THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of

PhD in Politics

in the Faculty of Humanities

2013

GERMÁN C. PRIETO CORREDOR

School of Social Sciences / Department of Politics
LIST OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 1. DEFINING THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO ANALYSING THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY .......... 24

1.1 The role of collective identity and regional institutions from constructivist approaches to regionalism ........................................................................................................................................... 25

1.1.1 Emphasis on collective identity .............................................................................................................. 25

1.1.2 Emphasis on regional institutions ........................................................................................................... 33

1.2 Theoretical issues, assumptions and method ............................................................................................... 39

1.2.1 Combining constitutive and causal analysis ............................................................................................ 45

1.2.2 Reasons as causes .................................................................................................................................. 47

1.2.3 Knowing the ideas that inform state action ........................................................................................... 50

1.2.4 Interpreting interviewees’ discourse about ideas: analysing transitive verbs and metaphors ................................................................................................................................. 53

1.2.5 An example of applying the constructivist interpretive method proposed in the thesis ......................................................................................................................................................... 59

1.2.6 A constructivist framework for the analysis of collective identity .......................................................... 64

1.2.7 A constructivist framework for the analysis of regional institutions ...................................................... 68

1.3 Examples of rationalist-materialist approaches to the study of the AC and other related approaches ....................................................................................................................................... 71

1.3.1 Approaches to the AC ............................................................................................................................ 72

1.3.2 Other related approaches ......................................................................................................................... 74

CHAPTER 2. CASE STUDY 1. PERU REMAINING AN AC MEMBER WHILE BEING RELUCTANT TO ADOPT THE FTZ AND THE CET ................................................................................................................. 81
2.1 Motivations for Peru not adopting the FTZ and the CET ......................................................... 82
  2.1.1 Backgrounds of the FTZ and the CET .................................................................................. 82
  2.1.2 First moment: Peru’s marginalisation from the FTZ and the CET in 1992 ......................... 84
  2.1.3 Second moment: Peru’s partial adoption of the FTZ (but not the CET) in 1997 ........... 96
2.2 The role of collective identity ........................................................................................................ 102
2.3 The role of regional institutions .................................................................................................. 109
  2.3.1 The role of the AGS ............................................................................................................. 113
2.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 115

CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY 2. ANDEAN COMMUNITY’S COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION ...................................................... 117

  3.1 Material incentives for engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU ................. 118
    3.1.1 The importance of trade relationships between the AC and the EU ....................... 119
  3.2 The role of collective identity .................................................................................................... 123
    3.2.1 The interest of strengthening the AC through collective FTA negotiations with the EU .................................................................................................................................. 123
    3.2.2 Ideological differences and the breaking of collective negotiations with the EU ..... 126
    3.2.3 Other effects of Andean collective identity ....................................................................... 132
    3.2.4 Balancing the importance of collective identity .............................................................. 134
  3.3 The role of regional institutions ................................................................................................. 139
    3.3.1 The constitutive and causal effects of D-598 and D-667 ............................................ 139
    3.3.2 The supportive role of Andean norms .......................................................................... 145
    3.3.3 The role of the AGS ......................................................................................................... 150
  3.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 153

CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY 3. THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED PLAN FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (PIDS) ......................................................................................... 156
4.1 The unfolding of the PIDS ................................................................. 157
  4.1.1 Background and content of the PIDS ........................................... 157
  4.1.2 The PIDS’ execution .................................................................... 160

4.2 The role of collective identity .............................................................. 163

4.3 The role of regional institutions ............................................................. 172
  4.3.1 Andean norms and institutions orienting the PIDS’ unfolding .......... 172
  4.3.2 The effects of the PIDS on Andean identity ................................... 179
  4.3.3 The role of the AGS .................................................................... 189

4.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 191

CHAPTER 5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE
ANDEAN COMMUNITY ........................................................................... 193

5.1 The content of Andean collective identity ............................................. 193

5.2 Understanding mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and
regional institutions in the AC ................................................................. 197

5.3 Contributions to explaining the AC’s maintenance ............................... 203
  5.3.1 The political cost of abandoning the AC ....................................... 205
  5.3.2 Institutional flexibility .................................................................. 209
  5.3.3 Institutional ‘inertia’ ...................................................................... 212
  5.3.4 The rhetoric of regional integration .............................................. 215

5.4 Discussing the limitations and contributions of the constructivist interpretive analysis
carried out in the thesis ........................................................................... 218
  5.4.1 Distinguishing constitutive and causal effects as explanation .......... 219
  5.4.2 Representativeness, trustworthiness and double hermeneutics .......... 225

5.5 Conclusion: Contributions to constructivist theorising and for the study of Andean
regionalism ............................................................................................... 231
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. CET (D-370, 1994) and national tariffs in 1992..........................................................84

Table 2. Member countries’ trade with the AC 1988-1992 ($US million).................................87

Table 3. AC members’ manufactured exports to the region 1991-1992 and participation in total manufactured exports to the world percentages.................................................................88

Table 4. Peru’s trade of manufactured products with Colombia and Venezuela 1990-1995 (US million)..................................................................................................................90

Table 5. AC members’ exports participation in total AC exports to the EU.........................120

Table 6. Levels of use of the GSP Drugs and the GSP Plus (percentage of each AC member’s total exports made to the EU).................................................................121

Table 7. AC member countries’ exports participation in the use of GSPs (portion that each AC member’s exports had in the total amount of AC exports to the EU made under the GSP)......121

Table 8. The cultural dimension of Andean collective identity.............................................195

Table 9. The relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the AC.................................................................202
# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement between the Andean Community and the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Andean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJ</td>
<td>Andean Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Andean Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Andean General Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALADI</td>
<td>Latin American Integration Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Andean Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Andean Presidential Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSC</td>
<td>Andean Strategy for Social Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPA</td>
<td>Andean Trade Preferential Agreement (from the US for the AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADS</td>
<td>Andean Council of Ministers in Social Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CartA</td>
<td>Cartagena Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPM</td>
<td>Common Foreign Policy Mechanism (of the AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPs</td>
<td>Communitarian Social Projects (of the PIDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTZ</td>
<td>Free Trade Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>The discipline of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Common Market of the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Multi-Party Agreement (between the AC and the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDCA</td>
<td>Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (between the AC and the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDS</td>
<td>Integrated Plan for Social Development (of the AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAI</td>
<td>Andean Integration System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISCAN</td>
<td>Andean System of Social Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCICAN</td>
<td>EU Programme for funding social projects in the AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDT</td>
<td>Special and Differential Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences (from the EU for the AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This thesis analyses the terms under which collective identity and regional institutions can explain state action towards the unfolding of regionalism in the Andean Community (AC). This analysis develops a constructivist approach that assesses constitutive and causal effects of ideas in order to provide explanations. For the assessment and distinction of these effects, the thesis proposes an interpretive method that consists of focusing on transitive verbs and metaphors denoting causation that state officials and regional bureaucrats use to refer to the role of ideas in orienting state action. The analysis of the explanatory role of collective identity and regional institutions is carried out in three case studies of the AC, namely, Peru remaining an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the Andean Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and the Common External Tariff (CET); collective negotiations of a free trade agreement between the AC and the European Union; and the adoption of the Integrated Plan for Social Development (PIDS). The thesis shows that constitutive and causal effects of ideas are possible to observe in the three case studies of the AC. By observing these effects, the thesis provides a better understanding of a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the AC, and suggests a number of issues that may explain the AC’s maintenance despite its modest achievements and low material benefits it provides to member states. The thesis also makes a significant contribution to constructivist theorising inasmuch as it provides a method to operationalise constructivism’s aim of providing explanations based on the role of ideas. To the study of the AC, this thesis represents a major contribution inasmuch as it is the first work that analyses the views of some of the main performers of state action and of the AC as a regional organisation, which accounts for the closest approach to how member states act in the AC.
DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual-property.pdf), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on presentation of Theses.
To my grandmas Sara and Pina, who made their greatest effort to give their daughters and sons the best education possible, and who taught them that learning was a secure path to happiness.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My mother Consuelo and my father Germán are the first persons I want to thank for all their support and motivation given for completing my PhD. My cousin Jimena has always been an example for me, and I want to thank her and her husband Andrés for having inspired me so much for doing my PhD and pursuing an academic career. Sergio and Juan Carlos also showed me the way, and their teachings were always reminding me the path I should follow, mostly at times when isolation felt deepest.

I also want to thank my former main supervisor, Nicola Phillips, and my current main one (second at an earlier stage), Maja Zehfuss, for their thoughtful orientation and substantial help in teaching me how to write a doctoral thesis, and what it means to pursue a PhD. My special thanks also to Cristina Masters, my second supervisor at the final stage, who collaborated with valuable comments to improve the final draft of my thesis. My examiners, Ben Rosamond (external) and Gabriel Siles-Brugge (internal) also provided great comments that helped making the definitive version of the thesis more robust.

Fieldwork was an amazing experience, and the help of Nicolás Verdesoto and his parents Luís and Mercedes in Quito, and the one of my friend Suanúa and her friend Javier Perla in Lima just made it not only easier but also joyful. To all the interviewees, to the people in the Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Colombian Ministries, and to the kind staff at the Andean General Secretariat in Lima, my gratitude for contributing to doing my interviews and showing interest in my research.

I also want to thank the Faculty of Finance, Government and International Relations at Universidad Externado de Colombia for giving me an academic position at the final stage of my thesis writing. To the students I had there during the first semester of 2013, and also at Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, for providing me with motivation about my thesis topic and encouraging me to finish my thesis in order to get a real start for my academic career.
I want to express my special regards and deep thanks to Felipe and Tom, who just made my life as a PhD student happier and easier, hosting me, supporting me and showing me the marvels of England. To Fabi, Hugo, Giuli, Jackie, Jamie, Gareth, Becks, Carlos, Sol, Alejandra and Alejandro, my deepest respects and admiration for having the strength and conviction to believe in what we do, and my appreciation for having made my days lighter and brighter during the last four years. Maria Paula also deserves my acknowledgments, for I think she endured quite the same hardness as I, and for a good while she lightened the PhD’s burdens.

Germán C. Prieto Corredor

Bogotá - Manchester, September 2013
INTRODUCTION

This thesis offers a constructivist analysis of the Andean Community (AC), a regionalist project existing between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru since 1969.¹ The AC has usually been analysed through rationalist-materialist approaches, mainly neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism,² which emphasise obtaining material benefits as the main explanation for engaging in regionalism. Since the AC has provided relatively small material benefits to its members, rationalist-materialist approaches usually find it difficult to explain the deepening and maintenance of this regionalist project. Material benefits are those benefits actors need to achieve in order to satisfy their material needs like survival and security (Finnemore 1996: 1-2).

Gaining power, understood in terms of possessing material resources like military assets (weapons and communication systems), money, infrastructure, technology and so forth, is seen as actors’ main interest, since power is needed for actors to satisfy their material needs (Barkin 2010: 33). By ‘material’ it is meant that these needs are considered ‘natural’, intrinsic to the ‘rationality’ that all social actors are assumed to possess. Rationalist-materialist approaches condense the satisfaction of material needs and the obtaining of material benefits under the concept of ‘interest’, and pursuing this interest is what makes an actor ‘rational’ (Wendt 1999: 116-8). Rationality consists of satisfying needs and maximising benefits, and for rationalist-materialist approaches this is what explains social phenomena, including regionalism (Söderbaum 2004: 18-27).

¹ Venezuela joined the AC in 1973, and left it in 2006. Chile was a founder member in 1969 but left the AC in 1976, and since 2006 it has only had associate membership. In contrast, Venezuela does not keep any relationship with the AC.
² Major relatively recent works in this regard are Salgado (1998); Casas (2005) and Moncayo (2006). None of these works explicitly adopt a neorealist or a neoliberal institutionalist framework, but implicitly do so.
In contrast, as an approach to the study of social life, constructivism focuses on the importance of ideas as social structures that orient agency. Constructivism holds that the meaning of material conditions is mainly constituted by ideas (Wendt 1999: 96; Berger and Luckmann 1968: 223-5). The usefulness of material resources, the extent to which they become significant, and in general the implications that are attached to possessing them (fear, relief, safety, wealth) are all issues whose meanings are socially constructed, and not predetermined to any social group (Onuf 1998: 64; 2012: 34). Actors’ interests are also constituted by ideas, and indeed constructivists consider that interests are ideas (Wendt 1999: 98, 114-5), inasmuch as they are also socially constructed and not pre-given to a single type of rationality, like the one of satisfying material needs and maximising material benefits (Finnemore 1996: 2-6, 15). Agents do not choose what ideas to think or ‘hold’, but ideas are social structures produced through agents’ interaction (Barkin 2010: 37), as their main function is to give meaning to agency and to the ‘world’ in which agents interact. In these terms, ideas are the main ‘explanatory factors’ of agency, and if we want to understand agency we need to look to the ideas that inform agents’ thinking (Wendt 1999: 135, 256; Searle 1995: 10).

Identities, institutions, knowledge and culture are often the social structures analysed by constructivist approaches in order to understand social action. In studying regionalism, constructivism emphasises the role of collective identity and regional institutions as two fundamental ideational structures – structures made of ideas – that contribute to explaining the unfolding of regionalist projects. Regionalism is understood as a state-led project aimed at organising a particular region along certain political and economic lines (Gamble and Payne 1996: 2). Certainly the main reason why constructivist approaches to regionalism emphasise the importance of identity and institutions in its unfolding is because a main ontological tenet of constructivism is that identity is at the basis of actors’ interests (Wendt 1992: 398; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 267), and organising a region along political and economic lines entails building an institutional framework that allows defining and implementing those lines.

---

The AC is an interesting case study for a constructivist analysis that focuses on the role of collective identity and regional institutions, for it has historically articulated a strong official discourse about the existence of an ‘Andean identity’, and since its creation it adopted a complex institutional design inspired by the European integration process. Regarding Andean collective identity, the AC and its member states have historically held an official discourse about an idea of ‘fraternity’ among states and their peoples, based on the common past of being Spanish colonies and liberated by the ‘Libertador’ Simón Bolívar. Sharing large territories along the Andes Mountains Chain and the influence of the Inca Empire over several indigenous populations before the Spaniards came to these lands are also features that compose this idea of fraternity. Hence, there is permanent reference to an ‘Andean identity’ that unites these countries.

Regarding regional institutions, the AC has developed a complex institutional framework that combines intergovernmental and supranational institutional organs and decision-making procedures. Andean norms, named ‘Andean Decisions’, are of supranational character and hence do not need to be approved by national parliaments to become part of member states’ legal order. The AC has two intergovernmental executive institutional bodies, the Andean Presidential Council (APC) and the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (ACM), and one supranational executive body, the Andean General Secretariat (AGS). The judiciary organisation, the Andean Court of Justice (ACJ), has supranational character, and other regional organisations such as the Hipólito Unaue Agreement and the Simón Rodríguez Agreement also operate on a supranational basis. The Andean Parliament is composed of congressmen and congresswomen.

---

4 Indeed, the word ‘Andes’ is derived from the Inca word ‘antis’, which was the name the Incas gave to the Andes Mountains. ‘Tiwantinsuyu’ was the name Incas gave to their territory around the Andes Mountains (Murra 1975). ‘Andean’, thus, is the word used to denominate things that are related to the Andes Mountains but also to the indigenous heritage of the Andean peoples, that is, the inhabitants of the Andes.

5 Yet, Venezuela has only a small portion of the Andes Mountains in its territory, and there has been no proof that the influence of the Inca Empire reached indigenous populations located in Venezuelan territory before the arrival of the Spaniards. In this sense, it could be thought that Bolivar’s legacy was more important in defining ‘Andean’ identity, at least for Venezuela. (See Lanata 2005; Rincón 2009: 32, 44).
congresswomen who are directly elected by the citizens of each member country to represent them on a national basis, and thus it does not have a supranational character.

The AC poses a serious challenge to rationalist-materialist approaches that focus on obtaining material benefits as the main explanation for the unfolding and maintenance of regionalism. Beyond relatively small trade benefits, the benefits generated in other areas of cooperation such as security, political cooperation, social issues and the environment have been hardly significant for member countries, and hence rationalist-materialist approaches face serious difficulties in explaining the AC’s enlargement of its institutional framework and its maintenance, even more now that the goal of establishing a common market has been put aside, and cooperation in other areas does not yield significant results. Since the AC has never been approached from a constructivist standpoint, the present thesis pursues a constructivist analysis in order to offer alternative explanations of its unfolding, hence providing a novel contribution intending to close the gap between constructivism and the study of Andean regionalism.

The main research question that orients the thesis is: in what terms can the role of collective identity and regional institutions explain state action towards the unfolding of regionalism in the AC? This question is to be answered through the analysis of three case studies of the AC, namely: Peru’s maintenance of its membership in the AC while keeping a reluctant position towards the adoption of the Andean Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and of the Andean Common

---

6 Direct election happened only recently. Whilst Venezuelan citizens elected their representatives to the Andean Parliament soon after direct election was established in 1997, Ecuador began doing it in 2002, Peru in 2006 and Colombia in 2010. Bolivia has not yet realised direct elections of its representatives.

7 Though the AC has notably contributed to manufactured exports of all member countries but Bolivia (Echavarría 1998), the AC has never accounted for more than a fifth of member states’ external trade. Therefore the importance of the Andean market for member countries has always remained relatively low.

8 Security aims were only pursued between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s (Ardila 2003). Although an agreement creating an Andean Peace Zone was finally reached in 2004, most cooperation agreements in security issues have not been enforced and their instruments have been put aside by member states to meet their security aims in recent years. As Chapter 4 will show, since cooperation efforts in the social and environmental issue areas are recent and incipient, their results are not easy to observe.

9 Indeed, there are very few constructivist analyses of regionalism in Latin America. Some exceptions are Petrâsh (2002), Fabbri (2005), Colacrai (2006), Battaglino (2008), and myself (Prieto 2003). However, these works are not systematic studies of particular regionalist projects, as they only offer general considerations depicting a ‘constructivist research agenda’ for the study of regionalism in Latin America.
External Tariff (CET); the negotiation of a free trade agreement (FTA) between the AC and the European Union (EU); and the implementation of the Integrated Plan for Social Development (PIDS, as for its initials in Spanish).\textsuperscript{10} The justification for choosing these case studies is their distinct significance as goals of the regionalist project. Trade has been the issue area always prioritised by member states, while the social area has been prioritised only recently.

Given that there can be different constructivist theoretical frameworks for the study of social life – and regionalism\textsuperscript{11} – this thesis draws on the works of some constructivist scholars, mainly Wendt (1987; 1998; 1999), Finnemore (1996), Checkel (2001) and Risse (2004; 2009), and argues that a useful way of providing explanations based on the role of ideas is by combining ‘constitutive’ and ‘causal’ theorising, which consists of analysing and distinguishing the constitutive and causal effects of ideas (Wendt 1998). The constitutive role of ideas consists of ideas making up part of agents’ interests, making those interests be what they are. The causal role of ideas consists of ideas making agents act the ways they do, implying a change in the state of things.

Since this thesis aims to analyse the terms in which collective identity and regional institutions can explain state action in the AC, states are considered actors. From a constructivist standpoint, state agency, as in the case of any other actor, is informed by ideas. The constructivist approach employed in the thesis assumes that collective identity and regional institutions are ideational structures that can explain the unfolding of Andean regionalism in terms of having constitutive and causal effects on state action. In order to know the ideas that inform state action, this research opted to interview a number of state officials who had significant participation in decision-making processes in the three case studies addressed. This option was made under the assumption that states act through the state officials who act in their name (Finnemore 1996: 2; Wendt 1999: ch.5). A number of regional bureaucrats (people working at the Andean General Secretariat) were also interviewed in order to complement the

\textsuperscript{10} ‘Plan Integrado de Desarrollo Social’.

\textsuperscript{11} Since, as pointed in footnote 3, constructivism is not a theory but an approach, there can be many different constructivist theories of politics, international relations, regionalism and so forth. See Ruggie (1998: 878-80).
analysis of the ideas about collective identity and regional institutions that oriented state action.

What interviewees said about the role of ideas is taken as the main object of analysis. Neither Wendt nor other constructivist authors provide a particular method for combining constitutive and causal theorising. Indeed, the lack of a particular method makes constructivist theorising difficult to develop, and thus proposing a method is needed to operationalise a constructivist analysis aiming to provide explanations based on the role of ideas. Drawing upon the work of Bhaskar (1978) and on the works of other constructivist scholars like Onuf (2012), Drulák (2004; 2006) and Walter and Helmig (2005), this thesis employs an interpretive method based on the analysis of transitive verbs and metaphors to distinguish constitutive and causal effects of ideas and to assess the terms in which they can explain action. It will be argued that when interviewees acknowledged the presence of ideas orienting state action constitutive effects are possible to observe. And when interviewees used transitive verbs denoting transformation (of behaviour, action or the unfolding of decision processes), or used metaphors that denote changes in state action, or posed ideas as reasons for action, causal effects are possible to observe. Additionally, following constructivism’s ontological tenet of mutual constitution (and causation) between agency and structure and between ideational structures, the thesis pays special attention to the constitutive and causal effects between collective identity and regional institutions in the unfolding of Andean regionalism.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 defines the constructivist approach engaged in the thesis, in terms of the theoretical and methodological tools for providing explanations based on the role of ideas. This chapter begins with a literature review on the ways that some constructivist approaches to regionalism address the role of collective identity and regional institutions, from which the need to combine constitutive and causal theorising and to articulate an interpretive method for pursuing such combination is derived. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 assess the role of collective identity and regional institutions – particularly regional norms – in explaining state action in each of the three case studies of the AC. Chapter 2 (case study 1) shows that despite significant material incentives for not adopting the FTZ and the CET, and
thus for leaving the AC, Peru’s decision to remain an AC member can be explained because of a ‘political cost’ that Peruvian government authorities did not want to ‘pay’ for making the decision to leave the AC. It argues that this ‘political cost’ is a metaphor closely related to issues of collective identity, particularly cultural and historical issues. Hence, issues of collective identity were not only informing Peruvian government officials’ interests (constitutive role), but also making Peru remain an AC member while maintaining a reluctant position in engaging the FTZ and the CET (causal role). Regarding the role of institutions, this chapter argues that Andean norms also had constitutive and causal effects on state action, as Peruvian officials identified with such norms because they provided certain benefits for national policymaking, and the AGS as a regional institutional organisation also provided benefits for Peru and exerted pressure on it to remain an AC member.

Chapter 3 explores a second case study where the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity can be more clearly observed. It argues that although AC member countries were interested in securing the trade preferences articulated through the GSP Plus,\textsuperscript{12} and although collective bloc-to-bloc negotiations was a condition imposed by the EU to negotiate the FTA with the AC, strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiation was a significant motivation to pursue collective FTA negotiations with the EU. It is argued that this motivation denotes strong identification with the regionalist project and such identification led states to pursue negotiations with the EU collectively. Furthermore, the breaking-off of collective negotiations because of the ideological differences that emerged between AC member states also accounts for causal effects of collective identity, since ideology will be introduced as one of the dimensions of Andean collective identity, together with a ‘cultural’ and an ‘inter-group’ dimensions. Regarding the role of institutions, this chapter shows the role of Andean norms informing state interests, but also argues that because of norms agents acted in particular ways. Some states not only acted because of the allowing and forbidding power of regional norms, but they also identified with regional norms, thus consolidating their collective identity. The causal role of regional norms and institutions is also emphasised as these institutions sometimes hindered progress.

\textsuperscript{12} General System of Preferences (\textit{Sistema General de Preferencias}). See Chapter 3 below.
A similar assessment is made in Chapter 4 (case study 3), where regional institutions are shown as triggering identification effects among agents, though sometimes institutions made progress difficult. Like in the previous case studies, regional institutions are also shown as facilitating progress, but it is argued that only constitutive effects can be observed in this regard because the extent to which such a ‘facilitating’ role implied a change in the state of things cannot be clearly established. In contrast to the two previous case studies, this one shows that although it is possible to find constitutive effects of the three proposed dimensions of Andean collective identity, their causal effects are harder to observe. Yet, the causal effects of regional institutions on the creation of collective identity show the importance of the inter-group dimension of Andean collective identity in orienting the unfolding of Andean regionalism in the social area.

Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by addressing the main contributions of the constructivist interpretive analysis of the AC. The distinction of three dimensions of Andean collective identity is pointed out as a significant contribution of the thesis not only for understanding the constitutive and causal effects of identity on state action, but also for providing concrete content to the often abstract concept of ‘Andean’ identity. It is argued that this distinction also enables a better understanding of a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions, from which a number of issues that contribute to understanding the AC’s maintenance are derived. This chapter also discusses some limitations encountered when applying the interpretive method to distinguishing constitutive and causal effects of ideas, and when developing an interpretive analysis of agents’ views on the role of ideas. From this discussion, the value of interpretive analysis is highlighted for developing constructivist theorising, and for explaining and understanding state agency and the unfolding of Andean regionalism.

Following the proposed constructivist interpretive analysis, the thesis shows that it is possible to observe constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions on state action and between them in the three case studies of the AC, though the extent to which those ideational structures can explain state action towards the unfolding of regionalism is different
in each case. Both collective identity and regional institutions were present in informing agents’ actions, and this warrants the claim that ideas informed states’ interests, making them what they were (constitutive effects). AC member states also acted the way they did because of collective identity and regional institutions – particularly regional norms – and because of these ideas things changed from one situation to another (causal effects). Hence, the main argument developed throughout the thesis is that collective identity and regional institutions can offer explanations that contribute to a better understanding of state action towards the unfolding of Andean regionalism and of the AC’s maintenance.
CHAPTER 1

DEFINING THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO ANALYSING THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY

In order to describe the constructivist approach to be employed in the thesis, in a first part this chapter reviews a number of constructivist approaches to regionalism that emphasise the role of collective identity and regional institutions in its unfolding. It will be shown that the terms in which these approaches use identity and institutions to explain action are diverse, but also sometimes confusing. These approaches acknowledge the constitutive role of these ideational structures, but sometimes they also suggest causal effects of ideas in terms of making agents act in certain ways, or implying changes in the state of things. It will be argued that the disinterest in distinguishing constitutive from causal effects of ideas and the lack of emphasis on analysing their causal role leads to a limited understanding of the role of collective identity and institutions in explaining state action and the unfolding of regionalism. The second part will argue for the usefulness of distinguishing between constitutive and causal effects of ideas in order to have better explanations based on the role of ideas. This part will also propose a method for making such distinction, and will set out the theoretical framework to carry out the analysis of the three case studies of the AC. Lastly, a third part will offer a quick review of some examples of rationalist-materialist analyses of the AC, and will outline the terms in which the contributions of a constructivist interpretive analysis like the one engaged in the present thesis are distinct from the ones of other approaches related to the object of study, as are historical institutionalism and the bureaucratic politics model.
1.1 The role of collective identity and regional institutions from constructivist approaches to regionalism

The constructivist works reviewed in this section have been chosen because they allow observing constitutive and to some extent causal effects of identity and institutions in the unfolding of regionalism. The first section reviews some constructivist approaches that emphasise the role of collective identity, while the second section reviews other approaches that emphasise the role of regional institutions.

1.1.1 Emphasis on collective identity

Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum, Luk Van Langenhove and Marianne H. Marchand and her collaborators are some of the most important scholars working on the so-called New Regionalism(s) Approach (NRA)\textsuperscript{13} who have theorised the role of identity in the unfolding of regionalism. Their works suggest that the process of construction of a region entails the configuration of a collective identity that may eventually motivate agents to engage in a regionalist project and build regional institutions. Furthermore, some insight into the relationships between identity and institutions can be derived from these authors’ views.

The NRA emphasises the importance of reflexivity, intersubjectivity and identity in the unfolding of regionalism and processes of region-building. The NRA makes the basic assumption that there is an inevitable connection between the dynamics of collective action and the social identity by which the individual teams up with others in real or ‘imagined communities’ (Söderbaum 2004: 44). A significant contribution to the comprehension of region-building processes and the evolution of regionalism is the concept of ‘regionness’, where identity has an important role to play.\textsuperscript{14} Hettne and Söderbaum define regionness as:

[T]he process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region. Regionness

\textsuperscript{13} Söderbaum has developed the NRA in joint work with Björn Hettne (Hettne and Söderbaum 1998; 2000). The New Regionalisms/Weave-World approach introduced by Marchand, Bøås and their collaborators (1999) is included in this review because significant differences in the treatment of identity are not found with respect to the NRA.

\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, although Hettne and Söderbaum do not label their work ‘constructivist’, Hänggi et al. (2006: 5) assert that the concept of ‘regionness’ is a constructivist concept.
thus implies that a region can be a region ‘more or less’. The level of regionness can both increase and decrease (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000: 461).

The level of ‘regionness’ defines the position of a particular region or regional system in terms of regional coherence and identity (Hettne 2003: 28). There are five levels of regionness, where collective identity evolves altogether with deeper levels:15

i) The ‘regional space’, a geographical unit delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological characteristics (like a proto-region), where people develop a kind of translocal relationship.

ii) The ‘regional complex’, where patterns of economic interdependencies arise, and the collective memory of a more widespread identity, albeit confined to a relatively small elite, dissipates. This level is seen as the real starting point for a regionalisation process.

iii) The ‘regional society’, which is a de jure or formal region characterised by the appearance of a number of different actors apart from states, making use of a more rule-based pattern of relations. Formal organisations and social institutions play a crucial role in this process leading towards community and region-building.

iv) The ‘regional community’, which is an active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised or informal actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, transcending the old state borders. A regional collective identity emerges and relations are characterised by mutual trust driven by social learning.

v) The ‘region-state’, or regional institutionalised polity, which is a ‘hypothetical’ entity constituted out of a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national communities into a new form of political entity where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all.

Although Hettne and Söderbaum do not aim to suggest a stage theory (2000: 470), these five levels of regionness denote a progressive identification of peoples with the region, creating a ‘sense of belonging’, which, as will be further argued, is what collective identity consists of. Identification refers here to the degree to which the inhabitants of a region ‘feel’ they are part of that region, and the extent to which the region constitutes part of their identity towards the inhabitants of other regions. It can be observed that Hettne and Söderbaum suggest a relationship of mutual constitution or co-evolution between regionness and collective identity, as they emphasise the dissipation of a ‘collective memory of a more widespread identity’ along

---

15 The following descriptions of each level of regionness are an edited transcription of the descriptions made by Hettne and Söderbaum in their 2000 article, pp. 462-8. They also contain some fragments of Van Langenhove (2003: 11-2) referring to the work of Hettne and Söderbaum.
a ‘small elite’ that occurs at the level of ‘regional complex’ as an incipient feature of regional identity formation.

In the definition of each level of regionness it is possible to see that institution building deepens along with higher levels of regionness, thus establishing a direct relationship between the level of identification from actors with the region and the development of more complex regional institutions. It can be noted that regionalism, as a formal state project that entails a minimum of institution building, starts at the level of the ‘regional society’. But Hettne and Söderbaum do not clarify if it is collective identity that causes institutions to emerge/enlarge or vice versa. In these terms, we can understand collective identity as ‘preceding’ regional institution-building, playing a constitutive role, but Hettne and Söderbaum do not suggest any causal effects of one ideational structure on the other.

The linkages between the levels of regionness and the rising of a regional identity and regional institutions can also be seen through the concept of ‘regionhood’ introduced by Luk Van Langenhove (2003: 12), for whom the five levels of regionness are understood as five phases in the process of ‘becoming’ a region. Accordingly, the concept of ‘regionhood’ serves to understand the agential capabilities of regions in the new regionalisms’ world order. Drawing on social psychology, Van Langenhove (ibid., 14-5) understands regionhood as those conditions which grant a region the capacity to act as a polity, namely, a corporate actor. These conditions are (i) the region as a system of intentional acts in the international and national arenas; (ii) the region as a ‘rational’ system with statehood properties; (iii) the region as a reciprocal achievement; and (iv) the region as a generator and communicator of meaning and identity.

It is easy to infer that regionhood entails the existence of a regional identity that allows the region to act as unitary actor, as the region needs to define who it is in relation to other regions and actors in order to act as a corporate actor - condition (iv). Likewise, the four conditions of regionhood imply the existence of a more or less developed institutional framework that necessarily follows a regionalist project, and which allows the region to: (i) perform intentional acts; (ii) acquire statehood properties; and (iii and iv) allow the region to make visible its achievements as a generator and communicator of meaning and identity. Van Langenhove
(2003: 23) asserts that a region must express meaning towards other social and personal actors as well as possessing a particular identity. Developing regionhood entails developing a collective identity and institution building, but following Van Langenhove’s reasoning we remain uncertain whether the interest in acquiring regionhood causes the other two ideational structures to emerge or if it is the interest in developing a regional identity and institution building which leads to the consolidation of regionhood. Neither does he enquire into the relationships of causation between identity and institutions, although their constitutive relationships are clearer to observe, since identity is part of regionhood, hence having a constitutive role.

Van Langenhove differentiates the concept of regionhood from the one of ‘regionality’. While regionhood allows the distinction of a region from a non-region, regionality corresponds to the suitable historical, geographical, economic, cultural and social conditions that allow for a region to be distinguished from other regions, and thus, more equivalent to the concept of regionness outlined by Söderbaum and Hettne (Van Langenhove 2003: 9, 12). According to Marchand et al., regionality has to do with

 [...] the relative convergence of dimensions such as cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements and economic policies (i.e. relative sameness). As such, it is the outcome of not one but several processes and involves the creation of a regional identity (Marchand et al. 1999: 900).

Regionality corresponds to the acquisition of a particular identity by a specific region, as regionality is understood as those cultural features that distinguish one region from others. Yet, the quoted definition includes institutional dimensions such as political regimes, security arrangements and economic policies as being constitutive elements of regionality, that is, of collective identity or the identity of a region. Hence, regionality entails mutual constitution between identity and institutions. However, the concept of regionality does not tell us anything about the causal relationships between identity and institutions.

16 Indeed, Hettne (2005: 270) asserts that the concept of regionness is closely related to the one of ‘actorness’, which implies “a growing capacity to act that follows from the strengthened ‘presence’ of the regional unit in different contexts [...]”. ‘Actorness’ is fully achieved at the fifth level of regionness – the regional state or institutionalised polity (Hettne 2004: 5).
In sum, while regionhood refers to the capacity of a region to act as a unitary actor, regionality refers to those identity aspects that allow a region to be distinguished from other regions, that is, a region’s identity. The relationship between the reviewed concepts could be conceptualised as follows: regionhood and regionality are progressively acquired with greater levels of regionness. All three concepts entail an acknowledgement of the importance of identity as a factor that constitutes actors’ interests in pursuing regionalism and regional institution building. Regionness might operate more as a preceding factor of the interest in pursuing regionalism, but regionhood and regionality can either precede or be a result of regionalism. Furthermore, both regionhood and regionality give account of the mutual (constitutive) dependence between identity and institutions, as the institutional arrangements of a region allow such region to act as a unitary actor and partly constitute the region’s identity. In any case, although these concepts account for relationships of mutual constitution between identity and institutions, they do not tell us clearly how these two ideational structures explain action and the unfolding of regionalism, mainly because the reviewed authors do not aim to assess the causal effects of identity and institutions over agency and between them.

In contrast, the examination of Söderbaum’s work about the Southern African Development Community (SADC) allows observing certain causal effects of identity. According to Söderbaum (2004: 45), “actors engage in regionalism not only on the basis of material incentives and resources [...] but they are also motivated by ideas and identities” (emphasis added). Söderbaum (ibid.) asserts that regionalisation is an instrument to “create bonds of identity and community” (emphasis added), and thus he sees collective identity not only as a motivation for actors to engage in regionalism, but also as the product of regionalism/regionalisation.17 Although Söderbaum does not speak of relationships of causation, it will be further argued that motivations should be assessed as causes for action, and that the effects of generative structures – meaning that they create things and make action happen (Wendt 1987: 354) – such

17 In contrast to regionalism, which results from states’ willingness to construct a region, regionalisation corresponds to a more ‘spontaneous’ process of region-building that develops through agents’ interaction – trade relationships, cross-border migration and movement, shared use of natural resources and so forth (Söderbaum 2004: 7). In these terms, regionalisation does not involve the pursuit of regionalism, but regionalism necessarily seeks to foster processes of regionalisation.
as collective identity and regional institutions should be considered as causal. This does not imply considering regionalisation, or the pursuit of it through regionalism, the only ‘factor’ that can create bonds of identity (which accounts for collective identity formation). But since collective identity may be created through regionalism, then we can assess that the creation of regional institutions - entailed to the pursuit of regionalism - creates (causes) collective identity. The previous analysis accounts for a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions, for identity can motivate actors to pursue regionalism – and hence build regional institutions, and the pursuit of regionalism (and hence the building of regional institutions) can also create collective identity.

Although Söderbaum emphasises that it is imperative to observe the historical formation of the Southern African region in order to understand how identities have been created, he does not address the process of collective identity formation as such, nor does he explain systematically how identity influenced the creation of the SADC regionalist project (Söderbaum 2004: ch.4). His main conclusion regarding the role of identity in orienting actors’ behaviour is that interests change through interaction and socialisation, inasmuch as actors develop a sense of belonging to the region (ibid., 201-2, emphasis added). From Söderbaum’s conclusion it is possible to infer that collective identity, understood as the ‘sense of belonging’, has causal effects on agency inasmuch as the development of such an identity changes actors’ interests through interaction and socialisation.

Constitutive effects of collective identity can be observed as Söderbaum (2004: 45) agrees with Wendt (1992: 398) in that identities are at the basis of interests. ‘Being at the basis’ means that identity informs (constitutes) actors’ interests towards regional institution building (pursuing regionalism). But causal effects can also be observed inasmuch as [partly] due to the existence of a collective identity actors become interested in building regional institutions. Here we can observe that interests are the ideational factor through which identity may have causal power on the creation of regional institutions. In other words, it is not that identity generates regional institutions all by itself, but that identity, as a constitutive factor of interests, not only orients and informs actors’ interests towards regional institution building, but also makes actors’
become interested in building regional institutions. The causal effects are observed in the changes that collective identity produces on actors’ interests, as interests pass from being one thing to being another. In this sense, identity can be understood as having causal effects over regional institution-building.

Lastly, Söderbaum’s conceptualisation of ‘regime-boosting’ as a significant reason why political leaders support regionalist initiatives, also allows observing causal effects of collective identity. Accordingly, by engaging the ‘symbolic game’ of regionalism, these leaders can be perceived as promoters of the goals and values of regionalism and regional integration, which enables them to raise the profile and image of their often authoritarian regimes, which is what ‘regime-boosting’ consists of (Söderbaum 2004: 96, 98). The aim of regime-boosting can be explained because of the inherent ‘weakness’ of most post-colonial states in Southern Africa, which “are overly concerned with absolute sovereignty as well as the formal status and survival of their regimes, rather than the promotion of the ‘national interest’ in a broader sense and the achievement of national security” (ibid., 96-7). Hence, in the terms posed by Söderbaum, illegitimacy and ‘state weakness’ may work as sources of collective identity – or identification factors for Southern African political leaders, which leads them to promote regionalism mostly in its rhetorical dimension (ibid., 99).

From Söderbaum’s analysis we can infer that collective identity around state ‘weakness’ and scarce legitimacy plays a powerful constitutive and causal role over state interest formation towards regionalism. The constitutive role can be observed as long as SADC state leaders share their concerns about the need for regime-boosting, that is, as long as state weakness operates as an issue around which state leaders become aware of this common need and identify with each other. The causal role can be warranted if the aim of regime-boosting operates as a motivation for Southern African states’ leaders to pursue the SADC project. The second part of this chapter will argue that when ideas operate as reasons for action they play a causal role. Yet, Söderbaum does not make explicit claims about the causal powers of regime-boosting as a source of identity, not least because he does not treat regime-boosting as a source of collective identity as such.
Söderbaum’s assessment of the role of identity is somewhat confusing. Accordingly:

Identity is in itself ambiguous and multiple and does not explain action itself, the point is rather that it informs and transforms individuals (and their behaviour and their interests) as well as the quality of interaction” (Söderbaum 2004: 45, parenthesis original, emphasis added).

When saying that even though identity ‘informs’ and ‘transforms’ individuals’ interests it does not explain action itself, one remains confused, not least because on the previous page of his book (ibid., 44), Söderbaum makes explicit his engagement of constructivism, and asserts that “From this perspective [constructivism], agency is often motivated and explained by ideas, identity, accumulation of knowledge and learning [...]” (emphasis added). Furthermore, a core argument throughout his book is that identity transforms – changes actors’ interests, and thus we have, at least, that identity is part of the explanation. The reason for this sort of contradiction about the explanatory power of identity may be that perhaps Söderbaum assumes that explaining equates to finding relationships of causation in a Humean sense, that is, finding observable regularities or patterns of behaviour between causes and their effects (Wendt 1987).

Söderbaum agrees with constructivists in that identity is at the basis of interest formation, and thus identity plays a constitutive role in actors’ interests in regional institution building, as he tells us that identity informs individuals’ behaviour and their interests. ‘Informing’ denotes a constitutive relationship, as it means that identity partly defines the contents of actors’ interests. But Söderbaum also tells us that identity transforms individuals’ interests, and that it motivates actors’ engagement with regionalism. ‘Transforming’ means change, and the second part of the present chapter will argue that when change occurs, the factor that causes change should be considered a cause. It will be also argued that motivations should considered causes for action, and in these terms identity should be assessed as playing a causal role. Hence, from Söderbaum’s analysis it is possible to observe constitutive and causal effects of identity.

However, Söderbaum does not differentiate between relationships of constitution and causation, though he suggests that regionalisation (and regionalism) and identity may constitute and create each other, which gives an implicit idea of mutual constitution and causation. Söderbaum (2004: 45) claims that regionalisation processes can be seen as
instruments to create ‘bonds of identity and community’, and it will be argued that ‘creating’ also denotes causal effects, for the creating factor creates (causes) something that did not exist before (thus implying a change). This assessment of relationships of mutual constitution and causation between identity and institutions – and agency – is in line with constructivism’s ontological stances, as will be seen in the second part of this chapter. But the previous analysis has shown the importance of distinguishing (or at least attempting to distinguish) constitutive from causal effects in order to have clearer explanations on the way ideas orient action and the unfolding of regionalism, or in other words, on their role.

1.1.2 Emphasis on regional institutions

This section reviews the work of some constructivists who have addressed the process of European regional integration showing that EU institutions have socialisation and learning effects that lead to the formation of collective identity. It also examines the work of Amitav Acharya on the ASEAN regionalist project, which claims that state interests on regionalism were not constituted by the previous existence of a collective identity in South East Asia, but in turn further regional institution building led to the formation of a regional collective identity among ASEAN member states.

Some constructivist works have shown that, in the case of the EU, regional institutions trigger socialisation effects that lead to the creation and reinforcement of collective identity, particularly among national bureaucrats. Thomas Risse has focused part of his work on assessing how national and European identities mould each other and how identity changes with the progressive construction of the EU. His starting point has been the concept of ‘entitativity’, which suggests that:

[...] the more salient a social context becomes, the more people identify with the respective social group (or strongly reject it). This leads to the proposition that levels of identification with or conscious rejection of Europe should increase, the more important the EU becomes in peoples’ lives (Risse 2000: 4).\(^\text{18}\)

\(^\text{18}\) In this text Risse acknowledges that he takes the concept of ‘entitativity’ as introduced by Castano, but does not provide a reference of it. For a later version of Castano’s work on ‘entitativity’ see Castano (2004).
Risse points out that there is a ‘constructivist story’ about how the EU and its institutions shape collective identities. Such a story endogenises identities, interests and institutions, as over time institutions “become part and parcel of the social and power structure that form the social environment in which people act” (Risse 2004: 263). Accordingly:

Institutions tend to have constitutive effects on corporate actors such as national governments and interest groups, but also on individuals. Since people act in an environment structured by the institutions, the latter affect their interests, preferences and collective identities. We should then expect identities and institutions to coevolve, with the causal arrows between the two pointing in both directions (Risse 2004: 263, italics original, underlining added).

The previous passage shows that institutions have constitutive and causal effects over collective identity, and Risse also acknowledges that collective identity has causal effects on regional institutions. Yet, some confusion arises from Risse’s account. First, by ‘affecting’ we cannot be sure if Risse means that institutions actually change interests, preferences and collective identities, and in this sense we cannot know whether this ‘affecting’ can be assessed as a causal effect. Furthermore, assessing collective identity and regional institutions as two ideational structures that ‘coevolve’, does not give us a clear sense of which constitutes and/or causes which, or the terms in which they do so. For instance, if we are facing stagnation or great advance in a regionalist project, what can a ‘coevolving relationship’ tell us about the explanatory role of collective identity and regional institutions? This is a case where distinguishing constitutive from causal effects can improve our understanding of the role of ideas in the unfolding of regionalism. Nonetheless, it is possible to assess causal effects of regional institutions on collective identity in Risse’s account. He tells us that “support for European integration and attachment to Europe appear to be closely related, motivating European elites to continue on the path of institution building” (Risse 2004: 270, emphasis added). Causal effects can be assessed as membership to the EU, which entails acting within and thereby reproducing EU’s institutions, motivates (causes) actors to follow the pursuit of regionalism (institution building).

A passage of one Risse’s more recent works also raises certain confusion about the extent to which regional institutions can explain the unfolding of regionalism:
The EU as an emergent polity is expected not just to constrain the range of choices available to, say, nation states, but the way in which they define their interests and even their identities. EU ‘membership matters’ [...] in that it influences the very way in which actors see themselves and are seen by others as special beings (Risse 2009: 148, emphasis added).

The previous quote warrants the constitutive effects of institutions, as the EU institutional framework defines and influences actors’ interests and identities – the views they have on themselves and how they are seen by others. But the extent to which ‘defining’ and ‘influencing’ can account for causal effects of regional institutions is not clear. One could think, on the one hand, that ‘defining’ denotes causation inasmuch as ‘defining’ means giving something its final shape. But if it is a matter of ‘finishing the shape’ then we rather assign the causal power to the main factor that gives something its shape, and not to the one that ‘finishes its shaping’ or ‘defines’ it. The problem is that Risse does not specify in his account if EU institutions as a ‘defining’ factor are also the main or even the initial factor that shapes states’ interests and identities. Since the latter is a possibility then we can infer that ‘defining’ may have a causal connotation. The case with ‘influencing’ is similar. If a factor influences something it means that it takes part in its shaping. Yet, if such influence is too low, then causal effects of such ‘influencing’ factor are difficult to assess. In these terms, it would be easier to assign causal effects to a ‘defining’ factor than to an ‘influencing’ one. The second part of the present chapter will introduce an interpretive method based on analysing the transitive verbs agents use to refer to the role of ideas. It will be argued that there are transitive verbs that denote causation (change) in clearer terms than others, and distinction should be made between them in order to better understand the explanatory role of ideas.

One of Jeffrey T. Checkel’s works (2001) emphasises social learning, socialisation and social norms as the reasons why European states comply with regional norms. The main argument is that “norms matter in a constitutive, interest-shaping way not captured by rationalist arguments” (Checkel 2001: 553-4). Checkel points to persuasion as the prevailing mechanism through which compliance occurs. He suggests that the reason why states comply with regional norms is because norms constitute state interests. Checkel (ibid., 573) argues that the historical and institutional context, and the experience that bureaucrats have on the issue area at play in a particular moment, determine to a large extent how bureaucrats comply with regional norms.
In a similar vein, Risse (2004: 260) found that identification with and support for the EU and its institutions were highest among political and social elites than the larger public. He explains this difference as “Policy makers and government officials on all levels of governance spend a considerable amount of time dealing with the EU” as a result of which the EU has “a real psychological existence” for the European elites (ibid. 261). Likewise, Brigid Laffan (2004) asserts that EU institutions have a socialisation effect, as a 1996 Eurobarometer study showed that 94% of European top decision makers stated that their country’s membership was a ‘good’ thing, and 90% believed that their country had benefited from membership. Accordingly, “These figures were far higher than recorded among the wider population, and there was far less interstate variation than found in the attitudes of the mass public” (ibid., 76-7).

From the previous accounts, causal effects of norms and institutions over the creation of collective identity can be observed alongside constitutive ones. Considering Berger and Luckmann’s (1968: 96-7) argument about the need of roles for creating and developing institutions, and the identification that agents generate towards the roles they assume, it is possible to infer that institutional environments make bureaucrats identify with each other and with the purpose of their jobs and carry out the tasks that institutions impose upon them, including compliance with norms. Persuasion, in these terms, would be a result of identification effects, as institutions and norms create a ‘bureaucratic’ collective identity, which would correspond to a state identity in the sense that a state acts through the bureaucrats that represent it and act in its name (Finnemore 1996: 2; Wendt 1999: ch.5). Hence, Checkel’s explanation – as well as Risse’s and Laffan’s assessments – could be summarised as follows: norms that constitute state interests make agents identify with such norms, and this is why bureaucrats comply with regional norms. From these analyses and drawing upon Berger and Luckmann’s views, it is possible to infer that the constitutive role of norms on state interests can also be assessed as having a causal effect on collective identity, for it makes agents (state bureaucrats) identify with such norms. Hence, norms can be assessed as creating (causing) collective identity and explaining state action.
The work of Amitav Acharya (2009) about the unfolding of the ASEAN regionalist project is interesting as it assesses the creation of regional institutions as the product of member states’ common interests – mostly around security issues, and the emergence of a collective identity is seen as a product of the pursuit of regionalism (which, as has been argued, entails the creation of regional institutions). Despite acknowledging the existence of common interests around security issues (ibid., 58, 64) and of cultural issues that were present among founder member states before the creation of ASEAN (ibid., 55, 62, 78-9), Acharya does not enquire into the possible existence of distinct sources of collective identity among South East Asian states before the configuration of ASEAN in 1967. This might be due to Acharya’s interest in assessing the explanatory role of regional norms, which he states from the beginning of his work.

Acharya’s purpose is to examine identity formation in ASEAN through “looking at the claims made by ASEAN elites about regionally specific ways of problem solving and cooperation” (Acharya 2009: 7), by which he explicitly acknowledges that state identity is what state representatives – which he equates to ‘elites’ – claim it is. Acharya’s emphasis is clearly on norms as the main explanatory variable in his study, as he intends to “analyse systematically the role of ASEAN’s norms in the management of regional order and their effect on the development of collective interests and identities” (ibid., 9; emphasis added). Since the ASEAN regionalist project has not developed a broad or complex institutional framework of diverse decision-making institutions, Acharya focuses on the analysis of norms as the main regional institutions. Ontologically, norms are assessed to operate as constitutive factors of identities, but identity is also assessed as being created (caused) by norms. Accordingly:

Norms not only ‘regulate’ state behaviour [...] but also redefine state interests and constitute state identities, including the development of collective identities. By focusing on the constitutive effects of norms, constructivism has thus restored some of the original insights of integration theory regarding the impact of socialisation in creating collective interests and identities [...] norms play a crucial role in the socialisation process leading to peaceful conduct among states, which form the core of security communities (Acharya 2009: 4, quoting marks original, emphasis added).

As can be seen, Acharya uses diverse transitive verbs to refer to the role of regional norms that denote both constitutive and causal effects. We can be sure that norms constitute state
identities and collective identities because Acharya explicitly says so. Verbs like ‘redefining’ and ‘playing a crucial role’ do not give a clear sense of causation, but rather of constitution, for they do not have a clear connotation of ‘change’. In turn, causal effects can be observed through the regulative and the creating role of norms. In the next part of the chapter it will be argued that the regulative role of norms accounts for causal effects over agency, as agents might refrain from doing those things that regulative rules proscribe because they fear being punished (Onuf 1998; Wendt 1999: 83). ‘Creating’ also accounts for causal effects, for this verb implies that without the ‘creating factor’ the created thing would not have been created. Note that in Acharya’s account, what creates collective interests and identities are the socialisation effects generated by institutions (norms) over agents. This implies that institutions cause collective identity to emerge. If socialisation and identification effects generate motivations for agents to team up, this should account for causal effects, inasmuch as institutions motivate actors to team up.

Acharya (2009: 286) conceptualises ASEAN as a sort of ‘imagined community’ that emerged “despite low initial levels of interdependence and transactions, and the existence of substantial political and situational differences among its members”. He attributes to the role of norms the main explanation for the evolving of ASEAN as an ‘imagined community’:

Central to this process was a set of norms, among which non-interference, non-use of force, regional autonomy, the avoidance of collective defence and the practice of the ‘ASEAN Way’ were the most salient [...]. While some of these norms were adapted from universal legal-rational principles, others had their sources in what ASEAN’s founders claimed to be the unique socio-cultural practices of the region. Together they led to the emergence of what its members claimed to be a ‘cultural-specific’ and sociological approach to conflict management and decision making, called the ‘ASEAN Way’. This turned out to be a key symbol of ASEAN, helping the grouping to overcome intra-mural tensions especially during the crucial early years of ASEAN [...] (Acharya 2009: 286).

Following Acharya, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is the product of normative settings, and it is an approach to conflict management mainly made of norms, which constitutes a source of collective identity for ASEAN member states. But according to the previous quote, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is the collective identity of member states, as the norms that compose the ‘ASEAN Way’ are what regional collective identity is made of. In Acharya’s view, ASEAN states have even considered
that not fulfilling one of their norms would lead to a loss of ASEAN identity (Acharya 2009: 196). Moreover, earlier on in his book Acharya (ibid., 30) equates the notion of the ‘ASEAN Way’ to ASEAN’s collective identity, and adds that the ‘ASEAN Way’, which was developed through socialisation, “forms the basis of ASEAN’s collective action”. Thus, in Acharya’s terms, regional norms and collective identity seem to be the same thing, inasmuch as the source of the ASEAN identity is the regional norms that constitute the ‘ASEAN Way’.

The previous assessment has two significant implications for the analysis of the role of collective identity and institutions in the unfolding of the AC that will be carried out in subsequent chapters. First, as has been shown in the review of the work of some constructivists working on the EU, Acharya’s work shows that regional norms and institutions can operate as a powerful source of collective identity formation as long as member states identify with them. Second, Acharya’s assessment of the relationship between regional norms and collective identity in ASEAN shows the need of providing a better understanding of the effects of collective identity and regional institutions on one another. If collective identity consists precisely of the norms that identify ASEAN member states – the ‘ASEAN Way’ – then it becomes difficult to understand that norms created a collective identity that consists precisely of the sharing of such norms. Acharya’s assessment accounts for a very powerful causal role of norms, as the ‘we-feeling’ collective identity consists of is fundamentally based on (constituted by) the sharing of regional norms. This assessment shows relationships of constitution and causation between identity and norms, though not mutual, as Acharya opts to emphasise only the role of regional norms. In contrast, the present thesis will assess the role of both collective identity and regional institutions in the unfolding of the AC, and will pay special attention to assessing the relationships between them. This is one of the key features of the constructivist approach employed in the thesis, to which description we will now turn.

1.2 Theoretical issues, assumptions and method

The previously reviewed constructivist approaches to regionalism suggest diverse effects of collective identity and regional institutions on agency and between one another. It was argued that all of them acknowledge the constitutive role of these ideational structures, but not all of
them clearly address their causal effects. This part of the chapter argues that combining constitutive and causal theorising provides a better understanding of the explanatory role of ideas. After addressing a number of theoretical aspects that characterise constructivism as an approach to the study of social life, and discussing a number of assumptions needed to define the theoretical framework employed in the thesis, a particular interpretive method for observing and distinguishing constitutive and causal effects of ideas will be proposed. To conclude the description of the theoretical framework employed in the thesis, the last sections of this part of the chapter offer a constructivist framework for the analysis of collective identity and regional institutions.

According to some scholars there are different types of constructivism where ontological premises are usually shared, but there are significant epistemological differences that make such types distinct from each other. In the ontological arena constructivism considers agents and structures as socially constructed, which means that the identities and interests of agents and the social structures that allow and constrain their agency are constructed through social interaction (Ruggie 1998: 879; Wendt 1999: 1; Klotz and Lynch 2007: 65). Constructivism considers that agents are ‘reflexive actors’ capable of defining who they are and what they want in every process of social interaction they face (Söderbaum 2004: 42-5). Yet, precisely because they are social agents, agents cannot choose their identities or their interests. Their identities are ‘intersubjective’, which means that they are to a significant extent defined by the impressions that other agents have of them, and their interests are informed by institutional structures where knowledge and cultural issues are organised as systems of meaning that allow agents’ actions to be understood by others (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 266; Onuf 1998). Agents’ reflexivity offers the possibility to ‘intervene’ and modify their identities and interests, but constructivism holds that the margin for such intervention is relatively small, as agents’ thoughts can never be autonomous or independent of the social structures of knowledge which allow them to become agents in the first place. For constructivism, agents are in a permanent

---

process of social construction, where their identities and interests are constantly subject to change through social interaction (Risse 2009: 145-6).

Constructivism considers that agents’ interests are ideas that emerge through social interaction, and not predefined mandates that exist before it. Interests are informed by identities and by the institutional structures that allow agents to carry their interests forward. These institutional structures are often called ‘rules’ (Onuf 1989, 2012), but they also include complex structures such as norms – understood as formal sets of rules, as for instance in the form of law – and institutional organisations. Institutions offer agents options for action, and agents must choose what rules to follow in order to achieve their aims, which are usually defined as well by institutional environments (Ruggie 1998: 879; Checkel 1998: 325-6). Constructivism engages a dynamic approach to the relationship between agents and structures where agents’ identities and interests are co-constituted with institutional structures that inform and constrain the construction of agency but at the same time are generated and modified by it (Wendt 1987; Söderbaum 2004: 43; Onuf 2012: 29). It is precisely in the relationship between agents and structures that two versions of constructivism can be distinguished according to different epistemological views.

These two versions of constructivism can be distinguished as ‘soft’ and ‘radical’.20 The ‘soft’ version of constructivism is more committed to an idea of ‘social science’ where it is possible to provide causal explanations based on the role of ideas.21 This type of constructivism proposes to combine constitutive and causal theorising where ideas are assessed as constitutive factors of agents and structures but also as causal factors that make agency occur in the ways it does

20 The term ‘soft’ is taken from Onuf (2012: chapter 2), who contrasts a ‘strong’ type of constructivism (namely his) with a ‘soft’ one of other authors like Wendt, Finnemore, Checkel, and Katzenstein among others. The term ‘radical’ is taken from Onuf’s (2012: 44) quotation of the work of Drulák, who emphasises the ‘radical change’ that the emphasis on language issues implies for constructivist analysis (Drulák 2004: 6-13). Walter and Helmg (2005: 1) also refer to ‘radical constructivism’ as the one taking the epistemological stance of focusing on the key role of language in constructing social reality. See also Onuf (1989: 78-94; 2012: 29, 43) and Drulák (2004: 4, 2006: 501-3).

21 This is the type of constructivism that Price and Reus-Smit (1998), Hopf (1998) and Ruggie (1998) labelled, respectively as ‘modern’, ‘conventional’ and ‘neo-classical’/‘naturalistic’, and it is also the one that Checkel (1998) focused his review on. In my view, Ruggie’s ‘neoclassical’ type of constructivism, which he claims to follow, can be included within the other authors’ ‘modern’ and ‘conventional’ types, for Ruggie himself acknowledges that it does have an aim of ‘explaining’ and a commitment to an idea of doing ‘science’. I find the term ‘soft’ as a more suitable adjective for this version of constructivism as it helps underscore the ‘radical’ change that the emphasis on language makes for the more ‘radical’ version of it.
This ‘soft’ version of constructivism usually engages – although seldom explicitly – ‘scientific’ or ‘critical’ realism as the philosophy of science that provides epistemological grounds for providing explanations. In contrast to empiricism, which engages the Humean model of causation, critical realism conceives causal explanation as identifying the underlying causal mechanisms that make an event happen, without the need to find regular patterns of behaviour between events (Wendt 1987: 353-4). Critical realism claims that it is possible to analyse the effects of unobservable generative structures that make social life what it is. Even though the existence of these structures – like capitalism, religious faith or political ideology – is not possible to verify empirically (by sensorial experience), it is warranted by the observation of the effects they have on agents and on other social structures (Wendt 1987; 1999: 51, 62-3).

When referring to the natural sciences critical (scientific) realism holds that even unobservable structures – like, for instance, quarks - exist independently of human ideas about them. However, when applied to the social realm, critical realism acknowledges that social structures, and particularly ideational ones like identity and institutions, do depend on agents having ideas and beliefs about them, but are not reduced to what agents think of them (Wendt 1987: 359). Like constructivists, critical realists consider ideational structures to be the product of social interaction, and thus cannot be easily transformed by agents’ ideas and beliefs. On the contrary, such structures inform, constrain and make possible agents’ thinking, and therefore have a constitutive and causal role on agency to a certain extent independent of agents’ minds.

22 Nevertheless, it is not that every constructivist ‘classified’ under the ‘soft’ version of constructivism makes explicit the aim of combining constitutive and causal theorising. It must be understood that speaking of ‘soft’ and ‘radical’ versions of constructivism is just an exercise of classification and differentiation, not a matter of constructivist scholars consciously engaging one or the other as if they were excluding ‘commandments’.

23 Critical realism has been developed in the IR discipline by a number of scholars who share certain ontological tenets with constructivism, like Wight (1999, 2006), Patomäki (2002), Kurki (2008) and Joseph and Wight (2010). Wendt (1987; 1999, especially chapter 2) was the first constructivist scholar who explicitly engaged critical realism (which he referred as scientific realism) to pursue constructivist theorising.

24 This model defines a causal relation as a ‘constant conjunction’ of temporally sequenced observed events that stands in a relation of logical necessity to certain initial conditions and laws (Wendt 1987: 353).

25 Although very few constructivists explicitly engage critical realism as the philosophy of science informing their works, what is meant here is that constructivism’s tenet of social structures being the product of social interaction can find a philosophical basis in critical realism.
This view on the relationships between agency and structure is closely related to the so-called ‘structuration theory’, which holds that agents and structures are mutually constituted and caused, in the sense that social structures are the product of agents’ interaction but at the same time define who agents are and to great extent what are their possibilities for action (Wendt 1987: 355-61). Structuration theory finds a solid philosophical basis in critical realism, and several critical realists are considered to engage more or less explicitly a ‘structurationist’ perspective in their works.26 ‘Soft’ constructivism engaging critical realism – and structuration theory – assumes that it is possible to assess constitutive and causal effects of ideas on agency that to certain extent operate independently of what agents think of the social structures that constrain and make their action possible.

In contrast, a more ‘radical’ version of constructivism rejects the assumption of independent existence of social reality from agents’ minds at any rate, and takes scientific knowledge as one discourse among many others that allow agents to provide explanations about their reality (Yanow 2000; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), but such discourse cannot be assessed as more valid or more real than other sort of agents’ views that do not engage any ‘scientific’ programme.27 This type of constructivism is more interested in describing how social reality is constituted by ideas, how agents come to share certain ideas and not others and how these ideas constitute their identities and interests (Hopf 1998: 184). For these constructivists, describing is the way of ‘explaining’, without needing to provide causal explanations, not least because many of them believe that causal analysis in social life is not possible (as pointed out by Yee 1996: 100; and Ruggie 1998: 881). These constructivists pay much more attention to language as the main tool through which agents constitute social reality and are more

26 Structuration theory is usually considered as having been developed in the works of Giddens (1979; 1984), but Wendt also includes as major contributions the works of Bourdieu (1977), Bhaskar (1979) and Layder (1981). Wendt (1987: 357) argues that critical (scientific) realists such as Roy Bhaskar and Andrew Sayer engage a structurationist perspective. However, he acknowledges that structuration theorists’ engagement of critical realism is less explicitly found (with the exception of Giddens).

27 Price and Reus-Smit (1998) and Ruggie (1998) labelled this other type of constructivism as ‘postmodern’, while Hopf (1998) named it ‘critical’. However, these authors included in their reviews a number of postmodern and poststructuralist scholars who have rejected their inclusion under the constructivist label (as pointed out by Zehfuss 2002: 8). The description provided here of the ‘radical’ version of constructivism does not refer to any postmodern or poststructuralist works so far.
interested in assessing the effects of language and discourse on agency than in finding causal explanations for language and agency as such.\footnote{Onuf (2012: 33–6) explicitly includes himself within this version of constructivism, and points out his emphasis on the analysis of rules as one key exercise that the ‘soft’ version of constructivism does not engage (granted, by the way, that Onuf (ibid., 29) conceives language as a ‘system of rules’). However, Onuf (ibid.) has made explicit his “belief in the possibility of meaningful knowledge of the world we live in”, conceiving such knowledge “as if it were independent of the language we use to represent the world, but only provisionally so”, only for analytical purposes [emphasis original].}

The present thesis does not take sides for a ‘soft’ or a more ‘radical’ version of constructivism, but takes elements from both types for carrying forward the analysis of the AC. Because theory and method must be at the service of the object of analysis and not the other way around (Wendt 1998), the thesis intends to ‘bridge’ apparent contradictory epistemological perspectives, not for the purpose of reconciling them or of inventing a broader or a more encompassing one, but for the purpose of providing better explanations of the unfolding of regionalism in the AC. The thesis is focused on assessing how much constructivism can explain about the unfolding of the AC through the analysis of collective identity and regional institutions. From the ‘soft’ version of constructivism the thesis takes the assessment of constitutive and causal effects of ideas as a useful way to provide explanations. From the more ‘radical’ version of constructivism the thesis takes the emphasis on the ways in which agents’ speak of the ideas that inform their thinking, not only to assess their importance in orienting agency but also to know the content of ideas as such, in an effort to assess the terms in which agents’ discourse constitutes ideas about collective identity and regional institutions and, further, their ‘social reality’. This position is coherent with the constructivist tenet of co-constitution (or mutual constitution) between agents and structures and between structures themselves, as the assessment of the relationships of constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions will show.

The following sections introduce a number of theoretical and methodological issues that define the constructivist approach used to analyse the role of collective identity and regional institutions in the three case studies of the AC. The first section will introduce the combination of constitutive and causal analysis as a useful way to provide explanations based on the role of
ideas. The second section will provide a justification to assess the causal role of ideas when they are posed by agents as reasons for action. The third section will address the assumption of the existence of ‘state thinking’ and will offer a justification for interviewing state officials and regional bureaucrats as an effective way to know the ideas that inform it. The fourth section will outline a particular interpretive method for interpreting agents’ discourse about the ideas that inform their thinking, consisting of focusing on transitive verbs denoting causation (Bhaskar 1978) and on metaphors (Onuf 2012; Drulák 2004, 2006; Walter and Helmig 2005) in order to distinguish constitutive from causal effects of ideas. The fifth section will offer an example of how the proposed interpretive method can be operationalised, in order to give an idea of how it will be applied to the analysis of the three case studies of the AC. Finally, the last two sections will outline a theoretical framework for the analysis of collective identity and regional institutions from a constructivist standpoint.

1.2.1 Combining constitutive and causal analysis

A characteristic feature of the ‘soft’ version of constructivism is its aim to combine – and distinguish – what Wendt (1998; 1999: 77-89) calls ‘constitutive’ and ‘causal’ theorising. Wendt (1998: 104, 111) tells us that the distinction is that constitutive relationships make things to be what they are, while causal relationships make changes occur from one state of things to another. According to Wendt (ibid., 104-8), constitutive and causal theorising are not incompatible because they just ask different questions, and therefore both are needed in order to provide more encompassing explanations. Causal theorising asks questions of the type ‘why’ and ‘how’, while constitutive theorising asks questions of the type ‘what is’ and ‘how possible’ (Wendt 1999: 83-6). Wendt tells us that the aim of constitutive theories is “to account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist” (Wendt 1998: 104). In his view, constitutive analysis counts for an explanation, even if it is different from a causal one. Wendt (ibid.) holds that scholars who engage critical (scientific) realism consider causal explanations those that describe the mechanisms or process by which something is
generated, instead of looking for positivist Humean-like causal explanations that intend to find regularity patterns between events and their causes.\footnote{Humean-like explanations are the ones that focus on causal inferences that engage the so-called ‘Humean conception of causation’. To complement the definition of the Humean model of causation provided in footnote 24 above, this conception affirms that four conditions must be satisfied if we are to be sure that A caused B on some occasion, namely: A preceded B; there was no intermediate event; events like A are always followed by events like B in those conditions; and we are in the habit of expecting the sequence (Hollis and Smith 1990: 49). Following Kurki (2008: 6), Humean causal analysis subscribes to an empiricist position where causal relations are regular relations of patterns of observables, and causes refer exclusively to ‘moving causes’ that ‘push and pull’ (emphasis original).}

Critical realism, and thus the ‘soft’ version of constructivism that engages it, is interested in assessing the causal effects of social structures (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 206, 212-3), besides their constitutive ones (Wendt 1998, 1999). Constitutive effects are those that make something to be what it is, something that makes part of something else. Causal effects are those that imply a change in the state of things, a transformation, and this includes creating something that did not exist before. In this sense, generative structures are considered to have causal effects in those cases where they create (generate) things that did not exist before, or that generate changes in the state of things (Wendt 1987: 346, 354, 357). In these terms, ‘creating’ equates causing and accounts for causal effects, besides constitutive ones. Referring to the role of ideas, this thesis understands that when both constitutive and causal effects of ideational structures over agency and between them can be observed, the explanatory role of ideas is greater, or in other words, ideas become more important. This position does not mean that when ideas only have constitutive effects they do not matter, since, as has been argued, constitutive theorising also accounts as an explanation.\footnote{For instance, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 52) speak of ‘constitutive causality’, which is referred to how humans conceive of their worlds and the language they use to describe them, by which describing is a form of explaining.} But when ideas are assessed as motivating action, creating interests or transforming agency and structures, their importance as explanatory factors is increased.

Wendt argues for combining constitutive and causal theorising, and asserts that both kinds of theorising are mutually implicating rather than mutually exclusive (Wendt 1998: 103). However, Wendt (ibid.) warns about the confusion that often appears between constitutive and causal theorising, as constructivists often speak of relationships of mutual constitution when they
involve causal effects. In this regard, Finnemore (1996: 16) considers constructivism to be “the most amorphous and least defined of the perspectives emphasizing the causal nature of social structures”, and points out the difficulties that constructivists show in making clear how social structures relate to one another either conceptually or substantively, and in specifying whether the elements that compose these social structures “can exist independently or whether they must appear as a part of a mutually reinforcing collection of norms, institutions and discourse” (ibid.) Klotz and Lynch (2007: 15), who assert that “The main dividing line among constructivists is the putative distinction between constitutive and causal claims”, also point out this frequent confusion “because the language of ‘causality’ is quite fluid”. Yet, they defend the claim for combining the two, for “Those who say they explain behavior also interpret meaning, and those who focus on understanding language also explain action to some degree” (ibid.).

The present thesis engages the challenge of assessing constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions on state action, and this is what is understood by ‘assessing their [explanatory] role’. Although Wendt – and also Klotz and Lynch - argues for the combination of constitutive and causal theorising, he does not provide a particular method for assessing and distinguishing the constitutive and causal effects of ideas. Indeed, as Klotz and Lynch (2007: 4) point out, constructivism holds no particular method of analysis. Before describing the method that will be used in order to assess – and distinguish – constitutive and causal effects of the ideas that compose collective identity and regional institutions (including norms), two assumptions need to be made: the first is to accept that ideas have causal effects when they are posed by agents as reasons for action. The second is to assume that state agency is informed by ideas, since states are taken as purposeful agents capable of making decisions and carrying forward actions to meet aims.

1.2.2 Reasons as causes

For Wendt, ideas play a constitutive role as long as they inform actors’ interests and grant meaning to material factors, but they also play a causal role inasmuch as they motivate action (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 207; Wendt 1998: 107). In these terms, Wendt aligns his arguments to the philosophical position that asserts that reasons are causes (Davidson 1963). In order to
show the causal role of reasons Davidson uses the case of an individual who turned on the light of his living room. He tells us that the cause for such action was the individual’s wish to warn a suspicious person prowling the outside of his house, that someone else was in the house in order to deter his intentions to rob it. Davidson claims that the cause why the individual turned on the lights is not that someone was prowling his house, but rather that he thought that someone could be a thief and thus he wanted to alert him. The individual’s suspicion and his will of preventing a burglary was the reason why he turned on the lights. This reason might not have been the only cause that explains his action, but Davidson claims that if such reason had been absent, the individual would not have turned on the lights (Davidson 1963: 691, 695).

Contrary to Davidson’s position, there is another philosophical tradition attached to Wittgenstein’s position about rejecting reasons as causes (Rubinstein 1977; Kurki 2008: 73-4; Porpora 2010: 89). According to Smith (2000: 159) “For Wittgenstein, to ask for a reason for action is to try and find the rule that led to the action, whereas to ask for a cause is to trace the mechanism, or find a statistical regularity, or a historical origin”. Hence, a ‘Wittgensteinian’ explanation of Davidson’s case might say that the individual was just following a rule that says ‘if I turn on the lights the person outside my house will know someone is in the house and will think it twice before deciding to enter my house to rob it’; and surely another rule that says ‘if you see someone prowling your house, you should alert him because he might be a thief’, and so forth among other rules.

Yet, in assessing the causal power of reasons and motives, constructivists – and social theorists in general – have no need to adopt a position pro or contra the ‘Wittgensteinian’ view of reasons as cases of rule-following. For in social life, cases where there is only one rule to follow

---

31 Note that, in these terms, Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘cause’ would be in line with the Humean vision of causes as ‘moving causes’ or ‘mechanisms’ that ‘push and pull’ (see footnote 29), which is not to suggest that Wittgenstein engaged the Humean conception of causation in its totality. Indeed, Wendt (1987) argues that critical realists are interested in establishing the ‘causal mechanisms’ that make an event happen, and this does not mean that they engage the Humean conception of causation, which they dearly criticise. In other words, what characterises the Humean conception of causation is not as much its conception of causes as mechanisms that ‘push and pull’ as its conception of causal relationships as conjunctions of events that hold regular patterns between them (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 200; Kurki 2008), and of causes as empirically observable mechanisms (Wendt 1987).

32 For a full ‘Wittgensteinian’ critique of Davidson’s conceptualisation of reasons as causes see Rubinstein (1977).
are rare. Most of the times, agents have a wide range of diverse rules and they must often choose what rules to follow. In their exercise of choosing, agents give to themselves, and often to other agents, reasons that justify their choices, particularly in moral and ethical terms. For instance, when dealing with a conflict with someone else, an individual usually has the option of being more or less understanding and more or less aggressive. Some rules may recommend aggression and revenge, whilst some others may suggest tolerance and peaceful conduct. The individual may choose to follow some rules and not others, and finally what counts for the researcher intending to explain the individual’s conduct is not only the set of rules that might have informed the individual’s behaviour, but also, and crucially, the reasons provided by the individual to justify his/her behaviour (Davidson 1963: 691-2), even if such reasons are also considered as other rules.

Agents choosing what rules to follow might be also a case of rule-following, but this does not rule out agents’ reasoning. By granting causal power to reasons one does not need to deny the constraining, constitutive and causal power of rules. As Wendt (1999: 83) points out, “Norms are causal insofar as they regulate behavior. Reasons are causes to the extent that they provide motivation and energy for action”. This view is shared by Patomäki (2002: 8, 41, and ch.4), who argues that by positing reasons as causes we are able to assess and acknowledge the meaningfulness of human activity.33 Referring to the insufficiency of addressing only the result or final outcome of action, Kratochwil (1981: 27, emphasis original) asserts that “motives and reasons do matter; they must be part of the explanation [...]”. Kratochwil does not tell us how exactly motives and reasons matter, but if the philosophical position warranting that reasons can be causes is accepted, it can be seen that constructivism has here a basis on which ideas, both in the form of rules and reasons, can be assessed as causes of action. As ideational settings, rules and norms – the latter understood as formal sets of rules – also have causal power as long as they tell actors what to do, and sometimes rules and norms can warn actors

33 Wight (1999, 2006) and Kurki (2008) are other scholars who are keen on certain types of constructivist analysis and who acknowledge the causal power of ideas when they are posed as reasons for action. Bhaskar (1978: 215), one of the main exponents of scientific or critical realism (which he calls ‘transcendental realism’), conceives human beings as intentional agents that cause things to happen. Intentions are crucial for human agents’ causal power, and the philosophical position that considers reasons as causes poses reasons as key components of human intentions.
about the consequences of not following them. There can be the case that an actor poses a rule/norm as a reason for action: ‘I did this because the rule/norm told me so’, and in this case the causal role of the rule/norm can be clearly assessed, not only as it constrained the actor to behave the way she did but also as it was posed by the actor as a reason for action.

‘Posing ideas as reasons’ is eminently a discursive action, that is, it is only in their discourse (and this includes agents ‘talking to themselves’) that agents can ‘pose’ the ideas that motivated their behaviour, at least the ones they are conscious of. Therefore, it is only through observing agents’ discourse that we can know when agents pose ideas as reasons. This is why analysing the terms in which agents speak of the ideas that inform their thinking is crucial for understanding agency.

1.2.3 Knowing the ideas that inform state action

Wendt (1998: 103) argues that if we are interested in studying social life, we have to engage in an “interpretive recovery of actors’ private and shared beliefs”. Constructivism engages to a significant extent the programme of ‘Understanding’, which in the terms Hollis and Smith define it, aims to reproduce the order in the minds of actors; this programme contrasts with the one of ‘Explaining’ which aims to find causes in a scientific manner (Hollis and Smith 1990: 87). According to Hollis and Smith (ibid., 2), advocates of Understanding take actors’ views as a starting point, and even often as the only starting point. However, even though constructivism invites us to enquire about the ideas that inform agents’ thinking, it does not offer a particular method for assessing their existence (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 4-5). Although constructivism does not compel the researcher to take actors’ views as the starting point, this thesis takes AC member states’ views as a key point in order to assess the importance of collective identity and regional institutions in orienting their action, not least because official

---

34 It is clear that agents may have – and more often than not, ‘unconscious’ motivations for acting the way they do (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 207). Yet, exploring the ‘unconscious’ cannot be the social researcher’s task, unless her analysis also aims to meet psychological purposes (Wendt 1999: 196).

35 To a great extent, Wendt’s argument about the need to combine constitutive and causal theorising aims to respond to Hollis and Smith’s (1990: 7) position that Explaining and Understanding are not possible to combine (see Wendt 1998: 104). Nonetheless, referring to Weber’s work Hollis and Smith (1990: 78) speak of ‘explanatory understanding’, which is “a matter of assigning the action to the right ‘complex of meanings’”. This suggests that understanding is indeed another form of explanation, just as Wendt (1998, 1999) and Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012) argue.
documents and declarations relating to the importance of collective identity and regional institutions in the AC are rather scarce.

If we take regionalism as a state-led project there is not much point in discussing whether states are agents or not, since if they ‘lead’ regionalist projects this is because they are actors capable of pursuing these projects. Indeed, state agency is something usually assumed by constructivists without much problematisation. Wendt (1987: 359) refers to states as agents inasmuch as they can be considered goal-directed units of action. However, how can the ideas that inform state action be accessed? The present thesis argues that a useful way is asking state officials who act in the name of states and through whom states ‘act’ – indeed, state officials are the ‘main performers’ of state action (Finnemore 1996: 2; Wendt 1999: 216, 221, 281; Wight 1999: 127-8; Koivisto 2010: 80; Onuf 2012: 25).

In the case of the AC – and of any regionalist project having regional institutional organisations, asking regional bureaucrats about the ideas that inform state action is also useful, as their views can be contrasted with those of state officials and complement the analysis of the ideas informing state action. Moreover, if we want to know how much ideas matter in orienting agency, asking agents about their importance is a useful form of carrying out this assessment (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 50-1, 90). Hence, fieldwork was carried out in the cities of Bogota, Quito and Lima, where a total of 32 interviews were conducted with 19 national and 13 regional bureaucrats. The criteria to choose the national officials to be interviewed was that they had some degree of responsibility in the decision-making processes corresponding to each case study, and the same was applied to interviewed AGS bureaucrats, who were also in charge of supporting the unfolding of all these negotiations. Hence, interviewees were not asked

36 Wendt (1999: ch.5) has developed a broad conceptualisation of states as ‘corporate agents’.

37 The full list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1. Only national officials from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were interviewed, for two reasons: First, Venezuela left the AC in 2006, and their current government maintains a distant position towards the regional scheme; these two facts would have made it difficult to carry out the same interviews done with current AC members’ national officials. The Bolivian government has also shown certain distance towards the AC in the last years. Second, including officials from a larger range of countries was impossible due to constraints of space. Since it is not an aim of the thesis to explain each AC member’s behaviour towards the AC, but to assess the role of collective identity and institutions in explaining state action towards the unfolding of this regionalist project, addressing national officials’ views of three out of four member states is sufficient.
questions about all three case studies, but only about the case study in whose decision-making processes they took part.38

Interviewees’ answers about the role of collective identity and regional institutions – and about state views on the unfolding of Andean regionalism in general – in the three case studies of the AC have been taken as the main object of analysis,39 but this is complemented by an examination of official documents, press reports and some academic works related to the case studies, following the need to contrast agents’ views with other sources for the sake of trustworthiness in interpretive analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: ch.5). Yet, it must be noted that academic literature about the three case studies of the AC is limited, and this further supports the value of taking agents’ views as the main object of analysis. Moreover, no previous study of the AC has involved interviewing state officials and regional bureaucrats about the ideas that inform their actions towards the unfolding of Andean regionalism, and thus the exercise carried out in the present thesis represents a significant contribution to understanding state action in the AC.

As can be expected with the analysis of a person’s thinking, and as something intrinsic to interpretive analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), this thesis shows that ideas informing state action are not homogenous, neither is their importance easy to assess by analysing what actors say. Doing so implies facing contradictions among interviewees’ views, and even within single interviewees’ views themselves. State action is also socially constructed, not only through interaction with other states, but also because as corporate agents, states are also the product of what their representatives ‘think and do’ in their names (Wendt 1999: 216). As a result, the assessment of the role of ideas that inform state action can only be the product of an interpretive exercise that allows dealing with contradictions, confusions and, in general, with different perceptions about the content and importance of ideas (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 46).

38 As will be seen, during the interview some interviewees nevertheless made comments about one or both of the other two case studies, and thus there are some cases where interviewees’ views are considered in more than one case study.
39 Note that this is the same position taken by Acharya (2009: 7) to examine identity formation in ASEAN.
By adopting an interpretive methodology, this thesis assumes that the terms in which ideas of collective identity and regional institutions can explain state action towards the unfolding of regionalism are not ‘data’ located at some ‘external place’ waiting to be ‘discovered’, but rather are constructed through agents’ (interviewees) interpretations of their worlds (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 90). Hence, and following a main tenet of interpretive analysis, data are co-generated between the researcher and interviewees through interviews, through the researcher’s revision of other texts, like official documents, press reports and academic works (ibid., 79-80), and through the researcher’s reflexivity of his own research design, fieldwork experience and analysis of co-generated data. This is what Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (ibid., 80) call ‘sense-making’ in interpretive research, which consists of understanding things and events from the perspective of everyday actors.

The extent to which ideas explain agency is thus assessed in the present thesis according to interviewees’ views on the role of collective identity and regional institutions, assuming that such views are agents’ interpretations of their realities. As a result, contradictory views are not taken as opening room for possible ‘lying’ or ‘lack of knowledge’, but as ‘multiple truths’ that make state action and the unfolding of Andean regionalism be what they are, that is, a social construction (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 82). An interpretive exercise is thereby crucial for understanding agency, social action and, as for the topic that concerns the present research, regionalism. The following section proposes a method to carry out this interpretive exercise, which will contribute to assessing the role of collective identity and regional institutions in orienting state action in the three case studies of the AC addressed in the thesis.

1.2.4 Interpreting interviewees’ discourse about ideas: analysing transitive verbs and metaphors

All interviews conducted with national officials and regional bureaucrats were semi-structured, using a standard format (see Appendix 2) that on many occasions was modified by asking interviewees more or fewer questions, and also different ones, as the conversation progressed. In each case study interviewees were firstly asked questions about the unfolding of negotiations, and then the second and third sections of the interviews posed questions directly
related to the role of collective identity and regional institutions. This means that interviewees could not avoid thinking or talking about the role of identity and institutions. However, questions about the role of collective identity and regional institutions were only posed in the respective sections of the interview, and they were not made every time the interviewee was narrating or responding to something else. This was done in order not to bias interviewees’ responses. Interviewees were not told what was meant or understood by ‘collective’ or ‘Andean’ identity and ‘regional institutions’ or ‘regional norms’. Interviewees were only asked about the content and role of these ideational structures, with the intention that they could freely react to such concepts and questions and speak about their content and importance in the terms they wished so.

As expected in interpretive analysis, and also because of the ‘freedom’ given to interviewees to refer to the content and importance of ideas in orienting state action, their answers often differed and contradictions were found among them and sometimes even within their own views. Hence, a concrete method is needed for assessing the importance of ideas based on what interviewees say about it. Furthermore, a method is also needed to differentiate constitutive and causal effects of ideas as the way to assess their role in orienting action. In order to meet both aims, this thesis proposes an interpretive method based on the identification of transitive verbs denoting causation – in order to distinguish constitutive from causal effects – and analysing the metaphors, and also expressions that have a metaphorical connotation, that interviewees use to refer to the role of collective identity and regional institutions in order to assess their importance.

Analysing verbs and metaphors is a methodological option based on the ontological and epistemological view that language makes the world we live in, a view shared by critical realists, who acknowledge that human action is ‘linguistically constituted’ (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 210). As Onuf (2012: 28-9) points out, language not only serves to represent the world, but it also plays a constitutive function: “By speaking, we make the world what it is”; indeed, he sees language as the ‘media’ of social construction (ibid., 29). This view is shared by Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 43), who consider language as one of the means of ‘worldmaking’, for it
shapes and constitutes understandings of the world. On his part, Drulák (2006: 501) asserts that language use tells us a lot about social structures and institutions, and that discursive structures “provide insights into the politics embedded in them”. Hence, analysing the terms in which agents refer to the role of ideas orienting their action not only contributes to assessing the importance of ideas, but also allows observing the politics involved in their social interaction (Walter and Helmig 2005: 4). Even Wendt, who as a ‘soft constructivist’ has been criticised for not paying much attention to the significance of language in the making of social life (Zehfuss 2002: 34, 48-9; Guzzini and Leander 2006: 86; Onuf 2012: 31), acknowledges that “social structures have an inherently discursive dimension, in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions” (Wendt 1987: 359, emphasis original).

The idea of focusing on the verbs that interviewees use to refer to the role of ideas is taken from Bhaskar (1978: 121-3), who emphasises the need to use transitive verbs that denote ‘mechanisms’ by which the state of things changes. For Bhaskar (ibid., 123), ‘causal notions’ are necessary to understand how the world works. Examples of transitive verbs denoting causation are verbs like ‘making’, ‘turning’, ‘affecting’, ‘enabling’, and so forth. The method proposed in the present thesis for distinguishing constitutive from causal effects consists of focusing on the verbs that interviewees use to refer to the role of ideas and distinguish those that imply changes in the state of things from those that acknowledge the existence and importance of ideas but without giving a sense that those ideas implied change or transformation. Furthermore, as argued above, when ideas are posed as reasons for action they are assessed as having causal effects, and the analysis of the three case studies of the AC will

---

40 Note that, as was above observed with the ‘Wittgensteinian’ view of causes (see footnote 31), Bhaskar also shares the ‘mechanistic’ view of causes that is entailed by the Humean conception of causation (see footnote 29), but also by the critical realist view (Wendt 1987), of which Bhaskar is a main precursor. Like in the former case, this does not imply that Bhaskar engages the Humean conception of causation—indeed, he provides an extensive critique of it (Bhaskar 1978: 33-5; 64-6). The point to highlight is the fact that philosophers as distinct as Wittgenstein and Bhaskar share the view of causes as ‘mechanisms’, though their views of causation are quite different and broader than the Humean conception. This means that accepting the ‘mechanistic’ dimension of causes is sound as long as philosophers standing in quite different philosophical stances (Wittgenstein on his own interpretive/linguistic approach, and Bhaskar on scientific, or as he calls it, ‘transcendental’ realism) acknowledge it.

show that when ideas of collective identity and regional institutions were posed as reasons for action usually interviewees used transitive verbs denoting causation to refer to their role.

The idea of analysing metaphors used by interviewees to refer to the importance of ideas is taken from Onuf (2012: ch.3), Drulák (2004) and Walter and Helmig (2005), who emphasise the constant use of metaphors that agents make to give meaning to their actions and the world(s) they live in. Onuf (2012: 40) takes Aristotle’s definition of metaphors as acts that consist of “giving the thing [any thing] a name that belongs to something else” (brackets original). Drulák (2004: 2) defines metaphors as “figures of speech which present one thing as another thing”. According to Walter and Helmig (2005: 8), metaphors are accredited with the reduction of complexity, elucidating knowledge from abstract and unknown instances by referring to known fields of experience. They also define metaphors as ‘condensed analogies’ and ‘linguistic vehicles’, agents of relation, reduction and transformation, and overall, (re)construction (ibid., 8-9). Onuf (2012: 43) argues that metaphors ‘make’ the world, and thus they are not just a tool used by actors to understand who they are and what they do, but also to define what they, their action(s) and their world(s) are about. For Walter and Helmig (2005: 2), metaphors have a “‘massive influence’” in the construction of reality.

Drulák (2004: 4) holds that what tends to be perceived as common sense in international politics depends to a great extent on metaphorical constructions. Indeed, considering states as actors who have ‘reasons’ and ‘motivations’ for acting as if they were ‘persons’ are examples of metaphorical constructions to analyse international politics (ibid.). As Drulák (ibid., 6) points out, “Metaphors shape our thinking, through our thinking they shape our actions, and through our actions they shape our reality”. In the same vein, Walter and Helmig (2005: 13) hold that metaphors “constitute knowledge and thinking”, and Onuf (2012: 43) asserts that metaphors shape “a world shaped in turn by our choices of words”. In these terms, a metaphor used to refer to the ‘danger’ or the ‘perversity’ of an idea does not only serve to refer, to characterise or to analyse such idea, but it also has the effect of making such an idea ‘bad’, ‘dangerous’, ‘wrong’ and ‘perverse’. The same happens when an agent uses a metaphor to make the meaning of an idea of collective identity ‘understandable’ to others. Such metaphor not only
serves the purpose of ‘explaining’ such an idea, but it also constitutes the idea itself (Onuf 2012: 40).

Drulák (2004: 1) addresses metaphors as “enabling and constraining conditions for the international practice”. Accordingly, the analysis of metaphors assesses not only what agents say but also how they say it, and this serves to operationalise a constructivist approach, “strengthening a traditionally weak link between constructivism and empirical research” (ibid.). Indeed, since constructivism lacks a concrete method to provide explanations based on the role of ideas, it will be shown that the interpretive method proposed for analysing the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions on state action and between them is a useful way to operationalise a constructivist approach to the study of regionalism. The analysis of interviewees’ answers in the three case studies of the AC will show that interviewees use metaphors, or expressions having a metaphorical connotation, to refer to the importance of collective identity and regional institutions that not only allow assessing their importance but also their content, and analysing and comparing these metaphors and expressions will serve to assess their role in orienting state action in the unfolding of the AC.

Onuf’s and Drulák’s assessment of metaphors has a further implication in relation to the transitive verbs agents use to refer to the role of ideas: agents might not know for sure whether ideas had effects in changing the state of things (causal effects).\footnote{Indeed, agents might have trouble remembering the ideas that informed their thinking at the time of acting (Hollis and Smith 1990: 2, 206), and this is another reason why trusting what an agent says about the ideas that inform her thinking might be problematic (see footnote 34); but as will be argued in Chapter 5, this is something that interpretive analysis is prepared to deal with (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).} Yet, the fact that they use transitive verbs to refer to the role of ideas that imply changes in the state of things, turns such ideas into causes. If agents think – and thus say so – that ideas changed the state of things, how can we deny that such ideas changed the state of things at least in the view of those agents who assert it? Think for example of the Humean conception of causation, namely the most often used in social sciences and particularly in IR studies (Kurki 2008: 6-7; Leon 2010: 45). As stated above, this conception considers causes to be mechanisms that ‘push and pull’. Verbs like ‘push’ and ‘pull’ are transitive verbs that have a ‘mechanical’ connotation, which in turn is associated with the concept of a cause as ‘something that makes something else happen’. The
point to highlight is that those transitive verbs that have mechanical – and thus causal – connotations not only ‘reflect’ the mechanical/changing effect of a causal factor, but they also constitute the causal dimension of such factor. If those transitive verbs having a causal connotation were not used, we could not identify causes (Bhaskar 1978: 121-2).\textsuperscript{43} Using transitive verbs that denote causation can be considered as ‘performative speech acts’ in the sense of Austin (1962) and Searle (1970), as speech acts that are producing the very things they are denoting (Walter and Helmig 2005: 3-4; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 81). When such transitive verbs are used, the factors that are subjects of the transitive actions those verbs denote are invested with causal power, and this turns these factors into causes at least in the view of those who use transitive verbs to refer to their effects.\textsuperscript{44}

The former reflection allows noting that, indeed, posing ideas as the subjects of transitive verbs that have causal connotations – as they denote mechanical effects, are metaphorical constructions themselves. In the view of Lakoff (1993, quoted in Drulák 2004: 6), metaphors “are not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason”. The argument here is not that ideas just have the effects that agents assign to them. If this were the case, then the researcher would simply become no more than an interviewer. The point is that taking agents’ views about the effects of ideas is a crucial action needed to analyse their importance. These views must be contrasted with other agents’ views, metaphors and with other sources of information (other texts like official documents, press reports and other academic analyses) in order to complete the assessment of the role of ideas (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 85-8). As Risse (2009: 145) points out, “interpretive understanding is an intrinsic, albeit not exclusive, part of any causal explanation”. Such is the value of an interpretive analysis, which gives the constructivist researcher a key task in contributing to understanding social action. This is the exercise carried out in the present thesis in order to explain state action towards the unfolding of the AC, which

\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, Bhaskar (1975: 146, 148) associates causal explanations with identifying the mechanisms by which things occur (see also footnote 40).

\textsuperscript{44} This point bears heavily upon Onuf’s perspective – and also Drulák’s (2004) and Walter and Helmig’s (2005), that language serves a constitutive function, since “By speaking, we make the world what it is” (Onuf 2012: 28-9).
also has the aim of making a contribution to operationalising a constructivist analysis in terms of assessing constitutive and causal effects of ideas.45

1.2.5 An example of applying the constructivist interpretive method proposed in the thesis

Before moving into the analysis of the three case studies of the AC, this section offers an example of how the proposed interpretive method can be operationalised, using certain parts of the works of some of the constructivist authors addressed in section 1.1 of the present chapter. At the final part of section 1.1.1 it was argued that Söderbaum’s assessment of the role of identity was confusing, for he asserted that even though identity informs and transforms individuals’ behaviour and interests, it does not explain action itself (Söderbaum 2004: 45). By using the interpretive method outlined in the previous section, it is possible to distinguish constitutive from causal effects of identity and provide a better understanding on how, for Söderbaum, identity does explain action. Söderbaum uses two transitive verbs that denote different effects of identity on action: informing and transforming. Following the interpretive method previously proposed, ‘informing’ denotes a constitutive relationship, as it means that identity partly defines the contents of actors’ interests. But this transitive does not have a clear connotation of change. ‘Informing’ something does not clearly give a sense of changing that something through what is informed. In contrast, Söderbaum tells us that identity also transforms individuals’ interests, and ‘transforming’ clearly means change: if interests are ‘transformed’, this means that interests are changed by identity. It has been argued in the previous section that when change occurs, the factor that causes change should be considered a cause, and the proposed interpretive method argues that when a transitive verb is used to refer to the role of ideas, and this verb clearly denotes change, the subject of such a verb such be considered a cause, in this case, identity. Moreover, Söderbaum tells us that identity motivates actors’ engagement with regionalism, and it has been argued that motivations are considered causes for action. In these terms, thus, identity can be assessed as playing a causal

---

45 It should be clarified that analysing metaphors and transitive verbs is the method, and not the object of analysis, proposed to assess the role of collective identity and regional institutions in orienting state action in the three case studies of the AC.
role. Hence, by using the proposed interpretive method to distinguish constitutive and causal effects of ideas, we can assess constitutive and causal effects of identity in Söderbaum’s analysis.

Regarding Checkel’s work reviewed in section 1.1.2, let us remind its main argument that “norms matter in a constitutive, interest-shaping way not captured by rationalist arguments” (Checkel 2001: 553-4). Even though Checkel does not employ the interpretive method proposed in the present thesis, it is interesting that Checkel associates the transitive verb ‘shaping’ with constitutive effects, for this allows inferring that perhaps Checkel also associates causes with things that provoke changes in the state of things. ‘Shaping’ is a transitive verb that does not have a clear connotation of change, for it can only refer to minor details of the ‘final shape’ of the thing that is being shaped. Yet, ‘shaping’ can also refer to a whole new shape, which would then imply a substantive change. Hence, without knowing the extent to which something ‘shapes’ something else, the causal role of the ‘shaping factor’ is difficult to observe. Hence, by using the interpretive method proposed in the thesis, we can agree with Checkel that the shaping effects of norms are better understood as constitutive and not causal, unless the extent to which norms shape interests is explicitly assessed as ‘high’.

In this latter vein, for instance, let us remind Checkel’s argument (2001: 573) that the historical and institutional context, and the experience that bureaucrats have on the issue area at play in a particular moment, ‘determine to a large extent’ (see p.35 above) how bureaucrats comply with regional norms. Even though Checkel assesses these effects as constitutive, ‘determine to a large extent’ could bring us a closer sense of causal effects, as the ‘constitutive factor’ plays a ‘highly determining’ role in the shaping of actors’ interests and the way they comply with regional norms. In the following chapters it will be argued that in those cases where transitive verbs do not clearly denote changes in the state of things, causal effects will be more possible to observe the more the implied change is specified. In Checkel’s account case, it is possible to observe causal effects of norms and the institutional context in which agents interact inasmuch as Checkel tells us that they determine to a high extent agents’ action (complying with norms).
Yet, this observation of causal effects is not as solid as one where a transitive verb denoting change in clear terms is used.

Lastly, a paragraph of Acaharya’s work was formerly taken as an example of the use of diverse verbs to refer to the role of norms in ASEAN. Norms were pointed out as ‘regulating’ state behaviour, ‘redefining’ state interests and ‘constituting’ state identities, and also as ‘playing a crucial role’ in the socialisation process that creates collective identities and interests (Acharya 2009: 4, see p.37 above). It was argued that verbs like ‘redefining’ and ‘playing a crucial role’ do not give a clear sense of causation, but rather of constitution. It is true that ‘redefining’ has an implication of changing what existed previous to redefinition, and in this sense it denotes a causal effect. But if something is redefined, it means it existed before redefinition – and hence it was somehow previously defined – and if the extent to which it is redefined is not warranted, then it becomes difficult to assess the causal effects of the ‘redefining factor’. Furthermore, ‘playing a role’, even if it is ‘crucial’, does not tell us anything about causation, for it does not give any sense of change or transformation.

A similar analysis can be done of Acharya’s main hypothesis, which reads as follows:

ASEAN’s frameworks of interaction and socialisation have themselves become a crucial factor affecting the interests and identities of its members. The idea of security community, sociologically understood, enables us to analyse ASEAN as a regional institution which both regulates and constitutes the interests and policies of its members in matters of war, peace and cooperation. ASEAN’s role in regional order can be studied and evaluated by looking at the extent to which its norms and socialisation processes, and identity-building initiatives, have shaped the attitudes and behaviour of its members about conflict and order in the region, and the extent to which they have led to the development of common understandings, expectations and practices about peaceful conduct (Acharya 2009: 9, emphasis added).

Like in the quote formerly addressed, the previous fragment contains transitive verbs that denote constitutive and causal effects of regional norms and institutions. First of all, it is worth remarking that Acharya explicitly asserts that ASEAN is a regional institution that ‘constitutes the interests and policies of its members’. But Acharya also says that ASEAN – as an institutional framework – ‘regulates’ these interests and policies. Since, as has been argued, the regulative role of norms accounts for causal effects, by following the interpretive method proposed in the thesis we can assess both constitutive and causal effects of the ASEAN’s institutional framework.
in Acharya’s account. However, other transitive verbs used by Acharya to refer to the effects of norms and institutions are not that clear. Verbs like ‘affecting’, ‘shaping’ and ‘leading’ may give a sense of causation as long as they denote some transformation. But, as argued in relation to Checkel’s work, ‘shaping’ does not mean that without the shaping factor, the shaped thing would not have occurred or existed. The same happens with verbs like ‘affecting’ and ‘leading’. These verbs tell us that their subjects had some influence in the event or thing in process; but without having a sense of the extent to which their subjects ‘affected’ the objects or ‘led’ to their new state, we cannot be sure about their causal role. In these terms, only constitutive effects can be assessed through this type of transitive verbs, namely a type that does not give a sense of causation in clear terms.

Even though the reviewed authors do not aim to distinguish constitutive from causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions on agency (particularly regarding interest formation) and between them, the analysis of the transitive verbs they use to refer to the role of regional institutions allows observing both types of effects, though not always in clear terms. From these authors’ analyses it is possible to establish that once institutions are created they have constitutive and causal effects on collective identity formation, and this in turn reinforces institution building. The use of the interpretive method proposed in the thesis allows observing a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the reviewed constructivist analyses of regionalism. But besides allowing for the observation of this relationship, which is in line with a constructivist ontology, the interpretive method of focusing on transitive verbs to refer to the role of ideas provides a better understanding of how this relationship works, by distinguishing constitutive from causal effects of identity and institutions in different ways.

The analysis of the three case studies of the AC will be done through analysing the terms in which interviewees referred to the role of collective identity and regional institutions, focusing on the transitive verbs they use to refer to the role of ideas making these ideational structures; and focusing also on metaphorical expressions that refer to ideas operating as a referent for action (constitutive effects), or implying a change in the state of things (causal effects).
Although distinguishing constitutive from causal effects will not always be easy to make, the distinction between constitutive and causal effects of ideas will allow understanding how a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between identity and institutions and also between both structures and agency actually works in the AC.

Analysing the terms in which interviewees referred to the role of ideas might seem problematic for knowing about the importance of ideas in orienting agency. It could be said, first, that ideas mattered more or less only for those people who commented on their importance, and second, that there is no way to know for sure whether interviewees are telling the truth when they spoke about the role of ideas. However, as will be argued in greater depth in Chapter 5, an interpretive perspective is prepared to respond to these questions about ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’, which interpretive analysis frames better as ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘knowledge claims’.

Regarding trustworthiness – which from a positivist perspective would correspond to ‘validity’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 91-4) –, it would make no sense for a researcher to engage in an interpretive analysis of the views of some people who the researcher suspects might lie to her. Engaging in an interpretive analysis implies, before anything else, respecting the actors one is investigating, and this implies not assuming that they might be lying, or interested in lying to the interviewer, or in leading astray the research process. Taking agents seriously is a primal condition of interpretive analysis (ibid., 51), and it is the start for ensuring that interpretive analysis allows making valuable contributions to the understanding of social life. Interpretive analysis is not about finding the ‘truth’ about what happened, or about what does and does not ‘exist’. It is about understanding the meaning of social action according to its performers; it is about understanding how and why agents do what they do according to their own understandings of the world(s) they interact within (ibid., 46-7).

The latter point is directly related with knowledge claims (validity in positivist terms). Ensuring trustworthiness and making useful knowledge claims about the meaning of agents’ action is achieved through ‘reflexivity’ and ‘intertextuality’, two analytical exercises that any interpretive researcher must carry out in order to ‘make sense’ of agents’ views (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 80-5, see also section 1.3.3 above). Reflexivity refers to the researcher critically reflecting
on how data is co-generated by agents through interviews, and through the words and languages they use in different situations (informal talks, formal meeting, press declarations, art exhibitions). In a close relation to this, intertextuality consists of contrasting agents’ views with other agents’ views and with the discourses and languages they engage in different situations. Hence, the interpretive researcher does not take an agent’s view in a particular situation (for instance, an interview) as the ‘last’ or ‘unique’ word on the topic she is investigating. The researcher must contrast every agent’s view with the ones of other agents (interviewees) and with other texts, like academic works, official documents and press reports, and provide a transparent account of such contrasting exercise, showing the contradictions, the silences and the cases where uncertainty or lack of clarity prevails. The researcher’s critical reflection on this process of data co-generation not only consists of being transparent on how the process was carried out, but also on reflecting on possible explanations for contradictions, silences and uncertainty. Transparency, reflexivity and intertextuality are the tools that allow an interpretive analysis to make trustworthy knowledge claims that enable a better understanding of social life, based precisely on how agents give meaning to the world(s) they live in and their action in that/those world(s). These points will be resumed again in Chapter 5 where the value of the constructivist interpretive analysis of the three case studies of the AC is discussed.

To conclude the description of the theoretical framework employed in the thesis, the last sections of this part of the chapter offer a constructivist framework for the analysis of collective identity and regional institutions.

1.2.6 A constructivist framework for the analysis of collective identity

A main ontological tenet of constructivism is that identity is at the basis of actors’ interests (Checkel 1998; Ruggie 1998; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Wendt 1999). This means that interests are partly constituted by the identities of actors. Thus, if we want to understand actors’ interests we must look at the identities they hold, which in turn are partly defined by how the others ‘see’ those actors. Following Wendt, “In a philosophical sense, an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is [...] a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and
behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings” (Wendt 1999: 224).

Wendt’s definition tells us that identity is a property of agents, but this must not be understood as if identity was something agents choose for themselves. To say that identity is a unit-level quality rooted in actors’ self-understandings does not mean that actors’ self-understandings are chosen autonomously by actors. Berger and Luckmann (1968: 166) assert that “To receive an identity entails to be awarded a specific place in the world”. This implies that identity is something that is primarily received, not chosen by agents. A specific place in the world is awarded by the world itself, a world that is social as other agents exist in it, and thereby a specific place in the world is given by ‘the other’ agents. Klotz and Lynch (2007: 74) tell us that constructivists agree broadly that identity is based on a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Identity, thus, is something relational, something that is constituted in relation to other actors, as it implies being self-aware of what makes an actor be what it is and what makes the other actors be considered as ‘others’. Wendt’s previous definition of identity establishes that actors must be self-aware of their identities for these identities to exist – and to operate informing actors’ interests, but from a constructivist perspective actors’ identities are constituted by the relationships actors have with one another. As previously stated in this chapter, identities are ‘intersubjective’. This does not preclude that actors cannot ‘voluntarily change’ their identities, this is, to do things for other actors to perceive them differently. But by the same token, those things actors do to change their identities will only be ‘effective’ if the other actors acknowledge such changes.

Wendt conceives collective identity as a set of narratives that define the members of a group as members of such group, which in turn constitute the interests that lead them to make behavioural choices (Wendt 1999: 366). For Wendt, the constitutive requirement of collective identity formation is “redefining the boundaries of Self and Other so as to constitute a ‘common-in-group identity’ or ‘we-feeling’” (ibid., 338). This definition can be complemented by Smith’s concept of ‘collective cultural identity’, which corresponds to “those feelings and values in respect of a sense of continuity, shared memories and a sense of common destiny of a
given unit of population which has had common experiences and cultural attributes [...]” (Smith 1990: 179).

In the case of regionalism, the identity of the members of a regionalist project is constituted, on the one hand, by those affinities that make actors identify with one another as part of a group/region. On the other, it is constituted by those differences that actors consider to have in contrast to other actors or regional groups, but also by those features that the ‘other actors’ attribute to the particular regional group in question. These features might be the same claimed by the regional group or different ones not necessarily accepted by such group. Rosamond (1999: 659) sees the ‘discursive elaboration of non-regional ‘others’ ’ as a requirement of the social construction of ‘regional selves’, which entails “the development of intersubjective understandings about the context within which these selves are able to define themselves collectively”. In these terms, a regional collective identity refers to the shared perception of belonging to a particular community and can be explained by internal (domestic and regional) as well as external (global) factors, in response to the Other. As something relational, subject to the perceptions of Self and Other, collective identity is in a permanent process of reproduction and transformation.

Identification is the process by which agents identify with each other and develop the ‘we-feeling’ that collective identity consists of. According to Wendt:

Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether. Self is ‘categorized’ as Other. Identification is usually issue-specific and rarely total [...] but always involves extending the boundaries of the Self to include the Other (Wendt 1999: 229).

Bloom tells us that identification is explained as a process to achieve psychological security, as

[...] every individual possesses an inherent drive to internalise – to identify with – the behaviour, mores and attitudes of significant figures in her/his social environment; i.e. people actively seek identity. Moreover, every human being has an inherent drive to enhance and to protect the identifications he or she has made; i.e. people actively seek to enhance and protect identity (Bloom 1990: 23).

Group identification, or identification of subjects with a group, can be made with the direct benefactor that provides material benefits for the members of the group, but it can also be
made not with a directly materialistic benefactor, but with a model that provides the right mode of behaviour in a situation of threat (Bloom 1990: 51). According to Onuf (1998: 64), “Agents acting collectively become a singular agent. By using resources, they acquire a material existence, and [...] they become objects of identification”.

Constructivism is interested in studying the interaction processes through which identity is constituted, but is also interested in assessing the terms in which identity explains action, that is, how it constitutes agents’ interests and makes them act the way they do. It is clear that in order to understand the ways in which identity constitutes agency and makes agents act in one way or another, a constructivist analysis would benefit from understanding how agents’ identities are constituted in the first place. Indeed, this is a preferred task of the more ‘radical’ type of constructivism. Yet, a ‘softer’ type of constructivism would not consider such analysis a necessary condition for assessing the explanatory role of identity. One can soundly take what agents consider their identities to be, and relate the ideas told by agents to other ideas present in other texts about the identity of those agents, and carry out an analysis of how the identity agents claim to have relates to their actions, in terms of constituting their identities and making them act the way they do. This position is warranted in the methodological concept/tool of ‘bracketing’ often used by ‘soft’ constructivists interested in providing explanations based on the role of ideas (Wendt 1987: 364-5).

Bracketing consists of provisionally turning ideational factors such as identity and institutions into stable variables in order to assess their explanatory power (Finnemore 1996: 24-5; Checkel 2001: 579). This is no more than a methodological exercise useful to avoid treating a variable simultaneously as the *explanans* and the *explanandum* – accordingly, what explains and what is to be explained. Ontologically, constructivism considers ideational structures as socially constructed, the product of agents’ interaction occurring in a social environment also made of material conditions. But to study the process of social construction of ideas is one thing different from analysing the structural effects of these ideas over agency. By ‘bracketing’, the constructivist analyst is *methodologically* taking for granted the composition of ideational
structures, but this does not imply that ontologically these structures are considered as something stable, immune to change (Wendt 1987: 364-5).

Bracketing is as valid a methodological exercise as the one of assessing the processes of social construction of ideational structures without enquiring into the terms those structures orient agency in particular situations (as most of the reviewed constructivist approaches to regionalism do). The present thesis focuses on the latter issue without studying the process of Andean collective identity construction or the one of configuration of Andean regional institutions. This methodological option can be criticised as one that limits the understanding of ideas as products of social construction (Zehfuss 2002: 10) but this limitation is only a methodological one that does not have any further ontological implications besides the one of turning ideas into explanatory variables instead of the object to be explained. Constructivism is interested in doing both things, but doing one does not require doing the other.

The object of analysis of the present thesis is the terms in which collective identity and regional institutions can explain state action in the AC, and not how collective identity and regional institutions are socially constructed by AC member states. However, as will be seen, the analysis of this object of study does not preclude obtaining conclusions about the ways in which Andean collective identity and AC institutions are socially constructed. But there is a matter of emphasis that is significant for research design in terms of defining the purpose of analysis, and bracketing is a methodological concept that helps understanding how such analysis is carried out.

1.2.7 A constructivist framework for the analysis of regional institutions

Searle (1995: 26, ch.4, 110-1) tells us that institutions are agreements about the meaning of practices, and that institutional facts are a product of collective intentionality (ibid., 46, 51). Institutions refer to the performance of a function containing an element that can be guaranteed simply by collective agreement or acceptance. Institutions can exist even if agents are not conscious of institutions’ existence and can also be unconsciously created and reproduced through practice (ibid., 47, 57; Wight and Joseph 2010: 21). On his part, Wendt (1999: 94) tells us that institutions and rules are ultimately ‘shared ideas’. Accordingly,
“Institutions are made of norms and rules, which are ideational phenomena, – ‘shared mental models’ – and as such, despite being objective social facts, they are on the idealist side of the equation” (ibid., 96), in contrast to a ‘material’ side of material resources and pre-given interests in benefit maximisation. According to Berger and Luckmann, institutions are created through the process of institutionalisation, which appears:

[...] every time there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by certain types of actors [...] The institution establishes that actions of the type X are performed by actors of the type X [...] By the same fact of existing, institutions control human behaviour establishing beforehand definite paths that canalise it in a determinate direction (Berger and Luckmann 1968: 74).

It is important to note that institutions need to be performed by actors in order to exist:

The institution can be manifested, in the real experience, only through such representation in ‘roles’ played. [Institutions depend] on flesh-and-bone actors repeatedly playing the prescribed ‘roles’. [Institutions do not empirically exist] outside from this recurrent realisation. To say, thus, that ‘roles’ represent institutions, is to say that roles make possible that institutions exist, once and again, as a real presence in the existence of concrete individuals [...] Institutions can be represented in other ways. [They can be linguistically objectified] and they can be symbolically represented by physical objects, be they natural or artificial. [But] the representation of an institution in ‘roles’ and through them is [...] the representation par excellence, on which all the others depend (Berger and Luckmann 1968: 97).

Note that the previous quote provides a solid justification for asking national officials and AGS bureaucrats as the main ‘role players’ of Andean institutions, about the role of Andean norms and of SAI institutional organisms. Yet, the fact that institutions need to be performed by agents in order to exist as institutional settings does not preclude them from having constitutive and causal effects on agency. Onuf (1998: 60) underscores the constitutive effects of institutions by saying that rules help to define situations from any agent's point of view, and are directly responsible for presenting agents with choices. Accordingly:

[...] rules are related to agents' practices, and to each other, through the consequences that agents intend their acts to have. Whether by accident or by design, rules and related practices frequently form a stable (but never fixed) pattern suiting agents' intentions. These patterns are institutions. As recognizable patterns of rules and related practices, institutions make people into agents and constitute an environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally (Onuf 1998: 61).
On his part, Searle (1995: 140, 147) emphasises that we also need to enquire about the role of institutional structures as systems of constitutive rules in the causal explanation of human behaviour. He points out that:

[…] the structure of human institutions is a structure of constitutive rules […] people who are participating in the institutions are typically not conscious of these rules; often they have even false beliefs about the nature of the institution, and even the very people who created the institution may be unaware of its structure. But this combination of claims poses a serious question for us: Under these conditions, what causal role can such rules possibly play in the actual behaviour of those who are participating in the institutions? (Searle 1995: 127).

As Hollis points out, an institutional structure is not the hidden structure of a building. Accordingly, “Institutional structure is a metaphor which needs cashing in [and it should be cashed] in terms of ‘power’, defined as the ability to bring about a desired outcome and traced to the enablements and constraints which institutional rules create” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 209, brackets original). That institutions have ‘the power’ to bring about desired outcomes accounts for their causal role in social life. This causal role of institutions is underlined by Finnemore, who asserts that:

The international system is said to be important because it constrains states from taking actions they would otherwise take. [However] The argument here is different. The international system can change what states want. It is constitutive and generative, creating new interests and values for actors. It changes state action, not by constraining states with a given set of preferences from acting but by changing their preferences (Finnemore 1996: 5-6, emphasis original, brackets added).

The assertion that the international system can generate changes in state preferences gives account of the causal power of the institutions composing the international system, as state preferences change from being one thing to being another. Saying that international institutions – which are what the international system consists of – are constitutive and generative, gives account of the differentiation that Finnemore wishes to pursue between constitutive and causal effects, where ‘generative’ would correspond to causal theorising.46

---

46 Finnemore (1996: 5) does not explicitly declare the aim to distinguish between constitutive and causal effects, although she explicitly manifests her intention to do causal theorising.
Since regionalism entails institution building, regional norms are considered a key part of the institutional settings that allow the unfolding of regionalism. According to Finnemore, norms are:

[…] shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors. Unlike ideas which may be held privately, norms are shared and social; they are not just subjective but intersubjective. Ideas may or may not have behavioral implications; norms by definition concern behavior. One could say they are collectively held ideas about behavior (Finnemore 1996: 22-3, emphasis original).

In these terms, regional institutions should be considered as both the institutional organisms at the regional level and its normative structures, which are derived from the pursuit of regionalism. In the present thesis, the regional institutions analysed will be mainly Andean norms,47 which in the AC are named ‘Decisions’.48 Andean Decisions are made by the Andean Presidential Council (APC), the Andean Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers (ACM), the Andean Commission (the Council of Trade Ministers) and other Ministerial Councils. The role of the AGS as an institutional organism of the AC will also be addressed in the three case studies, and some references to other institutional organisms of the SAI will be made when interviewees made some comments about their role.

1.3 Examples of rationalist-materialist approaches to the study of the AC and other related approaches

This section reviews some academic works that serve as examples of often tacit rationalist-materialist approaches to the study of the AC (Salgado 1998; Casas 2005; Moncayo 2006; and Forero 2010). It also outlines the distinct contributions that a constructivist interpretive analysis like the one engaged in the present thesis may provide vis-à-vis other related approaches to the object analysis – mainly institutions – as are historical institutionalism and the bureaucratic politics model.

47 Note that this coincides with Acharya’s (2009: 4; see p.37 above) option to focus on regional norms as the main regional institutions existing in ASEAN.
48 All Andean Decisions as well as all AC official documents referred in the following chapters are included in the References section of the thesis.
1.3.1 Approaches to the AC

Salgado’s work (1998) is a general account of the AC’s history. An implicit neorealist perspective can be noted when he asserts that member states only fulfil ‘international instruments’ (referring to regional norms and agreements) when they are ‘convinced of their ends’ (goals) and ‘keen on remaining subject to their rules’ (ibid., 21). In these terms, Salgado holds a rationalist approach that only accepts benefit calculation as the explanation for actors enforcing regional norms. In any case, Salgado (ibid., 41) holds that he does not have the intention to explain ‘frequent norm violation’ in the AC. Salgado (ibid., 34) also highlights the importance of ideological affinities among member states for reaching agreements on economic integration, but then this view raises the question of why in the absence of such affinities regionalism is maintained – as will be shown, in the case of AC’s collective FTA negotiations with the EU -. Furthermore, the constructivist analysis of regional institutions carried out in the three case studies of the AC (particularly Chapter 4) will offer explanations of why regional norms are enforced and reproduced, mainly conceptualising them as sources of identification for AC member states.

Casas’ work (2005: 21) focuses on analysing economic benefits of the Andean integration process and on assessing whether the AC constitutes an effective alternative for economic development. Casas’ perspective is mainly a neoliberal institutionalist one, with special emphasis in what he calls the ‘classical theory of regional integration’, mainly referring to neo-functionalism (ibid., 80). Yet, Casas (ibid., 94-102) also opens room for neorealism and what he calls the ‘globalisation approach’ (which asserts, accordingly, that regionalism is intrinsic to globalisation) as other materialist accounts that are useful for explaining regionalism in LA and in the AC. A constructivist approach to regionalism rejects neo-functional explanations of regionalism as they assume a fixed pattern of the evolution of regionalism that not only ignores the role of ideas, but that fails to have occurred in other regions of the world different than the EU, including the AC.

Furthermore, although at some point Casas (ibid., 70, 338-42) acknowledges the existence of ‘cultural factors’, ‘values’ and ‘identity’ in the unfolding of regionalism, and though he speaks of
a constant process of redefining regionalism around the ‘identitarian’ and ‘subjective’ character of the actors that engage in it, he does not analyse these issues in his study of the AC. Casas (ibid., 72-6) emphasises the importance of political will for the start and pursuit of regionalism, but does not discuss how this political will is created or what motivates peoples and political leaders to engage in regionalism. In contrast, the constructivist analysis developed in the present thesis emphasises ideational issues like identity and institutions, and pays special attention to the cultural components of Andean identity and to the ideological values that member states have sometimes shared and over which they have at some points disagreed.

For Moncayo (2006: 134) regional projects of ‘second generation’ (those of the so-called ‘new regionalism’ of the 1990s) like the AC were motivated by ‘economic reasons’, like increasing exports and FDI, and by ‘locking-in’ the neoliberal economic reforms adopted in the early 1990s. Accordingly, this ‘new regionalism’ was also motivated by ‘extra-economic reasons’, like improving national security, peace and cooperation for “developing political and social institutions” (ibid.). Yet, for Moncayo (ibid.) the main aim of regionalism during the 1990s was countries’ insertion in the world economy. As can be seen, all this accounts for a rationalist-materialist view that could well subscribe a neorealist or a neoliberal institutionalist perspective of material benefits obtaining. Moncayo (ibid., 147-54) also highlights the importance of manufacture trade in the AC not only to justify its maintenance but also as a reason to deepen regional integration and pursue a “regional industrial policy”. However, in general terms, Moncayo’s work focuses more on what should be done in the AC than in what actually hinders the progress of regional integration. While acknowledging the importance of material benefits in explaining state action towards the Andean regionalist project, the present thesis will show its limitation and will call for the need of analysing the role of ideational structures like collective identity and regional institutions.

Lastly, Forero (2010: 51) emphasises the need for AC members to coordinate their trade policies, given the ‘complex interdependence’ derived from the process of globalisation. His main argument is that the low level of trade policy coordination among AC members countervails the deepening of trade integration in the AC, thus decreasing the possibility of
international economic insertion of the Andean bloc (ibid., 52). Forero argues that flexibility in internal agreements and commitments at the regional level has impeded trade policy coordination within the AC. In other words, he suggests that institutional flexibility has countervailed institutional effectiveness – the latter understood in terms of strong policy coordination allowing AC members act in the trade area as a bloc – (ibid., 77-8). This argument is rather tautological because in Forero’s terms institutional flexibility equates weak coordination, and thus the argument becomes that weak coordination has led to weak coordination. In contrast, this thesis will argue that institutional flexibility, understood not much as weak coordination but as the AC’s capability of adapting regional institutions and norms to its members’ needs and interests, may contribute to explain the maintenance of the Andean regionalist project despite its failure in achieving a high level of trade policy coordination.

1.3.2 Other related approaches

In principle, constructivism’s understanding of institutions concords with the one of historical institutionalism, insofar as the latter approach claims that “institutional structures [have] profound effects on shaping political strategies, outcomes and, ultimately, political preferences” (Steinmo 2008: 161-2). Yet, following Steinmo’s distinction between three types of ‘institutionalisms’ in the social sciences – a distinction also shared by Thelen (1999) - constructivism might find even more coincidences with what Steinmo calls ‘sociological institutionalism’, which claims that:

[...] humans generally follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ – meaning that rather asking ourselves ‘what do I get out of X?’ people first ask themselves ‘What should I do? What is appropriate?’ In this view, the important institutions (rules) are social norms that govern everyday life and social interaction (Steinmo 2008: 163, parenthesis original).

In any case, the former view – as Steinmo (2008: 163) himself acknowledges – is often incorporated in any historical institutionalist analysis. Furthermore, another aspect around which historical institutionalism and constructivism would agree is opening a middle-way between rationalist and more structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, as Steinmo situates historical institutionalism in between rationalist institutionalist approaches that take
agents as benefit maximisers and sociological institutionalist approaches that take agents as mere rule followers. Constructivism, and particularly a soft version of it, also takes this middle-range position of studying how institutions and rules shape agents’ preferences and establish what it means for them to ‘maximise’ and engage in a ‘rational behaviour’.

Constructivism also shares with historical institutionalism the preference to focus on specific case studies in order to provide richer and more detailed explanations of why things happen the way they do in each specific case (Thelen 1999: 370; Steinmo 2008: 176-7). Like a constructivist, “what the (historical institutionalist) scholar wants to know is why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred” (Steinmo 2008: 163). Moreover, a main ‘agenda’ of a historical institutionalist is “an effort to comprehend the role of ideas in politics and history” (ibid., 167). In this vein, Steinmo (ibid., 170) asserts that from a historical institutionalist perspective, “ideas are at the bottom of political behaviour”. Affinities are so great that even constructivist scholars like Friedrich Kratochwil and Peter Katzenstein are seen as working on a historical institutionalist agenda (ibid., 150-1, 169; Thelen 1999: 371).

At the end, thus, the sole visible difference between historical institutionalism and constructivism, at least regarding their treatment of institutions, could be the former’s emphasis on history and placing their analyses in historical perspective (Steinmo 2008: 164-5), something that constructivists do not take as a must in every analysis. In any case, precisely because of its emphasis on how institutions shape actors’ preferences and on history, historical institutionalism can hardly be located in the same side of rationalist-materialist approaches that constructivism aims to contest. Indeed, Steinmo (ibid., 155, 174) himself opposes historical institutionalism to rationalist approaches like rational choice theory and to materialist approaches like Marxism and World-systems theory. Furthermore, another distinction between constructivism and historical institutionalism could be the former’s preference to employ interpretive methods in order to know the ideas that informs agents’ action, although not all constructivists – and even less the ‘softer’ ones, like Wendt or Finnemore – engage in interpretive methods, and some historical institutionalists have employed them to some extent (Thelen 1999: 382).
However, a more profound difference could be found in that constructivism considers institutions to be ideas, or ideational settings, whereas historical institutionalism seems to consider institutions and ideas to be two different kinds of stuff. This can be noted in Steinmo’s (ibid., 170) claim that for historical institutionalists “institutional change is the product of changes in ideas held by actors”. If for historical institutionalists institutions were ideas, this claim would say that ideas’ change is the product of ideas’ change, which would not make much sense. Moreover, even if constructivists could accept that a source for institutional change could be a change in certain ideas held by agents – ideas different from the same institutions they could change –, constructivist scholars would focus more on the extent to which ideas that compose institutional structures may allow for changes in agents’ ideas, and not the other way around (and in this sense, therefore, constructivism would get closer to the aforementioned view of sociological institutionalism).

The formerly quoted historical institutionalist view on institutional change that places changes in ideas as the source of such change would have the limitation of leaving the source of ideational change unexplained, something that constructivist analyses would in turn prioritise. Surprisingly, though, in a footnote Steinmo (2008: 171) suggests that the explanation of ideas’ change is the performance/effectiveness of institutions, a posture that would just form a vicious analytical circle, as then the primary source of institutional change would be institutional performance. Effectively, Steinmo (ibid., 173) asserts that “Bringing ideas into our understanding of institutional change, then, brings agents back into institutional analysis”. Thus, and in line with the previously mentioned posture, at the end the focus is on analysing institutions in order to understand change in agents’ ideas. But then this latter view is closer to constructivism, which would focus on institutions in order to understand change in agents’ ideas which are different from those same institutions. Furthermore, constructivism would wholly share Steinmo’s claims that:

“Integrating ideas into the analysis (makes) institutions both a constraining/incentivising force and the object of political contestation [...] Bringing ideas specifically into Institutional analysis thus allows for a better understanding of institutional evolution” (Steinmo 2008: 173).

Furthermore, agendas of study for constructivism and for historical institutionalism are very
similar, as Steinmo (2008: 173) tells us that historical institutionalism’s basic argument is “to see institutions, ideas and the environment as co-evolutionary processes”. Accordingly:

 [...] if you think history and ideas matter, institutions structure actor’s choices but are subject to change by actors themselves, and real people make decisions that [are] not always efficient or purely self-interested, then you probably are an Historical Institutionalist (Steinmo 2008: 178).

The same could just be said replacing the last two words for ‘a constructivist’.

Another issue related to historical institutionalism’s treatment of institutions is ‘path dependency’, which holds that the maintenance of institutions can be explained because agents obtain benefits from enforcing them and adapting to them (Thelen 1999: 385-6, 392-3). In this sense, path dependency could be considered a concept closely related with rationalist-materialist approaches that emphasise benefit obtainment as the main explanations for agents’ enforcement and maintenance of institutional settings. Yet, path dependency also holds an affinity with constructivism inasmuch as the latter conceptualises benefits provided by institutional settings as a strong source of agents’ identification with the institutions they act within, which in turn generates agents’ identification between one another (Bloom 1990). In other words, from a constructivist standpoint path dependency serves to understand how institutions may operate as a source of collective identity formation and, further, how collective identity and institutions mutually constitute and cause each other. However, whilst path dependency is a concept only aimed at explaining institutional maintenance, the focus of constructivism would be on understanding how institutions contribute to collective identity formation and reproduction, as the present thesis does.

Another case of affinity between path dependency and constructivism is found in what Thelen (1999: 386-7) calls the ‘new institutionalist’ approaches in sociology, which hold that institutions persist as long as they are made of ‘shared understandings’ that are very difficult to change, and that operate as a referent even for voluntary institutional transformation. As can be noted, the social construction of institutions as a product of agents’ shared understandings is totally in line with constructivist analysis. In this regard, path dependency is a concept that can hardly be considered as a rationalist-materialist one, inasmuch as it emphasises the importance of cultural constraints when explaining both institutional stability and change.
Moreover, another feature of path dependency is the claim that institutions remain the same as long as power relationships remain the same, following the view that institutions reflect the power relationships that exist in a particular context (Thelen 1999: 395-6). Chapter 5 of the present thesis will argue that ‘institutional inertia’, understood as the habit that national and regional bureaucrats develop by working within regional institutions and finding support in regional norms, is an issue that helps explaining the maintenance of the AC. This pattern of institutional inertia could well be conceptualised as one of path dependency following a historical institutionalist perspective, given the affinities that the concept of path dependency has with constructivist theorising.

Finally, in relation to a bureaucratic politics perspective, even a constructivist approach that accepts that states are the main actors of regionalism disagrees with such a perspective, as the latter rejects states as unitary agents and proposes instead that ‘state action’ is the product of competence among bureaucracies where a state decision reflects the winning of one competing bureaucracy over another(s) (Allison and Halperin 1972; Hermann and Hermann 1989: 362). While constructivism would find it awkward to conceptualise state agency as unitary and homogenous, a constructivist approach to state action would either believe that state action is reduced to the imposition of a winning bureaucracy, and would look instead for the ideas that inform all competing state bureaucracies, as long as different bureaucracies are identified. But instead of departing from the assumption that different bureaucracies exist within a state, constructivism would first investigate the ideas that inform bureaucrats’ minds and would have competition among bureaucracies as a research conclusion, not a departure point.

Yet, a constructivist interpretive perspective like the one engaged in the present thesis could well be incorporated into a bureaucratic politics perspective, inasmuch as it would contribute to explain why certain bureaucrats act the way they do towards the unfolding of regionalism. But as the analysis of the three case studies of the AC will show, an interpretive approach allows observing contradictions in the way bureaucrats conceive of their actions, thus transcending the more simple bureaucratic politics perspective that bureaucrats are part of a
bureaucracy that competes against another bureaucracy(ies) in order to bring forward its interests within a state or within an international organisation. What constructivism allows understanding is that a bureaucracy does not have much of a homogenous thinking as the bureaucratic politics approach assumes, but instead it is rather frequent to find contradictory views of the same bureaucrat about her action, which makes it difficult to conceptualise bureaucracies as having clear-cut different interests in relation to one another.

Furthermore, a constructivist approach differs from a bureaucratic politics perspective not only in that it does not assume a priori the existence of competing bureaucracies, but also in that it does not assume that these competing bureaucracies behave rationally according to a set of interests that are very much the same for all of them – namely, imposing their choices over the ones of other bureaucracies –. Indeed, although a bureaucratic politics perspective distinguishes between ‘types of interests’, an implicit assumption of benefit maximisation and power gaining is common to all of them (Allison and Halperin 1972: 43, 48). In Allison and Halperin’s bureaucratic politics model, what makes competing bureaucracies’ interests distinct from one another is to certain extent their different ‘views’ on policy problems (for instance, national security), but mostly their organisational position within the hierarchical decision-making structure of the state (ibid., 48-50). Again, such determining role of bureaucrats’ organisational position would possibly be a conclusion of a constructivist analysis, not a point of departure (indeed, constructivism would broadly reject the use of ‘models’ as tools of analysis).

Lastly, constructivism would not be interested in investigating the ‘games’ that bureaucrats play. While the bureaucratic politics model consists in analysing how bureaucrats play ‘decision games’, ‘policy games’ and ‘action games’, according to the interests they are assumed to have (Allison and Halperin 1972: 46, 50), constructivism would first enquire into the ideas that inform bureaucrats’ interests, either by asking them, or by analysing their interaction, or both (if possible), and then proceed to analyse how ideas can explain bureaucrats’ actions but without focusing on whether they won or lost any kind of pre-defined game. Indeed, constructivism would not consider it sound to analyse how bureaucrats’ play games they are not actually aware of playing.
The following chapters will show that without engaging in a historical institutionalist perspective, constructivism meets very similar aims of that approach. In contrast, the diverse and often contradictory views pointed out by interviewees about the content and role of collective identity and regional institutions will show that a bureaucratic politics model is unsound for understanding state agency in terms of why state representatives and regional bureaucrats act the way they do. Nonetheless, comparing the results of the constructivist analysis of the three case studies of the AC with historical institutionalist or bureaucratic politics claims is not the object of study of the present thesis, and will not be done in subsequent chapters. What has been outlined in this section should be enough for contrasting conclusions and finding points of coincidence and divergence between these approaches.
CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY 1. PERU REMAINING AN AC MEMBER WHILE BEING RELUCTANT TO ADOPT THE FTZ AND THE CET

During the 1990s Peru held a reluctant position towards the adoption of the Andean Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and the Common External Tariff (CET). Almost five years after the creation of the FTZ in 1992, Peru participated partially, and only fully adopted it on December 31, 2005. Regarding the CET, while the Andean customs union functioned from 1995, Peru postponed its adoption until 2002, and finally it never adopted it as the CET was never consolidated in full among AC member states due to the FTAs with the US signed by Colombia and Peru, and later on, to the negotiations of a FTA between these two countries and the EU undertaken since 2008 (and completed in 2010). The FTZ and the CET were the key tools that the AC needed to create a common market, namely, its main integration goal during the 1990s. Despite its reluctance, Peru maintained full AC membership. Hence, Peru’s behaviour demands analysis for it is the case of a country that maintained its membership in the integration process, but did not engage the tools designed to meet the main integration goal of constituting a common market.

Using the interpretive method introduced in Chapter 1, this chapter analyses the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions that contribute to explaining Peru’s decision to remain an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the FTZ and the CET.\textsuperscript{49} The chapter shows that there were motivations for Peru holding a reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET based on interests in obtaining material benefits, which could have motivated Peru to leave the AC. However, collective identity and regional institutions offer explanations of Peru’s behaviour towards the AC. Regarding collective identity, the explanation is related to the ‘political cost’ of leaving or ending the AC, which is

\textsuperscript{49} The national officials interviewed for this case study were P1, P2 and P3, and the interviewed AGS bureaucrats were A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 (see Appendix 1).
related to issues of collective identity. Regarding regional institutions, explanations are related to the institutional flexibility that made Peru feel comfortable with remaining an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the FTZ and the CET; to the benefits that Andean norms provided for Peru’s policymaking; and to the role of the Andean General Secretariat (AGS) in encouraging and sometimes even pressuring Peru to remain an AC member.

2.1 Motivations for Peru not adopting the FTZ and the CET
Motivations for not adopting the FTZ and the CET according to the obtainment of material benefits explain to a significant extent Peru’s behaviour towards the Andean integration process. Yet, this part of the chapter argues that in order to better understand Peru’s behaviour this materialist account needs to be complemented. For the material conditions of the other AC member states were not so different from those of Peru, and material benefits could have been also gained had Peru joined both liberalisation schemes. Moreover, these material incentives could have also motivated Peru to leave the AC, yet it did not. Following a brief overview of the backgrounds of the FTZ and the CET, Peru’s motivations for adopting the FTZ and the CET will be addressed in two sections corresponding to two critical moments when, after considering its withdrawal from the AC, the Peruvian government decided to back out from the adoption of the FTZ and the CET in 1992, and to partially engage the FTZ in 1997.

2.1.1 Backgrounds of the FTZ and the CET
The Cartagena Agreement (CartA) established in 1969 that an Andean CET should be adopted before December 1980, with an additional period of 5 years for Ecuador and Bolivia. The CartA also contemplated the creation of a FTZ (then named the ‘Liberation Program’), but mostly aimed at complementing the specific agreements that distributed projects for developing certain industrial production sectors among member countries.50 Yet, these agreements were never fulfilled, and industrialisation efforts did not meet their aims. When the debt crisis affected AC members in the early 1980s the aims of consolidating a common external tariff and constituting a common market were left aside (Echavarría 1998: 88), as well as the Liberation Program (Tello 2004: 47). The integration process was literally stopped until 1986, when intra-

---

50 Chapter V of the CartA, arts. 41-60.
regional trade gave signs of recovery (Echavarría 1998: 102). In the late 1980s Andean countries began to change their economic models through the adoption of economic liberalisation policies, which would be fully implemented later on in the 1990s. In December 1989 definitive action was undertaken by Andean Presidents at the Galápagos Summit, who decided to re-launch the AC regionalist project. Presidents agreed to eliminate administrative trade barriers and to create a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) by December 1993 (1995 for Bolivia and Ecuador), and a customs union (CET) by December 1997 (1999 for these two smaller countries).\(^{51}\)

The Andean FTZ aimed at the liberalisation of the whole tariff universe of member states, complemented by a CET that would protect certain strategic sectors of national industries. After intense negotiations during 1990 and 1991, the FTZ was put into practice in October 1992, but its configuration was fully achieved from January 1993 onwards. From then on, the FTZ was in force without restrictions between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Peru did not adopt the FTZ for reasons that will be outlined in the next section. Approximately 23% of regional imports in 1992 were excluded from regional liberalisation (Echavarría 1998: 98).\(^{52}\)

Regarding the CET, at the Galápagos Summit in 1989 Andean Presidents agreed to establish a scaled CET of four levels: 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. After four years of negotiations a final decision was made in November 1994 (Decision 370), and the CET was implemented in February 1995 with the four levels established in 1989. The CET was only adopted by Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, since Bolivia was permanently allowed to maintain lower tariff levels and Peru was allowed to adopt it only from 2002.

Table 1 shows that Peruvian tariff levels might have pushed up the other members’ tariffs, as it was the country with the highest average tariff level in 1992. But, as will be later shown, this was not the case, for Peru wanted a flat and lower CET, and not a scaled one as it was finally established.


\(^{52}\) The excluded sectors were mainly industrial, particularly transport equipment (83.7%), and textiles, apparel and shoes (60.6%) – these percentages correspond to the portions of these sectors excluded from liberalisation. In general terms, 31.4% of general consumption goods and 53.3% of capital goods were excluded from the FTZ (Echavarría 1998: 98).
Table 1. CET (D-370, 1994) and national tariffs in 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Categories</th>
<th>CET</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foods and beverages</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other consumption goods</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum and lubricants</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other raw materials</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other capital goods</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (average)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In spite of Peru’s absence, the other Andean members adopted a customs union still imperfect due to broad lists of products being excluded from the CET (Echavarría 1998: 100), and also due to special concessions made to Bolivia and Ecuador, which were granted Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). With the aim of further incorporating Peru, all Andean countries committed to consolidating a customs union by January 2004 which would cover 62% of the whole tariff universe (Casas and Correa 2007: 597). However, implementation of the CET would be further postponed and progressively abandoned after Colombia’s and Peru’s signing of FTAs with the US in 2006 and the breaking-off of collective negotiations of a FTA with the EU in 2008-9.

2.1.2 First moment: Peru’s marginalisation from the FTZ and the CET in 1992

The evolution of intra-regional trade growth paths between 1992 and 1997 accounts for the benefits that Peru could have obtained from the adoption of the FTZ and the CET. According to Echavarría (1998: 89) intra-regional liberalisation contributed to increasing trade within the Andean region in 60-80% between 1993 and 1995. Between 1992 and 1997 intra-regional exports increased 10.9% on average annually (Fairlie 1999: 32), going from US$2,225 million to
US$5,636 million. After a substantial decrease in intra-regional exports during the 1980s, since 1990 the portion of AC members’ manufactured exports to the Andean market was increasingly greater, reaching more than 30% of intra-regional trade by 1995. Between 1990 and 1995 manufactured exports to the Andean region increased five times faster than manufactured exports to the rest of the world (Echavarría 1998: 102).

Echavarría (1998: 112-3) considers that adopting the CET was a good decision for Andean members, for it provided long-term signals to a private sector seeking stability. The FTZ contributed much more to trade creation than to trade deviation, and intra-industrial trade increased 40% by 1995, more than in the other regions in the Americas. As a result, producers in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela showed their satisfaction with the Andean integration process. Echavarría (ibid.) concludes that Andean domestic firms learnt to export in the Andean regional market to further compete in a more exigent international arena, and this happened thanks to the efficiency of the regional market in terms of resource allocation and the creation of competitive advantages.

Given that the FTZ and the CET provided substantial benefits to member states, what then led Peru to resist the adoption of these schemes? Three first motivations that appear were the low percentage of exports to the AC in total Peruvian exports, the trade deficit that the country maintained with the world and with the Andean region, and the low levels of non-traditional exports to its Andean partners. The first three motivations that corresponded to material conditions of Peruvian exports, were framed within a fourth motivation, namely, the perception of lower competitiveness of Peruvian industrial sectors compared to Colombian and Venezuelan ones. Yet, interviewees who spoke of this condition phrased it as ‘a perception’, perhaps being aware that ‘competitiveness’ cannot be as easily measured as, for instance, export volumes, for there are several definitions of competitiveness and many of the items that define it are, precisely, matters of ‘perception’. In these terms, the perception of ‘lower

54 This perception was pointed out by interviewees P2, A1 and A2 (see Appendix 1).
55 For instance, “The World Competitiveness Yearbook”, which is one of the most important international competitiveness indicators and which incorporates the formerly quoted ‘rigid’ variables, also includes about 3,000 interviews conducted with businessmen from all over the world. This indicator names the information proceeding
competitiveness’ would be an idea that might not have a clear material basis like the three motivations formerly pointed out, but that nevertheless informs a materialist account. Moreover, an effort will be made to make an approximate assessment of the lower competitiveness of Peruvian industries versus Colombian and Venezuelan ones, showing that such ‘perception’ had some material grounds that warranted it.

A fifth motivation, particularly for not adopting the CET, was the need for the Peruvian government to combat hyperinflation, which at the beginning of the 1990s had reached levels of 7,600% (Jiménez 2001: 151; Tello 2004: 61; interviewees P1, A1 and A2). Hyperinflation made Peru a very unstable and uncompetitive economy, and from a materialist point of view this meant less economic benefits and more insecurity and vulnerability. Finally, a sixth motivation was the punching that the CET, and also the FTZ, would suffer because of Colombia and Venezuela signing of a FTA with Mexico in 1991 (the G-3). It will be argued that the latter three motivations have a greater weight in explaining Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET than the former three. Yet, limitations will be pointed out in all cases.

Regarding the first three motivations, it is argued that they cannot clearly explain Peru’s decision to remain apart from the FTZ, for the conditions of other AC members were not so different. Table 2 shows the evolution of member countries’ trade with the AC between 1988 and 1992. Peruvian exports to the AC increased from US$188.6 million in 1988 to US$275.6 million in 1992, accounting for 7% and 8% of Peru’s total exports, respectively. This meant a 46% increase in volume with respect to the levels of 1988. Hence, during FTZ negotiations, which started in 1990 and ended in 1992, Peruvian exports to the AC were very low. Nevertheless, these levels did not differ substantially from those of the other Andean members. Exports to the AC had greater weight for Colombia (14% in 1992), and for Bolivia (13%). For Ecuador, the proportion of exports to the AC actually diminished from 8% to 6% in 1992 (even though they reached their highest amount on this period in 1991). Venezuela showed inferior

from interviews as ‘flexible’, acknowledging that there is a portion of ‘competitiveness’ that is related to entrepreneurs’ perceptions about the conditions for doing business. See for instance Bonifaz and Mortimore (1998: 25, 27-8).

This motivation was pointed out by interviewees P1, P2 and A2 (see Appendix 1). They only referred to the perforation of the CET, but as will be further argued, the G-3 also had implications for the FTZ.
export levels to the AC than those of the other member states regarding their participation in the country’s total exports. Peru’s exports to the AC had greater participation in its total exports to the world than those of Venezuela, and represented a similar percentage in comparison to Ecuador. They were only inferior in proportion to those of Colombia and Bolivia. Therefore, the low participation of exports to the AC in Peruvian total exports to the world looks as a weak argument to explain Peru’s disinterest in engaging the FTZ and the CET, as the other members’ export levels to the AC were also relatively low.

*Table 2. Member countries’ trade with the AC 1988-1992 ($US million)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Trade Balance (TB)</th>
<th>Total TB variation</th>
<th>Exports to the AC as percentage of total exports to the rest of the world 1988 / 1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>328.2</td>
<td>+29.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>309.3</td>
<td>383.4</td>
<td>-74.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>372.8</td>
<td>473.6</td>
<td>-100.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>778.4</td>
<td>482.4</td>
<td>+296</td>
<td>+974%</td>
<td>7% / 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1014.4</td>
<td>694.2</td>
<td>+320.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td>+420%</td>
<td>5% / 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>+28.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>+30.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>+49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>220.7</td>
<td>275.6</td>
<td>-54.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>300.1</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>+133.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>493.7</td>
<td>234.5</td>
<td>+259.2</td>
<td>+148%</td>
<td>2% / 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>478.3</td>
<td>428.1</td>
<td>+50.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>665.8</td>
<td>617.6</td>
<td>+48.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>177.1</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>+99</td>
<td>-71%</td>
<td>8% / 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>+90.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>188.5</td>
<td>181.7</td>
<td>+6.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>203.7</td>
<td>233.3</td>
<td>-29.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>178.1</td>
<td>159.8</td>
<td>+18.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>188.6</td>
<td>302.4</td>
<td>-113.8</td>
<td>-181%</td>
<td>7% / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>196.2</td>
<td>240.9</td>
<td>-44.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>340.6</td>
<td>-126.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>253.9</td>
<td>591.5</td>
<td>-337.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>275.6</td>
<td>596.1</td>
<td>-320.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andean General Secretariat (2006) and own calculations.

Table 2 shows that Peru’s trade deficit was financing the other AC members’ surplus, and this could be seen by the Peruvian government and several Peruvian economic sectors as a
disincentive for adopting the FTZ and the CET (Rojas 1997: 27-8). But under this reasoning, Ecuador could have also feared that its trade surplus with the AC could be transformed in the near future into a deficit due to the decreasing trend of its trade balance with the region. Moreover, Colombia had suffered trade deficits in 1989 and 1990, and it could have had the same fears. In these terms, although the Peruvian trade deficit with the AC was growing progressively and this was not the case with any of the other members, this is not a convincing argument for explaining Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET, as its government and other Peruvian economic sectors could have seen the picture the other way around, as perhaps Colombia and Ecuador did: by engaging these liberalisation schemes, the country would have a chance to reduce – if not revert – its trade deficit with the AC.

The argument of the low portion of non-traditional manufactured exports to the AC is not convincing either, because the other AC members also shared this condition. Table 3 shows that manufactured exports to the AC represented low portions of total manufactured exports to the world for all AC members.

Table 3. AC members’ manufactured exports to the region 1991-1992 and participation in total manufactured exports to the world (percentages)\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Manufactured exports as percentage of total exports to the AC</th>
<th>Manufactured exports to the AC as percentage of total manufacture exports to the world</th>
<th>Manufactured exports as percentage of total exports to the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on ECLAC. Base de Datos Estadísticos de Comercio Exterior (BADECEL), and Andean General Secretariat (2006).\(^{58}\)

\(^{57}\) Excluding Food products, beverages and tobacco (see Appendix 3). Own calculations using ECLAC’s BADECEL data base (CIU Revision 2 Divisions (categories 32-39), available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/badecel/badecel_new/basededatos. It was extremely difficult to find homogeneous and coincident data on non-traditional exports for AC members. See Appendix 3 for an explanation of how these data were obtained, and also of calculating Colombia’s, Ecuador’s and Peru’s manufactured exports. Unlike for these three countries, it was not possible to find alternative data for Bolivia’s and Venezuela’s non-traditional exports for 1991 and 1992.

\(^{58}\) Care has been taken to ensure that numbers at BADECEL coincide with those of the Andean General Secretariat (2006), so combining the two sources is completely sound for analytical purposes.
Although exports to the region between 1988 and 1992 represented 7-8% of total Peruvian exports, manufactured exports to the Andean market were highly significant for Peru. Between 1991 and 1992, Peruvian manufactured exports to the AC represented 80% and 82%, respectively, of Peruvian total exports to the Andean region. These percentages were higher than those of Peruvian manufactured exports to the rest of the world, which were only 56% and 59% respectively. Manufactured exports to the AC in 1991 and 1992 represented 11% of Peruvian total manufactured exports to the world in both years, but still these numbers were significant inasmuch as they showed that the Andean market was a promising platform for the development of Peru’s manufactured exports. Moreover, only Venezuela’s manufactured exports to the AC were higher than those of Peru, amounting to 86% in 1991 and 89% in 1992. Table 3 shows that for all countries except Bolivia, manufactured exports to the AC represented a greater portion of total exports to the region than manufactured exports’ participation in total exports to the world. This means that the AC was a very significant market for AC members’ industrial development. Yet, manufactured exports to the AC represented low portions of total manufactured exports to the world for all AC members, being the highest for Ecuador (19% and 33%) and Colombia (18% and 27%) both in 1991 and 1992.

For the purposes of the present analysis it is important to highlight that Peru was not the country that had the lowest participation of manufactured exports to the AC as a proportion of total manufactured exports to the world (11% in both years). For Venezuela (6% and 9%) and Bolivia (5% and 10%) these portions were lower. Peru’s manufactured exports to the region had only less weight on its trade structure to the world than those of Colombia and Ecuador. In these terms, at the beginning of the 1990s the AC looked like a promising market for Peru’s manufactured (and non-traditional)⁵⁹ exports. Therefore, even though Colombian and Venezuelan industries were perceived as the strongest of the region, there is not a forceful argument to consider that by adopting the FTZ and the CET Peru’s industrial development would be necessarily curtailed. On the contrary, as Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela did, Peru

---

³⁹ The evidence addressed in Appendix 3 shows that there might not be significant difference between the definition used here for ‘manufactured’ exports and the one of ‘non-traditional’ exports.
could have increased its manufactured exports to the region in order to reduce its trade deficit with the AC.

However, regarding the perception of Peruvian industries’ lower competitiveness, Table 4 shows that while Colombia and Venezuela substantially increased their manufactured exports to Peru, Peruvian manufactured exports to these countries only showed a slight increase between 1990 and 1995. This may provide a ‘true’ material basis for such a perception.

Table 4. Perú's trade of manufactured products with Colombia and Venezuela 1990-1995 (US million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>117.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>142.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>181.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>280.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>131.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>149.3</td>
<td>355.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using the same BADECEL data quoted in footnote 57.

Table 4 shows that while Peru had a slight manufactures’ trade surplus both with Colombia and with Venezuela in 1990, the other years were marked by an increasing deficit. This fact could have undermined the confidence of Peruvian industrial producers who began seeing manufactures’ trade deficits with Colombia and Venezuela since 1991. Manufactures’ trade deficit with Colombia increased 3 times between 1991 and 1992, and 13 times by 1995. With Venezuela, manufactures’ trade deficit increased first 7 times by 1992 and 40 times by 1995. Even considering the industrial sectors that were excluded from the FTZ in 1992 (for instance textiles, apparel and shoes), Table 4 shows that it is highly improbable that if Peru had joined the FTZ in 1992 it could have counteracted its manufactures’ trade deficit with Colombia and Venezuela. However, the point to highlight here is that in August 1992, when the Peruvian government decided to back out from the FTZ and the CET, there was not ‘forceful material

---

60 These products are the same included in ECLAC’s CIIU Revision 2 Divisions (categories 32-39) of the BADECEL data base quoted in footnote 57.

61 This was mainly due to Colombia’s exports like textiles, apparel and leather products; paper, print works and editorial products; and oil and coal derivatives including rubber and plastics; which substantially increased their participation in Peruvian imports. The same happened with Venezuela’s exports to Peru of products like oil and coal derivatives including rubber and plastics; mineral non-metallic products excluding oil and coal derivatives; and basic metallic industrial products (according to BADECEL data as referred in Appendix 3).

62 See footnote 52. Note that textiles, apparel and leather products were one of Colombia’s most successful export lines to Peru in the observed period (see footnote 61).
proof’ of the inferior competitiveness of Peruvian industries towards Colombian and Venezuelan ones, and effectively the lower competitiveness of Peruvian industries versus Colombian and Venezuelan could only be a ‘perception’.\textsuperscript{63} Peru’s manufacturing trade deficit with Colombia and Venezuela existed in 1991, but it seems difficult to accept that Peruvian industrial producers could have foreseen such an increase of their competitors’ exports to Peru in the following years. On the contrary, the Andean FTZ could have been seen as an opportunity to counteract such a situation, and at least Peru could have the chance to increase its total volumes of manufactured exports if its industrial products joined preferential conditions to enter the other AC members’ markets. Yet, Table 4 shows that Peru’s ‘fear’ of facing Colombian and Venezuelan industries’ higher competitiveness does explain Peru’s reluctance to incorporate into the FTZ and to adopt a CET that was higher than the one Peru preferred, even more in those industrial sectors which needed to import production supplies with lower tariffs in order to be more competitive.\textsuperscript{64}

The latter point corresponds to Peru’s fifth motivation, as some interviewees\textsuperscript{65} asserted that the Peruvian government was particularly worried about controlling inflation. For this, a flat CET was preferable than a scaled one, because a flat CET contributed in greater extent to price stabilisation.\textsuperscript{66} A scaled CET would distribute benefits to certain sectors in a discriminatory fashion, and this was seen as a way to benefit certain industrial sectors of Colombia and Venezuela, and further, of Ecuador.\textsuperscript{67} Moreover, the Fujimori government also wanted to substantially reduce Peruvian tariffs as they were the highest in the region during the 1980s (64%). Additionally, the aim with the FTZ was to liberalise trade within the region, while with the CET the aim was to protect such liberalisation (though with tariff levels that allowed for the opening of Andean countries to the world economy). Thus, these two liberalisation schemes

\textsuperscript{63} In their study of Peru’s competitiveness between 1980 and 1995, Bonifaz and Mortimore (1998) show that Colombia’s international competitiveness was much higher than Peru’s, but Peru’s international competitiveness was not much lower than Venezuela’s. Unfortunately, these authors do not compare Peru with individual countries, but only show international competitiveness rankings of countries in general (ibid., 28, 32 and 47). Neither do they discriminate competitiveness by production sectors, and thereby Peru’s industrial competitiveness is not assessed against other countries’.

\textsuperscript{64} This point was also emphasised by interviewee P2.

\textsuperscript{65} P1, P2, A1 and A2.

\textsuperscript{66} P2 and A1.

\textsuperscript{67} P2, A1 and A2.
were complementary and the success of one depended on the success of the other. Colombia and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Ecuador, wanted to protect their competitive sectors at the regional level through a higher CET, so they could increase their export capacity first within the region and then to the rest of the world.

But some interviewees\textsuperscript{68} pointed the sixth motivation as the definitive reason that led Peru to move away from the FTZ and the CET in 1992. This was Colombia and Venezuela’s negotiation of a free trade agreement with Mexico (the G-3), which distorted the negotiation of the two Andean trade liberalisation schemes. According to P1 – one of Peru’s chief trade negotiators, at the beginning of the negotiation process Peru was fully committed with the Andean integration project and with the FTZ and the CET, even though Peru was pursuing a greater degree of economic openness than the other Andean members. The first proposal of a CET that the JUNAC (the former Andean General Secretariat) made to member states at the beginning of the 1990s was accepted in full by Peru. This proposal followed the four-level scaled CET that Presidents had defined at the Galápagos Summit in 1989, and these levels were in any case higher than the levels Peru wanted to adopt (P1).

Even though Peru had manifested its disagreement with Colombia’s and Venezuela’s intentions of signing the G-3 with Mexico, at a meeting of the Andean Commission in 1992 the Peruvian Foreign Trade Minister said that he would sign the CET proposal made by the JUNAC ‘just as it is’ (P2).\textsuperscript{69} But the other member countries rejected the JUNAC’s proposal, and said that they needed to revise its terms. So the Peruvian Minister left the meeting and after consultations with President Fujimori he declared Peru’s intentions to suspend its participation in the FTZ and the CET, to which the other AC members reacted by threatening Peru with expulsion from the AC (P2). Peru was finally allowed to remain an AC member without adopting the FTZ and the CET.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{68} P1, P2 and A2.
\textsuperscript{69} However, interviewee P2 – one of Peru’s trade negotiators present at this meeting - recognised that the Peruvian Minister’s attitude could have been but only a way of showing to the other Andean Ministers that an agreement about the CET was impossible.
\textsuperscript{70} Decision 321, namely the one that approved Peru’s marginalisation from the FTZ and the CET, compelled Peru to sign bilateral trade agreements with each of the other AC members to liberalise certain lists of products that were
Interviewee P1 asserted that Colombia and Venezuela’s negotiations with Mexico had already started when these member states asked the AC permission for signing this agreement. In the Peruvian government’s view, signing a free trade agreement with a non-AC member country contradicted the customs union and the FTZ, and in general terms, the integration process. Peru was not invited to join the G-3, but nevertheless it did not have the economic conditions to sign a free trade agreement with Mexico (P1). The Peruvian government found it unappealing to create a customs union that would have ‘holes’ because of the trade preferences conceded by Colombia and Venezuela to Mexico. Peru had understood that any trade relationship with third countries would be carried out jointly as a group by the AC, but this was not what occurred. The Andean market was of great interest for Peru, but with the G-3 Mexico would become a competitor without engaging in the FTZ and the CET (P1).

In sum, it can be seen that the Peruvian government had significant material incentives for not adopting the FTZ and the CET. Yet, from the six motivations assessed, only the one of the lower competitiveness of Peruvian industries can be understood as having a relatively strong material basis that contributes to explaining Peru’s reluctance to adopt both trade schemes. It has been shown that the first three motivations corresponded to material conditions that were shared by other AC members, and thus their explanatory power is very limited. Finally, it is worth noting that the fifth and sixth motivations had an important ideological dimension. Regarding the fifth one, the Peruvian government’s will for having a flat and lower tariff is explained by a ‘strong belief’ in trade opening and ‘shock economic policies’ that President Fujimori and his economic team possessed at the time (Jiménez 2001). Regarding the sixth motivation, it is true that the G-3 distorted both the FTZ and the CET, but there is no reason to think that Ecuador and Bolivia did not see the same distortion that the Peruvian government saw. Perhaps the Peruvian government was highly sensitive for both parts (P2). However, the signing of these agreements took a long time, and in any case they liberalised much smaller portions of trade than the ones liberalised in the FTZ.

71 In exchange for approving Peru’s marginalisation from the FTZ and the CET (Decision 321), Colombia and Venezuela asked Peru to sign Decision 322, which allowed them to negotiate their whole tariff universe in the G-3 with Mexico (P1).

72 Although documentation showing whether Bolivia and Ecuador also saw the G-3 as a disincentive to adopt the FTZ and the CET was not found, it could be deduced that they signed Decision 322 and adopted the CET because they were granted SDT.
government was too ‘jealous’ or ‘protective’ in favour of the Peruvian producers for not wanting them to compete with Mexican ones.

Interviewee A2 – an AGS bureaucrat who participated in CET negotiations, asserted that the large and several exceptions of product lists, including SDT granted to Bolivia and Ecuador, also operated as disincentives for Peru engaging in the customs union, since “the CET was not the same for everyone” (A2). Because of the disagreement with the CET Peru had another motivation for not adopting the FTZ, since both schemes were complementary and the success of one depended on the success of the other. A holed CET made the FTZ less effective, and thus less attractive for Peru. But by not engaging the FTZ and the CET, Peru was losing the opportunity to reduce its trade deficit with the AC and to foster its industrial development through increasing manufactured exports to the region, as Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela did.

The previous analysis shows that materialist explanations need, at least, some reflection. More often than not, material incentives do not have clear material conditions that support them, and when they do, they might be permeated by ideological or other ideational issues. It can be considered that the six motivations that Peru had for not adopting the FTZ and the CET were significant as a whole, and hence they do provide a sound explanation for Peru’s reluctance towards both schemes. But if this was the case, why then remain an AC member? A low portion of total exports and of manufactured exports to the Andean market, and a trade deficit with the region do not seem like significant material benefits to Peru. Moreover, the fear of losses that could result from lower industrial competitiveness, from a higher and scaled CET and from competing against Mexican products because of the G-3 does not easily translate into obtaining greater material benefits for Peru from the AC.

During the first years of its re-launching, the AC concentrated on the trade issue area, and cooperation in other areas was very incipient. Peru had signed, altogether with the other AC members, a preferential trade agreement with the US and another with the EU to help Andean countries’ fight against drug production and traffic. Yet, had Peru left the AC in 1992, it could
have sought individual agreements with both parties.\textsuperscript{73} It could be argued that the Peruvian government did not want to leave the AC as it thought it could later on be in better conditions to incorporate to the FTZ or to adopt the CET. But the former could have been done through bilateral trade agreements (which indeed Decision 321 had already introduced, see footnote 70), and adopting the CET in the near future did not make much sense, given that the Peruvian government was \textit{ideologically} committed to a flat and lower CET. Moreover, Peru could have left the AC and asked for re-admission in the future. Another issue that may explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member could have been the lack of international legitimacy and political isolation that the Fujimori government was suffering by mid-1992, because of the coup d’état it had carried out by closing the Peruvian congress in April that year (De Gregori 1996; Boniface 2002: 372-3). But it was the OAS and not the AC which was dealing with the Peruvian political crisis, and had Peru left the AC still President Fujimori would have been requested to compound Peru’s internal crisis before the OAS, though by leaving the AC Peru could risk losing the other AC members’ support. Yet, no interviewee suggested anything related to this issue so far.\textsuperscript{74}

Hence, material incentives may explain to a significant extent Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET, but these same material incentives make it rather difficult to understand Peru’s interest in remaining an AC member, and there were not any additional material incentives that might explain this. In these terms, the need to look at other ideational issues different from material interests,\textsuperscript{75} like collective identity and regional institutions, is warranted. Looking at Peru’s second critical moment in this case study reinforces this need.

\textsuperscript{73} Though these were bloc agreements, and perhaps signing individual agreements with the US and with the EU could take longer than expected. Yet, and since these agreements were aimed at helping Peru and the other AC members to fight drug production and trafficking, it seems awkward to think that Peru would remain an AC member just for benefiting from these bloc agreements with third parties. However, as will be further argued, the case of the AC participating as a bloc in FTAA negotiations would be different.

\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, this issue was thought of as a product of the researcher’s evaluation of the context in which the 1992 critical moment occurred, and it was slightly mentioned by professor Alan Fairlie in a personal conversation with the author of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{75} Remember that, for constructivism, interests are ideas, even if they are related to obtaining material benefits.
2.1.3 Second moment: Peru’s partial adoption of the FTZ (but not the CET) in 1997

When Peru partially joined the FTZ in July 1997, material conditions regarding trade relationships with the AC had not changed much with respect to the ones of 1992. Consequently, this section does not offer an assessment of Peru’s trade material conditions as detailed as the one previously provided. In April 1997 Peru faced a critical moment when once again the other AC members threatened to expel Peru from the regionalist project because of its reluctance to fully engage the FTZ and to adopt the CET. It will be argued that since material conditions were not too different from the ones in 1992, the obtainment of material benefits from the AC cannot clearly explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member and partially incorporate the FTZ. In turn, Peru’s decision to keep its distance from the CET can be better explained considering the material conditions assessed in the previous section.

Between 1993 and 1997 Peru kept participating in FTZ and CET negotiations (P2, A2) but during these years it was allowed to maintain fixed tariffs. Following D-321 Peru signed bilateral trade agreements with each of the other Andean members, though including only specific sectors that were of mutual interest (P2), and not the major part of the tariff universe as the FTZ did. By 1997, when the Andean Community officially started working under the new Andean Integration System (SAI) and the integration goals were reaffirmed – including the main one of consolidating a common market by 2005, Peru still had a reluctant position towards the FTZ and the CET. Four years after the FTZ was put into practice, and two years after the full adoption of the CET among the other members, Peru’s exports to the AC had grown by 91%, but imports had increased by 200%, mainly due to the huge energy requirements of Peruvian productive sectors, and to the greater development and export capacity of Colombian and Venezuelan industries that had penetrated the Peruvian market (Elmore and De La Puente 1999: 175-6).

In 1997 Peru still maintained a trade deficit with the AC as a whole, and also with each AC member (Rico 1999: 24). Between 1993 and 1997 Peruvian total exports to the world grew by 102%, while imports grew by 107%. This was translated into an increase in its total trade deficit.

---

76 See *Acta de Sucre* (IX Andean Presidential Council, 22/04/1997).
from US$676 million to US$1,673 million in those years.\textsuperscript{77} However, even though a great portion of Peru’s trade with the other Andean countries was not liberalised, Peruvian exports to the AC grew constantly between 1990 and 1997, going from US$214 million to US$515 million. But imports grew at a greater speed, going from US$340 million in 1990 to US$1,564 million in 1997, which means that 65% of the Peruvian total trade deficit with the world in 1997 was explained by its deficit with the AC (US$1,049 million).\textsuperscript{78} This was a very particular and crucial condition for Peru, and the permanent trade deficit with the AC was always seen by the government and several productive sectors as the main disadvantage for Peru belonging to the AC (Fairlie 1999a: 208). According to Fairlie, during the 1990s non-traditional exports to the AC represented only 7.3% of total Peruvian non-traditional exports on an average annual basis,\textsuperscript{79} while total imports from the AC increased by 14.3% with respect to the levels of 1990. The main sectors of intra-industrial trade for Peru towards the AC were paper, chemical products, rubber and plastic, metals, machinery and equipment, and leather (Fairlie 1999: 36). During the 1990s, intra-industrial trade with the other Andean partners was greater for Colombia and Venezuela, and more lately for Ecuador. Peru was the only country whose intra-industrial regional trade had decreased in this decade (Echavarría 1998: 109).

Nevertheless, the Andean market was still very significant for Peru’s non-traditional exports. In 1997, the year when Andean intra-regional trade reached its maximum level to that date, out of US$516 million of Peruvian exports to the AC (8% of its total exports to the world), US$495 million were manufactured products – more than 95% (the remaining percentage accounted for primary products). Manufactured Peruvian exports to the rest of ALADI countries\textsuperscript{80} were 70% in the same year, which means that the Andean market represented greater added value for Peru’s trade with Latin America than ever before (Rico 1999: 25). The fact that almost all Peruvian exports to the AC were non-traditional contradicted the historical tendency of

\textsuperscript{77} Own calculations made with data taken from the Peruvian National Superintendence of Tax Administration (SUNAT). The web address is included in the thesis’ References section.

\textsuperscript{78} Own calculations made with data taken from the Andean General Secretariat (2006).

\textsuperscript{79} Note that 7.3% is a lower portion than the levels of 11% (shown in Table 3) and 17% (using the numbers provided by Rojas (1997), see Appendix 3) for the participation of manufactured/non-traditional exports to the AC in Peru’s total manufactured/non-traditional exports to the world, which confirm that Peruvian non-traditional exports to the AC decreased its participation in the Peruvian trade structure during the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{80} ALADI – Latin American Integration Association, of which all Latin American countries are members.
Peruvian external trade, which mainly consisted of primary products (Elmore and De La Puente 1999: 181-2).\textsuperscript{81} The importance of the AC for Peru’s non-traditional exports was great, given that the Peruvian economy’s high growth rate between 1992 and 1997 was led by non-tradable and tradable extractive activities (Jiménez 2001: 154; García 2007: 143, 145).

The fact that the volume of Peruvian exports to the AC – including non-traditional and manufactured exports – had maintained a growing trend (though not as a portion of total non-traditional/manufactured exports to the world) might explain Peru’s partial adoption of the Andean FTZ in 1997, despite the persistent trade deficit with the region. But this adoption was preceded by a critical moment regarding Peru’s membership to the AC. After the Presidential Summit in Sucre in April 1997, the Peruvian government announced its retreat from the AC, because the other Andean members were pushing Peru to fully engage the FTZ (P2), and Peru only wanted to liberalise a portion of its tariff universe. Yet, after intense negotiations that will be addressed in greater detail at the second part of the chapter, Peru finally incorporated the FTZ in partial fashion in June 1997 through Decision 414. This Decision established a Tariff Reduction Program between Peru on the one side, and Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela on the other, which was intended to start in August 1997 and end in December 31, 2005. By January 1, 2000, 86% of the Peruvian tariff universe should be liberalised, and by January 1, 2006, 100% (Rico 1999: 24). Regarding the CET, the AC decided to accept Peru’s ‘special situation’ and Peru’s adoption of the CET was postponed to 2006 (Echavarría 1998: 96).

Note that the situation in 1997 was not too different from the one in 1992, as Peru still had a significant trade deficit with the AC. Moreover, the perception among Peruvian economic sectors about the inferior competitiveness of Peruvian industries vis-à-vis Colombian and Venezuelan ones might have persisted. Besides the previously mentioned decrease in Peru’s intra-industrial trade during the 1990s and the numbers shown in Table 4, between 1990 and 1995 high value-added exports of Colombia and Venezuela to the AC represented and average

\textsuperscript{81} According to Elmore and De La Puente (1999: 181-2), the most salient products among non-traditional exports were iron, steel and metallurgical manufactures, chemicals and textiles. Note that, unlike BADECEL data considered for calculating manufactured exports in the previous section, these authors include iron and steel in non-traditional Peruvian exports.
of 70% and 47% respectively, compared to 38% for Peru, 36% for Ecuador and 8% for Bolivia.\textsuperscript{82}

By 1997, Peru’s product participation in total AC’s manufactured exports was much lower than Colombia and Venezuela (10% compared to 32% and 35% respectively).\textsuperscript{83} In spite of this, after having announced its intention to leave the AC, the Peruvian government decided to partially adopt the FTZ and to maintain negotiations for the adoption of the CET.

Peru’s decision to remain an AC member might be explained by some advantages the Peruvian government saw: export growth to the Andean market; manufactured products as the main exports to the AC; and regional negotiations in issues like services, support programs and tariff evaluation (Fairlie 1999a: 216). But as a disadvantage, the Peruvian government saw the growing trade deficit that Peru maintained with the AC. As for the private sector, the main advantage of Peru’s belonging to the AC was the increasing involvement of Peru in international negotiations. The disadvantages perceived were: adopting the CET; engaging the FTZ; and the possible harmonisation of economic policies (Fairlie 1999a: 216-7). Hence, according to Fairlie, the private sector did not support Andean integration initiatives such as the FTZ and CET. Peru’s reluctance to adopt the CET can be explained because most Peruvian productive sectors had already learned to operate with the Peruvian structure of fixed tariffs, and there was no interest in moving to a scaled one in which tariff harmonisation would be done with the other Andean members. Peru also signed a free trade agreement with Chile in June 1998, and this, added to the existing trade agreements of Colombia and Venezuela with Mexico and the one of Bolivia with Mercosur,\textsuperscript{84} maintained a holed CET with a wide range of exceptions. Like at the beginning of the 1990s, it is reasonable to assume that Peru did not want to engage a holed CET that was established following the interests of the industrial sectors of Colombia, Venezuela and now Ecuador.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{82} See Pineda (2004) (Assessor for the Andean General Secretary). Reference included in the section of AC official documents.

\textsuperscript{83} Ecuador (8%) had a similar participation to Peru and Bolivia had the lowest participation (3%). See Comunidad Andina (2002).

\textsuperscript{84} Bolivia became an associated member of Mercosur in December 1995.

\textsuperscript{85} P2, A1, A2, A4 and A5.
But the private sector and the government’s interest in engaging bloc negotiations with third parties (P2) may explain Peru’s desire to prolong negotiations towards the adoption of the Andean CET. Since 1995, Peru was negotiating within the Andean bloc in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiation process. According to Elmore and De La Puente (1999: 191), during the 1990s Peru thought that if it engaged an Andean position, it would have greater weight in hemispheric negotiations, and in this sense, the internal Andean negotiating process was resulting effective for Peruvian objectives. In the view of these authors, the characteristics on which the FTAA liberalisation process was based were consistent and favourable to the Peruvian economic development program. Moreover, the FTAA was seen as compatible and complementary with the efforts that were being made at the AC (ibid., 201).

In 1999 the Peruvian Chamber of Commerce and the Peruvian Exporters Association advised the Peruvian government to procure bloc negotiations in international trade bargaining forums (such as the FTAA) and to strengthen the AC (Fairlie 1999a: 212). The National Association of Industries (SNI) also called for a revision of Peru’s unilateral position towards international trade, as unilateral positions eliminated certain levels of freedom to negotiate and obtain greater market access in the future. Additionally, the SNI advised about the need for Peru to take advantage of its trade preferences achieved at the regional level (ibid., 215). Hence, the interest in being part of the Andean bloc for international bargaining was an important motive for Peru to remain an AC member and to maintain negotiations towards the consolidation of the CET.

However, had Peru left the AC in 1997 it could have coordinated its position in hemispheric trade negotiations with the AC or with Mercosur without needing to be a member of any trading bloc. Likewise, as pointed out in the previous section, it could have renegotiated its trade preferences with the US and with the EU for supporting its fight against drug trafficking. In other words, material benefits obtained from AC membership were not great, and hence they cannot clearly explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member. If Peru believed in the potentiality of the Andean market for its manufactured products, it could have deepened the bilateral trade agreements that Decision 321 had created with each AC member. There was no
need to belong to the SAI in order to enjoy trade preferences for its exports. Moreover, without engaging the CET, Peru’s commitment with the consolidation of a common market was still in great doubt.

One final issue that could explain Peru’s maintaining its membership to the AC at the critical moment in 1997 is the episode of the ‘hostages’ crisis’, in which President Fujimori decided to pursue a successful military rescue of a number of hostages that the guerrilla group ‘Sendero Luminoso’ had kidnapped at the Japanese Embassy in Lima. The military operation was carried out in April 1997 at the same time as the Andean Presidential Summit in Sucre (Bolivia) was taking place, which President Fujimori did not attend because of this operation (P2). It could be argued that President Fujimori wanted to secure AC members’ support for his problematic decision of pursuing a military rescue of the hostages instead of negotiating with the kidnappers, and hence he did not contemplate leaving the AC in that precise moment. However, at some point Fujimori declared that Peru would leave the AC (as above shown), and thus the latter point loses its explanatory value.

Peru finally completed its adoption of the FTZ by 2006, but during the 2000s the completion of the CET did not progress much, to the point that by the end of the decade it was practically dropped by the AC, together with the aim of consolidating a common market. Despite some agreement reached in 2002, where Peru for the first time in ten years agreed to adopt the CET by 2004 (García-Sayán 2002: 180-1), the suspension of FTAA negotiations in 2005 made Andean countries lose interest in consolidating a CET (A1 and A3), although the prospects for negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU still brought some motivation for member states (P2). In any case, the trade preferences granted by Colombia and Peru to the US clearly dismantled the few achievements obtained within the Andean customs union by that time, and the same happened with the FTAs signed by Colombia and Peru with the EU in 2010 (A5). In 2008 the Andean Council of Ministers postponed the consolidation of an Andean CET for an undefined date, following a proposal that a special commission should present to this Council by the end of 2011, but works about such proposal had made very little progress by the end of
Another AGS bureaucrat asserted that this goal was definitely removed from the agenda of Andean integration (A4).

The assessment carried out in this part of the present chapter has not aimed to show that material incentives were not significant to explain Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET. On the contrary, if the motivations Peru had for rejecting these two liberalisation schemes in 1992 are taken as a whole, they invite wondering why Peru did not leave the AC when the other AC members threatened to expel it. In 1997, the importance of the Andean market for Peru’s manufactured exports and the interest in pursuing hemispheric negotiations as part of the Andean bloc might explain, respectively, Peru’s partial adoption of the FTZ and Peru’s interest in keeping its participation in CET negotiations, though without engaging the customs union. However, it has been argued that both in 1992 and in 1997 material benefits obtained from AC membership were not significant, and they could have been preserved had Peru left the regionalist project. Therefore, there is a need to analyse other motivations for Peru remaining an AC member different from material benefit calculations. Indeed, both critical episodes of 1992 and 1997 when Peru was close to retreat from the AC will be addressed in greater detail in what follows, as interviewees pointed out issues related to collective identity and to the importance of regional institutions that explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member while keeping a reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET.

2.2 The role of collective identity

When asked about the role of a ‘collective’ or ‘Andean’ identity in orienting state action in this case study interviewees’ understandings of the content of this identity were very diverse, and some of them even asserted that such an identity did not exist. Most interviewees did not say much about the content of an Andean identity, from which it can be inferred that for them collective identity was not very important in orienting trade negotiations within the AC. Only interviewees P2 and A1 spoke of the content of Andean identity. P2 – one of the Peruvian government’s leading trade negotiators, asserted that a ‘great’ Andean identity does not exist because citizens do not know about the existence of the AC, and there are several Peruvian

---

86 P1, A2, A3, A4 and A5.
entrepreneurs who do not know that their products have free market access to the other AC members. Interviewee P2 explicitly denied the existence of an Andean identity, which he/she understood as a feeling of belonging to the Andean region shared by AC member countries’ citizens, but nevertheless spoke of a ‘feeling of belonging to the Andean group’ shared by AC members’ government officials when negotiating as a group. On his/her part, interviewee A1 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of trade issues,\(^{87}\) held that there is an Andean collective ‘cultural’ identity consisting of “a common past, geography, language and common goals and aims”, which is very important (A1).

Interviewee P1 – one of Peru’s chief trade negotiators, asserted that identity among peoples is generated by trade (P1). For P1, “trade generates union and even identity”, because trade is the means by which entrepreneurs and people from different countries get to know each other (P1). Although P1 did not make any specific reference to the content of an Andean identity, it can be inferred that since this identity is created by trade, it emerges around trade issues (economic benefits, products, trade relationships and so forth). This view was shared by interviewee A2 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of trade issues,\(^ {88}\) who when asked about the role of identity only answered that “we [the AC member states] are the natural markets for all Andean [countries]” (A2). Interviewee P3 – a high official of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of AC issues, only mentioned that the issue of identity was ‘complex’. Accordingly, the construction of an Andean identity was more a goal of the integration process than something already achieved or consolidated (P3). Interviewee A3 – an AGS bureaucrat currently in charge of CET issues, did not even mention the word ‘identity’ when asked about its role. This interviewee did not say anything about any kind of identity, as if the concept or the existence of identity were simply not in his/her mind. Interviewees A4 – one of the AGS’ directors in charge of trade issues, and A5 – an AGS director in charge of international

\(^{87}\) A1 participated in CET negotiations during the early 2000s.  
\(^{88}\) A2 participated in CET negotiations during the 1990s.
negotiations, suggested that identity did not matter much in the unfolding of trade negotiations within the AC.\textsuperscript{89}

In sum, no interviewee denied the existence of an Andean collective identity as all of them commented on its role and gave some implicit insight about its content, with the only exception of interviewee A3. In these terms, constitutive effects of Andean identity can be observed, as interviewees – namely some of the main performers of AC member states’ and AGS’ actions – held ideas about collective identity. However, only interviewee A1 asserted that Andean identity was important in orienting trade negotiations within the AC. Thus, causal effects of collective identity are difficult to assess, and even constitutive effects seem to be rather weak, for few interviewees provided concrete answers about the content of Andean identity. Nonetheless, interviewees P1 and P2’s accounts of the critical moments lived in 1992 and 1997 when the Peruvian government announced its intention to leave the AC (at which both interviewees were present), contribute to the assessment of the importance of collective identity in the unfolding of FTZ and CET negotiations, and in explaining Peru’s decision to remain an AC member.

Regarding the first critical moment, interviewee P2 asserted that when Peru announced suspending its participation in the FTZ and the CET in December 1992, the other AC members threatened to expel Peru. But the information was filtered to the media as if Peru had proposed its withdrawal from the AC (P1). Yet, interviewee P1 said that initially Peru’s intention was never to abandon the AC but only to obtain a waiver so it would join the FTZ and the CET in the near future. It was the other Andean members who told Peruvian representatives that since Peru did not want to adopt the FTZ and the CET as they were proposed at the time, Peru would be in practice out of the AC (P1). Hence, it was not the Peruvian government who was looking forward to withdrawing from the AC, but the other member states that put it in such situation. Accordingly, in the same meeting at Caracas where they put pressure on Peruvian officials, the other four AC members got together in a room without the Peruvian representatives, and after

\textsuperscript{89} However, as will be seen in the Chapter 3, interviewee A4 considered that collective identity among government officials was very significant when the Andean group was negotiating with third parties.
a while they came out and asked Peru to stay in the AC, obtaining the waiver it had asked for (P1).

Something similar happened at the second critical moment, when President Fujimori announced his intentions to leave the AC in April 1997. Interviewee P2 asserted that at a Ministerial meeting in Bogota, the other member countries asked Peru to liberalise its whole tariff universe much earlier than expected (by the end of 1999 instead of by 2003), and since no agreement could be reached, the Peruvian Minister said that it was necessary to consult President Fujimori about Peru’s remaining in the AC (P2). Once again, as it had happened in 1992, the information leaked to the media was that Peru had withdrawn from the AC. After the meeting, the Bolivian delegation, which had the pro-tempore presidency of the AC, published a Reuter press communicate announcing Peru’s withdrawal from the AC. The next day the Peruvian Minister made clear to a Colombian radio station that Peru had not made such decision, and later President Fujimori had to declare in an official communication that Peru had no intention to abandon the AC (P2).90

A few weeks later, at a meeting of the Andean Commission, the other AC members told the Peruvian delegation that if Peru did not adopt the FTZ and the CET in the terms posed by the other members, Peru had to leave the AC, and they informed Peru about the redistribution and re-location of the AC institutional organisms (P2). According to P2, this meeting lasted 5 minutes as the Peruvian delegation said that it would not negotiate in those terms, and left the room. An hour later, the other member countries’ representatives phoned the Peruvian delegation and told them they wanted Peru to stay in the AC. But then the Peruvian delegation said they needed to consult President Fujimori whether Peru would remain within the AC, and warned that even if Peru decided to stay the advances in the negotiations would need to be set back (P2). The next meeting of the Andean Commission was to be organised in Lima by July

90 This does not coincide with what Tello (2004: 56) narrates about this critical episode, as he states that President Fujimori publicly announced his intention to abandon the AC on April 10, 1997. Press reports, like García Belaúnde (2002) and Caretas (1997) – a Peruvian news magazine, also asserted that President Fujimori made this announcement. According to interviewee A2, who slightly mentioned the 1997 critical episode during the interview, after the meeting in Bogota where the crisis broke out, President Fujimori had given his collaborators the instruction to ‘denounce the CartA’, which meant Peru’s withdrawal from the AC. Yet, these details do not undermine the arguments about the causal effects of identity that will be further derived from P2’s account.
1997. The Peruvian assessors had told President Fujimori that if the other members accepted a set of conditions, it was appropriate for Peru to remain an AC member. President Fujimori then gave instructions to ask for such conditions, and at the meeting in Lima the other AC members accepted Peru’s demands, which were included in Decision 414 (P2).

It is worth noting that P1 and P2 emphasised that in both critical moments it was the other AC member states’ representatives who ‘forced’ Peru to consider its withdrawal from the regional scheme. On both occasions the other countries’ representatives changed their minds and, a short while after having told Peru that it would have to leave the AC, they asked Peruvian representatives to maintain Peru’s membership and accepted Peru’s conditions. While P1 and P2 were narrating these episodes, a direct question about the role of identity was not asked (neither about the role of institutions) because this could have manipulated their answers and altered their accounts. Later on, when asked about the reasons why Peru did not leave the AC at the critical moment in 1992, P1 answered that “Peru thought that the integration project was feasible. Peru asked for a waiver but it did not want to leave the AC […] Peru did not want to disrupt the pace of Andean integration” (P1). Hereafter, when asked about the role of identity in orienting Peru’s decision to remain an AC member in 1992, this interviewee asserted that:

“Until the beginning of the 1990s Peru was always an integrationist without putting into doubt the values that oriented the AC since its creation until the end of the 1980s. It was since the Peruvian economic crisis that Peru began to adopt a different vision [as it] had to insert itself into the world economy. The fact of remaining an AC member for Peru has a co-narrative. Peru considered that the AC needed to be updated” (P1).

P1’s view of Peru as an ‘integrationist’ coincides with P3’s assertion that “Peru has always had an integrationist vocation, particularly with the AC” (P3), even though it must be clarified that this latter answer was not given to a concrete question about the critical moments of 1992 and 1997, but rather about Peru’s commitment with the Andean integration process in general. Both P1 and P3’s expressions have a metaphorical connotation as long they are assigning an identity to a country as if the latter was a person. This type of metaphorical construction that personifies countries or states has been highlighted by Wendt (1999: 196) and Drulák (2004: 4) as key to understanding international politics and state action. Peru having an ‘integrationist
identity and vocation’ can be assessed as one of those discursive figures that are ‘naturalised’ in agents’ discourse, which Walter and Helmig (2005: 9) call ‘conventional’ or ‘lively’ metaphors, “still visible as tropes in communication but not as striking as innovative metaphors”. Due to their frequent repetition the impact of conventional metaphors is reduced, but they are still highly useful in defining agents’ reality – and their identities – (ibid.).

In the case of P2, when asked about the reasons why Peru remained an AC member both in 1992 and in 1997, this interviewee answered that:

“There was a political issue for Peru to continue being an AC member. No President and no government have wanted to leave the integration process. Abandoning an integration process has political costs” (P2, emphasis added).

Even after asserting, as previously quoted, that “a great Andean identity does not exist”, interviewee P2 added that “As I said before, the political content of the AC is important” (P2). At some later point during the interview P2 said again that “There was also a political issue why Peru continued [being an AC member]” (P2). These references to the ‘political’ costs, issues and content related to the Andean integration process and Peru’s maintenance of its membership to the AC coincide with the views given by AGS bureaucrats A1 and A2. This latter interviewee asserted that Peru’s permanence in the AC “had a more political than an economic component. In Peru no Minister and no President wanted to take responsibility for Peru’s abandoning the AC” (A2). A2 added that this responsibility consisted of the fact that there were Peruvian sectors that had taken advantage of the Andean integration process. The so-called ‘platform effect’ was true with time, as “many Andean exporters learned first to export within the AC and then to third countries, particularly the ones producing value-added goods and manufactures” (A2).91 When asked about the role of identity in orienting Peru’s behaviour, A2 asserted that:

“There were reasons related to a collective identity why Peru did not leave the AC. In all Andean countries there are economic, political and opinion sectors for whom the Andean integration project is profitable. And there was a defence of the integration process. The other [member] countries also took identity into account for not letting Peru leave the AC; it was not just an economic calculation. It was a combination of the economic, the political and the social cohesion issues” (A2).

91 Note that this view coincides with the one of Echavarría (1998: 112-3) quoted in p.85 above.
In turn, interviewee A1 was more emphatic about the importance of identity, and unemployed several metaphors to refer to it. For this interviewee “The AC is initially a political scheme. We are naturally Andean [and] this makes it very difficult to tell a country ‘get out of here’ [the AC]. We are brothers” (A1). Accordingly, what the other AC member countries did with Peru’s reluctant position towards adopting the FTZ and the CET was to say “if you have difficulties, we can keep on negotiating” (A1). For A1, collective identity, which he/she defined as ‘cultural identity’, is “an axiom, a departure point” (A1). This interviewee considered that “there could not be an idea that Peru was not Andean”, and that “although Fujimori wanted Peru to leave the AC in 1997, [Peru] could not escape the concept of fraternity”. Even interviewee A3, who did not mention the word ‘identity’ when asked about its role, asserted later in the interview that although Peru wanted to leave the AC “the other countries did not let it do it”, and that ‘the other member countries’ integrationist spirit’ had great weight in not letting Peru abandon the AC, as they were “patient and understanding” (A3).

The previous interviewees’ assertions show that collective identity had constitutive effects, as it was part of the ideas informing Peru’s and the other AC members’ behaviour. Causal effects of collective identity can be assessed through the metaphor of the ‘political cost’ pointed out by interviewees P2 and A2. The expression ‘political cost’ is a metaphor because ‘cost’ is a word used to denote the loss of political legitimacy that agents may suffer because of making certain decisions. Presidents or Ministers who make this decision may incur a loss of political legitimacy that political leaders are not ‘willing to pay’ (where ‘paying’ accounts for a continuation of the same metaphor).92 This political cost operated as a reason for the Peruvian government deciding not to leave the AC. The ‘political cost’ of abandoning the AC is related to issues of collective identity, as interviewee P1 related this cost with ‘the political content of the AC’ – as opposed to an economic one – and with a ‘political issue’. Interviewee A1 related the ‘political cost’ with issues of identity like ‘Andean nature’, ‘brotherhood’ and ‘fraternity’, and with Peru’s ‘Andean identity’. Interviewee A2 referred to the responsibility that no Minister and no President wanted to take for Peru’s abandoning the AC (the political cost) with a ‘political

92 Besides these testimonies, other interviewees commented on the political cost of proposing or making the decision to abandon the AC or to end the regionalist project, and thus this metaphor will be further discussed in Chapter 5 as it will be assessed as an issue that helps understanding the AC’s maintenance.
component’ – also opposed to an economic one – and with ‘political and social cohesion issues’. These issues are surely related to the profitableness of being an AC member, which allows assessing the identification of certain Peruvian sectors with the Andean integration process. Interviewees P1, P3 and A3, who did not speak of this ‘political cost’, also pointed out issues of collective identity like ‘Peru always being an integrationist’ and the ‘integrationist spirit’ held by the other AC members, which help understanding the ‘co-narrative’ that the fact of remaining an AC member has for Peru (P2). This ‘co-narrative’ is another metaphor that refers to those ‘non-trade aspects’ entailed by membership to the AC, like political and identity issues. From this interpretive analysis causal effects of collective identity can be observed, and thus an explanation based on its role can be provided.

2.3 The role of regional institutions
In this case study constitutive effects of regional norms can be observed as long as all interviewees acknowledged the existence of the Andean Decisions that were the product of and oriented FTZ and CET negotiations among AC member states. Interviewee P2 – one of Peru’s leading trade negotiators, provided the full list of Decisions adopted between 1992 and 1997 that illustrates the importance of norms in the unfolding of the FTZ and CET negotiations, while the other interviewees spoke of some of them and their contents:

D-321 decreed Peru’s marginalisation from the adoption of the FTZ and the CET for a year, and compelled it to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with each AC member.

D-322 allowed Colombia and Venezuela to sign the G-3 with Mexico, and later on allowed Bolivia to sign an association trade agreement with Mercosur (1995) and Peru to sign a free trade agreement with Chile (1998).

D-347 extended Peru’s suspension from the FTZ and the CET until April 30, 1994.

D-353 incorporated a group of products to the FTZ between Peru and the other AC members; it gave Peru a deadline for engaging the FTZ by June 1995, and instructions to advance in the progressive adoption of the CET.

D-377 set an ultimatum to Peru to incorporate to the FTZ by January 1996.

D-387 extended to December 21, 1997, the deadline established by D-377, and allowed Peru to maintain its own tariff structure and to keep an observer status in the negotiations for the consolidation of the Andean CET.
D-414 decreed Peru’s partial incorporation to the FTZ, establishing that by December 1999 Peru would liberalise 86% of its tariff universe, and by December 2005 it would liberalise its whole tariff universe; it also allowed Peru to maintain its own tariffs towards third countries and to keep an observer status in CET negotiations.

In October 2002 Peru signed D-535 which by the first time established the conditions for the adoption of the CET for the five AC member countries, but this Decision was never fulfilled.\textsuperscript{93}

From the previous list of decisions and considering the description of the unfolding of negotiations for the adoption of the FTZ and the CET provided earlier, it is possible to infer that there was a need to create new Decisions in order to make the normative changes required to meet Peru’s demands and to maintain the normative-institutional cohesion of the Andean regionalist project. The provision of new Decisions was the way to ‘approve’ and ‘legalise’ the changes that AC member states agreed to make in order for Peru to remain an AC member despite its marginalisation from the main tools defined to meet the main goal of creating an Andean common market. From this pattern of subsequent Decisions regarding the terms in which Peru must engage the FTZ and the CET and remain an AC member, constitutive and causal effects of institutions can be observed.

Norms play a constitutive role as long as they are acknowledged by actors (Onuf 1998: 60-1), and Searle (1995: 47, 127) tells us that they have constitutive and causal effects even if they are not consciously recognised. Moreover, if norms are taken as a referent to act in one way or another, in terms of what can and cannot be done, they have regulative effects that account for causal effects (Wendt 1999), for agents might fear being punished if they act against the norms (Onuf 1998). The previous list of Andean Decisions allowed Peru to adopt a reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET and to remain an AC member without engaging these key tools for achieving a common market. These norms oriented state action in terms of AC member states preserving the coherence of the AC normative framework, and their adaptation to Peru’s demands provided security for member states in terms of having approval of the conditions in which they should treat Peru and in which Peru should remain an AC

\textsuperscript{93} A1, A3 and A4.
member. States had these norms present, and they acted in order to enforce these norms, and changed them when their enforcement was not feasible anymore.

This recurrent action of changing Andean norms as long as Peru needed new conditions to simultaneously preserve its reluctant position and its membership to the AC gives room to observe other causal effects of regional institutions besides regulative ones. For it can be inferred that the provision of subsequent norms demonstrates a great ‘institutional flexibility’ that could have motivated Peru’s decision to remain an AC member, even more at the critical moments in 1992 and 1997. This institutional flexibility could have made Peru feel comfortable enough to maintain its membership and keep participating in all meetings regarding the adoption of the FTZ and the CET (even as an ‘observer’) without engaging these two trade schemes. If institutional flexibility ‘made’ the Peruvian government feel comfortable enough to remain an AC member without having to engage the key tools to meet the AC’s main goal, this would account for a causal effect, as it would consist of a motivation. However, interviewees did not make any explicit comment about the benefits of the institutional flexibility shown by the pattern of subsequent Decisions’ changes, and therefore the causal effects of this flexibility can be inferred as a result of analysing the context, and further, interpreting what some interviewees said in relation to this issue.

For instance, interviewee A1 – an AGS bureaucrat who participated in CET negotiations in the early 2000s, provided a clue to thinking about this when he/she used the metaphorical expression that “the CartA is not imposing, is flexible” (A1). Indeed, it was from this metaphor, and from other interviewees’ assertions in the other two case studies, that the idea of ‘institutional flexibility’ – which is also a metaphor – as a reason/motivation for Peru remaining an AC member was derived as a product of interpretive analysis.94 A1 added that the other AC member states’ attitude towards Peru was “if you have difficulties, we carry on negotiating” (A1), which coincided with A3’s previously quoted account that the other AC members were ‘patient and understanding’ with Peru. These assertions invite reflection on the importance of norms’ adaptation to Peru’s demands and the capability of regional institutions to provide

---

94 This idea of institutional flexibility will be addressed again in Chapter 5 as one of the issues that might contribute to understanding the AC’s maintenance.
room for dissent and for prolonging negotiations. It is worth noting that, according to P1 and P2’s accounts of the critical moments of 1992 and 1997, at both occasions Peru only considered the possibility of leaving the AC when the other member countries hardened their position about Peru’s compliance with Andean norms (in other words, when the other AC members made Andean norms ‘inflexible’). On both occasions, when the other AC members’ representatives asked the Peruvian delegation to maintain Peru’s membership to the regional scheme, they offered to accept Peru’s conditions and to incorporate them into new Decisions that would legalise the way in which Peru would adopt the FTZ and the CET and remain an AC member.

One last point that contributes to the assessment of other causal effects of regional norms is found in P1's – a Peruvian chief trade negotiator, assertion that Andean norms have offered support for Peru’s trade policy. Accordingly, “the AC is an organisation that has solidly developed in the trade area. Ceding sovereignty here has been fruitful” (P1). From this assertion, it can be deduced that the making of Andean norms and even their adaptation to Peru's requests provided a regional normative basis for Peru's implementation of its trade policy. If this was the case, we can infer that Peru could have identified with Andean norms as long as they provided benefits for its policymaking. However this is a merely deductive observation, and it might be the case that Andean norms only counted as a referent for the making of Peruvian trade policies, and not necessarily as a normative framework that enabled the implementation of these policies.

If Andean norms were just taken as a referent by Peruvian government officials, then we could only be sure of the constitutive effects of these norms, but not of their causal ones, as we cannot be sure that these norms provoked changes in the making of Peruvian trade policies. In turn, causal effects of Andean norms can be observed inasmuch as Peruvian officials identified with such norms because of the supportive role they played for national policymaking, following Bloom’s (1990: 51) view that agents identify with the sources providing benefits. Interviewee P3 asserted that the AC institutional structure ‘favoured’ Peru because there is a series of Andean norms which have been incorporated into Peruvian national law (P3). Hence,
through interpreting interviewee P1 and P3’s previous assertions, we can assess Andean norms as a source of collective identity, for it is possible to infer that agents felt certain identification with regional norms, as long as norms offered support for Peruvian trade policy and their supranational character was ‘fruitful’ (P1), and as long as they have been incorporated into Peruvian national law.

2.3.1 The role of the AGS

The Andean General Secretariat (AGS) as an institutional organism of the AC also played an important role in the unfolding of the negotiations of the FTZ and the CET and in contributing to Peru’s maintenance of its membership to the regional scheme. Success in the provision of legal grounds for accepting Peru's reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET was possible thanks to member states’ commitment to attend official meetings, but also thanks to the intense efforts of the AGS to provide the work agendas for these meetings, formulate agreement proposals, and coordinate the organisation of meetings and maintain their frequency. Following interviewee A2 – an AGS bureaucrat who participated in CET negotiations during the 1990s, the AGS was always very proactive in showing Peru why it had to resume its trade obligations as soon as possible. Studies and analyses were permanently made by the AGS to show Peru a clear view for this (A2). In A2’s words, “the AGS always worked hard for Peru's reincorporation [to the FTZ and the CET]”, and thanks to that “there was never a total detachment so Peru never treated the other AC members as third parties” (A2).

The enabling role of the AGS to maintaining the pace of negotiations does not clearly denote causal effects. For it is not clear that ‘enabling’ equates ‘making possible’, as if in the absence of the enabling factor the particular enabled event would not have happened. ‘Enabling’ is more similar to ‘facilitating’, and if the extent to which the ‘enabling’ or ‘facilitating’ factors ‘changed’ things is not clarified, then assessing their causal effects becomes more difficult. Furthermore, since no interviewee affirmed that because of the role of the AGS Peru remained an AC member, causal effects cannot be observed in this regard. In these terms, constitutive effects of the AGS role can be more clearly assessed than causal ones.
Causal effects of the AGS can be more clearly observed in the political tension between member countries and the AGS that, according to interviewee A2, was generated after the transformation of the former JUNAC into the AGS in 1997. Accordingly, the AGS increased its capability to formulate proposals and this exerted great pressure over AC member states (A2). Causal effects of the AGS can also be observed through interviewee A1’s consideration that it sometimes behaved as a ‘sixth negotiator’, mainly because of the supranational character of Andean norms. Accordingly, the AGS’ participation in negotiations as a ‘sixth member state’ disturbed the other AC members (A1). A1 asserted that the AGS was so strong at the beginning of the 2000s that it almost forced member countries to adopt a CET that could never operate in real terms because it was imposed (A1 referred to D-414). If by generating political tension and disturbing AC members because of behaving as a ‘sixth negotiator’ the AGS made things more complicated, this might have caused delays or disinterest among AC member states in advancing negotiations, and this accounts for causal effects. But then, how is it that ‘facilitating’ does not count for causal effects in clear terms and ‘making difficult’ does? Here we might be facing a problem with the analysis of transitive verbs, which at the bottom entails confusion between constitutive and causal effects, and therefore, a problem for the interpretive method employed in the thesis. Since these problems will also appear in the other to case studies of the AC, this discussion will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. It will be argued that if progress is hindered because something turned things difficult, the change this implies is easier to detect than the one of some factor making things easier, for it is uncertain whether without the ‘facilitating’ factor things would have turned out differently.

The pressure that the AGS exerted over member states may account for causal effects over Peru’s behaviour, as long as the Peruvian government could have been influenced by the AGS to remain an AC member, or even forced to it. Yet, it must be noted that in FTZ and CET negotiations the AGS was an agent not only exerting pressure over member states but also enabling and supporting their negotiations, and therefore its constitutive and causal effects cannot be assessed in the same terms as the ones of other regional institutions like Andean norms. When considered as an agent, the AGS does not correspond to an ideational structure that needs agency to ‘realise’ its constraining power, like, for instance, norms. When enabling
or supporting state action – or as it will be seen in the other two case studies of the AC, when making things difficult – the AGS is an institutional structure that exerts its agency ‘all by itself’. Nonetheless, the bureaucrats that work for the AGS are not independent of the roles of ‘helping the unfolding of the AC regionalist project and of regional integration’ that the AGS as an ideational structure impose on them (Berger and Luckmann 1968: 97), as this is what such institutional organisation is supposed to do. Hence, the AGS role must be assessed as the one of an institutional agent that, as part of the AC institutional framework, contributes to explain state action and the unfolding of the AC.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there were material incentives that can explain Peru’s reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET, but it argued that material incentives cannot explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member while being reluctant to adopt these two trade schemes that were crucial to meeting the main goal of creating a common market. Moreover, and since material benefits were not very significant for Peru, the same material incentives for not adopting the FTZ and the CET could have motivated the Peruvian government to leave the AC; yet, they did not. In turn, this chapter has offered some explanations of Peru’s behaviour towards the AC based on the role of collective identity and regional institutions. The interpretive analysis carried out in the present chapter allowed observing the constitutive effects of collective identity and regional institutions as long as interviewees acknowledged their existence by explicitly speaking of them. This analysis also allowed observing causal effects that explain Peru’s decision to remain an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the FTZ and the CET.

It has been argued that the causal role of collective identity can be found in the ‘political cost’ that the Peruvian government did not want to pay for leaving the AC. By analysing interviewees’ assertions, it was possible to relate this ‘political cost’ – and the ‘political issues’ and ‘political content’ attached to AC membership – with issues of collective identity such as the ‘Andean nature’ of Peru, Peru’s ‘integrationist vocation’, ‘Andean fraternity’ and the ‘integrationist spirit’ of the other AC members. The ‘political cost’ of leaving the AC is a
metaphor that made the Peruvian government decide to remain an AC member, which does not mean that this was the only cause or the only reason that explains such decision. The argument here is rather that collective identity can provide an explanation, and thus a contribution to explaining Peru’s behaviour.

The causal role of regional institutions and norms is found in various ways. First, in the institutional flexibility that the AC’s normative framework offered to Peru for maintaining its full membership to the AC while keeping apart from the FTZ and the CET. Moreover, regional norms were modified incorporating Peru’s demands, and the attitude of the other members, though sometimes attempted to force Peru to adopt both trade schemes, was mostly one of tolerance and patience. It was argued that this ‘institutional flexibility’ could have made Peru comfortable with remaining an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the FTZ and the CET. Second, it has been argued that Andean norms may have operated as sources of collective identity, inasmuch as Peruvian officials identified with them because regional norms provided benefits for national policymaking. And third, it was argued that the AGS as an institutional agent had causal effects by making progress more difficult, as it generated political tension and disturbed member states when behaving as a ‘sixth party’ in regional negotiations. The AGS active role in these negotiations and in showing Peru why and how it could join the FTZ and the CET might have also exerted pressure on the Peruvian government to remain an AC member. It was also argued that the enabling role of the AGS in organising and keeping the pace of negotiations could also be assessed as having causal effects, but since the extent to which the AGS facilitated progress was not estimated by interviewees as high or significant, causal effects cannot be observed clearly.
CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY 2. ANDEAN COMMUNITY’S COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

In September 2007 AC members collectively began FTA negotiations with the EU, following the EU’s requirement that negotiations with countries that belonged to a regional bloc must be pursued with the bloc as a whole and not with single countries (Pietrangeli 2009). But in 2008 bloc negotiations broke off because of difficulties that emerged with Bolivia and Ecuador. During 2009 Colombia and Peru continued negotiations with the EU in a coordinated but separate manner, and finally each signed a FTA with the EU in March 2010. The breaking-off of collective FTA negotiations with the EU showed the AC’s failure in achieving another of its main integration goals, as it was pursuing bloc negotiations in the international arena and adopting bloc positions towards trade issues. This failure represented a new setback for the Andean integration process, which was already seriously affected by the signing of separate FTAs between Colombia and Peru with the US in 2006 and the subsequent withdrawal of Venezuela from the AC (Malamud 2006).

The breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU appears as an interesting case where collective identity and regional institutions did not seem to be strong enough to preserve the internal cohesion of the Andean bloc for negotiating jointly. Nevertheless, the negotiations of a FTA with the EU looked to be an opportunity for the reunification of the common trade policies for the AC, and further reaffirm the integration process. Considering that collective bloc-to-bloc negotiations was established by the EU as a condition for negotiating an FTA with the AC, this chapter enquires into the extent to which collective identity and regional institutions explain AC member states’ decision to collectively engage these negotiations.95 It also contrasts the role of

---

95 Interviewed national officials and AGS bureaucrats were C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, E1, E2, E3, P4, A4, A5, and A6. Interviewees C8, P1, P2, P3 and A2 also made relevant comments on these negotiations and their answers will also be addressed when appropriate.
these two ideational structures against the material incentives that AC member states had for engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU.

This chapter proposes to differentiate three dimensions of Andean collective identity that help in assessing the constitutive and causal effects of this ideational structure on state action and the unfolding of Andean regionalism. It is argued that collective identity played a causal role in this case study inasmuch as AC member states wanted to strengthen the regional integration process through collective negotiations with the EU, which denotes a strong identification with the Andean regionalist project. The causal role of this ideational structure can also be observed in the rupture of the ideological dimension of Andean identity, which can be assessed as the main reason why collective FTA negotiations with the EU were truncated. The chapter also argues that the two Andean Decisions that oriented collective negotiations with the EU (D-598 and D-667) had constitutive and causal effects over state action, and that regional norms in general operated as a source of identification of member states with each other and with the regional integration process, and thus had causal effects over the creation of collective identity. The role of the AGS is also assessed as having constitutive and causal effects, since it facilitated progress but also hindered it in some occasions.

3.1 Material incentives for engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU

There were two main material factors that explain AC member states’ decision to engage collective FTA negotiations with the EU: first, EU’s condition of bloc-to-bloc negotiations with third parties, which had been part of EU’s policy of relationships with third parties. And second, the interest in perpetuating the GSP Plus scheme, which was to be renewed every certain number of years, and whose trade preferences were very significant for AC member states since the EU was one of their main trade partners (Vieira 2006). Since the beginning of

---

96 From 1991 onwards the EU granted to the AC the General System of Andean Preferences (GSP Drugs), a trade agreement that gave preferential treatment to a list of Andean products to be exported to the European market with the aim of supporting AC member countries’ fight against drug production and traffic. In 2005, the GSP Drugs was turned into the GSP Plus, which was different from the former GSP in that its validity was subject to the fulfilment of international agreements related to governance, human and labour rights, and environment protection (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 230).
negotiations for the Association Agreement (AA) between the AC and the EU — in which the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreements (PDCA) were signed in 2003 — the EU made it clear it would only negotiate these agreements and the FTA on a bloc-to-bloc basis and not with individual countries who belonged to a regional scheme. Yet, interviewees’ perceptions of this condition as the only reason to engage collective FTA negotiations with the EU in 2008 differed, pointing out significant aspects of the role of collective identity and regional institutions that will be addressed in the second and third parts of this chapter. This first part of the chapter will focus on the significance that perpetuating the GSP Plus had for AC member states. It will be argued that material benefits that AC member states could obtain from signing a FTA with the EU were not very significant, yet they explain AC members’ interest to certain extent. It will be also shown that, at least in the case of Ecuador, material incentives cannot explain its decision to leave FTA negotiations with the EU. On the contrary, Ecuador should have been the country most interested in such agreement.

3.1.1 The importance of trade relationships between the AC and the EU

The EU had been a significant trade partner for AC member states. Although between 1997 and 2000 Andean exports to the EU decreased from US$5,541 million to US$3,193 million, from 2001 the trend was reversed, as Andean exports to the EU reached US$11,225 million in 2007. Between 1997 and 2007 Andean exports to the EU maintained an average annual growth rate of 6%. By 2006 the EU was the AC’s second main trade partner, as it was the destination of almost 15% of Andean exports, while the US accounted for 35%. By 2007 the EU received 16% of Andean exports while the US received 30% (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 18-9). Yet, for each Andean country the importance of the EU as a destination for their exports varied substantially. By 2006, the EU represented the destination of 4% of Bolivian exports, 11% of Ecuadorian exports, 12% of Colombian exports and 17.5% of Peruvian exports. For all countries except for Bolivia their main export destination was the US — for Bolivia it was Mercosur (ibid., 246). In 2006 the EU was the second trade partner for Colombia and Peru, while it was the third for Ecuador and the fourth for Bolivia (ibid., 21). Hence, the EU was more important for Colombia

---

97 The FTA with the EU was the third pillar of this Association Agreement (AA).
and Peru than for Bolivia and Ecuador, although in general terms it accounted for less than a fifth of any AC members’ exports. Nevertheless, the EU was still one of the main trade partners of Andean countries, being in all cases one of the top four trade partners for each of them.

Table 5. AC members’ exports participation in total AC exports to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fairlie and Queija (2008: 20, 22).

Table 5 shows that before the start of FTA negotiations, Peru and Colombia were the countries that had the greatest share in AC total exports to the EU. Once more, it can be observed that the importance of the EU for Bolivian trade was very low. According to Fairlie and Queija (2008: 304) Ecuador would be the country that would lose the most if the GSP Plus ceased to exist, as it was the main exporter of 6 of the main 8 tariff lines that had trade preferences. Several interviewees asserted that one of the main interests of their governments in pursuing collective FTA negotiations with the EU was to consolidate the trade preferences given through the GSP Plus and to improve market access for national products. Like the former GSP Drugs, the GSP Plus granted free access (zero tariff) to certain lists of products that were very significant for AC members’ exports to the EU. Since this scheme should be periodically renewed, this provided an unstable scenario for economic agents who could not be sure of whether their products would be included in the next renewal. A FTA would thus serve to secure these preferences and, further, provide greater market access for more products than those included in the GSP Plus (ibid., 236).

The products most benefited by the GSP schemes were mostly industrial ones, but some farming and fishing products were also included (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 231). However, Table

---

98 C4, E1, E2 and P4.
6 shows that by 2007 AC members had not taken much profit from the GSP schemes. Ecuador was the country whose exports made under this scheme had been greatest (almost 50% in 2006). By 2006, Bolivian, Colombian and Peruvian exports made under the GSP Plus only accounted for a fifth of these countries’ exports to the EU. According to Fairlie and Queija (ibid., 236), the reasons for the low use of trade preferences were the trade agreements signed by the EU with third countries, the extension of trade preferences from the EU to other countries, and the complexity of sanitary and phytosanitary conditions and other non-tariff barriers for imports, which were difficult to meet by Andean producers.

Table 7 shows that by 2006 Ecuador was also the country that had the greatest participation in the use of the GSP Plus. Colombia and Peru had similar shares, while Bolivia had a very low participation. According to Fairlie and Queija (2008: 251-2), the total amount of money that would have been ‘lost’ (or paid in tariffs) in 2006 had the GSP Plus not existed, would have been 2.8% of the total amount of money exported to the EU in that year. Hence, the importance of the GSP Plus was not great for AC members, except for Ecuador. Securing trade preferences granted through the GSP Plus could thus have been a significant motivation for Ecuador to sign a FTA with the EU, but not very significant for the other three AC members.

However, perhaps AC members were not that worried about preserving the GSP Plus but about broadening preferences and increasing their access to the EU market. 14% of Andean exports to the EU corresponded to tariff lines that had trade preferences under the GSP Plus, and which could not be exported if the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff were applied. Moreover, the
products included in this trade portion were mostly the ones with greater added value, capable of fostering the development of non-traditional exporting sectors (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 252). In these terms, the GSP Plus had some significance for AC members. Lastly, it could be thought that precisely because of the complexity and the difficulties imposed by the highly demanding non-tariff and technical barriers to trade imposed by the EU, AC members were interested in achieving a FTA with the EU that would reduce these barriers and facilitate trade (Vieira 2006: 37).

The trade balance with the EU was favourable for the Andean bloc, showing a surplus of US$2,077 million in 2006 and US$3,631 million in 2007. This surplus was explained mainly by Peru, the only country that maintained a surplus with the EU between 1997 and 2007 (except in 1998). In 2007 Peru had a trade surplus with the EU of US$2,312 million. For Colombia and Bolivia the trade balance with the EU was always in deficit (only in 2007 Colombia had a surplus of US$935 million), while Ecuador’s trade balance with the EU varied between surplus and deficit between 1997 and 2007. For those Andean countries that had trade deficits with the EU, and for all AC members seeking to improve their trade exchange terms in the sense of increasing their value-added exports to the EU, a FTA seemed of little promise, because the structure of Andean exports to the EU was mainly based on primary products. The EU had also been a significant AC partner in terms of investment, as it represented a quarter of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Andean region by 2006 (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 94-5). Since 2002, US investments were greater in the AC than EU ones, but the fact that the EU was so relevant as the second main provider of FDI for most AC members was an incentive to negotiate the FTA. Even though the FTA that was to be negotiated with the EU did not include an investment chapter, it was expected to generate greater confidence among EU investors (Arévalo and Arévalo 2009: 114).

In these terms, we can be sure of the importance that the EU had as a trade partner for the AC, but it is clear that the use that Andean countries had made of the GSP Plus until 2006 – namely

---

99 The reason for this is that the European Commission did not receive authorization from EU member countries to negotiate FDI issues (Fairlie and Queija 2008: 286). This point was confirmed by interviewee A5 (an AGS director in charge of trade issues).
the year before FTA negotiations started – was rather low. This shows that securing trade preferences granted through this scheme does not seem a strong motivation to engage in collective FTA negotiations with the EU. Moreover, the AC’s export structure to the EU was mainly of primary goods, and thus the EU market offered few opportunities for Andean greater value-added products. In any case, the FTA with the EU offered the chance to stabilise the trade preferences that had been given to AC members through the GSP Plus, and facilitate market access for primary and manufactured Andean products, even though the prospects for the latter type of exports were not promising. Hence, it seems reasonable to analyse other ideas different from material incentives in order to explain AC member states’ interest in engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU.

Furthermore, it has been shown that Bolivia had not much to lose by abandoning collective negotiations, as it did not benefit substantially from trade preferences granted by the EU. But neither did Bolivia have material incentives for leaving these negotiations. In contrast, Ecuador had greater material incentives for completing a FTA, yet it left collective negotiations. As will be shown, ideational issues distinct from material incentives better explain these two AC members’ decision to abandon collective negotiations with the EU.

3.2 The role of collective identity

This is the case study where the importance of collective identity can be more clearly seen, for two main reasons: first, several interviewees pointed out strengthening the Andean integration process as a significant motivation to engage collective FTA negotiations with the EU, and it will be argued that this motivation was closely related to issues of collective identity; second, according to most interviewees, the breaking-off of collective negotiations was due to ideological differences between AC members, which is related to what will be conceptualised as the ideological dimension of Andean identity.

3.2.1 The interest of strengthening the AC through collective FTA negotiations with the EU

AGS interviewees were very sceptical about AC member states’ willingness to pursue collective negotiations with the EU, as they all asserted that had the EU not established bloc-to-bloc
bargaining as a condition for FTA negotiations, AC member countries would have preferred to negotiate individually. This EU condition was also emphasised by some national officials as one of the reasons for pursuing collective negotiations. Yet, some of these national officials asserted that despite this condition, their governments did not prefer to individually engage FTA negotiations with the EU. Interviewee C5 – a Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, was the only one who affirmed that the Colombian government would have preferred individual negotiations because “it had no coincidences with the Bolivian or the Ecuadorian governments”, but only with Peru (C5). On their part, interviewees C2 – a Colombian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and P4 – one of Peru’s trade negotiators, were not sure whether their governments would have preferred individual negotiations. These individual perceptions give an initial idea of the low importance that Andean collective identity could have in orienting states’ interests towards these negotiations.

Some national officials spoke of states’ individualist interests towards collective FTA negotiations with the EU that had no relation with collective interests of the Andean group as a whole. Several interviewees coincided in that one of the main interests of their governments was to consolidate the trade preferences given through the GSP Plus and to improve market access conditions for national products. Other interests mentioned by national officials were: the possibility for Colombia of negotiating an AA with the EU that included the PDCA pillars besides the one of a FTA (C1 and C2); offering security for investors (C4); protecting Colombia’s access to Andean markets, as the EU could not distort such access on a unilateral basis (C5); the possibility of increasing Ecuador’s bargaining capacity if negotiations were carried out in collective fashion (E1 and E2); facilitating the implementation of the FTA with the EU through bloc negotiations (E1); consolidating an agreement on the PDCA pillars with the EU in order to ‘secure’ Ecuador’s relationships with the EU (E1); and strengthening the Ecuadorian state’s

---

100 A4, A5 and A6.
101 C4, C5 and E2.
102 C1, C3, C4, E1 and E2.
103 C2, C4, C5, E1, E2 and P4.
104 C4, E1, E2 and P4.
institutional capacity through the establishment of clear rules for regulating trade, like technical norms and sanitary issues (E2).

But besides pointing out AC members’ individualistic interests – in the sense that these interests did not consider benefits for the Andean group but only for each individual state – several interviewees also pointed out the collective interest of strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiations with the EU. The fact that all AGS interviewees shared this view might not be surprising, as they worked for the supranational executive of the AC. Collective benefits mentioned by AGS bureaucrats in this regard were: to promote the free circulation of goods, even if collective negotiations were not successful (A4); accelerating the approval of a common trade policy and the definitive approval of the Andean CET (A5); the harmonisation of trade disciplines and policies against disloyal competition (A5); accelerating the Andean FTZ both in goods and services (A5); the opportunity to consolidate the local [Andean] market, in terms of consolidating member countries’ regional policies on trade facilitation and deepening economic integration and investment (A6); and strengthening cooperation in areas like citizens’ participation, climate change and the environment through an AA with the EU (of which the FTA was one of the pillars) (A6).

Some national officials also highlighted AC members’ interest in strengthening the Andean integration process through collective FTA negotiations with the EU. Assuming communitarian commitments, ‘rescuing’ the Andean integration process and ‘solving’ some existing differences around the trade area (E2); strengthening the Common Foreign Policy Mechanism (CFPM) (C1); to have greater bargaining power and to seek special and differential treatment for all AC members (C3, emphasis added); and to fix joint positions among AC members towards greater economic, political and social integration and to consolidate the Andean Common Market by means of the commitments adopted with the EU (C3), were assertions that give account of states’ interest in strengthening the integration process. Moreover, interviewee C3 – a

105 C1, C3, E2, A4, A5 and A6.
106 The other executive organisms of the AC are the Andean Presidential Council, the Councils of Ministers and the Andean Commission, all of them being intergovernmental organisations.
107 The CFPM was established in 1999 through Decision 458 to coordinate the AC’s external relationships with third parties.
Colombian chief trade negotiator, asserted that collective bargaining with the EU “was historical inasmuch as it would consolidate Andean countries’ idealist aspiration of integrating among them” (C3).

The previous assertions show that AC member states had a significant motivation of fostering and deepening regional integration through collective negotiations with the EU. It is argued that this motivation is closely related to the existence of an Andean collective identity, for collective negotiations were not seen simply as a means to obtain greater benefits for states, but also as a means to strengthen the regional scheme, something that gives account of member states’ commitment – and hence identification – with the AC. Such identification might be due to the fact that AC members had an individual interest in being part of the AC, but nothing at this point ensures that this was the only reason why AC members identified themselves with the Andean regionalist project. If an interest in strengthening the Andean integration process was shared by member states, this would denote that states significantly identified themselves with the integration process, as long as fostering and deepening the AC was one of the aims of negotiating a FTA with the EU. This aim was a collective one that implied identification of member states with the regional scheme and with themselves, since a collective aim means that this was an aim shared by the group’s members.

The importance of collective identity in orienting state action during negotiations with the EU could be assessed as initially low, for most interviewees highlighted the constraining power of collective negotiating as a condition posed by the EU. Moreover, some interviewees pointed out individualistic interests of AC members towards negotiations with the EU that were not related to collective or group interests. Yet, the collective interest in strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiations with the EU serves to highlight the significance of collective identity in orienting state action at these negotiations.

3.2.2 Ideological differences and the breaking of collective negotiations with the EU

According to most interviewees, from the beginning of FTA negotiations with the EU it was possible to observe two different positions among AC members. On the one hand, Colombia and Peru were interested in negotiating a FTA of the same characteristics as the ones they had
signed with the US. These were FTAs that liberalised a great portion of the tariff universe for both parties, as well as establishing liberalising conditions in the areas of services, intellectual property, government procurement, environmental issues, competition and investments (Cancino 2006: 19). Apart from investments, which were not included in the FTA with the EU, all other areas were seen by Peru and Colombia as object of negotiations. According to Fairlie and Queija (2008: 13), there were clauses in the EU’s negotiating mandate that would extend the same concessions to the EU that Colombia and Peru had made to the US. This fact was confirmed by interviewee A5, who held that the EU had made clear that it would not conform with inferior concessions than the ones that Colombia and Peru had made to the US in all negotiating areas. On the other hand, the position of Bolivia and Ecuador was not to negotiate a good number of these areas, and not to make the same concessions that Colombia and Peru had made to the US, since the priority of Bolivia and Ecuador was to obtain special and differential treatment (SDT) in the FTA with the EU.

The main problems posed by Bolivia were in the areas of intellectual property, trade and sustainable development, and environmental issues. Bolivia did not want to negotiate anything related to the patenting of biodiversity, and did not want to make the same concessions that Colombia and Peru had made to the US in intellectual property, which had already caused an alteration of Andean norms. Moreover, Bolivia wanted to make market access for EU products conditional on increases of Bolivian exports to the EU. In the areas of services and government procurement Bolivia wanted to protect its national industries, and did not want competition from EU firms. These conditions could neither be accepted by Colombia and Peru, nor by the EU, not least because they were against WTO standards. The EU could not accept the exceptions Bolivia demanded for itself, as the European Commission was authorised only to pursue negotiations with the bloc of Andean countries, and

---

108 C1, E1, E2, A4 and A6.
109 E2 and A5.
110 C1, C3 and P4.
111 C3, E2, A4 and A6.
112 C1, C3 and P4.
113 C3 and A4.
the exceptions granted to one country would be understood as being granted to all of them.\textsuperscript{114} Interviewees C3 and E2 asserted that the drafting process of a new constitutional charter posed many difficulties for the Bolivian government to collectively negotiate a FTA with the EU, as concessions in the aforementioned areas would be against the legal provisions established in the new constitutional charter.

Ecuador posed similar problems to those of Bolivia. Besides holding the same positions in the areas of intellectual property, government procurement, services, and trade and sustainable development,\textsuperscript{115} Ecuador was also in the process of drafting a new constitutional charter and faced the same trouble as Bolivia of not being able to make concessions that would be contrary to new constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{116} Yet, when Bolivia announced suspending its participation in collective negotiations with the EU after the third negotiating round in April 2008, Ecuador did not withdraw from the negotiating process (E2). Facing the difficulties that AC members showed in negotiating together as a bloc, the EU suspended collective negotiations indefinitely. Only in December of that year the EU proposed to continue negotiations under a ‘Multi-Party Agreement’ (MPA) that consisted of negotiating bilateral FTAs with each Andean country using the same infrastructure and logistics for negotiating rounds, and presenting all FTAs under one single MPA to the European Parliament for approval. Bolivia did not accept this proposal but Ecuador did, as well as Colombia and Peru.\textsuperscript{117} Ecuador left collective negotiations in July 2009.\textsuperscript{118}

According to Berger and Luckmann (1968: 156), an ideology is frequently adopted by a group according to specific theoretical elements that will lead to its interests, and ideologies generate

\textsuperscript{114} C1, C2, C3, E1, E2 and P4.
\textsuperscript{115} E1, E2, C1, C2, C3, C5, A4, A5 and A6.
\textsuperscript{116} C3, E1, E2, A4 and A6.
\textsuperscript{118} E2 and C1. See also RPP Noticias Economía (18/07/2009). According to this press report, besides claiming the EU’s non-fulfilment of WTO instructions regarding the dispute over bananas (which was indeed put by interviewee E2 as a main reason why Ecuador left collective negotiations with the EU), the Ecuadorian government also claimed that the terms of the trade agreement that was being negotiated with the EU were against the new Ecuadorian constitutional charter and were favouring free trade in detriment of sustainable development. This denotes that ideological issues were officially posed by the Ecuadorian government as reasons to abandon collective FTA negotiations with the EU.
solidarity. Bloom (1990: 52) tells us that ideologies are identity-securing interpretive systems, as ideologies provide “appropriate behavioural patterns and attitudes for more diffuse life situations”. Several interviewees emphasised the ideological dimension when asked about the importance of Andean collective identity in orienting AC negotiations with the EU.\textsuperscript{119} High confidence (E3); coinciding visions about how to insert countries into globalisation (E3); ideological affinities around the development model (E1); pursuing the same objectives at the very beginning of the dialogue with the EU (E1); and common interests towards consolidating the Andean market and giving priority to the origin of products (A6), were some ideological features pointed out by interviewees as composing Andean identity during the late 1990s and the early 2000s. These views contrast with the one of interviewee E2 – an Ecuadorian trade negotiator, who considered that there was not ‘any’ Andean identity around trade issues, not even at the times when the AC was working towards the consolidation of a common market. E2 argued that at those times there was an acknowledgement of trade benefits, but never of a collective identity.\textsuperscript{120}

In general terms, the difference of visions among AC member states over trade, development and economic policy was the main issue highlighted by interviewees when speaking of the disadvantages that AC members perceived of engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU.\textsuperscript{121} Interviewees E1 and E3 held that problems for the AC started when governments with different visions were established in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, because these visions prevented AC members to agree common positions, and this was evidenced in collective negotiations with the EU. For E1 – an Ecuadorian chief trade negotiator, Andean collective identity consisted of AC members’ agreement over the economic model, and ‘no more than that’; accordingly, this change of visions was the cause of the ‘rupture’ and ‘loss’ of Andean collective identity (E1). Andean collective identity was not important for defining the Ecuadorian government’s national interests towards negotiations with the EU, because this

\textsuperscript{119}C1, C2, C3, C5, E1, E2, P4 and A6.
\textsuperscript{120}Note, therefore, that for this interviewee the obtainment of benefits would not generate identification with the regionalist project, contrary to what Bloom (1990: 51) suggests about agents identifying with the direct benefactor providing material benefits.
\textsuperscript{121}C1, C2, C3, E1, E2, P4 and A5.
identity had already ‘broken’ when the Ecuadorian government implemented a different development model from the one that had been formerly pursued by all AC members (E1). On his part, interviewee E3, another Ecuadorian chief negotiator, asserted that in the first half of the 2000s there used to be consensus among member states over the collective negotiating position of the AC, but the election of President Morales in Bolivia and of President Correa in Ecuador weakened internal coordination within the AC, and this would later on mark the negotiations with the EU.

Interviewee C5 – a Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, asserted that Bolivia was not interested in free trade, and this made ‘impossible’ building consensus positions with Bolivia. In interviewee P4’s view – a Peruvian trade negotiator, identity did not matter much in the pursuit of collective negotiations with the EU, because what really mattered was that some countries [Colombia and Peru] ‘had clear objectives’, whereas Bolivia and Ecuador did not. Although P4 asserted that Bolivia and Ecuador were the countries most interested in pursuing collective negotiations, this interviewee considered that this interest cannot be explained by issues of identity, because “one cannot speak of identity when one is placing obstacles to free trade and to advancing in the negotiations” (P4).

So far, the analysis has shown that, on the one hand, collective identity was a motivation for AC member states for engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU, as they thought that through collective negotiations the Andean integration process could be strengthened, and it has been argued that if Andean states thought this way it is because they identified with the AC. On the other hand, the rupture of collective identity, particularly of its ideological dimension, was the main cause for the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU. Distinguishing this ‘ideological dimension’ of Andean identity was derived from interviewees C2 and C5’s views on the role and content of Andean collective identity. This counts as an example of ‘concept development’ and as a product of the co-generation of data characteristic of interpretive analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 50). C2 – a Colombian Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, asserted that there were reasons related to the existence of a collective identity
that explain why AC member states decided to undertake collective FTA negotiations with the EU. Accordingly:

“The signing of the Andean Pact in 1969 was the acknowledgement of a cultural and geographic identity, and of an identification of common interests among Andean countries. In many aspects we are very similar countries. But in the last years, differences about the development models have been deepened. This divergence of visions about development models has deteriorated Andean identity” (C2).

Earlier in the interview C2 had spoken of the ‘breaking’ of certain ‘ideological consensuses’ around the prevalence of liberal democracy and market economics as the models to organise the political economy of Andean countries, which was evidenced during collective FTA negotiations with the EU. It is thus possible to infer that for C2 there are two different sources/types of Andean identity. One is related to cultural and geographical common aspects (cultural dimension). The other is related to common interests and the referred ideological ‘consensuses’ about the political and development models (ideological dimension).

These two different dimensions of Andean collective identity can also be distinguished in interviewee C5’s assertions – a Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, who when asked about the importance of collective identity, replied that there are ‘cultural affinities’ among AC members that give account of the existence of an Andean collective identity (cultural dimension); and that between Colombia and Peru there were also ‘affinities regarding economic policy’ (ideological dimension), but that these affinities over economic issues “did not justify the maintenance of collective negotiations [with the EU]” (C5). C5 pointed out constitutive effects of the cultural dimension, when asserting that cultural affinities “weigh at the background of trade policymaking” (C5). From this metaphor we can infer that, as long as FTA negotiations with the EU are part of AC member states’ trade policy, the decision to engage these negotiations in collective fashion was partly oriented by the cultural dimension of Andean collective identity.

More elements constituting the ‘cultural’ and the ‘ideological’ dimensions and a third one – the ‘inter-group one’ – will appear progressively across the following sections and chapters, and these three dimensions of Andean collective identity will be further addressed in Chapter 5 as
one of the major contributions of the present thesis to the analysis of the unfolding of regionalism in the AC.

3.2.3 Other effects of Andean collective identity

Interviewees pointed out other constitutive and causal effects of collective identity that explain state action in collective FTA negotiations with the EU. Besides the causal effect of the ideological dimension of Andean identity assessed in the previous section, constitutive effects of this dimension can also be assessed through interviewees’ perception that ideological affinities facilitated collective negotiations among AC member states when they existed. This effect should be considered only constitutive and not causal because no interviewee posed ideological affinities as a reason for engaging collective negotiations. Ideological affinities caused identification among AC member states and this facilitated collective negotiations, but it is not the case that interviewees said that ideological affinities made AC member states engage collective negotiations with the EU. As pointed out before, ‘facilitating’ is a transitive verb that does not denote causation in clear sense, at least not if the extent to which the ‘facilitating’ factor made things easier is not explicitly assessed as high – which would give account of a substantial change.

Some interviewees asserted that joint negotiating experiences made AC member states’ negotiating staff get to know each other and thus build inter-personal relationships that further derived in negotiators’ identification with each other and with the Andean negotiating group as a whole. The acknowledgment of this group-feeling manifested by some interviewees is what inspired the proposal of the inter-group dimension as a third dimension of Andean collective identity. Constitutive effects of this dimension can be observed as it was acknowledged by agents (AC members). Yet, a causal effect of this dimension is difficult to observe since interviewees did not point identification among negotiators as a reason for negotiating collectively with the EU. Interviewees only asserted that the inter-group dimension facilitated collective negotiations as a group. Here, as well as in the case of ideological affinities,

---

122 C2, C5, E1, E3, P2, A4, A5 and A6.
123 E1, E3, P2, P4 and A4.
identification among national negotiators cannot be clearly assessed as having causal effects on state action, for the extent to which it facilitated collective negotiations was not explicitly assessed as high.

In turn, causal effects of collective identity can be assessed through the testimonies of interviewees C3 and A6, who were the only ones who explicitly posed Andean collective identity as a reason for engaging collective negotiations with the EU. While interviewee A6 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of supporting FTA negotiations with the EU, did not further develop his/her assertion about collective identity as a reason to engage collective negotiations, the case of C3 – a Colombian trade negotiating chief, deserves particular attention, as this interviewee argued that “belonging to the AC responds to the existence of a collective identity”, even though this identity is ‘precarious’ and even when there is ‘a questioning’ of it. In C3’s view, Andean collective identity was very important in constituting the Colombian government’s national interests towards negotiations with the EU, and the government always granted Andean identity “the precedence it should have” (C3). Accordingly, the interest of the Colombian government in negotiating a FTA collectively through the AC was derived from “its commitment as an AC member to pursue integration with other markets in the political, cooperation and trade areas, under clear rules for negotiation” (C3).

From C3’s words, and particularly from the previously quoted metaphor highlighted in italics, we can infer that Colombia’s interest (and that of the other AC members) in negotiating collectively a FTA with the EU was explained by its membership of the AC, that is, the fact of being an AC member made Colombia (and the other countries) interested in engaging collective negotiations. In these terms, being an AC member is part of member(s) country(ies)’s identity, and this identity operates as a ‘mandate’ for pursuing collective negotiations with third parties. This would mean that membership to the AC generates certain cohesion among its members in terms of turning collective negotiations into something of interest for states as members of the regional scheme. This cohesion effect could be defined as ‘belonging to the AC makes member states particularly interested in pursuing collective negotiations with third parties’. If this cohesion effect is accepted, it denotes an important role of collective identity, not least
because sharing the interest in pursuing collective negotiations with third parties makes states identify with each other and with the regional scheme.

3.2.4 Balancing the importance of collective identity

According to Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 87, 108-9), showing contradictions and opposite views among agents is key for achieving transparency, which is one of the main issues that help make knowledge claims and meeting trustworthiness purposes in interpretive analysis. This is why showing interviewees’ divergent views and reflecting on the ways they counterbalance the analysis offered in previous sections is needed. Interviewees’ assertions about the interest in strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiations with the EU; the breaking-off of collective negotiations because of ideological differences between AC members; and other assertions about the cultural, ideological and inter-group dimensions of Andean collective identity, give account of the constitutive and causal effects of identity on state action in the present case study. However, only few interviewees considered that Andean collective identity was important in orienting AC members’ decision to engage in collective negotiations with the EU.\textsuperscript{124} Indeed, for most interviewees Andean collective identity was not a significant motivation for AC members to negotiate as a bloc with the EU.\textsuperscript{125} Interviewee E2 – an Ecuadorian trade negotiator, even asserted that “In the speech of Ecuadorian negotiators there is no reference to the existence of an Andean collective identity for supporting Ecuador’s negotiating positions” (E2). Moreover, some interviewees explicitly held that the only reason negotiations with the EU were collectively engaged by AC members as a bloc, was because this was an EU requirement.\textsuperscript{126}

Balancing the importance of identity can be complemented by addressing the extent to which interviewees considered that Andean collective identity was damaged because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, and by addressing the evaluations they made of the negotiating process. There were more interviewees who asserted that Andean collective identity

\textsuperscript{124} C2, C3 and A6.
\textsuperscript{125} C1, C5, E1, E2, P4 and A5.
\textsuperscript{126} E1, P4 and A5. However, note that A5 also made comments on strengthening the Andean integration process as a motivation for AC member states engaging in collective negotiations with the EU (see footnote 105).
identity was not damaged because of the breaking-off of FTA negotiations with the EU (C1, C3, E2, P4, C5, and A6), than those interviewees who did it was (E1 and C2). Interviewees C4 and A4 did not provide a concrete answer when they were posed the question. Interestingly, all interviewees (except C1) who asserted that Andean collective identity was not damaged by the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, had, at least partly, associated collective identity with the existence of ideological affinities among AC members on trade, development and economic policy. They had also argued that this identity had already been damaged by the different visions that the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia had on these topics. It is paradoxical that after having underscored the importance of the ideological dimension of Andean identity, these interviewees did not consider that Andean identity was damaged because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU. This contradiction invites doubt about the clarity of ideas that interviewees hold about collective identity and its importance in orienting state action, and this makes more difficult the assessment of the explanatory role of identity.

But the latter point is also significant because it supports the argument about the existence of different dimensions of Andean collective identity, as this differentiation may offer an explanation for the ‘contradiction’ in interviewees’ views. These interviewees asserted that Andean identity had been ‘broken’ because of the divergence among AC members’ ideological visions; and they also held that these divergences were underscored during collective FTA negotiations with the EU, and were one of the causes, when not the main one, for the breaking-off of collective negotiations among AC members. Yet, these same interviewees held that Andean collective identity was not damaged because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU. Clearly, when these interviewees made such a statement they could not be thinking of the ideological dimension of Andean identity that they had formerly addressed as having been damaged before and during collective negotiations with the EU. Hence, a sound explanation for this ‘contradiction’ is that these interviewees were thinking of a different dimension of Andean collective identity when they asserted that such identity was not damaged because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations.

127 Though they were not speaking of ideological issues as constituting a ‘dimension’ of Andean identity.
It is striking that even though a good number of interviewees pointed out the rupture of Andean identity as the main cause for the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, in their evaluations of the negotiating process with the EU interviewees did not make any reference to a negative impact that the breaking-off of collective negotiations could have had on the Andean integration process. It is paradoxical that those interviewees who pointed out that strengthening the Andean integration process was a motivation for AC member countries to engage collective negotiations with the EU, did not make any reference to the ‘failure’ that the breaking-off of collective negotiations meant for such an interests/aim. These ‘paradoxical views’ invite an assessment of the relatively low importance that strengthening the integration process and, further, collective identity, had for AC member states. If this was so, interviewees’ assertions on strengthening the Andean integration process as a collective interest/aim could be explained as part of the ‘rhetoric of integration’ which has been claimed to be salient in Latin American regionalism (Phillips 2001; Phillips and Prieto 2011: 120), and which will be further addressed in Chapter 5. Perhaps when pointing out this interest interviewees were just ‘reproducing’ a speech that they are supposed to ‘believe’ as officials and bureaucrats who work for states and regional institutions that are formally committed to the Andean integration process, but in practice they (interviewees, states and regional institutions) do not ‘really’ believe in such a collective interest.

Other contradictions among interviewees’ views are found in interviewees C4 and A4’s considerations about the importance of collective identity. When asked about the role of collective identity in orienting collective negotiations with the EU, C4 – a high official of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of dealing with AC issues, only answered that there was a Common Foreign Policy Mechanism (CFPM), as if he/she implied that this mechanism operated as a source of collective identity, as if the existence of a CFPM ‘proved’ that collective identity existed and was important. C4 did not deny the existence of an Andean collective identity, but neither did she say anything particular about its role. By his/her answer, we can only infer that for this interviewee Andean collective identity is related to the existence of a CFPM.
However, when asked about the importance of an Andean collective identity in constituting Colombia’s national interest towards negotiations with the EU, C4 replied that it was “the fact of belonging to an integration process that compelled member states to negotiate collectively” (C4), a similar answer to the one of interviewee C3 addressed above. Yet, strangely, he/she added that collective identity ‘had nothing to do’ with negotiations with the EU. From C4’s previous statement we can infer that the fact of belonging to an integration process has nothing to do with the identification of a member country with the integration process or with the existence of a collective identity, which would contradict the association made in this part of the chapter between belonging to a regional scheme and identifying with it. Identification of AC member states with the AC regionalist project was argued on the basis of the interest of strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiations with the EU. C4’s assertion that ‘belonging compels collective negotiating’ does not imply identification with the regionalist project, but might only denote a duty of enforcing regional norms. Even though C4 did not deny the existence of an Andean collective identity, it seems that the existence of this identity was simply not present in his/her mind, just as if it did not matter at all. This means that according to C4’s view, collective identity did not even have constitutive effects over state action. Hence, according to C4’s view, collective identity explains nothing.

On his/her part, interviewee A4 – one of the AGS directors in charge of trade issues, asserted that in the trade area there was not much of an Andean collective identity, but rather an Andean normative body that served as a basis for carrying out negotiations. A4 understood Andean identity as a shared conception by Andean countries’ citizens that ‘we are all Andean’, and he/she held that this type of identity ‘did not count’ for trade negotiations. A4 added that “more than an Andean identity, what existed was shared interests among AC members” (A4). In these terms, we can observe that A4 denied the existence of an Andean identity ‘in the trade area’, and thus we can be sure that according to A4’s view collective identity did not even have constitutive effects, for it simply did not exist, and therefore cannot explain state action. Nonetheless, the distinction proposed by A4 between ‘an Andean identity’ and ‘shared interests among AC members’ is worth noting, for identification between the members of a
group can arise around shared interests. Identity informs interests, but common interests can also make agents identify with one another.\footnote{This point was made in the review of Acharya’s work in Chapter 1.}

The difficulty of assessing even constitutive effects of Andean collective identity posed by C4 and A4’s views contrasts with the assessment derived from the other interviewees’ perceptions, who acknowledged the constitutive role of Andean identity as none of them denied its existence and even made references to its role in their answers. However, even according to some of these other interviewees the constitutive role of collective identity was of little significance, as being asked they replied that collective identity did not count much in constituting state interests towards negotiations with the EU, neither in orienting states’ decision to collectively engage these negotiations.\footnote{C5, E1, E2, P4 and A5.} In these terms, collective identity explains little, and this puts into question the assessment of the importance of collective identity made in previous sections.

Up to this point, we would need to conclude that even though constitutive and causal effects of collective identity have been possible to observe in the present case study, the fact that most interviewees did not consider that Andean identity mattered much in orienting state action in collective FTA negotiations with the EU, makes it difficult to assess as significant the explanatory role of collective identity. Moreover, the analysis has pointed out not only contradictions among interviewees’ views, but also contradictions within the views of some interviewees themselves. If interviewees hold different views on the importance of identity, and they even contradict themselves in assessing the role of identity, who and what are we to believe in order to assess the role of this ideational structure? This thesis argues that these analytical problems lead to think of the value of interpretation as a key exercise for understanding agency and the ways in which ideational structures exert their influence over it. For interpreting agents’ discourse and relating it to the context where they interact allows observing the terms in which certain ideas orient agency beyond what agents explicitly acknowledge. Despite the pointed limitations, interpreting interviewees’ assertions and analysing the metaphors they use for referring to the role of ideas has served to observe...
constitutive and causal effects of collective identity on state action towards collective FTA negotiations with the EU. The value of this interpretive analysis will be further addressed in Chapter 5, as it is related to the contributions that the present thesis can make to the improvement of constructivist theorising and to the understanding of the unfolding of the AC.

3.3 The role of regional institutions

The assessment of Andean norms and institutions’ explanatory capability of state action in collective FTA negotiations with the EU is developed in four sections. The first section will analyse the constitutive and causal effects of Decision 598 and Decision 667, which interviewees pointed out as the main norms orienting collective negotiations with the EU. The second section will analyse the role of Andean norms in supporting these negotiations. The third section will address the role of the AGS and of the AC institutional framework in the unfolding of AC’s negotiations with the EU. Finally, the fourth section complements the analysis of the importance of Andean norms and institutions in this case study.

3.3.1 The constitutive and causal effects of D-598 and D-667

Almost all interviewees were clear about the specific norms (Andean Decisions’ numbers and, to a lesser extent, their contents) that oriented collective negotiations with the EU. Some interviewees particularly acknowledged D-667 as the main Andean norm orienting negotiations, though few of them also acknowledged the importance of D-598 as the main Andean norm in orienting trade negotiations with third parties. The fact that some interviewees explicitly mentioned the numbers and content of D-667 and D-598 gives account of the constitutive effects of these Andean norms. These effects can be also observed through the answers of other interviewees who did not remember these Decisions’ numbers but who were certain about their content. Yet, the fact that some interviewees did not remember the numbers may give an idea of the low importance that these Decisions had in orienting state action during the negotiating process. Only interviewee A5 asserted that there were no norms orienting collective negotiations with the EU. Some interviewees also mentioned the CartA (C3),

---

130 C1, C3, C4 and E1.
131 C1 and E1.
132 C2, C5, E2, P4 and A6.
the CFPM and the Declarations of the Guadalajara and Vienna Summits\(^{133}\) (C4) as other Andean norms that oriented these negotiations.

In order to assess the causal effects of D-667 and D-598, it is necessary to describe their content. D-598 was emitted on July 11, 2004, in order to allow AC members to negotiate individually with third parties in those ‘exceptional’ occasions where it is not possible ‘by any motive’ to negotiate in ‘communitarian’ fashion.\(^ {134}\) In turn, D-667 was emitted on June 8, 2007, specifically for regulating collective negotiations of an AA (of which the FTA was part) with the EU.\(^ {135}\) From interviewees’ answers it can be observed that these norms generated certain confusion, and they were even subject of a legal dispute among AC members during FTA negotiations with the EU. When Colombia, Peru and Ecuador accepted the MPA format proposed by the EU, Bolivia brought a lawsuit before the Andean Court of Justice (ACJ) claiming that the acceptance of the MPA was a violation of D-667.\(^ {136}\) The problem with these two Decisions was that D-667 was interpreted by some actors as a mandate for undertaking negotiations with the EU \textit{exclusively} in a collective fashion. Perhaps this interpretation was due to the preamble of D-667, whose first principle reads that:

\begin{center} “It is indispensable to strengthen the unity of the Andean Community, taking into account the approaches of all Member Countries, in order to face successful negotiations of an Association Agreement with the European Union”.\(^ {137}\) \end{center}

Additionally, Art.1 of D-667 establishes that:

\begin{center} “The Andean Community recognises the existence of different levels of development and economic approaches among its Member Countries, which will be taken into account in the joint negotiation of an Association Agreement between the Andean Community and the European \end{center}

\(^{133}\) The Guadalajara (March 2004) and Vienna (May 2006) Summits were meetings held between the AC and the EU with the aim of advancing in the negotiation of the Association Agreement (AA) of which the FTA was one of the pillars.

\(^{134}\) See D-598. The authorisation to undertake bilateral negotiations had, in any case, been already made by D-322, though this Decision only referred to negotiations with ALADI (Latin American Integration Association) member countries and with countries from Central America and the Caribbean, and this is the reason why the last article of D-598 derogates D-322.

\(^{135}\) See D-667.

\(^{136}\) C1, E1 and A6.

\(^{137}\) See D-667.
Union, and the right to express their differences and to negotiate, according to the case, different levels of scope and depth in the issues and commitments of such Agreement.”  

No other paragraph of D-667 says anything about any sort of obligation that AC members must follow in terms of collectively negotiating with the EU. Quite on the contrary, in the final part of D-667’s preamble it is explicitly established that “Decision 598 regulates the general framework for Member Countries’ negotiations with third countries”.  

Yet, apparently the fact that D-667’s preamble manifested the ‘indispensability’ of strengthening the unity of the AC, and explicitly referred to ‘the joint negotiation of an Association Agreement between the Andean Community and the European Union’ (Art.1), made some actors (including interviewees E1 and A6) assume that D-667 mandated that FTA negotiations with the EU must be pursued by AC members exclusively in collective fashion. Indeed, only interviewees C1 and P4 explicitly stated that Andean norms did not compel AC members to pursue collective negotiations with the EU. P4 was certain that bargaining as a bloc was exclusively a EU demand. In contrast, interviewee A6 even declared that Bolivia ‘was right’ in bringing the lawsuit at the ACJ. Clearly, this was not the case, for D-667 stated that the framework for negotiating with third countries was D-598. As previously shown, D-598 established that AC members could negotiate individually in those ‘exceptional cases’ where ‘by any motive’ they could not negotiate jointly.

The ACJ understood that D-667 did not derogate D-598, and thus there were no legal grounds for Bolivia’s lawsuit (C1). Later on, Bolivia came to terms with the other AC members and withdrew the lawsuit, and hence the ACJ did not have to rule on this issue (E1). Subsequently, on July 1, 2010, AC members emitted D-738, whose only article derogated D-667 and reaffirmed that D-598 is the Andean norm that “regulates the general framework for Member Countries’ negotiations with third countries”. As Finnemore points out, norms are often the subject of discussion among actors because they are intersubjective and collectively held; accordingly, “Actors may specifically articulate norms in justifying actions, or they may call upon norms to persuade others to act” (Finnemore 1996: 24). It can be considered that the confusion about the contents of D-667 was only one part of the legal dispute that Bolivia established with

\[138\text{ Ibid.} \]
\[139\text{ Ibid.} \]
\[140\text{ See D-738.} \]
the other AC members. For it can easily be inferred that Bolivian officials were clear that D-598 allowed bilateral negotiations with the EU. Yet, it could be thought that they decided to bring the lawsuit before the ACJ to exert greater pressure over Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, in order to persuade these countries not to continue negotiations with the EU through the MPA, but, in turn, to incorporate Bolivian demands over trade issues in the collective negotiations’ format.

The causal effects of D-598 and D-667 are diverse. On the one hand, it is clear that D-598 allowed AC members to continue negotiations with the EU in bilateral fashion, independently of the MPA framework or a plain bilateral format like the one engaged by Colombia and Peru in FTA negotiations with the US. ‘Allowing’ must be understood as a causal effect because D-598 made possible bilateral negotiations with the EU, it made them stand as ‘legal’ action. Had this Decision not existed, bilateral negotiations could not have been carried out, as they would have been ‘illegal’ and thus invalidated. This is precisely why D-598 was created by AC member states - to enable bilateral negotiations with the US without violating the Andean normative. One could think that the same could have been done regarding negotiations with the EU: member states just create a norm allowing bilateral negotiations and that is it. But the fact that member states can create a new norm at any point does not deny the enabling role of D-598 (or any other norm that enables action), and this enabling role accounts for a causal effect. In other words, and according to interviewees, D-598 explains the continuation of bilateral FTA negotiations with the EU to the extent that it enabled AC members’ bilateral negotiations with third parties.

Note that in the particular case of norms – and not of other type of institutions (like, for instance, the AGS) –, ‘enabling effects’ should be considered as causal effects, simply for the fact that norms make things legal and illegal. Actors restrain from doing illegal things not only for the fear of being rejected by other actors, but also because other actors can take legal action against the actor who commits the illegal action (Onuf 1998). Note that actors could punish (do something against) another actor without resorting to the law, but then these actors could be acting ‘illegally’ themselves. If actors make norms, it is because they intend to care
about them, and thus it might be not of their preference to act against the norms they agree to enforce.

On the other hand, it is significant that D-667 was understood by interviewees E1 and A6 as a mandate for AC member states to carry out FTA negotiations with the EU exclusively in collective fashion. For this denotes that, according to these interviewees, this mandate was one of the reasons why negotiations with the EU were carried out collectively, even though none of these interviewees mentioned D-667 when they were asked why AC members decided to engage collective negotiations with the EU. The point to highlight here is that it could be the case that the idea of the ‘need’, the ‘commitment’ or the ‘obligation’ of member states of negotiating collectively, warranted in the fact that they were members of the Andean regional scheme, had so much force for some agents that they came to believe that D-667 mandated collective negotiating, even though this Decision only mentioned ‘the joint negotiation of an Association Agreement’ in one of its articles (Art.1) and explicitly recognised that D-598 was the legal framework for negotiating with third parties. It is understandable that these agents, and also Bolivian officials, could have interpreted that since D-667’s first principle spoke of the ‘indispensability of strengthening the unity of the AC’, collective negotiations were a mandate for AC members, inasmuch as agents conceived bilateral negotiations or the breaking of collective negotiations with third parties as something that was to the detriment of the AC’s unity.

Nevertheless, D-598 was created precisely for preserving the unity of the AC. It allowed AC members to pursue bilateral negotiations and established a set of conditions under which bilateral negotiations must be carried out, among which there are the ones of ‘preserving the Andean normative structure’ and ‘notifying and permanently maintaining the Andean Commission informed about the evolution and progress’ of bilateral negotiations with third parties. Furthermore, even interviewees C1 and P4 – who were sure that Andean norms did not compel AC members to pursue collective negotiations with the EU – considered the

---

141 Remember interviewee C3’s conception analysed in the previous part of the chapter (see p.143 above) that collective bargaining is intrinsic to membership to the AC as long as states are signatories of the CartA.

142 See D-598.
flexibility of Andean norms allowing member states to carry out bilateral negotiations with third parties as something ‘good’ in their evaluation of the negotiating process with the EU. Moreover, as has been shown, a good number of interviewees did not mention any negative impact that the breaking of collective negotiations with the EU had over the Andean integration process, and most of them neither saw any damage over Andean collective identity. Hence, we can be sure that the premise of bilateral negotiations with third parties curtailing the unity of the AC is not generalised. On the contrary, according to D-598 and to some interviewees, the authorisation that Andean norms give to AC members to carry out bilateral trade negotiations with third parties actually preserves and strengthens the unity of the Andean integration process.

To summarise, D-667 had constitutive effects over state action inasmuch as it was the norm establishing the conditions under which negotiations with the EU should be carried out. Besides the principle and the article (Art. 1) previously quoted, D-667 established that the existing asymmetries within the AC and with the EU must be considered in negotiations – especially in the form of ensuring SDT for Bolivia and Ecuador; and also allowing AC members to assume commitments with the EU that would not apply to the whole Andean group. It is worth noting that this last provision opened room for each AC member negotiating particular issues with the EU, which enforces the idea of institutional flexibility that was highlighted by interviewees C1 and P4 and pursued by D-598. Yet, the possibility of reaching individual agreements in certain areas does not contradict the collective negotiating format initially engaged with the EU, and does not equate in any case to bilateral negotiations.

In turn, the causal effect of D-667 is not related to its enabling force in terms of allowing member states to carry out bilateral negotiations with the EU, neither to its compelling force in mandating AC members to exclusively engage collective negotiations with the EU. Rather, its causal effect can be observed in making some agents believe that it mandated collective negotiations with the EU, as if it completely forbade bilateral negotiations. This causal effect is relevant inasmuch as the (mis)understood mandate was seen by interviewees E1 and A6 (and

---

143 C1, C8, P4 and A4.
probably by other actors) as a reason for AC member states engaging collective negotiations with the EU, and perhaps such (mis)understanding led Bolivian officials to consider that the Andean normative was being violated and to sue the other AC members before the ACJ. In other words, D-667 caused some agents to make a particular interpretation over the ‘mandate’ of exclusively pursuing collective negotiations with the EU, a (mis)understanding that made some agents (AC members) act the way they did.

It must be acknowledged, however, that this causal effect shall be supported by the strong ideas agents had about the commitment of collectively negotiating entailed to membership of the AC, just as the ideas of interviewee C3 formerly analysed. Such implied commitment might be explained by agents’ understandings of the legal duties that membership entails, but, as it was argued in the previous part of the chapter, this commitment may also be related to the identification that AC member states have with the Andean integration process. If the latter point is accepted, here we have a case where collective identity – in the form of member states identifying with the AC – has causal effects over the role of regional institutions in the form of Andean norms. For identification with the regionalist project made agents (AC members) interpret D-667 as a mandate for pursuing collective negotiations with the EU, thus providing an explanation of state action. In other words, a causal effect of collective identity on regional institutions generated a causal effect of regional institutions (norms) on state agency. This accounts for an explanation of state agency based on the role of collective identity and regional institutions, consisting of a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between both ideational structures.

3.3.2 The supportive role of Andean norms

Several interviewees highlighted the supportive role of Andean norms in collective negotiations with the EU, and also in orienting AC member states’ actions and policies.\(^{144}\) This supportive role of regional norms is particularly important because, on the one hand, it allows the observation of constitutive effects on state agency; and on the other, it generates AC member countries’ identification with Andean norms, which accounts for a causal relationship between

\(^{144}\) C1, C3, C4, E2, E3, P1, P2, A4 and A6.
regional norms and collective identity. Note that this argument is in line with those of Risse (2000; 2004) and Checkel (2001) addressed in Chapter 1. But besides acknowledging the socialisation and learning processes that norms trigger among national and regional bureaucrats, the emphasis here is on the benefits that member countries obtain from the existence of regional norms and, often, from their enforcement.¹⁴⁵

The supportive role of regional norms can be assessed in interviewees’ assertions that Andean norms were: useful for designing Colombian trade policies (C1); a guide for Ecuador during negotiations with the EU, as Andean norms supported Ecuador’s positions in areas like technical norms, sanitary norms, intellectual property, safeguards and commercial defence (E2); important to consolidate member countries’ institutional frameworks in trade matters, since the AC has managed to establish a series of norms that member countries have not been capable of elaborating individually, in issue areas such as intellectual property and competition (E3);¹⁴⁶ and norms on which AC members bear upon in several occasions where national norms ‘are not enough’ for facing trade negotiations with third parties (A6). It is worth remembering that in case study 1 interviewees P1 and P3 were quoted stating that Andean norms had offered support for Peru’s trade policy (P1), and that the AC institutional structure ‘favoured’ Peru because there was a series of Andean norms which had been incorporated into Peruvian national law (P3). Indeed, interviewee C5 asserted that one of the greatest disadvantages of ending the AC would be the many Andean norms that would need to be converted into national norms, or otherwise there would be ‘legal loopholes’ in many issues.

The previous considerations about the supportive role of Andean norms allow for the assessment of constitutive and causal effects of regional norms on state action. Interviewees’ answers give account of the importance that Andean norms have as a referent orienting AC members’ bargaining positions, but also for supplying national legislation in those areas where countries do not have it, and further, developing national legislation from the basis of Andean norms. These effects are constitutive inasmuch as Andean norms constitute a referent for state

¹⁴⁵ Remember Bloom’s (1990: 51) conceptualisation of the provision of benefits as a source of identification addressed in Chapter 1.
¹⁴⁶ E3 asserted that Ecuador bears upon Andean norms on competition issues because it does not have its own competition norms.
action, and they have causal effects as long as states identify with regional norms, and because of this identification (collective identity) they act the way they do. From other interviewees’ views it is also possible to assess the existence of a causal relationship between the supportive role of Andean norms on the construction of Andean collective identity. According to interviewee A4 – one of the AGS directors in charge of trade issues, in those areas where Andean norms exist, it is much easier to negotiate. A4 held that during negotiations with the EU, differences among AC members appeared precisely in those areas where there were no Andean norms, like biodiversity and environmental issues. As shown in the previous part of the chapter, A4 asserted that in the trade area there was not much of an Andean collective identity, but rather an Andean normative structure that served as a basis for carrying out negotiations;\textsuperscript{147} moreover, A4 explicitly affirmed that “Andean norms create a collective identity among state representatives, as in all negotiations with third parties ‘comradeship’ can be perceived among them”, and “if something happens to any member, the others support it” (A4). Norms ‘creating’ collective identity, particularly in its inter-group dimension, accounts for their causal effects.

Furthermore, in the previous part of the chapter emphasis was put on interviewee C3’s view, who associated collective negotiating with the EU with the advantage of having ‘clear rules for negotiation’ (C3). This assertion was made in the context of describing the Colombian government’s interest in strengthening the Andean integration process through collective negotiations with the EU. In C3’s view, the interest in engaging collective negotiations was partly explained because the AC provided ‘clear rules’ for negotiating, that is, the AC operated as a ‘securer’ of clear rules. Out of the AC, member states might feel that rules for negotiating would not be as clear as the ‘clear rules’ provided by the regional scheme. This view accounts for an important feature of the role of regional institutions as providers of clarity and security for pursuing negotiations with third parties. Clarity and security can be easily seen as motives for states to identify with Andean norms and with the regionalist project. Thus, it can be

\textsuperscript{147} Note that this is a different assertion from the assessment carried out in Chapter 1 regarding Acharya’s work about regional norms being what ASEAN collective identity consists of. In the case of A4’s assertion, regional norms are more important than an Andean collective identity, but he/she is not saying that collective identity consists of regional norms.
inferred that this identification of states with the regional scheme and with each other is explained partly by the existence of an institutional scheme that enables the pursuit of collective negotiations with third parties, for it provides the institutional environments to carry out these negotiations, and also provides clear rules for engaging these negotiations.

Hence, A4 and C3’s views, together with the ones of other interviewees who acknowledged the supportive role of Andean norms, provide grounds to observe an identification effect that Andean norms have on agents (AC members), not only because of the support that Andean norms provide to AC member states for negotiating with third parties, but also because of Andean norms’ usefulness for the development of national norms and the making of domestic trade policies. In these terms, the supportive role of Andean norms generates identification of AC members’ negotiating teams with each other and with Andean norms, thus contributing to the construction of an Andean collective identity, particularly regarding its inter-group dimension.

But not all interviewees agreed on the supportive role of Andean norms, and some of them made comments that invite doubt about the extent to which AC member states identify with regional norms. Interviewee C1 – one of Colombia’s chief trade negotiators, asserted that “Andean norms do not particularly hinder or facilitate the design and implementation of Colombian trade policy” (C1). Note that following C1’s view norms do not seem to imply any ‘change’, and hence their causal effects are not possible to assess in this regard. On his/her part, interviewee C4 – a Colombian official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of AC issues, argued that Andean norms help the implementation of Colombia’s trade policy “because Colombia is the country that mostly benefits from the AC”, and “Andean norms have always favoured Colombia’s interests” (C4). Although C4’s statement gives account of the importance of regional norms, it also invites the question as to whether these norms have served as a referent for the making of Colombia’s trade policy, or if they have only been an effective instrument for the Colombian government to achieve its aims – though it could be both. In any case, following C4, the Colombian government has a ‘positive vision’ of Andean norms, inasmuch as they help the country’s trade policy and favour its interests, which gives account of
norms’ constitutive effects. Yet, by ‘helping’ we cannot be sure of the ‘change’ norms make for the implementation of Colombia’s trade policy, and if the extent to which Andean norms ‘help’ such implementation is not made clear, causal effects are difficult to assess from this transitive verb.

In turn, interviewee C5’s view was explicitly negative regarding the supportive role of Andean norms. C5 – a Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, considered that the AC has been both a facilitator and an obstacle for the making of Colombian trade policy. Being a ‘facilitator’ and an ‘obstacle’ account for causal effects of Andean norms, as both nouns have a metaphorical connotation implying that the AC, in its normative dimension – that is, because of its norms – implied a ‘change’ for the making of Colombian trade policy (though again, without knowing the extent to which the AC ‘facilitates’ things it is more difficult to assess causal effects in this sense). Furthermore, C5 added that when he/she was in office, the AC represented more of ‘a burden’ than anything else, because it generated political and juridical worries, basically because the Colombian Constitutional Court could invalidate the FTAs that Colombia signed if the government challenged the AC normative framework (C5).

C5’s metaphor of a ‘burden’ denotes causal effects, inasmuch as a burden is something that, as an obstacle, hampers the progress of things. But this metaphor and the explanation that C5 gave allows for observation of the importance of norms and institutions for the politics of regionalism and regional integration. The fact that the AC treaty has legal superiority over Colombian law (as it is part of international law), made the Colombian government being very careful with enforcing Andean norms in order to avoid legal problems regarding the approval of its actions (in this case, the signing of FTAs) by Colombian Courts. This fact accounts for both constitutive and causal effects of Andean norms over state action. The constitutive effect can be observed inasmuch as the Colombian government is aware of the contents and legal superiority of Andean norms. The causal effect consists of the implication of this legal superiority for state action, as the Colombian government knows that it must respect Andean norms in any action it undertakes. Hence, in those cases where the Colombian government

---

148 As international norms, for the Colombian legal system – as well as for all AC members – Andean norms have legal superiority over national ones.
wants to do something that would curtail any Andean norm, it refrains from doing it because it knows the Colombian Courts will invalidate these actions.

Hence, following C5’s views, it is difficult to assess identification effects that Andean norms could have over the Colombian government, as they were considered more of ‘a burden’ than anything else. But interpreting C5’s assertions allows observing constitutive and causal effects of regional norms, and the analysis of interviewees’ assertions about the supportive role of Andean norms allowed observing a causal relationship between regional norms and collective identity that accounts for another explanation of the unfolding of the AC regionalist project based on the role of collective identity and regional institutions.

### 3.3.3 The role of the AGS

Some interviewees highlighted the AGS’ supportive role in the development of collective negotiations with the EU and other third parties. The main aspects pointed out were: the AGS’s ‘good job’ in coordinating negotiations (C3 and A2); the AGS’ support in working out all norms and principles that oriented negotiations (E1); the AGS’ full accompaniment of collective negotiations with the EU until the last day that member countries negotiated in joint fashion (A6); the AGS’ special support to Ecuador when deciding whether to continue negotiations with the EU, and to Peru when negotiating its bilateral FTA with the US (A4); and the AGS fulfilling Andean countries’ expectations in collective negotiations with the EU, as well as in FTAA negotiations and in negotiations with the Mercosur (A4).

The AGS’ supportive role allows observation of a constitutive effect of institutions on state agency, but not a causal one. During collective negotiations with the EU, the AGS helped AC members to carry out negotiations, as the AGS coordinated the logistics of negotiations and provided technical support. But the AGS did not cause collective negotiations with the EU. Yet, interviewee E1 – an Ecuadorian chief trade negotiator, argued it did to certain extent. Accordingly, it was the AGS who initiated contacts with the EU for starting negotiations of an AA (E1). Whether this was an AGS’ initiative is not clear, since E1 asserted that it was some AC members’ national representatives before the European Commission in Brussels who warned

---

149 C3, E1, A2, A4 and A6.
their governments and the AGS that the EU was bringing forward association agreements with other Latin American countries and was leaving the AC and Central America behind (E1). Since we cannot be sure that initiating contact with the EU for the signing of an AA was an AGS’ initiative, we cannot certainly assess a causal role. But in any case, we can be sure that the role of the AGS was very significant since the beginning of the elaboration of the AA between the AC and the EU back in the early 2000s.

Only interviewee A5 – one of the AGS directors in charge of trade negotiations, expressed some critiques about the role of the AGS in the unfolding of collective negotiations with the EU. A5 asserted that in the AGS there were some bureaucrats who believed in Andean integration, but there were other bureaucrats who were working for each country and not for the AC as a bloc. Hence, the AGS’ position was not unanimous towards the collective negotiation with the EU (A5). Accordingly, the AGS was ‘weak’ and ‘fearful’ for allowing bilateral negotiations without considering that this meant a rupture of the Andean institutional framework (A5). In A5’s view, the AGS was at the service of maintaining a bureaucracy and not at the one of integration. Moreover, member countries were not very supportive of the AGS’ role. A5 argued that when the AGS came with proposals for carrying out collective negotiations with the EU, Colombia and Peru did not show much interest in them. In A5’s words, “The AGS understood that there was a political mandate to strengthen the common market, as this was the AC Presidential mandate. But the signals of some subaltern government officials were different” (A5). Interviewee C2 – a Colombian Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, asserted that at a certain point of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, the confrontation between Bolivia and Ecuador was so serious that Bolivians asked the other member states to expel the Andean General Secretary, who was Ecuadorian and a very close friend of President Correa. Yet, interviewee A4 – one of the AGS directors in charge of trade issues, did not perceive that Bolivian representatives ‘blamed’ the AGS for the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU. Accordingly, “Bolivians complained against the other AC members and against the EU, but never against the AGS” (A4).
A5’s assertions suggest that the AGS contributed to the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, since there were some AGS bureaucrats who were ‘working for each country and not for the AC as a bloc’. In these terms, it is possible that A5 considered that one of the reasons why collective negotiations with the UE broke up was because of this ambivalent and sometimes detrimental attitude/role of the AGS, hence, a cause. Interviewee C2’s account of the dispute between Bolivia and Ecuador over the permanence of the General Secretary could be seen as another reason that contributed to the breaking-off of collective negotiations. Yet, interviewee A4’s testimony counterbalances the previous considerations, as accordingly Bolivia did not complain about the role of the AGS. Moreover, neither A5 nor C2 addressed these issues as causes for the breaking of collective negotiations with the EU. The relevant point to make here is that there is room to think of certain causal effects that the AGS could have had over the unfolding of collective FTA negotiations with the EU. In any case, here we are speaking of the AGS as an ‘institutional agent’ and not as an ideational structure (like regional norms and other types of institutions), and therefore the assessment of the explanatory role of the AGS is different from the one of collective identity and regional norms/institutions. Nevertheless, the analysis of the AGS’ role is important because it contributes to assessing its effects on state action and on the unfolding of collective negotiations with the EU, given that the AGS is a key component of the AC institutional framework.

Lastly, an important institutional feature of negotiations with the EU was emphasised by interviewee C2, who asserted that while the AC designated a different speaker from a different country for each pillar (though national negotiators of each AC member were present in each table), the EU had just one speaker who acted in the name not only of each of the EU’s 27 member states, but also in the name of the European Commission. This meant that the institutional structure of the EU was much stronger than the one of the AC, and this represented ‘an advantage in the negotiations for the Europeans’ (C2). This prompts reflection on the importance of the institutional framework for advancing collective bargaining. While negotiations between countries were made at the instance of the Commission in the case of the EU, negotiations among AC member states were conducted at the level of negotiations with the EU, and this may have created problems of coordination among members and difficulties
for advancing in collective negotiations. In other words, the European Commission was negotiating with one counterpart – the AC (or at most with four countries) –; while each AC member was negotiating simultaneously with four counterparts – the EU and the other three AC members –. In these terms, this could account for another causal effect of regional institutions on the unfolding of collective negotiations with the EU, inasmuch as the AC institutional framework could have made the negotiating process more difficult, and further this difficulty could have contributed to the breaking-off of collective negotiations.

3.4 Conclusion
The previous analysis has shown that collective identity made AC member states negotiate collectively and also made them break up collective bargaining. The cultural dimension was assessed as having constitutive effects on state action as long as interviewees spoke about certain issues of this dimension orienting AC member states’ action, like geographical and cultural issues (C2) and ‘cultural affinities’ (C5). The ideological dimension was assessed as having both constitutive and causal effects, the former being the ‘facilitating’ role that ideological coincidences had for AC member states official negotiating as a group, and the latter being the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU because of the ideological differences (rupture of the ideological dimension of identity) that emerged among AC members. On the basis of interviewees’ views, it was argued that ideological affinities strengthen the inter-group dimension, and this accounts for constitutive effects of this latter dimension of Andean collective identity.

All national officials interviewed for the present case study – with the only exception of C5 and P4, argued that Andean norms were very important in constituting their countries’ national interests. However, the fact that only few interviewees considered the role of collective identity as important in orienting member states’ action towards FTA negotiations with the EU counteracts the assessment of constitutive and causal effects of this ideational structure on state action. Yet the interpretive analysis of interviewees’ assertions in this regard shows that even for those interviewees who denied or undervalued the importance of collective identity, constitutive effects of this ideational structure were possible to observe, inasmuch as they
referred to issues of collective identity and spoke about their importance when referring to other situations (like the one of collective identity and the aim of strengthening the Andean integration process not being seriously affected by the rupture of the ideological dimension of Andean collective identity).

Regarding the role of regional institutions, it was argued that D-598 and D-667 had constitutive and causal effects on state action, as long as they were acknowledged by all interviewees as the regional norms orienting the unfolding of FTA negotiations with the EU, and as long as they enabled collective negotiations and later on allowed Colombia and Peru completing the MPA with the EU. Causal effects of D-667 were also observed as this regional norm made certain actors believe that collective negotiations with the EU were mandatory. It was argued that this effect was triggered on the basis that the sense of belonging and identification with the AC was high enough for these actors to interpret D-667 as making collective negotiations compulsory, even though D-667 and D-598 did not mandate this. This is a case where the causal effects of a regional norm depend on causal effects of collective identity, and thus a case of mutual constitution and causation between both ideational structures.

The supportive role of Andean norms was also assessed as generating causal effects on collective identity. The benefits that regional norms provide for national policymaking, for national legal orders and for international bargaining, generate identification effects of national officials with these norms and this contributed to the creation of Andean collective identity. Moreover, some interviewees emphasised the importance of regional institutions’ flexibility as a benefit of the Andean integration process, which may account as another issue generating identification effects on member states with the regionalist project. Identification effects generated by the supportive role of Andean norms and the flexibility of the AC institutional framework give account of causal effects of regional institutions on the creation of collective identity, which contribute to understanding the relationships between both ideational structures.

150 C1, C2, C8, P4, A4 and A6. These interviewees’ views will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5 where institutional flexibility will be suggested as an issue that helps explaining the AC’s maintenance.
The role of the AGS was assessed as having constitutive and causal effects, inasmuch as the AGS facilitated progress or made it difficult at certain occasions. Another institutional aspect that was observed as having causal effects was the AC negotiating format, which made negotiations more difficult because AC members had to negotiate simultaneously with each other and with the EU, whilst the EU was a single actor negotiating with the four AC members. The constitutive role of normative principles in orienting state action can also observed as most interviewees acknowledged that these norms and principles were respected during the unfolding of negotiations (with the only exception of A5). Indeed, no interviewee considered that any Andean norm was violated because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU, or because of what Colombia and Peru bilaterally agreed in their FTAs with the EU. Moreover, interviewees E2 and A6 asserted that this was officially certified by a legal examination carried out by the AGS.

In these terms, the present chapter has shown that it is possible to observe constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions through the analysis of interviewees’ views on their role. Nevertheless, it was shown that interviewees’ answers were diverse, sometimes contradicting one another and sometimes contradictory in themselves. Moreover, in several cases interpretive analysis was made on the basis of one or few interviewees’ views. Chapter 5 will discuss these issues as they may imply certain limitations to interpretive analysis, but it will argue that, as the analysis offered in the present chapter has shown, interpreting agents’ views is crucial for understanding agency and social interaction, like state action towards the unfolding of regionalism.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY 3. THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED PLAN FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (PIDS)

The PIDS was the instrument to develop the Andean Social Agenda (ASA) that was part of the New Strategic Design introduced in the mid-1990s to re-launch the Andean integration process. During the second half of that decade there were no significant advances in the development of the ASA, and only at the XIII Andean Presidential Council (APC) held in June 2001, Presidential directives were given for the adoption of a joint social agenda (Wagner 2007: 221). In the first half of the 2000s the AC had other important goals, such as negotiating as a bloc in the FTAA bargaining process, consolidating the Andean CET and the FTZ, and even strengthening intra-regional cooperation in security issues (Ardila 2003; Wagner 2004). Yet, developing the social issue area appeared as a new possibility to foster integration, given that advances in the trade area had been rather discouraging.

In contrast to the other case studies of the thesis, there were no material incentives derived from previous cooperation efforts in the social area that could be lost if the PIDS was not developed. The AC had programmes such as the Andrés Bello Agreement (education and culture issues), the Hipólito Unaue Agreement (health issues) and the Simón Rodríguez Agreement (socio-labour issues), but the ASA had lacked a plan to develop integration in other social issues. Hence, material incentives to adopt the PIDS consisted only of expectations to obtain future benefits from its implementation. In these terms, assessing the role of collective identity and regional institutions seems interesting as it provides alternative explanations for understanding member states’ decision to engage in negotiations over the PIDS.

The chapter will show that collective identity had constitutive effects in orienting state decisions to adopt the PIDS, but causal effects are less clear. In turn, the role of regional institutions will be assessed as more significant. It will be argued that the AC institutional
framework triggered identification effects among national and regional officials, as by working together at institutional settings they got to know each other and identified with one another and with the regionalist project around common needs and problems, and this generated the interest to adopt common solutions. Regional norms also triggered identification effects among national officials as long as they provide benefits for AC member states’ social policymaking. Besides these causal effects over the creation of Andean collective identity, constitutive and causal effects of regional institutions will also be observed as the AC institutional framework, including the AGS, contributed to and hindered progress.

4.1 The unfolding of the PIDS
A first section here outlines the backgrounds and contents of the PIDS, and a second one offers a general review of the PIDS’ execution according to interviewees’ answers on the development of the PIDS’ main projects.

4.1.1 Background and content of the PIDS
Since the signing of the Cartagena Agreement (CartA) in 1969, the harmonisation of economic and social policies was contemplated as a mechanism to meet the AC’s aims (Maldonado 1999: 197). Moreover, the CartA explicitly mentioned that member countries shall undertake joint cooperation actions that contribute to achieving a series of social development aims, and mandated national Ministers of ‘social areas’ to adopt a set of programmes to meet those aims. The ASA was introduced by the ‘Quito Act’ of the VII APC held in September 1995, as one of the three ‘big lines of action’ of the New Strategic Design for Andean integration. From then on, the ASA was addressed by subsequent APCs until the XIII APC held in Valencia.

---

151 Interviewed government officials were C6, C7, E4, E5, E6 and P5. AGS bureaucrats were A7, A8, A9, A10, A11 and A12. The reason why there are fewer national officials than AGS bureaucrats interviewed for this case study is that it was very difficult to find the officials responsible of the implementation of the PIDS in the national governments of Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. In turn, several AGS bureaucrats could be contacted who had clear responsibilities for developing the ASA and executing the PIDS.

152 See Acuerdo de Cartagena (arts. 129 and 130).

153 The other two were ‘deepening the integration process’ and ‘the external projection’ of the integration process. See Acta de Quito (VII Andean Presidential Council, 05/09/1995, section ‘New Strategic Design for Andean Integration’).

154 These were the IX APC (Sucre, 1997); the X APC (Guayaquil, 1998); the XI APC (Cartagena, 1999); and the XII APC (Lima, 2000). The only APC that did not address the ASA was the VIII (Trujillo, 1996), for this APC concentrated...
(Venezuela) in June 2001, where Presidents instructed the Ministers responsible of the areas of social welfare, health, labour, education and housing, to draft an Integrated Plan for Social Development (PIDS) in order to face the “serious problems of poverty, social exclusion and inequality in the sub-region”.\textsuperscript{155} The Quirama Summit that hosted the XIV APC in June 2003 defined the ASA as “the set of actions agreed by member countries to develop the social dimension of integration”.\textsuperscript{156} At this Summit, Presidents decided to give “maximum priority to the design, coordination and convergence of social policies that lead to developing specific and articulated strategies for social cohesion, and for fighting poverty and marginality”, and “to give priority to the approval of the PIDS as a complement to national development plans”.\textsuperscript{157} Directive number 8 of the ‘Quirama Declaration’ requested the Andean Council of Ministers (ACM) to formulate the PIDS, with the support of those Ministers responsible for social development.\textsuperscript{158}

According to Casas and Correa (2007: 598) political cooperation in the social area should grant the Andean integration process a multidimensional character, beyond the trade exclusive aspect. AGS bureaucrats also spoke of the scant efforts of the AC for solving the internal regional disparities within countries (A11), and the ‘exhaustion’ that trade integration had suffered, given the little advances in this area after 30 years of Andean integration (A8). The ‘novel’ character of social integration was highlighted in one of the principles of D-553 (the Decision defining the PIDS’ guidelines), which states that:

\begin{quote}
[...] Andean integration has entered a new stage, with a second generation of policies and a multidimensional agenda, in which it appears as top priority the development of a Social Agenda that facilitates developing mechanisms for regional cohesion and contributing to the fighting of poverty, inequality and social exclusion”.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{156} See Acta de Carabobo (XIII Andean Presidential Council, 24/06/2001, Directriz 5).
\textsuperscript{157} See Decision 601. ‘Plan Integrado de Desarrollo Social’, p.9.
\textsuperscript{158} See Declaración de Quirama (XIV Andean Presidential Council, 28/06/2003).
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
D-601 (the Decision defining the PIDS’ content) defined three axes for the ASA: a) the social dimension of the integration process; b) a communitarian strategy that contributes to the improvement of Andean inhabitants’ life quality; and c) citizen participation in the integration process. Accordingly, the PIDS constituted ‘the most significant proposal’ of the second axis (b). D-553 established the PIDS’ aims:

- To complement national programmes on food security, fighting against poverty, inequality and social exclusion, and improving peoples’ life conditions.
- To foster development objectives and goals based on international commitments made by each AC Member Country.
- To contribute to strengthening democratic governability through the provision of innovative financial mechanisms.
- To enrich the analytical background and instruments for the making of social policy through technical cooperation among AC Member Countries.
- To boost positive effects of trade and economic integration through the creation of employment.
- To adopt joint positions in international forums and negotiations related to the reduction of poverty, inequality and social exclusion.

D-553 defined three lines of action for the PIDS: communitarian social projects (CSPs); convergence of social objectives and aims; and a technical horizontal cooperation programme. CSPs were defined as “programmes or projects that can be executed jointly or co-ordinately by all member countries, or that engage at least three of them and can be extended to the other countries in the medium term”. Regarding convergence of social objectives and aims, the adoption of an Andean programme for the harmonisation of social statistics and indicators that contributed to the strategic thinking of social development from a countries’ bloc perspective was established as the main project. The technical horizontal cooperation programme consisted basically of exchanging experiences and information, and offering advice among member countries on social policies.

---

161 Ibid., p.10.
162 See D-553. These are the six aims established by D-553, but each aim has been summarised for length purposes.
4.1.2 The PIDS’ execution

Interviewees were asked about the execution and results of the PIDS in order to assess the coherence and effectiveness of its implementation, as well as AC members’ commitment to the PIDS’ unfolding. Information about the PIDS’ execution was very difficult to find, both at the AGS and at national ministries and online. Therefore, the information outlined in this section is mainly the one provided by interviewees.

Interviewees said very little on the PIDS’ lines of action corresponding to the Andean social indicators’ system and the programme for technical horizontal cooperation. Only in November 2006 did the AC create the ‘System of Social Indicators of the Andean Community’ (SISCAN) through Decision 647, by which the areas where AC member countries’ social indicators should be harmonised were defined, and the national statistics services of member countries were entrusted with producing the information and feeding it to the SISCAN.166 Furthermore, only in March 2009 did the Ecuadorian government present its proposal of SISCAN to the AGS.167 Interviewee E4 – an Ecuadorian high official in charge of coordinating the PIDS’ implementation, asserted that this project was assigned to the coordination of Ecuador, but he/she did not provide any further information about its development, neither was it possible to find additional information about the SISCAN on the ASA section of the AC website.168 Yet, at the statistics section of the AC website the SISCAN can be accessed, containing information about several social statistics in a unified fashion, and updated until 2010.169 Hence, it can be concluded that six years after its formulation SISCAN was finally put into practice and is currently working properly.170 Regarding the programme for technical horizontal cooperation, neither did interviewees mention anything about its advances, nor could any information be found at the ASA section in the AC website. Only interviewee A9 - an AGS bureaucrat in charge

166 See D-647
167 See Andean Community. Notas de Prensa (02/03/2009) ‘La CAN contará en breve con un sistema de indicadores sociales’.
168 See AC’s ASA official website.
169 See AC official website, statistics section; and also SISCAN website.
170 Interviewee A8 asserted that this project had stagnated for a long time, because it depended on external funding to advance and these resources were not fully obtained.
of PIDS funding, explicitly stated that the efforts for developing this programme had been ‘weak’ (A9). Hence, it can be inferred that this line of PIDS has not yielded significant results.

In these terms, the PIDS line of action that can be evaluated in greater detail is the one of Communitarian Social Projects (CSPs). This evaluation is based on the information provided by interviewees, for no information regarding the execution of CSPs could be found at the ASA section in the AC website, neither in the national ministries of member countries or at any other reliable internet resources. Moreover, no interviewee spoke of any official listing of the PIDS projects that had been defined/executed by 2010 – namely, the year when interviews were carried out. All interviewees coincided in that all CSPs were formulated and executed jointly by the four AC members, or at least by two or three of them. Yet, interviewees’ answers about concrete existing CSPs and their implementation and results were not homogenous.

Indeed interviewees seemed unable to remember concrete CSPs. From the projects included in the list provided by D-601, interviewees only mentioned the following as being included in the PIDS’ implementation process: the ‘Intercultural Andean programme’ (A8); the ‘Educimac’ project (A7, A8, A12, C6 and P5); the project of ‘Strengthening the Andean plan for health in border zones’ (A8 and C6); the ‘Programme for access to medicines’ (A8 and A11); and the ‘Food security Andean programme’ (A8, C6, E4, E5 and P5). The other projects mentioned by interviewees as being included in the PIDS’ implementation were not listed in D-601, although most of them can be considered as ‘fitting’ in one of the CSPs’ policy areas.

This lack of correspondence between the projects that interviewees mentioned and the ones originally defined in D-601 gives account of the expected flexibility that a large and ambitious plan such as the PIDS might have needed in order to be developed, and hence new projects were created and others modified over time. But it also gives a sense of dispersion and disorder, even more when several projects were only mentioned by one or two interviewees, and furthermore, some of them corresponded to countries whose interviewed national officials did not mention, like the ones of a telemedicine network between Colombia and Peru, a waste management project between Peru and Bolivia, and a health network between Ecuador and...

---

171 This list is provided in Appendix 4.
172 See Appendix 1 to know who these interviewees are. See Appendix 4 for the full list of CSP’s created by D-601.
Peru, which were mentioned by a Colombian official (C6) but not by the Ecuadorian and Peruvian officials in charge of coordinating the PIDS’ implementation. Furthermore, interviewees gave different and even contradictory information about the CSPs that were being executed at the time of interviews. A salient case was the Educimac project, which some interviewees suggested was being executed counting on the financial support of the EU, but interviewee P5 – a Peruvian official in charge of implementing the PIDS, mistakenly held had not yet started. Likewise, interviewee C6 – a Colombian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, mistakenly asserted that the projects of solid waste management at the border zone between Colombia and Ecuador and between Peru and Bolivia, and the project for a health network between Ecuador and Peru, had not yet started.

Interviewed national officials and AGS bureaucrats did not share the same information about CSPs, and had different knowledge concerning their content and status. This gives an impression of little interest among AC members in the PIDS and the development of the ASA. Moreover, almost all interviewees evaluated the PIDS’ implementation as unsatisfactory, and this accounts for the little identification that AC member states may have had over the PIDS, as it has not yielded significant results. Various interviewees coincided in that a great disadvantage of the PIDS was that it concentrated too much on the development of concrete projects and left aside the broader aim of coordinating and harmonising AC members’ social policies. Indeed, a number of AGS bureaucrats pointed out the AC’s intention to revise and update the PIDS, and some other interviewees asserted that the ‘Andean Strategy for Social Cohesion’ (ASSC) –

173 Note that, contrary to what D-553 and D-601 established, several CSPs involved only two member countries instead of three.
174 E4, E5 and P5.
175 A7, A12 and C6.
177 Press reports show that these projects were already being executed by 2010. See respectively: Andean Community. Notas de prensa (19/08/2010). ‘Buscan replicar experiencia binacional en manejo de desechos sólidos de municipios Tucán-Ipiales’; and FM Bolivia (online radio station) (07/10/2010) ‘CAN financiará proyecto transfronterizo en Desaguadero’; and Andean Community. Notas de prensa (15/07/2009). ‘Con el apoyo de la UE y la CAN Ecuador y Perú ponen en marcha proyecto binacional de integración fronteriza’.
178 A7, A8, A11, A12, C6, E5, and E6.
179 A7, A9, A12 and E4.
180 A7, A9 and A12.
in which the PIDS projects shall be incorporated – was the new tool for developing integration in the social area.\textsuperscript{181} Nevertheless, some AGS bureaucrats were pessimistic about the future of the PIDS, asserting that social issues had been ‘relegated’ in the AC (A9), and that the AC “is still far from having a strong social agenda” (A8).

4.2 The role of collective identity

Constitutive and causal effects of collective identity are more difficult to assess in this case study. This might be paradoxical since the social area of regional integration is ‘closer’ to the people as it is supposed to be focused on bringing direct benefits to them through regional programmes and policies, and, as will be further shown, the Andean Social Agenda (ASA) has often included the fostering of Andean identity as one of its aims. Yet, in general terms, all interviewees in this case study spoke about the content of Andean collective identity and made some comments on the extent to which it oriented state action towards the unfolding of the PIDS, which accounts for the constitutive effects of collective identity informing state action.

Interviewees made assertions about the content of Andean identity that can be classified into the three dimensions of Andean identity proposed in the previous chapter, though none of them suggested a distinction between dimensions. In the present case study most interviewees highlighted the cultural dimension of Andean identity,\textsuperscript{182} which refers to those cultural elements that make agents ‘feel Andean’, those ideas that compose what it means to be ‘Andean’. Some elements pointed out by interviewees as components of this dimension were biodiversity (A7 and C7), the Andean region – referring to the regions located around the Andes Mountains (A7 and E5), common language (A7, A10 and A11), and common history (A10, A11, and C6). Interviewee P5 – a Peruvian official in charge of implementing the PIDS, affirmed that an Andean identity existed, and that “over all there exists the social fraternity among Andean peoples”. Accordingly, “Andean fraternity has as the axis the Andean culture that unites AC members’ peoples” (P5). The ‘social fraternity’ among Andean peoples and Andean culture as an ‘axis’ uniting these peoples are metaphors that give account of the importance of Andean identity in its cultural dimension in orienting state action and peoples’ interaction. On his/her

\textsuperscript{181} A8, A12 and E4.
\textsuperscript{182} A7, A8, A9, A10, A11, C6, E5 and P5.
part, interviewee C6 – a Colombian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, held that an important element for the construction of Andean identity was the exchange between Andean markets.

Some interviewees pointed out an Andean citizenship as a constitutive element of Andean identity.\textsuperscript{183} Andean citizenship can be encompassed within the cultural dimension of Andean identity as it is an element that makes agents ‘feel’ Andean and is not related to a particular ideology (ideological dimension), nor is exclusively shared by national and regional officials (inter-group dimension). It is worth noting that Andean citizenship does not count as a metaphor as ‘Andean fraternity’ can do, since Andean citizenship is conceived as a number of concrete rights and there are on-going projects to enforce these rights for all inhabitants of the Andean region. These rights are, among others, the right to circulate within the AC without a passport, the right for workers to transfer social security payments from one AC member country to another, the right for workers to have a labour contract in any AC member country without a labour visa, the right to access health services in any Andean country and the right to study in another Andean country without the need of validating previous education degrees and diplomas.\textsuperscript{184} However, Andean citizenship was understood by some interviewees as the identification of one country’s citizen with another’s, though they denied its existence (A7 and A8).

Some interviewees also spoke of the multicultural and multi-ethnic character of the AC as another feature of Andean identity,\textsuperscript{185} which can be also classified into the cultural dimension, such as: the importance of identity in the case of indigenous and afro-descendant populations (A7); cultural identities of indigenous peoples (A8); and “the values that composed the Andean identity”, which are “the set of identity issues in the cultural order […] like the pluri-cultural and pluri-national aspects constitutive of the Andean countries” (A10); and other values like linguistic constructions and collective imaginaries based on common history and geography (A10).

\textsuperscript{183} A7, A8, A9 and A12.
\textsuperscript{184} C6, C7, E4, A7 and A9. See also the AC website for Andean Citizens’ Rights, included in the thesis’ References section.
\textsuperscript{185} A7, A8, A10, E5 and P5.
Some interviewees also commented on the importance of the ideological dimension of Andean identity, though without explicitly referring to this dimension as such. They pointed out the difficulties that the divergent AC members’ visions over development implied for effectively implementing the PIDS, though these interviewees did not refer to collective identity when speaking about those ideological differences. Interviewees pointed out social, environmental and sustainable development issues as the main developmental aspects around which ideological differences emerged, particularly with Venezuela until this country was an AC member (A11), and between Colombia and Peru on one side and Ecuador and Bolivia on the other, regarding social participation and the inclusion of social economy issues in the PIDS’ implementation (E4).

Interviewee A11 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the 2000s Strategic Agenda (of which the ASA and the PIDS were part), in the same vein as interviewee C2 quoted in case study 2, explicitly commented on the importance of ideological agreements as a constitutive element of Andean identity. This interviewee spoke of the agreement that existed about the concept of democracy as a component of Andean identity, a concept which was “a very important element for Andean cohesion” (A11). Accordingly, this concept of democracy has been contested because the new governments of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have a distinct conception of democracy from Peru and Colombia; before, there used to be an agreement about the role of democracy in the integration process, but this conception is no longer shared (A11). A11 also spoke of an agreement over regional integration as “a condition for countries’ development” that existed during the 1960s and the 1970s. Yet, nowadays the concept of integration has been ‘devaluated’, not only because member countries want to integrate with developed countries, but also because smaller countries like Bolivia and Ecuador have not seen any benefit from the integration process (A11). In turn, Colombia and Peru consider that ‘integration between the poor does not help’ and they prefer to ‘integrate into the big world markets’; hence, in these new conditions, cultural or historical identity does not matter much (A11). As a result, “collective identity over the concept of democracy, the development models and the international insertion models has broken” (A11).

---

186 A11, C6, C7, E4 and E6.
Interviewee C7 – a Colombian official in charge of implementing the PIDS and of AC’s environmental issues, succinctly referred to the importance of the ideological dimension of Andean identity when asserting that Andean identity existed, but that this identity has been ‘diluted’ in the last 5 years due to the declarations of certain Presidents discrediting the Andean integration process. As can be seen, Andean identity as an important ‘element’ for Andean cohesion; regional integration as a ‘condition’ for AC member countries’ development; the ‘devaluation’ of the concept of integration; and the ‘breaking’ and ‘dilution’ of Andean identity are all metaphors that denote the constitutive role of collective identity in orienting state action.

Finally, some AGS bureaucrats made comments related to the inter-group dimension of Andean identity, again without explicitly referring to this dimension. The existence of Andean collective identity among national officials (A7); an Andean identity and a ‘feeling of community’ shared by AGS bureaucrats (A8); the institutional dynamic of the AC contributing to strengthen this collective identity (A8); and a ‘spirit of confraternity’ and ‘a sentiment of affinity around interests’ quite visible among national officials (A12), were some aspects emphasised by AGS bureaucrats. Interestingly, no national official made comments related to the inter-group dimension of Andean identity, which suggests that identification among national officials in social issues is less significant than in the trade area (case studies 1 and 2).

In general terms, all interviewees – with the only exception of E6 – provided some insight about the content of an Andean collective identity and its role. The quoted AGS bureaucrats’ assertions about ‘feeling’, ‘spirit’ and ‘sentiment’ around issues that denote identification like ‘community’, ‘confraternity’ and ‘affinity’ also give account of the importance of collective identity, which is strengthened by the ‘institutional dynamic of the AC’. In these terms, it is possible to assess that collective identity had constitutive effects since agents voiced notions of collective identity. These constitutive effects are further warranted by the fact that, as will be shown in the next part of the chapter, the social issue area of integration and the ASA have historically included the construction of an Andean identity as a social development aim, and hence it should be understood that the PIDS also incorporated this aim, though not explicitly.
Moreover, the association made by a number of interviewees between the construction of an Andean identity and the holding of an Andean citizenship demonstrates that these agents were conscious about the existence/significance of Andean identity.  

Yet, some interviewees who spoke about the content of an Andean collective identity questioned its existence, particularly regarding its cultural dimension (though without explicitly referring to this dimension as such), and this may put into question its constitutive effects. For example, interviewee A7 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the ASA, did not consider that there is an Andean collective identity, as he/she did not believe that there was a feeling of Andean identity that made ‘a Bolivian identify with a Colombian’ (A7). Furthermore, A7 questioned that this were a purpose of the CartA. In this same line, interviewee A8 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, held that ‘there is not any conception of a common Andean citizenship’ (A8). Interviewee A7 argued that Andean identity is something that will be reached as long as the AC benefits the inhabitants of Andean countries ‘as it happened with European identity in the EU’ (A7). In A7’s view, constructing an Andean identity or and Andean citizenship should not be a priority, but rather showing citizens that the AC is useful for them in a number of aspects. In the same vein, interviewee E4 – an Ecuadorian official in charge of coordinating the PIDS’ implementation, asserted that Andean identity is “a process under construction, not something that already exists” (E4); and interviewee E6 – an Ecuadorian international official who participated in the PIDS’ implementation, asserted that an Andean identity was ‘more about a need of constructing such identity’ than something already existing. These interviewees’ negations of the existence of an Andean identity – referring particularly to its cultural dimension - question the importance of collective identity in orienting state action towards the PIDS’ implementation. However, as quoted before, interviewees A7, A8 and E4 also made some comments on the content of Andean identity, and thus we can be persuaded that ideas of collective identity were held by these interviewees, and thereby, informed their actions to some extent.

---

187 A7, A8, A9, C6, C7 and E4.
188 Though as will be shown in the next section, this is indeed a purpose of the CartA.
Constitutive effects of Andean identity can also be observed through some interviewees’ assertions about the importance of collective identity in orienting states’ decision to adopt the PIDS, though without explicitly referring to Andean identity as a reason. These assertions were: “Andean identity is always perceived as something important”, and has always oriented negotiations in the social area because the AC “has always sought to favour the people’s interests” (C6); the Colombian state, as well as the different Colombian governments, has always been convinced of the importance of the Andean regional process, of the priority that it has, and has always given the integration process ‘the attention it deserves’ (C7); and there is ‘a collective Andean element’ present in national officials’ high and medium command levels (E5).

Note that this reference to a ‘collective Andean element’ coincides with other interviewees’ references to ‘elements’ as metaphorical expressions to refer to identity or ‘political’ issues quoted in the previous case studies (P2, A2 and C5). E5 – an Ecuadorian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, explicitly stated that Andean collective identity oriented the constitution of Ecuador’s national interests towards the PIDS’ implementation as long as it was present ‘in the heads’ of certain national officials, but ‘no more than that’, since the AC is almost ‘unknown’ by the general public.

In contrast, causal effects of collective identity on state action towards the unfolding of the PIDS are more difficult to assess. Only two interviewees explicitly affirmed that there were reasons related to collective identity why the PIDS was adopted (A10 and A11). Interviewee A10 – an AGS director in charge of social issues, held that the aim was not only ‘to rescue Andean identity’ through the PIDS, but also ‘to promote it towards the future’. ‘Rescuing’ and ‘promoting’ Andean identity are metaphors that denote causal effects of Andean identity as these were aims – and therefore motivations – of implementing the PIDS. Accordingly, without these issues related to Andean identity “it would not have been possible to formulate the PIDS” (A10). Moreover, A10 argued that these issues related to the significance of a collective identity were ‘the little achievements’ of the Andean integration process. In turn, although stating that there were reasons related to the existence of an Andean collective identity why the ASA and the PIDS were developed, interviewee A11 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the 2000s Strategic

\[\text{168}\]

\[\text{189} \quad \text{C6, C7 and E5.}\]
Agenda, considered that collective identity does not matter in comparison to the expectations and interests that member countries have towards the Andean integration process.

Furthermore, interviewees E5 and P5 made certain comments that allow observing identification issues that could have motivated AC member states to adopt the PIDS, and as motivations these issues may account for causal effects of collective identity on state action. These views add to the previously quoted ones of C6 and C7, who spoke of the importance of identity for regional negotiations in the social area (C6) and of the priority that the Colombian government gave to the Andean integration process (C7), which also denote identification of the Colombian government with the AC and therefore a motivation for carrying out AC projects like the PIDS. In contrast to the identification effects that the PIDS’ implementation generated, which will be addressed in the next part of the chapter, the identification issues referred here existed before the PIDS’ adoption, and were: Ecuador’s interest in articulating its social policies and generating new joint projects with the other AC members, as a reason why Ecuador decided to participate in the adoption of the PIDS (E5); the Ecuadorian government’s perception that articulating policies that generated social development within member countries would further generate space for regional integration (E5); and the Peruvian government’s perceived advantage that having the PIDS would set ‘a common agenda’ and enabled the establishment of ‘common policies’ (P5). Note that these comments give account of an interest of AC members in deepening integration and pushing forward common issues, which denotes states’ identification with each other and with the regionalist project.

Yet, interviewee E5 also pointed out an Ecuadorian individualistic interest when asserting that the Ecuadorian government had the interest of using the PIDS to contain the massive flux of Colombian refugees to Ecuadorian territory in the border zone (E5). Nevertheless, note that having an interest in attending a problem occurring at the border zone with Colombia could not necessarily entail an interest in cooperating with the Colombian government to solve it – indeed it could be turned into a conflict instead of a motivation to cooperate. In contrast, the PIDS was perceived as a means to carry forward the interest in cooperating with the Colombian
government to address this problem. This accounts for another identification issue as the Ecuadorian government saw a benefit in adopting the PIDS.

Some interviewees made assertions that allow inferring causal effects of some of the elements composing the cultural and the ideological dimensions of Andean collective identity. Interviewee A9 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of PIDS funding, pointed out constructing Andean citizenship and Andean identity as a motivation for adopting the PIDS, as he/she referred to this construction as ‘a challenge’ of the AC, and in these terms this motivation would account for a causal effect. Moreover, some interviewees who spoke about the multicultural and multi-ethnic character of the AC as another component of Andean identity made some assertions that allow observing a causal effect of this identity feature on state action (A7 and A8), since it motivated actors to implement the PIDS. Interviewee A7 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of implementing the ASA, asserted that there was a need to protect and reinforce the identities of indigenous and afro-descendant populations, and interviewee A8 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of coordinating the PIDS’ implementation, held that the cultural identities of indigenous peoples was ‘one of the factors’ of the Andean policy for social cohesion, and the reason for the creation of the ‘Intercultural Andean Project’, namely, one of PIDS’ CSPs.

Furthermore, a causal effect of the ideological dimension of Andean identity can be observed in the different visions that AC member states had over the conception of development, since some interviewees asserted that these differences were a difficulty for the unfolding of the PIDS, something that caused ‘conflicts’, ‘delays’ and ‘slowness’ in its implementation. Lastly, when asked about their evaluation of the PIDS’ implementation process, interviewees made assertions that allow the observation of certain identification issues that will be addressed in the next section, for they are related to the effects of the PIDS’ unfolding on the construction of an Andean collective identity.

The fact that most interviewees considered collective identity not important in orienting state action towards the unfolding of the PIDS makes it difficult to value its explanatory capability. Six

\[190\] A11, C6, C7, E4 and E6.
Interviewees found it difficult or irrelevant to think about the importance of collective identity in orienting state action, and four interviewees asserted that there were no reasons related to the existence of collective identity orienting the adoption of the PIDS. Interviewee E4 did not mention anything related to the importance of Andean collective identity in constituting Ecuador’s national interests towards the implementation of the PIDS. He/she just stated that in the current Ecuadorian government there has been a ‘favourable policy’ for regional integration processes, both for the AC and for the UNASUR. On his/her part, interviewee C6 asserted that Andean identity did not orient much the constitution of Colombia’s interests towards the implementation of the PIDS because “it is something that is just being started to be acknowledged” (C6). Lastly, interviewee P5 held that “the ethnic sense is not sufficiently taken into account. More than thinking of indigenous peoples, [technocrats] think of people, citizens and the poor” (P5). Here it is clear that P5 associated Andean identity with the culture of indigenous peoples (cultural dimension). P5 asserted that “unfortunately, [the Andean culture that unites peoples] is not yet manifested at the level of national governments” (P5).

The former assertions suggest that Andean identity did not matter much in orienting state action towards the unfolding of the PIDS, and in these terms its explanatory power is put into question. For if collective identity was not taken into account by AC member states when adopting the PIDS, its constitutive and causal effects are practically ruled out. Yet, constitutive effects of collective identity can be observed through the assertions of interviewees A10, A11, C6, C7 and E5, who acknowledged the presence of ideas related to collective identity orienting state action and the unfolding of the PIDS. In turn, causal effects can only be observed in the views of A10 and A11, who posed ideas related to collective identity as ‘reasons’ for adopting the PIDS. Furthermore, identification issues pointed out by interviewees E5, P5, C6 and C7 account as motivations for adopting the PIDS, and in these terms they allow observing causal effects of collective identity on state action. But in general, interviewees who recognised the importance of Andean identity did not point it as a reason for action. Moreover, A11 asserted that collective identity does not matter in comparison to the expectations and interests that

191 A7, A8, A9, A12, E6 and P5.
192 A8, E4, C6 and P5.
193 Unión Suramericana de Naciones (Union of South American Nations), which exists since 2003.
member countries have towards the Andean integration process, by which its causal effects are diminished with respect to states’ rational expectations.

4.3 The role of regional institutions
The first section here analyses the extent to which Andean norms/institutions oriented member states’ action in the unfolding of the PIDS. The second one addresses the effects of the PIDS as an institutional plan and structure on the construction of Andean collective identity. Lastly, a third section reviews the role of the AGS in the PIDS’ implementation process.

4.3.1 Andean norms and institutions orienting the PIDS’ unfolding
All interviewees were clear that the main Andean norms that oriented the PIDS’ unfolding were D-553 and D-601, namely the Decisions creating and defining the content of the PIDS. No interviewee mentioned Presidential declarations or the CartA as other normative instruments that oriented the PIDS’ unfolding, and no interviewee considered that there were any problems with Andean norms for the PIDS’ implementation. Yet, interviewees’ perceptions about the adequateness of the AC institutional framework for executing the PIDS differed. While seven interviewees considered it adequate, three interviewees did not. Interviewees asserted that the AC institutional framework ‘facilitated’ the PIDS’ implementation process (A8) and ‘enabled’ the PIDS’ continuity, even though the PIDS’ execution had been ‘slow’ (E4). As has been already pointed out, ‘facilitating’ only accounts for constitutive effects of regional institutions on state action, since this transitive verb does not give a sense that the PIDS’ unfolding depended on regional institutions to ‘be possible’, nor to occur the way it did. ‘Enabling’ can neither be assessed as having a causal dimension, as it does not give a sense of a ‘changing’ effect that the AC institutional framework could have had on the PIDS’ continuity, at least not without some sort of specification of the extent to which the enabling or the facilitating factor implied a change.

---

194 Interviewees A10, E5 and E6 were aware of the existence of these norms but did not mention their numbers or their content.
195 A7, A8, A9, A11, C6, C7 and E4.
196 A10, E5 and P5.
It is possible to observe causal effects of the AC institutional framework on state action and the unfolding of the PIDS as interviewees pointed out some problems that caused difficulties for the PIDS’ implementation. The issue mostly criticised by interviewees was the institutional procedures and instances through which Decisions were made and carried out. The ‘high rotation’ and changes in positions among national officials (A7, A8, A9 and A10); the dependency that work advances in a technical level had on Councils of Ministers’ political decisions in order for advances to be materialised (C6 and C7); the need for consensus among the four Andean members in order for Decisions to be made (E4 and P5); and the lack of binding power of Presidential directives, which can only be transformed into Decisions by the ACM (A10), were particular aspects pointed out by interviewees as hindering the PIDS’ implementation. Yet, other interviewees criticised the ‘legalistic’ character of the AC in terms of pretending that every decision or initiative were translated into an Andean norm in the form of a Decision (E6 and A11). Another difficulty was the ‘high bureaucratisation’ of the AC in terms of enlarging its size and broadening its activities to more bureaucratic levels (C6 and E5). Lastly, interviewee A9 pointed out as another difficulty the lack of a permanent technical body for coordinating the PIDS, and interviewee E4 added that a problem of the AC institutional framework for the PIDS’ implementation has been that some decisions have been made at the Committee for Border Development instead of the Andean Council of Ministers of the Social Area (CADS), and this has created ‘problems of legitimacy’ over decisions. Inasmuch as the previous negative aspects of the AC institutional framework caused the PIDS not to be implemented in a satisfactory way, these institutional aspects implied a ‘negative’ change, and hence causal effects can be observed.

Interviewee A7’s testimony deserves particular attention. This interviewee – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of developing the ASA, considered that although the Andean normative framework was ‘enough’ for developing the ASA, the methodology of formulating concrete projects in order to put forward this agenda was not useful anymore. Instead, what is needed are lines for AC member states formulating regional public policies, but accordingly this exercise of policy formulation ‘lacks’ norms (A7). It is worth noting the importance that Andean norms have for

---

197 Namely, the executive authority in charge of the PIDS’ execution.
A7, as his/her declaration suggests that if norms existed, the exercise of regional policy formulation could be realised. A7’s statement denotes that norms may have causal effects, as long as their absence impedes regional policy formulation, and thus it can be inferred that their existence makes it possible. But, does it ‘making possible’ account for causal effects? A7 seemed to suggest that if norms existed, regional policy formulation would be made, and in these terms a causal effect of norms would exist. But since these norms do not exist, we cannot be sure of their causal effects in this sense. As can be noted, expressions like ‘making possible’ bring some confusion between constitutive and causal effects, and this accounts for a problem of distinguishing constitutive from causal effects following the interpretive method proposed in the thesis. Nevertheless, ‘making possible’ does give a sense of change, inasmuch as it can be understood that without the factor that makes something possible, ‘that something’ would not exist. This problem will be further addressed in Chapter 5.

Constitutive and causal effects of regional norms/institutions can also be observed through the analysis of interviewees’ answers about the extent to which Andean norms oriented the PIDS’ unfolding and were important in constituting member states’ interests towards the PIDS’ adoption. Only interviewees E4 and E5 – two Ecuadorian officials in charge of implementing the PIDS, asserted that Andean norms were not important in constituting Ecuador’s national interests. In contrast, most interviewees acknowledged the importance of Andean norms and some of their views allow observing causal effects of regional norms and institutions on collective identity. These effects correspond, on the one hand, to agents’ identification with norms, which accounts for causal effects of norms on collective identity and also on state action. On the other, to the binding force of norms, which accounts for causal effects of norms on collective identity and also on state action but not on collective identity.

Regarding identification with norms, interviewees asserted that: Andean Decisions account for member states’ political will of acting under binding norms (A11); to the extent that all AC members’ social policies ‘revolve around’ regional common agendas, Andean norms contribute to the formulation of Colombia’s social policies (C6); Andean norms have been very important

---

198 A11, C6, C7 and P5.
in constituting the Colombian government’s interests towards the Andean Environmental Agenda (AEA, which derived from the PIDS) because supra-regional normative frameworks enable and reinforce the development of national legislation on environmental issues (C7); and the AC has been ‘a facilitator’ for the making of environmental policies in Colombia, because it has served as a ‘justification’ for developing these policies (C7). Accordingly, “the AC has been a source of environmental law in member countries” (C7).

Note that in the previous assertions there is a difference between A11’s view and the ones of C6 and C7. A11’s assertion accounts for a case of identification from AC member states with regional norms and with the integration process in the social area, as long as states were ‘willing’ to *permanently* bind their actions through regional norms;¹⁹⁹ that is, states saw the binding power of norms as something ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ *through time*, as A11’s assertion referred to Andean norms *in general*. In turn, C6 and C7’ views on the helping role that Andean norms have played for the making of Colombian social and environmental policies account for identification of AC member states with regional norms, as they feel ‘supported’ by Andean norms in the elaboration of domestic policies. In these terms, identification with norms does not occur because states consider norms ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’, but because they obtain benefits from them. In any case, A11, C6 and C7’s views account for cases where Andean norms make states identify with them and with the integration process, and contribute to the creation of collective identity. Furthermore, such identification makes states comply with norms, either because states consider norms as something ‘good’ in itself, or because they benefit from norm compliance.

Regarding the binding force of norms, interviewees asserted that: the supranational character of Andean norms made it obligatory to enforce these norms (C6); Andean norms imply ‘global and international commitments’, and are not very different from what is done in other parts of the world regarding social issues (P5); and Andean norms did not matter more than the fact that the Ecuadorian government must be ‘subject to AC norms’ as long as Ecuador is an AC member (E4). According to these assertions, causal effects of norms can be observed as long as

¹⁹⁹ Note that this coincides with interviewee C3’s view on the implication that regional (and national) norms have for member state identification with such norms and with the regionalist project (see p.143 above).
states comply with norms because norms exist, but not because states see those norms as something ‘good’ (though not necessarily as something ‘bad’ either), like in the previous group of assertions made by interviewees A11, C6 and C7. Yet, in both groups of assertions regional norms can be assessed as having causal effects on state agency, either because norms make states identify with them and with the integration process and thereby they enforce regional norms, or either because states refrain from doing things that Andean norms forbid.

Furthermore, some interviewees provided individualistic and instrumental visions that invite doubt about the extent to which member states identify with regional norms. For instance, interviewee A11 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the Strategic Agenda in the early 2000s, held that countries are keener on fulfilling regional norms when they are obtaining benefits from the integration process. This can be interpreted as if there is greater identification with norms when complying with norms yields concrete benefits for states. Going back to interviewee E4’s assertion that Andean norms did not matter anymore than beyond their binding power, it can be inferred that E4 did not see any particular usefulness of Andean norms for the interests of Ecuador, which denotes a state individualistic vision. This individualistic vision is also observed in interviewee E5’s consideration that Andean norms did not matter at all in constituting Ecuador’s national interests towards the PIDS’ implementation because the government was ‘only worried about getting aid to develop policies at border zones’ (E5).

These individualistic visions lead to questioning of the explanatory role of Andean norms and institutions, for they suggest that states comply with norms and engage regional institutions only if they get particular benefits from this without considering the other members of the group. Note, in this regard, that C6 and C7’s previously quoted assertions highlighted the existence of ‘common agendas’ and the importance of Andean norms as a source of environmental law for (all) member countries. Yet, if the PIDS was adopted simply because AC members saw individual benefits on its implementation, causal effects of regional institutions can be observed, as long as agents might identify with regional institutions designed for
implementing the PIDS, which are expected to yield benefits. Hence, there is a difference between those identification effects derived from individual benefits and the ones derived from benefits for all members of the group.

The previous analysis raises the question about whether agents comply with norms because they identify with them, or just because they calculate the benefits obtained from norm compliance. Both cases can co-exist (Onuf 1998), but it is one thing to enforce norms because agents see compliance with norms as something ‘good’ (norms are seen as something appropriate by itself, as norms are a source of group identification); and quite another to engage in a rationalist calculation every time agents are about to enforce or violate norms. Moreover, as has been shown, a third option is that agents comply with norms because of the fear of being punished. Furthermore, a need emerges about distinguishing identification effects of norms, not only between those derived from considering norms as something ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ in itself, and those derived from obtaining benefits from norm enforcement; but also between those identification effects that entail considering benefits for all members of the group and that highlight a positive vision of the collective character of things, and those that entail considering only individual benefits in an instrumental fashion. Wendt’s distinction of three degrees of internalisation of culture and norms is useful to address these issues.

When speaking of these degrees of internalisation, Wendt (1999: 268-78) directly refers to norm compliance, as for Wendt norms and institutions are key components of culture. The three degrees of internalisation are coercion (first), self-interest (second) and legitimacy (third). The first degree accounts for the weakest degree of internalisation, as agents comply with norms just for the fear of being punished if norms are not enforced. This degree needs the existence of coercive means that can be effectively used to punish agents for their non-compliance. In the absence of those means, agents will most probably not enforce norms. The second degree accounts for a higher degree of internalisation, as agents comply with norms because of the benefits they find in doing it. This degree does not depend much on coercive

---

\(^{200}\) Once more, remember Bloom’s (1990: 51) position reviewed in Chapter 1 about agents’ identifying with the provider of benefits, in this case, regional norms.

\(^{201}\) Indeed, when describing the three levels of internalisation of culture Wendt (1999: 268) speaks of ‘cultural norms’ as the main objects of internalisation, and his discussion consistently refers to norm compliance.
means to punish agents. However, if agents do not see benefits in complying with norms, they will stop enforcing them, and thus in the absence of coercive means norms will not be enforced. In contrast, the third degree of internalisation does not depend on the existence of coercive means to punish agents, which does not mean that it is incompatible with it. This degree is the strongest one since agents comply with norms because they consider them legitimate. This means that agents see norms as something appropriate, not for them individually but collectively, useful for preserving the social order and, furthermore, constitutive of what identifies them as agents and of the social ordering they are part of as such. Independently of the existence of coercive means to punish agents, or of the obtainment of particular benefits, agents comply with norms because it is part of their identity to do so. The following paragraph by Wendt is highly illustrative in this regard:

To say that a norm is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectively held identity the role in which they have been positioned by the generalized Other. In the Second degree case actors “try on” identities that conform to role expectations but do so for only instrumental reasons, relating to them as if they were external objects. In the Third Degree case actors identify with others’ expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. The Other is now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it sees itself as in relation to the Other, its “Me”. It is only with this degree of internalization that a norm really constructs agents; prior to this point their identities and interests are exogenous to it (Wendt 1999: 272-3).

Even though Wendt does not refer to identification in his description of the three degrees of internalisation, it is possible to relate the two. Put differently, agents identify more with norms the more they make norms part of their identity(ies). What occurs at the third degree is precisely that norms become a feature or component of agents’ identity. This degree can be observed in the cases of those interviewees like C3 and A11 that referred to Andean norms as entailing an Andean identity: the subscription of Andean norms makes states become ‘Andean’ in terms of identifying with each other and with the regionalist project. This conception of Andean norms account for stronger causal effects of regional norms on collective identity, as norms become part of actors’ identity(ies) and thereby they act the way they do (complying with norms and pursuing regionalism and regional integration).

202 Note that this coincides with Checkel’s (2001: 553-4) assessment that agents comply with norms because norms that constitute state interests make agents identify with such norms.
In contrast, in the cases of those interviewees who pointed out rationalist calculations when referring to the role of norms (A11, E5, C6 and C7), weaker causal effects can be observed, as the degree of identification/internalisation is lower. But relating degrees of internalisation with levels of identification allows for making a significant distinction that Wendt’s categorisation does not: identification effects derived from considering the obtainment of benefits for all members of the group and that highlight the collective character of things are stronger than those considering individual benefits instrumentally. For the former consideration of benefits denotes greater identification with the group and poses the regional collective character of norms as something ‘positive’ (just as C6 and C7’s assertions show), in contrast to an individualistic and instrumental vision of the latter consideration that denotes identification with regional norms, but not with their collective character as something positive for the group as a whole. Note that this distinction has been possible to make thanks to an interpretive analysis of agents’ views, which focused on the terms used by interviewees to refer to the role of norms and contrasted their visions with the ones of other interviewees (or the same interviewees giving different views) who spoke of benefits derived from regional norms in different terms. In both cases causal effects of norms can be observed, as they make agents identify with them and thus contribute to the construction of collective identity, though more in the case of ‘collective’ benefits than in the case of ‘individual’ ones.

Lastly, in the case of those interviewees who spoke of the binding role of regional norms (E4, P5 and also C6), causal effects of norms on agency can be observed inasmuch as states restrain from doing things because of norms, but causal effects on collective identity cannot be observed because the first degree of internalisation does not entail any sort of agents’ identification with norms. Agents just comply with norms because they fear being punished, but not because they find any benefit from complying with norms (besides the one of not being punished), nor because norms are part of their identities.

4.3.2 The effects of the PIDS on Andean identity

As the key instrument to develop the ASA and the social issue area of regional integration, the PIDS can be considered as an institutional structure that has effects on state agency and on the
construction of Andean collective identity. The relationship between the social issue area of integration and collective identity in the AC regionalist project could be expected to be closer than the one of the trade area, for since its beginning in 1969 the CartA stipulated “the affirmation of cultural identity and the formation of citizen values for integration on the Andean area” as one of the AC’s social development aims.\textsuperscript{203} The CartA established that for the achievement of this one and other aims, “programmes and projects will be developed in the fields of health, social security, social interest housing, education and culture”.\textsuperscript{204} As can be seen, constructing an Andean identity was set by the CartA as an AC aim, and from the AC’s foundational treaty it can be assumed that every programme and project related to any of the previously fields mentioned should have as a more or less explicit aim contributing to the construction of an Andean identity.

Furthermore, in different APC’s declarations that preceded the creation of the PIDS an association was made between the development of integration in the social area and the strengthening of ‘Andean cultural identity’. This was the case of the ‘Quito Act’ (1995), which established that the programmes and actions developed must have as one of its priorities “affirming the Andean cultural identity”.\textsuperscript{205} However, the New Strategic Design for Andean Integration (included as an annex of the ‘Quito Act’), which established the ASA as one of its three main lines and defined its content, did not mention anything about the aim of strengthening Andean identity.\textsuperscript{206} The ‘Sucre Act’ (1997) also did not mention anything related to an Andean identity, but in turn the ‘Guayaquil Act’ (1998) expressed the necessity of “stimulating cultural developments that affirm the Andean identity”, and instructed the Ministers of Education and national officials responsible of cultural policies to present an action plan for achieving this objective.\textsuperscript{207}

Later on, the ‘Cartagena Act’ (1999) established that the ASA must provide the basis for “a policy on culture and science and technology which preserves and promotes our own

\textsuperscript{203} See Cartagena Agreement, art. 129.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{205} See Acta de Quito (numeral 7).
\textsuperscript{206} See Acta de Quito (section ‘New Strategic Design for Andean Integration’, numeral C).
\textsuperscript{207} See Acta de Guayaquil (numeral 50).
identity”. The same Act also recognised that the meetings that Andean Ministers held in order to give content to the ASA had fostered “the recognition of cultural diversity, the affirmation of the Andean identity and the cultural promotion of our peoples”. The ‘Cartagena Act’ also instructed Ministers of Education to propel actions for ‘strengthening Andean identity’ through education policies, departing from “recognising the cultural diversity of our peoples”. The next APC declaration, the ‘Lima Act’ (2000), did not make any mention of an Andean identity. In turn, one of the directives established by the ‘Carabobo Act’ (2001) of the XIII APC (the one that created the PIDS) instructed the AGS to develop “a Communication Programme about the integration process that fostered Andean identity”.

Surprisingly, the official document defining the content of the PIDS only made one reference to strengthening Andean identity as an explicit purpose of one of the CSPs. Effectively, the ‘Andean programme about quality and equity in education’ asserted that:

“Cooperation among the five Andean countries on designing policy criteria for improving the quality of basic education will help [...] strengthen the Andean cultural identity and develop a culture of integration”.

No other reference was made to fostering or constructing an Andean identity along the PIDS official document. The few references made to identity in this document were related to the cultural identity of indigenous peoples and other minority populations. Indeed, interviewee A8 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, asserted that no other explicit reference was made to collective identity in the PIDS besides the ‘Intercultural Andean Programme’ (A8). Alternatively, the PIDS also had the aim of democratising the integration process and extending the benefits of regional integration to all citizens, and particularly to those more vulnerable and impoverished sectors.

---

208 See Acta de Cartagena (numeral 12).
209 See Acta de Cartagena (numeral 13).
210 See Acta de Cartagena (numeral 40).
211 See Acta de Carabobo (Directriz 10).
213 Cultural identity of indigenous peoples and other minorities is addressed in D-601 by the ‘Intercultural Andean Programme’ (p.31), and by social development programmes in border zones (pp.46-7). See D-601, ‘Plan Integrado de Desarrollo Social’.
214 Ibid., p.12. See also SELA (2008).
According to former AC General Secretary Allan Wagner, part of the social agenda was to be concentrated in the formation of civil society participation networks that helped the construction of the Andean communitarian project so the benefits of integration could reach the ‘common citizen’ (Wagner 2007: 231). In these terms, it could be thought that the PIDS had as an intrinsic aim to strengthen Andean identity by fostering Andean citizens’ identification with the AC through the extension of benefits and increasing their participation in the integration process (just as interviewees A7, A8, A9 and A12 pointed out). Furthermore, since constructing an Andean identity was a social development aim established by the CartA, it could be assumed that the PIDS, as the main tool for developing the ASA, intrinsically pursued this aim. Indeed, interviewee A11 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the Strategic Agenda in the early 2000s, asserted that the ASA aimed at including social sectors in the Andean integration process, since the AC had historically focused only on public servants and on “well positioned entrepreneurs in the Andean market” (A11). It is easy to observe that this ASA aim is related to the aim of strengthening identity, even though A11 did not explicitly make such an association. Nevertheless, the absence of the issue of Andean identity and its promotion in the PIDS is notorious, and this fact gives a clue that collective Andean identity was not important in orienting the formulation of the PIDS, and thus the prospects of the PIDS in contributing to strengthening Andean identity were not significant.

In accordance with the diffuse terms in which the PIDS aimed at strengthening Andean identity, interviewees’ considerations about the extent to which the PIDS’ unfolding contributed to strengthening this identity were diverse. While two interviewees asserted that the PIDS had not made such contribution,²¹⁵ five asserted it did.²¹⁶ In turn, other interviewees considered this assessment irrelevant (A8) or difficult to make (A9 and C6). A12 – one of the AGS directors in charge of social issues, asserted that the PIDS had done ‘little’ to strengthen Andean collective identity, a common vision or approach. Accordingly, the PIDS did not incorporate a strategy for the participation of civil society, and in this sense it could not strengthen collective identity

²¹⁵ A12 and P5.
²¹⁶ A10, C7, E4, E5 and E6.
Interviewee P5 – a Peruvian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, argued that the PIDS had not contributed to strengthen Andean collective identity, but rather ‘to identify it’. In his/her words, “the AC is trying to find the spaces of action for constructing this identity” (P5). P5 argued that the AC was ‘a space for state action’, and that in the PIDS states were finding ‘a way for common interaction’, which was ‘important but not sufficient’ (P5). P5 argued that a problem of the PIDS was that it was defined by AC member states at the head of Foreign Affairs Ministries, and this reduced the participation of social sectors (P5). Accordingly, the PIDS ‘did not express’ the Andean identity, and this is why it was very important that the PIDS ‘reaches the common citizen’ (P5). As can be seen, A12 and P5 strongly associated Andean identity with citizen participation, and since the PIDS has done little to foster the latter issue, then these interviewees considered that the PIDS has not contributed to strengthening Andean identity.

In contrast, interviewee A10 – an AGS director in charge of social issues, said that Andean identity was ‘undoubtedly’ reinforced by the PIDS’ implementation: “Even though the PIDS was rather unknown among those populations who were actually the ones that the PIDS was referred to, the PIDS was a contribution to the affirmation of AC members’ common values, and therefore to the ‘more finished’ construction of Andean identity” (A10). A10 added that “the cultural background of the PIDS is full of a fundamental belief in the values entailed by a Latin American identity and of an Andean identity in particular” (A10). Moreover, A10 asserted that the AGS’ interest in implementing the PIDS was to make the integration process something more democratic and participatory. The aim was “to incorporate integration into the quotidian tasks of member countries”, and to ‘bring down’ the integration process from being a task carried out by diplomats, technocrats and authorities to be ‘a peoples’ task’ (A10). Here it can be observed once more that the aim of including AC members’ populations into the integration process was related to constructing an Andean identity, even if A10 did not make this explicit.

Interviewee E5 – an Ecuadorian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, also considered that Andean identity had been reinforced through the PIDS’ implementation, since there was
an attempt to have ‘greater cohesion and articulation, and with the PIDS ‘a new space of reference’ was generated (E5). In this same vein, interviewee E6 – an Ecuadorian international official who participated in the PIDS’ implementation process, estimated that having the PIDS contributed to the construction of Andean identity because it allowed posing discussions about issues that would have not been included in the integration process unless the PIDS had posed them. Finally, interviewee E4 – an Ecuadorian official in charge of coordinating the PIDS’ implementation, considered that the PIDS has contributed to strengthen collective identity, as projects have been executed in spite of ideological differences and political disputes among member countries. In his/her words, “we need to learn to respect each other and to work together” (E4). In these same terms, interviewee C7 – a Colombian official in charge of the AEA (which was derived from the PIDS), held that the development of the AEA linked to the ASA has contributed to maintain Andean identity amid the political tensions that have affected the AC in the last 5 years (C7). E4 and C7’s latter assertions give a clue about another possible feature of Andean identity, which consists of respecting the differences among member countries. These interviewees’ assertions about the ways in which the PIDS contributed to strengthening Andean identity allow observing causal effects of the PIDS’ implementation process on collective identity.

Interviewees pointed out some benefits of the PIDS’ implementation process, which allow thinking that the PIDS triggered certain identification effects among AC member states. These benefits were: the PIDS allowing an ASA (A9), and establishing criteria, principles and policy lines for developing the ASA (A7); the PIDS generating ‘consciousness and synergies among AC member countries’ (A7); the PIDS project of labour competencies’ certification ‘having inspired’ the elaboration of Bolivian national policies on this issue, and the turning of certain PIDS projects into public policies in some AC members (A7); the reduction that the AC obtained in prices to anti-retroviral medicines for Aids through the ‘Programme for access to medicines’, as well as obtaining the resources to eradicate yellow fever in the Andean border zones through the programme for ‘Strengthening the Andean plan for health in border zones’ (A8); the PIDS

---

217 As shown in Chapter 1, this is one of the features that is said to be part of the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ (Acharya 2009: 181).
helping state intervention in social issues, because “the PIDS seeks to have a vision of social development that is above sectorial orientations” (P5); and the PIDS allowing the execution of some significant projects, and the importance of the funding provided by the EU (E4). However, on this last point interviewee P5 made a critique, arguing that because of the importance of EU’s cooperation for the PIDS’ unfolding, the concept of social cohesion was ‘imposed’ by the EU, and AC members did not assume it in the same way as the EU understood it. P5 added that a more local conception should be created because the ‘European concept’ of social cohesion “was born in a reality distinct from ours” (P5).

From the previous interviewees’ views certain identification effects can be observed, through the generation of ‘consciousness and synergies’ among AC members, the usefulness of projects for developing Bolivian legislation and AC members’ public policies, and the benefits obtained in the projects of access to medicines and strengthening health in border zones. Even interviewee P5’s critique of the imposition of the EU’s concept of ‘social cohesion’ denotes the existence of AC members’ identification around ‘a local reality’ distinct from the EU, though we cannot know whether such identification was generated by the ‘imposition’ of the concept, or if it existed before. Moreover, if member states found some of their social interventions supported by the PIDS, this may account for another case of identification with the PIDS. All these identification issues account for the way in which the PIDS contributed to the construction of collective identity, and allow observing causal effects.

The enlargement of the AC institutional framework derived from the PIDS’ adoption was seen by some interviewees as a positive aspect of the PIDS, and interviewee A7 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of developing the ASA, argued that the development of new institutional instances ‘facilitated’ AC members’ identification with each other around social policy issues. Accordingly, during meetings national officials usually realised they had similar policies in order

218 According to interviewee A9, the EU had been the main cooperator of the ASA and the PIDS, providing more than 9 million Euros since the PIDS was created.
219 The Andean Council of Social Development Ministers (CADS) was created by D-592 for coordinating the PIDS’ execution. The Council of Ministers of Education (D-593) and the Council of Ministers of Environment and Sustainable Development (D-596) were also created because of the PIDS.
220 A7, A12 and E4.
to face similar problems, and at the end of meetings they identified their problems and needs not as individual issues, but as challenges for the Andean group as a whole (A7). In A7’s words, “there are common projects that made AC members identify among them”, and he/she added that the execution of some PIDS projects had helped to identify new areas of cooperation and to ‘learn from experience’ (A7). Hence, “nowadays there are many ‘policy identities’ among member countries” (A7). This is an example of how the inter-group dimension of Andean collective identity is created.

The former points made by A7 account for constitutive and causal effects of regional institutions on state action and on collective identity. According to A7, the creation of Andean institutions in the social area ‘facilitated’ identification over social issues among AC members, in terms of identifying common needs and problems and finding similarities between their domestic responses (policies) to these problems. As a result, AC members saw the advantages of cooperating on these issues. This is a case where regional institutions enabled and made possible identification among AC members, as they provided the space for states to identify with each other. The causal effects of regional institutions exist inasmuch as institutional instances compelled states to interact, and this institutional dynamic of interaction generated states’ interests in cooperating. But did not identification emerge because of the existence of common interests and needs? It seems more sensible to establish that collective identity emerged in this case both because of institutional organisms and the existence of common interests and needs. In these terms, AC institutions could be assessed as causal factors, but granting that their causal effects depended on the existence of common interests and needs among AC member states.

Yet, could it be the case that in the absence of common interests and needs AC institutions would have triggered identification effects among AC members? Since this is a counterfactual question, we remain uncertain about this. Nonetheless, interviewee C6 – a Colombian official in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, held that the integration process “is showing member states the necessity that countries work jointly” (C6). This is interesting because it suggests that the integration process can actually ‘create’ new interests among member states, which means...
that interests do not need to precede the pursuit of regionalism and the creation of regional institutions. According to C6 if a country produces something that a neighbour country does not, that neighbour can benefit from that ‘something’ the country produces.

However, as suggested in the review of Acharya’s work in Chapter 1, it is difficult to understand the pursuit of regionalism and the corresponding creation of regional institutions without the existence of some kind of interest in doing so. Note that one thing is to say that identity needs not precede institution building – as Acharya suggests – and quite another to say that interests do not need to precede institution building. The latter was not said by C6 (neither by Acharya), but the implicit suggestion is that interests do not need to precede institution building because they can be created in institutional instances. The point is not as contradictory as it seems: one could accept that when no regional institutions exist, some kind of interest in their creation is needed in order for them to be created. But once regional institutions exist, it can be accepted – as C6 and Acharya suggest – that new interests around cooperation emerge even among those agents that might have been reluctant to do so before interacting within institutional environments. For learning and socialisation effects can be triggered by regional institutions, as some of the reviewed constructivists in Chapter 1 showed (Checkel 1998; Risse 2004).

In contrast, some interviewees did not find it sound to assess the extent to which the PIDS’ implementation had contributed to strengthening Andean identity. Interviewee A8 – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the PIDS’ implementation, did not consider relevant to think of this, as the PIDS ‘was not referred’ to strengthening Andean identity. Even though it is true that the PIDS did not explicitly refer to this aim, it is clear that A8 was not aware that strengthening Andean identity was an explicit aim in several Presidential declarations that derived in the formulation of the PIDS, and constructing an Andean identity was a social development aim of the AC since the CartA. Hence, we can infer that A8 did not hold collective identity as an idea orienting his/her job at the implementation of the PIDS. On his/her part, interviewee A9 – an AGS bureaucrat responsible for the PIDS’ funding, argued that it could not be possible to affirm that the PIDS’ implementation had strengthened Andean identity. He/she only mentioned that in those places were concrete projects had been executed there had been a construction of
Andean citizenship (A9). Yet, since A9 was one of the interviewees who associated Andean identity with Andean citizenship, it could be inferred that in this sense the execution of PIDS projects contributed to constructing Andean identity. Finally, interviewee C6 held that since the PIDS ‘had just started being developed’ it was not possible to evaluate whether it had reinforced Andean identity. He/she only added that “the sole fact of seeking to reduce poverty levels in member countries strengthens the AC” (C6).

Furthermore, interviewees’ negative evaluation of the PIDS’ implementation and results, questions the extent to which the PIDS could have strengthened Andean identity. Most interviewees recognised that advances in the implementation of CSPs and of the PIDS in general had been few, and considered that the balance of the PIDS’ implementation was rather unsatisfactory. Interviewee P5 was the only one who explicitly held that the evolution of the PIDS in terms of what had been done in social areas was ‘satisfactory’ (P5). As shown in the previous section, several interviewees emphasised the slowness of the PIDS’ implementation process. Besides the difficulties posed by the AC institutional framework formerly addressed, interviewees also pointed out the difficulty of finding financial resources to fund the execution of projects (A7, A9, A11 and A12); logistical difficulties referred to information exchange and applying the technologies for communicating between countries (C6); and budget limitations of national offices that in many occasions impeded national officials attending regional meetings (C6). Likewise, as pointed out above, interviewees also considered the divergent visions among AC members over the conception of development as another difficulty for the PIDS’ implementation. These negative impressions make it difficult to think that agents could identify themselves with the PIDS and with each other, as the balance of its implementation process was rather unsatisfactory.

Interviewees also commented on certain reluctance showed by member states towards the PIDS’ implementation. Although some interviewees highlighted the political will showed by AC members in formulating the PIDS for advancing the ASA (A8 and C6), interviewees also spoke of

---

221 A7, A8, A11, A12, C6, E5, and E6.
222 A7, C6, E4 and P5.
223 A11, C6, C7, E4 and E6.
‘indifference’ and ‘lack of interest’ (A8), ‘lack of political will and commitment’ (A10 and A12), and jealousy over ceding sovereignty on social policy making (A10). These assertions show that interviewees had a general impression that AC members’ commitment to the PIDS implementation process has been rather weak. This impression accounts for a low level of identification that AC member states have held towards the PIDS and the social area as the ‘new priority’ of Andean integration. In these terms, it could be assessed that the PIDS’ implementation has not contributed to strengthening collective identity among AC members, but rather it might have curtailed a collective identity that was already weak and whose weakness was further evidenced through the PIDS’ implementation.

Interviewees’ diverse views about the extent to which the PIDS contributed to strengthening Andean collective identity make difficult such assessment. Five interviewees asserted that the PIDS had made such contribution; two asserted it had not; and two considered that this assessment was difficult to make. Another interviewee found this assessment irrelevant. Though these divergent views might question the importance of collective identity, interpretive constructivist analysis shows that it is possible to observe constitutive and causal effects of ideas even in those cases when agents do not explicitly acknowledge them. Hence, the fact that agents do not assign explanatory power to ideas does not play down their explanatory role. Chapter 5 will discuss this and other problematic issues entailed to the interpretive analysis carried out in the thesis.

4.3.3 The role of the AGS

Interviewees made positive and negative comments that allow observing constitutive and causal effects of the AGS on the unfolding of the PIDS. Positive aspects were: the AGS’ support to the Peruvian government for the PIDS’ implementation (P5); the AGS providing technical support to Councils of Ministers and enforcing the norms they established (A7); and the AGS’ efforts to obtain the resources needed for developing projects and mandates (A7). P5’s view can be taken as a case of member states’ identification with the AC and with the PIDS thanks to the AGS’ supportive role. This would account for a case of the AGS contributing to the construction of collective identity, and thereby a causal effect. In turn, A7’s considerations
account for the enabling role of the AGS, where causal effects are suggested, but not in clear fashion. For no interviewee asserted that it was thanks to the AGS that the PIDS could be implemented the way it was. Only interviewee A11 stated that “the job of the AGS’ official in charge of coordinating the PIDS implementation was crucial for making the PIDS survive” (A11). Yet, the former assertions allow observing that the AGS contributed to the PIDS’ unfolding, but there is no basis to assert that it caused it.

Negative aspects pointed out by interviewees were: the lack of enough institutional resources for the PIDS’ implementation, as in the first years there were only two people in charge of the PIDS’ tasks (A8); the AGS’ ‘institutional weakness’ for implementing the PIDS because in the AGS there was only ‘a small area for social development’ (A12); the AGS’ budget reduction after Venezuela’s withdrawal from the AC in 2006, which made very difficult the development of PIDS projects because there were no financial resources and there were not enough personnel to carry out all the tasks needed (A11); some AGS bureaucrats becoming more worried about obtaining cooperation resources for funding PIDS projects than about seeking the elaboration of Decisions to develop the ASA (A11); and some AGS bureaucrats having ‘their own agendas’ and not always managing resources for the benefit of all projects (E4).

The previous negative aspects were pointed out by interviewees as causing difficulties for the implementation of the PIDS, and hence account for causal effects of the AGS on the PIDS’ unfolding. As argued in the other case studies, in the case where AGS bureaucrats’ actions cause things to happen in one way or another, causal effects cannot be assessed in the same terms as when analysing the role of regional norms and institutions. For in this case the AGS is an institutional agent and not just an ideational structure. Yet, it is clear that the existence of the AGS is what allows bureaucrats’ actions to have causal effects on the unfolding of the integration process, not least because the AGS dictates to its bureaucrats the role they must perform in helping the regionalist project to meet its aims, even though sometimes, as pointed out by some interviewees in the three case studies addressed in the thesis, AGS bureaucrats do not play such role. Considering the AGS as an agent does not allow assessing the causal effects of regional institutions as when we observe the role of norms or of the institutional organisms
that compose the SAI, but nevertheless analysing the AGS’ role contributes to explain the unfolding of regionalism as the AGS is part of the AC institutional framework.

4.4 Conclusion

The importance of collective identity in orienting state action has been more difficult to assess in the present case study. Constitutive effects of Andean collective identity were possible to assess as long as interviewees spoke of various issues that correspond to one of the three dimensions of Andean identity. But causal effects could not be clearly observed, for only two interviewees posed collective identity as a reason for action, whilst the others considered that it was something that did not exist, was incipient or in the process of construction. Thus, it can be concluded that the explanatory capabilities of collective identity in the PIDS’ unfolding is inferior to those in the other two case studies of the AC. Yet, it was argued that issues related to the inter-group dimension of Andean identity like a ‘feeling of community’ shared by AGS bureaucrats; the ‘institutional dynamic’ of the AC contributing to strengthen collective identity; and a ‘spirit of confraternity’ and ‘a sentiment of affinity around interests’ among national officials, denote member states’ identification with each other and with the regionalist project. These issues may have operated as reasons and motivations for AC member states adopting the PIDS, and as such they account for certain causal explanatory capability of collective identity. Other causal effects of collective identity could be observed in the ideological differences among members making progress difficult.

Constitutive effects of regional institutions and norms were possible to observe as long as all interviewees spoke of the role of norms and of several SAI organisations in orienting state action and enabling the PIDS’ implementation. Causal effects of the AC institutional framework could be observed inasmuch as it hindered progress in certain occasions. The causal role of norms could be observed in the second and third degrees of internalisation proposed by Wendt, which account for norms’ causal effects on the creation of collective identity. Moreover, causal effects of the PIDS were observed to the extent that its implementation strengthened Andean collective identity. In general terms, the analysis of the role of AC norms and institutions in this case study has broadly shown causal effects of regional institutions over
collective identity, and this accounts for a significant contribution of constructivist analysis that helps understanding the AC’s maintenance, something that will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

Finally, causal effects of the AGS and other regional institutions were observed as long as they posed difficulties that caused delays, stagnation and further ‘failures’ in the PIDS’ implementation. In contrast to the other two case studies, this one has shown that other regional institutions other than norms were more important in orienting state action in the PIDS’ implementation process. This might be due to the fact that Andean Decisions and Presidential declarations concerning the development of the ASA did not contradict themselves or altered each other’s content, and there was no serious disagreement among member states in pushing forward the social issue area of regional integration that required adapting the Andean legal framework to deal with countries’ different claims. In turn, since the PIDS was an AC internal institutional programme in an area that does not jeopardise the economic or political course of member states – like the one of trade, this could have made it clearer for interviewees to establish relationships between its implementation and the whole institutional framework that supports it, including the role of Ministerial Councils, the AGS, and in general the institutional bodies designed for carrying forward the PIDS’ implementation. As a consequence, in the present case study the role of regional institutions could be assessed to a greater extent than in the other two case studies of the AC where interviewees emphasised the role of Andean norms and of few executive organisations of the SAI.
CHAPTER 5

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY

This final chapter addresses a number of issues that complement the contributions of the constructivist analysis of the AC carried out in the thesis. A first contribution consists of the distinction between the three proposed dimensions of Andean collective identity and the relationships between them. A second contribution consists of understanding a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions that can be observed in the AC. From the assessment of this relationship a third contribution consists of a number of issues that may help understanding the AC’s maintenance given the little success that this regionalist project has shown in meeting its main aims.

The chapter also reflects on certain limitations faced in employing the interpretive method proposed to analyse the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions. Difficulties in distinguishing constitutive and causal effects of ideas, and other problems of interpretation like representativeness, trustworthiness and double hermeneutics are discussed. Yet, by reflecting on those limitations significant contributions to the operationalisation of constructivist theorising are emphasised. These and other final contributions of the thesis to the study of Andean regionalism are addressed in the conclusion.

5.1 The content of Andean collective identity
Considering the testimonies of interviewees C2 and C5, and following an exercise of ‘concept development’ and co-generation of data characteristic of interpretive analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 50), it was argued in Chapter 3 that three dimensions of Andean collective identity could be distinguished, into which the other interviewees’ comments about the contents Andean identity can be classified. This distinction represents a significant contribution of the thesis not only because it allows defining the content of Andean collective identity –
which is usually diffuse both in the official and ordinary discourse (Ardila 2003: 247) –, but also because it enables a better assessment of the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity. A first dimension is the ‘cultural’ one, referring to those ideas that make people feel ‘Andean’ – that they belong to the Andean region – and that do not have an ideological connotation, and are not exclusively shared by national officials and regional bureaucrats. A second dimension is the ‘ideological’ one, referred to the ideological consensus about the political organisation and economic development models implemented in Andean countries, and which used to exist until the early 2000s. A third dimension is the ‘inter-group’ one, consisting of ideas referring to the ‘group feeling’ shared by national and regional officials when working and negotiating together. The ideas composing these three dimensions give birth to the ‘we-feeling’ that makes up collective identity (Wendt 1999: 338; Söderbaum 2001: 51; Smith 1990: 179-180).

Regarding the cultural dimension, and acknowledging that there have not been any previous studies about what an Andean collective identity – as the collective identity of the countries that are part of the AC – consists of, this thesis proposes to differentiate two main sets of ideas that refer to the common cultural features and to the common political features that Andean countries are said to share historically. On the one hand, a set of ideas of ‘Andinity’, which refers to the common past of these countries in terms of the indigenous cultural heritage from Inca peoples inhabiting the Andes Mountains. On the other, a set of ideas which refer more to a common political fate of these countries, as they were liberated by Simón Bolívar and became independent as a single country (the Great Colombia); plus, during their nearly 200 years of existence as independent states have shared common features in their political regimes and economic structures – homogeneity-type identity (Wendt 1999: 353-7) –. This common fate consists of a mandate to work together and help each other face political international

---

224 The term ‘Andinity’ was coined by John V. Murra (1975) in his studies about the pre-colonial history of the territories belonging to the Andean area, that is, the territories surrounding the Andes Mountains.

225 The Great Colombia (Gran Colombia) existed between 1821 and 1831 and encompassed the territories of what would later constitute the countries of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Yet, Bolivar wanted this country also to incorporate the territories of Peru and Bolivia.

226 Wendt (1999: 349-53), indeed, poses ‘common fate’ and ‘homogeneity’ (the latter related to states sharing a similar formal type of their political regimes) as sources of collective identity.
challenges, as if Andean countries were ‘brother countries’ and ‘sister nations’ (Prieto 2003: 277). These ideas about the common political fate of Andean countries can be encompassed under the concept of ‘Andeanness’, and altogether with the concept of Andinity provide grounds for the existence of an Andean collective identity prior to the creation of the AC in 1969.

Table 8 contains the ideas pointed out by interviewees that can be classified within the cultural dimension of Andean collective identity, including some ideas related to the concepts of Andinity and Andeanness previously suggested:

**Table 8. The cultural dimension of Andean collective identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANDINITY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regions situated around the Andes Mountains Chain (C2, E5, A1 and A7)</td>
<td>Cultural identity of indigenous peoples (A7 and A8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pluri-cultural and pluri-national aspects constitutive of the Andean countries (A10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andean markets as the ‘natural’ (geographic) markets of Andean countries. Trade as a source of people’s identification with each other (C6, P1 and A2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDEANNESS</td>
<td>Andean countries as ‘sons’ of Libertador Simón Bolívar (C5, C6, A1, A10 and A11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER IDEAS</td>
<td>Common language (C5, A1, A7, A10 and A11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts and literature (C5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biodiversity (C7 and A7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andean citizenship (C6, C7, P2, A7 and A9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The concepts of Andinity and Andeanness, altogether with other cultural features such as common language and arts, are constitutive elements of the idea of ‘fraternity’ among Andean countries, often quoted in official discourse at the national and regional levels, and also pointed out by two interviewees (P5 and A1). Biodiversity and the set of rights that the projects to constitute an Andean citizenship are trying to bring forward, are also part of the cultural

---

227 This figure of ‘fraternity’ is common place in the official discourse of these countries’ political leaders, and very often quoted in AC Presidential and Ministerial declarations.

228 The term ‘Andeanness’ is a creation of mine, to the conceptualisation of which has contributed the work of my colleague Jorge H. Rincón (2009) at the research group on Integration and Democracy in South America – DEMOSUR, which was part of the National University of Colombia until 2010 and today exists as an independent organisation.

229 See for instance García-Belaúnde (2000) and Madriz (2001). It must be clarified that neither the concept of ‘Andinity’ nor the one of ‘Andeanness’ appear literally quoted as such in the evidence I have compiled so far about Andean states’ official discourse and official documentation of the AC. However, both concepts gather the ideas expressed in their definition, which are indeed present in official discourse at both national and regional levels.
dimension of Andean identity insofar as they were pointed out by interviewees as features that identify Andean countries’ populations as a whole.

The ideological dimension of Andean identity is made of two main ideas pointed out by interviewees: first, a consensus over democracy as the political model in contrast to authoritarian rule;\(^{230}\) and second, a consensus over free market economics, economic openness and free trade as defining features of the development model.\(^{231}\) Most interviewees claimed that these consensuses were strong during the 1990s and allowed for significant advances of regional integration and the re-launching of the Andean Pact in the form of the AC in 1996,\(^{232}\) but were broken with the arrival to power of the left-wing oriented governments of Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia) and Rafael Correa (Ecuador), which implied a breaking of Andean identity that persists to the present day.\(^{233}\)

Finally, the inter-group dimension of Andean identity is also made of two main ideas: first, a feeling of solidarity among state representatives;\(^{234}\) and second, a shared interest in strengthening states’ negotiating capabilities and learning from each other.\(^{235}\) Among the three dimensions, this dimension of Andean collective identity is the one most closely related to regional institutions, for it has been argued that the AC institutional framework provides institutional settings where identification effects among AC member states are generated through socialisation and social learning. The benefits provided by Andean norms which trigger identification effects among national officials also contribute to strengthening the inter-group dimension of Andean identity in particular, for it is mostly through working together that these officials acknowledged such benefits, just as the reviewed works of Risse (2004), Checkel (2001) and Laffan (2004) point out. This dimension is also important because it contributes to understand the content of Andean collective identity among national and regional bureaucrats, complementing but at the same time transcending the cultural and ideological issues that

\(^{230}\) C2 and A11.

\(^{231}\) C2, E1, E3, P2, P4 and A11.

\(^{232}\) This was the year when the ‘Trujillo Protocol’ was signed, giving birth to the Andean System of Integration (SAI) and introducing the regional group’s current official name ‘Andean Community’.

\(^{233}\) C1, C2, C3, C6, C7, E1, E2, E3, E4, E6, P4, A5 and A11.

\(^{234}\) E1, E3, P2, P4, A4 and A12.

\(^{235}\) C6, C7, E1, E3, P2, P4 and A4.

196
generate identification among state and AC representatives but also among the wider population. Collective identity among national bureaucrats who work with the AC is not only about Andeaness and Andinity, or about ideological affinities, but also about the benefits that AC institutions – and also regional bureaucrats – provide for doing their jobs. The inter-group dimension relates to a collective identity that is exclusively shared by national and regional bureaucrats, but helps understanding the role of collective identity in orienting state action and the maintenance of the AC regionalist project. This latter point will be further developed in the third part of this chapter when the issue of ‘institutional inertia’ is addressed.

The following part of the chapter addresses in greater detail the relationships between collective identity and regional institutions, which also help understand the relationship between the three dimensions of collective identity and their importance for the AC’s maintenance.

5.2 Understanding mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the AC

Chapter 1 pointed out mutual constitution and causation between agents and structures as a main tenet of constructivism, and between structures themselves, and quoted Finnemore (1996: 16) to point out the difficulties that constructivists face in demonstrating how social structures relate to one another. That chapter also showed the confusion in which constructivist approaches to regionalism often fall when assessing the ways in which the evolution – or deterioration – of collective identity and regional institutions affect each other. A main contribution of the present thesis is to show that it is possible to observe a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the AC by assessing the constitutive and causal effects they have on each other.

Identification effects triggered by the supportive role of Andean norms and of the AGS for AC member states’ policy-making and negotiations with third parties, and the socialisation and learning effects of institutional environments on state representatives identifying with the AC regionalist project and with each other, account for the causal effects of regional institutions on the construction of an Andean collective identity. Moreover, some interviewees suggested that
regional norms entail the existence and significance of this identity, as if subscribing to regional norms were what Andean collective identity consists of – in a similar vein as Acharya’s assessment of the role of regional norms in ASEAN. In this regard, it is worth analysing a statement made by interviewee C3 – a Colombian chief trade negotiator, when asked about the principles that oriented the Colombian government’s actions.

For C3, Andean identity consists of “the constitutional mandate that compels Colombia to integrate with Latin America, and this includes Andean countries. Additionally, collective identity consists of respecting the CartA”. C3 considered that Colombia is a very ‘legalist’ country, meaning that Colombia always complies with international laws. From C3’s words, it can be inferred that collective identity partly consists of a constitutional mandate, a norm, a domestic institution. This means that the 1991 Colombian Constitutional Charter imposes a collective identity on the Colombian state as long as it commands it to integrate with the other Latin American states. In these terms, identity is imposed through a norm. But according to C3, collective identity also consists of a regional norm, the CartA, like in the case of Acharya’s work (2009), where ASEAN’s collective identity consists of the ‘ASEAN Way’. But in contrast to Acharya’s assessment of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a set of principles, here C3 is referring to two ‘supreme’ written norms of the Colombian legal order, namely its Constitutional Charter and the CartA as an international treaty. This can be interpreted as if for C3 the fact of subscribing a (very important) norm/institution is what creates collective identity among all actors who subscribe such norm. To say the least, this view implies that identity is intrinsic to norms.

In the same vein as C3 spoke of the interest in pursuing collective negotiations entailed by AC membership, as quoted in Chapter 3, the fact that states subscribed the CartA implies that states identify with the AC, that they share a collective identity. In other words, following C3’s view, identity and norms cannot be detached from one another. Norms entail identity. As long as they subscribe to the CartA there is an Andean collective identity shared among member states. We cannot be sure whether for C3 identity is always created by norms. Perhaps norms just reflect the existence of identity: first there is identity, and then the norm that imposes it as

---

236 C3, C4 and A11.
237 This mandate is explicit in the preamble of the 1991 Colombian Constitutional Charter.
a mandate is made. In any case, C3 asserted that identity is constituted by norms, that is, identity exists, at least partly, because there are norms that dictate it. This is a case where not only are identity and norms mutually constituted, in the sense that norms entail identity and identity emerges around norms. But it is also a case where, at least, norms cause collective identityuchs  (whether collective identity causes the making of norms remains uncertain as long as C3 did not say anything in this respect).

In turn, there are two cases where collective identity can be assessed as having causal effects on regional institutions. The first is the one where some interviewees (and probably some other actors) understood that D-667 mandated exclusively collective negotiations with the EU. In Chapter 3 it was argued that this agents’ interpretation may have been caused by ideas of collective identity that these interviewees held, making them interpret that if this Decision advocated for the unity of the Andean bloc, it meant that it compelled AC member states to negotiate collectively with the EU, although this was not the case. The second is a case of causal effects of collective identity on the maintenance of the AC regionalist project – and therefore of its institutional framework – which can be shown by analysing the relationship between the three proposed dimensions of Andean collective identity, in particular based on interviewees C5 and C2’s views.

As shown in Chapter 3, when speaking about the role of Andean collective identity, interviewee C5 – a Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, pointed out cultural affinities among AC member states related to arts, literature and language; “identity is gigantic”, C5 added. In his/her view, even though Colombia and Venezuela have less indigenous inhabitants than the other three Andean countries, “wherever one goes in another Andean country, one feels like home, and this weighs at the background of trade policy-making” (C5). C5 held that between Colombia and Peru there were also affinities regarding economic policy (ideological dimension); yet, these affinities over economic issues “did not justify the maintenance of collective negotiations [with

Note that this plainly coincides with Acharya’s view on the constitutive and causal effects of norms on the emergence of collective identity analysed in Chapter 1.
the EU)” (C5). This statement is interesting for, as just previously shown, C5 asserted that the cultural dimension of identity has ‘weight’ in the making of trade policy. If we accept that engaging collective FTA negotiations with the EU is part of AC member countries’ trade policy, then it could be inferred that in C5’s view collective negotiations with the EU were indeed oriented to some extent by the ‘weight’ of Andean collective identity, at least the one of its cultural dimension. If this inference is accepted, we would have that for C5 the cultural dimension of Andean identity is more important than the ideological one.

On his/her part, interviewee C2 – a Colombian Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, asserted that a source of Andean identity was the consensuses over liberal democracy and market economics:

“To achieve these consensuses Latin America struggled a lot. First, to get out from the stage of dictatorships. Dictatorships affected a lot Latin America’s developmental capabilities. After having overcome these periods of dictatorships and having constituted these consensuses, it is very serious that years later they are questioned again. I do believe that questioning these consensuses affects the capability of building on the basis of Andean identity. I don’t believe it affects the Andean identity as such, but rather the capability of building projects that have as a basis the Andean identity” (C2).

As can be seen, C2’s last statement about the way in which ‘the Andean collective identity’ is affected by the questioning of ideological consensuses seems a bit confusing, for C2 suggests that it is not Andean identity which is affected as such, but rather the capability of building projects on the basis of it. Yet, and considering that C2 was one of the interviewees who inspired the distinction between the cultural and the ideological dimensions of Andean identity, from his/her words we can infer that the type of identity consisting of ‘sharing ideological consensuses’ (the ideological dimension) – which is indeed affected by the questioning of these consensuses – does not affect the first type of identity related to ‘common cultural and geographical issues’ (the cultural dimension); nevertheless, the development of projects that require an identification among member states around ideological consensuses is curtailed, such as negotiating a FTA with the EU and other integration projects/aims. Hence, by interpreting C2’s view, it is possible to infer that the cultural dimension of Andean identity is

---

239 These assertions by C5 were quoted in Chapter 2 (see p.131) to make the argument about different dimensions of Andean collective identity.
not affected by (negative?) changes in the ideological dimension of Andean identity. In other words, the ideological dimension affects the progress of regionalism, but not its existence. An assertion made by interviewee A10 is also illustrative in this regard, as he/she said that “nowadays the AC is looking for the way to preserve its political co-existence until new coincidences of interests can be achieved”; in other words, it is one thing is to keep the AC together and another to resume the progress of the process, which is achieved through ‘coincidences of interests’.

Analysing C2 and C5’s previously addressed assertions allows observing causal effects of the cultural and the ideological dimensions of identity on the unfolding of the AC regionalist project and the maintenance of regional institutions: if collective negotiations with the EU broke up because of the rupture of the ideological dimension of Andean collective identity, this means that the pace of integration – understood as the durability and possibilities of success of integration projects and aims –, does depend more on the ideological dimension of identity than on the cultural dimension. Yet, it is in fact the cultural dimension of identity that helps the AC remain together, as the AC did not disintegrate because of the rupture of the ideological dimension of identity. If the cultural dimension is more important than the ideological one (C5) and if it is not affected by negative changes in the ideological dimension (C2), then it is possible to assess that the cultural dimension of identity is the one that mainly keeps the AC together, but the ideological dimension of identity is more influential in determining the pace at which the integration process advances, and thus, its progress.

Think of the following: it was highlighted in Chapter 3 (see p.134-5) that those interviewees who pointed out ideological differences as the main reason why collective negotiations with the EU broke up, did not consider that Andean collective identity was damaged because of the breaking-off of these negotiations. Hence, it could be inferred not only that these interviewees were thinking of the cultural dimension of Andean identity when making this assessment, but also that such dimension was more important or even the most important one, for even some

---

240 The parenthesis and question mark are due to the fact that we have no evidence, considering C2’s statements, that positive changes in the form of greater ideological affinities would reinforce the cultural dimension of Andean identity.
of them (C1, C2 and A6) highlighted the fact that the AC did not disintegrate because of the breaking-off of collective negotiations with the EU or because of the ideological differences that were evidenced during this process among its members (the rupture of the ideological dimension).

Lastly, thanks to the analysis carried out in Chapter 4 of the socialisation and learning effects of regional institutions and the identification effects they trigger among national officials and regional bureaucrats, the inter-group dimension of Andean collective identity can be assessed as the dimension where the cultural and ideological dimensions are reproduced, reinforced and sometimes also weakened among AC member states’ representatives, which in turn affects the progress and maintenance of the regionalist project. By establishing relationships between the three proposed dimensions of Andean collective identity and regional institutions, it is possible to assess a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between these two ideational structures.

Table 9. The relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions in the AC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE</th>
<th>Constitutive and causal effects on the other ideational structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLLECTIVE IDENTITY</td>
<td>Agents’ identification with the AC regionalist project making them understand that D-667 mandated exclusively collective negotiations with the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The cultural dimension of Andean identity making possible the AC’s maintenance, while the ideological dimension of Andean identity making possible the progress of regionalism and regional integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The inter-group dimension of Andean collective identity as the dimension where the cultural and ideological dimensions are reproduced, reinforced and sometimes also weakened among AC member states’ representatives, which in turn affects the progress and maintenance of the regionalist project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>Identification effects triggered by the supportive role of Andean norms and of the AGS for AC member states policy-making and negotiations with third parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialisation and learning effects of institutional environments on state representatives identifying with the AC regionalist project and with each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subscribing to regional norms entails the existence and significance of Andean collective identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

241 Though it must be remembered that no interviewee explicitly distinguished between the three proposed dimensions of Andean collective identity.
As Table 9 shows, by ‘a relationship of mutual constitution and causation’ it is not meant that each relationship between collective identity and regional institutions entails mutual constitutive and causal effects, but that there are different relationships of constitution and causation between both ideational structures that ‘together as a whole’ account for ‘a relationship’ of mutual constitution and causation. Explaining the terms through which a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between identity and institutions works in the AC represents a major contribution to the constructivist literature on regionalism reviewed in the thesis. Instead of taking for granted such a relationship, the interpretive method employed in the thesis has made possible observing constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions – namely the two ‘master variables’ of constructivist approaches to regionalism – on state action and between them, and this allows a better understanding of how both ideational structures construct each other. Conceptualising a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between collective identity and regional institutions as the sum of different constitutive and causal effects of one structure on the other offers a better understanding of the unfolding of regionalist projects. By specifying what each of those effects consists of, it is possible to overcome the limited assessment of the role of identity and institutions in the unfolding of regionalism exposed in Chapter 1, due to most constructivist approaches’ disinterest in distinguishing constitutive from causal effects of ideas.

5.3 Contributions to explaining the AC’s maintenance

The three case studies of the AC showed that material benefits for member states have not been very significant, and that the regionalist project has largely failed in meeting its main aims. Case study 1 showed that Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET significantly hindered the achievement of an Andean common market, which was the AC’s main goal during its first 35 years of existence. Moreover, the exceptions contemplated in the Andean CET for the other four AC members also made it difficult to consolidate such aim (Echavarría 1998). The signing of bilateral FTAs by Colombia and Peru with the US, and later with the EU, meant almost the complete abandonment of consolidating a CET in the AC, and hence the resignation to establish an Andean common market. At least to a certain extent, renouncing the main historical goal of the AC regionalist project can be considered a failure.
Furthermore, beyond the EU’s condition of bloc-to-bloc negotiations, AC member states aimed at collective trade negotiations with third parties, and so they did in the negotiations with Mercosur, in the FTAA bargaining process and with the US.\textsuperscript{242} Likewise, official AC declarations and D-667 advocated for collective negotiations with the EU. In these terms, the incapability of negotiating a trade agreement as a bloc, showed in case study 2, can be also considered a failure, as it was also an AC aim. Finally, the new issue area of Andean integration, the social one, has not made great advances, as case study 3 showed. The PIDS, now turned into the Andean Strategy for Social Cohesion (ASSC), has not yet ended, and the ASA keeps developing. But its few advances and the evaluation made by interviewees of the PIDS’ implementation as unsatisfactory, do not allow counting the results of Andean social integration as significant achievements.

The previous points provide room for enquiry about the sensibleness of maintaining a regionalist project that has not yielded significant results according to the main goals that it has traced. But moreover, Venezuela abandoned the regionalist project in 2006 arguing the lack of consistency with the purpose of deepening trade integration implied with the signing of FTAs with the US by Colombia and Peru (Malamud 2006). The 2008-2010 diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuador due to the Colombian Army’s bombing of a FARC guerrilla camp located in Ecuadorian territory close to the border zone with Colombia (Vallejo and López 2009), confirmed that the AC completely lacks the cohesion and cooperation mechanisms to deal with security and political issues. Trade in the Andean region continues to be important for AC member states, but an FTZ neither needs an integration process, nor a complex institutional framework to work out. Yet, the AGS and member countries keep on working on trade issues (A4), the Andean Social Agenda (ASA) and the Andean Environmental Agenda (AEA) continue to be developed, and even Andean Presidential Councils (APCs) continue to meet and Presidents

\textsuperscript{242} AC members made an effort to negotiate as a bloc at the FTAA bargaining process between 1994 and 2003. More than negotiating as a bloc, what was done in practice was to coordinate AC members’ positions, but since the bargaining process was stopped in 2005, it is difficult to establish whether the AC succeeded in its coordinating efforts. In contrast, the AC completed a bloc-to-bloc agreement with Mercosur in 2004, though based on the agreements that Peru and Bolivia already had with the Southern Cone bloc since the 1990s. With the US, negotiations of the AC members as a bloc (except Venezuela) began in 2005, but by 2006 Bolivia and Ecuador left the bargaining process, and only Colombia and Peru reached separate FTAs with the US in this year.
have announced the ‘renewal’ of the AC\textsuperscript{243} and the re-engineering of the SAI,\textsuperscript{244} although during 2012 the APC did not meet, thus breaking the rule of meeting once per year established by the CartA.

The argument is not that the AC does not provide any material benefits at all. There are benefits derived from intra-regional trade, the AC institutional framework provided the conditions to negotiate a FTA with the EU that Colombia and Peru finally achieved, and the PIDS’ implementation has yielded some results, like the Harmonised System of Social Statistics (SISCAN) and the benefits derived from the execution of some Communitarian Social Projects (CSPs). The point is that these benefits do not seem significant enough to support a rationalist-materialist analysis based on benefit maximisation to explain the maintenance of the AC regionalist project. In contrast, and once more in line to the exercise of ‘concept development’ intrinsic to interpretive analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 50), this part of the chapter argues that from the analysis of constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions, and from the assessment of the relationship of mutual constitution and causation between both ideational structures, a number of issues can be derived that may help understand the AC’s maintenance, despite the few material benefits and achievements that the AC has represented for member states.

5.3.1 The political cost of abandoning the AC

The political cost of abandoning or ending the AC pointed out by a number of interviewees can be considered a possible explanation for why this regionalist project is maintained. In Chapter 2 it was argued that by leaving the AC, Presidents or Ministers who make this decision may incur a loss of political legitimacy, pointed out by interviewees P2 and A2 as a ‘political cost’ that political leaders are not ‘willing to pay’ (where ‘paying’ accounts for a continuation of the same metaphor). Besides these testimonies, other interviewees commented on the political cost of proposing or making the decision to abandon the AC or to end the regionalist project. Interviewee A9 held that no President is capable of ‘assuming the cost’ of ending the AC.

\textsuperscript{243} See Lima Declaration, XVIII Andean Presidential Council (28/07/2011).
\textsuperscript{244} See Bogota Declaration, Extraordinary Meeting of the Andean Presidential Council (08/11/2011).
because it would imply his/her ‘own political decease’, ‘political decease’ being another metaphor related to the one of ‘political cost’. In A9’s view, the AC had 42 years of history, and ending it would give ‘no benefit to anyone’. On his/her part, interviewee A10 argued that in spite of the recent circumstances, where there are distinct visions among AC members’ governments, there was awareness that “burying the AC was not a good idea, and no one wants to take the ‘burden’ of taking that step” (A10). Note that the ‘burden’ attached to ‘burying the AC’ is another metaphor related to the one of ‘political cost’. In A10’s view, “no country wants to pay the political cost of burying the AC because the AC is one of the few concrete elements of integration that is possible to find and present” (A10).

Alternatively, interviewee A11 held that AC member countries’ contradictory attitude of formulating the PIDS but not putting money for its implementation was explained because “they wanted to maintain the AC”. Accordingly, “Colombia cannot assume the political cost of ending the AC because it is the country that has won the most from the Andean trade integration process” (A11). The AC also represents economic benefits for Ecuador, and it has benefits for Bolivia as it provides conditions of special and differential treatment. Hence, “Finishing the AC is not easy” (A11). Note that A11 associates the ‘political cost’ with the obtainment of material benefits for member countries – as did interviewee A2 quoted in case study 1 (see p.107 above) – which does not reduce the metaphorical dimension of the expression ‘political cost’. Regardless of whether the political cost is associated with the loss of material benefits because of abandoning the AC, or with issues of collective identity, the causal role of the metaphor holds. In the latter case, interviewee A12 asserted that the political cost of abandoning or ending the AC is not only related to the benefits derived from trade, but it is also ‘a sentimental issue’. Accordingly, there is ‘an institutional background’ and ‘a historical feeling’ (A12) entailed to AC membership. Note that both metaphors of the ‘institutional background’ and the ‘historical feeling’ correspond to the cultural dimension of Andean identity (without this interviewee explicitly speaking of such dimension). A12 held that there have been member countries’ Foreign Minsters that have worked for Andean integration because of ‘an issue of

245 Note that this interviewee was quoted in Chapter 4 (p.165 above) asserting that “Bolivia and Ecuador have not seen any benefit from the integration process”, which accounts once more for the ‘exposure’ that interpretive analysis must engage towards agents’ own contradictory views (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 84).
affection’ (A12). It is worth highlighting as well that A12’s association of AC membership with ‘feelings’ (‘sentimental issues’ and ‘issues of affection’) has a metaphorical connotation that complements the metaphor of the ‘political cost’.

The former metaphors give account of an association between the political cost of abandoning or ending the AC and identification from member states with the AC regionalist project, to the point that in A12’s view this becomes a ‘sentimental issue’. This allows linking the political cost with ideas of collective identity, and this amounts to the existence and importance of Andean identity. However, not all interviewees who spoke of the political cost of abandoning or ending the AC suggested identification issues. This was the case of interviewee C5, who asserted that “The existence of the AC has no sense at all nowadays for any of the four countries that are part of it, and it will never have any sense again” (C5). Yet, C5 considered that the AC has not been ended since “no one has the courage to propose the end of it because [it] entails certain political costs”. C5 added that the AC should be left ‘to die slowly’, it is ‘insignificant’ and ‘it is better not to assume the political costs of ending it’; accordingly, “It makes no sense to make the effort to end it. The AC costs very little money” (C5).

Nonetheless, it is worth reminding ourselves of interviewee C5’s assertion that Andean identity ‘weighs at the background of trade policymaking’. Let us depart from this assertion and propose the argument that Andean identity has a ‘political weight’ that directs state action which is related to the political cost of abandoning or ending the AC. Regarding Peru’s behaviour addressed in case study 1, it can be inferred that the political weight of identity was generated by Peru’s membership to the AC during more than 20 years before 1992, and by permanent interaction that Peruvian government officials and businessmen, producers and other economic agents kept with the institutions of the Andean regional scheme. This is related to the effect of ‘institutional inertia’ that will be addressed below. The ‘political weight’ of identity was reinforced as the Andean decision-making organisms and the AGS were institutional environments where the other AC members’ representatives exerted direct pressure over Peruvian representatives to engage the FTZ and the CET and to maintain Peru’s
membership of the AC.  

In this sense, identity could have been partly caused by institutions, as Andean executive organisms (including the AGS) and Andean norms had both constitutive and causal effects on the creation of collective identity and the construction of Peru’s ‘integrationist’ identity (P1 and P3). The linkage between the ‘political weight’ of Andean identity and the ‘political cost’ of abandoning the AC allows the assessment of the causal power of collective identity as a sort of ‘burden’ that had a ‘weight’ over Peru’s government officials when deciding about Peru’s permanence as an AC member and maintaining a reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET.

Regardless of whether the ‘political cost of abandoning or ending the AC is related to material benefits or to issues of collective identity, the causal power of this metaphor consists of the interiorisation by agents of this idea, which is reproduced in and illustrated by the repetition that agents make of it in their speech. Even though only seven interviewees spoke of such political cost, and even though most of them were AGS bureaucrats, it is significant that these interviewees spoke of this political cost in more or less the same terms, without being asked direct questions about it. According to Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 95), agents’ similar interpretations provide grounds for making knowledge claims and for warranting trustworthiness. It should be clarified that the topic of why the AC is maintained came about in some interviews as the conversation unfolded, but interviewees were never posed a question directly related to any ‘political cost’ of abandoning or ending the AC. The fact that most interviewees who pointed out the ‘political cost’ that would be ‘paid’ by state leaders as a reason why they do not decide to leave or to end the AC were AGS bureaucrats, denotes greater identification with the regionalist project on the part of regional bureaucrats than on the part of national officials. This might be explained because working for Andean integration is actually the job of AGS bureaucrats, it is the role imposed by this institutional structure (Berger

246 Remember interview A2 highlighting the AGS role in showing Peru why it should resume its trade obligations with the other AC members (see p.113 above).

247 C5, P2, A2, A9, A10, A11 and A12. Interestingly, no Ecuadorian official referred to the political cost of abandoning or ending the AC. This might denote, on the one hand, that material benefits for Ecuador, particularly with respect to trade, have been less significant than for Colombia and Peru. On the other, perhaps President Correa’s several declarations criticising the AC regionalist project have brought the option of abandoning or ending the AC ‘closer’ to Ecuadorian officials’ perspectives about regionalism than in the case of Colombian or Peruvian ones. See for instance press reports by La Gente radio station (12/11/2011) and El Tiempo (23/12/2006).
and Luckmann 1968: 97), while it is only a task of national officials who, in addition, often rotate more within government institutions and change tasks more frequently.

Since a question about why the AC is maintained was not posed to all interviewees but it was only an issue that emerged in some interviews as they unfolded, posing the ‘political cost’ of ending or abandoning the AC as a reason that explains the AC’s maintenance is just a result of analysing the metaphors used by agents to explain state action. Although no interviewee explicitly posed collective identity as a reason for not abandoning or ending the AC, the analysis of interviewees’ assertions allows establishing a linkage between the ‘political cost’ of abandoning or ending the regionalist project and issues of Andean collective identity – mostly of its cultural dimension – and this accounts for a significant contribution of carrying out an interpretive analysis of agents’ views. If the metaphor of the ‘political cost’ of abandoning or ending the AC is interiorised by many national officials and other agents at the national and regional levels, this metaphor becomes a ‘truth’ or a ‘fact’ (Walter and Helmig 2005: 5) that has the force of making agents maintain the AC regionalist project even if the ‘political costs’ of ending it or leaving it are not clearly defined or cannot be clearly measured. Such can be the power of metaphors (Onuf 2012: ch.3) and such can be the constitutive and causal power of ideas, one that does not need ideas to be ‘materialised’ or ‘translated’ into material terms, but that just consists of making agents believe that something exists – in this case, that there are political costs that no one wants to pay. Whether many agents at the state level have interiorised this metaphor is something that exceeds the scope of the present thesis and should be considered for further research, but as a product of interpretive analysis the metaphor of the ‘political cost’ not only allows observing causal effects of collective identity, but also helps visualising an issue that may help explain the AC’s maintenance.

5.3.2 Institutional flexibility

The analysis of case study 1 showed that the AC’s institutional flexibility could have motivated Peru to remain an AC member while maintaining a reluctant position towards the adoption of the FTZ and the CET. The room for dissent and bargaining provided by the decision-making organisms (the Andean Commission, the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers), and
the adaptation of the Andean legal structure (Decisions made by these organisations) to Peru’s demands, could have made Peruvian officials feel comfortable enough to maintain Peru’s membership of the AC while not adopting the two main tools to achieve the project’s main goal, namely, the consolidation of a common market. Yet, this argument about the causal role of the AC’s institutional flexibility was only implicitly suggested by interviewees A1 and A3 (see p.111 above), while no other interviewee made any comment in this respect. In turn, some interviewees involved in case study 2 made explicit comments highlighting the significance of the AC’s institutional flexibility.

Interviewee P4 pointed out that Colombia and Peru’s continuation of bilateral negotiations with the EU did not represent a ‘breaking’ of Andean regulations and, in this sense, “Andean norms were more complemented than confronted” (P4). In this same vein, interviewee C1 asserted that “No Andean country can impose its vision over the others […] The same fact of negotiating flexibly with third parties strengthens the Andean integration process within the framework of open regionalism” (C1). Regarding the role of Andean norms in orienting Colombia’s trade policy, C1 asserted that “flexibility is needed in several cases” (C1). This interviewee highlighted that the AC has always been capable of ‘adapting the norms to the reality of the needs of member countries’ (C1). On his/her part, interviewee C2 emphasised that one great achievement of the AC was that in spite of Colombia and Peru’s individual negotiations with the EU, the AC institutional framework was preserved and the AC continues to exist. According to interviewee A4, Andean legislation allowed for individual negotiations, and both the AGS and member countries knew that this would not crack the integration process. Lastly, interviewee A6 highlighted the ‘understanding’ that the four member countries and the AGS had for recognising that it was too complex to continue advancing in collective negotiations with the EU, and that this situation should not impede any country to advance in negotiations with the EU if it was interested in doing so. In A6’s words “what was basically aimed was to respect each member’s development model” (A6).

Interviewee C8 argued that Andean norms never interdicted Colombia and Peru’s aim of continuing bilateral negotiations with the EU, and this was important because “Colombia needs
to look out for its interests even when the other AC members do not want to support Colombia’s views” (C8). C8’s view denotes that the fact of belonging to the AC does not have to put countries in a submissive position of sticking to what others or the majority wants. Such view implies that a state needs to be independent and to detach from other members of the regional scheme at those times when they do not want to support the pursuit of its aims. On the one hand, this shows that the regional scheme is seen by C8 as something good for a state when it favours that state’s interest and something not as good when it does not (which would correspond to a merely utilitarian perspective). But on the other hand, C8’s view shows the need – and adequacy – for a regional scheme to be flexible, in terms of accepting bilateral action of member countries in those situations where the others do not want to act in the same way or meet the same aims, as long, of course, as bilateral action does not prejudice the other members or affects ‘negatively’ the regional scheme. Judging ‘goodness’, ‘suitableness’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘negative effects’ is ambivalent and it will depend on the optics of member states. But this point on the need and adequacy of institutional – and political – flexibility offers a possible explanation of why the AC has been maintained despite several difficulties and differences faced by its members.

In case study 3, interviewee A9, who acknowledged the difficulties posed by the confrontation of two different visions (Colombia and Peru on one side and Ecuador and Bolivia on the other), asserted that these different proposals “have learned to live together, like unity in diversity” (A9). This view accounts for the importance of tolerance and respect of differences that has existed in the AC, and it can be easily noted that the flexibility of the AC institutional framework has played a role in contributing to building tolerance and respect among AC members. Moreover, tolerance and respect around members’ differences and the AC institutional flexibility could amount to another feature of Andean collective identity, just as it was pointed out by Acharya (2009: 181) in the case of ASEAN addressed in Chapter 1. The fact that institutional flexibility was seen by eight interviewees\textsuperscript{248} as something ‘good’, allows thinking that such flexibility could generate identification from AC member states with the regional

\textsuperscript{248} C1, C2, C8, P4, A1, A4, A6 and A9. Again, it is worth noting that no Ecuadorian official pointed out the significance of the AC’s ‘institutional flexibility’. This could be partly explained by the fact that Ecuador did not finally reach a FTA with the EU as Colombia and Peru did.
institutional framework and, further, with the AC regionalist project. This accounts for another causal relationship between regional institutions and collective identity, as institutional flexibility generates that states identify with the regionalist project. In these terms, there would be another explanation of state action based on the role of collective identity and regional institutions.

Yet, no interviewee in the three case studies of the present thesis commented on institutional flexibility as a feature of Andean identity, and thus this latter argument, together with the one of institutional flexibility as a reason that might explain the AC’s maintenance, is the result of interpreting interviewees’ assertions. In this case, the interpretive exercise does not entail analysing metaphors or transitive verbs that denote causation, or which are used to pose ideas as reasons for action. The assessment of institutional flexibility as an issue that might generate member states’ identification with the AC and which might explain its maintenance is just made on the basis that institutional flexibility was posed by a number if interviewees as something ‘good’, something that represents ‘benefits’ – though not clearly material – for states. Hence, this is an interpretation that does not require any particular methodology besides acknowledging the identification that agents tend to have with ‘good things’ providing benefits (Bloom 1990: 51).

5.3.3 Institutional ‘inertia’

The idea of an institutional ‘inertia’ as a factor explaining the AC’s maintenance derives on the one hand, from the identification effects triggered by the benefits provided by Andean norms and institutions; on the other, from the inter-group dimension of Andean identity. Benefits derived from Andean norms and institutions were pointed out in previous chapters in relation to the supportive role of Andean norms for AC member states’ policymaking, the provision and development of national legislation in those areas were member countries did not have national laws (particularly in case study 2), and the opportunity to identify common needs, problems and policies that made AC members identify with each other and with the Andean regionalist project (particularly in case study 3). The benefits derived from the supportive role of the AGS are also included here. These benefits are directly related to the inter-group
dimension of Andean identity, as it is through national officials’ interaction within AC institutional environments that identification effects are produced and further derive in the emergence of the ‘group-feeling’ pointed out by several interviewees.\textsuperscript{249}

Apart from those testimonies of interviewees quoted in previous chapters,\textsuperscript{250} it is worth considering interviewee A13’s – an AGS bureaucrat in charge of the AEA, assertion that “there is an identity around the AC as long as people work with AC institutions”. This view accounts for a causal relationship between regional institutions and collective identity. According to A13, working within AC institutions makes national officials and regional bureaucrats identify with the AC. A13 asserted that when people come to work with AC institutions, be they AGS bureaucrats or national officials, people come ‘as Andeans’. He/she added that “it is sought that when new people arrive they understand that ‘the regional’ is different from ‘the national’” (A13). In his/her view, an AC’s achievement has been that collective identity is incorporated into bureaucrats and officials’ consciousness, and added that the AEA has contributed to the strengthening of collective identity.

The argument about ‘institutional inertia’ reads as follows: the benefits derived from Andean norms and institutions plus national officials and AGS bureaucrats’ interaction within AC institutional environments generate an institutional inertia consisting of these agents assuming the practices of Andean regionalism as a habit.\textsuperscript{251} In other words, member states’ national officials get used to working with the AC regionalist project, and AGS and other AC institutions’ bureaucrats get used to the existence of the Andean integration process, to the point that never mind its advances or results, the maintenance of the AC is not questioned. An extreme example of the idea of institutional inertia is found in interviewee A11’s assertion that “today the ASA is a pretext with which AC bureaucrats ensure their permanence” (A11). Although this is a rather harsh statement, it gives a sense of the point to which AGS bureaucrats may stick to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{249} See footnote 234.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Remember particularly A8’s (quoted in p.166 above) about ‘the institutional dynamic of the AC contributing to strengthen collective identity’.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Remember Berger and Luckmann’s (1968: 97) account of agents’ interiorisation of their institutional roles. Remember also Checkel’s (2001: 573) assessment about the historical and institutional context determining to a high extent the ways in which bureaucrats comply with regional norms, both quoted in Chapter 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
their job as they get used to it. The same can occur to those national officials who deal with AC issues, although, as stated above, these officials tend to face greater rotations and task changes in their jobs.

Other interviewees’ assertions not included in previous chapters allow thinking of the idea of institutional inertia in the AC. Some assertions are related to the benefits derived from Andean norms and institutions. Interviewee C5 asserted that if the AC ceased to exist, there are many Andean norms, in areas such as sanitary and customs issues, which would need to be introduced into member states’ national legislations, and “this is no easy task” (C5). Interviewee C7 asserted that if the AC disappeared, this would imply ‘a loss’ for member countries, because the AC “has offered support for national [policymaking] processes” (C7). Interviewee A10 held that the AC is still important because there is a ‘historical heritage’, overall in the legal and trade orders, as well as in ‘negotiating practices’, and all this has ‘a meaning’ for member states. In this same line, interviewee A8 held that there is ‘a heritage’ produced by the AC: “There is a FTZ that works and there is an institutional framework. SOCICAN provides a rotating fund to finance social projects” (A8). Interviewee A7 asserted that the Andean integration process is ‘a whole’, a set of actions and commitments, an institutional framework that is working to ‘improve the life conditions of everyone in the Andean region’. Other assertions are related to the constraining effects of regional institutions. Interviewee A12 held that Foreign Affairs Ministries’ bureaucrats keep holding AC meetings partly because there is ‘a lot of pressure’ to continue working with the AC (A12). On his/her part, interviewee A11 asserted that while the AC was always seen by Peru as an obstacle for its international negotiations, the fact that the AGS is located in Lima serves to appease Peru’s will of abandoning the AC.

Interviewee A8 asserted that regional institutions matter ‘precisely’ because in spite of adverse political situations, these institutions survive. Besides accounting for the strength of AC institutions, A8’s view invites us to wonder why, in spite of the few advances of Andean regional integration and the political differences among AC member states, the AC institutional

252 SOCICAN is the EU programme for funding social projects in the AC, and hence one of the funding sources of the PIDS.
framework is maintained, and sometimes even broadened, and the institutional pace of the AC in terms of meetings and working activities continues. Metaphors like ‘people come to AC institutions as Andeans’ (A13), ‘incorporating collective identity into bureaucrats and officials’ consciousness’ (A13), the ‘historical heritage’ of the AC institutional framework (A10 and A8), the ‘meaning’ that this heritage and the negotiating practices have for member states (A10), and ‘the whole’ that the AC consists of for improving the life conditions of everyone in the Andean region (A7), account for the causal power of regional institutions making agents identify with the Andean regionalist project. These metaphors, also enhanced by regional institutional environments where agents interact, give a sense of ‘institutional inertia’ that, as another metaphor itself, contributes to explaining the AC’s maintenance.

5.3.4 The rhetoric of regional integration

The rhetoric of regional integration (Phillips 2001; Phillips and Prieto 2011: 120) refers to the discourse held by state officials that addresses regional integration as something beneficial per se, something of utmost significance for Latin American states. Regional integration is like a ‘natural mandate’ that states must pursue because of being ‘Latin American’ and sharing a common history as former Spanish colonies, which added to the history of their independence processes make them ‘sister nations’ and ‘brother countries’ who must integrate with each other as part of their identity as Latin American states (Larraín 2000; Mignolo 2007). Regional integration is thus shown as something ‘natural’ and ‘unavoidable’ for Latin American countries. The idea of ‘peoples’ fraternity’ is also part of this rhetoric.

Interviewee A10 explicitly referred to the importance of the rhetoric of regional integration, asserting that “We Latin Americans are the champions of the integrationist rhetoric and the systematic losers of integration” (A10). A10 held that the reason why leaders put so much effort in this rhetoric of integration is because this is a way to ‘inflate the Latin American ideology’. This interviewee asserted that it is “precisely because of that excess of rhetoric about integration that political leaders are conscious that it is not easy nor possible to assume that [political] cost [of abandoning or ending the AC]” (A10). In A10’s view, maintaining the AC is

---

253 Though Brazil is also usually included in this rhetoric.
functional to that rhetoric (A10). This vision denotes the importance of this rhetoric for political leaders, and contributes to explaining the maintenance of the AC. According to A10’s view, this rhetoric even has the causal power of making agents believe that there is a political cost in abandoning or ending the AC, something in line with what was argued in the previous section addressing the issue of the ‘political cost’. A10 argued that the integrationist rhetoric is nevertheless ‘beneficial’, as long as words have ‘a value’ and rhetoric allows constructing and ‘lifting up’ certain things.

In this sense, A10’s view coincides with Onuf’s (2012) and Drulak’s (2004) positions that language constructs reality. The rhetoric of regional integration can be conceptualised as a ‘generative discursive structure’ (Wendt 1987) that constructs the ‘political cost’ of ending or abandoning the AC as something real and keeps the pursuit of regional integration as ‘a must’ for Andean and Latin American states. This rhetoric also contributes to reproducing Andean and Latin American identities. Note that this assessment is closely related to Söderbaum’s (2004: 99) concept of ‘regime boosting’, assessed in Chapter 1 as a source of identification for SADC member states. Yet, A10 argued, the rhetoric of integration is not a way of searching for a collective identity, but rather something at the service of the interests and power ambitions of the rulers on duty. He/she added that, as a result of the latter, what has been shaped in Latin America are ‘separate identities’. In his/her view, there are ‘created interests’ that lead to ‘parochial’ and ‘provincial’ visions (A10).

Although only interviewee A10 explicitly referred to the ‘rhetoric’ of regional integration, other interviewees made comments that can be considered ‘rhetorical’, inasmuch as they can be encompassed within the discourse of regional integration as something ‘natural’ and ‘great’. For instance, interviewee A7 argued that Andean integration will be ‘anyways occurring’ without the existence of the AC, as if it were something natural or inevitable. In his/her words, “the AC was only a facilitator of integration” (A7). On his/her part, interviewee A11 considered that the current focus of the AC is the one of ‘integral integration’ defined since the Tarija
Summit in 2007. He/she asserted that the different topics in which the AC is currently working to “generate identity and an acknowledgment of the need to work at the regional level” (A11). A11’s comments are paradoxical, for this interviewee emphasised the loss of Andean unity over trade issues and the poor advances of integration in the social area during the first decade of the 21st century. Interviewee A1’s comments about the ‘naturalness’ of being Andean and the concept of ‘fraternity’ among Andean peoples also add to this rhetoric of regional integration (see p.108 above), as well as those interviewees’ comments about member states seeing the Andean integration process as something good due to entailing common initiatives and projects among AC members (for instance, C6 and C7).

Furthermore, in Chapter 3 it was highlighted that those interviewees who pointed out strengthening the Andean integration process as a motivation for AC member countries to engage collective negotiations with the EU, did not make any reference to the ‘failure’ that the breaking-off of collective negotiations meant for such an interests/aim. It was argued that this paradoxical fact may give account of the relative low importance that strengthening the integration process and collective identity had for AC member states. If this was so, interviewees’ assertions on strengthening the Andean integration process as a collective interest/aim could be explained as part of the rhetoric of regional integration. Likewise, the poor results of the PIDS show that the importance of the social agenda and of the PIDS has not been that high for AC member states, but rather the PIDS could be assessed as a ‘rhetorical tool’ to justify and prolong the existence of the AC, as it was the only area where AC members had some agreements, given the different visions that dismantled the few achievements in trade integration (A11). The rhetorical dimension of the PIDS consists in that, given its scant achievements, its purposes and content have remained ‘on paper’. However, despite their evaluation of the PIDS’ implementation as unsatisfactory, some interviewees still pointed out

---

254 This Summit corresponded to the XVII APC, which in the first point of the Tarija Declaration about ‘Deepening and Renewing integration’ spoke of “an integral integration more balanced between the social, cultural, economic, environmental and trade aspects”. 
the social area as the promising one for the future of Andean integration, which would amount as another component of the rhetoric of ‘social’ integration.

The argument of the rhetoric of integration as a factor that explains the maintenance of the AC regionalist project reads as follows: the set of ideas pointing to regional integration as something intrinsic to the existence of Andean countries is part of these countries’ identity. Being ‘Andean countries’ entails pursuing regional integration among them. If they did not pursue it, they would lose their ‘Andean identity’, and this identity is a key part of their state identity, just as membership to the SADC and promoting Southern African regionalism is part of SADC member states’ identity (Söderbaum 2004: 99). Furthermore, the rhetoric of regional integration also contributes to the construction of Andean states’ identities as ‘modern’, ‘progressive’ and ‘updated’ states, for regionalism is something that modern states should pursue (Sideri 1997). However, the extent to which the rhetoric of regional integration contributes to the construction of state identity was not referred to explicitly by any interviewee, and only to a certain extent implicitly by A10 when saying that “no country wants to pay the political cost of burying the AC because the AC is one of the few concrete elements of integration that is possible to find and present”.

In turn, it is a product of reflection on the importance that the rhetoric of regional integration as a ‘generative discursive structure’ holds in a number of interviewees’ views. Lastly, it is argued that the rhetoric of integration and its effects on the reproduction of Andean identity are enabled by the AC’s institutional settings where this rhetoric is spread and reproduced, and this in turn helps maintaining the AC’s institutional framework and the regionalist project itself.

5.4 Discussing the limitations and contributions of the constructivist interpretive analysis carried out in the thesis

The constructivist approach applied to the analysis of the three case studies of the AC chose to focus on agents’ views in order to assess the explanatory role of collective identity and regional institutions, in terms of their constitutive and causal effects on state action and between them.

---

255 C6, A7, A8 and A12.
256 As quoted on p.206 above.
This methodological choice was made on the basis of two ontological assumptions: first, states are actors whose actions are informed by ideas. Second, states act through the persons who act in their name, this is, state representatives; hence, it was argued that a useful way for knowing what ideas inform state action is asking state representatives about them, and contrasting these ideas with the ones present in official documents, academic work and press reports. But from these ontological and methodological choices a number of limitations arose in the analysis of the case studies addressed in the thesis. First, is the problem of distinguishing constitutive from causal effects of ideas according to interviewees’ assertions. Second, is the problem of representativeness, which consists of the extent to which we can know the ideas that inform state action by focusing on the views of a limited number of interviewees. Third, is the problem of trustworthiness, consisting of the extent to which we can make knowledge claims about the ideas that inform agents’ thinking. This latter problem is related to two other problems: the biasing that interviewees’ views can suffer because of the questions they are posed; and the problem of ‘double hermeneutics’ (interpreting agents’ interpretations).

5.4.1 Distinguishing constitutive and causal effects as explanation

Constructivism does not tell us how to look for constitutive and causal effects of ideas. Wendt (1998: 104, 111) tells us that the distinction consists of constitutive relationships making things to be what they are, while causal relationships makes things change from one state to another. Things have constitutive effects on those things they compose. In turn, causal relationships make changes happen in the state of things. Things have causal effects on other things inasmuch as they cause their existence, in terms of the changes that occurred for those things to exist in a subsequent state or in their current one. Causal theorising departs from the idea that “a cause makes its effect happen, implying [...] that to find a cause is to show why the effect had to happen as it did” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 3).

The problem of relying on agents’ views is that constitutive and causal effects of ideas are derived from the terms in which interviewees speak of the role of ideas. Hence, words like ‘orienting’ and ‘informing’ have a clear constitutive connotation. They tell us that ideas were held by agents, taken into account, considered, but we remain uncertain whether they implied
a change in agents’ actions. This assessment seems rather simplistic, for it does serve to claim that agents hold certain ideas (though not necessarily with complete certitude, as will be further seen), but it does not tell us anything about their importance unless agents specify the extent to which they matter. This thesis has argued that without this specification in agents’ discourse, assessing the constitutive importance of ideas becomes difficult. This does not mean that without such specification we should conclude that ideas do not matter at all. On the contrary, this thesis has argued for constitutive theorising as a valid form of explanation, and hence if ideas are assessed as having constitutive effects, we can be sure of their importance in orienting agency. The argument is that without agents being explicit about the extent to which ideas matter, it is difficult to know how important they are, how much they matter. This is why interpretive analysis becomes valuable, for contrasting agents’ views (exposure), relating them to the context in which they interact and where ideas are produced, and engaging other data sources like official documents, academic works and press reports (intertextuality), are interpretive tools that allow making knowledge claims on the basis of how agents see their worlds and make meaning of their actions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 46, 84-9).

This thesis has argued that when ideas can be assessed as having causal effects, their importance in explaining agency is increased, and the extent to which they matter can be more clearly established. Again, this does not mean that ideas only matter if they have causal effects. The argument is that ideas matter more if both constitutive and causal effects can be observed. This thesis has assumed that ideas have causal effects when agents’ views, or the interpretive analysis of them, give account of a change that ideas implied in the unfolding of actions and processes. The thesis has proposed that a sound way to identify ‘change’ is by analysing the transitive verbs interviewees’ use to refer to the role of ideas. If those verbs imply change, causal effects can be observed. Yet, it has been pointed out that there are certain transitive verbs that do not clearly denote change, and thus interpretive problems arise.

This is the case of transitive verbs like ‘facilitating’ and ‘enabling’. When interviewees spoke of collective identity and regional institutions ‘facilitating’ action, does facilitation account for causal effects? In all three case studies of the thesis it was argued it did not, at least not if the
extent to which they ‘facilitated’ or ‘enabled’ progress was not explicitly assessed by agents as ‘high’. If we take the Humean conception of causation traditionally engaged in approaches to social science – including most IR constructivism (Kurki 2008: ch.4) – facilitating does not equate causing. The fact that A made it easier for B to occur does not mean that if it were not for A, B would not exist (as a fact or as a new state of affairs). By ‘facilitating’, A just made B ‘easier’ to occur. But this account is attached to the Humean conception of causation addressed in Chapter 1, and it is problematic because it clashes with the transformative effects that, according to critical realism, causes are supposed to have (Wendt 1987, 1998). If A made B easier to happen, A played a role in changing the state of things from one where B did not exist to another where it does. Moreover, if A ‘facilitated’ B it contributed to B’s transformation. Transformation implies change, but this thesis has argued that without knowing the extent to which the ‘facilitating factor’ contributed to the facilitated thing’s transformation we cannot observe causal effects. The problem here might not be related to assessing causation as such, but rather to the concept of causation engaged (Kurki 2008: ch.6). But causation understood in the terms it has been in the present thesis, as things that make other things occur or that generate change, does not allow equating ‘facilitating’ to ‘causing’. We can accept that the ‘facilitating factor’ contributed to the transformation of things, but it did not ‘trigger’ it, and without knowing the extent to which the ‘facilitating factor’ implied a change it is difficult to observe its causal effects.

Something equally problematic is the ‘enabling role’ of ideas. When interviewees asserted that collective identity and regional institutions enabled action, does this account for causal effects? Again, the analysis carried out in the three case studies of the thesis argued it does not in clear terms. But ‘enabling’ means ‘making possible’, and making possible is tightly related to making something happen. Once more, the problem might be the concept of causation. Wendt, for instance, speaks of a ‘genetic explanation’, which is a form of causal explanation that shows how a certain outcome comes about (Wendt 1999: 83). Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 14, 99) speak of ‘constitutive causality’, which engages “how humans conceive of their worlds and the language they use to describe them” (ibid., 52). Analysing constitutive causality also consists of explaining “why humans do what they do due to their own understanding of their
However, given that when pointing out the enabling role of ideas interviewees did not explicitly assert that because of those ideas things happened the way they did, causal effects cannot be observed in clear terms.

The same happens with verbs like ‘shaping’, ‘defining’, ‘leading’, ‘influencing’ and ‘affecting’, used by interviewees as quoted in previous chapters. It was argued that these verbs do not denote causal effects in clear terms if – as was the case in interviewees’ assertions – the extent to which they ‘acted’ upon their object is not specified. Nonetheless, it is clear that those verbs give a sense of transformation, and therefore from a critical realist conception of causation they could be assessed as having causal effects to some extent. The interpretive method for pursuing causal theorising based on analysing transitive verbs has proposed to distinguish those verbs that imply change in clear terms from those that do not. Perhaps this interpretive problem could be solved by establishing that causal effects are clearer to observe through some transitive verbs than through others; yet, as long as the used transitive verbs denote transformation, the ideas object of those verbs can be assessed as having causal effects. The distinction between constitutive and causal effects clearly depends, in any case, on the concept of causation engaged.257

Furthermore, in previous chapters it was argued that when ideas of collective identity and regional institutions were assessed by agents as making difficult or hampering progress, causal effects could be observed, without needing to have any indication of the extent to which they made things difficult. Why was such assessment made? This thesis argues that it is because of the result or final state of things. If A made the progress of B difficult but B – or the final state of things to which B refers – finally ended being what was expected, then a changing effect of A is not easy to assess. But if the result of B was not the expected one – as for instance the breaking-off of collective FTA negotiations with the EU – then we can be more certain that A implied a change, at least for those agents who pointed it out; understanding agents’ views is what interpretive analysis consists of (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 46-51). The same

257 Kurki’s work (2008, particularly ch.6), for instance, proposes to engage a different conception of causation from the Humean one and from the critical realist one, by bringing back Aristotle’s four definitions of causes: material, formal, efficient and final, which, among other things, would imply that constitutive factors would also account for (constitutive) causes.
happens, as another example, with the PIDS’ implementation: those institutional aspects pointed out by interviewees as making difficult the progress of such implementation had causal effects because the PIDS’ results were, according to most interviewees, unsatisfactory. If the PIDS’ results had been valued as satisfactory and some institutional issues had been pointed out as making difficult the PIDS’ implementation, causal effects of such institutional issues could not be assessed in such clear terms. The same would have happened with the AGS’ intense action behaving as ‘another’ negotiator ‘disturbing’ member states in AC bargaining for the FTZ and the CET addressed in case study 1. Had the CET been adopted in full by the five AC members then the ‘negative’ causal effects of the AGS would have been harder to observe. But since the results were not ‘positive’ and the AGS made progress difficult in those terms, then we can be more certain that the AGS’ behaviour contributed to some extent to the ‘negative’ results.

The thesis has also argued that the causal role of ideas should also be established when ideas operate as ‘reasons for action’ (Davidson 1963; Wendt 1998: 107; 1999: 83; Kurki 2008: 11-2). This assumption is grounded in a philosophical tradition that supports this argument (critical/scientific realism), but there is another philosophical tradition that rejects it (see Chapter 1). Hence, constructivism needs to take the side of one philosophical tradition – critical realism – in order to warrant its assumption of reasons as causes of action, in order to be able to assess the causal effects of ideas (Wendt 1999: ch.2). Yet, in considering reasons as causes of action, constructivism – and critical realism – might be violating the condition of independence between cause and effect (Suganami 2006: 65). If reasons are ideas and ideas constitute agents’ thinking, the independent existence of reason from action (cause and effect) does not hold, since agency is oriented by agents’ thinking, that is, agency is constituted by agents’ ideas. However, the critical realist tradition holds that were it not for certain reasons agents gave for their actions, such actions would not have taken place.

Note that the work of Davidson (1963) was prior to the ones of Roy Bhaskar (1975), Rom Harré (1975) and Hilary Putnam (1975), namely the main precursors of ‘scientific’ or ‘critical’ realism. Yet, Davidson is not associated with this philosophical tradition (he is said to belong to the ‘analytic school’ of philosophy), but rather the critical realists took Davidson’s work on reasons as causes as a seminal work to develop their philosophical positions.
Critical realism considers reasons to be ideas, but holds that ideas as reasons are causes for their absence would have implied the non-realisation of the action in question (Davidson 1963). Hence, perhaps the problem here is once more related to the conceptualisation of causation and not with pointing reasons as causes as such (Porpora 2010: 89). For instance, if constitutive relationships were accepted as a particular form of causation different from the Humean conception of causation, reasons could be more coherently assessed as causes (Kurki 2008: chs.1 and 6). But we can be sure that the Humean conception of causation can hardly accept reasons as causes, for reasons as ideas are constitutive of agency – at least of intentional action – and thus cannot have causal power over it, since they are not independent from agency.

Nonetheless, this problem of the independent relationship that must hold between the cause and the thing caused can be solved through the way we theorise about agency. It is true that ideas constitute agents’ identities and interests, but from a constructivist standpoint ideas are fundamentally part of structure (Wendt 1999). Interests are ideas, and interests are located on the agency part of the equation, but the ideas that inform interests are (collective) identities, institutions, knowledge, culture, that is, ideational structures. Hence, if we theorise agency as being oriented by ideas, we are ontologically placing ideas on the structure side of the equation, thus separating them from agency. This is an ontological assumption that must be made if we are to theorise about the ways in which ideas orient agency. In these terms, it is not that ideas and agency are independent from each other – indeed, constructivism holds the opposite –. Wendt (1999) tells us that social structures are mainly made of ideas, and as ideational structures they do not exist independently of the ideas agents hold, though neither are they subject to what agents choose to think of them (ibid., 1987: 359); otherwise they would lose their structural character as things that ‘structure’ (making possible and constraining) agency. But if constructivism is to provide explanations of agency on the basis of ideas, then it must address agency (interests) and the ideas that inform it as two separate things, ontologically independent – though only temporarily, as a sort of ‘methodological

---

259 Porpora (2010: 89) distinguishes between ‘discursive’ causes (reasons) and ‘non-discursive’ causes (i.e. material constraints).
bracketing’ (Wendt 1987; see pp.67-8 above) – in order to assess the ways in which ideas orient, constitute and cause agency.

Beyond the previous ontological stake, the fact that agents pose ideas as reasons for action brings us to the problematic choice of trusting agents. Agents can point to certain ideas as reasons for action, but there is no way we can be sure those ideas ‘truly’ were reasons for their action. Agents can claim that ideas mattered, but there is no way we – and agents themselves – can be sure that ideas ‘truly’ mattered when decisions were made. Relying on agents’ discourse can be problematic as it entails interpreting agents’ interpretations about ideas and, further, reality. Regarding the assessment of the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions in the three case studies of the thesis, problems arose when interviewees did not make explicit assertions about the importance of these ideational structures, but only made suggestions that gave some clues that allow thinking about their importance.

Problems also arose when interviewees contradicted themselves. In the case of suggestions, only inferences can be made, and this might be problematic because the extent to which suggestions ‘allow’ thinking about the importance of ideas is left to the researcher’s criteria (interpretation). In the case of contradictions, uncertainty emerges: did ideas matter or not? The only answer can be ‘yes, in this sense and to this extent’; ‘not, in this other sense and to this other extent’. As Smith points out, “[…] the actors’ own understanding is an area of underdetermination. Actors interpret, filter and assess; they perceive and misperceive” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 206). The next section will address the problem of interpreting interpretations and will emphasise the contributions of interpreting agents’ views.

5.4.2 Representativeness, trustworthiness and double hermeneutics

As shown in Chapter 1, constructivism engages to a significant extent the programme of ‘Understanding’, taking actors’ views as a starting point (Hollis and Smith 1990: 2). Asking interviewees about their views of Andean regionalism was considered the most direct way to know what ideas informed their thinking, and through this, approaching the ideas that inform state action. Yet, there is no basis to assume that what a number of interviewees say about the
ideas that inform state agency is representative. As Hollis and Smith (1990: 2, 90) point out, what officials speaking in the state or in the government’s name actually say, can never be considered what the government or the President and Ministers themselves ‘really’ think. Their discourse is an interpretation of the government’s and the President’s and Ministers’ thinking, and this is a case of ‘double hermeneutics’ (Brglez 2001; Patomäki 2002: 14) in which the researcher’s interpretation of such interpretation accounts for a third interpretation – therefore, a case of ‘triple’ hermeneutics.

Interviewing actors might not be the most certain way to know what were the ‘true’ ideas informing actors’ thinking. First, actors can lie, even to themselves (Hollis and Smith 1990: 90; Patomäki 2002: 151; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 41). Actors can just hold the discourse that their roles, fixed by the nature of their jobs, demand them to hold (Hollis and Smith 1990: 176; Berger and Luckmann 1968: 96; Koivisto 2010: 76). Actors might disagree even completely with that discourse, but they tell the researcher – or the media/public – ‘what they are supposed to tell’. This is related to the philosophical problem of ‘other minds’, which is ‘how one mind can ever know what is in the mind of another’; the answer is that no one can ever know, and the only way to get close to know to what is in someone else’s mind is to observe her behaviour, including language (Hollis and Smith 1990: 172).

Second, and moreover, what actors say can only be considered as what they say was in their minds at the moment of acting (Hollis and Smith 1990: 2). Every time an actor makes an assertion about what was in her mind, she is making an interpretation of what was in her mind (ibid., 55), and it can even be the case that actors are unable to remember what was in their minds at the moment of acting. In turn, the researcher takes account of what actors say and makes an interpretation of actors’ assertions (Wendt 1998: 103). This is again a case of ‘double hermeneutics’ or double interpretation, which constructivist students of international relations can never be free from (Brglez 2001: 344, 347-8). Interpreting interpretations is problematic inasmuch as hermeneutic circles never allow accessing in full or in real terms what actors really think. Hence, reality – the object of analysis – is (re)constructed by the researcher through her interpretations of interviewees’ interpretations, and this does not allow acknowledging what
were the real ideas that informed agents’ thinking, and thereby, neither what really happened. In other words, constructivism must pay the price of conceiving reality as a social construction, and this is why italics have been used to highlight words referring to ‘realness’ and ‘truth’: if reality is what agents make of it, then constructivism must conform to agents’ interpretations of reality revealed in their discourse in order to know reality, at least if the researcher opts for departing from agents’ view. This is not to say that reality is reduced to what agents say it is. But engaging an interpretive analysis necessarily entails taking agents’ discourse as partly – and significantly – constituting reality (Wendt 1987).

Indeed, and as a result of the former reflections, the purpose of interpretive analysis cannot be to ‘find the truth’ or ‘unveil reality’, as if there was only ‘one’. As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 46, 80-5) point out, interpretive analysis is about making sense of how actors make meaning of their actions and the worlds in which they interact. In these terms, and since actors have different views on their ‘realities’, also to a great extent determined by their different positions in the world/context of interaction (ibid., 85), there cannot be a single reality, but multiple realities that need to be interpreted in order for the constructivist researcher to provide an explanation of how agents’ different realities construct ‘social’ reality, where ‘reality’ – and actors’ realities – is understood as a social construction (Berger and Luckmann 1968).

This does not mean that social reality, or a particular social context, as objects of study, can be as diverse as agents’ views on them. Interpretive analysis does not allow establishing ‘real’ claims about social interaction as if there were real claims that imply others being ‘false’ or ‘unreal’ (Yanow 2000: 18). But interpretive analysis possesses the tools to make knowledge claims about the object of study and to warrant analytical trustworthiness. These tools, addressed in this and previous chapters, are mainly contrasting agents’ views (exposure) and relating them to the context in which they are produced, and complementing the analysis with other ‘texts’ (intertextuality), like official discourses, academic works, press reports and other ‘means of expression’ or sources of meaning (like, for instance, art works) (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 84-9). Transparency, understood as the researcher’s commitment to reflectively
show the contradictions, differences and similarities between agents’ views, and also with other texts’ accounts, is one core tool for interpretive analysis to meet trustworthiness purposes (ibid., 82). Another tool to make trustworthy knowledge claims is coherence and logic of argumentation, even when these claims are made on the basis of one or few agents, and even when agents’ views are contradictory within themselves (ibid., 108-9). Even in the latter case, coherence and logic of argumentation can be maintained by transparently showing agents’ own contradictions and suggesting some explanations/reasons that explain agents’ own contradictory views. This includes asking and providing answers for the ‘causes’ of such contradictions. Indeed, for Shapiro and Wendt (1992: 215), trustworthiness can be achieved by linking causal claims to agents’ self-understandings.

The analysis carried out in previous chapters put significant effort in showing interviewees’ different and opposite views, and pointed out contradictions within individual views themselves when they emerged. When possible, explanations for those contradictions were suggested. It also contrasted interviewees’ views with official documents, academic works and press reports, and in those cases where constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions were observed on the basis of one or few interviewees’ views – like in all the other cases – maximum effort was made in providing a coherent analysis and sharpening the logic of argumentation to the highest possible degree. These are the standards against which the constructivist interpretive analysis carried out in the thesis must be judged, and not the extent to which constitutive and causal effects of ideas are more or less mirroring a ‘reality’ existing independently from agents’ and the researcher’s view (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 80, 95).

The researcher’s reflexivity on the way data has been co-generated and on his exercise of making sense of such data is another key tool for achieving transparency and meeting trustworthiness purposes (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 100-4). For instance, a problem found in the analysis carried out in previous chapters was that by taking agents’ views as the main object of analysis, it was only possible to assess the effects of those ideas agents spoke of, which does not mean that there were no other ideas that also played a role in orienting agency. This could be the case in case studies 1 and 2, where interviewees only spoke of the role of the
AGS and did not refer to the role of other regional organisations or institutional instances, which does not mean that these did not play a role in the unfolding of processes. In these terms, asking agents about their views in order to understand their reality implies a limited access to that reality inasmuch as the researcher can only analyse what agents speak of.

Moreover, by asking agents questions about aspects they do not initially refer to, one runs the risk of biasing their answers. In the three case studies of the AC interviewees were asked questions about the importance of collective identity and regional institutions in orienting state action. Hence, interviewees were not given the chance to avoid thinking about the role of identity and institutions, or to avoid speaking about the content of these two ideational structures. Just posing the questions “were there any reasons related to collective identity why states acted the way they did?” and “was collective identity important in orienting state action?” inevitably suggests that there should be reasons and that collective identity should be important. Perhaps if interviewees were not posed questions about the importance of certain ideas, they would not have mentioned them when answering why states acted the way they did. Yet, this is an inevitable risk implied in doing interviews and asking questions about what the researcher aims to find out. The research question of the present thesis was “in what terms can the role of collective identity and regional institutions explain state action towards the unfolding of regionalism in the AC?”, and this implied asking the question of “why did AC member states act the way they did?”. It was necessary to ask interviewees about the motives for state action and about the role of collective identity and regional institutions in orienting it.

Another problem of interpretation might be the invention of ‘categories’ for interpreting agents’ views, as it is the distinction of three dimensions of Andean collective identity that no agent explicitly made, and that we should remain dubious whether agents would acknowledge it; not least because if we asked them about it perhaps their answers would be biased when saying: “yes, actually those three dimensions exist”. This is a risk involved in the process of co-generation of data that develops through interviews (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 80). Nevertheless, the contributions made through the distinction of those dimensions have been

260 Of course, the same applies to regional institutions (see Appendix 2).
already pointed out, and inventing categories of interpretation is a tool that can help the researcher to understand agents’ thinking. The best thing the researcher can do to cope with these interpretive problems is to use other sources to counterbalance the possible bias. Unfortunately, the lack of official documents, press reports and academic works referring to the importance of collective identity and regional institutions in the AC has hampered this counterbalancing exercise in the present thesis, but efforts were made to use these sources when possible.

Following Hollis and Smith (1990: 205), “Understanding [...] requires reconstructing the rules on the one hand and seeking the actors’ intentions, legitimating reasons, and underlying motives on the other”. But Onuf (1998: 60) tells us that most of the time agents have limited, inaccurate, or inconsistent information about the material and social conditions that affect the likelihood of reaching given goals. Thus, a question that emerges is how we ‘reconstruct’ the rules of behaviour or social interaction. Official documents, press reports and participatory observation of how actors behave within institutional environments might be crucial for this purpose. Yet, relying on these sources also entails the problem of double hermeneutics, since official statements are always given by a particular state official, and press reports and academic works are written by a particular journalist or scholar, all of whom make an interpretation of the ‘information’ (‘reality’) they have when giving the official statement and when writing the press report or the academic piece of work. But it is clear that reconstructing the rules also requires asking actors about their behaviour and about ‘the rules’ themselves (Patomäki 2002: 89-90). Despite hermeneutical limitations, interpretation does not make agents’ ideas turn unreal or false. On the contrary, it allows understanding how agents make meaning of their worlds and actions, and this allows understanding why they act the way they do (Yee 1996: 96-7). Moreover, even if all discourses are permeated by interpretation, it is on the researcher to decide (on the basis of her criteria) which of them might be trustworthier than others (Patomäki 2002: 141).

It is important to emphasise that constructivist interpretive analysis does not depend on confirmation against ‘reality’ or against ‘sources’ in order to be valid. Indeed, it has been argued
that for constructivism reality is partly constructed through interpretation. Imagine we showed interviewees the conclusions and inferences made in the present thesis, and that all of them agreed on the fact that identity and institutions were absolutely irrelevant in orienting state action in the three case studies of the AC. Would this invalidate the analysis and, thereby, constructivism? Clearly not. For the fact that agents deny the constraining power of ideas does not verify their irrelevance. This is a basic tenet of psychologists, who often attempt to show the patient that what she is saying or thinking about herself shows that there are more ideas – or thoughts – to be considered than what she (the patient) is actually prone or even capable to acknowledge. It is clear that the job of the constructivist social researcher is not – and by no means can be – the one of a psychologist (Wendt 1999: 196). But the point is that the fact that agents deny the importance of ideas does not necessarily imply that ideas were irrelevant. Such is the value of analysing agents’ views and perceptions about their action. Otherwise, interpretive analysis would lose its methodological usefulness. However, it was argued in previous chapters that when interviewees denied the importance of collective identity and regional institutions the assessment of constitutive and causal effects of ideas was put into question. As part of interpretive analysis, balancing the importance of ideas by contrasting agents’ views with other contents of their own views, with the ones of other agents and with the ones included in other texts, is crucial for understanding agency and the role of ideas in orienting it.

5.5 Conclusion: Contributions to constructivist theorising and for the study of Andean regionalism

The decision to propose a method for assessing causal and constitutive effects of ideas resulted from engaging a constructivist approach that combines elements from two types of constructivism that in Chapter 1 were labelled as ‘soft’ and ‘radical’. From the ‘soft’ type, the constructivist approach engaged in the thesis took the aim of providing constitutive and causal explanations based on the role of ideas. From the more ‘radical’ type it took the ontological conception of language as a key means through which agents construct the social reality where they interact. It was argued in Chapter 1 that this combinations of elements of a ‘soft’ and a ‘radical’ version of constructivism was not intended to reconcile both versions or to come up
with a third ‘middle-range’ or ‘synthesising’ version of constructivism. Question-driven analysis – in contrast to a method-driven or a theory-driven one – like the one carried out in the present thesis aims rather at building bridges between different and even contradictory approaches in order to provide better explanations of social issues. Since constructivism lacks a concrete method for showing the explanatory power of ideas, an interpretive method had to be proposed for distinguishing constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions as ideational structures orienting agency, while at the same time focusing on the constitutive and causal effects of language on agency and on the construction of these ideational structures.

This method constitutes itself an important contribution of the present thesis to constructivist theorising. This is not because the proposed method wholly meets the methodological needs of constructivist analysis, nor because it has no limitations, as previous sections have shown. Its contribution consists of opening a way for operationalising constructivist theorising, in terms of assessing the explanatory power of ideas. The proposed method offers an alternative for overcoming the vacuum in which constructivists often fall, by assuring that ideas play a significant role in orienting agency but fail to specify the terms in which they do so. Constructivism’s assumption about the importance of ideas in orienting social life does not constitute an explanation itself, but only sets the object of analysis.

The constructivist approach engaged in the present thesis epistemologically takes the side of critical realism as a philosophy of science that is not only worried about providing explanations to social life, but also about assessing the validity of such explanations, in terms of assessing what explanations are better than others (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 217). Since this thesis is not about discussing these issues of philosophy of science, suffice is to say here that in making an effort to specify the terms in which ideas orient agency, the constructivist approach and the interpretive method engaged in the present thesis offer an alternative to contrast their explanations not only with explanations of other theoretical approaches (like rationalist-materialist ones), but also with other constructivist explanations and other interpretive analyses. Indeed, contrasting explanations is the method that critical realism offers for
assessing the validity of explanations, which it calls ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 200, 212). This method consists of evaluating which explanations are ‘better’ than others, in terms of their coherence and logic of argumentation (Wendt 1999: 62-3; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 108-9). Offering an alternative for showing the terms in which ideas orient agency opens the floor for comparing this sort of constructivist explanation with others, and this helps to assess their validity. This exercise of comparison and validation increases the value of constructivist analysis, as well as the possibilities for constructivist theorising of contributing to the understanding of social life, transcending and developing the ontological position that ‘ideas matter’, which many constructivists often take as an explanation.

Putting together constructivism and critical realism might seem problematic, as constructivism faces a problem with the critical realist tenet that reality exists independently from agents’ minds, for constructivism holds that agents’ ideas constitute to a significant extent the reality in which they interact (Brglez 2001; Kratochwil 2006; Suganami 2006; Bowring 2010; Gunnell 2011). But following the line of bridging approaches instead of merging them into a single one, the apparent contradiction between constructivism and critical realism can be overcome both in epistemological and methodological terms. Regarding the former, we must not lose sight that constructivism is a theory of social life, whereas critical realism is a philosophy of science. Thus, since their explanatory aims are different, their apparent incompatibilities should be addressed in the concrete analysis of the object of study, and not get stranded in a philosophical discussion. The answer to such epistemological and ontological incompatibilities is often found in methodological stances.

The problem of the impendent existence of reality formerly mentioned can be addressed through the methodological tool of ‘bracketing’ (Wendt 1987: 364-5), in order to explain, on the one hand, how reality is constituted by agents’ views, and on the other, how ideas – as the main structures constituting reality – constitute and orient agents’ interests and cause agency to occur in the ways it does. Moreover, assuming that reality is to a great extent constructed by agents’ ideas does not equate to assuming that reality is just what agents think of it. The
product of the interaction between agents and their ideas is not reduced to what agents think of reality, not least because, as the present thesis has shown, agents usually think different things, and have divergent views about reality. Since social reality is not what each individual agent thinks but mostly the product of interacting agents and their ideas, then the apparent contradiction between the above mentioned critical realist tenet and constructivism is significantly reduced. From a constructivist standpoint, reality is not completely independent of what agents – and the social researcher – think of it, but neither it is just the product of what agents – and the social researcher – think. It may be sound for constructivist theorising to engage critical realism as a philosophy of science that helps providing explanations based on the role of ideas, which is not to suggest that all constructivists should engage critical realism or any other philosophy of science in particular; it is only argued that constructivists – and all social theorists in general – can benefit from reflecting on the philosophical bases of their scholarship.

The constructivist analysis carried out in the present thesis has shown that constructivism needs epistemological and methodological developments – and also ‘bridges’ between different perspectives – in order to be ‘operationalised’, in terms of being capable of providing explanations based on the role of ideas. These developments do not need to be constructivist, in the same terms as constructivism’s ontology has been developed, surely being the ontological arena the one where constructivism shows its greater strengths, as it is an original ontology well differentiated from others. Developing constructivism’s epistemological and methodological dimensions should be done by bearing upon different philosophies of science, and upon interpretive and other research methods used by distinct disciplines and approaches. For instance, the constructivist approach engaged in this thesis drew upon scientific/critical realism, the analytical philosophy of Donald Davidson (for assessing the causal power of reasons), and the analysis of transitive verbs and metaphors (as tools of linguistic and discourse analysis) for assessing the constitutive and causal effects of ideas as the means to provide explanations based on their role. This is no more than one option among a variety of epistemological and methodological options that constructivists must explore, taking the
courage to leave or to transcend their ‘ontological fortresses’ by building bridges with other epistemologies and methodologies.

Epistemological and methodological stances are usually less secure than ontological ones (Shapiro and Wendt 1992: 217). Affirming what we see as constituting the world we investigate is easier – though not less valuable – than affirming what we consider ‘sound’, ‘valid’ or ‘useful’ knowledge of it and how to produce it. More serious problems often derive from taking epistemological and methodological positions than from ontological ones, though problems also derive from the latter nonetheless. The constructivist approach developed in the present thesis will surely raise more doubts about its engagement with critical realism and about the proposed interpretive method for analysing constitutive and causal effects of ideas than about the ontological assumptions that identity is at the basis of interests and that institutions make possible the understanding of agency by other agents. But constructivists must not fear the problems derived from their epistemological and methodological stances. Quite on the contrary, this thesis has shown that facing such problems – which in no sense necessarily implies solving them – serves to enrich the analysis.

As a result of the previous reflections, this thesis argues that providing a method for assessing the constitutive and causal effects of ideas, and concretely of collective identity and regional institutions, represents a significant contribution to constructivist approaches to regionalism. By applying this method to the analysis of the three case studies of the AC, this thesis has transcended constructivism’s ‘common place’ that ideas matter because they orient agency, by specifying the terms in which they matter (constitutive and causal) and the extent to which they matter. Another contribution, particularly for the reviewed constructivist approaches in Chapter 1, is that by analysing the constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions on each other, it is possible to conceptualise a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between both ideational structures that allow understanding how the co-evolution (not necessarily in a positive sense) of such structures affects the unfolding of regionalism. Constitutive and causal effects between both ideational structures assessed in the three case studies of the AC were not always positive for one another, in the sense of
strengthening them. On some occasions these effects were ‘detrimental’ (see Table 9 above). This analysis leads us to address some final contributions of the thesis to the study of Andean regionalism.

This thesis is the closest approach to how member states act in the AC because it is the first work that has analysed the views of some of the main performers of state action, namely high-level national officials who have had a significant degree of participation in the unfolding of regional negotiations and in national decision-making processes towards Andean regionalism. Analysing AGS bureaucrats’ views, also for the first time, has significantly contributed to analysing state action. This represents a major contribution to understanding the AC’s unfolding. The thesis has shown that rationalist-materialist accounts face limitations in explaining state action in the three case studies of the AC addressed, because even though obtaining or losing material benefits can explain state action to some extent, their relatively low significance justifies the need to analyse other ideational issues like collective identity and regional institutions.

The constructivist analysis carried out has shown that it is possible to provide explanations of state action towards the unfolding of regionalism based on the role of collective identity and regional institutions, which contributes to close the gap between constructivism and the study of Andean regionalism. The analysis of the three case studies showed the terms in which these ideational structures can explain the unfolding of the processes addressed, through the assessment of constitutive and causal effects of both ideational structures, and also of a relationship of mutual constitution and causation between them. Understanding this relationship allowed proposing four issues that may help explaining the AC’s maintenance: besides the metaphor of the political cost above addressed, institutional flexibility, institutional inertia and the rhetoric of regional integration are issues that denote significant constitutive and causal relationships between collective identity and regional institutions that help explaining why the AC is maintained despite its few achievements and scant material benefits for member states.
The fact that this thesis has assessed constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions must not be read as if such ideational structures were strong enough to secure the AC’s progress and success. Quite on the contrary, the thesis has suggested that these ideational structures might contribute to explaining the AC’s maintenance, but the AC’s achievements have been limited, and the ruptures that Andean identity has suffered and the flexibility of regional norms could well also be posed as factors explaining the AC’s limited progress. Collective identity and regional institutions in the AC also have weaknesses, they are created by agents but are also transformed by them, and if they were really strong and their effects on the unfolding of processes were only positive (in the sense of favouring regional integration) then the progress of Andean regionalism would be rather guaranteed. But as social structures, collective identity and regional institutions constrain and make agency possible, constitute it and cause it, but agency is performed by agents, not by structures. This is why analysing the terms in which ideas orient state action contributes to understanding the unfolding of regionalism.

In this sense, the analysis of interviewees’ assertions often showed opposing views about the role of identity and institutions and about ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ of Andean regionalism. It even revealed contradictions within interviewees’ views themselves, or diverse views of the same interviewee about the same topic. These issues also contribute to our understanding of the ways in which collective identity and regional institutions, and further, the AC, are socially constructed, which in turn allows us to understand Andean regionalism as an issue at permanent dispute. Opposing, contradicting and divergent views among agents and within them shows us that the ideas that constitute and cause state action are not homogenous, and thus the social construction of identity, institutions and regionalism is not a straightforward process, but something intricate, complex, and even conflictive. The constructivist analysis developed in the present thesis has shown that the social construction of reality, and particularly of Andean regionalism, is not precisely a collaborative process where all agents make their contributions to the progress of regionalism and regional integration. As long as agents share certain ideas and not others, social reality is not only the product of agreement, but also of contestation.
If reality is socially constructed this means that social actors construct reality through interaction. An often pointed out mechanism for constructing reality – and a key one for agents’ interaction – is language (Berger and Luckmann 1968: 85, 191; Wendt 1987: 359; Searle 1995: 51, ch.3; Onuf 1998, 2012; Drulák 2004). In these terms, agents construct reality through what they say reality is, what they say about reality, how they perceive it and what is their position towards it (Hollis and Smith 1990: 2, 6, 206; Wight 1999: 124). Onuf tells us that “Indeed, saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is” (Onuf 1998: 59). The interpretive exercise carried out in the present thesis has allowed observing constitutive and causal effects of collective identity and regional institutions that account for the explanatory role of ideas in orienting state action towards the unfolding of Andean regionalism. Thanks to the analysis of interviewees’ views on the role of identity and institutions it was possible to know significant aspects of their social reality that contribute to understanding why AC member states acted the way they did, why the processes addressed in each case study unfolded as they did, and even to outline a number of issues that may help understanding the AC’s maintenance. Of course, the explanations provided in the thesis based on the role of identity and institutions do not explain the addressed phenomena in full, but just contribute to their understanding. Moreover, showing the possibility of providing explanations based on the role of ideas does not rule out or ‘replace’ rationalist-materialist approaches, but simply opens the spectrum of alternatives for understanding social life, and particularly, regionalism.
APPENDIX 1

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Note: Because of the confidentiality form that interviewees signed at the beginning of the interviews, and given the ‘uniqueness’ of the responsibilities described in each case, it is not possible to reveal in this list whether interviewees occupied the described positions in the past or if they do in the present. Neither is it possible to specify their gender, for this could easily allow identifying who they are in most cases, and this is why they are referred as ‘he/she’ in the thesis.

**National officials**

**Colombia**

C1 – One of the negotiating chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industry and Tourism. This person was in charge of leading FTA negotiations with the EU.

C2 – One of the Vice-ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This person was one of the decision-makers participating in the FTA negotiating process with EU.

C3 - One of the negotiating chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industry and Tourism. This person was also in charge of leading FTA negotiations with the EU.

C4 – A high-level official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of dealing with AC issues, including the FTA negotiations with the EU.

C5 – One of Colombia’s Ministers of Foreign Trade.

C6 – An official of the Ministry for Social Protection in charge of dealing with AC issues.

C7 - An official of the Ministry of Environment in charge of dealing with AC issues.

C8 – One of Colombia’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

**Ecuador**

E1 - One of the negotiating chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This person was in charge of leading FTA negotiations with the EU.
E2 - A high-level official in the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of one of the negotiating tables at FTA negotiations with the EU.

E3 - One of the negotiating chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This person was in charge of leading FTA negotiations with the US.

E4 – A Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Coordination for Social Development in charge of dealing with AC issues.

E5 - A high-level official in the Ministry of Coordination for Social Development in charge of dealing with AC issues.

E6 – An Ecuadorian international bureaucrat who participated in defining Ecuador’s participation in the PIDS’ implementation.

**Peru**

P1 - One of the negotiating chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This person was in charge of leading the negotiations of the FTZ and the CET and also the FTA negotiations with the EU.

P2 - A high-level official in the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of conducting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET, and also FTA negotiations with the EU.

P3 – A high-level official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of dealing with AC issues.

P4 - A high-level official in the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of conducting FTA negotiations with the EU.

P5 - A high-level official in the Ministry of Women and Social Development in charge of dealing with AC issues.

**AGS bureaucrats**

A1 – A high-level bureaucrat in charge of supporting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET during the 2000s.

A2 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of supporting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET and also FTA negotiations with the EU.

A3 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of supporting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET.
A4 – One of the AC directors in charge of supporting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET and also FTA negotiations with the EU.

A5 - One of the AC directors in charge of supporting negotiations for the FTZ and the CET and also FTA negotiations with the EU.

A6 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of supporting FTA negotiations with the EU.

A7 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of developing the Andean Social Agenda and the PIDS.

A8 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of implementing the PIDS.

A9 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of managing funding for the Andean Social Agenda.

A10 - One of the AC directors in charge of social issues.

A11 - A high-level bureaucrat in charge of implementing the AC’s New Strategic Design in the 2000s, including the development of the PIDS.

A12 - One of the AC directors in charge of social issues.

A13 – A high-level bureaucrat in charge of developing the Andean Environmental Agenda.
APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN INTERVIEWS

Case study 1. Peru remaining an AC member while being reluctant to adopt the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and the Common External Tariff (CET)

National Officials

Part 1. General questions:

a) Why was the FTZ and the CET of interest for Peru at the beginning?
b) Why did Peru take so long to engage the FTZ and the CET?
c) What were the economic and political incentives to engage the FTZ and the CET?
d) What were the economic and political incentives to not engage the FTZ and the CET?
e) What interests were involved in favour of the FTZ and the CET?
f) What interests were involved against the FTZ and the CET?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

g) What were the norms/principles/rules that Peru invoked to be excluded from the FTZ and the CET?
h) Why did the other member states allow Peru for being excluded?
i) Were there any ideological or theoretical precepts informing Peru’s position towards the FTZ and the CET?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

j) Were there any reasons related to collective identity or an ‘Andean’ identity because of which Peru was participating in the negotiations of a FTZ and a CET?
k) While asking to be excluded for so long from the full adoption of the FTZ and the CET, did Peru feel that it was ‘betraying’ the other members of the group?
l) How did Peru explain in political terms to itself and to the others and the public that it was the only member of the AC not adopting the FTZ and the CET?
m) If Peru was not to adopt the FTZ and the CET, why then to keep being a member of the AC?

Part 4. Questions about interests:

n) What was Peru’s national interest towards the FTZ and the CET?
o) What were the bases for the constitution of such national interest?
p) What were the main actors in constituting such interest?
q) How important were AC norms for constituting such interest?
r) How important was collective identity for constituting such interest?

**AGS bureaucrats**

Part 1. General questions:

a) Why was the AC interested in having a FTZ and a CET?
b) Why did Peru take so long in adopting the FTZ and the CET?
c) What were the economic and political incentives for AC members to adopt the FTZ and the CET?
d) What were Peru’s economic and political reasons for not adopting the FTZ and the CET?
e) What interests and sectors favoured the adoption of the FTZ and the CET?
f) What interests and sectors did not favour the adoption of the FTZ and the CET?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

g) What were the norms/principles/rules invoked by Peru for being excluded from the FTZ and the CET?
h) Why the other member states allowed Peru being excluded?
i) What was the AGS position towards Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET?
j) Were there any ideological or theoretical principles orienting the AGS position towards Peru’s reluctance to adopt the FTZ and the CET?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

k) Were there any reasons related to a collective or ‘Andean’ identity why the AC aimed to adopt the FTZ and the CET?
l) Did the other member states consider that Peru was betraying the other members for not adopting the FTZ and the CET?
m) How did the AGS explain to the general public that Peru was the only AC member not adopting the FTZ and the CET?
n) If Peru did not want to adopt the FTZ and the CET, why did it keep its membership to the AC?
Case study 2. The negotiation process of a free trade agreement between the AC and the EU

National officials

Part 1. General questions:

a) Why did (country) engage collective negotiations with the EU through the AC scheme?
b) Would (country) have preferred to engage negotiations individually?
c) What were the advantages of collective bargaining?
d) What were the disadvantages of collective bargaining?
e) What is your general assessment of the negotiation process?
f) What were the problems with Ecuador?
g) What were the problems with Bolivia?

Part 2. Questions about norms and institutional framework:

h) What were the AC norms/principles/rules that oriented collective negotiation with the EU?
i) What were the AC norms that allowed Colombia and Peru bargaining under the AC regional scheme without the other two member states?
j) What were the AC norms that were infringed because of the split among member states during the negotiation process?
k) Were there any ideological or theoretical precepts informing (country’s) position towards the negotiation process?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

l) Were there any reasons related to collective identity or an ‘Andean’ identity because of which the negotiations were undertaken collectively under the AC regional scheme?
m) Was collective identity ‘damaged’ because of the disagreement between member states?
n) How did (country) explain in political terms to itself and to the others and the public that it would keep/drop collective bargaining?
o) Why maintaining a regional integration scheme whose members do not negotiate free trade agreements as a bloc?

Part 4. Questions about interests:

p) What was (country’s) national interest towards the negotiation process?
q) What were the bases for the constitution of such national interest?
r) What were the main actors in constituting such interest?
s) How important were AC norms for constituting such interest?
t) How important was collective identity for constituting such interest?

**AGS bureaucrats**

Part 1. General questions:

a) Why did the AC engage collective negotiations with the EU?
b) Would member states have preferred to engage negotiations individually?
c) What were the advantages of collective bargaining?
d) What were the disadvantages of collective bargaining?
e) What is your general assessment of the negotiation process?
f) What were the problems with Ecuador and Bolivia?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

  g) What were the AC norms/principles/rules that oriented collective negotiation with the EU?
  h) What were the AC norms that allowed Colombia and Peru under the AC regional scheme without the other two member states?
  i) What were the AC norms that were infringed because of the split among member states during the negotiation process?
  j) Were there any ideological or theoretical precepts informing the AC position towards the negotiation process?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

  k) Were there any reasons related to collective identity or an ‘Andean’ identity because of which the negotiations were undertaken collectively under the AC regional scheme?
  l) Was collective identity ‘damaged’ because of the disagreement between member states?
  m) How did the AC explain in political terms to itself and to the others and the public that it would keep collective bargaining?
  n) Why maintaining a regional integration scheme whose members do not negotiate free trade agreements as a bloc?
Case study 3. The implementation of the Integrated Plan for Social Development (PIDS)

**National Officials**

Part 1. General questions:

- a) Why does (country) participate in PIDS?
- b) Has the PIDS’ implementation been collectively undertaken?
- c) What are the advantages of having an Andean PIDS?
- d) What are the disadvantages of having and Andean PIDS?
- e) What is your general assessment of the implementation of PIDS?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

- f) What have been the AC norms/principles/rules orienting (country’s) implementation of PIDS?
- g) Have there been any problems with AC norms that orient the implementation of PIDS?
- h) Have there been any ideological or theoretical precepts informing (country’s) implementation of PIDS?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

- i) Have there been any reasons related to collective identity or an ‘Andean’ identity because of which the implementation of PIDS works/not works the way it has?
- j) Has collective identity been enforced/damaged through the implementation of PIDS?
- k) How does (country) explain in political terms to itself and to the others and the public that it is committed to the implementation of PIDS?
- l) Is PIDS a reason why the AC regional scheme should be maintained?

Part 4. Questions about interests:

- m) What is (country’s) national interest towards PIDS?
- n) What are the bases for the constitution of such national interest?
- o) What are the main actors in constituting such interest?
- p) How important are AC norms for constituting such interest?
- q) How important is collective identity for constituting such interest?

**AGS bureaucrats**
Part 1. General questions:

a) Why did the AC decide to have PIDS?
b) Has the PIDS’ implementation been collectively undertaken?
c) What are the advantages of having an Andean PIDS?
d) What are the disadvantages of having and Andean PIDS?
e) What is your general assessment of the implementation of PIDS?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

f) What have been the AC norms/principles/rules orienting implementation of PIDS?
g) Have there been any problems with AC norms that orient the implementation of PIDS?
h) How adequate has the AC institutional framework been for the implementation of PIDS?
i) Have there been any ideological or theoretical precepts informing the implementation of PIDS?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

j) Are there any reasons related to collective identity or an ‘Andean’ identity because of which the implementation of PIDS works/not works the way it does?
k) Has collective identity been enforced/damaged through the implementation of PIDS?
l) How does the SG AC explain in political terms to itself and to the others and the public that it is committed to the implementation of PIDS?
m) Is PIDS a reason why the AC regional scheme should be maintained?
Secondary interviews

Even when the main interviews are the ones related in the three case studies outlined above, a number of ‘secondary’ interviews were conducted in order to obtain a general picture of the regionalist project.

Part 1. General questions:

a) Why is the AC important?
b) Why is the AC important for your country?
c) Why does not regional integration, understood as ceding sovereign decision-making power to regional institutions, advance in the AC?
d) Why, after the latest events occurred in the first decade of the 21st century, is the AC maintained?

Part 2. Questions about norms:

e) What do you think about Andean institutions and norms in general?
f) Are they useful for achieving the goals of the AC?
g) How important are Andean norms in orienting state behaviour towards the regional scheme?
h) Why are Andean norms so often not fulfilled?
i) Do you think that Andean norms provide cohesion among member states?
j) Do you think that Andean norms generate a sense of collective identity among member states?

Part 3. Questions about identity:

k) Do you think there is a collective or ‘Andean’ identity among member states?
l) What are the bases for such identity / or / why having a ‘common history’ there is no such collective identity?
m) Is collective identity / or / the lack of it important for the development of the AC?

Part 4. Questions about interest:

n) What is (country’s) national interest towards the AC?
o) What are the bases for the constitution of such interest?
p) What are the main actors in constituting such interest?
q) How important are AC norms for constituting such interest?
r) How important is collective identity for constituting such interest?
NOTES ON THE CALCULATIONS OF MANUFACTURE EXPORTS IN THE AC IN THE EARLY 1990s (Table 3)

The difficulty in finding homogeneous and matching data on non-traditional exports for AC members might be due to the fact that the products included under this export category vary among countries - for example, Peru excludes fish flour from its non-traditional exports, while Ecuador includes it. As a result of this difficulty the numbers shown in Table 3 correspond to manufactured exports, which may be in greater or lesser extent different from non-traditional exports, depending on each country’s definition of the latter category. Manufactured exports included in Table 3 correspond to categories 32-39 of the ECLAC - Base de Datos Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior (BADECEL), which contain the following product classifications:

(32) Textiles, apparel and leather industry
(33) Wood industry and wood products including furniture
(34) Paper making and paper products, printing and editorials
(35) Chemical substances and chemical products, and products derivative from oil, coal, rubber and plastic
(36) Non-metallic mineral products, excluding those derivative from oil and coal
(37) Basic metal industries
(38) Metal products, machinery and equipment
(39) Other manufacture industries

Note that these categories exclude Food products, beverages and tobacco (category 31 of ECLAC classification), which may be considered non-traditional exports by AC member countries, as they have a certain degree of manufacturing. Yet, this category has been excluded from the present analysis as it includes, precisely, fish flour, and its inclusion would distort comparison between, at least, Peru and Ecuador. In any case, the product categories included in the present analysis clearly contain added value (in general greater than that one of Foods, beverages and tobacco), which is the most relevant characteristic to assess the importance of intra-regional trade for AC members’ industrial development.

262 For Ecuador’s definition see ALADI (2001).
263 BADECEL data base can be consulted at: http://websie.eclac.cl/badecel/badecel_new/basededatos.asp
Calculating Peru’s manufacture exports

The percentages of 80% and 82% of Peruvian manufacture exports to the AC between 1991 and 1992 (respectively) are much higher than the ones resulting from using the data on Peruvian non-traditional exports provided by Rojas (1997: 30) – the only source that could be found on this issue - which would amount, according to my own calculations, to 57% of Peruvian total exports to the AC in 1991 and 63% in 1992. Using the data provided by Rojas, these numbers would correspond to 14% and 17%, respectively, of Peruvian non-traditional exports to the world. The difference in percentages might be due to the fact that, even though ECLAC manufacture categories used in my analysis exclude fish flour, Rojas might have included the making of non-metallic mineral products in his definition of non-traditional exports (but this is just an intuitive guessing of mine). Or perhaps Rojas just used different data available at the time. Unfortunately, Rojas does not provide any definition of non-traditional exports. His quoted sources are the Peruvian Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) and the Peruvian National Superintendence of Tax Administration (SUNAT), but it was not possible to find data about Peru’s non-traditional exports for 1991 and 1992 in the official websites of these institutions (their websites’ links are nevertheless listed at the ‘Official documents’ sub-section of the ‘References’ section of the thesis). In any case, 57% and 63% are still high percentages for Peruvian non-traditional exports to the AC, and they are still much higher than the portion of non-traditional exports to the world, which according to the data used by Rojas would amount for 30% in both years. Hence, the data provided by Rojas do not contradict the arguments outlined in pp.88-91 in the thesis’ main text.

Calculating Colombia’s manufacture exports

The percentages of 65% and 67% of Colombian manufactured exports to the AC in 1991 and 1992 (respectively) do not vary substantially if we use the data provided by the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Trade (MCIT),264 in which case they would amount to 69% in 1991 and 77% in 1992. This official source uses a classification that distinguishes between ‘Primary products’ and ‘Industrial products’, where the latter category includes agro-industrial products, and this might imply differences with the respect to the ECLAC classification used in my analysis. According to the numbers of MCIT and my own calculations, manufactured exports would amount to 32% and 33% of Colombia’s total exports to the world in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and the proportion of manufactured exports to the AC would represent 23% and 33% of Colombia’s total manufactured exports to the world in those years.

264 MCIT data has been taken from Exportaciones Anuales, Colombian Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industry and Tourism, available at: https://www.mincomercio.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=10438
Calculating Ecuador’s manufacture exports

The percentages of 16% and 41% of Ecuadorian manufactured exports to the AC in 1991 and 1992 (respectively) differ substantially from the ones of Carrillo (2002: 10) – namely the only source that could be found regarding Ecuador’s non-traditional exports to the AC in these years, who asserts that non-traditional exports amounted for 96% and 97% of Ecuador’s total exports to the AC in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Unfortunately, Carrillo does not provide data on export amounts in any currency, so it was not possible to contrast her numbers with the ones used in the present analysis. Her quoted source is the Ecuadorian Central Bank (BCE), but it was not possible to find data for Ecuador’s non-traditional exports to the AC in 1991 and 1992 (the BCE official website link is nevertheless listed at the ‘Official documents’ sub-section of the ‘References’ section of the thesis). In this case, the great difference between numbers might be explained because Carrillo used a much broader definition of non-traditional exports (which she also names ‘industrialised products’) than the one used in the present analysis for ‘manufactures’. Unfortunately, Carrillo does not provide either any definition of ‘non-traditional’ exports or ‘industrialised products’.

As stated in footnote 68 in the thesis’ main text it was not possible to find alternative data for Bolivia’s and Venezuela’s non-traditional exports for 1991 and 1992.
APPENDIX 4

LIST OF COMMUNITARIAN SOCIAL PROJECTS (CSPs) INCLUDED IN DECISION 601

Socio-labour aspects
- Programme for the sub-regional harmonisation of methodologies, criteria and priorities about labour formation and capacitating.
- Andean sub-regional programme for fostering employment.
- Andean sub-regional programme for preventing and eradicating child labour.
- Andean sub-regional programme about workers’ fundamental rights.

Health aspects
- Programme for epidemiological vigilance and control.
- Strengthening the Andean plan for health in border zones.
- Programme for access to medicines.

Education and culture
- Intercultural Andean programme.
- Andean programme about quality and equity in education.
- Programme for the diffusion and greater utilisation of information and communication technologies for education (Educimac).\(^{265}\)

Rural development and food security
- Andean forum for rural development.
- Developing and strengthening negotiating capacities for financing rural development regional initiatives.
- Food Security Andean programme.

Environment and sustainable development
- Economic valuation and sustainable profitableness of biodiversity.
- Programme for sustainable management of water resources.

Social development in border zones
No specific projects were defined in this area. The PIDS document only mentioned that all projects aiming at improving the life conditions of Andean border zones’ inhabitants would be included in this area.

\(^{265}\) This programme was merged with the ‘Andean programme about quality and equity in education’ under the name ‘Educimac’. See Andean Community, Consejo Andino de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores (2010). Principios orientadores y agenda estratégica andina. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/Ageenda_Estrategica2010.pdf
REFERENCES


Rincón, Jorge H. (2009) Análisis de la identidad cultural andina en el contexto de la Comunidad Andina. Graduate thesis presented to opt to the MA in Latin American Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá.


**OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS**

**Andean Community**


Acts of the Andean Presidential Council (chronological ordering)

Declaración de Galápagos (Galápagos Meeting, Andean Presidential Council, 18/12/1989). In Documentos de la Reunión Presidencial de Galápagos (1989) Available at: intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Presidencial/REUNION%20DE%20GALAPAGOS.doc

Documentos de la Reunión Presidencial de Galápagos (1989) Available at: intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Presidencial/REUNION%20DE%20GALAPAGOS.doc


Andean Decisions

Decision 321. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx#

Decision 322. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D322.htm

Decision 324. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx#
Decision 370. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx#

Decision 414. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx#


Decision 553. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D553.htm

Decision 592. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D592.htm

Decision 593. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D593.htm

Decision 596. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D596.htm

Decision 598. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D598.htm


Decision 647. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D647.htm

Decision 667. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D667.htm

Decision 738. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/decnum15.htm

Decision 771. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx#

Andean Community’s official websites

Andean Community. Andean Social Agenda (ASA) official website: http://www.comunidadandina.org/agendasocial.htm


Andean Community. SISCAN website: http://siscan.comunidadandina.org/weborb4/siscan/#

Other official documents

Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración – ALADI (2001) *Análisis del comercio ecuatoriano en la década de los noventa*. Departamento de Promoción Económica Publicación No. 04/01. Available at: www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/estudios.nsf/.../$FILE/4-01.doc (paste this link in google search engine and the document will be available for downloading).


ECLAC. *Base de datos estadísticos de comercio exterior* (BADECEL). Available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/badecel/badecel_new/basededatos.asp

Ecuadorean Central Bank (BCE) http://www.bce.fin.ec/


PRESS REPORTS


Andean Community. *Notas de prensa* (15/07/2009). ‘Con el apoyo de la UE y la CAN Ecuador y Perú ponen en marcha proyecto binacional de integración fronteriza’. Available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/notas/np15-7-09.htm


DePeru.com (27/02/2012) ‘Vicepresidenta Espinoza representará a Perú en audiencia de Parlamento Europeo que analizará TLC’. Available at: http://economia.deperu.com/2012/02/vicepresidenta-espinoza-representara.html


