the Batwa as a separate category as they are all vulnerable”, but expressed the low likelihood of this as “it would be illegal under current law”. This is relevant to this thesis as it prevents interventions being targeted at particular communities, potentially marginalising them further. It also impacts on relationships between NGOs, states and communities. I explore this further in chapters 6 and 8.

5.2.4. The Congo Wars

In addition to the tribulations in Rwanda and Burundi, two wars also took place in the DRC from 1996-1997 and from 1998-2002 and conflict has continued in North Kivu since this time. Exploring these conflicts provides context to understand the relationship between Rwanda and the DRC within which transboundary mountain gorilla conservation takes place, connections and disconnections exist and conservation ideas circulate.

In the Nineteenth Century, Tutsi emigrants from Rwanda had settled on the grazing land around Mulenge in South Kivu, DRC (Meredith 2005: 528). In the 1960s, they began to call themselves the Banyamulenge in order to distinguish themselves from the Tutsi refugees who had arrived after the massacres in Rwanda (ibid; Rusagara 2012: 224). Despite having fought for Mobutu in the 1960s, in the 1980s, with pressure from other local populations and increasing tensions, Mobutu repealed a law that had granted the

32 Interview with Davis, November 2009
Banyamulenge citizenship (Meredith 2005: 528). The local populations of Hunde and Nyanga, who had tried to ‘cleanse’ the region of Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) in the past, joined forces with the Rwandan Interahamwe in the mid-1990s and began to attack the Zairian Tutsi in North Kivu (Meredith 2005: 530). The Banyamulenge joined with Zairian Tutsi and Tutsi refugees and turned to Paul Kagame for help (ibid).

In July 1996, Kagame visited Washington DC, warning that if the international community did not deal with the genocidaires and intervene then Rwanda would take action (Stearns 2011: 43; Meredith 2005:531). He organised military training for the Banyamulenge and Tutsi refugees and prepared the new government army, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)\(^3\) (ibid). At around the same time, Rwandan Intelligence Chief, Patrick Karegeya, along with several Tanzanian officials, visited a former Congolese revolutionary, Laurent- Désiré Kabila, at his home in Tanzania, asking him to lead a new rebellion to overthrow President Mobutu and ‘liberate’ Zaire (Stearns 2011: 87). Kabila agreed and with Rwandan and Ugandan support, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) was created. On the 8\(^{th}\) October, the Deputy Governor of South Kivu ordered all Banyamulenge to leave the DRC (ibid). The international community took no action\(^4\) and Rwanda invaded. This was the start of what is known as the First Congo War. On 17\(^{th}\) November, Rwanda attacked Mugunda camp and over a period of three days, more than a million people returned to Rwanda (Stearns 2011: 44). By the end of November 700,000 people had returned to Rwanda and as many as 200,000 refugees in transit had been killed by the AFDL (Meredith 2005: 535). Many others fled deeper into Zaire and the AFDL followed them across the country. In May 1997, the AFDL overthrew Mobutu and Laurent Kabila became President of Zaire, renaming the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Kabila failed to deal with the Interahamwe and genocidaires living in the DRC. He even recruited ex-FAR (ex-army under the previous Hutu government) and Interahamwe into his army (Meredith 2005: 538; Taylor 2003: 50). This led to tensions

\(^3\) When the RPF came into power, it employed a full government cabinet, as such it was no longer solely a military outfit. The military arm of the new RPF government is called the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)

\(^4\) Although Taylor (2003) argues that the US provided technical assistance to help Kabila’s army reach Kinshasa.
between Rwanda and the DRC and in 1998 Rwanda began putting together a new rebellion, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the RCD launched a rebellion from Kivu to bring down Kabila (Stearns 2011: 205-6; Meredith 2005: 538-9). The Second Congo War had begun. Laurent Kabila invited Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe to intervene and support him and began arming local groups, also known as Mai Mai (Stearns 2011: 250). According to Stearns, the war was ‘militarily successful’; by 1999 the RCD had seized half of the country, including its third largest city, Kisangani (Stearns 2011: 211). However, the RCD was seen by many Congolese as a Rwandan party and was attacked by local militia. In retaliation, the RCD killed large numbers of civilians (ibid).

At the same time as the Rwandan rebellion, Jean-Pierre Bemba, a Congolese businessman and politician, started up another rebellion in Northern DRC, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). This was backed by Uganda but without the same level of external interference experienced by the RCD (Stearns 2011: 216-226; Prunier 2011: 204-8). The MLC captured Mobutu’s hometown of Gabodolite in July 1999 and established its headquarters there (Stearns 2011: 218; Prunier 2011: 208). In 2001, at the request of Uganda, it began expanding its operations outside of Equateur Province (Stearns 2011: 218). This led to conflict with other armed groups for resources and many people were killed (Stearns 2011: 230). Unable to overthrow Kabila, Uganda and Rwanda began carving up the DRC for its resources, particularly coltan (Meredith 2005: 540-541; Prunier 2011: 220; Global Witness 2004a; 2004b). In May 1999, the MLC and the RCD began fighting for control of Kisangani, an area rich in diamonds, arguably making it difficult for either group to keep up the pretence that they were invading Congo for security reasons (Stearns 2011: 235-7). In Eastern DRC, the RCD splintered into rival factions, some backed by Uganda and some by Rwanda and they began fighting over resources across the country (ibid; Prunier 2011: 204-8; Beswick 2012: 255-6).

In 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated. His allies decided that his son, Joseph Kabila should become President. In May 2002, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue was held in South Africa and a deal was reached whereby Joseph Kabila would be President and Jean-Pierre Bemba would be Prime Minister (Stearns 2011: 316). Bowing to pressure from the international loans institutions, Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their troops (ibid: 
However, violence and civilian deaths escalated and parties returned to South Africa in November, where a further deal was reached: Kabila would be President but members of both the MLC and RCD would hold vice presidential positions (ibid). This marked the official end of the Second Congo War.

Remnants of Hutu militia still operated in Eastern DRC and by 2000 had joined with the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) to form the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (Martin et al 2011: 629). In 2004, Laurent Nkunda launched an insurgency against the government in North Kivu, justifying his actions as protecting his community from ex-FAR and Interahamwe, but it also helped the RCD to keep its influence in Eastern DRC (Stearns 2011: 322-3). Nkunda had previously been a member of the RPF, had fought alongside Laurent Kabila to overthrow Mobutu, had fought for the RCD during the Second Congo War and had been a member of the new integrated national army of the Transitional Government of the DRC (Stearns 2011: 322; Beswick 2009). However, in 2007, having rejected the authority of the Congolese Government, he moved to the Masisi Forests of North Kivu with other RCD rebels and set up the political organisation: Congrès National pour la Défense du People (CNDP) (ibid). Rwanda was widely accused of supporting CNDP and using it as a proxy to intervene in the DRC (Beswick 2009; 2012). In 2009, Joseph Kabila made a deal with Paul Kagame; Rwandans were allowed into the DRC to seek out FDLR in return for arresting Nkunda (Stearns 2011: 323). On 23rd March 2009 the DRC government and the CNDP made a peace deal, which amongst other things recognised CNDP as a political party and reintegrated some CNDP members into the Congolese national army (Democratic Republic of Congo 2009). Most recently, many of these soldiers have defected from the Congolese army and formed the rebel group M23 in North Kivu citing violations of the peace deal. Rwanda has been widely accused of supporting M23 rebels (Smith 2012; BBC 2012) who at the time of writing was taking control of the city of Goma and were threatening to march to Kinshasa to overthrow the government.

Violence thus continues in the region today. An International Rescue Committee Study found that 5.4million people died as a result of the conflict in the DRC between 1998 and 2007 and many more have died since this time (IRC 2010). The UN estimates that 200,000 women have been the victims of sexual violence since 1998 (Stearns 2011: 328; Human Rights Watch 2009b).
With respect to conservation interventions and the concerns of this thesis, the insecurity in the region has had a direct impact on conservation and on NGO interventions. Large displacement of hundreds of thousands of people across the region has placed increasing pressure on forests for food and fuel; rebel activities conflict with park interests and have led to deaths of rangers and threats to NGO staff and the uncertain and localised nature of the conflict has meant NGOs and park staff cannot work in certain places at certain times and have had to move staff and projects at short notice.

In 1994, more than 800,000 refugees moved into DRC, all travelling through the Virunga forests (Kalpers et al 2003: 327; Martin et al 2011: 627). The refugee camps have also exerted tremendous pressure on the forests (Kalpers et al 2003: 327; Glew and Hudson 2007: 141-2). Rebel groups are responsible for vast amounts of charcoal production in PNVi to supply the Goma market (UN News Centre 2011; De Merode 2011; Miller 2009). Whilst there are claims that rebel fighters have prevented park rangers from accessing certain areas of the park for gorilla monitoring\(^\text{35}\) (see Kalpers et al 2003), gorillas have also been used as propaganda tools by both the government and rebel groups; the Government claiming that rebels are killing gorillas and rebels claiming that the government was planning to bomb the park with napalm (Adams and McShane, 1996: 203). According to the Africa Research Bulletin, ‘at least 10 [gorillas] have been killed in Congo’s Virunga National Park by rebel fighters and those involved in the illegal charcoal trade’ (2008: 17444), yet it was a Park Ranger that was accused of Gorilla killings in the region (BBC 2008). When Karl Ammann, a photographer, visited the DRC in February 2000 he was informed by a rebel leader that the rebel fighters support conservation and would welcome researchers back into the areas that their troops control (Vogel 2000: 2387). Much to the criticism of other NGOs, IGCP was able to work in sections of PNVi under CNDP control when park staff and other NGOs were denied access\(^\text{36}\) (see chapter 7, page 224-7).

Insecurity has also meant that some NGO projects have had to be moved, postponed or cancelled (FZS 2011, 2012; WWF 2005). For instance, Frankfurt Zoological Society’s (FZS) work in the DRC was suspended in the 1990s and restarted in 2001 (FZS 2011). Similarly, another international NGO’s project to support patrols in Kabara, PNVi was

\(^{35}\) Interviews with Richard and Liz, November 2009
\(^{36}\) Interview with Liz, November 2009
also ended due to insecurity in that part of the park.\textsuperscript{37} One NGO had been forced to support a different health centre from the one they had intended to support due to security concerns.\textsuperscript{38} In 2009, IGCP transboundary project exchange visits only took place in Uganda and Rwanda and their joint transboundary project with Care had been postponed in the DRC\textsuperscript{39}. The MGVP was forced to end their employee health programme in the DRC for security reasons, but had restarted it by 2009.\textsuperscript{40} There was only one NGO that worked in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC that had not postponed or altered its Congolese projects as a result of the conflict. Staff acknowledged that this meant they had to work with rebel groups sometimes.\textsuperscript{41}

In summary, conflict and regional politics are clearly closely entwined with conservation in the region. In the DRC, charcoal production inside PNVi finances rebel groups, degrades the forest and leads to conflicts with ICCN and conservation NGOs, in some cases making it very difficult, if not impossible for conservation to continue in the park. Wider political instability has meant that conservation efforts have had to be moved, postponed or stopped completely. This is likely to affect communication between conservation actors, potentially creating disconnections and impacting on idea circulation. In Rwanda, the political history has fostered a culture of a top-down state and a compliant population, potentially creating barriers to idea circulation and particularly to the inclusion of certain people’s voices within decision-making processes. Equally, the nature of some of Rwanda’s post-genocide laws prevents interventions targeted specifically at certain marginalised groups, such as the Batwa, who live on the boundaries of PNV.

The complex political and cultural history of the region provides interesting and relevant context for investigating different types of connections – including some of the more blurred connections – and disconnections between states, NGOs and local communities in later chapters. However, despite this context of political instability and many possible disconnections, I show below that collaborative transboundary efforts to conserve mountain gorillas have continued throughout conflict in the region. This

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Beatrice, November 2009
\textsuperscript{38} Interview with Helen, November 2009
\textsuperscript{39} Interviews with Eze, October 2009 and Juma, November 2009
\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Jenny, October 2009
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Harvey, November 2009
creates an interesting paradox, whereby on the one hand, conservation in closely informed by and linked to regional politics, but on the other hand conservation operates in a ‘bubble’, in many ways disconnected from regional politics. I develop this discussion below.

5.3. Mountain Gorilla conservation

5.3.1. A history of mountain gorilla conservation

Mountain Gorillas are found in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda and the Virunga Volcanoes Region of Central Africa, which encompasses parts of Virunga National Park (PNVi) in the DRC, Volcans National Park (PNV) in Rwanda and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP) in Uganda42 (see Figure 9). These areas are also part of the Albertine Rift Biodiversity Hotspot (Myers et al 2000). PNVi is also a UNESCO World Heritage Site and PNV is a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. The parks in Uganda, the DRC and Rwanda are managed by the Uganda Wildlife Authority, the Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de Nature (ICCN) and the Rwanda Development Board (RDB)43 respectively.

The Virunga Volcanoes consist of a variety of afromontane habitat stratified by altitude: Neoboutonia species zone; bamboo zone; Hagenia-Hypericum zone; and sub alpine and alpine zones (Kalpers et al 2003: 327; Schaller 1963; Owiunji et al 2005: 12-14). Only the middle altitude forest and its associated zones are suitable for gorilla nutritional needs year round (Weber and Vedder 1983: 351). The Mountain Gorilla (Gorilla beringei beringei) is listed as ‘critically endangered’ (IUCN red list 2008). However, numbers have steadily been increasing in recent decades. A 2010 census of the Virunga Massif shows that there are now 480 mountain gorillas in this area, up around 25% from the 380 identified in the 2003 census (IGCP 2010). These typically live in the DRC and Rwandan parts of the Virungas, but do travel through MGNP. Combined with the 302 mountain gorillas in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda (based on 2006 census data) and the four orphaned mountain gorillas in captivity, this gives a total of 786 individuals living across Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC.

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42 See Kalpers et al 2003 and Weber and Vedder 1983 for full details of geographical range in each area
43 Until recently Rwandan national parks were managed by the Office Rwandais de Tourisme et des Parcs Nationales (ORTPN). This has now become part of RDB.
There are several explanations, besides their limited habitat size, for the low number of mountain gorillas. They have slow reproductive rates; the average age for a gorilla to produce its first offspring is ten and a single offspring is typically born every three to four years (Lonsdorf 2007: 72). They live in small groups ranging from 2 to 23 individuals (McNeilage et al 2001) and research shows that when a female gorilla is killed, her young offspring are very unlikely to survive becoming orphaned (Lonsdorf 2007: 74). Similarly, the removal of a particularly important male member of the group can lead to further killings of unweaned offspring by the successive male (Lonsdorf 2007: 74; Kalpers et al 2003: 331). Mountain gorillas are also susceptible to human disease, a risk which increases with tourism and gorilla tracking (Sandbrook and Semple 2006).

The Central Albertine Rift is one of the most densely populated regions in Africa, with an average of 420 people per square kilometre, most of whom are subsistence farmers (IGCP 2007: 3). The population density around PNV is particularly high, with an average of 590 people per square kilometre in the twelve sectors bordering the park and even reaches 1,028 people per square kilometre in Gahunga sector (Bush et al 2010: 4).
Around a third of people living around PNV are landless and many households feel they have insufficient land to meet their basic needs in the future (Bush et al 2010: 5). Households report that they still use the park illegally to collect firewood, for honey, water, bush meat and bamboo (ibid). Kivu is home to over 300 people per square kilometre and is perhaps the most densely populated region of the DRC due to its climate and soil fertility44 (Biswas et al. 1996). The recent and ongoing conflict and high numbers of Internally Displaced People have compounded this. People have been attracted to certain parts of the region due to the benefits offered by NGO projects.45 Human presence in the park arguably poses a threat to mountain gorillas as some people lay snares for other animals, destroy habitat for firewood, charcoal and beekeeping and carry diseases that can be transmitted to mountain gorillas. This understanding informs many of the interventions implemented by NGOs and states in the region (see chapter 6, page 156-182).

Combined with their endangered status, Mountain Gorillas are arguably one of the most charismatic species on the planet. Often portrayed as cuddly creatures and used as ‘adoption’ animals to raise funds for other conservation activities; the similarity of great apes to humans sets them apart from many other animals and allows the Western public to empathise more deeply with their plight. Adams and McShane document how in 1977, ‘the death of a single gorilla in a tiny, faraway place was worthy of the CBS Evening News’ (1996: 184) and over thirty years later, gorilla slaughter in the DRC was still making international news (BBC 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d). Amy Vedder, a gorilla researcher, tells how in 1994, she was asked by a US TV network to speak about the fate of the gorillas in the midst of the Rwandan genocide (Weber and Vedder 2001: 300-331). Feeling that there were bigger issues at stake she agreed on the condition she could speak about Rwanda and its people; the network responded that viewers would be more interested in the gorillas (ibid). Dowden recalls how “The Times treated [the genocide] as a wildlife in danger story and ran several stories about the fate of the mountain gorillas” (Dowden 2008: 238). The popularity of mountain gorillas means that their conservation attracts a diverse range of interests with different ideas about how

44 Interview with Thomas, December 2010
45 Interview with Harvey, November 2009
they should be conserved and by who should be conserving them. The history of their conservation, and the nature of interventions today, demonstrates this well.

Once portrayed as mighty beasts in films such as King Kong, charismatic individuals, such as Dian Fossey’s favourite gorilla Digit, or the famous Titus\textsuperscript{46}, have brought the world’s attention to what can also be a very gentle, and considerably ‘human like’ species. However, whilst Dian Fossey is probably the name most would associate with Mountain Gorilla conservation, the history of Western interest in mountain gorillas and their protection predates her by several decades. The first European to see a Mountain Gorilla was Dr. Thomas D. Savage in 1847 (Adams and McShane, 1996: 187). In 1902, the German Captain Oscar von Beringe shot two mountain gorillas dead and sent one back to the Zoological Museum in Berlin where it was classified as a new species of gorilla and named \textit{Gorilla beringei} (Schaller 1963; Weber and Vedder 2001). But mountain gorillas had a very small range size - by 1894, farmers had cleared 75% of Rwanda’s montane rainforest and cattle and fire had meant much of the natural wooded savannah had been converted into grassland (Weber and Vedder 2001: 124). By 1911, the Germans had declared the majority of the remaining natural areas along the Congo-Nile divide as forest reserves (\textit{ibid}).

In 1925, Carl Akeley, from the New York Museum of Natural History, made a proposal to King Albert of Belgium, the colonial ruler of Virunga to create a national park to protect the Mountain Gorillas. Albert Park, Africa’s first national park, was established in 1925, covering Karisimbi, Visoke and Mikeno Volcanoes and expanded into the Congo in 1929 to cover Nyiragongo, Muhabura and Gahinga Volcanoes. In 1958, with growing pressure from the surrounding population, the Belgians converted over 20,000 acres of this parkland in Rwanda into farmland (Weber and Vedder 2001: 127-8). In 1960, following Congolese independence, Albert National Park was split into two and the Rwandan part of the park named \textit{Parc National de Volcans}. The Congolese section of the Park was renamed \textit{Parc National de Virunga} in 1969.

Between 1968 and 1969, the Rwandan government cleared 25,000 acres of forest from PNV. Two thirds was designated for pyrethrum production and a third was given to the

\textsuperscript{46} Titus rose to fame in the 2008 Public Broadcasting Service Nature/BBC Natural World documentary film \textit{Titus: The Gorilla King}. 
community to promote pyrethrum production\textsuperscript{47} (Harroy 1981, cited in Bouché, 1998). The Government-owned Pyrethrum company, Sopyrwa, awarded local families five-acre plots on the condition that they use 40\% of their land to grow pyrethrum, which was in huge demand due to the recent European ban on DDT (Weber and Vedder 2001: 102-3). As demand for pyrethrum fell in the late 1970s, farmers began growing white potatoes \textit{(ibid)}. However, since this time, people have died and left land to their children, but the government argues that the contracts only stood for the people who signed them and now say that the land still belongs to Sopyrwa.\textsuperscript{48} This has led to issues around land ownership and registration today (see chapter 8, page 177). PNV now covers 12,760 ha (Rutagarama and Martin 2006).

Mgahinga National Park (MNP), the Uganda section of the Virunga Massif, was first gazetted as a Game Reserve in 1930 covering 3,370 ha. It was converted into a Forest Reserve in 1939, which was reduced in size to just 2,330 ha in 1951. It was regazetted as a Game Reserve covering 4,750 ha in 1964 and was finally declared Mgahinga Gorilla National Park by the Uganda National Resistance Council in 1991 (Adams and Infield 2001: 134). In 1991, over 1,700 people lived within the park; a further 680 cultivated there; and 4,000 people used its resources (Adams and Infield 2003: 180, following Werikhe 1991). Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June 1992, it was agreed that all residents and farmers would leave the park and would receive payments to help them resettle\textsuperscript{49} (Adams and Infield 2003, following Bachou et al 1992). I pay less attention to MGNP in this thesis (see chapter 3, page 66-7), but it is useful to understand how the three parks join across national borders; boundaries which were declared at the 1885 Berlin conference by interests who perhaps knew little of the volcanic landscape through the middle of which they drew their lines (Weber and Vedder 2001: 93-4).

In 1958, the World Conservation Society (WCS) provided financial support for George Schaller’s year-long study of mountain gorillas, based at Kabara Meadow, on the slopes of Mount Mikeno, DRC (Schaller 1963). WCS also provided initial support for Dian Fossey, who at the invitation of the British archaeologist Louis Leaky began

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Interview with Margaret, November 2010
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Interview with Margaret, November 2010
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Interview with Stephen, October 2009
\end{itemize}
behavioural research on mountain gorillas in the same area in 1967. After just a few months, security concerns forced her to move her research to Rwanda, where she set up Karisoke Research Centre between Mount Karisimbi and Mount Visoke (Fossey 2004). As well as behavioural research, Fossey started her own anti-poaching patrols in the park (Hayes 1991). Whilst her passion for the cause has never been denied, her solitary way of life living amongst the Mountain Gorillas of the Virungas, her background and methods, personal relationships and attitude towards Rwandans were such that some have questioned whether her work may have actually been detrimental to Gorilla conservation (for example see Adams and McShane 1996; Hayes 1991; Weber and Vedder 2001). Indeed, questions have been raised about whether Dian’s actions caused such resentment that they led to the death of more gorillas and possibly even her murder in 1985 (Hayes 1991: 329; 349). She was accused of killing cattle, torturing suspected poachers, kidnapping a herd boy and verbally and racially abusing her staff (Weber and Vedder 2001: 239-243; Hayes 1991). When Amy Vedder and Bill Weber arrived at Karisoke in the late 1970s, Dian Fossey had even reportedly offered them a gun, telling them “if you see anyone in the park, shoot them” (Weber and Vedder 2001: 33). Tales also exist of Dian asking Kirsty Stewart, a researcher at Karisoke, to smuggle a gun hidden in a cake and use it to scare off intruders (Stewart 1996: 13-14).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, mountain gorilla conservation began to move away from a protectionist approach towards conservation that aimed to allow local communities and the government to be involved in and benefit. In 1977, WCS gave Amy and Bill a grant of just under $12,000 to conduct an 18-month study of ecology and population trends of mountain gorillas in Rwanda (Weber and Vedder 2001: 5; 25; 32). In 1978 Bill began conservation education in secondary schools in Rwanda and his research surveyed local farmers to understand their attitudes towards the national park (Weber and Vedder 2001: 133-7). Findings showed that they held little value beyond cutting trees for wood, converting forest into farmland or hunting; there was no tourism programme in the area at the time (ibid).

At the same time, the Rwandan government was making plans to clear 12,500 more acres of the park for cattle (Adams and McShane 1996: 195-7; Weber and Vedder 2001: 141-3). In response, the Mountain Gorilla Project (MGP) was founded, encompassing recommendations for anti-poaching, education and tourism and supported by The Fauna

In the mid-1980s, USAID supported Bill Weber to set up the Ruhengeri Resource Analysis and Management Project (RRAM) to understand in more detail the attitudes of local people towards the park (Weber and Vedder 2001: 275-278). Findings showed that land and poverty were major concerns and the project began to explore issues such as soil fertility, access to water and forestry (ibid). In 1986, RRAM II was launched to address the problems facing people living around the national park (page 285). This was slightly set back in the 1980s when ORTPN ended the two tiered system whereby Rwandans could pay less to visit gorillas, sending out the message that the park and gorilla tourism were for outsiders (page 299). In 1989, the MGP came to an end and with advice from Annette Lanjouw (an expert in Great Ape conservation, now Vice President for Strategic Initiatives and Great Ape Programs at Arcus Foundation), the International Gorilla Programme (IGCP) was launched in 1991 (Martin et al 2011; Annette Lanjouw, pers. comm. 2009). Its remit extended beyond Rwanda to cover the entire Virunga Mountain Gorilla habitat ranging across Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda. Rwandans took over the day-to-day management of tourism, education and security of the PNV (IGCP 2012; Weber and Vedder 2001: 302). Revenue from tourism in the mid-1990s allowed anti-poaching forces to expand to 70 full time guards in PNV (Adams and McShane 1996: 201).

5.3.2. The conservation model today

5.3.2.1. Responsible bodies

In Rwanda, the Tourism and Conservation Department of the RDB is responsible for conservation and protected areas (Volcans National Park, Nyungwe National Park and Akagera National Park). It has a head office in Kigali and field offices at each park. RDB had until recently been known as Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN). There were five departments within ORTPN: law enforcement and protection of the park; the community conservation; tourism; research and
monitoring; and the veterinary unit. Each department had a manager based in Kigali who oversaw his counterparts in each of Rwanda’s three national parks.\textsuperscript{50} ORTPN experienced three restructures between 2004 and 2009.\textsuperscript{51} Most recently, ORTPN came together under RDB to include the Wildlife Agency and the Rwanda Tourism Agency under one banner along with agencies responsible for business registration, investment promotion, environmental issues, privatisation and specialist agencies which support the priority sectors of Information and Communications Technology and tourism as well as small and medium enterprises and human capacity development in the private sector (Rwanda Development Board 2012).

The same specialist areas still exist within the Department of Tourism and Conservation, with staff counterparts at Kigali and park level but the Department has undergone many changes, including streamlining its staff with a focus on tourism rather than conservation.\textsuperscript{52} The conservation sector of the Department in Kigali now has just four staff, highlighting several staff changes at field and head office level between my first visit to Rwanda in 2009 and my second visit in 2010. Restructuring provides more opportunities for interactions and connections, but it also perhaps contributes to disconnections between state ministries, despite the fact they work in similar areas. I return to this in chapter 7.

The ICCN is responsible for conservation and protected areas in the DRC. It has been undergoing reform since mid-2009 and is being used as the pilot for the reform of other government ministries post-conflict (Languy 2009). It has over 2,000 staff, many of whom have recently been transferred between sites to balance distribution (\textit{ibid}). The reform involves retirement programmes to encourage the recruitment of young staff and training programmes and therefore presents many opportunities for the introduction and circulation of new ideas about conservation. However, for the staff interviewed for this thesis, PNVi was the first and only park they had worked in, although there had been some movement between projects.\textsuperscript{53} The political context in this region of DRC and in the country as a whole may in part be responsible for this and suggests another area where conflict might influence the circulation of conservation ideas.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Jacques, November 2009
\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Tristan, November 2009
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Tristan, December 2010
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Baakir, December 2010
5.3.2.2. The UN Great Ape Survival Partnership (GRASP) and conservation ideas in the Virungas

The Great Apes Survival Partnership (GRASP) began as a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) initiative in 2001, informed by a request from Ian Redmond (see chapter 5, page 108). Whilst I highlight in chapter 6 its lack of mention by any of my research participants, it is likely that its existence shapes the discursive environment about how mountain gorillas should best be conserved and by whom and in turn influences some of the projects run by the state and NGOs, yet the plan itself is arguably less visible at the local level amongst field staff. In fact, I show in later chapters that interviewees mention how other international processes have informed their projects (for example USAID’s Predict and Respond Programme and the Clean Cookstove Alliance), but fail to mention GRASP Action Plans.

GRASP involves a network of various categories (UN GRASP 2012a). It includes Category A range states (such as Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC, i.e. countries where great apes live). Category B range states include the UK, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Norway and the European Union through the European Commission and the US. A number of these countries’ governments were highlighted as funders of NGO and state projects during interviews as I show in chapter 6 (page 163). Category C constitutes the Secretariat and includes a number of UN agencies such as UNEP and UNESCO. Category D includes intergovernmental organisations such as CITES. Category E includes conservation NGOs. Those conservation NGOs included in Category E that are also reportedly involved in mountain gorilla conservation include AWF, CI, DFGFI, FFI, Gorilla Organization, IGCP, WCS, Wildlife Direct, WWF and ZSL. Thus not all NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation are part of GRASP. Finally Category F includes private companies. In this case, the only private company involved in GRASP and also connected to mountain gorilla conservation is Volcanoes Safaris. All of these government and nongovernmental organisations are large and arguably powerful. They will have specific ideas about the world, which will inform how conservation is best achieved and the role of different actors, such as themselves and that of local communities, in achieving it. These ideas are likely to have informed the GRASP strategy. Whilst interview data suggest projects were not necessarily influenced directly by this strategy, or the country strategies; the coming together of
particular people to discuss ideas and develop these strategies is likely to have at least indirectly influenced decision-making around projects by shaping the discursive environment within which this process takes place. I discuss some of these wider ideas below and how they relate to the circulation of other ideas and ideational power.

Whilst each Category A range state has a GRASP Action Plan, which I discuss below, GRASP as an international entity has several key priorities (UN GRASP 2012b):

1. Great Apes, Economics & Climate Change
   a. REDD & Economic Incentives
2. Great apes and peacebuilding
   a. Transboundary Collaboration & Conflict Resolution (although Virungas not mentioned under this on website)
3. The green frontline
   a. Monitoring and law enforcement
   b. Livelihoods and community development

Of these priorities ‘livelihoods and community development’ is the most relevant to this thesis. In 2005, the European Commission (EC) granted UNEP/GRASP €3.1 million from a four-year project entitled “Preservation of forest resources and improved livelihoods of forest peoples through conservation of Great Apes as flagship species” (UN GRASP 2012b). This includes a high-level intergovernmental meeting, the first of which was held in Kinshasa in September 2005 and attracted over 500 participants, including state and NGO representatives from across the world. The meeting led to the adoption of the Kinshasa Declaration; signed by 76 representatives from governments, NGOs, multilateral institutions and funders, this was a political statement to protect the future of Great Ape species. The partnership also includes national plans for great ape conservation. It also includes several field projects of GRASP partners based in EC member countries. The only one of these relevant to this thesis is a Gorilla Organization (formally DFGFE-Europe) project to work with local communities in the DRC to improve awareness through education campaigns; to distribute livestock; and to support local schools and roads (UN GRASP 2012b). In fact, some of this work refers to a project with Grauers and not mountain gorillas. Whilst some of these activities, as well as EC funding, were mentioned in Gorilla Organization interviews; there was no mention of GRASP or the DRC Action Plan. This indicates that whilst GRASP priorities may influence the project in its conception, there seems to be a disconnect between this and the conservation NGO actors on the ground, who do not see the link.
In fact the organisation’s website and all interviewees reported that ideas for all projects come from the community (see chapter 8).

**Rwanda’s National Great Apes Survival Plan (2003-2008)**

The Action Plan covers Chimpanzees and Mountain Gorillas and a range of issues and interventions affecting their survival. Many of the details in the plan have changed since it was launched. For instance, the government has been restructured and departments renamed; and NGOs have been renamed, have arrived in and have left Rwanda. The plan names twelve government departments; six international NGOs (DFGFI, DFGFE (now Gorilla Organization), IGCP, MGCF (no longer present in the field), MGVP and Care) and 15 local organisations/cooperatives (Republic of Rwanda 2003). It outlines current threats facing mountain gorillas and existing policies for their protection. Considering the cross-overs highlighted in the document between Ministry interests; it is interesting to see the lack of communication between Ministries around certain issues.

The five-year goal of the plan is to “Reduce the immediate threats to gorillas, increase local communities benefits from tourism, and ensure sustainable ecotourism” (Republic of Rwanda 2003: 30). Objectives to achieve this goal include:

1. Protect and conserve PNV, at least within the current limits of the park, by diminishing poaching and other illegal activities.
2. Increase the benefits to local communities from conservation, as well as increase local support for conservation.
3. Increase sensitisation to conservation issues at the local and political levels.
4. Continue and increase research and monitoring for the gorillas and their habitat.
5. Improve human, gorilla and livestock health standards; diminish disease amongst the gorillas through control of Zoonoses and gorilla/livestock interaction.
6. Increase tourism revenue through sustainable ecotourism.

Projects aimed at achieving these objectives all fit within the time frame of the plan and therefore were planned for a maximum of five years. This could explain why interviewees did not mention GRASP in interviews, although many of my interviewees
had been in the field pre 2008 and in many cases pre 2003 and so would have been part of and experienced some of these projects.

I focus here on those projects relevant to the themes discussed in chapter 6 (agriculture and commodities, land, health and alternative energy). It is clear that many projects are planned under these themes. It is less clear whether these activities all went ahead. For instance, “promote fire-efficient stoves’ is outlined as a project for various government actors and one NGO to undertake (Republic of Rwanda 2003: 32), but interviews revealed this NGO had little success in persuading the government to support such an intervention (see page 216-7). The plan lists multiple project ideas under each objective, including beekeeping, livestock farming, fuel-efficient stoves, rainwater tanks and health projects (including community health, employee health and livestock health projects) (Republic of Rwanda 2003: 31-5). It seems that even though many NGO interviewees report that ‘the idea came from the community’ (see chapter 8); this action plan has informed, not just the discursive environment about the sorts of conservation work needed, but the actual projects themselves at some stage. I return to this point in chapter 8.

**Strategy and action plan for the survival of the great apes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005)**


The plan lists current mountain gorilla activities, which include: IGCP’s awareness raising work in the Virungas; projects by AWF, FFI and WWF (IGCP partners) to establish community reserves, micro-projects for community development, reforestation, and environmental education for communities in North Kivu; and DFGFE’s (now Gorilla Organization) work to support alternative activities such as micro-credit (page 7). Interestingly, the plan highlights the lack of a structure to coordinate NGOs, something which ICCN has begun to address (see page 190-2).
with Rwanda’s action plan, the strategy outlines existing policies in place to protect
great apes and support particular interventions and discusses the greatest threats facing
great apes.

The strategy offers a vision for the DRC for 2030 in relation to great apes (DRC

(a) Where all the great ape populations and their habitats will be protected and
viable;
(b) Where the local populations and the general public will freely undertake to
protect the great apes and their habitats with the support of public institutions,
the private sector, universities and research centres, national and international
non-governmental organizations and national and international partners in
conservation and development;
(c) Where the local populations will be able to cope economically without engaging
in the hunting or illegal trading of great apes;
(d) Where loggers, miners, farmers and businessmen and women will give financial
support to nature reserves and sanctuaries for great apes and where development
within the buffer zones of these nature reserves is implemented in a manner
respectful of nature;
(e) Where great ape viewing flourishes for the great apes without disturbing their
health and peace, and
(f) Where customs, usages and traditions conducive to the survival of great apes
remain popular.

It also outlines an overall goal which is “[…] to ensure the preservation of great apes
within their natural habitats, with the involvement of local communities and other
concerned stakeholders, and thereby to contribute to the well-being of the Congolese
people and humanity in general.” (DRC Ministry of Environment, Nature
Conservation, Water and Forests 2005: 25). Twelve specific goals are identified under
this, mainly relating to ape protection directly, as well as to tourism and research and
some relate specifically to certain habitats or ape species. With particular relevance to
this thesis goal (d) aims “to contribute to the economic development of the country by
reducing poverty among the populations living around the sanctuaries and reserves,
working in cooperation with the private sector and with bilateral and multilateral
partners” and goal (g) aims “to establish a cordon sanitaire that will protect the great
apes from their own diseases and also those they share with humans (zoonoses)”.

Under goal (d) (also called programme 4), the plan sets out to increase per capita
income of villages around great ape protected areas by at least 10% per year for at least
five years. It outlines eight expected results (including some quantitative targets) under this, which include (DRC Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, Water and Forests 2005: 43-6):

1. Zoning of agricultural, forestry and mining activities in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
2. Income-generating agricultural, forestry and mining activities supported in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
3. Access roads and paths to villages surrounding great ape protected areas developed and maintained
4. Primary and secondary schools built and maintained in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
5. Health centres built, supported and maintained in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
6. Drinking water supply systems built and maintained in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
7. Alternative income-generating activities developed and supported in villages surrounding great ape protected areas
8. Mitigating the effects of population influx due to development in villages around great ape protected areas

Under goal (g) (also called programme 7), the plan envisages that endemic and epidemic disease screening teams will cover at least three great ape sites per year from year 3 and that a cordon sanitaire and rapid response system will be properly planned and equipped from year 3. It outlines five expected results under this (DRC Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, Water and Forests 2005: 50-1):

1. Early warning and rapid response system set in place to combat such epidemics as Ebola, Marburg fever, monkey pox, etc. in great ape habitats
2. Endemic and epidemic screening of wild great ape populations in DRC
3. Screening of great ape populations in captivity for endemic and epidemic diseases
4. Cordon sanitaire swiftly thrown round human populations both in towns and in rural areas, to counter zoonoses and endemic and epidemic diseases connected with great apes

5. Health of visitors to great ape sites verified before visits allowed to proceed

These goals and objectives all outline relevant government departments but do not specify involvement of specific NGO actors as in Rwanda’s action plan. The projects also seem to be very much in line with some of the government development needs discussed in chapter 8, where I argue that local community needs are often identified by district governments and relate to wider development targets (see chapter 8, page 193). Whilst some of the NGO projects discussed in chapter 6 relate to the themes highlighted in DRC’s action plan, there are many other activities that fall outside of this, unlike with Rwanda’s action plan. This suggests that GRASP has had more influence on affecting the overall content of projects in Rwanda than it has in the DRC and raises questions again about the source of ideas and the likelihood of project concepts originating within local populations.

5.3.2.3. GRASP, idea circulation and ideational power

Both great ape action plans were written several years before I conducted fieldwork (Rwanda’s in 2003 and the DRC’s in 2005). Many of the activities in Rwanda were already being carried out before the action plan was adopted and it is likely, given the mention of specific international NGOs against particular projects in the action plan that NGOs helped to inform some of the strategies, rather the strategy informing the NGO activities. However, whichever way round these strategies and activities took place, it is likely that the coming together of powerful actors with ideas about how things should be done, could have and could still be influencing how conservation plays out on the ground today, even if the circulation of specific intervention ideas is less clear.

All of the objectives in these plans align closely with a more dominant view within conservation between many NGOs, donors and states that to achieve nature conservation, people must be separated from, rather than part of, nature. Despite language around forest peoples within the plans, this concept still comes through strongly. It informs some of the more dominant interventions that we see in the plans and in conservation today in the tropics, including protected areas, community
conservation and neoliberal economic approaches to conservation. In the context of Rwanda and the DRC several dominant concepts seem to underpin the conservation ideas presented in these plans, as well as the interventions I discuss in chapter 6. Firstly, it is taken as a given that protected areas – which have in both Rwanda and the DRC involved the eviction of indigenous forests peoples and local communities – can help to achieve great ape conservation by protecting apes from human activities and diseases. Second, it appears to be assumed that ‘community conservation’ will help to encourage people to support such protected areas by participating in their conservation and benefitting from them economically. Finally, the dominant capitalist model of development adds another layer to these dominant ideas, prompting further disconnection from other values of nature and suggesting people need to benefit economically for conservation to be achieved.

All of these concepts about nature and people’s relationship to it inform particular models of development that NGOs, states, donors and multilateral agencies often base their interventions on today. The UN GRASP is another extension of this and such ideas inform both its objectives and suggested activities. For instance, many of the livelihoods projects concern ‘alternatives’ such as cook stoves, mainstream education systems, or ecotourism which encourage people to move way from their existing way of life to livelihoods separate, but benefitting financially, from nature. Whilst GRASP activities are similar to those implemented by NGOs and state actors (see chapter 6), it is unclear which came first.

Rather than considering whether GRASP alone influenced the circulation of project ideas on the ground in Rwanda and the DRC, perhaps it is more useful to see the GRASP strategy and country plans as compounding the ideational power of some of the large and powerful actors involved. As I discuss in chapter 8, it has become common sense that ‘outsiders’ should be doing conservation and that this should involve particular ‘community conservation’ projects, placing a barrier to local community members being able to inform projects, were they to have the ability and will to do so.

5.3.2.4. Transboundary conservation

Arguably due to a transboundary approach to conservation, mountain gorilla numbers have increased in recent years. Despite the negative impacts of the fighting on mountain
gorillas, claims that the conflict has helped to protect Mountain Gorillas are widely cited (see Plumptre et al 2007; McNeilage et al 2001; Glew and Hudson 2007). Common concern for mountain gorilla welfare has arguably contributed to people in all three countries lobbying their armies and governments to protect them, allowing conservation to continue throughout the fighting (Plumptre et al 2007: 283). Conflict, combined with a highly visible presence of armed guards and illegal traders from entering the park (ibid). Glew and Hudson suggest that peace talks have led to trade routes to the Arab peninsula reopening, increasing opportunities for illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products (2007: 146, following Anthony 2006). Equally, the financial support for conservation, which continued throughout the conflict, may have been directed to other, more urgent human priorities following the end of the war (ibid).

Historically, park rangers from all three countries have worked together at the park level across the Virungas habitat at different times (Martin et al 2011). Despite the long history of conflict and tension in Rwanda and Eastern DRC and specifically in and around PNV, transboundary conservation of Mountain Gorillas has been hailed a conservation success. In fact, as the RPF invaded through PNV, they rearmed Tutsi guards and instructed them to protect the park and its wildlife (Weber and Vedder 2001: 333). IGCP has facilitated the formalisation of transboundary park authority relationships up to the national level (IGCP 2012).

Various interventions have been implemented under the transboundary framework, supported with revenue sharing funds and by assorted NGOs, especially IGCP. These include joint patrols, improving local resource access, school and health centre infrastructure development, construction of a buffalo wall and plantations along this, conservation education, honey production and agricultural improvement (Bush et al 2010: 78-9). Much of the community conservation work associated with the transboundary programme built on Care’s “Development Through Conservation” (DTC) Programme, launched in 1988 at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and Lake Mburo in Uganda (Blomley 2003: 240). This was later accepted as the dominant community conservation model across Uganda. Care partnered with IGCP on this.

54 Interview with Juma, November 2009
project, setting the basis for a long-term working relationship. One of the key people involved in this programme, as a programme manager for ten years, was later invited by the Rwandan government to support the design of a similar programme in Rwanda, which led to the establishment of a community conservation department within ORTPN.\textsuperscript{55} A multiple-use zone was created around Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda in 1993 to allow limited access to forest resources and non-timber forest products.\textsuperscript{56} In 1996, a 500-metre multiple-use zone was created around MGNP (Adams and Infield 2003: 180) and local communities are occasionally allowed into the park, with permission to collect firewood and water. However, in Rwanda, access to park resources is limited to water collection where permission has been granted; and in the DRC access is completely denied.

The Revenue Sharing Scheme for communities was first trialled in Uganda. In 1995, 12\% of visitor-derived revenue was kept aside to be directed towards various development projects (Adams and Infield 2001: 140). This was reduced to 20\% of gate entry fees only in 1996 (\textit{ibid}), implemented for each national park in Uganda.\textsuperscript{57} There was immense competition for these funds, which until 1999 supported 50\% of the Ugandan National Park Management’s income (McNeilage et al 2001: 39). Adams and Infield argue that, at least in Mgahinga, this meant that poverty and issues of the park’s legitimacy were not addressed sufficiently (2001: 137). Having met with people involved in the revenue sharing scheme at Mgahinga and Bwindi National Parks in a meeting facilitated by IGCP, ORTPN implemented a similar policy in Rwanda in 2006 whereby 5\% of all park revenue from PNV would be directed to community development projects\textsuperscript{58,59} (also see IGCP 2012b). At the time of fieldwork, revenue sharing had not been realised in the DRC. However, a policy has now been passed to direct 30\% of all tourist revenue from PNV\textit{i} to community development projects (de Merode 2011).

In response to local concerns about crop raiding, a buffalo wall was created around Mgahinga National Park in 1991 and has since been extended (Bergorilla 2011)

\textsuperscript{55} Interviews with Ernst, October 2009 and Juma, November 2009  
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Juma, November 2009  
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Juma, November 2009  
\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Jacques, November 2009  
\textsuperscript{59} This was also implemented around other parks in Rwanda
Unfortunately buffalos were able to cross it as it was not high enough and later
construction in Rwanda and the DRC has involved a higher wall. In 2002,
construction of the buffalo wall around PNV, Rwanda and around PNVi, DRC began
and in 2004, construction was started on the Uganda-DRC border (IGCP 2011).

In 2001, with IGCP facilitating, park authorities from the three countries signed a
Tripartite Declaration expressing intention to create a full transfrontier protected area,
the Virunga-Bwindi Transfrontier Park (IGCP 2012b). In January 2004, a meeting was
held in Goma attended by representatives from all three park authorities to form the
core Transboundary Secretariat as part of a Memorandum of Understanding for the
Central Albertine Rift Protected Area Network (Martin et al 2011: 629). In the meeting,
participants defined on a map the areas concerned and established the Virunga Protected
Area Network, alongside a ten-year Strategy Plan.

Over a two-day meeting which took place in December 2005, a Transboundary
Ministerial Declaration was signed by all three countries which recognised “the Central
Albertine Rift Transfrontier Protected Area Network as a transboundary ecosystem
shared by the three countries, and efforts are committed to initiate the development of a
collaborative protocol amongst the three governments which will ensure formal
agreement of management of this transboundary protected area network” (IGCP 2012b).
Signatories also agreed to “lobby their respective governments and other key players to
make a financial commitment to enable implementation of the Transboundary Strategic
Plan” (ibid).

In 2006, the Ten Year Transboundary Strategic Plan was completed and adopted by the
Transboundary Secretariat (Martin et al 2011: 269). Dutch funding of around
€4million was donated for the Transboundary Secretariat to cover salaries and
strengthen community work around the parks (Africa Research Bulletin 2008:
17444; Martin et al 2011: 269). Also in 2006, a Trilateral Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on the Collaborative Monitoring and Sharing of Revenues from

60 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
61 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
62 Interview with Alphojnse, October 2009; Interview with Jacques, November 2009
63 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
64 Interviews with Jacques and Gerrard, November 2009
65 The Dutch government has invested 22million Euros since 2007 in the Virunga Region
Transfrontier Tourism Gorilla Groups was signed (Martin et al 2011: 269). This means that, for example, if a Rwandan tourist group visits a Congolese habituated gorilla group, the revenue will be split between ICCN and RDB. Staff from each office will visit their counterpart’s office regularly to facilitate this process and record the division of funds.66

In July 2007, five mountain gorillas were killed and ICCN set up a ‘cellule de crise’, or crisis cell in response, calling on all conservation NGOs in the area for support. The crisis cell meeting, held in Rumungabo, brought together all NGOs working in the area to support ICCN priorities, indicating further movement towards a more collaborative way of protecting mountain gorilla habitat. I discuss this meeting and other Congolese government conservation coordination mechanisms in further detail in later chapters. In particular it is relevant to the thesis as it represents a move by the Congolese government towards coordinating international NGO activities and forcing them to fit in with their strategy rather than their own.

In 2008 a further meeting – supported by USAID funding, chaired by the Secretary of State for Environment for Overseas Development, and attended by Ministers from the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as NGOs and other organisations involved in both conservation and security in the three countries – was held to discuss how legal status for the transboundary strategy could be achieved67 (IGCP 2012b). This led to the Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Secretariat (GV-TCS) being established and later granted legal status in 2009 (Martin et al 2011).

All of these mechanisms across Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda would indicate that a connected and collaborative approach to mountain gorilla conservation has continued despite years of conflict. The approach suggests multiple opportunities for diverse connections and collaboration, for ideas to circulate regionally and for states, NGOs and local communities to have the opportunity to influence conservation. Examining the history of transboundary conservation, separate from regional politics, suggests that conservation in the region operates regardless of the conflict. This presents an interesting paradox to arguments made earlier in this chapter. On the one hand,

66 Interview with Tim, October 2009
67 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
conservation appears to operate in a bubble, quite separate from regional politics. Yet on the other hand, it is precisely the regional politics, connections and vague boundaries (as I show in chapter 6) between states and conservation NGOs that have allowed conservation to continue during the conflict.

To an extent both contrasting scenarios may coexist. Indeed, conservation does seem to operate in a bubble. Motivated and passionate individuals have continued to work at the local level across national boundaries to monitor and conserve mountain gorillas despite conflict, which they may be influenced by, but are not necessarily involved in. These connections have now been supported by NGOs, such as IGCP, right up to the Ministerial level. At the same time, high level politics at the ministerial level and conflict between governments and rebel groups have meant that conservation has continued throughout the conflict, but as I show in chapter 7 (page 224-5), it is still entwined deeply with these politics, meaning that only certain people could work at certain times in the park.

5.4. Conclusion

To summarise, this chapter has presented the political and environmental history of the region, showing how the two are interlinked and providing the historical context for understanding connections, disconnections and idea circulation in the Virungas. Specifically I have argued that the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide and their proceeding support for genocidaries may shape Rwanda’s view of outside interventions. This could explain why the government is so keen today to coordinate international NGO activities (see chapter 6, page 183). I have discussed how a strong, top-down state, combined with a culture of obedience, can stifle civil society voice in Rwanda. This may present a barrier to communities using their own ideas to influence state and NGO conservation interventions. Current post-genocide laws about divisionism may present additional barriers to NGOs wanting to provide targeted support for Batwa communities. I explore this further in chapter 6 (page 188-9). Finally, I have shown that ongoing conflict in the DRC has caused many conservation projects to be moved or stopped and I suggested that this might prevent idea circulation.

The latter part of this chapter explored the conservation model today, specifically looking at wider international and regional structures and processes, including
transboundary conservation and the ideas incorporated by the UN GRASP strategy. On the latter I argued that it is difficult to determine the extent to which this strategy has influenced directly projects and organisations on the ground. However, I did suggest that the underlying concepts behind all interventions outlined in the strategy for communities revolve around separating people from nature and therefore promoting a ‘protected area plus alternative economic livelihoods’ approach to conservation. Arguably this coming together of large and powerful international NGOs around such ideas with policymakers compounds these NGOs’ ideational power and further pushes this more dominant view of how conservation should be done and who should be doing it. Finally, I ended the chapter by highlighting an interesting situation whereby mountain gorilla conservation has continued despite conflict that has played out at the local, regional and international level. Conservation has in some ways operated in a bubble, with park staff continuing their work at the transboundary scale on the ground to protect mountain gorillas and international NGOs supporting this model up to the Ministerial level. I explore this situation further in chapter 7 to try to understand how particular relationships have allowed conservation to continue through the conflict (page 224-5). In conclusion however, it is important to note that the unique history of Rwanda and the DRC raises questions about the generalisability of findings presented in this thesis. I reflect on these in my concluding chapter.
Chapter 6: The Conservation Actors

6.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses a core aim of this thesis: to understand the detail of what a transnational network looks like on the ground. Understanding this detail provides important context for investigating connections, disconnections, inclusion and exclusion of particular people, groups and their ideas in decision-making processes, later in the thesis. Specifically, I identify who is involved in mountain gorilla conservation in the Virungas; how they are involved; how they are connected; and whether these connections are clear or opaque. In particular, I explore what blurred boundaries between NGOs and other entities look like and why they are important.

The chapter presents and begins to analyse the detail between the local and the global that is often overlooked in studies of transnational networks. I argued in chapter 2 that transnational networks play a role in linking local communities to international decision-making (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5).68 Whilst some studies emphasise the role of national organisations (for instance see Lent and Trivedy 2001: 163 on how international and national NGOs collaborated to develop campaigns around children’s rights in countries such as Mozambique), there is still little attention afforded to the diversity and complexity that exists between local communities and international NGO headquarters, such as regional and local governments or NGO field staff. Studies also often fail to consider processes and structures that arguably glue network actors together in particular ways, as part of the network. There are exceptions (see Wapner 1996 on how transnational environmental activist organisations use interconnections and leverage points between actors to influence political behaviour). Jepson et al argue that non-human actors such as species, processes and structures should also be considered as ‘conservation actors’ as they affect relationships between human actors (2011). This chapter addresses this gap to explain the detail - beyond and between local communities and international NGOs - needed for understanding how ideas circulate between actors.

68 Also see Florini 2001: 32-33 on joint community-international NGO lobbying of the World Bank on dams and lending polices; or Keck and Sikkink 1998: 94, 117 on the case of the Argentinean human rights organisation, Grandmothers of the Plaza del Mayo
As well as missing many of the ‘in-between’ actors, structures and processes, I argued in chapter 2 (page 33, 57) that the literature on transnational networks often unitises network actors, meaning that it can overlook or simplify diverse interconnections and overlaps between and within states and NGOs. It typically fails to consider critiques within the broader NGO literature about state-NGO relationships, blurring of boundaries between actors and lines of accountability. Yet these critiques can be used usefully to interrogate network (dis)connections to understand the on-the-ground detail and complexity of transnational networks. In this chapter I show that a number of vague, or blurred, boundaries between people and organisations exist as a result of certain structures and processes. On the surface such structures are designed to ‘harmonise’, or coordinate NGO activities which, as I show in later chapters, is an important intervention. However, exploring these relationships can explain how some actors, specifically states, use structures within the network to further their own agenda. Specifically, they play a role in defining who the community is and who NGOs should work with, essentially identifying those that should be included in projects and those that should not. The detail I present here allows me to examine the relationships and interactions within the mountain gorilla conservation network that I investigate in chapters 7 and 8.

I begin with a discussion of ‘the ground’; a concept that I find useful for framing the complexity of actors and their interactions that constitute the gap in detail between the local and the global that I described in the opening of this chapter. I then describe the actors and some of their interactions that take place within this space, beginning by introducing the NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation in the Virungas. Alongside the communities and state departments introduced in earlier chapters, NGOs are key players in this network and understanding who they are and what they do therefore provides important contextual information. In the second part of this chapter, I explore ‘non-human conservation actors’ (following Jepson et al 2011), including conservation ideas and interventions, specifically those relating to health, alternative energy, land issues and farming; as well as government coordination structures.
6.2. The ground

Studies often talk about what happens on the ground, but what does this actually mean? In this context, the ground can include organisations such as NGOs, district and national government, cooperatives and businesses. It can include people that work for these organisations, as well as local community members. It can include the places where interactions between these people and organisations might take place, such as villages, protected areas and NGO offices in towns and cities. The interactions between network actors might include project collaborations or personal relationships (I present a typology in chapter 7). The ground also includes the interactions that take place with those outside of the immediate network, for instance the websites and promotional material that tell stories to the western public about the situation ‘on the ground’. In the context of this thesis therefore, I understand the ground, not as geographical location (although this forms part of it), but as something that emerges as diverse types of interaction take place between people and organisations within particular spaces at particular times. In this sense, understanding the actions and interactions of the actors on the ground can help us to visualise what a transnational network looks like.

NGOs represent some of the most prominent players on the ground in the Virungas. Table 13 presents some basic facts about NGO geography and history in the region. It shows that the majority of international NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation have existed for a long time and many have programmes of work dating back to the 1970s and 1980s in the region. Many NGOs working in the DRC only or regional NGOs with DRC programmes started their work either after the conflict officially finished in the DRC (Gearing up for Gorillas, Wildlife Direct, African Conservation Fund) or else paused their work during the conflict (Frankfurt Zoological Society, Care). This demonstrates the impact of conflict on conservation in the region.

**Table 13: NGOs involved in Mountain Gorilla conservation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>HQ country</th>
<th>Field presence?</th>
<th>Est. Date</th>
<th>Date began involvement in Mountain Gorilla conservation?</th>
<th>Country of activities run or supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Conservation Fund</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>No (funds and helps manage donations to ICCN)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Rwanda, DRC, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Rwanda, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauna and Flora International</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1979 (through IGCP)</td>
<td>Rwanda, DRC, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>2003 (although Grzimek involved in pushing for mountain gorilla</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gearing up for Gorillas (G4G)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gorilla Association</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla CD</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1978 (as DFG- Europe)</td>
<td>Rwanda, DRC, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish African/Asian Conservation &amp; Wildlife Trust</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Conservation Fund</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Veterinary Programme (MGVP)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1985 (as part of Morris Animal Foundation)</td>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Environment and Development Organisation (REDO)</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Direct</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 includes just two national NGOs implementing activities in relation to mountain gorilla conservation: Rural Environment and Development Organisation (REDO) and Amahoro Integrated Development Programme (AIDP). Both are in Rwanda. REDO’s headquarters are in Kigali and AIDP’s are in Musanze where it is funded through the local tour operator Amahoro Tours run by the same director (Amahoro Tours n.d.). However, diverse local organisations are also involved in mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC, predominantly as partners for international NGOs and governments. Table 14 shows these organisations and their relationships with international NGOs.

Despite the presence of these local groups, as well as other local environmental organisations present in North Kivu with no involvement or connection to mountain gorilla conservation, US and UK-based NGOs dominate mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC. They include some of conservation’s most powerful and wealthy players. Of the 20 international NGOs that work in mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda and the DRC; nine have US headquarters, five have UK headquarters and four have headquarters in other European countries. This includes several of the largest NGOs working in wildlife conservation in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically WWF, Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) and Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International (DFGFI), as well as Fauna and Flora International (FFI) and African...
Wildlife Foundation (AWF) through their work as partners and supporters of the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) (see Table 8, chapter 4, page 159).

Table 14: NGO and local NGO relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Local partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IGCP (Rwanda)</td>
<td>SACOLA: Umbrella organisation for community associations including ex-poachers, beekeepers, porters and an animal-human conflict management group. SACOLA own Sabinyo Silverback Lodge and receives $50 pp/night from the total paid by guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP (DRC)</td>
<td>Two cooperatives: A women’s mushroom cooperative and a beekeeper’s cooperative; Embaraza (a local Rwandan land rights organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization (Rwanda)</td>
<td>Eight cooperatives: environmental education; beekeeping; modern art; promotion; microcredit; Volcanoes Wildlife Club; ARASI (rainwater tanks engineers); AIMPO (African Indigenous and Mankind People’s Organisation); Imbaraga (farmer’s union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization (DRC)</td>
<td>MÀIDENI (Mouvement et Action Intellectuels pour la Développement Ecologique de Naturalistes Intégrés)- various community conservation activities; women’s associations for stove programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI (DRC)</td>
<td>DRC local organisation UGADEC- although mainly for activities outside of Virungas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS)</td>
<td>Three Congolese CBOs working with indigenous people CIDOPY, Eco-Action and PIDEP; and Aide et Action pour la Paix, a local Congolese land rights organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care</td>
<td>APiP (savings and lending association); COPEP - a farmers’ cooperative experienced in mushroom farming; Embaraza (local Rwandan land rights organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI Rwanda</td>
<td>Rural Environment and Development Organisation (REDO) (national organisation working with Batwa communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF (DRC)</td>
<td>Women’s associations for stove programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the Francophone history of the region, it is intriguing that there are so few Belgian and French organisations. Even the French Association Gorilla has no on the ground presence (see below). This aside, it is fascinating that ‘the ground’ is dominated by so many organisations from outside the physical location that they are operating in. This provides ample opportunity for dominant views in the US and Europe about conservation to filter into projects and policies in Rwanda and the DRC.

Interestingly, a number of NGOs have no (or in some cases very little) field presence. These are important as they still circulate ideas about what happens on the ground. Despite a lack of physical presence, these NGOs still interact within and outside of the on the ground network by telling stories about the way things are and the way people and organisations are connected. This includes a range of NGOs carrying out different activities in their head office country. Gearing up for Gorillas (G4G) raises funds and buys equipment to support ICCN rangers at PNVi, whilst their director visits the field,
the organisation is not implementing projects there (Gearing up for Gorillas 2010). The Irish African/Asian Conservation and Wildlife Trust is an educational website about charismatic mega fauna (Irish African/Asian Conservation and Wildlife Trust 2006). Association Gorilla is a French-based NGO, which declares that it does have mountain gorilla projects in Rwanda (Association Gorilla 2006), but interviewees had not heard of them and I had no response from emails sent to them. The Mountain Gorilla Conservation Fund was active in Rwanda in Mountain Gorilla conservation in the past, but presently its role appears reduced to fundraising and education with some more general environmental projects in Uganda (Mountain Gorilla Conservation Fund 2012). Gorilla CD and Africa Conservation Fund UK play a very active role in fundraising for PNVi, the latter helps to manage the funds of the former, as well as larger EU donations received by ICCN (Gorilla CD 2012). Finally, there are some organisations that arguably have a field presence, but due to the nature of their work, it is difficult to identify what this role is. For instance, at the time of fieldwork, the Zoological Society of London (ZSL) stated on their website that they were involved in mountain gorilla conservation (Zoological Society of London n.d.69). I did hear about projects that it had previously been involved in, in other non-mountain gorilla sectors of PNVi and funding that it had given to support the park.70 However, it seemed from talking informally to other NGO staff and consultants that its presence in the region was not specifically connected to mountain gorillas. Whilst the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) is reported to have been present at various ICCN-organised meetings, it did not have the same ground presence, at least in terms of mountain gorilla conservation, that other international NGOs had. It declares on its website that it funds researchers and ICCN rangers (Wildlife Conservation Society 2012).

These NGOs include some of conservation’s biggest and perhaps most influential players and it is important that they appear to be ‘involved’ in mountain gorilla conservation. At the same time they do not seem to be working with people or gorillas directly in the field. This implies that some NGOs circulate ideas about conservation and development in the region from afar, particularly through their marketing and promotional materials. Photos, videos and internet stories are a powerful medium used

69 The website has now been updated to more clearly reflect their current role, but it still shows information about mountain gorillas (see Zoological Society of London 2012)
70 Interview with Liz, November 2009
by conservation NGOs to share their ideas and influence people’s decisions (Igoe 2010: 377-80). Such stories and images offer potential supporters a relationship with nature, but this nature is portrayed in a particular way, often rather separated from the reality on the ground and promoting particular approaches to conservation (ibid). Igoe suggests that conservation NGO online videos typically tell a positive story of beautiful landscapes and prosperous communities who have benefitted from conservation interventions, yet at the same time, they miss or make invisible ‘complex and messy connections and relationships’, hiding issues of uneven development and inequality (ibid: 382).

Many of the organisations I identify above do have websites that tell stories about and show images and videos of mountain gorilla conservation. Thus they have the potential, as Igoe argues, to share stories and ideas that are disconnected from the complex reality on the ground and that could potentially hide disconnections and exclusions. Understanding these organisations’ connections, or disconnections, from field offices and other actors in the field is therefore important as it will help to determine their real ‘distance’ from this reality. Investigating these (dis)connections can explain which ideas and realities from the field flow to the international arena and whether and how they become part of the stories told by international NGOs through their websites.

Turning to geography of where international NGOs work, there is a split between those organisations that work in a completely transboundary way, such as Care, MGVP and IGCP where activities in different countries are part of the same projects; those organisations, such as DFGFI and the Gorilla Organization, who may have joint meetings, but typically run separate projects in separate countries; and those organisations who only work in one country, such as Art of Conservation and Frankfurt Zoological Society (see Figure 10). Some organisations are unique in that they fit across several categories. IGCP, for instance, could be classed as a ‘project’ rather than an ‘organisation’. It is funded by WWF, AWF and FFI and staff report to these organisations, who also visit the field and may fund individual activities as well as their joint share of core costs (IGCP 2012a). However, interviewing IGCP and other NGO staff suggests that this ‘project’ is very much a separate entity in its own right, at least in practice. IGCP has its own staff, structures and processes. At the same time, WWF also runs a completely separate programme in the DRC (see Table 13). This contextual
information is relevant for analysing data on connections, disconnections and idea circulation in later chapters.

Figure 10: Focal country of international NGOs

6.3. Conservation ideas and interventions

Conservation interventions in the Virungas broadly fall into four categories: practical park conservation such as research, monitoring and law enforcement; veterinary interventions for mountain gorillas; community conservation programmes; and orphan gorilla rehabilitation (although the latter could be considered a welfare, rather than a conservation intervention). The majority of these conservation interventions share a commonality in that they are informed by wider worldviews about the human relationship with nature, which in turn influences a particular approach to conserving wildlife. In the context of the Virungas, this wider idea is that to conserve mountain gorillas successfully, they need to be separated from humans to prevent risk of habitat loss, poaching and disease transmission. This view has informed the establishment of strictly protected areas; with many on the ground community interventions aimed at increasing support for these protected areas, as well as providing ‘alternative economic livelihoods’ to stop people from entering the park. Whilst these wider ideas mean that most international NGO and state actors take a similar approach to conserving mountain
gorillas; in this context I am interested at the specific project ideas that they support as exploring these more subtle differences highlights clearly some of the connections, disconnections, inclusions and exclusions that play out at the local level.

These projects are diverse. They include health, alternative energy, land registration and demarcation, agriculture and education, although the latter is typically intertwined with the other interventions, for example through sanitation or nutrition education in schools and at the village level. The necessarily detailed information on interventions below explains how sometimes different and separate groups of state and NGO interests support very similar ideas separately, sometimes they support similar ideas collaboratively and sometimes they support separately quite distinct ideas about how conservation problems should be addressed. This begins to explain how conservation actors are connected, or disconnected, in different ways in the Virungas and provides the context for investigating why they are connected or disconnected in chapter 7. Table 15 shows project details, including the project name, implementing organisation, partner organisations and funding sources.

**Table 15: Conservation interventions in the Virungas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Implementing organisation(s)</th>
<th>Partner(s)</th>
<th>Funder(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>One Health</td>
<td>MGVP</td>
<td>RDB, ICCN, UWA Ministry of Health (all countries) Wyman Worldwide Health Partners (WWHP)</td>
<td>USAID, UC Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>One Health</td>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
<td>WWHP MGVP</td>
<td>Donations through Wildlife Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Ecosystem Health and community development</td>
<td>DFGFI</td>
<td>REDO RDB Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Various sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Access Project</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>DFGFI Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Earth Institute of Colombia University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Comprehensive Community Health Initiatives and Program (CCHIPS)</td>
<td>WWHPS</td>
<td>AoC Ministry of Health</td>
<td>WWHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Indigenous Communities in DR Congo</td>
<td>Gorilla Organization</td>
<td>African Indigenous and Mankind People’s Organisation (AIMPO)</td>
<td>Various sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative energy</td>
<td>Eco Makala</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>Two women’s associations</td>
<td>WWF Sweden and a Swedish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative energy</th>
<th>Fuel Briquette Programme</th>
<th>ICCN</th>
<th>WWF</th>
<th>Previous partners: FZS and MGVP</th>
<th>ACF USFWS Dutch, UK and Belgian Govts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative energy</th>
<th>MGVP briquette programme</th>
<th>MGVP</th>
<th>Art of Conservation</th>
<th>Various sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative energy</th>
<th>Inyenyeri programme</th>
<th>Inyenyeri</th>
<th>Red Cross</th>
<th>Various, also community benefit company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative energy</th>
<th>Improved stove programme</th>
<th>Gorilla Organization</th>
<th>In DRC- MADEMI</th>
<th>In Rwanda- AIMPO</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative energy</th>
<th>CATALIST SEW</th>
<th>IFDC</th>
<th>Dutch Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Eviction from PNVi</th>
<th>ICCN</th>
<th>WWF, ZSL, FZS, WCS, GO</th>
<th>Various sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Programme Autour de Virunga</th>
<th>WWF</th>
<th>ICCN</th>
<th>Various sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Batwa land advocating</th>
<th>REDO</th>
<th>DFGFI</th>
<th>DFGFI, Rufford (small grants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Bambuti land rights</th>
<th>FZS</th>
<th>Aide et Action pour la Paix</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Bambuti land rights</th>
<th>GO DRC</th>
<th>UNFAO</th>
<th>Various sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Mushrooms</th>
<th>CARE IGCP</th>
<th>DFGFI</th>
<th>NLC, RDB, ICCN, UWA (government), Embaraza, APIP (CBOs)</th>
<th>Howard Buffet Foundation REMA IGCP (WWF, FFI and AWF) each give $135,000/yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Tree tomatoes</th>
<th>CARE IGCP</th>
<th>DFGFI</th>
<th>COPEP</th>
<th>Through EEEGL funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Maize, beans, potatoes</th>
<th>GO RW</th>
<th>Imbaraza</th>
<th>EU UNDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Potatoes, wheat</th>
<th>DFGFI REDO</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>DFGFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Various</th>
<th>FZS</th>
<th>Unidentified at time of fieldwork</th>
<th>WB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Pigs</th>
<th>GO DRC</th>
<th>MADEMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>DFGFI REDO</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>DFGFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Honey</th>
<th>CARE IGCP</th>
<th>Local beekeeping cooperative</th>
<th>Through EEEGL funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Honey</th>
<th>GO RW</th>
<th>Local beekeeping cooperative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 6.3.1. Health interventions

Health interventions, perhaps due to the high risk of disease transmission between humans and apes, are popular with NGOs in the Virungas. They form a core part of community conservation initiatives and several NGOs, including DFGFI, World Wyman Worldwide Health Partners (WWHPS) Comprehensive Community Health
Initiatives and Program (CCHIPS) and Gorilla Organization, support work with the Ministries of Health to build, rehabilitate and fund local health clinics (DFGFI 2012a; WWHPS 2008a; Gorilla Organization n.d.f.). At a broader scale, several NGOs (MGVP, DFGFI, Art of Conservation, and Gorilla Organization) support a ‘One Health’, or ‘Ecosystem Health’ concept, taking a more holistic approach to improve the health of local people, tourists, livestock and pets that may come into close contact with gorillas. Project interventions include providing health education, parasite screening and research, access to protein and clean water (see Figure 11) and livestock interventions.

**Figure 11: Water tank supported by conservation NGOs near PNV**

Established in 2000, MGVP’s One Health programme is regional across Rwanda, DRC and Uganda (Gorilla Doctors 2012). It is funded mainly through USAID’s Predict and Respond programme, a $500million five-year programme across five parts of the world, which aims to build capacity for disease prevention and response (USAID 2011). MGVP receives USAID funds of just under $250,000 a year via the University of California to look at pathogens in different species and to predict where the next disease outbreak will come from. The programme in the Virungas targets school children; park
rangers, trackers and guides; tourists; and farmers. It involves an employee health programme for its staff and partners (including RDB or ICCN rangers, trackers and their wives) that covers health insurance costs and involves regular health screening and treatment. MGVP has recently moved from a research focus to a patient focus, running four sessions a year for staff and their wives, which include family planning education and de-worming clinics (Gorilla Doctors 2010a). Much of this work is carried out in partnership with CCHIPS, using the clinics that it supports.71

One Health also encompasses livestock health. This involves research into whether diseases can be transmitted into the park through cattle and buffalo grazing on the same land at different times (Gorilla Doctors 2010b). Findings will be used to clarify implications for livestock farmers.72 The programme also involves interventions to improve general livestock health (Gorilla Doctors 2010c). For instance, MGVP works alongside the ‘one cow per poor family’ government initiative, carrying out health checks on cows, offering advice to households, providing rainwater catchment systems and training local vets in artificial insemination.73

Art of Conservation, which raises funds through its Wildlife Direct blog (Art for Gorillas 2012a), works with school children to advocate a ‘staying healthy message’ and teaching them how human health, wild animal health and ecosystem health are all interconnected. The work involves teaching children basic hygiene practice such as washing hands, brushing teeth, keeping a clean home and nutrition (see Art of Conservation website). It gives every child soap, a wash cloth, toothbrush, toothpaste and a clean t-shirt and provides each school with a rainwater tank for cleaning classrooms, toilets and washing hands, as well as brooms, mops, buckets, jerry cans, soap and gloves (Art for Gorillas 2012b; Art of Conservation 2011a). It also runs a teacher training programme (Art for Gorillas 2012b). Art of Conservation works closely with MGVP by implementing its One Health programme at the school level and it brings in nutritionists from CCHIPS to schools to talk to pupils about nutrition (Gorilla Doctors 2010d).

71 Collaboration discussed only in interviews with both organisations and is not made clear on either website
72 Interview with James, October 2009
73 Interview with James, October 2009
DFGFI extends the ecosystem health concept to the village level through its Ecosystem Health and Community Development Project, which is funded through various sources. This project began in 1998 and has grown to include projects to improve the health of people living in close proximity to gorillas (DFGFI 2012b). The project has four components: screening for and treating intestinal parasites and teaching people in Bisate about hygiene and sanitation; clinic rehabilitation; improving clean water accessibility; and improving access to essential protein. DFGFI implements the first three of these components in Bisate, a sector which is home to around 20,000 people, adjacent to PNV and the last component through REDO, a national organisation working with Batwa communities in Gahunga sector, also close to the park boundary.

CCHIPS, a programme of Wyman Worldwide Health Partners, works with two health centres in Kabire and Shingiro and plans to support two more clinics in Kinigi and Gazeeza with the aim of making them all self-sustaining through training Rwandans (WWHPS 2008b). Training involves bringing in US doctors to train Rwandan doctors (ibid). CCHIPS works with Art of Conservation on nutrition education and with community health workers, or Health Animateurs (HAs), as well as with village leaders and the Ministry of Health at various levels.

My data on health projects show a lack of involvement from local groups (with the exception of AIMPO, Gorilla Organization’s partner for its work with Bambuti communities in the DRC, which encompasses some health work- clinic building and education). This indicates that there is perhaps less opportunity for communities to influence or determine projects than there is for other types of intervention. I explore this in chapter 8 (see page 212-7). Additionally, data on health interventions show that most NGOs base projects on a similar idea of ecosystem health. Many work separately, but on what are arguably complementary projects (different interventions in schools, villages, with park staff and with farmers). Figure 12 represents this detail in diagrammatic form to try to give a better sense of how donors, NGOs and government departments are connected or not on the ground. Two-way arrows indicate collaboration and one-directional arrows indicate funding flows or coordination roles.

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74 Interview with Kara, November 2010
75 Interview with Edwin, November 2010
This suggests that ideas circulate between NGOs in the region, even though organisations work on separate projects.

**Figure 12: Health project collaborations, coordination and funding**

![Health project collaborations diagram]

6.3.2. Alternative energy

Charcoal production is a major threat to mountain gorilla habitat\(^{76}\) and indeed to many other forests around the world in close proximity to poor urban centres (Mercer et al 2011; Arnold et al 2003; Ahrends et al 2010). Demand for charcoal in nearby Goma is high and illegal production is strongly linked with insecurity in the region as the majority of these activities support rebel livelihoods (UN News Centre 2011; de Merode 2011). This has led to conflict between charcoal producers and conservation NGOs and park staff\(^{77}\) (Miller 2009). Charcoal is typically produced from trees felled from the slopes of two of the active volcanoes in PNVi.\(^ {78}\) NGOs employ diverse interventions to address charcoal production including promoting improved stoves which require less charcoal; alternative biomass such as briquettes; and plantations. Harvey, an NGO

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\(^{76}\) Interview with Thomas, November 2010
\(^{77}\) Interview with Richard, November 2009
\(^{78}\) Interview with Thomas, November 2010
employee, explained that 60% of the charcoal previously produced inside the park is now produced outside using wood from plantations.\textsuperscript{79} Alternative energy interventions represent two different ideas about how to do conservation. On the one hand, interventions that aim to offer alternatives to the existing way of life (charcoal and firewood use) are popular with NGOs and parks departments. At the same time, other NGOs prefer to work with people’s cultures to reduce, rather than change, use of charcoal and firewood and provide alternative sources outside of the protected areas.

ICCN launched its Alternative Energy Fuel Briquette programme in 2008 in response to deforestation and poverty, as well as in an attempt to cut off armed groups’ resources from the charcoal trade\textsuperscript{80} (de Merode 2011). Africa Conservation Foundation, US Fish and Wildlife and the Dutch, Belgian and British Governments have all funded the programme. The work involves several activities: it identifies target groups for briquette presses and trains them in machine use and enterprise skills; it designs proposals for local malnutrition centres (in Rutshuru and Nyiragongo) which use briquettes instead of firewood; it organises exchange meetings with communities bordering the park; it carries out awareness raising activities with administrative and traditional authorities; and it tracks briquettes from villages (Kiwanja, Rubare, Rutshuru, Rubare, Rumangabo, Rugari, Kibumba) to the warehouse in Goma to market.\textsuperscript{81} In the initial stages of the project FZS supplied ICCN with a press for making briquettes but has not been involved since.\textsuperscript{82} Due to the smoke they produce, many villagers rejected briquettes as a fuel alternative (see chapter 8, page 259) and ICCN has therefore begun targeting larger users in Goma, such as international donors, bakeries, restaurants and prisons, where smoke is less of a problem.\textsuperscript{83}

In 2009, MGVP and Art of Conservation collaborated with ICCN on this project. They facilitated exchange visits, taking Rwandans to see briquette presses in DRC; providing presses to Rwandan communities; and bringing Congolese briquette makers to Rwanda to train Rwandans.\textsuperscript{84} By 2010, MGVP and Art of Conservation had begun implementing

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Harvey, November 2010 \\
\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Baakir, December 2010 \\
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Baakir, December 2010 \\
\textsuperscript{82} Interviews with Richard and Liz, November 2010 \\
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with Thomas, December 2010 \\
\textsuperscript{84} Interview with James, October 2009; Interviews with Jenny and Marcus, November 2010
\end{flushright}
their own briquette projects in Rwanda, supporting two small-scale briquette producers\(^85\) (see Figures 13 and 14), providing briquettes to around 30 households (Gorilla Doctors 2010c and personal observation). Andre, an employee of another international conservation NGO working across Rwanda, DRC and Uganda mentioned that one of their donors had seen the ICCN project when visiting the region and plans were underway to provide funding for it.\(^86\)

**Figure 13: Briquette making press in a Rwandan household**

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\(^85\) Interviews with Jenny and Marcus, November 2010  
\(^86\) Interview with Andre, November 2010
Inyenyeri\textsuperscript{87} is a social benefit company, formally launched in Rwanda in August 2011, providing stoves and biomass fuel pellets across Rwanda (Inyenyeri 2012). Its Lucia Stoves are made from stainless steel and gasify pellets produced from readily available materials such as banana leaves, roseau, eucalyptus leaves and sawdust, meaning that they do not produce smoke and quickly generate long lasting heat. Like Gorilla Organization, Inyenyeri gives away stoves in rural areas and sells them in urban areas. They generate income from selling the biomass fuel pellets, although where households (typically rural) supply biomass for pellets, they receive pellets for free.

Other NGOs prefer to work with people’s traditional way of life and support interventions to encourage people to reduce their overall impact on the environment. Established in 1987, \textit{Programme Environnementale Autour de Virunga} (PEVi) is WWF’s longest running programme (WWF Belgium 2012). It includes the Eco-Makala Project, environmental education and park boundary demarcation (see below). The Eco-

\footnote{\textsuperscript{87} Meaning star in Kinyarwanda}
Makala Project involves distributing improved stoves and establishing plantations (WWF 2008). It grew from a GTZ project started in 2005, which was put on hold due to volcanic activity and then restarted in 2008.\textsuperscript{88} WWF Sweden and a Swedish corporation fund the project, which is run by WWF Belgium\textsuperscript{89} (WWF 2008). Initially, WWF only provided wood to meet refugee fuel wood demands from IDP camps, but quickly realised stoves were also important (WWF 2008; Benz and Benz-Schwarzburg 2010: 418). The project aims to plant 5,000 hectares of trees, which combined with improved stoves - of which it aims to eventually produce 200,000 - could half the amount of charcoal needed and meet all of Goma’s energy needs (WWF 2008). The project also provides larger improved stoves to schools. WWF has worked with women’s associations to test models and prices of stoves. It works with ten community-based producers and twenty community-based sellers.\textsuperscript{90} It also supplies stoves to ICCN for its briquette project (see below), as well as buying briquettes from ICCN to distribute with their stoves to IDP camps and schools on behalf of ICCN.\textsuperscript{91}

Gorilla Organization works with the same community-based organisation as WWF in the DRC to distribute improved stoves.\textsuperscript{92} It produces around 1,000 stoves per year, which it gives away to rural residents around PNVi and charges urban residents $2 for (The Gorilla Organization n.d.a.). In Rwanda, it distributes stoves to Batwa communities around PNV. REDO, supported by DFGFI, also distributes improved stoves to Batwa communities living around PNV.\textsuperscript{93}

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\textsuperscript{88} Interview with Thomas, November 2010  
\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Thomas, November 2010  
\textsuperscript{90} Interview with Thomas, November 2010  
\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Thomas, November 2010  
\textsuperscript{92} Interview with Thomas, November 2010  
\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Idasse, November 2010
Bamboo planting (see Figure 15) is a popular intervention that aims to offer an alternative for people entering the park to collect firewood, as well as to prevent soil erosion. Projects are often linked to agroforestry to address the shortage of land and the ‘food-fuel conflict’ that this presents. Three conservation NGOs support bamboo planting in Rwanda: IGCP (through local partner SACOLA), REDO and Care. At a larger scale, the Dutch Government has directed some of the 22 million Euros it has invested in the Virungas region since 2007 to IFDC for its CATLIST-SEW project (IFDC 2012). This began in January 2009 and involves reforestation on public land and developing wood fuel and charcoal value chains in Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern DRC94 (IFDC 2012). The project set out to plant 6,000 hectares of forest and agroforestry trees in Burundi, 6,000 in Rwanda, 3,000 in North Kivu and 3,000 in South Kivu during 2010 and 2011 (IFDC 2012). It involves training people to use improved kilns that require lower volumes of wood to produce charcoal.

94 Interview with Gerrard, November 2009
Figure 16 illustrates diagrammatically the network of funders, NGOs, government departments and local groups involved in alternative energy projects. There are more players involved in alternative energy at different levels than with health and I have tried to structure this diagram to reflect this. At the centre of the diagram are the local and national Congolese and Rwandan groups, surrounded by government departments and international NGOs, with funders on the outside. Again two-way arrows indicate project collaboration and one-way arrows indicate funding flows or coordination roles. Some project collaborations also involve funding (e.g. Gorilla Organization funds AIMPO).

**Figure 16: Alternative energy project collaborations, coordination and funding**

Data on alternative energy projects show that unlike with health, in general, local groups are involved in implementation. This indicates that there is potential for ideas to be fed from the local community into these projects. The data also suggest that very different ideas (changing people’s lifestyles through offering fuel alternatives versus working with people’s lifestyles to reduce fuel usage) inform different project ideas (improved stoves, briquettes, plantations), which are supported by separate groups of
NGOs. Whilst ideas may circulate, they seem do so in small, rather exclusive groups of collaborating NGOs. This scenario raises the potential for tensions and disagreements between NGOs, which in turn could lead to disconnections.

6.3.3. Land issues and conflicts

In terms of projects relating to land, NGOs support two rather distinct type of intervention. The first set of interventions discussed below concern evictions, or moving people to ensure they are not living or accessing resources with protected areas. The second set of interventions concerns work outside of protected areas to educate people about their land rights and advocate land for them. None of this land is within the protected area, but instead works towards securing land as an approach towards poverty alleviation as a route to encouraging greater support for protected area conservation, i.e. by trying to reduce the need for people to illegally enter the park to access resources. Thus despite the different types of project supported by NGOs and state actors, all interventions stem from an approach to conservation, which advocates the strict protection of nature, separated from the local human population.

6.3.3.1. Marking and changing park boundaries

In the DRC, five NGOs worked in Butembo, on the Western Coast of Lake Edward, to help park staff move Mai Mai, or armed local groups, from Virunga National Park: Gorilla Organization, ZSL, FZS, WCS and WWF. 95 I was told the reason for this ‘evacuation’ was that there has been “a huge encroachment of population living in the park, in this ecological corridor which is now blocked basically by houses and villages” 96 (see also WWF 2010a). Conflict in the area and local politics at play between village chiefs and different groups around land issues compound these issues. 97 Initially NGOs asked people to move from this area and return to their “original villages”, but these people had lived in the area for thirty years and Harvey, an NGO employee, explained that they had only participated in the project as they wanted to provide an alternative to the way the government suggested that it would move people:

95 Interviews with Richard, Liz and Harvey, November 2009
96 Interview with Richard, November 2009
97 Interview with Harvey, November 2010
The wildlife authority wanted to chase [the community] with guns so ok, then we said, no, let us go and tell them, let us go there, discuss with them and see if we can go in good condition. We help them with some kit so that they can go and establish another place. Then we started the dialogue and we went to see the place where they would go to stay and the local chief of that place said “ok they are welcome”, but you see people who are going to fish everyday, they can get money easy. It’s not like somebody who is farming, he works like nine months before getting crop, so that’s the main constraint, but we were in touch with a big [French] NGO who are involved in humanitarian business and they said “ok, while the people will be waiting for the crops we can give them some food until the crops will be ready”.98

Conflict in the area following the Laurent Nkunda uprising (see chapter 5, page 129) delayed this work.99 WWF is the only organisation that publishes information about this work on its website and even then it is spoken of in a different way to the way other NGOs involved spoke of the work (see WWF 2010).

As part of its Programme Environnementale Autour de Virunga (PEVi), WWF supports ICCN to identify the PNVi boundaries and mark them with signboards, walls and green belts of trees (WWF 2010b). It uses maps and historical documents and checks landmarks, such as rivers and fields, with the community and the local authority, then signs an MoU on a GPS point, marking the boundary.100 There have been occasions where individuals have disagreed with the markers and have had to be moved, but WWF suggests that this removal is ‘peaceful and voluntary’ (WWF 2010b).

In contrast, evictions around PNV last occurred in the 1920s (see Table 12, page 107). However, in 2009, RDB and other government officials began to consider plans to expand PNV (Karuhanga 2009) following interest from Great Plains Safaris to build a lodge on the extended area.101 Some NGOs and other factions of government have raised concerns and lobbied the government about the potential social impacts of the expansion.102 I discuss this further in chapter 7.

98 Interview with Harvey, November 2009
99 Interview with Harvey, November 2009
100 Interview with Thomas, November 2010
101 Interview with George, November 2009
102 Interviews with Peter and Eze, October 2009; interviews with Marcus and George, November 2009
6.3.3.2. Advocating land rights and helping communities engage in land policy

At the same time as interventions take place to remove people from protected areas; other organisations advocate for secure land rights for marginalised and landless groups living on the boundaries of protected areas in Rwanda and the DRC. High population densities mean that land, particularly for poor and marginalised pygmy groups that previously lived in the forest, is scarce (Bush et al 2010).

Many Batwa people in Rwanda are landless and live in extreme poverty, often without homes and typically carrying out casual work for their food. REDO and Care work with Batwa communities living close to PNV to secure land rights (EEEGL 2010a). However, when land is allocated, other Rwandans often come and buy it from the Batwa, perpetuating landlessness and poverty. NGOs are beginning to implement longer-term solutions, helping Rwandans, and particularly marginalised Rwandans such as the Batwa, to engage with the new land registration policy in Rwanda and combining advocacy for land rights with ‘social integration’ of Batwa communities through capacity building and agriculture and infrastructure projects (EEEGL n.d.a.).

The Enterprise, Environment and Equity in the Greater Virunga Landscape (EEEGL) project helps communities to understand Rwanda’s new land registration policy. This is a joint Care, IGCP and DFGFI initiative funded by the partners themselves, REMA and Howard G. Buffet Foundation and in collaboration with the National Land Centre of the Rwandan government (Daconto et al 2011; Care n.d.). Karisoke Research Center (DFGFI) conducts research to understand what is driving local people in all three countries to illegally use the park (Bush et al 2010); IGCP is involved with applied policy work and park management projects; and Care implements livelihood and development projects. In particular, EEEGL works to empower communities in Kinigi District to engage in land policy by supporting the farmer’s cooperative, Embaraza, who specialise in dealing with land issues and conflicts. Funding has provided training for over 300 farmers to sit as land committee members. As well as communicating

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103 Interview with Davis, November 2009
104 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
105 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
government policy down to village level, the project communicates views back to
government officials from the community.106

In the DRC, the Gorilla Organization works with Bambuti communities in Ngwenda
village (Gorilla Organization 2011: n.d.b.). These people were evicted from the park in
1925 (see Table 12, page 107) and now live in villages surrounding the park, often
under tarpaulin.107 Gorilla Organization bought a plot of land and built twenty houses
and a clinic and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO)
provided agriculture tools and seeds (Gorilla Organization n.d.b.). When Laurent
Nkunda was arrested (see chapter 5, page 129), many people came through the park and
built IDP camps where the UN provided food, promoting a culture of receiving free
food, which has raised expectations of what NGOs can offer. As well as refugees, the
clinic attracts military and other people to the area; what started off as a project to
support a community of 40 now supports 200 people.108 Gorilla Organization also
negotiates between local politicians and communities over land conflicts that have
arisen following false promises made during election campaigns.

In October 2010, FZS began a three and half year project with Aide et Action pour la
Paix (AAP), a Congolese NGO. The project is funded by $2.4million from the World
Bank through its Projet de Réhabilitation du Réseau des Parcs Nationaux programme
(PREPAN) (Martin 2012), as well as £200,000 from the Dutch Government, via TBS
specifically for water collection.109 AAP specialises in land conflicts in Mikeno Sector
of PNVi (International Land Coalition n.d.). In 2010, the local Mwami offered a 42Ha
area of land for Bambuti communities to live on.110 Legal requirements mean that if a
management association was set up to decide how the land should be used, then anyone
could be part of it (including but not limited to Bambuti people). To overcome this, the
land was given to FZS who will own it for the duration of the project, during which
time families will be informed about their land rights and the land can be transferred
back to them with a legal clause to prevent resale of land (World Bank 2008).

106 Interview with Juma, November 2009
107 Interview with Harvey, November 2010
108 Interview with Harvey, November 2010
109 Interviews with Richard and Liz, November 2010
110 Interviews with Richard and Liz, November 2010
FZS is zoning land in collaboration with the Bambuti people for schools, clinics and agriculture, which will also be open to surrounding Bantu communities in an attempt to aid social integration (FZS 2011). The project will provide health insurance; primary school fees; teachers’ salaries; uniforms and school equipment; and training in some agricultural techniques as many Bambuti have often only worked casually for others and received food in return for their work.

These data show how a number of NGOs work together, with the state, to support a particular idea. This demonstrates that ideas do circulate and NGOs and states are connected in the region. However, such collaborations make it difficult to determine the origin of project ideas, raising a question about of blurred boundaries between actors. This is particularly important in the case of evictions from PNVi where potentially negative outcomes on local populations result. Brockington and Igoe conceptualise mutually dependent state-conservation NGO relationships and suggest that official dialogue can mask the true nature of the relationship and remove accountability or culpability from both parties (2006: 448-9). In my example of evictions from PNVi, the involvement of multiple NGOs and the state, through the mechanism of a ‘conservation project’, means that boundaries between different actors become opaque and lines of accountability to communities affected are blurred.

**Figure 17: Land project collaborations, coordination and funding**
Figure 17 illustrates diagrammatically project collaborations, funding flows and coordination for land projects. As with alternative energy projects, local and national organisations are at the centre of the diagram, surrounded by international NGOs and government departments, surrounded by funders. Again, two-way arrows indicate project collaboration and one-way arrows indicate funding flows or coordination roles. Bolder lines indicate organisations and departments collaborate or have collaborated on more than one land project (i.e. FZS and Gorilla Organization or WWF and ICCN).

6.3.4. Commodities: Agriculture, livestock and honey

Agricultural activities are another popular NGO intervention, informed by the wider concept that such approaches can help to alleviate poverty and provide alternative food and livelihoods to encourage people not to enter the park illegally, as well as promoting a more environmentally friendly form of farming. Projects include supporting farmers’ cooperatives in organic farming methods, mushroom farming enterprises, micro credit schemes and providing support to grow specific crops such as potatoes, tomato tree plants and maize. Care supports COPEP, a mushroom farmers’ cooperative, in an attempt to provide an alternative income and protein from bushmeat and stop people entering the park. By 2010, the enterprise element of this project had been expanded through EEEGL to develop value chains and markets for the mushrooms and also for potatoes. The project targets Batwa communities. The Gorilla Organization in Rwanda supports maize, bean and potato projects and provides training in sustainable farming (Gorilla Organization n.d.c.). REDO, supported by DFGFI, works with Batwa communities to grow potatoes, tomato trees and more recently, wheat (DFGFI 2010).

Other NGOs support livestock projects with a view to providing alternative forms of protein from extra-legal hunting of bushmeat. MGVP runs a livestock model farm under its One Health Programme, which involves supplying a household with cows, pigs or goats and teaching villagers about animal care to improve productivity. DFGFI works with REDO to distribute goats to provide alternative protein to Batwa communities.

111 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
112 Interview with Margaret, November 2010
113 Interview with Margaret, November 2010
114 Interview with Jenny, October 2009
115 Interviews with Davis November 2009 and with Idasse November 2010
The Gorilla Organization distributes pigs to provide alternative protein to communities living around PNVi, DRC (Gorilla Organization n.d.d.).

Beekeeping is also a popular intervention. The predominant reason for beekeeping interventions is to establish an alternative form of income and make sure hives are kept outside the park boundary to prevent people entering the forest to collect honey, an activity often associated with forest fires and ‘illegal’ activities such as laying snares (IGCP 2011; also see Sabuni 1997; Zilihona et al 1996: 6 on the links between beekeeping and forest fires). IGCP, Gorilla Organization and Care all implement beekeeping projects (IGCP 2011; EEEGL 2010b). Gorilla Organization works with beekeepers in Rwanda to create an umbrella organisation for beekeepers.\textsuperscript{116}

IGCP and Care work together with beekeepers to establish cooperatives in different sectors; money made from honey sale at market is reinvested in the project (EEGGL 2010b). The project began in Uganda and is now implemented in Rwanda and the DRC.\textsuperscript{117} It also involves training beekeepers and helping them to develop “\textit{new technologies of honey production}”.\textsuperscript{118} By my visit in 2010, each of the twelve sectors around PNV had its own beekeeping cooperative and the conservation NGO involved, in collaboration with park staff, had chosen managers for all of them in an attempt to overcome some of the conflicts that had arisen in previous years.\textsuperscript{119} IGCP built a treatment facility in Rwanda and Virunga Honey now has the \textit{Certificate Rwanda Bureau of Standard}, which means it can be exported to other countries (EEGGL 2010b). The most recent development in this project has been to start facilitating service providers for honey, for example in Kampala, to market the honey.\textsuperscript{120} Producers and servicer providers signed an MoU in Summer 2010.

\textsuperscript{116} Whilst beekeeping projects are ongoing in Uganda, see http://www.gorillas.org/Project/Detail/Honey_Farming, the website does not corroborate interview data that Gorilla Organization runs beekeeping projects in Rwanda, suggesting that this project may have ended or been postponed since fieldwork
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Shani, October 2009
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Christophe, November 2010
\textsuperscript{119} Interview with Bernard, November 2010
\textsuperscript{120} Interview with Eze, November 2010
Figure 18: Commodities project collaborations, coordination and funding

Figure 18 illustrates diagrammatically project collaborations, funding flows and coordination for commodities projects. As with other diagrams, local and national organisations are at the centre of the diagram, surrounded by international NGOs and government departments, surrounded by funders. Again, two-way arrows indicate project collaboration and one-way arrows indicate funding flows or coordination roles.

Data on commodities show that lots of NGOs work separately with lots of different local partners on lots of separate projects, despite them all being informed by similar ideas about why such interventions are important. Whilst this suggests that opportunities exist for local communities to feed their ideas into interventions, it also intimates that lots of opportunities also exist for disconnections and duplication. That is, if lots of NGOs implement distinct projects without collaborating or communicating, they could potentially be doing the same thing in the same area, whilst at the same time, other places and the people that live there might not benefit from any sort of NGO project.

6.4. Blurred State-NGO boundaries

The data presented so far in this chapter have showed how different NGO and state actors have supported particular ideas and projects together and separately. The
connections in these cases (with the exception of evictions from PNVi) have all seemed rather clear. However, this was not always the case and I begin to examine blurred boundaries between actors below. Blurred state-NGO boundaries are important as they can reduce the autonomy and therefore the legitimacy of an NGO (Avant 2004; Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Bebbington 2004). They can also mask lines of accountability, which can be particularly problematic when negative impacts result (Brockington and Igoe 2006: 448-9). I show here that seeing state structures as conservation actors that are part of the network can shed light on what blurred boundaries between NGOs and states look like and can explain how states can use such mechanisms to circulate their own ideas and values more widely through NGOs and their projects. This in turn can impact on NGO relationships with communities and can potentially lead to the exclusion of local ideas from conservation decision-making processes. I show, however, that the blurred boundaries created through state structures can mask lines of accountability, making it seem from the outside that NGOs are responsible for such exclusions. This detail is important for understanding how NGOs and states are connected on the ground; it provides the detail needed for investigating why this is important in terms of idea circulation.

6.4.1. NGO coordination, Rwanda

The Rwandan government has a number of mechanisms in place to coordinate and ‘harmonise’ NGO activities. Firstly, NGO activities at district and sector level in Rwanda are ‘coordinated’ by the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) (Impact Alliance n.d.; SNV 2011). Every organisation - from local to international NGOs - that wishes to work in the district must submit their action plan (ibid). JADF’s role is “to coordinate and follow up on NGOs’ activities to check they are following that action plan”.121 If an NGO wants to work in a particular area but there is already an NGO working there, they are still given permission to work there but they must also establish an additional project elsewhere.122 Whilst a number of NGO interviewees highlight JADF’s role in coordinating them123, others, including in central government, dismiss it

121 Interview with Rashad, November 2009
122 Interview with Rashad, November 2009
123 Interviews with Etienne; Eze and Idasse, November 2010; interview with Shani October 2009
as a paper exercise. In fact, many government structures arguably struggle to coordinate diverse NGO interests and personalities and to prevent duplication (see chapter 7, page 228).

Secondly, NGOs carrying out activities under themes such as health or agriculture are required to sign agreements with the relevant Ministry and their activities must fall under the relevant strategy. For example, Musanze District Health Office focuses on several themes of the national health strategy and all NGOs involved in health in the district must tie their work to these themes. These include health insurance; infrastructure (water, electricity); pharmacy; IT/ data management (e.g. distributing laptops to health centres, computer training); planning and coordination; monitoring; finance (modular training and following up); and human resource management (see also National Health Strategy- Ministry of Health 2009). The Ministry of Health “wants all health systems to be coordinated in one way” and seeks the “coordination of all NGOs working in health”.

The District Health Office in Musanze also participates in the Access Project, an initiative supported by the Earth Institute at Colombia University, USA that aims to improve the health of people living in poverty by applying business and management models to public health systems (The Access Project 2011). Through this project it has developed a structure that it encourages NGOs working in health to work within, particularly if they are working at the village level. In Musanze, the project focuses on improving the health management system in the district through capacity building, particularly around hygiene, to improve disease prevention. In each village (Umudugudu) there are four Community Health Workers chosen by the Ministry of Health at district level: a man, a woman, a maternal community health worker and a general health representative. They must be literate and have basic first aid skills so that they can distribute medicine and administer vaccinations. At sector level there is one health representative and one representative for the community health workers. There

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124 Interviews with George and Ernst, November 2009; Interview with Eze, November 2010
125 Interview with Kara, November 2009; interview with Idasse, November 2010
126 Interview with Benedict, November 2010
127 Interview with Benedict, November 2010
128 Interview with Benedict, November 2010
129 Interview with Benedict, November 2010
are eleven sector health centres connected to the District hospital\textsuperscript{130} (Musanze District Government n.d.).

Finally, NGOs wishing to carry out conservation related activities close to Rwanda’s protected areas are required to sign a MoU with RDB in Kigali and field staff must sign similar agreements with park staff at the relevant national park.\textsuperscript{131} The NGO is required to submit regular plans and reports to RDB; attend relevant meetings; and ensure that its activities fit into the relevant park’s management plan under one of two frameworks relating to community development and livelihoods or practical conservation and park management.\textsuperscript{132} Community conservation activities must fall under one of four approaches: education, wildlife conflict management, revenue sharing and improving the park-community relationship.\textsuperscript{133} The Chief Park Warden is responsible for ‘regulating’ and ‘harmonising’ conservation NGO activities and all NGOs need to let him know if they want to carry out any activities.\textsuperscript{134} NGOs have to submit quarterly and annual reports to RDB in Kigali\textsuperscript{135} and quarterly meetings take place at park level.\textsuperscript{136}

RDB’s role in coordinating NGOs was seen as a new thing and a change from the past, where Marcus, an NGO director, explained to me that in Rwanda:

\[
\text{[\ldots] it was a free for all with all the NGOs and you’d just come in and you’d basically stake out your territory and go do it, it was haphazard.}^{137}
\]

Marcus felt that RDB was now able to prevent duplication and overlap and ensure each NGO had clear responsibilities. Some NGO staff agreed.\textsuperscript{138} Jacques, a PNV employee reported similar changes since the restructure of RDB:

\[
\text{Before the restructure of ORTPN, [NGOs] used to come and set a water tank there without consulting the community, without coming to see ORTPN, they’d go and put a water tank there and this is because their interest is only in spending money from outside, but as soon as we came up}
\]

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Benedict, November 2010
\textsuperscript{131} Interviews with Frederic, Shani, Ernst and Kara, November 2009; interview with Efia, November 2010
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Jacques, November 2009
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Peace, October 2009
\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Peace, October 2009
\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Peace, October 2009; Interview with Kara, November 2009
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Tim, October 2009
\textsuperscript{137} Interview with Marcus, November 2009
\textsuperscript{138} Interview with Christophe, November 2009
with the restructure of ORTPN, setting up a community conservation department in charge of coordinating all those activities.\textsuperscript{139}

This role is discussed more extensively – and disputed – in chapter 7 where I argue that states still struggle, despite numerous structures and processes, to coordinate disparate NGOs (see page 228). However, it is important to highlight here how the Rwandan government has evolved and defined a clear role for itself in coordinating disparate NGOs working in the region. I do not think that this represents attempts by the state to spread its own agenda in a way that is secretive, or underhand. I think in this case, it shows that state actors operate openly to influence NGO activities and ensure that they fit into wider strategies and management plans, that activities are not duplicated, and that communities and forests do not suffer. This was not always the case.

Government structures directly and obviously impacted NGO activities. For instance, some NGOs were asked by the state, as part of coordination attempts, to change their activities. One NGO director was asked “\textit{by the government to [...] do teaching training instead [of conservation education and training]}”.\textsuperscript{140} Idasse, who runs a health project for a conservation NGO which involves screening faecal samples for parasites, was asked by the Ministry of Health to try to work with local clinics who could take over the screening process.\textsuperscript{141} Gracious, whose NGO is involved in house building, development projects and ecotourism, was asked to focus all of its work on house building.\textsuperscript{142} In some cases, these requests seem to be more about positive engagement; indeed training local clinics to take over NGO work is a positive step towards the long-term sustainability of an intervention and the NGO welcomed and embraced this suggestion.\textsuperscript{143} However, not all of these requests resulted in NGOs changing their work. Perhaps some well-known or international organisations are able better to resist such ‘requests’ from government, but it does raise questions about the role of NGOs as ‘funders’ carrying out the state’s agenda, and the role of the state as a ‘definer’ of the NGO’s role.

\textsuperscript{139} Interview with Jacques, November 2009
\textsuperscript{140} Interview with Jessica, November 2009
\textsuperscript{141} Interview with Idasse, November 2010
\textsuperscript{142} Interview with Gracious, October 2009
\textsuperscript{143} Interview with Idasse, November 2010
These examples begin to resemble claims made in the literature about the use of civil society networks by the state to further its own agenda (following Cox 1999, Gramsci 1971; Hagel and Peretz 2005; Igoe and Kesall 2005a; Katz 2006). However, these examples are not so subtle. In fact, they are quite obvious; states openly asked NGOs to change their activities. My data show how state structures in place to coordinate NGO activities in Rwanda blur boundaries, mask lines of accountability between NGOs, states and communities and can be used by states to indirectly circulate their own ideas and values and influence NGO activities and relationships. This is particularly the case in the way that coordination mechanisms define the local community that should benefit from conservation interventions. Understanding these structures and their role in this context sheds light on what blurred boundaries actually look like and explains why they are important in terms of idea circulation.

For the purposes of revenue sharing and interventions in Rwanda, the community living around PNV is defined through the identification of eighteen ‘environment committees’. These were conceived by Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA) and approved by the Ministerial Cabinet (Rwanda Environmental Management Authority 2010: 11; Mugabukomeye 2007; Bush 2010; Gray and Rutagarama 2011). Their purpose is to ensure environmental protection at the district and sector level (nine members at district level and nine members at cell level) and they are all structured in the same way. These committees include a group that focuses on buffalo wall maintenance; a group of ex-poachers “that give information about illegal activities” and who are involved in joint patrols with park staff to identify snares; ANICO (Animateurs de Conservation) who “are in charge of sensitising communities and represent the community into the park management, but also the conservation park management into the community”; Education into Schools which organises wildlife clubs for the community so that “children begin early to be involved in conservation, students go and teach their parents at the grassroots level”; a women’s group; and various cooperatives, including farmers cooperatives.

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144 Interview with Margaret, November 2010
145 Interview with Margaret, November 2010
146 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
These groups, articulated through coordination mechanisms, represent a wide range of interests, but they also embody Rwandan government ideas about how things should be done. In this way the government defines who should benefit from conservation and who should not. This is particularly important given other state policies on divisionism which make it illegal to separate people by ethnicity, including Batwa communities (see chapter 5, page 125-6). The eighteen environment committees do not include a group that addresses the needs of Batwa communities specifically. In fact, RDB requested that EEEGL staff work with the groups that the government has identified rather than the original target groups for the project which focused on women, people with disabilities, widows, orphans, women involved in polygamous marriages, returned refugees and Batwa communities.\(^{147}\) Some NGO staff felt that this meant that 'historically marginalised people' (Batwa people) and other vulnerable groups such as children and orphans would be excluded from benefitting from their conservation projects\(^{148}\) and not included as part of the ‘community’ in terms of state conservation interventions. In this sense, the government was able to use the coordination mechanism as justification to influence other network actors and who they work with, circulating its own ideas, but at the same time potentially excluding others.

This example shows that blurred boundaries between states and NGOs are created by way of a structure or process, which the state can invoke in the name of coordination, but which also allows them to push their own ideas through NGO activities about how the community is defined and benefits. Brockington and Igoe suggest that blurred boundaries between states and NGOs mask accountability and allow each party to share the blame when things go wrong (2006: 448-9). I show that this is the case with my data on certain collaborative state-NGO projects, making it difficult to determine the origin of the project idea. However, in this case, the nature of the blurred boundary is different and arguably easier to unravel to identify the origin of the idea. Here, the state coordination mechanism and policy on environmental committees masks the state’s influence over the NGO’s activities and wider relationships with local communities. At first glance, it is unclear that the state has anything to do with who benefits or does not

\(^{147}\) Interview with Margaret, November 2010; observation from project meeting November 2010
\(^{148}\) Interviews with Davis and Juma, November 2009; interview with Margaret, November 2010
benefit from NGO interventions, but further exploration shows that the state can subtly influence how and where NGOs work.

Other government defining processes compound potential marginalisation of already marginalised groups. For instance, in 2005, 10 schools, 56 classrooms and 32 water tanks were constructed using revenue sharing funds (Nielsen and Spenceley 2009: 11, following Uwingeli 2009). In 2009, revenue sharing funds paid for the construction of 43 classrooms and 20 water tanks (out of the 65 that have been built) across the twelve sectors bordering PNV.\(^{149}\) Whilst the state would argue that ideas for spending revenue sharing funds come from the community, Juma, an NGO programme manager, explained:

> I found that most of the projects being funded under revenue sharing were invoked at the sector level and made to support the district projects, in district development programmes, which is okay, but that may not necessarily contribute to the conservation of the protected area, like building schools and water pumps and roads. It’s nice but it’s not what the poor people adjacent to the protected area want, they want something that is going to minimise loss of crop, wild animals, they want something that is going to, you know, help them, you know, address some of the forgone benefits from the protected area and things like that.\(^{150}\)

This would certainly link into wider rhetoric about top-down development in Rwanda (Dowden 2008: 252-3; McGreal 2010; Kinzer 2011; Grant 2010; Human Rights Watch 2012).

In this way the government again plays an important role in defining who the ‘community’ is and who will benefit from revenue sharing funds, as well as the sorts of interventions that are considered as beneficial. The state corroborated this view, explaining that whilst they invite a ‘community representative’ to the meeting to decide how funds are spent, they also invite district government representatives and consult with the mayor of the district.\(^{151}\) With such a diverse population living around PNV, defining a ‘community’ is practically impossible, but defining the community as the district office is problematic as it suggests that the government uses processes to further its own agenda whilst at the same time potentially stifling and marginalising local ideas.

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\(^{149}\) Interview with Jacques, November 2009
\(^{150}\) Interview with Juma, November 2009
\(^{151}\) Interview with Jacques, November 2009
6.4.2. DRC NGO coordination

Unlike Rwanda, in the DRC there is no state organisation comparable to JADF that coordinates conservation NGOs. NGO activities must fall under ICCN’s park management plan and they must sign a three to five year agreement with ICCN at the park level.\(^{152}\) Despite having less of a reputation for being ‘top-down’, the Congolese government seems to be fairly successful and perhaps more successful than Rwanda in coordinating disparate NGO activities. I explore these coordination mechanisms below.

In the DRC CoCo-Congo (\textit{Committee de Coordination de Congo}) meetings, organised by ICCN, are held annually for all World Heritage sites in the DRC and attended by all park chief wardens and international partner organisations. CoCoSi (\textit{Committee de Coordination de Site}) meetings also take place at each World Heritage Site (USAID 2006; pers. comm. Annette Lanjouw 2012). These groups became official in 1999 (Hart and Hart 2003). On my field visit in 2009, CoCoSi meetings for Virunga National Park took place twice a year.\(^{153}\) By November 2010, there were no more formally planned meetings between PNVi management and conservation NGO partners, but the park management team instead called specific themed meetings as and when they felt it was necessary.\(^{154}\)

CoCoSi meetings involved all the partners for PNVi working together and carrying out an annual planning session.\(^{155}\) They involved listing all needs and activities from all partners including park staff and thinking about how gaps might be filled and funded. I explore some of the debates and tensions that arose in these discussions in chapter 7 (page 231-2). As in Rwanda, it was clear that NGOs felt the situation had changed from one where they could do what they liked, where they liked, to one where ICCN played a major role in coordinating NGO activities in and around the park.\(^{156}\) For instance:

\begin{quote}
ICCN took clearly the lead and it was really, really important that it got organised that way […] It was ICCN taking the lead and inviting all the partners to join […] I like that a lot as it was the first time we experienced really ICCN being so clear. This was so important!
\end{quote}

\(^{152}\) Interview with Harvey, November 2009
\(^{153}\) Interview with Helen, November 2009
\(^{154}\) Interview with Andre, November 2010
\(^{155}\) Interviews with Helen and Harvey, November 2009
\(^{156}\) Interviews with Helen, Richard and Liz, November 2009
Did that happen in any of the meetings?

No, nobody failed to join the same plan and to cooperate properly, but everybody in the room thought that it could have happened… it was rather likely, but it didn’t, luckily it didn’t, which was pretty good.\(^{157}\)

In particular, NGO staff explained how they felt ICCN had previously been “weak” and had “only reacted in terms of crises”\(^ {158}\). As there were constant ‘crises’, there were constant requests for NGOs to support ICCN, but with no real strategy in place.\(^ {159}\) Now NGOs all agreed that ICCN had a strategy and made it clear how they wanted NGOs to fit within this\(^ {160}\):

When we arrived there wasn’t a park plan, there wasn’t a general management plan and ICCN were very keen that there were plans. [...] You now have a plan, you have a vision, you have a park philosophy, you’ve got a strategic approach that the park has said: this is what our priority objectives are, we need to work towards them.\(^ {161}\)

Perhaps, unlike in Rwanda, where some NGOs felt government coordinating structures merely existed on paper, NGOs in the DRC felt that real changes had been made in recent years and instead of activities only taking place where NGOs had funds and wanted to support them, now gaps were being filled as ICCN took the lead with its strategy and insisted that NGOs fit within and financially support this if they wished to work in the region. Helen, an ex-NGO employee explained that ICCN would tell NGOs:

If somebody thinks now to do an extra thing and does not follow the same plan then you rather stay at home, then you don’t have to join the meetings anymore!\(^ {162}\)

Whilst no NGOs had officially been asked to leave, others, as in Rwanda, had been asked to change their projects slightly. For instance, due to lack of funds, Harvey explained how his NGO had to stop pig farming and firewood collection programmes around Mikeno and Nyiragongo so that they could direct their funds and focus towards the ICCN strategy.\(^ {163}\) This shows that structures did have real impact on the ground and influenced NGO work plans and strategies. They coordinated NGOs well, leaving little

\(^{157}\) Interview with Helen, November 2009
\(^{158}\) Interview with Liz, November 2009
\(^{159}\) Interview with Liz, November 2009
\(^{160}\) Interviews with Helen, Liz and Beatrice, November 2009
\(^{161}\) Interview with Richard, November 2009
\(^{162}\) Interview with Helen, November 2009
\(^{163}\) Interview with Harvey, November 2009
space for duplication. Despite this, chapter 7 (page 230-7) shows how such structures are still unable to overcome all NGO conflicts outside of meetings. I return to this point in later chapters.

This situation differs from Rwanda. Despite a similar context of conflicting NGO interests working in the region, the government in the DRC is able to coordinate NGO activities and prevent duplication. There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, whilst there are various coordinating processes in Rwanda, coordination around PNVi, DRC takes place at the park level and through one structure (although this is coordinated nationally with other parks). This is arguably less confusing and allows less space for duplication to go unseen than with multiple, overlapping structures. In Rwanda, multiple overlapping structures and MoUs perhaps allow NGOs to ‘slip through the net’ and carry on doing what they like. In the DRC, a single, local management plan that all conservation NGOs must fit within ensures full inclusion.

Secondly, the ‘success’ of ICCN’s NGO coordination may in part be due to individual personalities. In 2008, Emmanuel de Merode (of Belgium) was appointed the Director of PNVi (Wadhams 2008). The changes that NGO employees speak of began around this time. As the first foreign national to be given such responsibility across the whole of the DRC, there are undoubtedly different power dynamics at play than if a Congolese national, with existing affiliations, had been appointed. Equally, according to NGO employees, Emmanuel de Merode has built a reputation in the area as a strong park manager and is well-respected in the NGO community based in North Kivu.164 Thus, to fully understand inclusion and exclusion within a network we need to understand the role of the individual, as well as the role of the organisation. I return to this in more detail in chapter 7 where I consider the connections and disconnections that result from personal relationships

In this instance state-NGO lines actually seem very clear. ICCN uses NGOs to push its agenda and ideas, but it does so openly, meaning that lines of accountability between NGOs, state actors and communities are clearer and there is less space for ulterior interests to push through unchallenged, as there would be were lines of accountability to be hidden. ICCN’s agenda is openly articulated through the park’s management plan,

164 Interviews with Henry, Helen, Richard and Liz, November 2009
which NGOs all support and are involved in.\textsuperscript{165} Whilst wider national processes coordinate all protected area management plans, it does not seem to be the case, as it is in Rwanda, that wider state interests influence this process and use it to further their own agendas. Where NGOs have been asked to change their activities, it has been so that they are able to address park management priorities only. Openness also prevents blurred boundaries and confusion and allows clearer lines of accountability between state and NGO actors and affected communities to be identified. As I show below, whilst ICCN does to an extent determine ‘the community’ that benefits from interventions, this does not seem to be associated with wider state interests and values around ethnicity as it is in Rwanda.

ICCN, like RDB, works through local community associations to carry out its work. For instance, one ICCN employee explained that he works with local associations of villagers located on the border of PNVi through their briquette programme\textsuperscript{166}. Through this project ICCN has provided over 500 presses, 4,000 sacks of briquettes a month, and involved over 3,000 people in this production (Gorilla CD 2010). However, one NGO employee, Andre, explained that his NGO ‘goes through ICCN’ to assess local community needs, who in turn communicates with local government to identify these needs.\textsuperscript{167} This suggests that, as in Rwanda, to an extent, the government defines the community through its local representatives and processes. Whilst in such a diverse community this may be the most practical option, it does raise concerns about whose voices and ideas from the local population are excluded at the same time as state definitions and ideas are circulated.

Unlike in Rwanda, the Congolese government does not identify a set of community groups with whom they insist NGOs work. NGOs work with a multitude of community-based organisations for different projects. This is perhaps most likely because at the time of fieldwork the DRC had not yet established a revenue sharing programme from mountain gorilla tourism; and it did not have dedicated funds to distribute to communities like in Rwanda. This has since changed and 30\% of funds from tourism are now distributed to social projects such as hydropower, alternative energy and road

\textsuperscript{165} Interviews with Richard, Liz, Helen, Beatrice and Harvey November 2009
\textsuperscript{166} Interview with Baakhir, December 2010
\textsuperscript{167} Interview with Andre, November 2010
and school construction (de Merode 2011). Whilst the park management team appears to have an influence over NGO activities more generally, it does not try to dictate which ‘communities’ NGOs work with in the same way that RDB does in Rwanda. This is again relevant to discussions in chapter 8, which examine whether and how ideas do indeed ‘come from the community’. It also suggests that the ‘state’ in this instance is not trying to extend its power through NGO networks in the same way that it has in Rwanda.

6.5. Conclusion

I argued in chapter 2 (page 29) that we need to rethink what constitutes a network and to consider the detail in between the local and the global, including the overlaps and interconnections between all actors. I showed in chapter 2 (page 51) and at the beginning of this chapter that the literature highlights the important role played by transnational networks in linking local communities to international NGOs and political arenas (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998: 94, 117). However, it often fails to consider the detail in between. By detail, I refer to the diverse and heterogeneous interests beyond unitised ‘states’ and ‘NGOs’ and the links and overlaps between these interests. The literature often fails to consider different processes, structures and projects as network actors, yet these can shed light on the relationships between actors (Jepson et al 2011). Equally, it fails to consider the wider critical literature on NGOs, which explores issues of autonomy, blurred boundaries and accountability, yet this detail can also explain connections and idea circulation. This chapter addresses these gaps.

I began the chapter by introducing ‘the ground’. The ground is this context is useful for conceptualising how diverse interactions occur between people and organisations within particular spaces at particular times and therefore understanding what a transnational network looks like. It can include various individuals, entities such as organisations and state departments, physical places such as NGO offices, villages and protected areas and communications such as websites. Whilst much of what happens ‘on the ground’ is informed by wider ideas about people’s relationship with nature and the best way to do conservation; I focused in this chapter on the interventions, or specific project ideas that play out on the ground, as felt they provided a useful way to look at local relationships.
between people and organisations and understand what they meant in terms of inclusion and exclusion. Alongside states and communities, I argued that NGOs are key actors in implementing conservation and circulating ideas about conservation and this information is therefore important. As well as providing important contextual material for investigating (dis)connections in later chapters, this section highlighted an interesting sub-sector of NGOs: those that are involved in mountain gorilla conservation, yet do not appear to have a presence on the ground. These NGOs are important as they circulate ideas about mountain gorilla conservation and the local communities involved, yet it is unclear in what ways they are connected or disconnected from what is happening on the ground. Often conservation NGOs can present stories and images which are rather disconnected from the on-the-ground reality and can mask the true complexity of interactions and the inequality and exclusion that this can result in (Igoe 2010). Therefore, I argued that investigating (dis)connections within Rwanda and the DRC, as well as with international headquarters can explain which ideas and realities from the field flow to the international arena and whether and how they become part of the stories told by international NGOs through their websites.

The remainder of the chapter focused on interventions and state structures and processes. By presenting details of interventions, I showed that NGOs and states have diverse ways of working, both together and separately. This is important contextual information for analysing data in chapters 7 and 8. For instance, in the case of health interventions, NGOs and states all supported similar ideas, such as One Health, or Ecosystem Health. However, they supported these ideas through separate – although complementary – interventions. This shows that ideas circulate within the region even if they choose not to work together. Equally, data on health interventions revealed that there is a noticeable lack of involvement from local organisations, suggesting that their ideas are absent in this instance.

Turning to energy interventions, this chapter showed that different groups of NGOs supported quite different ideas and there was a noticeable divide between those championing improved stoves and those advocating alternative biomass such as briquettes. This suggests that whilst ideas might circulate within the region, it is possible that they circulate within small exclusive groups. Equally, it suggests potential for tensions and conflicts between actors who disagree about the best way to do
conservation. These interventions typically involved local groups suggesting potential opportunities for them to influence projects. Again, this is all important contextual detail for examining (dis)connections in chapters 7 and 8.

My data on land interventions and commodity interventions showed an interesting paradox and one which highlights the diversity of the-ground detail of relationships within the mountain gorilla network. On the one hand, many NGOs support very similar, yet separate agriculture, livestock and beekeeping projects. This suggests a lack of idea circulation and the potential for a series of rather disconnected and duplicated projects. At the same time, turning to land interventions, NGOs seemed to collaborate well to support a couple of key ideas, such as working together to remove people from PNVi, to advocate the government about the expansion of PNV, or to educate people about land policy and land rights. Particularly in the case of removals from PNVi, my data revealed blurred boundaries between NGO and state project implementers, making it difficult to determine where the idea originated. This shows that whilst some connections within the transnational network may be quite obvious, making it relatively easy to understand what they mean in terms of idea circulation, others are not.

Brockington and Igoe suggest that such blurred boundaries can mask lines of accountability and allow parties to share the blame when things go wrong (2006: 448-9). My data show that blurred boundaries also mask the origin of an idea. This not only makes it difficult to understand how an idea circulates, but specifically, in masking such relationships, it makes it difficult to understand who is included and who is excluded from sharing their ideas, potentially masking important exclusions. By overlooking all of this detail, the literature on transnational networks fails to understand and articulate properly the role of transnational networks in linking local communities to the international arena.

I developed this discussion on blurred boundaries in the final section of this chapter. My data showed that by invoking an NGO coordination mechanism, the state defines groups that NGOs should work with. Whilst these groups represent a wide range of interests, they arguably exclude some of the more marginalised and vulnerable groups, such as Batwa communities as a result of wider cultural and political stances about ethnicity and divisionism. In this way the Rwandan government pushes NGOs to circulate its ideas about who should benefit from conservation (and who should not).
Some of the literature on transnational networks shows how states use their relationships with civil society to push discretely their own agendas (see Katz 2006: 335; Hagel and Peretz 2005; Cox 1999, following Gramsci 1971). In this case, state actors use a particular mechanism as a justification for influencing NGO activities and wider relationships. This mechanism blurs the boundary between state and NGO and means that from the outside it might be unclear why an NGO works with a particular community group and not another. This is important as it identifies one way that wider ideas might circulate through a transnational network and also sheds light on why certain people, or groups of people, might become excluded from circulating their ideas.
Chapter 7: NGO (dis)connections

7.1. Introduction

Understanding network relationships goes beyond simply highlighting their complexity and describing how people are connected (or not). In this chapter I investigate why people are connected, or not, and how some of the forms of exclusion and inequality that transnational networks are accused of strategically disseminating (see chapter 2, page 28-9) come about on the ground. To do this I explore connections and disconnections between people and organisations within the mountain gorilla conservation network to understand how ideas do, or do not, circulate. I consider the ideational power of network actors in terms of their ability to influence decision-making around policy and projects. I investigate how factors such as perceived expertise, staff movement and personal relationships affect this process, as well as an NGO’s ability to connect to other conservation actors and share their ideas. I suggest that those who do not have the same level of perceived expertise, or who do not move in such professional or social circles can be ‘accidentally’ excluded or disconnected from collaborating with others and circulating their ideas to influence decision-making around policy and projects. I also examine more obvious tensions and conflicts and argue that they can result in ‘strategic’ disconnections or exclusions. Whilst the transnational networks literature is largely silent on such disconnections (see chapter 2, page 54), I argue that they are important.

I begin this chapter by presenting a typology of connections and disconnections between NGOs, donors, states and communities, describing their range and severity. This typology addresses the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ questions that this thesis seeks to address by describing what (dis)connections look like on the ground. It provides a framework to analyse different types of (dis)connection encountered in this research. I then explore intra-organisational connections, or rather organisational decision-making and communications structures. In the following section of this chapter I investigate inter-organisational connections and the accidental disconnections that they can lead to in relation to perceived expertise, staff movement, organisational relationships and personal relationships. In the final section of this chapter, I investigate more obvious tensions and conflicts and consider how they can lead to disconnections; influence the
circulation of certain information; and contribute to duplication of projects at the community level in some areas and lack of projects in other areas.

7.2. A typology of (dis)connections

Table 16 provides a typology of connections and disconnections, which I discuss in further detail throughout this chapter and chapter 8.
Table 16: A typology of connections and disconnections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Connection</th>
<th>Disconnection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-organisational connections</td>
<td>Decision-making and communications structures of state departments and NGOs allow the movement of ideas back and forth between head office and the field.</td>
<td>Strategic disconnection: personal tensions between staff of the same organisation prevent communication and ideas circulating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government informed connections</td>
<td>Top-down collaboration due to government structures.</td>
<td>Strategic disconnection: organisations do not collaborate or due to competition for funds and publicity, as well as organisational politics (see below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connections based on perceived expertise</td>
<td>Formal collaboration and ideational power based on perceived expertise.</td>
<td>Accidental disconnection: lack of perceived expertise may mean organisations are excluded from collaborating and may reduce their ability to influence policy and project decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff movement between organisations</td>
<td>People move from one organisation to another forming personal and professional relationships, which may influence collaboration and ideational power.</td>
<td>Accidental disconnection: high-level of movement between a small circle of NGOs may mask lack of movement between others and may prevent collaboration and reduce ideational power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement from other countries</td>
<td>People have lived in other countries and will bring ideas and values from these countries into current work. Transboundary conservation also means movement of ideas between Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC (see below)</td>
<td>Accidental disconnection: local ideas may be excluded from projects in favour of external ideas brought in from countries such as the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational relationships</td>
<td>NGO HQs impose collaboration on their field staff due to higher level organisational relationships.</td>
<td>Strategic disconnection: organisational politics prevent organisations collaborating and circulating ideas outside of formal meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal relationships</td>
<td>The social and professional circles people move in, as well as staff movement between organisations lead to personal relationships. These may influence project collaboration and ideational power.</td>
<td>Strategic disconnection: Organisations do not collaborate or communicate due to personal conflicts at HQ and field level which can scale-up into organisational conflicts. Accidental disconnection: some people do not move in the same social circles and form the same personal relationships as others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community connections</td>
<td>Communities discuss their ideas with states and NGOs.</td>
<td>Accidental disconnection: certain approaches to conservation present barriers to communities generating ideas and feeding them to NGO and state staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Transboundary conservation approach and certain regional politics facilitate collaboration and idea circulation.</td>
<td>Accidental disconnection: Regional politics can prevent idea circulation by physically preventing staff movement and by leading to projects being stopped, postponed and moved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3. Intra-NGO connections

Whilst the literature affords them little attention, intra-NGO connections are important as they can help to explain how ideas flow into the network from seemingly ‘external’ sources such as NGO headquarters. External influence, be it from donors or international headquarters, can potentially stifle innovation at the local level and downwards accountability (following Edwards and Hulme 1995a; 1995b; Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Ebrahim 2003: 193; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 17; Mitlin et al 2007) and is therefore important. Equally, intra-organisational connections can help us to understand whether and how NGO field staff feed ideas and information up to their headquarters and ultimately into the international arena. Whilst literature on transnational networks argues that the influence and legitimacy of a network is often based on its ability to link the local to the global and be seen to be representing ‘the local’ (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001), it says nothing about the role of intra-organisational connections in creating this link and moving ideas from the local to the international level.

My data reveal that, with one exception, all NGO field staff interviewed feel that they have the opportunity to feed their ideas up to headquarters and influence wider organisational strategy and decisions. This indicates that US and European headquarters make decisions that take into account what happens on the ground. For instance, Kara, an NGO country programme director in Rwanda explained:

[...] we don’t have a situation where somebody in the states says ‘let’s do a, I don’t know, ‘X’ project’ and we have to make it work here. No the ideas come from here and I guess my role as well is, and our programme managers’ role, they, we have a lot of meetings that are coordination meetings at a national, like, just in Africa with other partners.168

This was typical for the majority of NGOs. For example, Marcus, a regional NGO director, was keen to highlight that their “board does not micro-manage”.169 Richard, a country programme director in the DRC, explained that whilst his NGO’s headquarters and Executive Director are based in Europe and that there is a regional director based in

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168 Interview with Kara, November 2009
169 Interview with Marcus, November 2009
another African country, he felt that he had complete independence to make decisions as things happened on the ground:

[...] we have independence, [the director] understands that it’s the people on the ground that really understand what’s going on in the area and that’s the people who should make the decision so it’s absolutely not a top-down approach. We have a strategy document which guides and orientates our plans and our decision-making process, actually which you need to adhere, but we’re also very focused on working with the priorities of the park and not a strategy that people conceived in Europe or wherever. [...] So the onus is on you as the project manager to identify what the needs are, but then develop [the strategy] in a way that it can be easily communicated back to the regional office so that they can understand where the focus is of our activities.\textsuperscript{170}

In contrast, Liz, an NGO employee in the DRC, compared her current experience, in which she feels she has a lot of independence to make decisions about projects, with the structure of a conservation NGO that she previously worked for:

When I worked with the other organisation, it was a really different structure and there was no headquarters in Africa. It was all based in London and I found a huge difference in the communication and prefer having people based in Africa [...] they’re so used to the situation and you don’t have to explain things as much as you do when you’re talking to someone who has perhaps done some fieldwork but hasn’t for a while and might be in their frame of mind of how things work in Europe or whatever.\textsuperscript{171}

Strong connections and the ability to feed up information and ideas to influence organisational strategy are clearly important as they mean that staff in the US or Europe are not solely responsible for designing programmes of activities which do not reflect on-the-ground needs. My data show that field staff believe that information they provide flows freely to their head office counterparts and is integrated into organisational strategy and decision-making. This presents a different view from the literature, which typically focuses on how ‘external’ influences stifle local decision-making and ideas (Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Ebrahim 2003: 193; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b: 17; Mitlin et al 2007; Fyvie and Ager 1999). Whilst head offices are part of the organisation, I still consider them as external, with the potential to act in a similar way

\textsuperscript{170} Interview with Richard, November 2009
\textsuperscript{171} Interview with Liz, November 2009; it is also clear from this NGO’s website that they have no office base in Africa, only in London.
to donors or governments and impose top-down ideas on their field staff without taking local conditions and ideas into account. However, my data show that this is likely not the case. They imply that strong intra-organisational connections play an important role in circulating ideas from the local level up to the international level. This suggests that it is important to understand how information is interpreted at the field level before it is communicated to headquarter staff. That is, how is ‘local’ information, fed by field staff to their head offices, interpreted and translated? And what does ‘local’ mean? Does information circulated up to the international level originate in local communities, or is it based on interpretations of what field staff see and hear? What does this mean in terms of inclusion of exclusion of local voices and ideas within decision-making processes? I address these questions in chapter 8.

My data reveal one exception to strong intra-organisational connections and idea circulation. This relates to an instance where a senior staff member told Beatrice, an NGO employee, that she was “not allowed” to socialise with people from other NGOs in the region.\(^\text{172}\) This led to personal conflicts between Beatrice and other staff members. Language differences led to further tensions with other office staff. According to Beatrice, these problems meant that she was excluded from contributing to decision-making processes, despite being employed at a senior level within the organisation. She felt she was seen as an outsider and was accused of being “racist” by other staff, perhaps she felt, as a result of language differences. Another ex-employee corroborated that these tensions do exist within the organisation.\(^\text{173}\)

Whilst it is unlikely that all interviewees would be so open about internal politics within their organisations, it did seem that this instance was a stand-alone case. Other interviewees spoke positively and openly about internal decision-making and communications structures. However, this example does highlight the potential important role that individuals can play in causing, or contributing to disconnections. I explore later in the chapter how such disconnections, when scaled-up across multiple organisations, can prevent collaboration and idea circulation.

\(^{172}\) Interview with Beatrice, November 2009
\(^{173}\) Interview with Helen, November 2009
7.4. Inter-NGO connections

An analysis of inter-organisational connections is key to this thesis as it is important for understanding when, how and why diverse actors are connected or disconnected from the network and what this means for them in terms of idea circulation, ideational power, inclusion and exclusion. This section considers three types of inter-NGO connection. First, NGOs collaborate in response to gaps they feel they cannot fill but another organisation may be able to. Both parties bring different skills and experience to the table. In some cases connections are based on perceived expertise. I showed in chapter 2 (page 49-50) that perceived expertise is important for influencing policymakers both directly and through simultaneously constructing and solving political problems (following Kingdon 1984; Murray Li 2007; Adler 1992; Haas 1992b; Clark 1994; Henry 2004) and can also indirectly marginalise others from this process (Duffy 2008: 340, following Keller 2009; Ottaway 2001; Radcliffe 2001; Verkoren 2006). I investigate how perceived expertise influences connections and idea circulation and look at whether it also excludes people and organisations without the same level of expertise. Second, the movement of staff between different NGOs, countries and state departments creates the space for multiple interactions and the potential for ideas to circulate (following Mitlin et al 2007). I explore whether such movement can account for the circulation of particular ideas. I also examine how movement is linked to the development of personal and professional relationships and explore what this means for the inclusion or exclusion of particular people and organisations and their ideas within decision-making processes. Personal relationships are the third type of NGO connection. The literature says very little about them (see chapter 2, page 54), yet I feel that they are important and can say something about how ideas circulate and whether and how particular people and their ideas are included in, or excluded from, decision-making processes.

7.4.1. Visualising the network

This chapter shows a confused and messy array of connections and disconnections, separate from and overlapping with each other. Whilst this helps to explain how ideas are exchanged between one or two people or organisations, or how one organisation might be excluded in a particular instance; the data presented do not necessarily
illustrate an overview of what the network looks like on the ground. In this section I try to illustrate this visually in an attempt to clarify connections and disconnections and give the reader a sense of what the overall ‘network looks like’ before I go on to analyse and discuss individual parts of it in detail later in the chapter. In the first instance, however, mapping out the entire network only adds to the confusion as there are so many actors connected and disconnected in so many ways. Figure 19 shows an outer circle of international funders and NGO offices, including those with no field presence. Within this sits a range of international organisations and government departments operating at the national or regional level and within this sits a range of international and national organisations and government departments with local field presence. Local organisations and cooperatives sit at the centre of the diagram.

Figure 19: Visualising the mountain gorilla conservation network
Whilst Figure 19 is somewhat confusing, breaking the network up starts to distill some of these (dis)connections. Figure 20 shows project (dis)connections as a result of collaboration or lack of collaboration on community conservation projects. I have included state departments in this diagram in the cases where they were actively collaborating on projects (as opposed to coordinating, i.e. district government offices and JADF were excluded, but ministries of health and parks departments were included). The fainter lines illustrate occasions where organisations have worked together on projects in the past, both formally and informally, but for a one-off project. For instance, WWF, FZS, WCS and the Gorilla Organization worked together to move people from Lake Edward, Virunga National Park. Bolder lines indicate a longer-term, ongoing collaboration. For instance, Care, IGCP and DFGFI have all worked closely on the EEGL programme; Art of Conservation, MGVP and CHHIPS have all collaborated around health and nutrition projects on a number of occasions.

**Figure 20: Project collaboration (dis)connections in Rwanda and the DRC**

Figure 20 is also useful for illustrating those disconnected organisations who have less on the ground presence and either focus their efforts on fundraising or education (for...
example the Irish/Asian Conservation Fund) or only appear to exist on their website (Association Gorilla). The diagram also goes some way to illustrating accidental disconnections, note Gorilla Organization’s lack of connections to other organisations in Rwanda. Maintaining anonymity makes it unethical to discuss specific strategic disconnections due to personal and organisational conflicts as information is not available publicly and only came out during interviews with a promise of confidentiality. However, the fact that certain organisations support similar ideas, but do not collaborate on projects, begins to paint a picture about what is missing.

Taking the local groups and government organisations out of the picture starts to show up international NGO connections and disconnections even more clearly (Figure 21).

**Figure 21: International NGO project collaboration (dis)connections**

Figure 22 shows connections (and disconnections) as a result of staff movement between all organisations involved in mountain gorilla conservation. I have also included organisations with involvement in mountain gorilla conservation even where the position was in a different part of the organisation, not directly involved in mountain gorilla conservation, i.e. other national parks in Rwanda, WCS at Nyungwe National Park, Conservation International in the US. I have not included all of the other organisations that people moved from, including development organisations (see Table 19, page 221). Whilst this raises interesting points about idea movement from other
areas, I do not class them as part of the mountain gorilla conservation network and their inclusion simply made the network visual below more confusing. There were no inter-organisational connections between Congolese and Rwandan organisations on the ground. The bolder the line, the greater the number of times movement has occurred.

**Figure 22: Staff movement in Rwanda and the DRC**

This diagram shows a high level of movement in general across Rwanda, illustrating high staff turnover at organisations and suggesting potential for lots of idea circulation. It also shows more frequent movement between different parks; as well as between IGCP and Volcans National Park. The diagram highlights some accidental disconnections as it shows for instance how REDO is not at all connected. However, it also still masks some accidental disconnections that came out more clearly in interviews. For instance, staff have moved in the past between the Gorilla Organization in Rwanda and various other NGOs and parks; yet the current staff member had previously worked at no other conservation NGO in Rwanda. Some organisations, such as IGCP on the other hand, are very well connected in terms of staff movement; many staff that now work for them have worked for other NGOs and the government and
many staff that work for other NGOs have worked for IGCP in the past. Connections due to staff movement in the DRC tell a different story. Figure 22 shows very little connection as a result of staff movement in the DRC. In fact it represents the movement of just three staff and two of these connections related to staff in the DRC having previously worked for donors involved in mountain gorilla conservation, even though their previous role was not directly or solely related to mountain gorilla conservation.

These figures only tell part of the story. They are useful in some ways as they aim to help the reader visualise the network in terms of a series of weak and strong connections between organisations and the disconnections that might result where organisations are not linked up in such ways. However, the rest of the chapter will fill in the detail which the diagrams are unable to do, but using interview data and NGO websites and documents to explain these connections and disconnections in more detail, why they come about and why they are important.

7.4.2. The perception of expertise: exclusive connections and accidental disconnections

7.4.2.1. What is ‘perceived expertise’?

The perception of expertise in this context typically relates to technical skills, such as for health and veterinary science. This led, in some cases, to western qualifications seeming to be valued over African qualifications. For instance, MGVP sends Rwandan vets to UC Davies in California and third year medical students from UC Davies volunteer at Ruhengeri hospital (see MGVP website). Others bring in US ‘experts’ to train Rwandan staff, for instance CCHIPS, in collaboration with other conservation NGOs, brings in American medical doctors to train Rwandans.\(^{174}\)

Tristan, who has worked for both the Rwandan government and an international conservation NGO, explained that:

> From time to time I used to have some person coming from the US into work here, because he’s coming from the US and trained in the US you

\(^{174}\) Interview with Marcus, November 2009; interview with Kara, November 2010
know? He doesn’t have really a lot of expertise, experience, but this person is then considered someone coming to give more than you can give.\textsuperscript{175}

Whilst Tristan felt that this perception was problematic and unsustainable, it did seem to be limited to technical issues or to areas where there clearly was a lack of skills in the area and organisations had to seek staff from Uganda. Tristan explained that some skills were more developed in Uganda, which has better-established training facilities. Other examples corroborate this view. For instance, lodges would often employ Africans from outside the area, such as from Kenya, as people from the local community were typically subsistence farmers and did not have the appropriate skills.\textsuperscript{176} Care Rwanda sought a country director for their community conservation programme from Uganda as they could not find a suitable person in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{177} However, these perceptions did not dominate the conservation sector, but were limited to particular areas such as veterinary medicine and health. In fact, just over half of senior staff within NGOs across Rwanda and the DRC are African (see Table 17) and hold a diverse mix of western and African qualifications (see Table 18). This means that, with exceptions such as around health and veterinary interventions, different types of ideas from diverse people will circulate and diverse people and organisations will collaborate on projects.

### Table 17: Nationalities of conservation managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>Field site</th>
<th>Nationality programme manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDP</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Rwandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
<td>US\textsuperscript{178}</td>
<td>RW</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>RW, DRC, UG</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHHIPS</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Rwandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Guatemala\textsuperscript{179}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZS</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>RW, DRC, UG</td>
<td>Rwandan, Congolese, Ugandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>RW, DRC, UG</td>
<td>Rwandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGVP</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>RW, DRC, UG</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDO</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{175} Interview with Tristan, November 2009
\textsuperscript{176} Interviews with George and Brian, November 2009
\textsuperscript{177} Interviews with George and Juma, November 2009
\textsuperscript{178} At the time of fieldwork, headquarters were located in Rwanda but AoC has since established a US registered charity for fundraising purposes, see http://art-of-conservation.org/
\textsuperscript{179} This is the regional director. The director of Karisoke Research Center was British but has recently left and the deputy director, a Rwandan, has replaced her. In the DRC, at the time of fieldwork, the office was managed by a Congolese and an American.
Table 18: Qualifications of conservation managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of interviewee</th>
<th>Highest level of qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director, national NGO</td>
<td>No higher level qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, international NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme manager, international NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree, African University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project officer, international NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree, African University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>PhD, British University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme manager, international NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree, African University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>Masters degree, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project manager, international NGO</td>
<td>PhD, European University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>Master degrees, British University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional director, international NGO</td>
<td>Masters degree, British University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director, international NGO</td>
<td>PhD, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant, previously programme manager, national NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme manager, international NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree, African University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PhD, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, international NGO</td>
<td>PhD, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project manager, international NGO</td>
<td>PhD, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project manager, international NGO</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, national NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate Degree, African University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, national NGO</td>
<td>Undergraduate Degree, African University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4.2.2. Perceptions of expertise and collaboration

All NGOs are connected to at least one other NGO through joint projects in Rwanda and the DRC (see chapter 6, Table 13, page 156-8). In some cases, organisations place importance on the ‘expertise’ of a potential partner. For example, Marcus explained how his conservation NGO collaborates with a health NGO to bring expertise into their projects:

We’re a very small NGO and we have to really educate a lot of people into why we’re expanding into other areas. And usually when we expand into other areas we have to have other partners, we have to collaborate with other partners because we’re not human doctors so we have to bring human
doctors on board and it’s usually another NGO or organisation that we do that with.\textsuperscript{180}

Jessica, a conservation NGO director, also collaborates with this health NGO on a particular project, which educates children about conservation. She invited a nutritionist from the NGO to visit the school that she works in to talk to pupils about nutrition. Interestingly, the health NGO concerned is known for bringing in Western doctors rather than employing or training Rwandan doctors\textsuperscript{181} and it employs a large number of western staff or African staff with western qualifications. This suggests that in the case of health, NGOs choose to collaborate with those NGOs who value western health qualifications. I did not encounter any examples of NGOs collaborating with community-based organisations for health projects.

Examples do exist outside of health. In the case of the EEEGL project, staff from IGCP, Care International and DFGFI all felt that they brought different specialisms to the collaboration\textsuperscript{182}: Care is targeting the poorest of the poor around Volcanoes National Park, of course IGCP goes with Care, as far as IGCP is very experienced in mountain gorilla conservation and Care is experienced in livelihood improvement so we are working together to just do something in those programmes around the Volcanoes National Park.\textsuperscript{183}

Care and IGCP had a budget for monitoring and evaluation but “lacked research expertise” and so invited Karisoke Research Center on board.\textsuperscript{184} This collaboration built on an existing working relationship between Care and IGCP in Uganda around Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Wild and Mutebi 1996: 6).

These connections between NGOs are important; they ensure that a multidisciplinary team addresses interdisciplinary environmental issues, so that vets are not doing human health care, conservation educators are not teaching about nutrition and conservation scientists are not making human development interventions. This is important for the success of the intervention itself and the people who are impacted by it, but it also raises

\textsuperscript{180} Interview with Marcus, November 2009; also corroborated on NGO’s website
\textsuperscript{181} Interviews with Marcus and Jessica, November 2009; interview with Kara, November 2010
\textsuperscript{182} Interviews with Kara, George and Christophe, November 2009
\textsuperscript{183} Interview with Christophe, November 2009
\textsuperscript{184} Interviews with George and Kara, November 2009
questions about who is unable to collaborate equally on projects as a result of perceived lack of expertise. In fact, as all NGOs collaborate in some way on projects, it is unlikely that a lack of perceived expertise prevents NGOs from collaborating in the first instance in general. However, in the case of health it does seem that collaborations are typically based on a perception of health expertise within an organisation. In these cases, typically western health or veterinary qualifications focused in international health organisations are preferred. Whilst NGOs collaborate with local groups around all other issues, there appears to be a lack of collaboration with local groups around health and veterinary issues. This indicates that local partners are excluded from collaborations about health.

It could be that such local groups simply do not have the technical skills needed to be involved in health and veterinary projects. However, as I show in chapter 6 (page 164-8), such projects clearly impact wider aspects of people’s daily lives such as cooking, farming, sanitation and hygiene. Thus local groups, who may not have specific medical or veterinary qualifications, may still have useful and important ideas about how such interventions should be carried out. If they are not brought into collaborations, these people and their ideas will be excluded from decision-making around projects that will ultimately affect them.

7.4.2.3. Perceptions of expertise and ideational power

Perceived expertise can help to increase ideational power, particularly in relation to the first two dimensions of power: to influence policy and to influence the construction of political problems (Lukes 1975, 2005; Kingdon 1984; Mehta 2011; see also Murray Li 2007; Ferguson 1990 on the power of NGOs to influence problem construction; and see Haas 1992; Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992b; Henry et al 2004; Clark 1994 on how epistemic communities use their expertise to influence policymakers), as well as in relation to decision-making about interventions, which often aim to change people’s behaviour directly, bypassing policy. I suggest that there are limits to this influence and that other factors likely play an equally, if not a more, important role in influencing idea circulation and ideational power.

Examples of perceived expertise improving ideational power are particularly clear in the context of health and veterinary policy. For example, MGVP successfully pushed a
number of ideas either into policy or to the point where they were discussed by
decision-makers in Kigali. It used its research findings to urge the government to
enforce a ‘seven metre rule’ for tourists in Rwanda - this is the closest tourists and
trackers are supposed to get to mountain gorillas to prevent disease transmission
(Cranfield 2008). This was followed by less formal ‘policies’ where MGVP persuaded
guides to advise tourists that they should cough and sneeze into their arms rather than
their hands.\textsuperscript{185} These rules have all been informed by research, which involved
collecting information from local clinics and the district hospital on respiratory diseases
and feeding it “up the chain” to RDB staff, including to senior staff such as Rosette
Rugamba, the Deputy CEO for Tourism and Conservation at RDB and former Director
General of ORTPN.\textsuperscript{186}

MGVP also suggested to the government that all people who come into contact with
Mountain Gorillas should wear a mask (Zimmerman 2012). This is already the case in
the DRC where MGVP came up with the idea and provide ICCN with masks (\textit{ibid}). The
policy is informed by research in chimpanzees about the transmission of respiratory
diseases and how they declined once masks were worn\textsuperscript{187}. An NGO employee explained
how they translated data to influence government decisions:

\begin{quote}
What we need to do as NGOs is, we collect data and we make conclusions, the data isn’t information, data’s data right? We have to change that into information that can be used. Sort of like, well six out of ten streams have pathogenic E-Coli flowing down them and we give that to them. They go ‘oh ok. What’s E-Coli?’ It doesn’t mean anything to them. But if we tell them that 6 streams are unhealthy and people should not use the water without boiling ...then they will know what to do [...] They want management ideas. They want research that will go towards management changes or management improvements.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

Other NGOs with medically qualified staff working in the area were also able to
influence health policy in Rwanda. One organisation had written protocols for a number
of diseases, as well as a protocol on nutrition, which has now been accepted by the
Ministry of Health for use across the country.\textsuperscript{189} Equally, scientific expertise and

\textsuperscript{185} Interview with Jenny, October 2009, Interview with Marcus, November 2009
\textsuperscript{186} Interview with Jenny, October 2009
\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Jenny, October 2009
\textsuperscript{188} Interview with Marcus, November 2009
\textsuperscript{189} Interview with Etienne, November 2010
research findings have also been used to influence behaviour directly through project interventions. For instance, Idasse explained that his NGO’s project aimed to influence community members to change behaviour around:

> Things like washing your hands after the toilet, cleaning dishes, cleaning your home, your house, your compound, having toilet in safety. I mean respecting the standards, everything regarding public health.  

Jessica stated that her project involved educating about:

> […] the basic hygiene rules: washing hands, brushing teeth, keeping a clean home, the nutrition.

James explained that his research on livestock would likely have implications for farmers living around the park. These examples all show how policies and interventions aimed at protecting mountain gorillas from disease actually have a much wider reaching impact into people’s everyday lives.

It is clear that, as argued in the wider literature, certain organisations use their expertise to translate scientific, inaccessible data into acceptable policy solutions, as well as direct community interventions, and act to inform the construction of both problem and solution (following Kingdon 1984; Murray Li 2007; Ferguson 1990). However, what is interesting is their ability to use their expertise to inform policy and wider behaviour directly through projects that reach beyond their specific expertise. Whilst interventions focus on veterinary issues and threats from trackers and tourists, they are linked into One Health, or Ecosystem Health, programmes that also influence wider aspects of people’s lives. Information is translated into policy options or project interventions aimed at conserving gorillas, but with clear social implications for people on the ground, such as in the way that they cook, access water and graze livestock. This is not to say that the research is not rigorous and highly useful for informing interventions that will protect mountain gorillas. However, it is important to emphasise that NGOs with western veterinary expertise or NGOs basing their interventions on scientific research about disease transmission between humans and apes are able, through influencing

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190 Interview with Idasse, November 2012
191 Interview with Jessica, November 2009
192 Interview with James, October 2009
decision-making about policies and projects, to influence daily aspects of people’s lives and behaviour.

These examples are also important as they suggest that at the same time as people are respected because of their expertise, other people and organisations’ ideas might be ignored by policymakers due to their lack of perceived expertise. This argument is common in the wider literature (see Radcliffe 2001: 26; Verkoren 2006: 53, following Stone 2005: 99; Duffy 2008: 340, following Keller 2009; Ottaway 2001: 16). My data indicate ‘nondecision-making power’ (following Bachrach and Baratz 1962; see chapter 2, page 42-3) of particular organisations with perceived expertise. This means that by providing expert advice, particular NGOs create and perpetuate a situation whereby governments looking for health and veterinary advice will look to international organisations with typically western qualifications and other actors without such expertise will be excluded from discussions in the first instance. It is not that their ideas are heard but ignored, but rather that their lack of expertise means they would not even be invited to the table to discuss potential policy decisions. Indeed, these non-experts may not even realise that they could have something relevant and important to say as the system in place suggests that such decisions need to be made by policymakers and people with particular types of knowledge and qualifications. In this way, though their expertise, NGOs (although not necessarily deliberately) may exclude others from decision-making processes. Interventions and policies about human behaviour are thus determined by international conservation NGOs and not by the communities who will be affected.

Despite asking all interviewees specifically, I came across no instances outside of health where NGO staff felt that they had tried to influence policy but were unable to do so due to their lack of expertise. For example, whilst Ernst, a Rwandan NGO employee, had been unable to persuade Musanze District Government to support alternative stove policies and interventions despite multiple previous efforts\(^\text{193}\), there was no evidence that this was a result of his lack of perceived expertise. Equally, Jessica, an NGO director, explained that the district government had tried to change her activities to fit

\(^{193}\) Interview with Ernst, November 2010
their agenda but would not give her an audience to explain her ideas. Again there was no evidence that this was due to her lack of perceived expertise.

Equally, I encountered situations, even in relation to health and veterinary issues, where the government did not listen to NGO advice despite staff having high level, western qualifications and despite them being able to influence on other issues. This suggests that perceptions of expertise may not always be a factor in an organisation’s ideational power. For instance, whilst MGVP had successfully pushed for the introduction of a mask wearing policy for trackers and guides in the DRC, they were yet to realise similar policies in other countries, although planned to do so ‘once more scientific health data are released’ (Weir 2010: 6). At the time of fieldwork, whilst MGVP had tried to encourage RDB to adopt a mask wearing policy for tourists, guides and trackers (Zimmerman 2012), RDB did not feel that masks were necessary and could scare gorillas.

In late 2009, the H1N1 virus reached Kigali (Wane et al 2012; Gahigi 2009). This clearly presented an increased threat to gorillas and pushed the government to reconsider and discuss the idea further. In February 2012 the governments of the DRC and Rwanda revised tourist regulations to require the wearing of masks by staff and tourists when viewing the gorillas, specifically to protect against H1N1 (Zimmerman 2012). This suggests that scientific reasoning by NGOs was successful in promoting policy change when it became useful and relevant to the government to use such information.

A further example illustrates the tendency of the government to ignore NGO networks when their ideas are not in line with their interests. In 2009, a government proposal to expand PNV came to light (Karuhanga 2009). A number of international conservation NGOs tried to work together to prevent the government from expanding the park. They raised concerns about what this would mean for local populations living and farming around PNV. Some NGOs were initially consulted, but felt that they could not be involved and support the project until better information was made available on how

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194 Interview with Jessica, November 2009
195 Interview with Tristan, November 2009
196 Interview with Tristan, November 2009
197 Interviews with Peter and Eze, October 2009; Interviews with Marcus and George, November 2009
communities would be affected, but this information was not available. However, rather than NGOs turning down a chance to be involved, it seems more the case that they were cautious about supporting the expansion until a land use survey had been conducted to understand implications for local communities. On the back of this, the government invited a Canadian consultant to conduct a socio-economic survey around the park.

One interviewee described the consultation as “disastrous” and the findings as “nonsense.” He felt that the conclusions did not match the data presented, as if they “had been written before the survey was carried out”. It seems that now that the government has the data from this consultation, carried out by an external consultant, they are unprepared to listen to NGOs who protest. One interviewee, George, described the consultation process, arguing that the government is resisting NGO intervention and will not listen to NGO suggestions:

When [IGCP] made a statement to RDB about it then they were basically politely told well, or very impolitely told, “well go and mind your own business, you’ve been given your chance, but it’s too late now, we’re going to have to go down other directions.”

These examples suggest that whilst expertise may be an important factor in a network’s ability to use its ideas to influence policy and the construction of political problems, this ability is limited by a government’s agenda. This scenario seems more in line with academic arguments that states may only look to groups such as epistemic communities for advice when that group’s interests are in line with their own interests or with more mainstream ideas (Adler and Haas 1992: 382). Whilst NGOs use their technical expertise to influence political behaviour, government staff can limit their ideational power, choosing only to draw the ideas of NGOs with perceived expertise where they see fit. The situation is more complex than experts translating difficult, complex issues into straightforward political solutions as much of the literature suggests. In this case, expertise is respected by policymakers when they invite it, but it plays much less of a role in cases where other economic and political interests are at stake. My data reveal

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198 Interview with Eze, October 2009; Interview with Marcus, November 2009
199 Interview with George, November 2009; this document is not publicly available
200 Interview with Peter, November 2010
201 Interview with George, November 2009
that other factors, beyond perceived expertise, are equally, if not more important in an NGO’s ability to circulate its ideas and use them to influence political behaviour. I discuss these below.

7.4.3. Staff movement, personal relationships and more accidental disconnections

The literature says little about the role that staff movement or personal relationships play in circulating ideas or ideational power, yet I argue here that their role is important. Movement of people between NGOs, government ministries and the private sector may provide a useful lens for understanding the movement of ideas through a network (following Mitlin et al 2007: 1702). Whilst frequent movement of staff in some areas provides ample opportunity for interactions and idea circulation, it is difficult to identify which ideas circulate as a result. However, staff movement, particularly between certain NGOs, such as IGCP, and the state can be relatively exclusive meaning that seemingly strong bonds form between particular people, but exclude others. Other personal relationships form as a result of the social circles people move in. Whilst in some cases ideas may be shared at informal gatherings, personal relationships build trust and rapport, which undoubtedly influence interactions in formal meetings. People from different cultures and in particular those from local community groups are typically excluded from these relationships and this can mean they are unable to share their ideas with some of the more influential players in the field.

I present data on staff movement in Table 19. Movement is much greater in Rwanda than in the DRC. Lack of movement in DRC is likely to be a result of many NGOs having only re-established, or (re)started projects in the country since 2005 (FZS 2011; WWF 2005) meaning that many staff were new to the country or had moved away during the wars.\(^{202}\) This reflects wider discussions in the literature about how conservation NGOs left the DRC during the two Congo Wars (Hart and Ducarme n.d.). In Rwanda, where conservation NGOs have worked more consistently over the last half a century (see Table 13, chapter 6, page 156), there is a high rate of staff movement between organisations (see Table 19). Others have commented on this high rate of movement with conservation NGOs in Rwanda (for instance see Huxley 2006: 12 on the ‘abnormally high’ staff turnover at IGCP). Between field visits in 2009 and 2010,  

\(^{202}\) Interviews with Richard, Liz, Helen and Harvey, November 2009
five interviewees had changed job and my interviews revealed such flows of people were typical of the conservation and development sector in Rwanda.

Such movement should offer ample opportunity for connections and idea circulation. In some cases the evidence for this is clear. For instance, a former trustee of one international conservation organisation that ran various health projects left and set up her own NGO addressing health issues in the same region\(^\text{203}\) (WWHP 2008c). Julie Ghrist, who set up Art of Conservation, which amongst other things runs a health education programme in schools, previously worked for MGVP who has a large health focus; her board includes staff and ex-staff from MGVP (Art of Conservation 2011b). MGVP’s integration of the US model of employee health schemes into its One Health programme reflects the fact that its senior staff are American and have previously worked in the US:

[The director] really started that and that was because in the United States, you know, where we work, people have healthcare. And it really makes sense that if these rangers and trackers and guides are out there with the gorillas, we really ought to know about their health and help them stay healthy and so [he] initiated that a number of years ago and again, it’s not a new idea, it’s just not an idea that’s been done here.\(^\text{204}\)

However, these cases aside, identifying specific ideas and arguing that they circulate as a direct result of staff movement is not always clear-cut. Despite ample examples offered by interviewees of their movements, I found no further evidence that this had directly impacted the circulation of specific ideas. Nevertheless, looking at the types of organisation that staff moved between may partially explain why some concepts and conservation language, such as ‘sensitisation’, ‘capacity building’, ‘social integration’ and ‘the poorest of the poor’ have become so prevalent, especially in Rwanda. It is likely that frequent movement helps to explain the perpetuation of these development concepts, such concepts that are far less prevalent in DRC where there is a clear lack of staff movement between organisations. I return to this in chapter 8 (page 263-6) as I explore the wider structure and embedded discourse that ultimately create the environment within which all ideas circulate (following Lukes 2005; Dowding 2006; Béland 2010).

\(^{203}\) Interview with Tristan, December 2010
\(^{204}\) Interview with Jenny, October 2009
Table 19: Movement of staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current organisation</th>
<th>Previous organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amahoro Integrated Development Programme</td>
<td>Eos Visions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
<td>Cameroon Wildlife Aid Fund; Chimfunshi Primate Centre, Zambia; MGVP; IGCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care (Rwanda)**</td>
<td>Care (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCHIPS</td>
<td>RDB (2 positions at Volcans, 1 at Akagera); IGCP; Gorilla Organisation Rwanda (when DFGFI Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI Rwanda**</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI Rwanda</td>
<td>WWF, CAR; Cameroon Wildlife Aid Fund; Monkey Town Primate Centre, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI Rwanda/WHRC</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS); WWF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFGFI Congo</td>
<td>Conservation International (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eos Visions</td>
<td>DFGFI Congo; GTZ (Rwanda and Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZS</td>
<td>ZSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZS</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization Rwanda</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization DRC</td>
<td>UN Habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Lodge</td>
<td>IGCP (when MGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCN (Virunga)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP Rwanda</td>
<td>Microfinance association, Kigali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP Rwanda</td>
<td>RDB (3 positions at Volcans and 2 at Nyungwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCP DRC</td>
<td>None (academic background)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGVP (US)</td>
<td>Toronto Zoo; Baltimore Zoo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGVP (Rwanda)</td>
<td>Indianapolis Zoo; The Brooklyn Zoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGVP (Rwanda)**</td>
<td>Livestock researcher (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private consultant</td>
<td>IGCP; UNDP; Care; Ministry of Agriculture in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>RDB Nyungwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB Kigali</td>
<td>MGVP</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB Volcans</td>
<td>DFGFI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transboundary Secretariat</td>
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<td>UNDP (RDB Nyungwe)</td>
<td>UNDP (RDB Kigali*, Cameroon, Chad, Yemen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCS Nyungwe</td>
<td>RDB Kigali*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCS Nyungwe</td>
<td>Care International*; Concern Worldwide; World Relief International; World Vision International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Congo</td>
<td>EU (Belgium); Unnamed development NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wildlife Tours</td>
<td>RDB Volcans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Also interviewed in this position in 2009

Table 19 shows that staff movement between NGOs in Rwanda and the DRC typically takes place between a select group of western conservation and development NGOs. Seven interviewees who worked, or had worked, for an international conservation NGO

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205 Had left position by time of write up
206 Had left this position (and country) by 2010
had held previous roles at another international conservation NGO and two had worked for large US zoos with international conservation programmes. Only two of these nine interviewees were in positions in the DRC, again highlighting the high rate of movement between staff in Rwanda and the lower rate of movement in the DRC. Seven of the people that I interviewed about their current or recent conservation roles\textsuperscript{207} had previously worked in international development roles for well-known western development NGOs and development institutions. These included the German Development Institute (GIZ, formerly GTZ), UN Habitat, Salem Rwanda, Care International, Concern Worldwide, The Asian Development Bank, the International Rescue Council, World Relief International and World Vision. All staff interviewed were, or had been, involved in implementing community projects.

A number of NGOs are marginalised from this process. Two cases in Rwanda stood out as having employed staff with less experience of working for other NGOs. One was a small national organisation working in Rwanda with two communities. The employee had previously worked at a development NGO but this was totally unconnected from the network of organisations that other interviewees had moved between. The second was a UK-based NGO who employed Rwandan, Congolese and Ugandan staff in its respective country programmes. The Rwandan director had no previous experience in the conservation or development sector:

*Were you working for any other conservation organisations before that?*

No not really, actually, I had never even seen a gorilla before I started working. Actually we had some culture saying that gorillas could bring bad luck. I can say that to say the name of a gorilla or a volcano in the morning it was high risk. As for myself, I had no idea about gorilla conservation.\textsuperscript{208}

Despite not being as well connected to other NGOs as a result of staff movement, both organisations were connected in other ways. The first organisation received financial support from and partnered with an international conservation NGO in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{209} The second organisation had links with other NGOs through previous project collaboration

\textsuperscript{207} Here I include consultants who had previously worked for conservation NGOs. I also include Care with other conservation NGOs as the staff I interviewed were in conservation roles and had always worked for Care in this capacity. Care is perhaps a unique example in this respect, known as a development NGO that runs conservation projects.

\textsuperscript{208} Interview with Ernst, November 2009

\textsuperscript{209} Interview with Davis, November 2009
(directed by headquarters) in the DRC but no such links in Rwanda. Both organisations also participated in formal state-organised collaborative meetings.

The importance of being disconnected due to a lack of staff movement becomes clearer in relation to the personal and social relationships that movement fosters. I argued in chapter 2 (page 54) that personal relationships receive a lack of attention in the literature on transnational networks. Yet I argue that these personal connections play a key role in fostering inclusion of particular people and circulation of their ideas. Staff movement and personal relationships between particular NGOs and state departments illustrates this particularly well.

Staff movement between NGOs and state departments in Rwanda is limited to a select group of organisations. In particular, staff move frequently between IGCP and RDB (see Table 19), highlighting the close nature of their working relationship. For instance, one member of staff explained how he began working in one national park in Rwanda for RDB in 1988 and worked for both of Rwanda’s other national parks in the period before the genocide. When he returned to Rwanda in 1994 he worked for RDB again, before starting work for another international NGO at Nyungwe National Park. He began working for IGCP in 1997 at PNV. Another NGO interviewee had previously moved from working at PNV for MGP (now IGCP) in 1986, to working for RDB at the same park in 1993. He went on to work for the DFGF Europe (now Gorilla Organization), then other parks in Rwanda and now works for a different NGO. In one instance Bernard, who had worked for RDB for many years, had moved to IGCP for a ‘break’ from the field to write up his research. He had worked for RDB for sixteen years, regularly moving between Nyungwe and Volcans National Parks.

This movement often made it seem that IGCP and RDB were part of the same organisation. Whilst titles and organisational affiliations make the distinction clear on the surface, regular movement and close personal and organisational relationships blur the boundaries between state and NGO. Certainly, IGCP’s involvement in bringing

\[\text{References}\]

\[\text{Interview with Richard, November 2009}\]
\[\text{Interview with Eze, October 2009}\]
\[\text{Interview with Etienne, November 2010}\]
\[\text{Interview with Bernard, November 2010}\]
\[\text{Interview with Bernard, November 2010}\]

223
ICCN, UWA and RDB together would indicate their policy work is very much intertwined (IGCP 2012b). One interviewee who had not worked for IGCP or RDB commented on this close relationship as a result of staff movement:

I mean if you see Eugene, he used to work with RDB at the national park service so they are very much, their interaction’s very natural; on the other hand as he’s in an NGO environment that position is different from a governmental environment.216

However, other NGO staff are more critical of this relationship. In the same way that the academic literature suggests blurred state-NGO boundaries can mask accountability (Brockington and Igoe 2005, following Mbembe 2001; Hulme and Edwards 1997a), in this case, such close relationships may allow the Rwandan government to intervene in the DRC under the neutrality of an NGO. For example, Liz, an NGO employee explained:

IGCP, because they’re a regional transboundary gorilla organisation, you have to take into consideration who’s their head right? Whether they’re Congolese, Ugandan or Rwandan and that may or may not, and in this case did, influence their work. So I’ll give you the history a little bit. During the war last year, you really had the CNDP rebels that were occupying [Mikeno] sector of the park, which meant that none of the NGOs were able to access that area, except for one. And ICCN wasn’t able to access that area for over a year because they can’t work with the rebel groups and they were kicked out and they weren’t able to collaborate. The only ones who could and did work throughout that time was IGCP because they have political links with Rwanda and CNDP, you know? So yeah, I’m not saying they’re the same people, I’m saying they were able to negotiate with CNDP and say ‘we’re Rwandan’. So you can imagine that, using their political background, or especially one or two individuals running the organisation, with the support they could get from Rwanda, they negotiated the entrance and working in the park, when not even the ICCN could. So that created a situation where the ICCN were on the outside, or at least officially outraged ‘how can an NGO work with a rebel group when we’ve been kicked out?’217

However, Liz continued to explain that as IGCP supported rangers in PNVi, “or at least CNDP rangers”, ICCN “unofficially were happy of the support as it meant conservation

216 Interview with Peter, October 2009
217 Interview with Liz, November 2009
in the park could continue despite the fighting”. ICCN was able to continue its support during the conflict due to financial support from IGCP (WWF 2009).

The way that IGCP and the Rwandan government work suggests that their activities are closely entwined and the boundaries are blurred. This allowed IGCP to operate in North Kivu in areas under CNDP occupation, at a time when even the Congolese government was unable to enter the area. IGCP was able to influence conservation in the DRC when no other NGOs, or even ICCN, could. Such vague boundaries allow the Rwandan government potentially to have a wider influence beyond its own borders in the DRC.

Blurring of boundaries between NGOs and RDB means that this kind of intervention can be justified for conservation, yet it ignores the fact that the Rwandan government has a long and complicated political and economic interest in what happens in North Kivu due to the presence of genocidaries, as well as DRC’s valuable mineral resources (cf Stearn 2011; Prunier 2011). This case brings several themes to the fore relevant to this thesis. Firstly, it shows the importance of contextual factors and their influence on connections and disconnections. Conflict in the Virungas excluded many NGOs and even the Congolese state from working in the region and influencing decision-making about conservation. Equally, this wider historical and political context, and the personal connections that some argue it supports, allowed certain NGOs to be involved in conservation when others were not. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that through its Rwandan political connections, IGCP was able to continue working in the DRC, despite the Rwandan government itself having no official presence there since the official end of the second Congo War. This statement is controversial, but it reflects wider rhetoric about the current political situation in the region which suggests that the Rwandan government continues to support rebel groups in Eastern DRC (see Stearn 2011; Prunier 2011; Mcgreal 2012; Shepherd 2012) and in particular that the Rwandan government worked through and supported Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP (Beswick 2012). Second, this is important as such exclusive connections and relationships led to tensions and conflicts with those NGOs who were excluded and prevented from continuing their work in the DRC and influencing decisions about conservation on the ground. The political and historical context of the region

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218 Interview with Liz, November 2009
219 Interview with Liz, November 2009
underpins many connections and disconnections in conservation as it does in other sectors.

This situation presents an interesting paradox. In many ways, as I argue in chapter 5 (pages 132, 151-2), it seems that conservation operates in a bubble, continuing despite years of conflict in the region (Plumptre et al 2007; Weber and Vedder 2001: 333). Indeed, rangers from both countries have consistently worked together to achieve conservation goals (Martin et al 2011; Weber and Vedder 2001; IGCP 2012b). Yet at the same time, conservation was also, in part, able to continue because it was so closely entwined with the state and regional politics. On the surface it may appear that conservation has been prioritised and continued separately from and despite regional politics, but my data suggest that regional politics have actually played a key role in allowing conservation efforts to continue.

Other staff movement between state departments and NGOs in Rwanda is more limited, but clearly also contributes to personal relationships which facilitate idea sharing and project collaboration. For example, two RDB staff had previously worked at MGVP and DFGFI. In both cases, there is good communication between the two. The connection between staff at MGVP and RDB fosters idea and policy discussion, which has resulted in policy change (for instance, in the cases of the 7-metre rule and mask wearing policies). In the case of DFGFI, a park employee often approached and was successful in gaining financial and other support (for example vehicle use) from DFGFI. The two organisations also collaborate around park monitoring and gorilla data collection activities (DFGFI 2012c). These are two of the larger and longer-established of the international NGOs working in Rwanda and no further examples arose in interviews.

These examples demonstrate that, as with flows of staff between NGOs, state-NGO movement takes place between the same organisations by the same people. It indicates that an elite group of people and their ideas circulate, whilst at the same time, other interests may not have the opportunity to circulate so freely. Again, a lack of evidence exists - even though I discussed the issue thoroughly in interviews - about whether staff movement directly contributes to the circulation of specific ideas. However, the importance of this movement for facilitating longer lasting personal relationships and

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220 Interviews with Peace and Kara, October 2009
future discussions and collaborations should not be ignored. It is these relationships that are important for idea circulation and that arguably allow particular people to influence policy and practice. Those who have not had the same history of moving throughout the sector and have perhaps not had the opportunity to form particular social connections can be marginalised from this process. They may be present in government-organised meetings and share their work plans with others, but they are marginalised from other discussions that take place informally outside of these meetings.

7.4.4. Personal relationships and social networks

Personal relationships are not exclusive to connections developed between people who had previously worked together. Informal social gatherings I attended in Musanze between NGO staff from typically international organisations, on occasion fostered discussion and debate about conservation and what people were currently working on. However, whilst such gatherings did not deliberately exclude certain people - they may often relate to the area people live in, the fact that they share a similar cultural background, or even simply that their children attend the same school - it did happen. Likewise, the Rwandan social gatherings I attended in Musanze seemed to consist of a completely different group of people. In Gisenyi, on the border with DRC, there did seem to be a greater range of people from Rwandan, Congolese and European backgrounds at social gatherings. Although, again, these people all represented international NGOs or businesses and I did not meet people from local or national organisations at such events.

People will always move in different social circles, forming friendships based on common interests and culture. In itself, this is nothing new. However, if professional collaborations are formed and conservation ideas are shared on such occasions, then it becomes ever more important to understand the impacts of the ‘accidental’ exclusion that results. In all cases, there were no members of local community groups present at social gatherings and any further research would need to determine whether NGO staff are present at local groups’ social gatherings. However, from initial observations it seems that through such events, international NGO staff have the opportunity to form bonds and build trust that will later be important in more formal meetings where ideas are discussed. If other groups, such as local grassroots organisations, are not part of this
process, they will be excluded from these relationships and this could influence dynamics in more formal meetings.

Some connections came about as a result of personal relationships at head office level. There was one case where two NGOs who did not typically work together in the DRC had been asked to collaborate as a result of staff relationships between their European head offices.\textsuperscript{221} Others came about as a result of a long-established country programme. For example, in the DRC, WWF has been able to get the concept of participative park demarcation adopted by park management teams in PNVi, as well as across the DRC.\textsuperscript{222} Their long-established and close relationship with ICCN has allowed them to develop a strong relationship with the government and communities and to build the trust and legitimacy to be able to do this.\textsuperscript{223}

\section*{7.5. Strategic disconnections and government ‘harmonisation’}

The literature typically highlights tensions and conflicts within a network without discussing what they look like or why they are important (for instance see Florini 2001: 31, 34-35; Collins et al 2001: 141-143; Duffy 2006: 743; Jordan and Tuijl 2000). There are a few exceptions to this. For example, studies suggest that tensions and conflicts can affect a network’s lack of ability to influence policymakers (Adler and Haas 1992: 384; Haas 1989: 398; Peterson 1992), can lead to project failure (Lewis et al 2003: 543), and can prevent participation (Anand 2006). However, these limited examples still fail to distinguish the strength and severity of such conflicts and tensions. I attempt to fill this gap and investigate further the impact and importance of the more obvious conflicts within networks, particularly in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion. I argue that ‘strategic’ or deliberate conflicts result in disconnections, which are important as, despite a context of diverse government structures aimed at preventing such conflicts and duplication, they can prevent information being circulated and lead to duplication of projects in some areas and lack of projects in others. This can potentially cause confusion or exclusion within the local population.

\textsuperscript{221} Interviews with Liz and Richard, November 2009
\textsuperscript{222} Interview with Thomas, November 2010
\textsuperscript{223} Interview with Thomas, November 2010
7.5.1. The success of NGO coordination

In the Virungas, NGOs share ideas in collaborative, state organised forums such as transboundary meetings, RDB park management meetings, Coco-Si (site coordination) meetings in the DRC, the cellule de crise meeting in the DRC and JADF meetings in Rwanda (see chapter 6, page 183-94). All of these are all-inclusive of all NGOs and local organisations. Whilst competition and organisational politics may play out within these meetings, it is clear that they provide an important platform for organisations to share their work plans and identify how they fit into a wider park strategy.

In Rwanda, some NGO staff see some of the coordinating structures, such as for JADF and RDB, as ‘paper exercises’.224 Park staff similarly felt that their plans did not have quite as much of a coordinating impact as they had anticipated.225 An RDB employee in Kigali even expressed that: “Coordination of NGOs by RDB is our weakness”.226 He felt that there was a lack of a proper monitoring system and people trained to maintain it within RDB. He offered the example of water supply tanks, which are built by many NGOs in the same places, as an example of how the government had been unable to coordinate and prevent duplication of NGO activities.

This view was not held by any staff in the DRC, all of whom spoke about how Emmanuel de Merode and his team at PNVi coordinated NGOs in a very practical way and ensured that their activities fitted with the park management plan and that no organisation duplicated another’s work (see chapter 6, page 192). This presents an interesting scenario, whereby organisations in a country considered to have a weak governance structure (the DRC) are very tightly coordinated, yet NGOs in a country considered to have a very top-down governance structure (Rwanda) are not coordinated so tightly.

7.5.2. Strategic disconnections

Regardless of how well formal mechanisms coordinate NGOs, organisations have the potential to work well, or not work well, together outside of these structures and this

224 Interviews with George and Ernst, November 2009; Interview with Eze, November 2010
225 Interview with Peace, October 2009
226 Interview with Tristan, November 2010
affects idea circulation. In both countries, interviewees highlighted many conflicts between NGOs both inside and outside of formal meetings. These strategic disconnections come about for several reasons: as the result of organisations having different strategies, goals and ways of doing things; as a result of organisational conflicts; and as a result of personal conflicts. The latter two are very much intertwined and can come about at head office or field level due to competition for funds, publicity and individual personalities. Below I explore each of these disconnections and offer examples.

Disconnections that result from NGOs having different ways of doing things and different organisational values can lead to different expectations about how others should be doing things (Jordan and Tuijl 2000). My data show that one NGO deliberately chose not to collaborate on projects for this reason. It had collaborated in the past and felt it had been a mistake. Richard, the country director, explained:

> I think coordinated activities whereby an NGO is responsible for its activity in its entirety and does not rely on another NGO, in order for that activity to be completed, is the best approach. And so what we are looking for, based on that experience, working for others, if you are relying on another organisation to, in order that your part of the activity be completed, you run serious risks of achieving very little because of the speed and efficiency which varies between NGOs to which you can actually operate and work.\(^{227}\)

Richard gave an example of such a project where he felt their partner organisation had had a much smaller workload but had missed all deadlines and they were now unlikely to work together in the future. He argued that “even with the best intentions”, issues of capacity, funding and different administrative procedures all combine and “lead to problems and frustrations and inter-NGO conflicts.”\(^{228}\) Such conflicts are important as they lead to NGOs being unwilling to collaborate and cause personal conflicts which mean people are less likely to communicate, particularly about work, outside of formal meetings. I return to this point and its importance below.

The second type of strategic disconnection results from organisational conflicts. Interviewees offered a number of explanations for this type of disconnection. The first and perhaps most obvious of which was ‘competition’. Richard explained that

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\(^{227}\) Interviews with Richard, November 2009

\(^{228}\) Interviews with Richard, November 2009
“regardless of what’s going on on the ground, NGOs have a nature to be competitive, for visibility, for leadership or whatever it is that they’re striving for”. 229 Indeed, competition is arguably the most plausible reason given for the lack of collaboration in the NGO sector more generally (Glennie 2012; Cooley and Ron 2002; Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2012). George described how it was to work in this environment:

[... it is a bloody mess [...] infighting between government departments, between NGOs, between CBOs and a feature of, I’m not saying it’s a bad or a good thing, it’s just the way it is [...] usually disputes are over petty issues, everybody’s looking to try and achieve the same end job, but everybody wants their slice of the pie in terms of finances for their organisations, they’ve got their own political standpoints, but we’re all trying to achieve the same thing: development and conservation. It’s just we haven’t, I think there’s so little money out there, that’s why it’s such a sort of handbag fight for the meagre resources that are out there. 230

Such competition means that NGO staff are less likely to communicate and share their ideas outside of formal meetings. However, NGOs not only compete for the same funding. My data show that competition for perceived ownership of projects and even for perceived ownership of mountain gorillas when it comes to media and publicity plays a greater role in disconnections, both on the ground and between headquarters.

Richard illustrated how this type of conflict played out. Speaking about the cellule de crise, he claimed that instead of taking on one specific role as the majority of organisations did, one NGO chose to fund a bit of each part of the plan and then claimed in its press release that they had “funded the crisis”. 231 He felt that this led to tensions, arguing that “it compounds [the crisis] and can derail the entire momentum”. Interestingly, Helen, who worked for the organisation in question told a different story, highlighting tensions even further. She explained that for many years, whilst she wanted to collaborate on an individual basis, as a representative of a particular organisation, she was restricted from even talking to other organisations. 232 Competition, in this example, seemed to be less about funds and more about perceived responsibility for the success of mountain gorilla conservation. Helen explained that:

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229 Interviews with Richard, November 2009
230 Interview with George, November 2009
231 Interviews with Richard, November 2009
232 Interview with Helen, November 2009
Some other people had some personal interests or their organisation had an interest in research data, being important or being in touch with the press at a moment like that and getting some extra money if they get more publicity… they can sometimes perhaps be a little bit difficult because it’s really that kind of setting claims and they tried to look better than the others with slogans like ‘we are claiming now that we do the most important part in this crisis situation’ or ‘we already are in the press now because we made sure immediately that we were in touch with all the journalists’.  

Again, these tensions are important, they suggest that even though NGOs must agree to a specific plan in government-organised meetings; their competitive nature (even within the meetings) means that this collaborative way of working is unlikely to continue outside of such meetings. I return to this below.

Even in cases where NGOs may work very collaboratively on the ground; the presence of similar politics to those described above at the international level can trickle down to the field causing further disconnections. For instance, Liz, who worked for a different NGO at the time of the cellule de crise to her current NGO, explained:

> There would be a collaborative effort on the ground, a group of NGOs coming together and [...] then the HQ from one of the organisations starts putting out press releases saying you know ‘what we’re doing, isn’t it wonderful?’ that frustrates then other organisations that are saying ‘hang on a minute, but we’re doing this too’ or ‘we’ve put in twice the funds that you’ve put in and you know there’s no recognition whatsoever of our contribution, of our effort’.

This highlights high levels of competition between NGO headquarters in the US and Europe. This was particularly the case with the orphan mountain gorillas and had led to tensions between a well-known British conservation NGO and a well-known American conservation NGO. For instance, Liz told me that:

> There’s a huge difference, sometimes collaborations with partners on the ground, for example, can be very good [...] but then all of a sudden at HQ level they might be very competitive and their press team are extremely competitive and quite unfair and often go off and publish articles without getting feedback from the ground and in these articles it’s clear that they’re being competitive and saying that there’s no input from the other NGO or whatever, which can actually then cause a clash up at the top which then

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233 Interview with Helen, November 2009  
234 Interview with Liz, November 2009  
235 *ibid*
filters down and then that can cause problems, so luckily, if the two project managers from the two different NGOs get along then we can laugh about it and say ok this is like our HQ going crazy. But if there’s already tension, that escalates hugely.\textsuperscript{236}

Similar examples can be seen with DFGFI and the Gorilla Organization, as well as with DFGFI and CCHIPS, although the former now seems to have been resolved. Historically, there was well-known, open conflict between DFGFI and Gorilla Organization, the latter formally DFGF-Europe, a fundraising arm of DFGFI. This came about in informal discussions with various NGO staff prior to fieldwork though there is nothing in the public domain, save for a historic description of Gorilla Organization that details its name change (Gorilla Organization n.d.e.). However, according to both parties, they now actively work together in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{237} Another organisation, CCHIPS, used to fall under DFGFI, but now has its own registration (WWHPs 2008c). Both parties spoke of this split in a matter-of-fact way, although according to staff from an independent organisation, there had been “\textit{a falling out}”\textsuperscript{238}

Such organisational politics create tensions at the international level that trickle down to the field. This can exacerbate simmering tensions and prevent NGOs from collaborating on the ground. Whilst government structures may, in some cases, facilitate coordination and prevent project duplication, this does not equate necessarily to better sharing of ideas, especially outside of formal meetings. This means that on the one hand, NGOs will meet formally and share the information that they need to share, such as their work plans. This is important as it can prevent duplication and allow park objectives to be met, but on the other hand, NGOs will continue to work disparately and not always communicate or share ideas outside of meetings. I explore this in the following section.

Organisational conflicts are closely connected to and informed by personal conflicts and individual personalities at both head office level and in the field in Rwanda and the DRC. For example, turning to a case that I discussed earlier in the chapter (page 203), staff explained that Beatrice, an NGO country director, could not socialise or communicate with other conservation NGO staff. According to Beatrice:

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\textsuperscript{236} Interview with Liz, November 2009; it is also true that some of the websites of those involved in protecting orphaned gorillas do not mention other NGOs involved.

\textsuperscript{237} Interview with Kara, November 2009; Interview with Ernst, November 2010

\textsuperscript{238} Interviews with Jenny and Marcus, November 2010

\end{flushright}
[...] every time I’m trying to build partnerships I’m told that I don’t understand Congo and that I’m undermining the organisation by bringing in other conservation organisations. ②39

She spoke of how senior staff accused another well-known conservation NGO of forging letters from the community so that they could work in that area. She told me:

There’s just this paranoia, like ‘everyone else is trying to bring us down, everyone else doesn’t understand the politics of Congo’. ②40

In another case, although formal publications suggest the reasoning for two orphan gorilla facilities in the DRC was to have one for Mountain Gorillas at Rumungabo and one for Grauer’s Gorillas at Tayna (Gorilla Doctors 2012b), individual personalities and personal tensions between staff from different NGOs, at head office level and on the ground, caused a number of disconnections. For instance, a staff member who has now left the field “fell out” with another NGO over a lost email and stopped communications on this basis. ②41 In both of these cases, one individual with strong views about other NGOs was able to create tensions and disconnections with other NGOs in the area. It is clear in this case that particular individuals were the cause of what ended up as wider organisational conflicts.

Disconnections between people, and therefore organisations, present a stark comparison to frameworks in place at the park, district and regional level to ensure collaboration. In fact, it seems that whilst some organisations collaborate and work well together; personal relationships and organisational politics have resulted in tensions and disconnections between others. I explore why these are important for the circulation of ideas and the inclusion or exclusion of particular people in the following section.

7.5.3. The importance of strategic disconnections

Whilst the literature shows that more obvious tensions and conflicts can reduce the ability of a network to influence, can lead to project failure and can prevent participation at the project level (Petersen 1992; Lewis et al 2003: 543; Anand 2006);

②39 Interview with Beatrice, November 2009
②40 Interview with Beatrice, November 2010
②41 Interviews with Sarah and Kara, November 2009
they are important for two other reasons. They prevent idea circulation outside of meetings and they can lead to project duplication.

A lot of information does circulate as a result of meetings, despite conflicts, but these typically only take place quarterly. In a fast-paced environment where restructuring of government departments, new NGOs, new staff and new policies are compounded by conflict and instability; there is a lot of space outside of these meetings for things to happen. However, tensions between NGOs inevitably mean that some, often urgent information, will not be communicated between NGOs. This may be the case even when the most basic of security information in the DRC is concerned. Richard explained that when he started working in the DRC, conservation NGOs were rarely communicating with one another, describing how even essential security information was not being exchanged. He tried to set up a regular meeting between NGOs to address this, with initial success, but it “died off after six months”.

This became an issue when the security situation worsened:

I went for a road trip and in the course of that road trip came across three separate ambushes, lorries on fire burning, you know bodies and stuff everywhere and military and rebels. And these NGOs were doing this route, working in the park, working in these areas, had information that wasn’t being passed from one NGO to another. So you had one NGO narrowly escaping an ambush knowing that there’s a hell of a lot of military activity, rebel activity, knowing that it was dangerous... and you have another NGO following up a couple of hours later, maybe getting caught up in something.

If NGO tensions prevent staff from collaborating over the most basic, security information, it says something about their inability to connect and share ideas outside government forums with regards to conservation projects.

Strategic disconnections also result in project duplication. For example Ernst, an NGO employee, explained that tensions in the past with another NGO in the region Ernst, caused duplication of projects. He suggested that:

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242 Interview with Richard, November 2009
243 Interview with Richard, November 2009
I can be doing schools and someone can come and be like ‘yeah, I’m also going to do environment education to the same schools’, which is not good I think.\textsuperscript{244}

A number of interviewees from different NGOs explained how an email getting lost, combined with the personality of a certain individual who had since left the field, had resulted in two orphan gorilla rehabilitation and community education facilities\textsuperscript{245}, rather than one, being built for orphaned gorillas.\textsuperscript{246} Daniel, an ex-RDB employee explained that duplication was a real issue and he felt frustrated that NGOs would not collaborate on projects more often.\textsuperscript{247} Ernst shared this view:

\begin{quote}
So at the NGOs level, we still have a kind of duplication [...] because you can be somewhere and someone can come and do similar things to what you are doing, which I don’t support. So for me what we could be doing or what we should be doing would be I’m here, I’m building cisterns in this area, you go there you build cisterns. So this will be complementing, instead of coming and “oh! I’m coming to do a project in the same place you work”\textsuperscript{248}.
\end{quote}

Importantly, this duplication has impacts at the local level. A recent household survey as part of the EEEGL project carried out by researchers from Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) and DFGFI at the same time as my fieldwork shows that many people living around PNV are in fact unaware of NGO projects and even if they know about them, many are not affected by them (Bush et al 2010). It seems that while some NGOs duplicate their efforts in single locations\textsuperscript{249}, they are not covering many other areas, particularly some of the more remote and very poor areas. In fact, whilst many households were aware of social infrastructure projects such as community water tanks and school and clinic rehabilitation, it was the highest income households that tended to enjoy most of the benefits which were not felt by the poorest households (Bush et al 2010). The report comments that the community conservation programmes “do a poor job of targeting those households posing the greatest threat to the conservation of the park” (\textit{ibid}). That is, certain villages seem to be more popular for NGOs and states to work in than others and are targeted by multiple NGOs, whereas the poorest households are less likely to benefit from NGO or state conservation interventions.

\textsuperscript{244} Interview with Ernst, November 2009
\textsuperscript{245} In Rumungabo and Tayna, DRC
\textsuperscript{246} Interviews with Kara and Sarah, November 2009
\textsuperscript{247} Interview with Daniel, October 2009
\textsuperscript{248} Interview with Ernst, November 2009
\textsuperscript{249} Interviews with Tristan, Kara and George November 2009, as well as personal observation in Gahunga
Even more surprisingly, given the number of agricultural projects I encountered on a visit to one village in Gahinga sector, the survey reports that only 5% of respondents from households living around PNV were aware of agricultural projects relating to conservation (Bush et al 2010: 78). Whilst a higher percentage - around one third of respondents - were aware of honey production conservation projects, only 20% felt they were directly benefitting; and just over 10% were aware of or were directly impacted by health centre infrastructure development (ibid). These are interesting statistics given the number of interviewees that spoke of honey production as a core community conservation activity (see chapter 6, page 181). It suggests that a culture of tensions and disconnections between NGOs, which results in a lack of communication, means that NGOs duplicate existing work in some areas, yet other areas do not benefit at all. In other words, strategic disconnections between NGOs can potentially foster confusion in some areas and fail to support other areas, often the areas which are arguably most in need. In doing so this facilitates inequality within the local population. This all happens in spite of multiple, diverse government structures aimed at harmonising and coordinating NGO activities.

7.6. Visualising idea circulation, connections and disconnections

Chapters 6 to 8 highlight instances of connections, disconnections and idea exchange and help to develop an understanding of inclusion or exclusion of particular people and organisations from decision-making about policies and projects. Box 1 offers a detailed empirical example of the way ideas circulate and the different connections and disconnections that they encounter along the way. Specifically, Box 1 considers the idea that ‘we can protect mountain gorillas from diseases by influencing human health and behaviour’.

Box 1 shows that ideas do not move in a linear fashion, with one idea moving from Organisation or person 1, to 2 to 3. There is no one origin of an idea. Instead multiple ideas at the international level, including research, funding programmes and dominant theories about how conservation should be done influence the wider discursive environment within which policies and projects are discussed and debated at the national, regional and local level. Some ideas may be more likely to influence policy due to a mixture of perceived expertise and personal connections. These same factors are
likely to play a role in preventing other ‘non-experts’ including local community members from informing projects. At the same time, there is no evidence of mechanisms within organisations to listen to and integrate local ideas, whether or not they are present. Ideas are prevented from circulating due to more strategic disconnections as well and in some cases the government will resist an idea from an NGO, regardless of other connections, if it does not fit with the government’s agenda. In other cases, strategic disconnections mean that NGOs duplicate each others’ work and do not share lessons where things have not worked.
Box 1: The circulation of the ‘idea’ to protect mountain gorillas from disease by influencing health and behaviour of humans

International level

- Research and publications on the risk of disease transmission between humans and apes (for example, see Lilly et al 2002 on transmission of intestinal parasites between apes and humans in the Central African Republic; Woodford et al 2002 on disease risks of habituating great apes; Goldberg et al 2007 on direct and indirect disease transmission between chimpanzees and humans in Uganda). Papers make suggestions for strategies to reduce the risk, benefitting both ape conservation and human health. Interviewees highlighted this body of literature as influential to their interventions (e.g. interviews with Kara and Mike, November 2010)

- USAID Predict and Respond is a $500 million five-year programme across five parts of the world, which aims to build capacity for disease prevention and response (USAID 2011). MGVP receives funds of just under $250,000 a year via UC Davies to look at pathogens in different species (including humans) and to predict where the next disease outbreak will come from.

- The community conservation narrative sees health as one strand of a range of interventions aimed at giving local people incentives to conserve (see Emerton 2001; Hulme and Murphree 2001: 289; and all NGO websites listed in chapter 6 as working in health)

- Health is one of six objectives in Rwanda’s Great Ape Action Plan 2005: “Improve human, gorilla and livestock health standards; diminish disease amongst the gorillas through control of Zoonoses and gorilla/livestock interaction”. Interestingly, this plan was not cited in any interview when asked about where ideas for health projects originated. Instead, the academic literature, offering community incentives to conserve and funding were given as reasons.

- Health is one of twelve objectives (programme 7) in the DRC’s Great Ape Strategy: “To establish a cordon sanitaire that will protect the great apes from their own diseases and also those they share with humans (zoonoses)” (page 25). Again, interviewees did not cite this strategy. Health also falls under programme 4 to address poverty, with one aim being to build more health centres, whilst many NGOs were doing this type of intervention, they did not relate it to the Great Ape Strategy.

National level

- Connections and idea circulation based on expertise and personal connections:
  - The 7-metre rule was informed by MGVP research and fed from existing staff to government staff who previously worked for MGVP (personal connections). This intervention will influence the distance trackers, guides and tourists can get to gorillas and has implications for gorilla health. It establishes a role for MGVP staff as expert policy advisors.
Mask wearing policy - MGVP research feeds into policy (expertise and personal connections). The idea was initially rejected by the Rwandan government until H1N1 arrived showing how state staff will use NGO advise when it fits with their agenda and with what they see as most appropriate for gorillas.

Accidental disconnections - there is notable lack of NGOs without perceived veterinary expertise advising the state. MGVP is seen as the expert in this context, raising questions about whether others with different forms of knowledge and ideas are excluded.

District/village level
State mechanisms to coordinate NGO health activities
- The District Health Strategy for Musanze influenced some conservation NGO activities, namely around infrastructure by helping to rehabilitate clinics and develop water infrastructure; and health insurance provision. Whilst the strategy does not directly mention conservation, staff understand the links and play a role in coordinating NGOs. At the same time, NGOs reported a lack of communication between the Ministry of Health and RDB. Local community members are elected to help implement the MoH strategy, indicating some mechanism for allowing local input in decision-making.
- The Joint Action and Development Forum, Musanze has a health themed group for all NGOs involved in health, including conservation NGOs and local groups where relevant. Here NGOs must share their work plans. However, some interviewees describe this as ‘paper exercise’, suggesting this mechanism does not necessarily ensure collaboration and idea sharing.

NGO health/conservation projects
- Organisation A has projects in artificial insemination and training vets; model farms; and research to determine disease transmission on shared grazing land. Results may have implications for farmers, potentially affecting where, when and how they graze livestock.
- Organisation A has an employee health programme for trackers, guides and their wives. The idea came from the US, where several of its staff come from. This aims to have positive health benefits for people and gorillas. In the case of the former, it is not trying to change particular behaviour as other projects do, suggesting fewer implications for community members not being involved in influencing the project.
- Taking biological specimen samples from villagers and analysing:
  - Organisation B sends samples to the US, but staff noted uncertainty and resistance from villagers. The government pushed for local clinics to take over responsibility for analysing samples. Whilst communities may benefit health wise in terms of treatment, they are excluded from informing project details, despite personal information being sent overseas. This project is combined with education and sensitisation work to prevent parasitic and other diseases. Whilst this project aims to influence local behaviour, there is an absence of any sort of mechanism within the NGO to listen to ‘ideas’ from the community; yet Organisation B has conservation and development related expertise, but no health expertise.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented a typology of connections and disconnections, arguing that disconnections can be both ‘accidental’, as a result of people being excluded from certain types of connection, and they can be ‘strategic’, as a result of more obvious tensions and conflicts between people and NGOs. Connections and collaborations between NGOs and between NGOs and states are typically the result of a mixture of

- Organisation A collects data about diverse diseases under a larger donor funded programme. This started off as a research-focused project and has moved to a more intervention-focused project, including deworming and reproductive health education clinics. Local people may benefit from treatment, but again there are issues with people’s samples being sent overseas. Despite not having human health expertise, Organisation A is able to educate local people about reproductive and health issues; yet at the same time, Organisation A has no mechanism to allow local communities to feed their ideas into the project.

- Organisation C, sometimes in collaboration with Organisation D for their health expertise, runs health and conservation education projects, teaching children about the importance of washing their hands, keeping their homes clean, brushing their teeth and eating healthily, for the survival of gorillas. Children are provided with soap, toothbrushes etc. and the programme involves thematic teacher training in health and education. The government has proposed this training become more generalized teacher training. The aim is to reduce disease among children and - indirectly - their families and thus reduce disease risk for gorillas. Again, there are no opportunities for local communities to feed into decision-making around this work.

- Organisation D brings in doctors from the US to work with and train Rwandan doctors. This has implications for Rwandan doctors and the patients they treat, but suggests a more uni-directional flow of information and ideas about how medicine should be practiced.

- Organisations B, E, F and G implement access to protein projects to improve health and provide an alternative to bushmeat. NGO interviewees reported problems with these projects, which at most supplemented diets, rather than providing an alternative. This suggests that local community members did not inform projects and also suggests likely disconnections between NGOs running such projects as it involves little, if any, lesson sharing.

- Organisation B, D, H and F are involved in clinic rehabilitation. Strategic disconnections due to personal and organisational politics have meant that Organisation B and Organisation D are trying to work in the same area, meaning that whilst resources may be concentrated in more ‘popular’ villages, they could be lacking elsewhere.

7.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented a typology of connections and disconnections, arguing that disconnections can be both ‘accidental’, as a result of people being excluded from certain types of connection, and they can be ‘strategic’, as a result of more obvious tensions and conflicts between people and NGOs. Connections and collaborations between NGOs and between NGOs and states are typically the result of a mixture of
factors combining perceived expertise, staff movement, organisational relationships and personal relationships. They are important as they mean that interdisciplinary networks of NGOs address interdisciplinary issues; they mean that despite instability and conflict and many NGOs not being able to work in an area, other NGOs could continue conservation efforts; they mean that interesting and new ideas can be brought in from ‘outside’; and they mean that relationships and trust are developed and ideas will be more openly discussed in formal meetings.

I argue that these connections are not all-inclusive and formalities can mask ‘accidental’ disconnections that exclude particular people and NGOs. The literature on transnational networks suggests that if an organisation or its staff do not have the perceived expertise to collaborate on a project or to advise on a particular policy their ideas may be excluded (following Radcliffe 2001: 26; Verkoren 2006: 53, following Stone 2005: 99; Duffy 2008: 340, following Keller 2009; Ottaway 2001: 16). I argue that perceived expertise is important for some collaborations and for an NGO’s ideational power in some cases, especially around health and veterinary issues. In these cases perceived expertise arguably facilitates nondecision-making power (cf. Bachrach and Baratz 1962) of organisations with such perceived expertise as it perpetuates a situation where those without perceived expertise (such as community groups) may be subtly excluded, arguably without even realising it, from participating in these types and levels of discussion. However, I also suggest that there are limits to the influence of perceived expertise on ideational power and inclusion and exclusion. Firstly, I suggest that governments will look to experts in certain situations, especially where it is line with their own interests to do so, or where additional expertise will corroborate their arguments (cf. Adler and Haas 1992: 382). Secondly, I argue that there is no evidence that suggests a lack of expertise limits ideational power, or collaborations around other issues, outside of health and veterinary issues. Typically, people and organisations do not seem to be excluded from collaborations or influencing policymakers on the basis of perceived expertise. I argue that other factors, besides the perception of expertise, are equally, if not a more influential in terms of connections, disconnections and idea circulation.

The movement of staff can be used to say something about how ideas circulate and perhaps offer insight into how and why particular people are excluded (following Mitlin
et al 2007: 1702). My data show a low rate of movement in the DRC, which I argue is due to instability in the region. In contrast, there is a high rate of staff movement between organisations in Rwanda. Whilst it is difficult to understand how ideas circulate as a direct result of staff movement, it is clear that exclusive personal and organisational relationships are entwined with such movement, resulting in other people and organisations being excluded. This is particularly clear to see in the case of movement of staff between states and NGOs. For instance, I showed that in the case of IGCP and RDB, such movement and personal relationships blur the boundaries between the two. This arguably allowed IGCP to continue its work in PNVi even when other NGOs and ICCN were not allowed to enter CNDP-controlled areas. This is interesting as from the outside it appears that conservation has operated in a bubble, quite separate from ongoing conflict in the region, yet a closer examination reveals that conservation is deeply entwined with regional politics. I argue that such close relationships also exclude and create further disconnections with other NGOs in the region who were unable to work in PNVi at the time.

Personal relationships, often, but not exclusively, connected to the movement of staff between organisations are relevant to several themes addressed in this thesis. The literature is largely silent on the role of personal connections (Bebbington and Kothari 2006 and Manno 1994 provide exceptions) and the potential hidden disconnections that they result in. My data therefore contribute to this literature and show that people may be indirectly, or accidentally, excluded from circulating their ideas and influencing wider political behaviour if they move in different social circles as this can present barriers to people forming personal relationships with people from international organisations. This develops discussions in chapter 2 (page 54) where I argued that the literature focuses on organisational relationships and typically fails to consider the role of the individual. I show that individuals and personal relationships are important in connections and idea circulation as well as in facilitating disconnections directly.

I investigated the obvious, or ‘strategic’ disconnections that arise due to competition for funds and publicity, organisations having different expectations and ways of working, organisational conflicts and personal conflicts. These all exist despite a context of diverse governmental structures aimed at preventing them. The literature on such disconnections is limited save for a few examples, which suggest such disconnections
can impact a network’s ability to influence policymakers (Adler and Haas 1992: 384; Haas 1989: 398; Peterson 1992); lead to project failure (Lewis et al 2003: 543) and prevent participation (Anand 2006). The literature fails to discuss disconnections in detail; why they come about; their strength and severity; or what they mean for idea circulation. I developed this literature in this chapter and used my data to argue that these ‘strategic’ or deliberate disconnections at the local and headquarter level are important as they can prevent information from being circulated outside of formal meetings and can lead to duplication of projects in some areas and lack of projects in others. This can potentially cause confusion or exclusion within the local population (following Bush et al 2010).

Whilst this chapter focuses on the negative outcomes of (dis)connections, intra-NGO connections were all seen in a positive way by interviewees. With one exception, all NGO staff felt they had ample opportunity to feed information and ideas back up to headquarters to influence organisational strategy. This is important and shows that, as far as field staff are concerned, head offices are allowing issues on the ground to guide their decision-making. In chapter 8, I return to this finding, to investigate what the origin and detail of the information being circulated is, in an attempt to understand whether NGOs and the state actually base their interventions on ‘ideas’ from the community.
Chapter 8: “The idea came from the community”

8.1. Introduction

One of the core aims of this thesis is to understand how ideas circulate within transnational networks and what this means in terms of inclusion and exclusion of particular groups. I address this in this chapter by investigating whether and how states and NGOs work to circulate ideas from the local population. NGOs and NGO networks often build their legitimacy by presenting ‘stories from the field’, taking information from local communities and bringing it to the international level to use in their campaigns (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5). These narratives then shape national and international policies, as well as a wider understanding about the people living in and around protected areas and the environment they interact with (for example see Brockington and Scholfield 2010a on how conservation NGOs produce particular images and stories about people’s relationship with nature).

Due to such strong intra-organisational connections and internal communication structures within NGOs involved in mountain gorilla conservation, field staff feel that they have significant input into wider organisational strategies (see chapter 7, page 201-3). This may be effective in terms of allowing NGO boards and senior staff to adapt to changing situations on the ground and to what they see as the ‘needs’ from the field. In this chapter I use data from interviews with NGO and state staff to investigate the origins of this information and challenge this view to understand whether the interventions used by states and NGOs really are informed by ‘ideas from the community’.

I begin this chapter by linking back to discussions in chapter 6 about ‘the community’, highlighting the problems associated with such a term and emphasising the important role played by the Rwandan government in defining ‘the community’. I then set the scene, introducing extracts from interviews to illustrate that staff claim ideas they employ come from the community. I contest this, suggesting that in fact NGO and state staff are interpreting the term ‘idea’ as need and in turn are seeing themselves as best placed to interpret what the community needs. This links to discussions elsewhere in
this thesis about the value of western expertise and the way that some NGOs position themselves as the best problem constructors and solvers. I then consider instances of resistance to NGO and state projects, described by the staff themselves. I argue that these instances contradict claims that ideas originate in the community.

In the following section of this chapter I discuss barriers that prevent communities from feeding their ideas up to NGOs and states. Barriers exist within a context of sensitisation and capacity building, where the local population will in any case suggest ideas that have been filtered down to them through NGOs and the state. I also draw on the literature on hegemony (following Gramsci 1971) and argue that the dominant hegemony in Rwandan conservation suggests that NGOs and states are best placed to define conservation interventions. This filters through into the everyday lives of local people who then look to NGOs and states to make decisions about their lives. This is compounded by a long political history in Rwanda, which has resulted in a top-down state and a culture of obedience amongst the local population (Prunier 2010: 57, 245; Paluck and Green 2009: 622; Republic of Rwanda 2002: 4 (on obedience only); National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2004: 16). This culture is compounded by the Genocide Law, which “forbids ‘playing the genocide card’ and the denying, negation or neglect of the genocide against the ‘Tutsi’” (Marijinen and van der Lijn 2012: 17). Through its vagueness, this law spreads fear and compounds a compliant or obedient culture, as people are worried about saying something wrong (ibid).

In contrast, terms such as sensitisation are not prevalent in the DRC (or at least were not used by any of my interviewees). I discuss the possible reasons for this, drawing on data presented in chapters 5 and 7, which suggest that the ongoing instability in the region means there is less movement of staff, as well as long periods of time when NGOs have not been present in the region. This is combined with different characteristics within the population. For instance, the DRC is typically known for its vibrant civil society, combined with weak governance (Royal African Society 2011; Vorrath 2011; Stearns 2012). The current political instability creates different, yet equally important challenges; interventions are typically urgent and reactive and fail to recognise the importance of local innovation and ideas.

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250 The obedience argument is contested, for instance see Thomson 2009
In both Rwanda and the DRC, for different reasons, the political context means that there is little space for empowerment or fostering of community innovation. This creates a barrier to local ‘project’ ownership and future sustainability beyond NGO support. This is particularly important in the existing NGO ‘project’ context where support may be ongoing but often relies heavily on short-term donor funding. However, there are exceptions. I end the chapter by exploring efforts by NGOs to help communities exchange ideas and to empower them so that they can engage in policy and influence government decision-making.

8.2. ‘The community’

The wider conservation approach encourages active community involvement; and the transboundary framework in the Virungas, as well as the projects of both state departments and NGOs, reflect this, arguing that communities actively participate in the network and decision-making process about interventions that will affect them (Transboundary Core Secretariat 2006; IGCP, DFGFI, Gorilla Organization; EEEGL websites).

In chapter 5, I introduced the ‘communities’ living around PNV and PNVi, suggesting that they are large and diverse (page 134). This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to define any particular ‘community’ to work with and define the needs of (following Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Logan and Moseley 2002). In the DRC and Rwanda, local authorities are often responsible for defining communities’ needs with regards to spending on development (see chapter 6, page 189, 193). In particular, they articulate the needs of the community to RDB and ICCN when decisions need to be made about revenue spending or other community conservation funds. Thus, using the term ‘community’ is used solely for practical writing reasons; I fully acknowledge the heterogeneity of communities living in and around the Virungas and the diversity of ideas and needs they are likely to have.

The Rwandan government plays a central role in defining the ‘community’ around PNV. For instance, RDB encourages NGOs, particularly new NGOs, to work with REMA’s eighteen environment committees that ‘represent’ the community around
PNV. This structure marginalises some groups, particularly Batwa communities. Even existing groups, such as the ex-poachers association, ANICO, has a clear gender bias. Bush et al (2010) show that the poorest households around PNV are least likely to be aware of or benefit from community conservation activities. These structures do not yet exist in the DRC, but clearly in both countries, such large, dense populations, combined with a reliance on local government institutions to define ‘community needs’ means that many people are marginalised or excluded from NGO interventions from the outset.

8.3. “The idea came from the community”

This thesis is not concerned with whether an NGO intervention is inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but whether - as the majority of state and NGO interviewees working with communities so regularly claim – the ideas that they implement originate in the community. Understanding this is important because one of the key roles of transnational advocacy networks is to the link the local to the global (cf Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001), but what does ‘linking the local’ actually mean? Gramsci understood one meaning of civil society to be providing a platform to unite disparate, subordinate groups and give them the capacity and tools to challenge existing hegemonic powers such as their own government or international institutions (1971). Following Gramsci we can explore here whether NGOs really are taking on board local ideas and using them not only to influence local interventions, but also taking this voice to the international arena. In this section I therefore investigate what NGO and state staff mean when they say an ‘idea came from the community’.

In the first instance, I looked at NGO websites to see what they said about their relationship with local communities (see Table 20).

251 Interview with Margaret, November 2010 and personal observation in EEEGL meeting with RDB
252 Interviews with Juma and Davis, November 2009; Interview with Margaret, November 2010
253 Interview with Margaret, November 2010
### Table 20: NGO websites and what they say about community relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International NGO</th>
<th>Claims about ideas coming from community/relationship with local community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gorilla Organization</td>
<td>“work with local communities to find alternative resources to those found in the forest, lessening encroachment into the gorilla habitat and helping lift local people out of poverty”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“In 1996, and in response to these changing threats, local DFGF-E staff carried out surveys throughout the local communities, and identified the main reasons for people encroaching on the gorilla habitat. These community conversations built relationships with the local people, which would prove invaluable to the gorillas’ future, and formed what would become the foundations of the Gorilla Organization’s unique approach to gorilla conservation […] From here on in, the organisation funded the projects of local African NGOs that would improve the lives of communities bordering the gorilla national parks and lessen their dependency on the gorillas’ precious home – community conservation was here to stay and would dramatically improve the gorillas’ chance of long-term survival.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International</td>
<td>Information on community projects but no reference to ideas coming from community in relation to mountain gorilla conservation or specifically about relationship with local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Zoological Society</td>
<td>“To help conserve and manage the threatened wildlife of Virunga National Park in partnership with the Congolese Wildlife Authority, neighbouring communities and other stakeholders; to support local communities (including Batwa Pygmies) by implementing a series of social and economic projects.” Project detail focuses on what FZS is doing for local communities. Website lists local project partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Gorilla Conservation Programme</td>
<td>Lots of information in programme and project sections of website about ‘working with communities’ and supporting ‘community initiatives’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>Specifically in relation to Virunga work: “It is implementing catalytic work with local communities living around the park and it continues to operate in a context of civil conflicts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Veterinary Project</td>
<td>Information is available on community interventions but website says nothing about relationship with local communities or ideas coming from the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art of Conservation</td>
<td>Information is available on community interventions but website says nothing about relationship with local communities or ideas coming from the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyman Worldwide Health Partners</td>
<td>WWHP believes in a ‘bottom-up approach’. It supports ‘Empowerment: Ultimately, the changes that we champion will be delivered by Rwandans, for Rwandans. We are not giving people fish but rather teaching people how to fish. We believe we must empower people.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
<td>“WCS conservationists work with community leaders and members to develop ways people can use their land and water to generate income while promoting natural resource conservation. We help local people create new agricultural products and practices, modify fishing techniques, generate ecotourism revenue, and provide recovery aid to areas devastated by violence and natural disasters. Investing in the current and future quality of life is the key to sound conservation practice.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation International</td>
<td>Communities are listed as CI’s ‘partners’ “People in the towns and villages where we work have become some of our best friends in the world.” The website has lots of information about CI’s good relationship with local communities. Specifically relating to its DRC work: “In exchange for their commitment to conservation and development, CI and our partners have helped these tribal leaders build a professional program of monitoring and protection for their nature reserves, and have found financing for a number of community development initiatives, including a university, an orphanage, a community radio station and a hydropower station. Two affiliated tribal authorities have completed their plans, and their nature reserves are now a part of the DRC’s protected area network.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, all NGOs report positive relationships with communities through the projects that they implement. Whilst not all NGOs report ideas coming from communities, there is emphasis from many on conversations with and empowerment of local communities. This material, alongside photographs, makes a compelling case for support. At the field level, this message was equally as strong and emphasis was also placed on ‘the idea coming from the community’ by my research participants.

Whilst many interviewees claim the ‘idea came from the community’, they appear to confuse the term ‘idea’ with ‘need’ both in the context of their own work, as well as within the interview setting. For instance, in the case of a beekeeping project, Shani, an NGO employee explained:

If it is a decision which involves the local community we involve the community, and the community give their input and we support them, we
help them to understand the situation and to take a group decision. All this is for them, the projects are for them, everything is for them.254

At a glance this statement indicates that people in the community set the agenda and inform project details. However, when pressed for further details about whether and how communities were able to feed their ideas up to NGO field staff, Shani claimed:

Yeah, yeah, [our staff] talk to the community. They visited the community, some even go up to the buffalo wall, there is a wall at Volcans National Park and this wall ORTPN have allowed the beekeepers to put their beehives there instead of putting them in the forest, as I was telling you, there is a problem of fire, because when they collect the honey they use fire and then it is a threat for the forest. They can put fire around the forest and I remember the last time we had that problem; a beekeeper was collecting honey and to avoid that, they allowed them to put beehives on the buffalo wall. So when people come they go there and see that the beehives are there to see how people are collecting honey, because they are interested to see if they have the honey, they are collecting honey. They communicate, they collaborate with the community.255

This statement reflects wider literature about the link between beekeeping and forest fires (Sabuni 1997; Zilihona et al 1996: 6). It does not however, suggest that the idea to relocate hives came from the community. I return to this point below.

Davis, an NGO employee, runs a bamboo planting project with Batwa communities around PNV to prevent erosion and provide an alternative from going into the forest for wood. Davis told me that idea came from sitting down with villagers and discussing their needs.256 Other NGO staff similarly told me that “the idea came from sitting down and talking to the community”.257

State staff were also keen to highlight that ideas for community projects came from the communities that they worked with. For instance, Jacques claimed:

The idea came from the communities, the meeting with the community to see the key issue which was the crop raiding, the human conflict and then the meeting suggested the building of that for the wall.258

254 Interview with Shani, October 2009
255 Interview with Shani, October 2009
256 Interview with Davis, November 2009
257 Interviews with Ernst and Harvey, November 2009
258 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
I asked where Jacques thought the ideas originated, questioning whether he thought they were from the community or whether NGOs influenced which projects were implemented. He tried to answer, but his response was vague:

The influence came with all of us because we sit, [...] we exchange, and we have quarterly meetings with our close partners so that they build projects, it may not basically go to their interests, but the interests of the community, to the interests of the park conservation, so during our meeting for planning and evaluation, a report was released all around the park.²⁵⁹

In part, such vague responses about how staff sit and exchange project ideas with the community are understandable; discussions with multiple people over periods of time mean that it may be difficult to identify a specific instance when an idea was generated. However, it also suggests that NGO and state staff find it difficult to comprehend the concept of an ‘idea’ coming from the community. They instead talk about how the community expresses its ‘needs’. They describe projects as compromises, aimed at addressing what they see as a threat to the park and at the same time, taking into consideration the nutritional and economic needs of local communities. This is the case of many community conservation interventions trying to address the dual aims of biodiversity conservation and human development (Adams et al 2004; Adams and Infield 2003; Hackel 1999; Hulme and Murphree 2001). However, whilst it may be the case that conversations take place between NGOs, states and communities about community needs, it is less clear whether the ideas to address these needs originate in the community. This is not to say that all ideas from all people living in the local community will be a) existent, or b) the best way to solve a given problem or meet a given need. Equally, where community members have ideas, they may simply not be interested in engaging in decision-making. However, in the interests of community empowerment and the legitimacy of the NGO who says that they use local ideas and that they play a role in linking the local with the global (see chapter 2); this is obviously important.

In any case, there were occasions where it seemed that needs were not properly determined by the community. For instance, Davis, an NGO employee, explained how his NGO had given goats to Batwa communities for milk production, only for the goats

²⁵⁹ Interview with Jacques, November 2009
to be eaten within days. He also told me how another NGO had constructed shelters for goats, but people had moved into them as they were better quality than their own homes. These examples suggest that even where NGOs have tried to interpret community ‘needs’ they have not always been successful.

Interviews with NGOs about the work of other NGOs suggest that in some cases, the idea does not come from the community. For example, Care and IGCP both support farmers’ cooperatives to grow mushrooms (EEEGL n.d.b). The primary aim of such projects is to provide alternative income and nutrition/protein and stop people stop from entering the park to hunt for bushmeat (Hitimana et al 2006; EEEGL n.d.b: 2).

One of the NGO employees working on a mushroom enterprise project explained:

[mushroom farming] is one of the potential enterprises around the Virunga National Park which would just address what? Most of the time when you have considered why you go in the park, just to poach for animals and they used to say ‘we need meat so that our children may gain proteins’ and other explanations. So to help them not to go back in the park, we are bringing this mushroom enterprise so that they grow mushroom, they eat mushroom, which will be a substitute to what they already used to go to the park.

In this case mushroom farming is implemented in an area to address what the NGO identifies as the ‘need’ of the community, i.e. access to protein, rather than basing an intervention on a community idea about how to address this need.

Important, when I asked Ernst, an NGO employee (from a different NGO) if he could think of any examples of top-down projects, or projects that did not come from the community; he suggested mushroom projects. Having grown up in the region, he claimed that NGOs supporting such projects “did not understand local needs” and that he had “never seen any mushrooms on the market in the village”. Other NGO staff suggested this was also the case with beekeeping and honey. Andre, an NGO employee explained that communities preferred to keep beehives inside the park as they were able to collect more honey. Again this shows that whilst the intervention may be a useful

260 Interview with Davis, November 2010
261 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
262 In fact, academic research is beginning to show that in any case protein substitutes do not reduce bushmeat hunting (Abernethy 2012)
263 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
264 Interview with Ernst, November 2010; the interviewee had grown up in the region
265 Interview with Andre, November 2010
compromise in the name of forest conservation, it is unlikely that the idea came from the community.

Ideas that are more top-down and imposed by NGOs onto communities than they first appear may still meet community needs to improve agricultural productivity and provide food security, whilst at the same time protecting biodiversity. For instance, if communities express the need for a health project, building capacity around hygiene knowledge may be the most appropriate response. If they want to run their own business and generate income, developing enterprise skills and an understanding of the benefits of tourism may be the logical response. Likewise, teaching certain farming skills or pushing communities to grow mushrooms may ultimately meet nutritional needs and alleviate food poverty. However, these are not necessarily ideas from the community; instead they are ideas based on the NGO’s knowledge, skills and expertise, which they use to decide what the community most needs. They represent how the NGO translates and defines community needs. Indeed, as I suggested in chapter 7 (page 210), these staff often have western qualifications and work for western NGOs. This will influence their own values and is likely to influence the way that they interpret any information given to them by local communities.

The argument at stake is whether community members are able to discuss their needs with NGO staff and suggest how they would like NGOs to address them if they have such ideas; or whether NGOs influence what these needs and solutions might be, failing to make the effort to find out whether anyone in the local community has an alternative idea. Interview data reflect the self-legitimating behaviour that I discussed in chapter 2 (page 49-50), whereby NGOs simultaneously frame both problem and solution (Kingdon 1984; Murray Li 2007; Mehta 2011). I argued in chapter 7 (page 214-9) that some NGOs use their expertise or findings based on scientific research to lobby governments to change particular policies, particularly relating to health. NGOs and states also act in this way when working with communities by defining their problems and needs and generating the solution, which typically involves an NGO or state intervention. NGOs do this to an even greater extent than they do with governments, interpreting community ‘needs’ across all issues (not just health).

This leaves little space for supporting local innovation and creativity; communities tell NGOs and state staff what their needs are and NGOs and states respond with projects to
address these needs. Thus the cycle continues, and whilst communities may benefit in many ways from such conservation and development interventions and they may be able to influence these interventions, they are not able to determine what their interventions are in the first instance. Again, this is not to say that people within the local community would be either willing or able to put forward such ideas, but rather that NGOs do not appear to have the mechanisms in place to find out if these ideas exist and what they might be. Community members are excluded from circulating potential ideas and influencing policy and project interventions. This process thus perpetuates a need for NGO interventions, as communities are not always encouraged to think of, or share, their own solutions. This is unsustainable without external support and means that a need for external interventions and funding will always exist.

There are of course exceptions. These exceptions suggest that where properly supported through NGO processes, members of the local community do have ideas about how to address particular issues and are willing and able to share these ideas with NGOs. Some NGOs play more of a financing role, funding project proposals from local communities. For example, just two NGOs employ strategies that involve reviewing proposals from community groups and funding them, although one of these NGOs also supports numerous other interventions not based on community proposals. One of these NGOs is The Gorilla Organization, whose website states:

[…] the organisation funded the projects of local African NGOs that would improve the lives of communities bordering the gorilla national parks and lessen their dependency on the gorillas’ precious home – community conservation was here to stay and would dramatically improve the gorillas chance of long-term survival (Gorilla Organization n.d.e.)

Senwe, who worked for a regional NGO was keen to share the message that his organisation’s projects were informed by the community:

The project, as I told you before, we don’t design projects for partners, partners initiate their projects, they initiate their idea, what we can do is improve on them, but we don’t initiate projects for partners, no, no, no, no, no.\(^\text{266}\)

Christophe, another NGO employee explained:

\(^\text{266}\) Interview with Senwe, October 2009
[...] for sure we provide funding for the projects. Normally the local organisations decide just to write a proposal then we analyse the proposal, then we provide funding.\textsuperscript{267}

Interestingly, many of these projects involved supplying improved stoves, supporting agriculture and livestock interventions and funding microfinance groups, all typical western development ideas. Despite claiming to support local community ideas, there were no examples of projects that were different from projects being implemented by all of the other NGOs in the region. Indeed, Senwe, an NGO employee, explained that the community his organisation worked with in Uganda came and asked for project funding because they saw another local community in Rwanda benefitting from similar work.\textsuperscript{268} This suggests that NGOs’ ideas circulate throughout the region, reaching out even to communities who are not the target of particular interventions.

Whilst this method of working demonstrates a defined mechanism for communities to feed their ideas through local cooperatives up to NGOs, it still raises questions about where such ideas originate. ‘Ideas’ reflect the ideas of many other projects across the region and more importantly, they appear to reflect the values and rhetoric of western conservation and development organisations active in the region. In some cases these ideas may be effective in addressing human and conservation needs; they are unlikely to have become so prolific if this were not the case. But if conservation is to be sustainable, that is, if it is to continue into the future independent of outside support, it is essential that space is created to foster and fund new and alternative ideas at the local level.

8.4. Resistance: a sign that ideas do not originate in the community?

Resistance to projects by local communities provides further reason to suggest that project ideas do not come from the local community. NGO staff suggest that resistance to, or ‘problems’ with projects are typically the result of poor management. I argue here that the high level of resistance reported by some NGOs to their community interventions is a further indicator that NGOs translate what they see as the needs of the

\textsuperscript{267} Interview with Christophe, November 2009
\textsuperscript{268} Interview with Senwe, October 2009
community into interventions rather than supporting local initiatives. One of the key roles of a transnational NGO network is to connect the local with the global (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001). By arguing that ‘local’ ideas used in international advocacy efforts and campaigns are not necessarily informed by local communities, I suggest that this role is undermined. Networks will use some interpretation of local information in their wider strategies, interventions and in promotional material to show that they work closely with local communities, but the examples of resistance demonstrated below suggest that ideas do not originate in local communities.

According to one interviewee, George, some members of the local population complained about the buffalo wall surrounding PNV in Rwanda when it was built; whilst they needed a solution to address crop raiding, they had not realised that the wall would create such a clear demarcation of the park boundary and thus prevent them from accessing it. Participatory park boundary demarcation in the DRC by WWF, in collaboration with UN-Habitat (WWF 2010) has also prompted resistance and people “had to be moved” in some cases. It is unclear though to what extent this project originated from the community and how literally the term ‘participative’ should be translated. However, in this case UN-Habitat did collaborate with WWF to prevent land conflict in the area (WWF 2010). However, there have been violent evictions from this part of the park in previous years (Schmidt-Soltau 2010).

Examples of resistance to ‘community’ projects were clear in relation to beekeeping. Shani, an NGO employee reported in 2009 that challenges in the project were a result of fund mismanagement and limited skills and by 2010, another employee of the same organisation, Bernard, reported that they had chosen new, ‘skilled’ and ‘well-educated’ managers for the twelve beekeeping cooperatives around the park to overcome these problems. Instead of considering that the project intervention may not be the most suitable for the community in this situation, Shani felt that the project had not worked as the people in the community leading it did not have what they perceived as the right skills. However, Bernard suggested that the main problem with beekeeping projects was

269 Interview with George, November 2009; there is no publicly available information on this
270 Interview with Thomas, November 2010
271 Interview with Shani, November 2009
272 Interview with Bernard, November 2010
that beekeepers “don’t like to have their beehives outside of the park as they don’t get much honey”. This implies that from the outset, this intervention was an NGO initiative, trying to meet community needs without compromising the conservation of the park. Resistance varied between sectors and Bernard told me the main problems were in Gataranga and Cyanika, with some people still entering the park ‘illegally’. He argued that this was for cultural reasons.

Ernst, another NGO employee reported that they had had to suspend a number of programmes with their CBO partners until they could get “proper management”. However, he explained that they had tried to work with local communities to develop beekeeping projects, but that another NGO had created problems as they had imposed top-down structures for cooperatives onto the local community, identifying those who they thought most suitable to manage the project. This was also reflected in an interview with the organisation in question, where Shani explained that they had helped to elect new leaders of the cooperatives, rather than working with traditional structures. Ernst argued that this completely undermined his NGO’s “bottom-up” work to support existing cooperatives. He explained that his organisation’s approach to beekeeping is to focus on supporting existing cooperatives rather than establishing new ones. It shows that whilst some NGOs do try to work with existing community structures and initiatives, other NGOs are able potentially to undermine this and impose their own ideas on communities, based on the values and skills that they think are most valuable. In this case, Ernst felt that this marginalised other community members who had tried to share their ideas with NGOs.

NGO and state staff in the DRC reported resistance from communities, particularly rebel groups to anyone involved in conservation, particularly park staff. For instance charcoal production funds many rebel groups (UN News Centre 2011) and rebel groups have been known to destroy briquette presses (Miller 2009). Specifically, state staff reported resistance to the briquette programme from the local community, emphasising that it was due to “culture shock” as they were trying to change the way that people

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273 Interview with Bernard, November 2010
274 Interview with Ernst, November 2009
275 Interview with Shani, October 2009
276 Interview with Ernst, November 2009
277 Interviews with Liz and Richard, November 2009; Interviews with Thomas and Baakir, November 2010
cook their food. Other interviews with NGOs corroborated this, suggesting that ICCN’s programme was top-down and communities had resisted it due to the smoke the briquettes produced. ICCN acknowledges this issue though and is responding by trying new drying techniques to address this problem.

NGOs also cited resistance to health interventions. For instance, Idasse, an NGO employee explained:

[...] people could be somehow reluctant to... for example if it was a matter of asking them to provide their stool samples, for some people, they were somehow reluctant. Although we had started by telling them what was going on, but there was some reluctance: ‘oh why to take our faecal sample?’ especially when we told them that ‘ok, your faecal sample will be divided into two parts: one will be analysed here in Rwanda and another part will be analysed in the states to compare the two results’! No, they actually asked “you send our faecal to States, why?” They could, ok they tell us ‘oh no, no come back tomorrow’ and then tomorrow you go back there and he is not at home. Yeah there would be some reluctances but anyway I think they, they knew me, I’m from that area, most of the people responded positively.

In this case, the NGO employed a local project leader from the region; they were very clear about who they defined as the community, and they were transparent to people who lived in the community about why they were implementing the project. They made clear links using posters, discussion groups and radio shows to make clear links for local people about what the project would involve and how it would address their problems. This resulted in the acceptance of the project and as a result many people were tested and later received treatment for intestinal parasites. People were also successfully encouraged to change their behaviour: to wash their hands, to clean their dishes and to keep their homes clean to avoid parasitic diseases. Since the project started, infections have declined in the area by 50% (DFGFI 2012b). In this case, such a health intervention required an outside idea to be brought in as it required medical knowledge not available within the community. This provides a clear example of how a community could be influenced and have their minds changed about a project:

278 Interview with Baakir, November 2010
279 Interview with Harvey, November 2009; Interview with Thomas, November 2010
280 Interviews with Richard; Liz and Eze, November 2010
281 Interview with Idasse, November 2010
282 Interview with Idasse, November 2010
Then we used to do some kind of sensitisation with the community to let them know what it is, what is the [programme], what are the objectives and what are our goals, what do we want to achieve? And what do we want them to do? Then once we gained their approval, they accepted.283

This project provides a good example of ‘sensitisation’, a concept I had not been aware of before fieldwork in Rwanda. In the following section I explore this term further and I argue that it presents a major barrier to communities being able to circulate their ideas within the mountain gorilla conservation network.

8.5. Sensitisation

Why might communities accept interventions that are not necessarily in their best interests? What methods do states and NGOs use to ensure acceptance from communities? I investigate here how such methods can prevent original thought and idea generation at the local level and essentially exclude communities from circulating their own ideas about conservation. On my second trip to Rwanda, Andre, an NGO employee in the DRC suggested that communities are so poor, that they will accept any intervention offered to them. He suggested that communities “will always take up these opportunities as there are no other alternatives”.284 He claimed that he had never heard anyone say “no thank you” and in fact he felt there are not enough NGO opportunities. This provides a very plausible explanation. However, while this may play a role, I argue that reasons for project acceptance are more complex.

Multiple state and NGO actors in Rwanda use the term sensitisation to refer to the process whereby people come to accept your interventions as good and necessary, even if at first they outright rejected them. In fact, in a recent work meeting, a conservation NGO employee told me that she had asked one of their African partners what they meant by sensitisation and was told that “if the community don’t want to do something, we keep telling them that they should do it until they do” (anonymous comment, UK conservation professional). In Rwanda, sensitisation efforts seem slightly subtler than this, but it is still difficult to see how innovation and creativity can flourish in such a climate. In contrast the term was not used by DRC interviewees, though communities

283 Interview with Idasse, November 2010
284 Interview with Andre, November 2010
there are presented with equally as important barriers to idea circulation. I return to this later in the chapter and investigate the reasons why sensitisation is not used in the DRC.

I suggest that in Rwanda, sensitisation persuades people not only to ‘care’ for their environment (following Agrawal 2005), but also to see that caring for their environment is the right thing for them to do in terms of personal gain. Sensitisation is the mechanism that states and NGOs use to filter behaviour about the environment and PNV into people’s common sense, to inform their everyday behaviour. As I show below, this develops Gramscian thought on hegemonic power (following Gramsci 1971), as well as writing on the third dimension of power (following Lukes 2005; Dowding 2006; Béland 2010; Mehta 2011), which explores how ideas influence wider philosophy and ideology within which all ideas circulate. I develop this literature by showing that sensitisation can be used as a tool by the state and powerful transnational NGOs to impact people’s everyday lives, by affecting how they see their own interests.

A house-building project for Batwa communities in Rwanda demonstrates sensitisation well. Christophe, who works on such a project to help “socially integrate” Batwa into local villages, found that houses remain empty and the Batwa returned to their ‘homes’ under tarpaulin, closer to the park boundary:

> Sometimes you will take them out of the forest and you build a very beautiful house outside, but they fail to remain in the houses. They are sometimes obliged to go back, maybe to look for meat in the forest, water, other benefits they used to gain from the forest, and that is also a big challenge we have had between all the three countries [...] we want to force those forest people to come out of the forest and maybe live in the villages like the others, which is not easy, but by this time we have learnt from Uganda that the change is not direct, it’s a process and we should just learn to be passionate with them and continue to educate them and maybe slowly by slowly they may just come down and live with the others but that has helped a lot in Rwanda, but now we are looking at the problem as not the forest people being a burden to the country because they go back in the forest, but we are looking at it as their normal life. We need to integrate them socially into society.  

Christophe explained that resistance to the project could be overcome through persistence over a longer period of time. Sensitisation efforts could be employed to enable communities to make cultural changes.

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285 Interview with Christophe, November 2009
RDB’s community conservation department uses sensitisation to improve acceptance of projects and promote behavioural changes. They do this work, not necessarily directly, but through the environment committees that they work with. For instance, they ‘sensitise’ communities through ANICO (Animateurs de Conservation), who they claim “represent[ed] the conservation park management into the community”. This shows that not only does the government define community groups, but it works through them to push particular values to the wider community. In this way it is successful in changing widespread behaviour. That is, before RDB started community work, there was a lot of resistance from communities to their conservation work, but the interviewee alleged that they were able to sensitise them and they now work for the park, reporting illegal activities:

They used to go into the park freely, or towards illegal activities, they used to go and cut bamboo and there were many people getting into the park. Some of them named themselves as man in iron...! but it was a community organised, it was very, very difficult to fight them and as they used local weapons and fighting park rangers, you cannot control them, but we came to organise them, to sensitise them and to get now actively working for the conservation of the park [...] they came [and reported] as they are sensitised as they go and sensitise them and educate them and they come and tell us, they may even take themselves to the police, take people to the police.

The government and NGOs use sensitisation to change the way people think about and act towards the environment. In this way, this process also resembles Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, whereby powerful states spread ideas, not just through rule or dominance, but also through filtering them through society into a place where they become the norm, or common sense (Gramsci 1971; 1995; Morton 2010; Gill and Law 1989; Cox 1994; Burawoy 2003; Agnew 2003). It seems that sensitisation is a tool used by governments and NGOs to articulate the third dimension of power (following Lukes 2005; Béland 2010; Dowding 2006) and redefine communities’ interests. The way that states – and powerful NGOs – work to ‘sensitise’ communities and make them act in a particular way towards their environments reflects this well. It indicates a ‘hidden’ circulation of ideas. This is relevant to this thesis as I argue it affects how other ideas circulate. In this case specifically, it affects the ability of communities to generate and circulate their own ideas. Any ideas that they do ‘generate’ will undoubtedly be

286 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
287 Interview with Jacques, November 2009
informed by a wider political philosophy. In this instance this philosophy, or dominant
ehegemony, relates to the fact that governments and NGOs are best placed to determine
community conservation interventions and best placed to advise communities on how to
behave. Worryingly, this allows them to influence behaviour outside of ‘environmental
actions’ such as health and hygiene behaviour and how people farm, cook and live.

This is particularly important in the context of this thesis as, by sensitising communities
in Rwanda about conservation, it influences the common sense on which people make
their decisions, thus potentially stifling free and original thinking. In this way, the way
that governments and NGOs work subtly prevents communities from circulating their
ideas. On the outside, they are fully included in decisions about conservation; but
deeper exploration reveals that seemingly more powerful actors predetermine their
ideas. This is compounded by the political, cultural and historical context in Rwanda. I
turn to this below.

8.6. Cultural and political barriers to community innovation

The political, historical and cultural environment in Rwanda compounds government
and NGO attempts to sensitise local communities, creating further barriers to local idea
generation and innovation. In contrast, I suggest that in the DRC, weak governance and
a vibrant civil society means such barriers are less prominent, but political instability
often forces the government and NGOs to work in such a way that they do not consider
local ideas and foster local innovation.

In chapter 5, I highlighted a historically embedded culture in Rwanda of a top-down
state and an ‘obedient’ civil society (Prunier 2010: 57, 245; Paluck and Green 2009:
622; National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2004: 16). Indeed, interview data
often portrayed the stereotypical differences between Rwandans and their Congolese
and Ugandan neighbours. That is, from personal observation, the Ugandan and
Congolese people that I interviewed, as well as the Rwandan people that had grown up
in Uganda and the DRC, seemed far more unguarded and informal in interviews than
Rwandans. They talked openly about other NGOs and their government. Through these
interviews, I was able to understand better the way that the political context in Rwanda
creates barriers to communities circulating their ideas.
Juma, an NGO employee, talked openly about the difficulties in empowering Rwandans - and particularly the marginalised groups in Rwanda, such as Batwa communities - to give them a voice. He explained how his organisation’s project to empower communities and support civil society was “not working out fine”. He explained that:

In Rwanda you still have a very vigorous strong government and a strong government is good because it delivers services to the people, it’s holding government servants accountable but the downside of that is that does not necessarily promote emergence of civil society. So that’s proving very difficult you know? How can you have a vibrant civil society and need a strong government?

Juma also argued that, the current system works on the basis “of people listening to the government” and saying “just tell us what to do [...] tell us what you want us to do”. He felt that this was a major barrier to “empowerment” and “the emergence of civil society”, especially for marginalised people.

This view of the Rwandan state is reflected in the wider academic literature and media which praise the RPF and the progress it has made towards development goals and peacekeeping efforts (Dowden 2008: 253), but question the top-down nature of its rule and the human rights abuses potentially associated with this (McGreal 2010; Kinzer 2011; Grant 2010; Dowden 2008: 252; Human Rights Watch 2012).

Juma explained that the ‘strong’ national government set development priorities and targets for each district or sector to meet, which contradicted (some) NGO missions to support local ideas for interventions:

The reality of it is the government is there, whether it’s the mayor or the sector leader, they send this programme and this programme, you have to produce A, B, C, this is, you know they have these contractual agreements with government- ‘this year you must deliver this’ and then you are the NGO there saying ‘no, let the people decide what they want to’, you see? It can be difficult. The mayor for the district, or the sector representative, has made a pledge that this year, he is going to build five classrooms, he’s going to deliver maybe fifteen kilometres of good maram road and now we’re telling him no we need to get these communities to sit down and try and tell us their needs and draft activities, how they’re going to do them and then

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288 Interview with Juma, November 2009
they are talking about rights of sitting down... and you know their civic rights, it can become a bit difficult.289

Equally, citizens have become so accustomed to this relationship that it becomes ever more difficult to change its dynamics and advocate people to share their ideas, even with non-state actors. Juma concluded:

I think they come to have that system of people listening to the government and it’s there we see it- ‘Just tell us what to do!’- That’s what the people say- ‘Tell us what you want us to do!’ but as an NGO, from an empowerment perspective, it’s ‘No, we want to listen! We want to help you tell yourselves what you should do.’ And it’s like, so what you get from the government official is ‘That’s wasting time! Tell the people what to do!’290

Until the dynamics of this relationship can be changed so that states understand and value the importance of fostering local ideas and local people feel that they are empowered and able to contribute their ideas; communities will remain marginalised from transnational networks. Even where people have ideas that are not informed by government and NGO sensitisation processes, they may not have the confidence, or the experience to feed them to NGO staff and government officials. This process will take a long time, but NGOs could potentially play a major role in facilitating it through working with states and local communities.

In contrast, DRC interviewees did not speak about sensitisation. Indeed, there is less rhetoric in general about ‘the idea coming from the community’. Whilst NGOs have operated in the Congolese section of the Virungas for a long time, their efforts and presence have been inconsistent. Many staff reported how they had been forced to abandon or move projects due to conflict, with violence directed at conservationists themselves as well as local villages.291 The lack of staff movement between organisations is arguably a direct result of this instability (see chapter 7, page 221). NGOs work in the DRC in a very different way from Rwanda as a result. Their work is reactionary and often responding to the urgent, ever changing needs of the park (see Gorilla CD website). In many ways it is likely that this is why a concept such as sensitisation has not become embedded as a conservation tool in the same way as it has in Rwanda.

289 ibid
290 Interview with Juma, November 2009
291 Interviews with Helen, Harvey and Christophe, November 2009
Equally, whilst sensitisation is not such a popular intervention in the DRC, interviewees did not speak of ideas originating in the community. With the exception of the Gorilla Organization, whose regional focus is to fund community proposals and thus does base its work on ‘ideas from communities’, NGO interventions into communities are often conceived by NGOs or donors, for instance FZS’s community work came about as a result of a suggestion from the World Bank and MGVP’s employee health programme was introduced by staff who had worked in the US (see chapter 7, page 220).

Community interventions are just as prominent in the DRC as in Rwanda, but they are typically informed by the park management plan and not the local community. There are exceptions, such as certain projects of the Gorilla Organization (Gorilla Organization n.d.f.)

Due to conflict, instability and constant movement of NGO interventions, it is likely that all projects will be reactionary for the foreseeable future. In this context, it is less likely that NGOs and the state will think about how to foster community ideas within their interventions. At the same time, sensitisation is based on consistent work with communities over a long time period and due to the political situation this is not possible in any case in the DRC. However, the lack of sensitisation is perhaps also a result of the type of government in the DRC compared to Rwanda. Where Rwanda is known for its top-down governance and ‘obedient’ citizens; DRC is known for its weak governance and often vibrant civil society (Royal African Society 2011; Vorrath 2011; Stearns 2012).

8.7. Capacity building and engaging local communities in the network

NGO interventions and mechanisms do exist that support local communities to generate, share and circulate their ideas. Despite NGOs and state departments typically failing to foster idea generation to address conservation issues at the local level; I argue that there are wider, more embedded examples of NGOs actively trying to include communities in the network. In some ways these examples reflect a boomerang pattern (following Keck and Sikkink 1998). This relates to the way communities might bypass the state to get their ideas and stories across to the international community; or the way that NGOs may bypass the state to work directly with local communities, in some cases
even using them strategically to influence the state on particular issues, but may also work with them to empower them so that they can influence state decisions themselves.

Whilst in its early stages, it does seem that, through the EEEGL project, NGOs are beginning to work with communities to support them to engage in policy. In this context, there are major political barriers to overcome; the Rwandan government has introduced Land Reform and it is keen for people to register their land as soon as possible, with completion anticipated in 2013 (Rwanda Natural Resources Authority 2012). EEEGL staff work with local communities to help them understand and better engage in the policy (EEEGL 2010a). An employee of one of the EEEGL partners explained:

[Empowerment is] a long-term process, yet the government wants households to have their land registered yesterday. Because the government programme is every household must register their land and have a title and they want it done very quickly. When you go to empowerment processes they seem too long for the government and yes they are adamant, we are trying to find a middle way of working very fast and achieving results, but at the same time showing that all the people, especially the vulnerable groups, in a way the Batwa, whether it’s the women, the youth, the orphans, you know, whose voice that it comes up very quickly to be involved, yeah, yeah it’s a big challenge but we... yes we are working on it, we are involving government officials, we explain, they listen, so both sides are listening and it just takes, it requires a lot of patience from us NGOs, it requires understanding from the government.  

Here NGOs play an intermediary role between the state and its citizens (particularly those that they see as vulnerable), communicating policy to people on the ground and trying to communicate their needs and ideas back up to the state (EEEGL 2010a). This would be one example where capacity building takes on a different meaning to simply training NGOs in technical skills. By doing such work, communities will arguably have a better chance of feeding their values and ideas into the network. In this example, the project is still in its early stages and it is yet to be seen whether communities are better able to engage in influencing policy any better than they were previously.

Another international NGO works in a similar way, but on a smaller scale, in the DRC. Gorilla Organization has helped to establish a dialogue between local communities and

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292 Interview with Juma, November 2009
politicians who had promised to degazette parts of PNVi for fields for the community, but had not done this following election. In this way, and perhaps with less of a cultural barrier to overcome, the NGO supports marginalised groups who may previously have been excluded from the conservation network, to connect with it and circulate their ideas.

Perhaps due to the historical and political context, this boomerang pattern is not so prominent yet in either country, but it does indicate an approach which could potentially be scaled up to ‘empower’ other local communities to be engaged in other political decisions. It builds the capacity of, and provides an important mechanism for, communities to circulate their ideas into the wider network so that they are included in decision-making processes about conservation, either in relation to policy or projects. At the same time, any approach should consider whose interpretation of the policy is being made available to communities. Any translation of land reform policy by a conservation NGO is likely to be embedded with particular notions about conservation and development as a result of the values and experiences of the organisation carrying out the work. This way of working is not always altruistically about giving a voice to the less marginalised to participate in political decisions, but is also a way for NGOs to widen their influence on the state indirectly through communities (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Wapner 1996).

Another international NGO is trying to build the capacity of local community groups to ‘communicate’ with international donors. This is important as, whilst many local communities may have interesting and different ideas about how to address conservation and development issues in the Virungas, they are less well resourced to implement these than international NGOs. Whilst a reliance on international funding (with its attached conditions) is not ultimately sustainable in the long-run, in the short-term, being able to understand how these donors operate and being able to apply directly for funds means that they can become independent of government and donor support and the values attached to this support. In this instance, the community had successfully applied for UNDP funding:

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293 Interview with Harvey, November 2009
294 Interview with Shani, October 2009
They have to know how to communicate with these people, to negotiate because they are dealing now with different donors. They had a grant from UNDP and that grant has been used to build a water tank for the community. And this involved their communication skills and contract skills.295

Equally, there are other ways that NGOs work to help communities circulate their ideas, beyond helping them to engage donors and the government. In particular, IGCP is well known for its community exchange programmes (Gray and Rutagarama 2011: 37). The community origin of the ideas themselves is questionable and, as this chapter has shown, there has been resistance to some of them, such as to beekeeping projects and possibly to the buffalo wall. IGCP plays an important role in facilitating this work due to its perceived political neutrality, which means that it can work across national borders. Prospects for scaling-up this approach are accompanied by myriad caveats, not least that the NGO and park staff are defining who the community is that they take to visit the project, and which project it is that they take the community to visit. However, the concept of taking communities to other countries (the programme involves themed trips to Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC296) to learn about what other communities are doing, what works and what does not work and how the project can be improved or adapted, is potentially an important way of helping communities to circulate their ideas and overcome marginalisation.

Finally, there are examples of people from the areas adjacent to the park that have set up their own NGO or hold important positions within an international NGO. They have been able to use their ideas and those of the communities within which they have grown up to influence interventions.297 NGOs have supported or employed these people with the recognition that they can be better positioned to understand local needs and to identify and support local ideas, in a way that external actors cannot. Whilst there are national efforts to fast track Africans into leadership positions in some NGOs298, mechanisms are not typically in place to support and develop local innovation and leadership in the same way. Supporting such mechanisms at this level is important if

295 Interview with Shani, October 2009
296 trips were suspended to DRC in recent years due to conflict
297 Interview with Gracious, October 2009; Interview with Idasse, November 2010
298 Interview with George, November 2009
organisations are to move beyond employing people to meet quotas and towards full inclusion of African ideas and values at all levels.

8.8. Conclusion

Several key studies argue that transnational networks play a key role in linking the local to the global (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001), this chapter explores what this means and explores the origin of local information and how this might be translated and circulated back to international headquarters. This chapter develops discussions in the literature on hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and the third dimension of power (Lukes 2005) to show how sensitisation can be used as a tool in Rwanda by both states and donors to spread the dominant view that they are better placed than communities to identify needs and solutions to address these needs.

To summarise, on the surface, community conservation in the Virungas really is just that; NGOs work within frameworks to ensure they involve communities and the majority claim to base their projects in this field on the needs and ideas of local communities. At a deeper level, there are examples of NGOs actively trying to achieve this by facilitating idea exchange between different communities and translating government policy to help local people better engage with it. These interventions should be developed and scaled-up. However, these formal structures and positive examples mask a culture of sensitising communities, defining and translating, rather than listening to their needs and ideas.

NGOs and states sometimes fail to understand the difference between community ideas and needs. These actors see themselves as best placed to translate community needs into appropriate policy and project interventions. In some cases they may be better placed to at least translate local needs and ideas, based on their experience and skills, but at the same time, this creates a barrier to local idea generation and circulation. Actors translating ‘needs’ typically fail to foster ‘ideas’ from the community to address environmental and development concerns. This is important as it means that space is not created for innovation and creativity and projects are unlikely to survive beyond the term of the project. This way of working is unsustainable beyond external support.
This becomes clearer when instances of local communities resisting NGO and state interventions come to light. Resistance is not simply always a case of a few corrupt people with poor management skills and provides a further indication that ideas have not originated in the community. There are also barriers to communities being able to feed their ideas to NGOs to influence wider policy and practice. In Rwanda in particular, the state and NGOs use the concept of ‘sensitisation’ to change people’s behaviour over time. In doing so, they are able to define community needs and suggest what they see as appropriate solutions. I argue that in this context sensitisation is the mechanism used by states and NGOs to disseminate and embed into local populations’ thinking the idea that outsiders are better placed to identify their needs and determine the best solutions for addressing them. In this way, this contributes to the literature on hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and the ideational power to influence wider philosophy or ideology within which ideas circulate (Lukes 2005) to investigate one mechanism used to change indirectly how local communities think about conservation and conservationists.

A top-down government which, through various means, is able to stifle civil society voice, combined with a culture of obedience and compliance within the local population compounds this situation. In contrast and arguably as result of recent political instability, ‘sensitisation’ is not used by any of the organisations interviewed in the DRC. However, communities in the DRC are presented with other barriers to circulating their ideas as the political situation means that NGOs consistently have to relocate projects and typically focus their resources and efforts on meeting the urgent needs of the park.

Both contexts, whilst very different, arguably prevent NGOs and states from fostering community ideas and local innovation in cases where communities might have ideas and be willing and able to share them. Whilst there are exceptions, typically, the way that NGOs and states work and the historical, political and cultural context of each country, combine to make it difficult for communities to circulate their ideas or have a wider influence on political behaviour. As this situation perpetuates, communities are likely to continue to be marginalised from the conservation process, leading to a sustained need for NGO presence in the region. Creating the space and the mechanisms for local community members to share their ideas, where they have them is important. It
is important on ethical and moral grounds; people should have the opportunity to participate in and inform decisions about activities that affect their daily lives. It is also important based on legitimacy arguments. In terms of a conservation NGO’s normative legitimacy, and particularly in terms of its procedural legitimacy (see chapter 2, page 37), the NGO needs to be seen to be doing the right thing. Through the stories NGOs tell on their websites and other promotional material about positive relationships with communities, conservation NGOs develop cognitive legitimacy, justifying their existence and their approach, which becomes widely socially accepted; at the same time, dispelling alternative organisations or alternative approaches (following Suchman 1995: 582-3).
Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1. Introduction

This thesis set out to address three research questions in order to understand the way that transnational networks circulate ideas and disseminate various forms of inclusion and exclusion. I begin this concluding chapter by summarising each chapter. I then discuss the extent to which this thesis addresses my research questions by identifying what I see as the key empirical and conceptual contributions of this thesis. I end the chapter by exploring the limitations to this work and suggesting possibilities for future research.

9.2. Chapter summaries

In chapter 2, I explored how the meaning, remit and scale of NGOs and transnational networks have changed over time and suggested that they have increasingly become involved in a growing number of global issues. Transnational networks are increasingly accused of spreading diverse forms of inequality by strategically including and excluding particular people and places from their interventions and this chapter drew on several bodies of literature to investigate how and why this inequality and exclusion arises. I examined the literature on NGO relationships with states, donors and local communities and argued that whilst the literature on transnational networks largely ignores this work, it can be used usefully to interrogate network connections, particularly in terms of the cause and impact of blurred boundaries between actors. I also suggested that states and other powerful elites could use NGO networks to circulate their ideas and further their agendas.

The chapter also demonstrated that ideational power, or rather how ideas influence political behaviour, be that policy directly, the construction of political problems, or wider political philosophy and assumptions, can provide a good indication of the ‘success’ of an idea. This can show whether a particular person or group is able to use their ideas to influence decision-making processes and therefore represents a good indication of inclusion or exclusion. Despite its relevance, I argued that little of this thought is brought into discussions about NGO networks.
A review of the literature on transnational NGO networks in the latter part of this chapter revealed the different factors that inform how they circulate ideas and influence political behaviour. The way that network actors portray the intrinsic value of an idea, the perception of expertise and representation, consensus and personal relationships all influence a network’s ideational power in terms of impact on policy and the construction of political problems. The literature paid little attention to personal relationships in the literature, but I suggested that they are likely to be important. It also said little about the processes that take place to circulate ideas, or understand the origin of ideas and this makes it difficult to determine whose ideas are included and whose are excluded. I identified a gap in the literature concerning these hidden types of exclusion and their importance, as well as the disconnections and exclusions that potentially result from more ‘obvious’ conflicts. The final section of this chapter explored how networks influence wider political philosophy, structures and norms. I suggested that this understanding is important as it informs the context within which interactions take place and all ideas circulate. This chapter led me to identify my three research questions.

Chapter 3, the methodology chapter, was split into three parts to reflect how the research developed over two different time periods. The first section explained the quantitative methods used to investigate the activities of conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. I described how, in collaboration with Prof. Dan Brockington, I used a mixture of websites, emails, phone calls, discussion fora and financial reports to collect data on the geography and expenditure of 281 conservation organisations implementing 900 projects.

The second part of this chapter explored possible case studies and justified the use of mountain gorilla conservation as the most appropriate case study for this thesis. I argued that mountain gorilla conservation attracts a lot of funding and a diverse range of interests, all supporting different ideas, offering a good opportunity to explore the multiple interactions between actors within a transnational network and understand how they move ideas about. I also suggested that mountain gorilla conservation as a case study works on practical grounds as its geography is concise and therefore suitable for carrying out the research within the time constraints of a PhD. Mountain gorilla conservation in the Virungas (as opposed to Bwindi) offers the added opportunity to explore how ideas circulate across country borders and differ between countries. The
DRC and Rwanda were the most appropriate countries to focus on due to the larger number of NGOs present. Community interventions represented the most apposite idea to research as they involve more people, with a greater diversity of ideas, than park conservation and gorilla monitoring.

In the final section of this chapter, I discussed the methods used for researching this case study. Whilst the chapter carefully considered the criticisms of semi-structured interviews, it argued that, triangulated with NGO and government reports and websites, they presented the most appropriate method for researching transnational connections and disconnections in this context. The chapter concluded by outlining ethical issues and highlighting the importance of considering my positionality throughout the research process.

Chapter 4 presented a survey of the activities of 281 conservation NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. It showed what the conservation sector looks like from afar at the continental scale. It provided the context for exploring what a transnational network looks like on the ground and identifying a case study to do this. I examined the geography of NGO activities and demonstrated that, at the continental scale, networks operate in a patchy and unequal pattern. The findings also helped to identify Mountain Gorilla as a suitable case study by highlighting the diverse interests and high levels of funding directed to Rwanda and the DRC, as well as more specifically to charismatic species.

This chapter revealed an unequal NGO sector in terms of spending, dominated by a few key players; just ten NGOs are responsible for 65% of conservation spending. I suggested that such an uneven sector indicates that some organisations are likely to have greater power to determine which ideas circulate. Any case study for this thesis should reflect this structure by including a mixture of these large and small players to understand the power dynamics and interactions between them and what this means for idea circulation and inclusion and exclusion of particular organisations and their ideas. Whilst this chapter only provided an overview of the work of conservation NGOs from afar, it provided an insight into the overall workings of a considerably large sector, at a scope and scale, which has not, to my knowledge, been studied before.
Chapter 5 presented the historical context necessary for understanding connections, disconnections and idea circulation on the ground in the Virungas. This chapter was necessarily descriptive but it did highlight several themes relevant to this thesis. It argued that whilst on the surface conservation appears to operate in a bubble, despite years of conflict, in many ways conservation is deeply entwined with regional politics. Historically, the international community failed to act to help stop the genocide, yet in many instances supported the perpetrators post-1994 through sheltering *genocidaires* and directing large aid flows to refugee camps in the DRC, which were also home to and typically run by *genocidaires*. I suggested that it is likely that this makes the Rwandan government wary of outside intervention and perhaps helps to explain the many mechanisms in place to coordinate and manage outside intervention today.

Secondly, I argued that a top-down state in Rwanda arguably stifles civil society, closes political space and continues to promote a culture of obedience and compliance. I argued that this context was important for understanding the barriers to communities sharing their ideas about conservation. Thirdly, I showed that laws relating to divisionism in Rwanda can prevent targeted interventions for particular marginalised peoples’ groups, such as the Batwa. Again, this provided important context for exploring in later chapters how the state, or state structures and processes, influence who has the opportunity to share ideas and who does not. Fourthly, I claimed that the ongoing conflict in the DRC has caused many NGOs to move, postpone or stop their work and this can create potential disconnections between NGOs. The second part of this chapter explored the conservation model in the Virungas today and examined some of the different strategies and ideas encompassed in transboundary conservation and the United Nations Great Ape Survival Partnership. I ended this chapter by arguing that in some cases, conservation was able to operate outside of regional politics: park staff continued collaborative transboundary conservation work on the ground to protect mountain gorillas; and international NGOs supported this model up to the Ministerial level.

Chapter 6 introduced the conservation actors involved in mountain gorilla conservation on the ground in the Virungas. Whilst the literature on transnational networks typically focuses on their role in linking local communities to the international arena, I argued that there was a real gap in our understanding of the detail in between in terms of the diverse actors beyond local communities and international NGOs; in terms of the
structures and processes that link actors; and in terms of the heterogeneity of actors and
the overlaps between them. I suggested that this detail is important as it provides the
basis for understanding diverse connections and disconnections on the ground and
explaining how different forms of exclusion come about.

The chapter began with an introduction to the ground, a useful conceptualisation for
introducing the different NGO actors, the projects and ideas they support and the
interactions between them. Data revealed the presence of NGOs that seem to have little
if any presence on the ground, yet still circulate ideas through their websites and other
media. The chapter then discussed the ideas and interventions supported by NGOs,
states and donors. I suggested that the main ideas underpinning the majority of
interventions centred on the view that conservation works best when people are
separated from nature. This in turn meant that all community interventions in the
Virungas worked to support the protected area and to encourage the local population to
support it and/or provide economic alternative livelihoods to stop people from accessing
it. The chapter focused on the project and policy ideas that played out within this
context, including health, alternative energy, land and commodities and showed that
NGOs and states have diverse ways of working, both together and separately, to support
similar and rather different ideas. For instance, in terms of health interventions, my
findings revealed that different NGOs support similar ideas separately, indicating that
ideas do circulate in the region, even where organisations do not collaborate. In terms of
alternative energy interventions, NGOs supported quite different ideas, suggesting lots
of opportunity for disagreements and tensions. In terms of land interventions, NGOs
and states often work collaboratively around one or two interventions. This helped to
shed light on what blurred boundaries between NGOs and states look like and why they
are important as it showed that in the case of evictions from Virunga National Park that
it was difficult to determine the origin of the idea. In terms of commodity interventions,
I argued that lots of organisations support many projects separately and there appears to
be a fair amount of overlap. This suggested a lack of idea circulation. These data also
revealed instances (especially for health interventions) where there was a real lack of
local organisation involvement, suggesting that local ideas are less likely to be included
and influence projects in certain cases.
The final section of this chapter developed the discussion on blurred boundaries between state and NGO actors, suggesting that in Rwanda, the government invokes NGO coordinating structures to influence who NGOs work with. I argued that this ultimately defines who benefits from conservation interventions and who does not. My data showed that, in this way, the government was able to circulate its own ideas, influenced by wider policies about ethnicity, through NGOs. I argued that this could prevent some of the more marginalised and vulnerable groups in society, such as the Batwa people, from benefitting from NGO interventions, as well as from feeding their ideas into the conservation process. This process was masked or hidden behind official, government attempts to coordinate NGOs and prevent duplication of projects.

Chapter 7 classified, explored and analysed connections and disconnections within the mountain gorilla conservation network. I began the chapter by arguing that intra-organisational connections were strong and that NGO field staff felt that they had ample opportunity to feed their ideas into wider organisational decision-making. I then discussed inter-organisational connections to look at their impact on an organisation’s ability to influence political behaviour, be that by impacting policy and the construction of political problems and solutions, or through influencing project decision-making and therefore wider behaviour. Whilst financial and other resources may play a role in organisation’s ideational power, my data suggested that factors such as perceived expertise, staff movement and personal and organisational relationships were key. Perceived expertise increases an organisation’s ability to collaborate and influence decisions about projects and also strengthens their ability to influence policy. This can lead to the ‘accidental’ exclusion of others in relation to certain issues, notably health and veterinary interventions. However, the influence of perceived expertise on ideational power is limited to certain themes and to cases where the government chooses to draw on such experts. I suggested that other factors may be equally, if not more important for explaining connections, disconnections and idea circulation. Specifically, my findings showed that movement of staff and the personal and professional relationships that this leads to play a bigger role in determining connections and disconnections and facilitating the inclusion of some people and the exclusion of others in decision-making processes. I used the example of the relationship between IGCP and RDB to illustrate this, showing how the close nature of their relationship created blurred boundaries between the two organisations and arguably
allowed IGCP to work in parts of PNVi when all other organisations were excluded, including the ICCN.

The chapter ended with a discussion about the importance of deliberate, or ‘strategic’ conflicts and tensions that arise as a result of competition for funds and publicity, organisations having different strategies and ways of working, organisational conflicts and personal conflicts. These all exist despite diverse governmental structures aimed at preventing them. I argued that the disconnections that these tensions and conflicts resulted in could prevent information from circulating outside of formal, government-organised meetings and could lead to duplication of projects in some areas and lack of projects in others, thus potentially confusing some communities and excluding others.

Chapter 8 explored whether and how ideas from local communities actually did inform and influence NGO and state interventions as their staff claimed that they did. I argued that typically, they did not and suggested several reasons why. In the first instance, NGOs and states often confuse ideas with needs, seeing themselves as best placed to translate community needs into appropriate policy and project interventions. Whilst in some cases these actors might be best placed to interpret community needs and determine appropriate interventions, I suggested that this could also close the space for local innovation and idea generation.

I argued that in Rwanda, barriers exist within a context of sensitisation, where the local population will in any case suggest ideas that have been filtered down to them through NGOs and the state. This is compounded by the political and cultural context, which fosters a lack of space for local groups to share their ideas. My data revealed that the context was different in the DRC, but that the current political instability creates other, equally important challenges to communities feeding up their ideas to inform or influence projects. Interventions are typically urgent and reactive, leaving little space and time for working with communities to understand and include their ideas. I ended the chapter, however, by identifying instances where NGOs had worked to help communities exchange ideas and to empower them so that they can engage in policy and influence government decision-making.
9.3. Addressing the research questions

Overall, this thesis provided an important contribution to our understanding of the ways that transnational networks disseminate diverse forms of inclusion and exclusion. I highlighted at the beginning of this thesis a growing literature about how networks might operate to strategically include particular places and people and bring about global forms of inclusion and exclusion (for example see Ferguson 2006: 14, 41 on the capital flows of transnational networks in Africa; or Verkoren 2006: 34 and Smith 2002: 520 on the exclusivity of some transnational networks; or Edwards 2001: 9-10 on the way that NGOs ‘leapfrog’ to Brussels and Washington in their global advocacy and can exclude people and organisations in the process). This thesis attempted to shed some light on how this exclusion comes about. It explored the different types of connection and disconnection on the ground, so often concealed through NGO public discourse (Igoe 2010) and so often overlooked by the wider transnational networks literature, that contribute to inequality and exclusion on the ground.

The conceptual framework presented in chapter 2 informed the core aim of this research: to understand how transnational networks circulate ideas and what this means in terms of inclusion and exclusion. This was split into three questions:

1. What do transnational networks look like on the ground?
2. What do (dis)connections look like and what do they mean in terms of idea circulation, inclusion and exclusion?
3. (How) do transnational networks (and specifically NGOs) operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society?

9.3.1. What do transnational networks look like?

The findings presented in chapter 4 showed what a conservation sector looks like from afar at the regional scale and, as far as I am aware, there is no other study like it. Typically NGO studies focus on BINGOs and the rest (Hulme and Edwards 1997a; Bebbington and Riddell 1997; Igoe and Kelsall 2005b). My thesis moved beyond this to reveal the diversity of the sector. I suggested that conservation, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, is characterised by uneven power dynamics, pockets of inclusion and large areas of exclusion. These findings prompted a closer investigation into what is happening on
the ground to understand how these power dynamics, inclusions and exclusions play out. In terms of their intellectual contribution, these data have been published in several journals including *Conservation Letters*, *Antipode*, the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, and the *International Journal of African Historical Studies* (Brockington and Scholfield 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Brockington et al 2009). In a collaborative paper led by George Holmes we also compared the financial data we collected to different conservation prioritization models (Holmes et al 2012). I suggest further ways I would like to develop this research below.

As I argued in chapter 2, the literature often emphasises the importance of such networks in linking local communities to the international decision-making arena (see Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994) but it typically falls short of a detailed understanding of the diverse players, processes and interactions between the local and the global. My thesis tried to fill this literary gap by investigating this detail as I felt that it might be relevant and important for explaining how networks operate and bring about different forms of inclusion and exclusion highlighted in the literature by shedding light on the diverse ways that NGOs work together and separately with each other and states to support a range of ideas. Beyond highlighting the diversity of interests involved in mountain gorilla conservation and providing the detail necessary for exploring connections and disconnections in later chapters, investigating this detail developed our understanding of blurred boundaries to try to explain the different forms they take and why they are important. This thesis revealed three instances of blurred boundaries between state and NGO actors.

Firstly, I showed that in the case of evictions from PNVi, multiple NGOs working together with the state to remove people from PNVi made it difficult to determine who played what role and where the responsibility lay. This corroborates Brockington and Igoe’s understanding of blurred boundaries (2006: 448-9) as it suggests that official language (such as a formal project in this instance) envelopes the state-NGO relationship and can blur boundaries between the two, meaning that each party share the responsibility if things go wrong. In the DRC example, it was difficult to identify the origin of the idea and therefore where responsibility should lie for the people who were negatively impacted by such a move.
I also identified two other types of blurred boundary between state and NGO actors, which I feel contribute something new to the literature on state-NGO relationships. Firstly, I showed how the professional and personal relationships between IGCP and RDB made it appear almost as one organisation. This was useful for allowing IGCP, who was seen officially as a neutral, regional player, to bring about important regional policy changes in relation to transboundary conservation. However, it also meant that there were instances, where despite conservation seemingly continuing separately from conflict, it was in fact arguably tied closely to these politics. My data revealed that this close relationship allowed IGCP to work in CNDP-controlled parts of PNVi during times of conflict, even though even ICCN could not enter the park. This statement is controversial and the more formal narrative would suggest that conservation continued due to the passion and willpower of the park staff on both sides of the border, which I feel is also true. However, I think that blurred boundaries created through these personal relationships also played a role in allowing IGCP to continue its work. This is important, and whilst further research would be needed to develop this argument, it suggests that blurred boundaries potentially allow states to intervene in issues beyond their own borders. Exploring this issue further could provide useful contributions to the literature exploring Rwandan intervention in and relationships with the DRC (for instance see Stearn 2011; Prunier 2011; Beswick 2009).

Secondly, by loosely drawing on Jepson et al’s (2011) understanding of conservation actors, I was led to consider state structures and processes as part of the mountain gorilla conservation network. I argued that the Rwandan government invoked certain processes, or mechanisms, officially aimed at coordinating NGOs and reducing duplication, in order to encourage them to work with particular groups that they had identified as suitable targets for NGO interventions. In this sense, the blurred boundary was not created directly between state and NGO actors working closely together, but instead occurred more subtly through the use of a formal coordination mechanism. This example also contributes to literature that tries to understand how states and other powerful actors might use NGOs and NGO networks to further their own agendas through more subtle means (see Katz 2006: 335; Hagel and Peretz 2005; Gramsci 1971, Cox 1999). My data develop our understanding of how these processes play out on the ground in Rwanda. In this context, these findings are particularly important as they show that not only is the state pushing its ideas openly and directly onto NGOs, for
instance through asking them to change certain projects, but it is also influencing them in a more hidden, subtle way. This blurs the boundaries between state and NGO actors so that from the outside it may appear that NGOs are excluding certain groups, whereas in reality this exclusion is heavily influenced by the state.

9.3.2. What do (dis)connections look like and how do they influence idea circulation, ideational power, inclusion and exclusion?

Whilst I addressed the question in different ways through chapters 6, 7 and 8, the main contribution to addressing this question comes from the material and analysis presented in chapter 7. I showed that, with regard to health and veterinary issues, perceived expertise increases ideational power to influence policy and influences collaborations. I argued that, in these cases, there was a lack of community groups and others without perceived technical health and veterinary expertise. This corroborates arguments made in the literature that suggest that as certain people and their ideas are respected and included based on their expertise others may be excluded (Radcliffe 2001: 26; Verkoren 2006: 53, following Stone 2005: 99; Duffy 2008: 340, following Keller 2009; Ottaway 2001: 16). This is important as many health interventions impact wider aspects of communities’ daily lives such as cleaning, sanitation, cooking and farming, yet they appear to have little, if any say in determining and influencing these interventions. At the same time, I argued that perceived expertise might not always have the same impact on connections and disconnections than the transnational networks literature might suggest. There were numerous cases where NGOs collaborated without this being a factor and there were also cases where states failed to listen to experts on certain issues where it was not in line with their own agenda. I argued that that other factors beyond perceived expertise can be equally, if not more important, in terms of shaping inclusion and exclusion.

My thesis also makes a contribution to the literature with regards to its understanding of the role of staff movement, personal relationships and conflicts in influencing connections and disconnections and therefore the circulation of ideas and the inclusion and exclusion of particular people and groups. I argued that the movement of staff between different NGOs, countries and state departments creates the space for multiple interactions and the potential for ideas to circulate (following Mitlin et al 2007). I
suggested that despite high levels of staff movement in Rwanda, it was generally impossible to determine which ideas moved as a result of this movement. However, I claimed that staff movement fostered personal relationships between staff and that this was particularly the case between IGCP and RDB, as I have discussed above, as well as between RDB and MGVP and RDB and DFGFI.

As I argued early in the thesis, the literature is largely silent on the role of personal connections (Bebbington and Kothari 2006 and Manno 1994 provide exceptions) and the potential hidden disconnections that they result in. From observation, I showed how NGO staff in the Virungas typically moved in rather distinct social circles. As I showed at the start of this thesis, this was also the case when I recently attended IUCN’s International Conservation Convention in Jeju in September 2012. People will always move in different social circles, forming friendships based on common interests, language and culture. As I argued in this thesis, this is nothing new. However, it is important. It means that, whilst ideas will circulate well within formal state-organised meetings, outside of such meetings they will circulate between and within select groups of individuals and certain people and groups will be excluded. For instance, I highlighted the lack of community groups in any of the social gatherings that I attended. Whilst these groups do attend more formal meetings, this means that they are excluded from opportunities to form bonds and build trust that could be pivotal to discussions within formal meetings, as well as formal collaborations. There is a clear need for further ethnographic research into this issue, which is typically overlooked in the transnational networks literature that focuses at the organisational rather than the individual level.

Finally, the data presented in chapter 7 contribute to filling a gap in our understanding of the impact of more observable conflicts and tensions. I argued in chapter 2 that the literature pays little attention to the strength, severity and importance of conflicts within networks, save for a few brief exceptions (Peterson 1992; Lewis et al 2003: 543; Anand 2006) but I suggested that they might be important for explaining how exclusion comes about. This thesis contributed to this literature by classifying these ‘strategic’ disconnections and showing how different ideas about how things should be done; competition for funds; competition for publicity; organisational politics; and personal politics can lead to disconnections between people and organisations, which can
ultimately lead to a lack of circulation of ideas (outside of formal meetings) as well as duplication of projects in some areas and lack of projects in others. I argued that this is important as it can ultimately lead to confusion in some communities due to lots of NGOs carrying out similar projects, and at the same time, communities being excluded from conservation projects and benefits in other areas.

9.3.3. (How) do transnational networks operate to include and circulate the ideas of more marginalised groups in society?

I addressed this question in chapter 8, by investigating the opportunities and barriers to communities feeding their ideas (where they have them and are willing to share them) to NGOs and states and influencing the interventions that ultimately impact them. In answering this question, I developed discussions about the origin of ‘local’ ideas. As I showed above, the literature emphasises the role of transnational networks in linking the local to the global (Princen and Finger 1994; Princen et al 1994: 221-30; Stone 2002: 4-5; Florini 2001; Lent and Trivedy 2001), but it is only by understanding the methods used by NGOs and states to listen to and interpret community ideas that we can understand fully whether and how what is presented in the international arena really does represent the reality on the ground.

I showed how sensitisation can be used as a tool by states and NGOs in Rwanda to spread the dominant view that these actors are better placed than communities to identify community needs and identify solutions for addressing them. This contributes to our understanding of hegemonic power (Gramsci 1971) and the third dimension of power (Lukes 2005). Gramsci and Lukes both argue that NGOs may work to influence the wider context and norms which ultimately defines the common sense, upon which people make their decisions. I show how sensitisation is used in Rwanda to try to change indirectly how local communities think about conservation and conservationists. This is important as it presents a barrier to communities being able to circulate their ideas. A strong government and a compliant, or arguably obedient, civil society compounds this situation and excludes communities from informing conservation interventions.

I showed in chapter 7 that intra-organisational relationships are strong and information circulates from field staff up to the international level. However, whilst NGOs derive
legitimacy from being representative of the local communities that they work with, often they are not representative. This means that despite being well-connected to field staff on the ground; it is likely that NGO headquarters are disconnected from the realities on the ground and fail to include community ideas in their decision-making processes as this does not inform the information that they receive. This is important and reflects more recent discussions about the role of NGOs as service providers versus their role as agents of empowerment. Banks and Hulme recently prompted lively online debate (see Green 2012) when they suggested, as others have previously, that NGOs have moved a long way from their radical roots and empowerment role towards a service provision role (2012; see also Adamczyk 2012: 66-8 on African and specifically Rwandan civil society). In this case, it does seem that, whilst there are exceptions (such as Care’s work with local communities to help them to engage in land reform and IGCP’s community exchange work), typically, NGOs do not listen to or use community ideas. Whilst other factors prevent communities from voicing their ideas, typically NGOs are not transforming this situation by working to empower communities to lead the conservation agenda. I argued that this is important on ethical and moral grounds; community members, where willing and where they have good ideas, should be able to engage NGOs and states and inform interventions that will affect their daily lives. I also argued that this is important as it is what NGOs base much of the legitimacy on it terms of attracting support for them as an organisation, for their approach and that they are the right, or even the only, organisation to be implementing their approach.

Whilst I did not encounter the same scenario in the DRC, I argued that communities there face other barriers to circulating their ideas. I argued that these barriers are created due to the political situation which means that conservation interventions typically focus on meeting urgent park needs and projects are constantly being moved or stopped, providing little space for consistent work with communities to support and foster their ideas. Both contexts, whilst very different, mean that NGOs and states do not foster local innovation. Whilst there are exceptions, typically, the way that NGOs and states work and the historical, political and cultural context of each country combine to make it difficult for communities to circulate their ideas or have a wider influence on political behaviour. As this situation perpetuates, communities are likely to continue to be marginalised from the conservation process, leading to a sustained need for NGO presence in the region.
9.4. Limitations and areas for further research

The necessary time (and cost) restraints for a PhD, combined with the population dynamics of the Virungas (high population densities of diverse communities and indigenous peoples’ groups, often in physically hard to reach areas) meant that I was unable to properly represent communities’ voices within my thesis. My research tried to understand how NGOs and states attempt to include the community voice and so such data were beyond the scope of this project. My research questions (and skills) were better suited to elite interviews with government and NGO staff and I think my positionality made me well placed to investigate from an NGO perspective. By not including communities’ voices, I am not dismissing them, indeed, I felt that they are so important that I would be unable to include them in a respectful way that would truly represent their full range within the scope of this research. However, this does constitute an important limitation of this thesis and more research is needed to understand how community members see themselves as fitting into transnational networks. In a country such as Rwanda, where people are generally quite guarded with who they talk to and what they talk about, this sort of research is probably best carried out by a Rwandan, or someone who has lived in Rwanda for many years. In this sense, EEEGL funded research on community views of conservation around PNV (Bush et al 2010) was timely and welcome. More of this kind of research, but that moves beyond household surveys to use in-depth interviews at the household level, would provide a useful lens for understanding the extent to which communities feel they are able to influence NGO and state interventions.

Through using websites, having informal conversations with headquarter staff prior to fieldwork and interviewing some NGO directors whose field visits coincided with my fieldwork, I was able to get a sense of how NGO headquarters fit into the transnational network. However, a useful further piece of research would be to conduct formal in-depth interviews with headquarter staff in the US, Europe and other parts of Africa. I would like to explore how NGOs use the material they get from the field in their international advocacy efforts, organisational strategy and promotional material at the international level. In particular this would help to develop our understanding of how distant NGOs at the international level are from the reality on the ground. Igoe suggests that many of the stories, images and videos used by conservation NGOs on their
websites can mask the real complexity on the ground and hide important exclusions and inequality (2010). Thus, this kind of research would build on this thesis and in particular the arguments that I made in chapter 7 about intra-organisational relationships and the arguments that I made in chapter 8 about whether or not an idea comes from the community, to shed light on how connected international NGOs are to the reality on the ground and how they articulate this reality to their supporters. Moving forward it would help us to understand how NGOs wishing to could help to ‘re-tell the real conservation story’ in a way that does not risk losing support for conservation.

Finally, it is important to develop the NGO survey data presented in chapter 4. The financial crisis is likely to have changed spending patterns and I have noticed many NGOs closing or being established since conducting this research. Specifically, it would be useful to understand, as the sector continues to change and grow, what sort of growth or change would be most effective? For instance, should the large and powerful NGOs continue to get bigger and receive more funding, or would a greater diversity of smaller NGOs be more effective? These questions tie in with a long list of suggested questions laid out in the initial report for this survey (Scholfield and Brockington 2008). Further research projects to address all of these questions would be a useful starting point for understanding the current and future role of the conservation sector.

Rwanda and the DRC both have unique political histories, making it important to consider the generalisability of the findings presented in this thesis. This is even more important given that mountain gorilla conservation is sold as a success story in terms of being able to save a particular species and its habitat and conservationists are therefore keen to learn lessons from it and apply them elsewhere. However, there are large elements of my research that are not generalisable. In particular, I argue in many places that regional and national level politics, as well as history and culture, are deeply entwined with research findings. In Rwanda, a top-down government and a largely compliant civil society in many cases, combined with high revenues from mountain gorilla tourism mean that strictly protected areas are more likely to work (in the biodiversity conservation sense). This creates a scenario where it is likely that mountain gorillas will survive and will continue to generate funding for this approach to conservation. Whilst community projects help to sensitise the local population to this scenario and do arguably provide a range of social and economic benefits, there is less
need to empower them to set their own conservation agendas fuelled by their own ideas about how to manage the forest in terms of addressing the conservation agenda. The situation is sustainable as funds are likely to always be there for conservation and the political and cultural environment is likely to always support government and NGO led conservation whereby the local population might participate and benefit but they will not lead it. Thus working to empower communities to lead conservation is unlikely to have a major impact on mountain gorilla conservation in Rwanda as it is today.

Mountain gorilla conservation is also a unique case in that it attracts so much funding and so many diverse interests. However, rather than preventing findings from being generalisable, this is what can make this case study so relevant to conservation in other places and was the reason that I chose it. It offers an opportunity to explore multiple, diverse connections and disconnections to understand how ideas circulate, who is included and who is excluded. The diversity of people and interactions means that different conclusions can be drawn about different types of interaction that may play out in other parts of the world. They may not all play out in the same place, but different things can still be taken from these data. For instance, findings about the barriers to communities being able to feed their ideas up to influence conservation may be relevant for other countries with arguably weak civil society and strong governments, such as Vietnam. Findings about the implications of tensions and conflicts between NGO staff are certainly relevant across the sector, as I have seen in other aspects of my work for a conservation NGO. These findings are embedded in the literature on transnational networks and NGOs and as such, there are lessons that can be applied to other situations, but careful consideration should be afforded to the different political and social contexts and the impacts that these have on my findings.
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List of general websites used

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Charity Commission http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/

DFGFI http://gorillafund.org/

EEEGL http://www.virunga.net
Frankfurt Zoological Society http://www.zgf.de

Gorilla CD http://www.gorillacd.org/

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**Map references**

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Appendix 1: Interview schedule NGOs

Interview Schedule – NGOs

Background and interviewee’s role

1. Could you tell me a bit about how you got involved in Mountain Gorilla conservation and how you came to be doing the job that you’re doing now? (length of time worked in Mountain Gorilla conservation and in current organisation and role; previous jobs and positions, academic background)
2. Could you tell me about your current role? (Decision making role? Specific decisions?)
3. Could you tell me about the structure of decision making and communicating decisions within your organisation and the nature of communications (who are you responsible to and who is responsible to you? Does head office influence your research?)

Connections

4. Do you work with any other organisations/ state departments? (How came about, how they work, ideas sharing, funds etc; try to draw out opinions)
5. Have you worked with any organisations in the past who you no longer work with? (follow up)

Ideas

6. Could you tell me about your main projects in Rwanda/ MG conservation (use background knowledge to direct if need to)
7. What do you think are the main (conservation) ideas encompassed by these projects? (i.e. community conservation, sanctuary, transnational conservation, endangered species etc)
8. When did you first hear about this idea? Where did it come from? (find out about feeding down process from head office and feeding up to head office here).
9. Could you tell me about any discussions/ negotiations that you have had about this idea?
10. Were any other ideas discussed and dismissed?
11. Are there any occasions when you’ve negotiated/ discussed an idea with someone outside of your organisation (who, when, why, where, what happened, what was the outcome?)
12. Are there any ideas you support which perhaps haven’t been as readily received by other organisations? (follow up)
13. Are there any ideas you’ve been involved in in the past which haven’t worked out quite as planned? (follow up)

State relations

14. Could you tell me a bit about how you work with the government of Rwanda to help conserve Mountain Gorillas? (follow up and find out how they find out about new policy interventions)
15. Are you able to have any input into policy making? Or just giving advice? (follow up to find out how NGOs are presenting information to government- try to get information on a specific policy intervention)
16. Do you think ORTPN staff (at both levels) influence your work?
17. Do you receive state funds? How is this distributed between projects? Do you have to use it in a specific way? Does someone from government oversee your activities? (ask about for this country and for organisations home country, e.g. DFID for UK etc)
18. Do you provide funding to the state to carry out conservation activities?

**Funding**

19. Could you tell me a bit about who you get funding from? (follow up; how long for? conditions attached?)
20. Do you fund any other organisations (or projects)? (follow up: How do you divide funds between projects, what negotiations take place on how money is spent, how do you have to report how money is spent?)

Finally, Do you think there’s anyone at that organisation I should speak to as well? What do you think they will be able to tell me?

**Interview schedule- ORTPN**

**Background and interviewee’s role**

1. Could you tell me a bit about how you got involved in Mountain Gorilla conservation and how you came to be doing the job that you’re doing now? (length of time worked in Mountain Gorilla conservation and in current organisation and role; previous jobs and positions, academic background)
2. Could you tell me about your current role? (Decision-making role? Specific decisions? Policy formation role?)
3. Could you tell me about the structure of decision-making and communicating decisions within ORTPN and the nature of communications (who are you responsible to and who is responsible to you?)

**Connections**

4. Do you work with any other organisations/ state departments? (How came about, how they work, ideas sharing, funds etc)
5. Could you tell me a bit about the collaborative work with state departments in Uganda and DRC?
6. Have you worked with any organisations in the past who you no longer work with? (follow up)

**Ideas**

7. Could you tell me about your main projects (MG conservation) (use background knowledge to direct if need to)
8. What do you think are the main (conservation) ideas encompassed by these projects? [i.e. community conservation, sanctuary, transnational conservation, endangered species etc]
9. Where did the original idea come from?
10. How do you communicate new policy to rangers at Volcans NP? (HQ only)
11. Could you tell me about any discussions/ negotiations that you have had about this idea/ policy?
12. Are there any occasions when you’ve taken on board an idea from another organisation? (donor/ NGO etc) (who, when, why, where, what happened, what was the outcome?)
13. Are there any ideas/ policies which perhaps haven’t been as readily received by others in the past? Or perhaps haven’t been implemented in the way you’d hoped? (follow up)
NGO/donor relations

14. What do you think of the work conservation NGOs working in Mountain Gorilla conservation in Rwanda?
15. What sort of process do outside organisations need to go through to be involved in Mountain gorilla conservation? (for HQ)
16. Could you tell me a bit about how you work with other MG conservation NGOs?
17. Are you able to have any input into policy making? Or just giving advice? (only at field level- try to get information on a specific policy intervention)
18. How do you think non-state conservation actors influence your work? (NGOs, tourism, donors)
19. Do you receive NGO or international donor funds? How is this distributed between projects? (follow up)

Funding

20. Could you tell me a bit about who you get funding from? (follow up; how long for? conditions attached?)
21. Do you fund any non-state conservation initiatives (CBOs/NGOs) (follow up: How do you divide funds between projects, what negotiations take place on how money is spent, how do you have to report how money is spent?)

Finally, Do you think there’s anyone at that organisation I should speak to as well? What do you think they will be able to tell me? Also do you have any copies of current policy that you think would be useful for me to read?
## Appendix 2: List of conservation NGOs active in Africa

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* Birdlife International partner
Appendix 3: Full list of acronyms for groups of NGOs

A. BLINGOs (BLImey that’s a big NGO!)

These are known elsewhere as BINGOs. In Africa they are the WWF (US and International), CI and WCS.

B. FLAMINGOs (Fairly LArgest Multi-million dollar NGOs)

These are slightly smaller than the BINGOs, but still spend millions of pounds a year. Examples include Fauna and Flora International, Birdlife International, African Wildlife Foundation, as well as slightly smaller organisations such as Care for the Wild International and Born Free Foundation UK.

C. WANGOs (Wonderful Animal fOcussed NGOs)

These organisations focus their African activities around the conservation of a particular species, but can range in size and origin. Examples include Save the Rhino International, the Mountain Gorilla Conservation Fund and WildiZe Foundation.

D. PONGOs (wonderful Person fOcussed NGOs)

These are conservation organisations devoted to saving wildlife but whose appeal is focussed on charismatic individuals examples include the David Sheppard Wildlife Foundation and Jane Goodall Institute and Wildlife Conservation Network.

E. HONGOs (Habitat fOcussed NGOs)

These are NGOs that focus on various habitat types across African. Examples include Wetlands International, Rainforest Action Network and African Mangrove Network.

F. GNUNGOs (GeNUs focussed NGOs)

These organisations focus on groups of animals, for instance, big cats, primates etc. Examples include Project Primate, CERCOPAN and Born Free USA.

G. BONGO (Bird fOcussed NGOs)
These are similar to Genus focussed NGOs, but they focus their conservation activities on birds. Examples include the International Crane Foundation, the Peregrine Fund and Birdlife International. Better still would be SONGS ON BONGOS (SONGbird Or Non song Bird fOcussed NGOs)

H. SPANGOs (Single protected area NGOs)

These are usually smaller organisations and focus all their attention on one particular area. Examples include Project African Wilderness, Kasanka Trust and Ol Tukai Conservancy.

I. DINGOs (Dabbling in Conservation NGOs)

These are organisations linked to hunting clubs or tourism organisations, where perhaps, conservation is the ‘secondary’ activity of the organisation. Examples include Safari Club International Foundation, African Impact and African Fund for Endangered Wildlife.

J. BANGOs (community-BAsed NGOs)

These are small conservation organisations that were set up by local African people. Examples include Mazingira Bora Karatu, Vokatry ny Ala and Amboseli Community Wildlife Tourism Project (ACWTP)

K. STINGOs (Student Inspired NGOs)

These are organisations that have been set up by groups of friends, predominantly students who had previously travelled to the area and decided they want to make a difference and set up a conservation organisation. An example would be Tandroy Conservation Trust.

L. MANGOs (MemoriAl NGOs)

These are NGOs that have been set up in the name of deceased prominent conservation figure. Examples include the John Muir Trust and the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International.
M. GRINGOs (Good Research Involved NGOs)

These are organisations that have often grown out of, or been established alongside research projects. Examples include the Brown Hyena Research Project, the Lion Conservation Fund and Lukuru Wildlife Research Project (LWRP).

N. NGONGONGOs (Non-Governmentally Organised Networks and Groups Of NGOs)

These are large organisations that network African conservation organisations, though not necessarily implementing their own projects. Examples include Wildlife Conservation Network and Global Communications for Conservation.

We also identified a number of suitable acronyms for other categories, but are hesitant to name the NGOs they describe. These include OH! NGO (the set of particularly silly conservation NGOs); BROWN NGOs (the NGOs who will say anything to get approval); OGNNGOs (just because its an unpronounceable palindrome); PINGOs the cold hearted callous NGOs; LINGO (non Anglophone NGOs); SORRY I DON’T SPEAK THE LINGO (Anglophone NGOs) and the NGONG NGOs (all the NGOs focusing on conservation areas south of Nairobi)
### Appendix 4: Breakdown of expenditure

Note these figures include some double counting: sums spent by some organisations have been given to others on this list. These figures are not comparable with the country level distribution from which double counting has been excluded. The purpose of this table is to give an indication of the relative importance of different conservation organisations.

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<td>457,587</td>
<td>367,350</td>
<td>317,875</td>
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<td>A Rocha</td>
<td>303,708</td>
<td>299,800</td>
<td>147,328</td>
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<td>David Shepherd Wildlife Fund'n</td>
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<td>269,349</td>
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<tr>
<td>WildZe Foundation</td>
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<td>219,964</td>
<td>214,637</td>
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<tr>
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<td>243,800</td>
<td>225,570</td>
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<td>264,890</td>
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<td>232,421</td>
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<td>Roan River Conservation Studies</td>
<td>41,647</td>
<td>205,900</td>
<td>305,126</td>
<td>184,224</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Forest Cons Group</td>
<td>208,441</td>
<td>206,488</td>
<td>296,019</td>
<td>236,983</td>
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<tr>
<td>BirdLife Denmark</td>
<td>201,400</td>
<td>186,430</td>
<td>211,500</td>
<td>199,777</td>
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<td>William Holden Wildlife Foundation</td>
<td>217,234</td>
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<td>204,872</td>
<td>212,996</td>
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<td>Rare Species Conservatory Fund'n</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>61,800</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lewa Wildlife Conservancy UK</td>
<td>108,318</td>
<td>296,628</td>
<td>80,576</td>
<td>161,841</td>
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<td>Cercojan</td>
<td>156,711</td>
<td>186,459</td>
<td>240,566</td>
<td>194,579</td>
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<td>Owens P’n for Wildlife Cons’n</td>
<td>152,358</td>
<td>185,117</td>
<td>155,216</td>
<td>164,230</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albertine Rhi Conservation Society.</td>
<td>114,278</td>
<td>233,267</td>
<td>225,962</td>
<td>191,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallmann Memorial Foundation</td>
<td>109,602</td>
<td>103,471</td>
<td>106,036</td>
<td>106,036</td>
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</table>

¹ Includes overheads of 25% on all projects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Trust</td>
<td>173,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdlife Germany</td>
<td>162,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon Wildlife Aid Fund</td>
<td>174,128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bushmeat Crisis Taskforce</td>
<td>154,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Conservation Fund US</td>
<td>-195,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Luangwa Conservation Society</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Sheldon Wildlife Trust UK</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Gorilla Cons Fund</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdlife Netherlands VPN</td>
<td>19,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends of Conservation</td>
<td>111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebelaire Black Rhino Trust</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iroko Foundation</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Crane Foundation</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimpanzee Rehabilitation Trust</td>
<td>49,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project African Wilderness</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF/GA A'can Wildlife P'n Trust</td>
<td>98,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maasai Foundation of East Africa</td>
<td>57,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Westerveld Conservation Trust</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amara Conservation</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The wildlife trust</td>
<td>53,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Primate</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Elephant Foundation</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People and predators project</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Conservation Foundation</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humane Society International</td>
<td>22,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save Earth Nigeria</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakans Wildlife Research Project</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons through Poverty Alleviation</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Hyena Research Project</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murielle Foundation</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<td>Endangered Wildlife Trust</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Conservancy</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minamupi</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Goodall Institute (UK)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nambha Envi and Wildlife Soc</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kesho Trust</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conserve Africa International</td>
<td>331,000</td>
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</table>

1The African Conservation Fund (US) was only started in 2004 and its first two years costs were devoted to starting the organisation up. Hence it only has overhead costs. All overheads of the African Conservation Fund (UK) are paid for by an EU grant and all other donations go straight to wildlife causes on the ground (De Merode pers. comm.)

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Appendix 5: Predicting total expenditure

We predicted expenditure for NGOs for which we had no financial data on the basis of the geographical scope of their activities, placing limits on the size their budgets could be. The distribution of NGO financial size and geographical scope of activities is shown in the table below.

The distribution of NGOs according to size and geographical scope.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of countries worked in</th>
<th>NGO size class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We then made two predictions for the distribution of NGOs without financial data. First we distributed them assuming that none were larger than category 3, second assuming that none were larger than category 4. The results of these predictions are shown below. Note that we were not able to include all the organisations on our lists as we did not have good geographical data for all of them.

Predicted distribution using size class 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries worked in</th>
<th>NGO Size Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predicted distribution using size 1-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries worked in</th>
<th>NGO Size Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We then took the average of these two distributions (the total rows at the bottom of each table) to produce a predicted distribution of the NGOs without financial data. We predicted their budgets to be the average of the other NGOs in that size class.

Note that this method hinges on there being no NGOs out there with budgets larger than $2 million per year. We are confident that, because of the amount of consultation and checking that our search has involved, we have not missed any large organisations.