Hegel’s *Phenomenology in Translation:*

A comparative analysis of translatorial *hexis*

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Abstract

The thesis adapts Bourdieu’s theory of *hexis* as a method for approaching the Baillie (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) and Pinkard (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) translations of Hegel’s *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hegel, 1807/1970) as embodiments of a translatorial practice informed by social and philosophical contextual factors. The theoretical concept of a translatorial *hexis* is analogous to Bourdieu’s *habitus* but differs in that the translatorial *hexis* embodies a specifically dominant, honour-seeking stance of the translator with regard to the micro-dynamics of the surrounding sub-fields; the translatorial *hexis* is also embodied primarily in the detail of the text and in the peritexts to the translations.

Chapters 3 and 4, which focus on the Baillie and Pinkard translations, are each divided into three sections: an analysis of the historical background to the translation in terms of interrelated Bourdieusian fields defined by rival positions vying for academic reputation; an analysis of lexical patterning identified in TT corpora with reference to the translations of two ‘dialectically ambiguous’ terms Geist [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate]; an analysis of peritexts to the two translations. Starting with a discussion of Hegel’s ‘dialectical ambiguity’ in chapter 1 and an elaboration of the Bourdieusian theoretical framework in chapter 2, the thesis attempts to explain the lexical findings with reference to the concept of translatorial *hexis* in a manner which takes philosophical and sociological factors into consideration as determinants of the translators’ strategies. The analysis focuses on the positioning of Sir James Black Baillie with regard to Absolutist and Personalist versions of British Idealism and Terry Pinkard with regard to the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel and the development of communitarian ideologies.

The publication of new translations of Hegel’s works and new critical works on German Idealism suggest that a Hegel revival is in full progress. Given the centrality of translation to this phenomenon, it is appropriate that translation studies should contribute to the discussion, especially to demonstrate the value of a self-reflexive, multi-disciplinary approach which brings linguistic analysis and sociological contextualisation to bear on some of the philosophical issues at stake.
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Finally, I would like to dedicate the thesis to the ‘The I that is we and the we that is I’, dem ‘Ich das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist’.
Introduction

The overarching aim of this thesis is twofold. In theoretical terms, it sets out to develop an appropriate method for analysing and comparing multiple, historical, German – English translations of a canonical philosophical text. The method of contextualisation, which is based on an adaptation of Bourdieusian sociology, is intended to do justice to at least some of the translatorial and philosophical complexities involved and, in this manner, to mediate between the disciplines of translation studies, sociology and philosophy. Secondly, the thesis applies the theoretical approach developed as a basis for analysing and comparing two translations, the Baillie (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) and Pinkard (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) translations of Hegel’s *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hegel, 1807/1970). Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is regarded as his first, large-scale, mature work and established his reputation as a philosopher (Stern, 2002: 4; Westphal, 2009: xvi-xvii). It was translated into English only a considerable time after some of his later works during the first of several Anglophone revivals of interest in Hegel.\(^1\) The rationale behind the present comparison is that the growing interest in Hegel’s philosophy in recent years, which is evidenced by the appearance of new translations of Hegel’s works and new critical works on German Idealism, suggests that a new revival is in full progress. Given the ideological and cultural significance of Hegel’s work, not only in logic and metaphysics, but also with regard to contemporary ethical, legal and political theory (Pinkard, 1987; Pinkard, 1994; Houlgate, 2005; Beiser, 2008; Pippin, 2008; Pinkard, 2011), this newest revival invites broad theoretical discussion. Since translation plays such an important part in the intercultural and interlingual phenomenon of the Hegel revival, it is appropriate that translation studies should contribute to the discussion, especially in order to demonstrate the value of a multi-disciplinary approach which brings literary and linguistic analysis as well as sociological contextualisation to bear on some of the philosophical issues at stake.

While it would be extravagant to claim that there has been a proliferation of translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* approximately coinciding with the two-hundredth anniversary of the publication of the source text in 1807, the appearance of David Healan’s online translation (Hegel/Healan, 2007), the online draft of Pinkard’s

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\(^1\) For example, the ‘shorter’ or ‘Encyclopaedia’ *Logic* was translated in 1873 (Hegel/Wallace, 2005); the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in 1892 (Hegel/Haldane, 1892).
translation (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008), which is soon to be published by CUP\(^2\), and the planned publication of Nicholas Walker’s translation for Routledge (Hegel/Walker, in preparation) certainly seems to present a challenge, in publishing terms, to the existing translations by A.J.Miller (Hegel/Miller, 1977) and Sir James Black Baillie (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931). The appearance of several new English translations of the same (notoriously difficult) work raises the apparently straightforward, descriptive question of how these translations differ from one another but also the more interesting question of why they differ from one another in the ways they do and what was at stake for the intrepid translators who undertook this daunting task. It should also be mentioned that the full translations of Hegel’s text are not the only examples of translatorial work surrounding Hegel and his philosophy, because they have been accompanied by a proliferation of secondary literature on Hegel in English, published through a range of electronic and print media, which can also be considered translatorial in a broader sense. However, the focus of the thesis is narrower; it considers just two of the translations, the first and one of the most recent. In methodological terms, the lexical analysis sections of the thesis provide a tomographic perspective, focusing on a thin lexical slice through these two translations in order to achieve a radical contextualisation of specific translatorial decisions.

The author of this thesis has more than twenty years’ professional experience of translating from German into English. This experience informs the primary thrust of the thesis which is to establish theoretical connections between the many small decisions required in any kind of translation and the vast uncertainty about how this translatorial work will be understood and used. The translator’s more or less professionalised anticipation of how the target text might be understood or misunderstood, and by whom, seems to be a significant component in the process of translation which lends itself to sociological investigation. This personal view of translation resonates with an often-cited reference to Bourdieu’s concept of ‘the subjective expectation of objective probability’ (Jenkins, 2002: 28). The thesis presented here is an interdisciplinary essay. It combines Bourdiesuan sociology with a simple numerical analysis of lexical patterning found in the TT corpora and an analysis of peritexts to the translations to investigate the relationship between translatorial decisions embodied in the two chosen translations of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the very different historical

\(^2\) Section 4.3 refers to the delay in the publication of this translation and the change of status from a single-translator work to a joint translation.
contexts in which they were made. In the sense of Bourdieu’s phrase, the translatorial decisions represent the translator’s subjective expectation, while the dynamics of the surrounding fields represent an objective social reality for the translator, one of whose tasks is to anticipate the probability of misunderstanding. This requires an attitude of self-reflexivity from the translator because, in the specific case under examination, the translators are also professional agents within the sub-field in question.

At the time the translations were made, both of the translators considered in the thesis were professors of philosophy with a considerable reputation as Hegel experts. In terms of the cultural capital associated with understanding Hegelian philosophy, they occupied a dominant position with regard to the majority of their readers. In fact, the intended readers of translations of canonical works of philosophy are always, in a sense, subordinate in their knowledge of the philosopher concerned to the translator. While there is a sense in which translators can, in general, be considered subservient (Simeoni, 1998) to the source text author and to other powers, such as the publishing companies and market forces, the philosopher-translators investigated in this thesis are also characterised by their dominant status in the specific cultural sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. At the same time, however, in spite of their high professional status and the relatively subordinate status of their potential readers, these translators must also have been aware of rival philosophies, rival professors of Hegelian philosophy and other critical voices occupying strong positions in the surrounding fields. Awareness of such a potential for professional criticism can be taken up by the translator as one of the several challenges presented by the task of translating Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. The thesis attempts to characterise this challenge-and-response situation in terms of the micro-dynamics of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy.

The ‘subjective expectation of objective probability’ also resonates with the content of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* which, after all, is about the subjective experience of consciousness and various historical attempts to objectify this subjective experience, or, to paraphrase the Greek quotation from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, which appeared on the

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3 The case of Arnold Miller, who translated several of Hegel’s works including the *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel/Miller, 1977), is somewhat different, because Miller was an amateur philosopher, not a professor, but rather a retired staff translator working in collaboration with people of different status in this sub-field. An analysis of Miller’s translatorial hexis is planned as a further research project.
title page of the first edition of Baillie’s translation in 1910, to ‘think about thinking’. The ‘dialectical ambiguity’ analysed in chapter 1 of this thesis describes the interplay between individual, ‘phenomenologically’ experienced instances and the universals which they instantiate. For example, the concept of my ‘mind’, as something which I experience subjectively, individually and personally, instantiates the objective probability of such a mind, of a plurality of such minds or of an overarching, all-embracing, universal mind. Hegel describes the dynamic, dialectical relationship between the individual and the universal in many different ways, but one of the most interesting and perplexing is the concept of ‘sublation’ which can be thought of as a kind of ‘translation’, a passage from one domain to another, involving change but preserving identity. The key lexical items, *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate], around which the lexical analysis sections of the thesis are based, are therefore not chosen arbitrarily but embody the central themes, relating to translation, philosophy and sociology, which will be elaborated throughout the thesis.

**Research Questions**

The thesis is structured around a set of research questions derived from the rationale described above. The subsequent questions raise specific details implied by the overarching, initial question.

How and why do the Baillie and Pinkard translations of Hegel’s *Phänomenology* differ in their translation of the ‘dialectically ambiguous’ terms *Geist* and *aufheben* and to what extent can such differences be theorised as an embodiment of translatorial *hexis*?

- What is the rhetorical and philosophical role of ‘dialectical ambiguity’ in Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and how does this present a challenge to translators?

- Are there any significant patterns in the Baillie and Pinkard translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* which support their theorisation as an embodiment of the translator’s *hexis*?

- To what extent is the translatorial *hexis* also embodied in the peritexts?
To what extent can the relationship between the translators’ *hexit* and the dynamics of the surrounding fields be described as reciprocal?

How does the concept of a translatorial *hexis* facilitate a radical contextualisation of multiple translations of the same work?

**Outline of Chapters**

Answers to these questions are elaborated throughout the five chapters of the thesis. Chapter 1 investigates a central obstacle to the understanding and translation of Hegel’s philosophy, which is referred to here as ‘dialectical ambiguity’; it is the sense that semantic uncertainty plays an active and deliberate part in Hegel’s methodology, his way of writing and thinking. Although perhaps not strictly ambiguous, many terms, including *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate], which are analysed with reference to lexical patterning later in the thesis, are sometimes used with different and even opposite meanings. To some extent, Hegel’s apparent pleasure in ambiguity is attributable to the background literary culture, of which German philosophy formed a part. This culture of wit and wordplay is examined in section 1.1. Section 1.2 analyses the philosophical context of Hegel’s language, with particular reference to dialectical ambiguity in subsection 1.2.1, and focusing on the key terms *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate] in subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 respectively. Baillie’s and Pinkard’s translations of every occurrence of these terms in the ST will be analysed in detail with reference to lexical patterning in chapters 3 and 4 in order to demonstrate how the translations differ in this respect and to address the question of why these differences are found. Section 1.3 briefly introduces Hegel’s *Phenomenology* as a textual embodiment of dialectical ambiguity, while section 1.4 contains an analysis of translations of a short paragraph from the text with regard to terminological consistency and word-level equivalence. While this level of analysis shows how the translations differ, it does not address the question regarding why the translators might have made the decisions they made. The need for an explanation of translatorial strategies provides the rationale for adopting a Bourdieusian theoretical framework in the remainder of the thesis in order to achieve a radical contextualisation of textual differences. Such a contextualisation with regard to the theoretical concept of a translatorial *hexis* provides a basis for understanding and reconstructing the reasoning behind the translatorial decisions under investigation.
Chapter 2 elaborates the theoretical concept of the translatorial hexis, which is derived from Bourdieusian sociology, and also explains the method for the study. Like the more familiar Bourdieusian term habitus, but narrower in focus, the translatorial hexis denotes a textual embodiment of a specific subset of translatorial dispositions which relate to the distribution of various forms of capital or honour within the cultural sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. By contrast with the ‘subservient’ translator’s habitus discussed by Simeoni (1998), the honour-seeking translatorial hexis theorised here expresses a dominant, professionalised stance towards the social practice of translation which, like Bourdieu’s use of the term hexis in his early ethnographic work (Bourdieu, 1977), is physically embodied, in this context, in the text and paratexts (Genette, 1997) of the translation, which accordingly reproduce the dynamics of the sub-field in which the translators worked. The theoretical framework for the thesis is established firstly, in section 2.1, by defining and orientating the translatorial hexis within the context of Bourdieusian approaches to translation studies. The appropriateness of this Bourdieusian approach is further justified in subsection 2.1.1 with reference to Bourdieu’s analysis of academic, specifically philosophical, language as a form of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1988; 1991a; 1991b). Section 2.2 outlines the method to be adopted in chapters 3 and 4 with reference to an analysis of fields, lexical patterning and paratexts. Subsection 2.2.1 elaborates a Bourdieusian approach to the historical sub-fields of Hegelian philosophy and political ideology which provide the background context for the production of the translations. Subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 explain respectively how lexical patterns and paratextual features of the translated texts embody the translatorial hexis as a pro-active, honour-seeking response to the honour-endowing micro-dynamics of the sub-field.

Chapter 3 applies the theoretical framework and methods elaborated in chapter 2 to Sir James Black Baillie’s translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931). Accordingly, section 3.1 analyses the historical background to the Baillie translation in terms of Bourdieusian field theory. Subsection 3.1.1 contextualises Baillie within the field of British Idealist philosophy with particular reference to the opposition between Absolutist and Personalist versions of idealism and significant historical changes in religious and political ideology, while subsection 3.1.2 provides a brief biographical and bibliographical profile of the translator. Section 3.2 analyses Baillie’s translations of Geist and aufheben as textual embodiments of the translatorial hexis, with specific reference to Geist in subsection 3.2.1 and aufheben in subsection 3.2.2.
Drawing on the work of Genette (1997), section 3.3 provides an analysis of the extensive peritexts to the 1931 edition of *The Phenomenology of Mind*, which also embody Baillie’s translatorial *hexit* at a more explicit level and further support the textual analysis.

Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework and methods described in chapter 2 to Pinkard’s online-draft translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008). Section 4.1 analyses the ideological and philosophical background to the Pinkard translation in terms of Bourdieusian field theory. Subsection 4.1 contextualises Pinkard within the field of contemporary political and legal philosophy with specific regard to the role of Hegelian philosophy in the development of a communitarian challenge to liberalism in subsection 4.1.1 and with regard to the opposition between non-metaphysical and metaphysical readings of Hegel in subsection 4.1.2. Subsections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 provide brief biographical and bibliographical profiles of the translator. Section 4.2 analyses Pinkard’s translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* as textual embodiments of his translatorial *hexit*, with specific reference to *Geist* in subsection 4.2.1 and *aufheben* in subsection 4.2.2. Section 4.3 provides an analysis of the peritexts to Pinkard’s translation of *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, which also embody Pinkard’s translatorial *hexit* of liberal-democratic circumspection.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by comparing the translatorial *hexit* embodied in the Baillie and Pinkard translations on the basis of the radical contextualisation offered in chapters 3 and 4. Subsection 5.1.1 addresses similarities in translatorial *hexit* between the Baillie and Pinkard translations, and subsection 5.1.2 considers differences. Section 5.2 contains a concluding discussion of the research questions, while section 5.3 provides a self-reflexive evaluation of the theoretical framework and methods used. Finally, section 5.4 presents a summary of conclusions and discusses the outlook for further research.
Chapter 1 Hegel’s ambiguity as a challenge to the translators

Chapter 1 argues that, since ambiguity is an inherent feature of Hegel’s language and philosophy and presents a challenge to translators and commentators, an adequate understanding of the differences between the translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* must be based on a careful analysis of how and why the translators responded to this challenge as they did. In particular, the analysis must embrace linguistic as well as historical and social factors relating to the translators. Such an analysis is provided in the remainder of the thesis; chapter 1 outlines the challenges presented by Hegel’s ambiguity. Hegel’s language is the German of the literary and philosophical culture of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the periods known as Weimar Classicism and German Romanticism (Sagarra and Skrine, 1997). As such, the language of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* embodies not only the literary preoccupation of the age with the paradox of identity-in-difference, sometimes described as *Witz* [wit] and *Humor* [humour] (Daverio, 1993), but also the social and political dynamics of Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution, during the Napoleonic wars and the gradual emergence of German nationalism. Hegel’s language is charged with ideological ambiguity which has either confused successive generations of interpreters or given them opportunities for appropriating Hegel’s philosophy to support a variety of standpoints and ideologies. For example, Hegel has been interpreted as arguing for conflicting, sometimes mutually exclusive positions, as a reactionary and/or a radical, as a conservative, right-Hegelian and/or as a progressive, left-Hegelian (White, 1975; Singer, 1983); such polarising interpretations have also been countered by a type of interpretation which argues for Hegel’s ideological neutrality (Stern, 2006). Many of the interpretations, on both sides as well as in the middle, go far into the ontological and epistemological ambiguities of Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the relationship between the universal and the particular; to discuss them in depth would exceed the scope of this thesis. The intention here is to provide sufficient detail to support the analysis of the translator’s handling of Hegel’s ‘dialectical ambiguity’ which will be defined in subsection 1.2.1.
Section 1.1 outlines the word-spinning literary culture which informed Hegel’s language and thought. Subsection 1.2 analyses the epistemological foundations for Hegel’s philosophical preoccupation with a specific kind of metaphysical ambiguity. Subsection 1.2.1 explains how the ambiguous sense of identity-in-difference found in literature of the time informs Hegel’s dialectical method. Subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 analyse respectively the ambiguity of Geist [mind/spirit] and aufheben [cancel/preserve/sublate] in preparation for the subsequent analysis of the translations of these terms in chapters 3 and 4. Subsection 1.3 orientates the Phänomenologie des Geistes within this historical context and provides a short comparison of translations of paragraph 177 from the Selbstbewußtsein [Self-consciousness] chapter of the book, with reference to the translational norms (Toury, 1978; Baker, 2011) of terminological consistency and word-level equivalence. This descriptive comparison supports the argument that a more nuanced contextualisation is required in order to explain, as well as merely describing, the differences and similarities between the translations.

1.1 A literary-philosophical culture of ambiguity, *Humor and Witz*

Ambiguity can be construed as a minor semantic or syntactic problem relating to the interpretation of individual words or the parsing of clauses; it can be taken as a linguistic expression of a universally experienced, existential or ontological phenomenon, or as a useful political tool, an opportunity to say one thing while meaning another (Baker, 2006: 107-109). Subsection 1.1 argues that the ambiguity associated with Hegel’s work (Stewart, 2008: 74-93) is attributable at least partly to the influence of literary fashion. Secondly, however, this literary sense of ambiguity is superimposed onto a post-Kantian, philosophical preoccupation with dualistic metaphysical oppositions: universal and individual; being and nothing, mind and nature, subject and object; and with the possibility of reconciling these oppositions. A third factor, which shapes present-day perceptions of Hegel’s ambiguity, arises from the cultural distance between Hegel and his modern readers, which possibly blurs the underlying ‘dialectical ambiguity’ into vagueness. A fourth consideration, which will also be explored in detail in chapters 3 and 4, is the inevitable semantic shifting which occurs when an ambiguous text is translated into another language. In spite of these difficulties, Hegel’s ambiguity does not necessarily act against his commitment to

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4 Stewart is only one of many commentators on Hegel’s ambiguity. This reference is particularly relevant because it focuses on the macro-structural ambiguity of the *Phenomenology*, that is, the ambiguity of the book as a whole.
rationality or against his readers’ ability to derive something valuable from his philosophy (Stern, 2006: 235-266). Accordingly, it is not necessary to sweep Hegel’s ambiguity under the carpet in order to defend his reputation as a philosopher. Especially in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the ambiguous style and structure of the book serve as pedagogical and rhetorical effects, challenging the reader (and the translator) to seek rational answers to the phenomenological problems it poses (Harris, 1995; Houlgate, 2005).

In a broad sense of the term, ambiguity (*Doppelsinnigkeit* or *Mehrdeutigkeit*) was almost a defining preoccupation of German literature and philosophy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It was based upon a kind of delight in paradox, incongruities and contradiction for their own sake and can be seen as part of a general trend towards synthesis of academic philosophy and poetic creativity described by Sagarra and Skrine:

> Synthesis was the guiding principle of German Romanticism, a cultural and intellectual movement which brought together poetry and philosophy, two disciplines which had made enormous strides during the preceding century, and it was appropriate that universities should be the meeting places of its leading minds and of the young men who were its foremost representatives. Without much experience of adult life, but endowed with extraordinary intuitive and creative gifts, the writers of this new post-Kantian age such as Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, sought to emphasise the universality of feeling and knowledge at a time when the political and social framework in which Germans had lived for centuries was falling apart.  
> (Sagarra and Skrine, 1997)

In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel uses double meanings in a philosophical but, at the same time, particularly creative way. Integrated alongside the humorous wordplay and dialectical analysis of epistemological fault-lines, there is also a mystical sense, which can be traced back from Hegel, via Schelling to Jakob Böhme (Magee, 2008: 253-280), that the German language contains precious, secret and therefore (possibly)  

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5 Hegel scholars emphatically reject the once-popular oversimplification of Hegel’s logic in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This triad of terms is more correctly associated with Kant (Inwood, 1992: 296f).
untranslatable (national-cultural) meanings. Hegel’s wordplay with *meinen* provides a well-known example (Hegel/Miller, 1977: 61). As a verb, *meinen* can be translated as *mean or think*, but (potentially ambiguously), as a possessive pronoun/adjective, it also translates as *my/mine*, so that in (Hegelian) German to mean something is (almost mystically) to make it my own.\(^6\) There are also many instances of alliteration and assonance, for example, playing on the voiced fricative in words such as *Bewußtsein* [consciousness], *Gewissheit* [certainty], *Wahrheit* [truth], *Wesen* [essence], *Wirklichkeit* [reality or actuality], *Wissenschaft* [science], which co-occur in close proximity throughout the book, suggesting poetically that these concepts are deeply related through the medium of the German language.\(^7\)

These examples share the kind of German wit [*Witz*] described by Friedrich Schlegel as ‘the power that allows us to posit connections between markedly contrasting entities’ (Daverio, 1993: 73). Daverio goes on to explain that *Witz* was also a key concept for the novelist Jean Paul Richter and poet/philosopher Novalis.\(^8\) For instance, Richter refers to wit as ‘a lightning flash’ and ‘electric charge’ (1959-1963: 197-199). For Novalis, ‘*Witz* is spiritual electricity’ (1960-1975: 621). The pun in German is that *Witz* [wit or joke] rhymes with *Blitz*, a lightning flash.\(^9\) Daverio also references Richter’s book on aesthetics, *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (1804/1813), in which Richter speaks of the special German humour, *Humor*, which ‘delights even in contradictions and impossibilities’ (Daverio, 1993: 74). The main activity of the humourist is said to involve setting the ‘small’ against the ‘infinite’. This resonates with Hegel’s metaphysical interest in juxtaposing the universal with the particular and the individual in the dialectical processes of logic (Inwood, 1992).\(^10\)

The relationship between wit and ambiguity is further underlined by Richter’s biographer, Günter de Bruyn, who cites a letter written by Richter to philosopher F.H.\(^6\) The phrase *ich meine es* [I think it] could thus also be read as *I mine it*, meaning *I make it mine*.\(^7\) In fact, the whole semantic field around the verb *wissen* (know) is exploited in a similar way throughout the book. *Bewusstsein* [consciousness]; *Gewissen* [conscience]; *Gewissheit* [certainty] and *Wissenschaft* [science] are accordingly played off against one another in a thought-provoking manner. Such features are, of course, particularly difficult to translate without lengthy explanations.

\(^6\) Novalis is the pen-name of Friedrich von Hardenberg.

\(^9\) This metaphorical relationship between static electricity and literary wit is surprisingly taken up in a recent contribution to linguistic theory described as ‘lexical priming’ (Hoey, 2005). Accordingly, words can be seen as the carriers of a kind of semantic charge, which they accumulate through use.

\(^10\) The ambiguity alluded to here has a political as well as a metaphysical dimension: every individual woman is also a particular exemplar of a type of human being and thus embodies the universal of humanity. In the drive to unite German speaking lands into a single nation, the claim that every (e.g.) Swabian is a German derives much of its energy from the metaphysics of parts and wholes.
Jacobi in 1802, in which Richter decries the ‘one-sidedness’ [Einseitigkeit] of literature (De Bruyn, 1991). Accordingly, the complex of ideas of doubling, duplicity and duplication, which is also associated with Romantic Irony, can easily be seen as a literary antidote to one-sidedness and dogmatism in the traditional, academic philosophy taught in German universities of the time (Pinkard, 2000: 45-118). Other colourful, cross-disciplinary examples further elucidate this point, such as the despairing cry of Goethe’s Faust: ‘Two souls live, alas, in my breast!’ (1962: 27). 11 The concept of a single, indivisible soul was a central concern in philosophy and theology from Descartes to Kant, yet Faust histrionically claims to have two souls within one body! Perhaps the most powerful, ideologically relevant example of this fashion, combining poetic alliteration with political metaphysics, is Schiller’s negative version of ‘All men are born free’: ‘Kein Mensch muss müssen!’ [literally but inaccurately: ‘no man must must’, but also translatable as ‘no rational human being is/ought to be subject to the deterministic laws of nature’] (Schiller, 2005). 12 The wit of Weimar Classicism and Jena Romanticism exercised a wide influence on the immediately following generation of German writers and philosophers. Given this literary-philosophical discourse of Schlegelian-Hegelian, word-spinning Witz, it is perhaps no surprise that Jean Paul Richter was impressed on reading Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes by its ‘clarity, style, freedom and force’ (Pinkard, 2000: 261). As these examples show, Hegel’s recourse to ambiguity and wordplay effectively translated a contemporary literary fashion into the new context of his distinctively German, or more specifically Jena, philosophical style.

1.2 The philosophical context of Hegel’s language

Section 1.2 offers a brief explanation for the association between the literary ambiguity referred to in section 1.1 and the tradition of post-Kantian philosophy within which Hegel worked. The third antimony from Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason] (1781) provides a useful starting point. 13 The third antimony juxtaposes freedom and deterministic nature as seemingly contradictory truths. It challenged and

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11 Part I of Faust was published in 1805, originally written in 1775 (in the version known as Urfaust). The translation of ‘Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust!’ is mine.
12 The Schiller quotation is taken from an essay ‘Über das Erhabene’ [On the Sublime] published in 1801. ‘All men are born free’ is a translation from Rousseau but reappears famously re-worked or translated as ‘all men are created equal’ by Thomas Jefferson in the American Declaration of Independence. The translations of Schiller are mine.
13 Stewart makes a similar point introducing his discussion of the Phenomenology as a ‘systematic fragment’ with reference to Kant’s first antimony (2008: 79).
inspired the witty generation of writers and thinkers whose literary and poetic preoccupation with ambiguity was analysed in section 1.1. The quotation below is shown as it appears in the Norman Kemp-Smith translation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis</th>
<th>Antithesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.</td>
<td>There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Kant, 1929: 409)

The antinomy maintains contradictorily or paradoxically that there is freedom and that there is no freedom. The metaphysical paradox suggests an ambiguous, dualistic metaphysical state which can be taken as both free and determined. Kant’s solution to the antinomy, namely that ‘as phenomena we are determined like the rest of nature, but as noumena we are free’ (Bowie, 2003: 30),14 failed to satisfy the generation of German Romantic and German Idealist philosophers and writers who succeeded Kant. However, the dialectical power of this logical and metaphysical challenge continued to resonate through their work, not least through their fascination with ambiguity and/or paradox, which offers the possibility of reconciling or at least expressing the irreconcilable in a symbolic or specifically linguistic manner.

Hegel’s answer to the logical dilemma posed by Kant’s antinomies pivots on the ontology of becoming rather than being, werden rather than sein. Head-on logical contradictions, such as those presented in Kant’s antinomies, can be overcome through the dynamic or dialectical development of the terms in the argument. One of several modes of becoming is described by Hegel with the verb aufheben, which can be translated literally as to ‘lift up’, but figuratively as to ‘cancel/annul/negate’ and also, ambiguously, as to ‘preserve’. In view of Hegel’s technical use of the word, it is often but not always translated as ‘sublate’, an English term which is used almost exclusively

14 Bowie’s Introduction to German Philosophy (2003) explains this section of Kant’s book and its importance for post-Kantian philosophy clearly. The translation is Bowie’s.
in the context of Hegelian philosophy. In the *Preface* to the *Phenomenology* (Hegel/Miller, 1977: 7), Hegel gives the example of the identity of an acorn with an oak tree, which can be used to explain the process of sublation in simple terms. The acorn possesses potential; the oak tree possesses actuality and history. The acorn is sublated in the oak tree. In one sense, or at one level, they are identical; in another sense or at another level, they are mutually exclusive. Man can become free only by coming to understand his apparently deterministic, phenomenal nature from the rational, philosophical perspective of absolute knowledge, which Hegel defines as *der sich als Geist wissende Geist* (Hegel, 1970: 591) [spirit knowing itself as spirit] (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 735). Hegel focuses on the crossing points between apparently mutually exclusive narratives, the transition, for example, between universal and particular. The dynamic concept of becoming connects irreconcilables through the action of the mind or spirit as it gradually comes to understand itself and the world more completely.

Hegel’s theory of becoming is elaborated more fully and more systematically in the *Science of Logic* (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010), which was first published in 1812, five years later than the *Phenomenology*. The logic described pivots on the ambiguous interdependence between being and not-being as the source of all epistemological determinacy, as explained by Houlgate:

> The determinacy we arrive at [in the early chapters of the *Science of Logic*] is thought simply by means of the bare ‘not’, by saying that what is, is what it is by virtue of the fact that it is not what it is not, that is, by saying that being lies in not-being... Hegel is not trying to throw thought into chaos through his account of determinacy. He is pointing to an important ambiguity in the most primitive concept of determinacy that thought can think…
> (Houlgate, 2005: 35)

Although Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* does not represent the full elaboration of his philosophical method, it presents a long, multiple narrative of social and scientific discovery and disappointment. It is characterised by a troubled and troubling sense of semantic indeterminacy, possibly inspired by Kant’s antinomies, and a sense that

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15 The translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* briefly contextualised here are discussed in considerably greater detail in subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 below.

16 Miller translates this as ‘The self-knowing Spirit’ (Hegel/Miller, 1977: 492)
familiar terms can turn out to have unexpected meanings. The literary-philosophical or rhetorical effect is similar to the popular narrative device used in novels and drama of the time, but particularly frustrating to modern readers who are not familiar with this device, when the true identity of one or more incognito characters is unexpectedly and dramatically revealed.\(^\text{17}\) By analogy, Hegel’s dialectical ambiguity creates and prolongs suspense, but it should also sharpen the reader’s attention to detail, in particular, to the special philosophical, or phenomenological way in which Hegel uses and develops the meanings of words towards the logical or rational goal of the concept \([\text{Begriff}]\). In later works such as the \textit{Science of Logic} (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010) and the \textit{Encyclopaedia Logic} (Hegel/Wallace, 2005), Hegel’s concept or ‘notion’, as it is sometimes translated, is the goal, towards which the philosophical system progresses.

\subsection*{1.2.1 Dialectical ambiguity as an intrinsic feature of Hegel’s language}

With specific reference to the ambiguity of Hegel’s language, Inwood explains, in the introduction to \textit{A Hegel Dictionary} (1992: 14), that ‘Hegel has no general interest in using a word in the same sense throughout his works or even in a single text’. In this general sense, therefore, many of Hegel’s terms can be expected to be ambiguous in that they may have more than one sense within the same text. Inwood also provides a detailed outline of reasons for Hegel’s special kind of ambiguity. Firstly, ‘a term must remain available for us in the senses in which past philosophers employed it’ (Inwood, 1992: 14-16). Secondly, Inwood explains that for Hegel, a philosopher must ‘watch words developing their own senses rather than arbitrarily declare that he (the philosopher) intends to use them in such and such a way’. This means that ‘Hegel begins by using a term in one or more of its already familiar senses and then develops his own sense or senses from it’. Inwood’s third point is that the ‘meaning of a word does not depend on the word alone, but on its place in a system of words that contrast with it’. Accordingly, the word ‘man’ derives its meaning from a range of contrasts with other words such as animal, woman, boy, officer or mouse. In Hegelian logic, even the word \textit{Sein} [being] changes its meaning as the system of logic evolves. The crucial contrast in Hegel’s \textit{Logic} is between being \([\text{Sein}]\), essence \([\text{Wesen}]\) and the concept \([\text{der Begriff}]\). In the \textit{Phenomenology}, Hegel contrasts \textit{being in itself} with \textit{being for itself} and

\footnote{\textsuperscript{17} For example, the end of Goethe’s \textit{Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre} [Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship] (1796).}
being in and for itself, three different moments of being which are determined by their negative relationship with one another.

According to Inwood’s account, the meanings of the words are determined by what they exclude. This explanation focuses only on systematic aspects of Hegel’s ambiguity and although it provides a useful framework, it underplays the sociality of language, the significance of Hegel’s stance within Hegel’s philosophical and ideological context, his defiance of the old tradition and his experimentation with language, and most importantly, his reasons for adopting this stance. Inwood rounds off his explanation of Hegel’s ambiguity with reference to three Hegelian doctrines which imply that the word changes its meaning as Hegel’s thought progresses. Firstly, in a proposition such as ‘God is being’ or ‘God is eternal’, the subject term (God) has no fixed meaning, but is assigned a meaning by the predicate term. The subject term thus ‘develops in meaning as we apply further predicates to it, or more generally, say more about it’. Secondly, Hegel’s thought usually ‘advances in triads, the third term of which is a restoration of the first on a higher level’. According to Inwood, ‘the same word is often used for the first and for the third term of a triad, in distinct, but systematically related senses’. For the reader, this usage would mean that it is not possible to determine which sense should be understood without understanding the systematic framework. For a translator, this presents the challenge of whether to attempt to communicate this kind of ambiguity or not, and more particularly of how to implement the decision in the target text. Thirdly, Inwood explains that ‘the universal specifies itself into the particular and the individual. Thus the universal appears both as the genus and as a species of that genus. Thus the same word is often used in both a generic and a specific sense’ (1992: 15). This third source of ambiguity in Hegel’s thinking is particularly relevant to the discussion of the ambiguity of Geist in subsection 1.2.2. The distinction between interpretations of Geist as a specific phenomenon, such as an individual mind, as a generic entity, such as the spirit of a community or as a universal, such as mind or spirit ‘as such’, is a recurring source of ambiguity throughout the Phänomenologie des Geistes and will play a significant part in the analysis of the translators’ practice. Through the manner in which they handle translation difficulties like Hegel’s dialectical ambiguity, the translators reveal something about their stance, that is, their particular understanding of the way Hegel is using these particular words in his particular context and how this can be translated into the translator’s own, very different context. The
concept of the translatorial *hexis* is developed in chapter 2 as a theoretical tool for analysing this phenomenon.

Subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 summarise Inwood’s etymological analysis of the ambiguity of *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate] in *A Hegel Dictionary* (1992), which contains the most detailed account of Hegel’s usage of individual terms in English. However, in spite of the apparently objective, dictionary-like format of the book, this approach does not provide unmediated access to Hegel’s thought; it represents a different kind of translation from a complete translation of the *Phenomenology*, but still exists within a socially determined space. Like Baillie and Pinkard, Inwood also occupies a position within this social space which could be analysed with regard to (translatorial) *hexis*. Inwood’s analysis is invaluable as an aid to understanding Hegel but should be supplemented with a broader consideration of the social dynamics of translation in the target culture. The analysis adopted in chapters 3 and 4 takes Inwood’s etymological analysis as a starting point for investigating the translators’ socially determined, textual and paratextual responses to the dialectical ambiguity of the terms *Geist* and *aufheben*.

**1.2.2 The ambiguity of *Geist* [mind/spirit]**

The German noun *der Geist* can be taken as ambiguous at many different levels, especially in translation. This is particularly evident even from the conflicting translations of the title of Hegel’s book: *Phenomenology of Mind* (Baillie, 1910/1931) versus *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Miller, 1977, Pinkard, 2008). The unique interest of Hegel’s use of the term *Geist* is that, in German also, it seems to encompass a range of meanings from ‘subjective *Geist*’, which is personal, particular and coextensive with the brain and/or its activity (i.e. approximately equivalent to normal, non-technical uses of the English word ‘mind’) to ‘objective *Geist*’ and ‘absolute *Geist*’. These latter terms are collective, generic and/or universal and, dependent upon the theological, philosophical or ideological position of the interpreter, can be thought of as coexistent with a universal ‘God’ or with some kind of ‘collective spirit’ of a community.

Inwood’s entry on ‘*Spirit*’ in *A Hegel Dictionary* (Inwood, 1992: 274-277) relates the term *Geist* to near synonyms in English (ghost, spirit, mind, soul, supernatural being), French (*esprit*), Latin (*spiritus*) and Greek (*pneuma, nous*). Inwood then provides a list
of ten dictionary-style ‘meanings’. The selection and ordering of these terms reflect Inwood’s own perspective. For example, the list begins with ‘the holy spirit’, which is followed by ‘spirit, demon or ghost’, while the ‘inner meaning’ of a law in contrast with the letter of the law’ comes close to the end of the list. Corresponding to the dialectically ambiguous senses referred to in section 1.2.1, the list also defines spirit (towards the end of the list) as ‘[m]ind, intellect, both in general and of an individual. In this sense, ‘mind’ is more appropriate than ‘spirit’, but the adjective geistig usually requires ‘spiritual’ rather than ‘mental’’ (Inwood, 1992: 274-277).

This first list is followed by a second list explaining Hegel’s special, technical uses of the term Geist developed throughout his philosophy, again, as understood and interpreted by Inwood. Inwood explains 9 different Hegelian uses of Geist making specific reference to Hegel’s later works. In this list, Inwood focusses on progressively more specific senses of Hegel’s Geist, moving from the general sense of ‘human mind’ in contrast with nature; to the ‘subjective spirit’, which covers ‘all individual psychological life’; to ‘objective spirit’, which is the ‘common spirit of a social group embodied in its customs, laws and institutions’ (Inwood, 1992: 274-277).

Following this second list, which also includes definitions of ‘absolute spirit’ and ‘world spirit’, Inwood explains that ‘Hegel views these not as distinct senses of Geist, but as systematically related phases in the development of a single Geist’. This progression of the phases of Geist forms the central narrative of the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Accordingly, a major focus in the thesis will be Hegel’s and the translators’ articulation of the various levels of semantic tension, indeterminacy and change existing between this complex diversity of meanings on the one hand and a putative, single meaning on the other. Inwood explains three special features of Geist, which make this progression of meanings possible:

a) it involves no underlying THING or substratum, but is pure activity;
b) it develops by stages into successively higher forms, primarily by reflection on its current stage; and

Inwood’s is clearly not the only list of dictionary meanings for spirit or Geist. The Langenscheidt Encyclopaedic German-English Dictionary (Springer, 1990), for example, lists 16 distinct entries for Geist, but these entries are not in the same order as Inwood’s list. It is interesting that even in this list of ‘meanings’, Inwood engages critically with distinctions between mind and spirit.
c) it takes over, both cognitively and practically, what is other than itself, nature as well as lower levels of Geist, and realises itself in them…

(Inwood, 1992: 276)

Regarding the divergent translations of Geist as mind or spirit, Inwood concludes the entry with the comment that the connotation of ‘mind’ cannot be wholly excluded from any of Hegel’s main uses of Geist, for three main reasons:

1) The uses of Geist are systematically related, and are so owing to the activity of Geist itself. But the paradigmatically active Geist is subjective Geist i.e. ‘mind’ as much as ‘spirit’,

2) The theological background of Hegel’s Geist suggests that it is a mind as well as a spirit.

3) He often personifies the Weltgeist: “the architect of this work of millennia is the one living Geist, whose thinking nature it is, to bring to consciousness what it is and, when this has become its OBJECT, to be at once already elevated above it and at a higher stage” (Enc. I §13).

(Inwood, 1992: 276)

In summary, Inwood’s entry on ‘Spirit’ supports the argument that Hegel’s Geist can be understood in many different senses and provides a valuable tool. While the polysemy or indeterminacy of Geist may not generally present any problems in German or in translation, the more specifically philosophical senses relating to the logical (categorial) distinctions between universality, particularity and individuality seem to rely on the presence of an adjectival qualifier, such as ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ in order to distinguish between logically divergent senses of Geist. Where Hegel provides such qualifiers there should be no problem in understanding which of the senses Hegel intends, and there should be no problem for the translator. However, where Hegel does not specify which sense of Geist is intended, there may be a problem, even for a German reader, in distinguishing Geist as individual from Geist as universal. This problem is defined in the present thesis as Hegel’s ‘dialectical ambiguity’ because it plays a part in the dynamic unfolding of Hegel’s argument; Hegel gradually reveals the relationship between universal, particular and individual and relies to some extent on the (initial) indeterminacy of the terms he uses. Moreover, this problem is compounded
by translation into English because of the distinction in conventional English usage between ‘mind’, which seems to match some of the ‘individual’ senses of Geist and ‘spirit’, which seems to match some of the ‘universal’ senses of Geist. In a very general sense, Inwood’s dictionary reinforces the confusion not only by suggesting a fixed relationship between words and meanings, but also through repeated reference to the spatial metaphor of ‘height’ suggesting that some forms of Geist are (metaphysically?) ‘higher’ than others (cf. especially section 3.2.1). The challenge posed to translators by Hegel’s dialectically ambiguous use of Geist combined with the existence of two English terms which approximately match the ambiguous senses of Geist is that it offers translators various options: to use mind consistently as the translation for Geist; to use spirit consistently (cf. chapter 4); to use both terms with different senses in an attempt to clarify Hegel’s meaning (cf. chapter 3); to use mind/spirit, as some Anglophone commentators and translators have done (Bowie, 2003; Hegel/Healan, 2007); to avoid the problem by retaining the German term Geist in translation (cf. the general acceptance of Heidegger’s German term Dasein [existence/being-there] in Anglophone philosophical discourse). As explained in greater detail in section 2.2.2, the translational problem is further complicated by the difference in use of the deictic with abstract nouns in German and English. The specific manner in which individual translators deal with the problem of Hegel’s dialectical ambiguity is theorised in this thesis as an indicator of their stance with regard to wider philosophical and ideological oppositions.

1.2.3 The ambiguity of aufheben [cancel/preserve/sublate]

Hegel’s ambiguous use of aufheben [sublate], which applies whether the word is used as a verb aufheben or a noun Aufheben or Aufhebung [sublation], is widely recognised and has been commented on by numerous writers.19 Hegel himself refers to the double meaning in the Phänomenologie des Geistes:

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19 For example, (Pinkard, 1994: 349-350; Beiser, 2009: 217; Westphal, 2009: 43-44)
113. The *sublation* exhibits its truly doubled meaning, something which we already have seen in the negative; it is now a *negating* and at the same time a *preserving*.

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008)²⁰

The historical usage of *aufheben* in the sense of *cancel* is investigated in the book chapter ‘Money of the Mind’ (Shell, 1993: 130-155), which explains the origin of this metaphor in the language of double-entry accounts, where *aufheben* was used for the ‘cancellation’ or ‘reduction to zero’ of a debit by a credit and vice versa. This metaphorical use was consciously taken up and used philosophically by Kant. However, Kant’s quantitative analogy was criticised by Hegel, who insisted on a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension. A further possible influence on Hegel’s use of the word derives from the philosopher Friedrich Schelling, who was a friend of Hegel at the *Tübinger Stift* [Tübingen Seminary]. Schelling used the term *aufheben* in his 1800 work *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* [System of Transcendental Idealism], primarily with the meaning of eliminating or resolving contradictions (Schelling, 1978):

… alle Widersprüche sind aufgehoben, alle Rätsel gelöst.
… all contradictions are eliminated, all riddles resolved.

(Schelling, 1978: 221) (Translation by Peter Heath)

It is widely acknowledged that Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* marked a departure from Schelling both in terms of personal friendship and philosophical approach, (Pinkard, 2000: 153-160, 259-165, 464; Bowie, 2003: 79-81). Accordingly, it is likely that Hegel’s exploitation of the ambiguity of *aufheben* was intended as a witty extension of the term beyond its usage by, for example, Kant and Schelling. In other words, Hegel exhibits, through his lexical choice and usage of *aufheben*, a subtly defiant stance or *hexis* with regard to the surrounding sub-field of rival philosophers. The concept of a translatorial *hexis* will be defined in chapter 2 and elaborated with reference to the translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* throughout the thesis. As in the case of *Geist*

²⁰The quotation is taken from Pinkard’s two-column, parallel-text translation and shows the paragraph numbering adopted in this translation.
discussed in section 1.2.2 above, Hegel’s uses of *aufheben* have already been analysed in detail by Inwood (1992).

Under the heading of ‘Sublation’, Inwood again provides an etymological analysis, which, in spite of its impartial, note-like appearance on the page, nevertheless interprets Hegel’s usage in a controversial manner (1992: 283-285):^21^

The verb *heben* is related to ‘heave’ and originally meant ‘to seize, grasp’, but now means ‘to lift, raise; to remove (especially an adversary from his saddle, hence) to supplant him; to remove (e.g. a difficulty, a contradiction)’. It enters many compounds, the most significant for Hegel being *aufheben* (‘sublate’). *Aufheben* has three main senses:

1. ‘to raise, to hold, lift up’.
2. ‘to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend’.
3. ‘to keep, save, preserve’.

(Inwood, 1992: 283)

Inwood asserts that usually ‘*aufheben* is used in only one of these senses on a given occasion’ but that ‘Hegel regularly uses *aufheben* in all three senses at once’. The entry on sublation continues with a brief discussion of the Latin verb *tollere*, which is also described as ambiguous, denoting ‘(1) to raise up and (2) to take up from its place, i.e. to destroy, remove’. *Tollere* has an irregular past participle *sublatus*, which provided the historical origin of the English verb *sublate*. Inwood explains that it was used by Sir William Hamilton for ‘to deny, contradict, disaffirm (a proposition), in contrast to posit’. This is the sense in which Schelling uses *aufheben* in the passage cited above. The term *sublate* was then used by James Hutchinson Stirling in *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), the first book on Hegel published in English. This specialist philosophical use possibly appealed to philosophers because of the technical distinction between the two major types of syllogism in traditional logic, the positive *modus ponens* (all men are mortal …) and the negative *modus tollens* (no men are immortal…). The word *sublate* is therefore strongly associated with the semantic field of philosophical logic, especially

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^21^ Inwood’s three meanings are contested by Pinkard (2011) who explains that Hegel actually only ever intends meanings (2) and (3) from Inwood’s list. Inwood therefore controversially prioritises the meaning which Pinkard denies, namely the sense of elevation or raising up. This issue is taken up in section 4.2.
with the negative *modus tollens* syllogism. As a translation of *aufheben, sublate* thus technicalises the German metaphor.

Hegel’s ambiguous uses of *aufheben* are also significant in ideological terms. This aspect will be analysed in detail with regard to the Baillie and Pinkard translations. In brief, the distinction between conservative and progressive ideologies depends to a considerable extent on whether an existing social, economic or political order is construed as having to be destroyed or abolished in order to achieve progress, as in radicalism; or whether priority is given to gradual reform or to the preservation of social, economic and political orders, as in conservatism (White, 1975; Freeden, 2003). For radical and conservative philosophers and readers of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, it is significant whether Hegel repeatedly recommends the need to abolish and destroy or whether his emphasis is consistently on the preservation of that which is superseded in a higher, sublated form. The extent to which translators and/or commentators seek to influence the interpretation of Hegel’s ambiguity in this respect is also significant and will be addressed in chapters 3 and 4 in greater detail.

While *A Hegel Dictionary* (Inwood, 1992) addresses Hegel’s ambiguous and difficult language through etymological analysis, providing, as it were, an extended set of critical footnotes which can be used alongside a translation of any of Hegel’s works, the translators of a specific work such as the *Phenomenology* were faced with the somewhat different problem of providing a readable translation. This raises the intractable question of precisely what such a translation is supposed, by its originator (the translator/s) and by its potential readers, to achieve. Faced with this task, the translator adopts a stance or *hexit* which combines such complex considerations in a translatorial strategy. The analysis of translations of particularly difficult, dialectically ambiguous terms such as *Geist* and *aufheben* should thus provide a good insight into the translatorial *hexit*. 
1.3 Hegel’s *Phenomenology* as an embodiment of dialectical ambiguity

Hegel’s *Phenomenology* provides a unique speculative and critical analysis of various conceptions of consciousness. It is not therefore simply about what consciousness is but also about what different people, from different ages and different cultures, have taken consciousness to be. The book is divided into chapters of different lengths as shown in Figure 1.1 below. The horizontal distances in Figure 1.1 represent the approximate number of words (tokens) in each chapter based on word counts from the Gutenberg Project electronic version of the German source text (Hegel, 2004). The subdivisions of the book are the Vorrede [Preface] and Einleitung [Introduction], followed by six chapters: Bewusstsein [Consciousness] Selbstbewusstsein [Self-Consciousness], Vernunft [Reason], Der Geist [Spirit], Die Religion [Religion] and Das absolute Wissen [Absolute Knowing]. Hegel’s approach throughout the book is to demonstrate the shortcomings or internal collapse of various conceptions of consciousness, which are more or less overtly associated with historical periods and individual thinkers, by subjecting them to a special form of dialectic (Stern, 2002: 15-16). For example, the idea that knowledge of the world is gained exclusively through observation is shown to fail in its own terms; the decline of ancient Greek and Roman civilizations is explained with reference to internal fault-lines in the conceptions of ethical consciousness underlying these cultures. Various world religions and phases of Christianity are subjected to the same kind of dialectical analysis. In spite of the apparent negativity of this critical procedure, there appears to be a positive, hierarchical progression through the book from Consciousness to Absolute Knowledge. Less adequate forms of consciousness give way to more refined, self-conscious forms of reason, spirit [Geist] and ultimately absolute knowledge, according to the dialectical, logical processes of ‘determinate negation’ (Bowie, 2003: 85), which include sublation [aufheben].

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22 The contents pages provide an overview of the macro-structure of the book. Several recent introductory books summarise the content of each section in turn (Stern, 2002; Westphal, 2009).

23 The translations here are taken from the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977) which agrees with the Pinkard translation (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) in most respects. The Vernunft chapter in the Baillie translation was provided with an extra heading ‘FREE CONCRETE MIND’ with ‘REASON’ as a sub-heading, and the last chapter is headed ‘ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE’ (See section 3.3 for further discussion). Pinkard also uses the chapter title Absolute Knowledge.
As Figure 1.1 shows, the main body of the book is contained in the two longer chapters *Reason* and *Spirit*. The *Preface* and *Introduction* have not been included in the corpora used in chapters 3 and 4.

The philosophical relevance of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* can be seen in the way the book articulates the logical connection between ontological and epistemological presuppositions or misconceptions and actual historical events. Hegel’s book was written in Germany in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Alongside its preoccupation with ontological and epistemological questions, the book also investigates literary and historical examples, such as the role of women in ancient Greek society as portrayed in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, stoicism and the decline of the Roman Empire, the atheism of the Age of Enlightenment and the collapse of French Aristocracy. These essentially ethical questions resonated strongly with the ideological concerns of late-Victorian, British Idealist philosophers but there has been a second revival of interest in Hegel dating from the mid-1970s which continues to grow in strength (Pinkard, 2007). Throughout the reception history of the *Phenomenology*, especially in the Anglophone world, Hegel’s treatment of the issues in question has been associated with strongly conflicting and often incorrect interpretations of Hegel’s own position (Stewart, 1996: 1-16).
Even the title of Hegel’s book, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, alludes indirectly to the dialectical challenge posed by Kant’s dualism. It foregrounds the word *Geist* [mind/spirit]. The term *Geist* was historically associated with the mystical, theosophical philosophy of Jakob Böhme (1575-1624) and with Fichte’s German nationalism (Inwood, 1992; Bowie, 2003: 68-71); it was used less prominently by Friedrich Schelling, for example, in discussing the identity of nature with *Geist* [mind/spirit] (Frank, 1995: 118) but hardly used at all by Kant (Inwood, 1992: 274). By linking *Geist* with *Phänomenologie*, Hegel’s title raises the question of whether *Geist* as mind and/or spirit is noumenal or phenomenal; whether *Geist*, whatever it is, ever has been or ever can be free and, if so, in which of the several possible senses of *Geist*? Does the phenomenology of *Geist* – that is, the suggestion that *Geist* can be described and discussed as a phenomenon, as something in the experienced world – necessarily (in view of Kant’s resolution of the third antinomy) preclude it from (Kant’s sense of) freedom? The title of Hegel’s book itself is therefore powerfully, metaphysically ambiguous; it controversially suggests that the noumenal realm (the ‘thing in itself’) can be experienced phenomenologically.

The *Phenomenology* embodies dialectical ambiguity and a more general sense of incongruity or fragmentariness at many different levels of analysis. In addition to the ambiguity of individual words, for example, the whole text has been construed as ambiguous. Stewart (2008: 81) explains that early commentators, such as Rudolf Haym (in 1857) had noted a discrepancy between a ‘psychological-transcendental’ approach in the first part of the book and a ‘historical’ tendency in the second half of the book. In a similar vein, Theodor Haering (in 1933) identified a distinction between Hegel’s account of the ‘experience of consciousness’ in the first part of the book up to and including the Reason chapter; while the later part of the book from the Spirit chapter onwards was devoted to an account of the development of forms of spirit in the sense of a group consciousness. Ultimately, Stewart rejects the accusation of ambiguity, at least in the sense that it is a weakness or fault in Hegel’s philosophical method:

Speculative philosophy involves examining the whole universe of thought, which invariably involves contradictions. Instead of insisting on one side of a

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24 As will be discussed in chapter 3, Baillie’s translation approximately allocates the terms *mind* and *spirit* to the first and second parts of the book. This allocation possibly reflects the influence of Haym’s analysis.
contradiction or the other or stopping once a contradiction has been reached, it observes the dynamic movement in pairs of opposites and looks beyond the immediate contradictory terms towards a higher truth that arises from the dialectical development of the contradiction.

(Stewart, 2008: 80)

Once again, therefore, the (apparent) ambiguity of Hegel’s language and thought is portrayed as integral to his dialectical purpose. The type of philosophising Hegel seeks to encourage requires the reader to confront ambiguity and contradiction in specific ways in order to reconcile the apparent opposites. Any third-party explanation, for example, by a commentator or particularly by a translator, in a sense intrudes into the relationship which Hegel is trying to set up, for example, through his use of dialectical ambiguity, between himself and the reader. The need to preserve Hegel’s dialectical sense of ambiguity is a serious challenge to commentators and translators. This further justifies a concentration on the translators’ handling of the ambiguous terms Geist and aufheben as an indicator of their translatorial stance or hexas.

1.4 Beyond equivalence and consistency

Section 1.4 provides an analysis of three translations of paragraph 177 from the Self-consciousness chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology. The comparison considers the German ST and three English language versions by Baillie (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931), Miller (Hegel/Miller, 1977) and Pinkard (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008), and is based on the translational norms of terminological consistency and word-level equivalence which have played a controversial role in translation studies (Baker, 2011; Kenny, 2011; Saldanha, 2011). The intention here is to point the way beyond an exclusive preoccupation with terminological consistency and interlingual equivalence at the level of individual words towards a radical contextualisation, which seems not only appropriate but necessary for a comparison of an ideologically ambiguous philosophical text, such as Hegel’s Phenomenology. Paragraph 177 contains the first occurrence of the term Geist in the six main chapters of the book which form the corpus under analysis.25

For readers unfamiliar with German, it should be pointed out that all nouns are

25 The paragraph numbering does not appear in the source text; it was introduced in the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977) and is also used in the two-column, parallel translation by Pinkard.
capitalised in German. The italicisation used for emphasis in Hegel’s original text is also relevant to the discussion below.

Es ist ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein. Erst hiedurch ist es in der Tat; denn erst hierin wird für es die Einheit seiner selbst in seinem Anderssein; Ich, das der Gegenstand seines Begriffs ist, ist in der Tat nicht Gegenstand; der Gegenstand der Begierde aber ist nur selbständig, denn er ist die allgemeine unvertilgbare Substanz, das flüssige sichselbstgleiche Wesen. Indem ein Selbstbewußtsein der Gegenstand ist, ist er ebensowohl ich wie Gegenstand. - Hiemit ist schon der Begriff des Geistes für uns vorhanden. Was für das Bewußtsein weiter wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist, diese absolute Substanz, welche in der vollkommenen Freiheit und Selbständigkeit ihres Gegensatzes, nämlich verschiedener für sich seiender Selbstbewußtsein[e], die Einheit derselben ist; Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist. Das Bewußtsein hat erst in dem Selbstbewußtsein, als dem Begriffe des Geistes, seinen Wendungspunkt, auf dem es aus dem farbigen Scheine des sinnlichen Diesseits, und aus der leeren Nacht des übersinnlichen Jenseits in den geistigen Tag der Gegenwart einschreitet.
(Hegel, 1807/1970: 144-145)

The next quotation is taken from the second edition of the Baillie translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931):

A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not “object”. The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we”, a plurality of Egos, and “we” that is a single Ego. Consciousness first finds in self-
consciousness — the notion of mind — its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-
coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the
transcendental and remote super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of
the present.
(Baillie, 1931: 104)

Even for readers unfamiliar with German, it is evident from a comparison between ST
and TT that Baillie does not adhere to Hegel’s italicisation; Baillie also capitalises
certain words for emphasis, such as *Ego, Mind* and *Spirit*. Baillie uses quotation marks
for emphasis. It may also be noticed that Baillie inconsistently spells the same word
with and without an initial capital, e.g. *ego, mind*. With some knowledge of German, it
is also evident that Baillie expands the number of words used to translate some German
terms, e.g. *Erst hierdurch* becomes *Only so and only then*; *des übersinnlichen Jenseits*
becomes *of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous*. This kind of comparison
between ST and TT could be used to justify a claim that Baillie’s translation is
inconsistent and would achieve a low score in terms of word-for-word equivalence.
These findings could also be used as a basis for comparing Baillie’s translation with the
other translations; however, as will be shown in chapter 3, such a comparison would be
based on an inappropriate and inadequate understanding of Baillie’s work and indeed of
the complexities involved in translating philosophy. The style or manner in which
Baillie translates embodies a complex set of linguistic, philosophical and social
priorities which can only be explained with reference to contextual factors.

The next quotation is from the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977) which currently
represents the standard translation for most Anglophone philosophy teaching and is
widely quoted in secondary literature in English (Stern, 2002; Houlgate, 2005;
Westphal, 2009).

177. A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact
self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness
become explicit for it. The ‘I’ which is the object of its Notion is in fact not
‘object’; the object of Desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal
indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical essence. A self-consciousness, in
being an object, is just as much as ‘I’ as ‘object’. With this, we already have
before us the Notion of *Spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the
experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.

(Miller, 1977: 110-111)

Once again, even without a knowledge of German, it is evident that Miller’s translation of this paragraph scores higher than Baillie’s in terms of terminological consistency (e.g. Geist = Spirit) and in terms of word-for-word equivalence (Erst hierdurch = Only so); however, there are still inconsistencies and deviations with regard to equivalence, for example, Miller italicises only the second self-consciousness in the first line but not the first; Miller also uses initial capitals for emphasis or to indicate a special usage of terms like Desire, Notion and Spirit. It is tempting to speculate that Miller revised or corrected Baillie’s translation in order to increase consistency and word-level equivalence (cf. Baillie and Miller: With this, we already have before us...). In his translator’s note, Miller explains, ‘I have done my best to steer a course which, avoiding loose paraphrase, departs at times from a rigid consistency in rendering Hegelian locutions where this seemed to be more helpful to the reader’ (Hegel/Miller, 1977: xxxi). In spite of its greater consistency and word-level equivalence, Miller’s translation thus evidently also has other priorities, such as foregrounding Hegel’s technical usage of terms like Desire, Notion and Spirit; Miller also seeks to emphasise and to explain, for example, through his use of quotation marks with ‘I’ and ‘We’. Such minor textual details thus serve as objective indicators for Miller’s approach to the translation; they provide an objective basis for differentiation between the Baillie and Miller translation, but they do not supply an explanation for the translatorial strategy.

The final example is taken from the 2008 online-draft version of Pinkard’s translation (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008).

177. A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only thereby does self-consciousness in fact exist, for it is only therein that the unity of itself in its otherness comes to be for it. The I, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not
an object. However, the object of desire is merely self-sufficient, for it is the universal, indestructible substance, the fluid essence in-parity-with-itself. Because a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much an I as it is an object.

– The concept of spirit is thereby on hand for us. What will later come to be for consciousness will be the experience of what spirit is, that is, this absolute substance which constitutes the unity of its oppositions in their complete freedom and self-sufficiency, namely, in the oppositions of the various self-consciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we and the we that is I. As the concept of spirit, consciousness first reaches its turning point in self-consciousness, where it leaves behind the colorful semblance of the sensuous world and the empty night of the supersensible other-worldly beyond and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present.

(Pinkard, 2009: 163-164)

A comparison between Pinkard’s translation of this paragraph and the German ST shows that a high degree of consistency and word-level equivalence has been achieved. Pinkard’s provision of a glossary of terms accompanying his translation further confirms that emphasis has been placed on the norm of terminological consistency. Even without knowledge of German, the accurate match between ST and TT italicisation is evident; the complete absence of capitalisation for additional emphasis or elucidation also matches the ST.

To some extent at least, this comparison based on consistency and equivalence does provide a partial answer to the research question. It does illustrate how the translations differ from one another with fairly close reference to the text. However, this approach contributes nothing to our understanding of why the translators made the translatorial decisions embodied in the text; on the contrary, it tends rather to mask the other, more complex priorities involved in the translation of philosophy, not least, in this case, the translators’ handling of ambiguous terms like Geist. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, Baillie’s translation of this first occurrence of Geist in paragraph 177 as Mind or Spirit is not an instance of inconsistency or indecision; Pinkard’s choice of spirit is not a simple lexical choice but embodies the translator’s engagement with Hegel’s philosophy, especially with the changing uses of Hegelian terminology within the philosophical communities in which the translator works.
An adequate understanding of the issues involved in comparing these translations requires a considerably more radical contextualisation of the minutiae of the specific translations than is offered, for example, in *A Hegel Dictionary* (Inwood, 1992). The Bourdieusian approach adopted in chapter 2 achieves a radical contextualisation by analysing textual and paratextual details of the translations as the products of active social agents participating linguistically and intellectually in specific philosophical and ideological sub-fields in which their translations of Hegel play a complex but historically determinate role. In particular, the Bourdieusian approach seeks to answer the question of why the translators made the translatorial decisions embodied in the text, for example, why it has become increasingly important for Pinkard to score high marks in terms of consistency and word-level equivalence even at the cost of other priorities. The concept of a translatorial *hexis* developed in chapter 2 provides a theoretical tool for this investigation.

### 1.5 Summary

Chapter 1 has shown that while Hegel wrote at a time when literature and philosophy were not clearly distinct from one another and when wordplay in general and ambiguity or double meanings in particular were fashionable, not least because of their association with philosophy, there is a specifically philosophical or dialectical sense in which ambiguity plays a part in Hegel’s philosophical style. The dialectical ambiguity of *Geist* relates to the possibility of taking the term either as an individual or as a universal. The dialectical ambiguity of *aufheben* relates to the manner in which the process it denotes articulates the transition between individuality and universality either as a simple negation or as a more nuanced sense of negation together with preservation; added to this is a sense of upward movement through a hierarchy of forms, so that higher forms subsume and supersede lower forms, thereby achieving this sense of negation combined with preservation. While the literary and rhetorical fascination with ambiguity was seen to play on intrinsic features of the German language making puns such as Hegel’s wordplay with ‘*meinen*’ difficult to translate, the dialectical ambiguities were, in a sense, made more difficult to translate into English because of the possibility of matching, for example, perceived senses of the German *Geist* with the English terms *mind* and/or *spirit*, thereby possibly interfering with Hegel’s strategy to a significant or confusing extent. The potential translation difficulty presented by Hegel’s dialectical ambiguity was suggested as an indicator for describing the translatorial strategies
adopted in dealing with the problem, which could and would be analysed in greater detail. Finally, in subsection 1.4, a comparative analysis of three translations of the same paragraph from Hegel’s *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* was used to argue that while a comparison with reference to terminological consistency and word-level equivalence can show how the translations differ, it provides no insights regarding why the translators might have adopted the translatorial strategies they chose; for this, a more radical contextualisation, as provided in the following chapters, would be required.
Chapter 2  Bourdieu’s theory of \emph{hexis} as a basis for textual and paratextual analysis

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework for analysing data on the individual translations and translators in the subsequent chapters. The framework is based on Bourdieusian theory and develops Bourdieu’s concept of \emph{hexis} as a theoretical tool for investigating and comparing the translators’ positioning or stance within the sub-field of philosophy and the associated, wider field of political ideology. The concept of translatorial \emph{hexis} developed in the thesis is closely related to Bourdieu’s habitus but differs in its focus on textual and paratextual details of the translated text and through the translator’s honour-seeking stance which it embodies. Ultimately, the translators seek to share the honour which Hegel enjoys as a result of their work. With regard to the research questions which the thesis addresses, it is argued that such an adaptation of Bourdieu’s theory of \emph{hexis} provides a useful conceptual tool because it postulates a reciprocal relationship between text and ideological context which requires explanation and thus encourages a ‘radical contextualisation’ (Johnson, 1993: 9) of microscopic translatorial decisions which are seen as embedded in the micro-dynamics of the sub-field. The concept of translatorial \emph{hexis} will be applied in the analysis and comparison of selected data from the Baillie and Pinkard translations of Hegel’s \emph{Phenomenology} in chapters 3 and 4.

The interdisciplinary approach developed in chapter 2 combines insights from the tradition of linguistic criticism (Halliday, 1964; Fowler, 1996; Hoey, 2005) with a Bourdieusian approach to literature and translation studies (Simeoni, 1998; Lahire, 2003; Gouanvic, 2005; Inghilleri, 2005; Parker, 2009; Pasmatzi, 2012) in an investigation of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. With reference to Bourdieu’s key concepts of habitus, capital and field (Johnson, 1993; Jenkins, 2002), it is argued that the lexical and grammatical patterning found in the translations of the selected, dialectically ambiguous terms, and certain aspects of the paratexts (Genette, 1997) embody a translatorial stance or \emph{hexis} which combines divergent dispositions of each philosopher-translator’s multiple habitus in a pro-active or dominant, honour-seeking gesture in the face of challenges identifiable in the micro-dynamics of the field. The Bourdieusian concept of \emph{hexis}, introduced in \emph{Outline of a Theory of Practice},
(1977) is therefore adapted here to theorise the translator’s more or less unconscious desire for recognition, honour, distinction and legitimacy within the academic and associated fields. Developing Bourdieu’s original concept but still remaining within the overall Bourdieusian framework, it will be argued that, especially in the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, the translator’s *hexis* is articulated symbolically through ‘infinitesimal’ (Bourdieu, 1991a: 83) but nevertheless significant features of the text and the paratext.

Bourdieusian theory is particularly appropriate to the philosophical subject matter of the present thesis because of Bourdieu’s discussions of the academic field and philosophical language, for example, in *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu, 1988), *Language and Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu, 1991b) and *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Bourdieu, 1991a) which also prompt a self-reflexive approach (Bourdieu, 1992) to collecting and analysing the data for this thesis. In particular, Bourdieu’s later work suggests that the study of (objective) data, for example, from the translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, should always be broadened to keep in mind a self-reflexive focus on the researcher’s ‘struggle’ to further her/his respective professional trajectory by enhancing her/his capital internally within the academy and externally in the adjacent fields of economic and political power (Bourdieu, 1988: 95-99), primarily through qualifications and publications. With this self-reflexivity in mind, one focus of the study is therefore on the role of academic language in (re)-establishing (or undermining) the legitimacy of philosophical discourse and especially discourse about philosophy by non-philosophers, with particular reference to the phenomena of ‘ordinary language’ (Bourdieu, 1991a: 73), ‘symbolic violence’ and ‘bad faith’ (Bourdieu, 1988: 114), the ‘elevated style’ (Bourdieu, 1991a: 73 and 88) and ‘euphemism’ (Bourdieu, 1991a: 152). The analysis of academic language plays a significant part in what Bourdieu refers to as the ‘conflict of the faculties’ (Bourdieu, 1988: 37-72), a conflict between academic disciplines, on the one hand, with a politically significant, social impact and, on the other hand, disciplines ostensibly concerned with politically less relevant, ‘pure’ subject matter.²⁶

²⁶ In scientific disciplines, an analogous distinction is sometimes made between ‘blue-sky research’ and research associated with technological, industrial and commercial applications. In philosophy, the terms ‘pure’ and ‘practical’ relate specifically to Kant’s first and second critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Accordingly, ethical, social and political matters are dealt with under the heading of ‘practical’ philosophy, which is kept distinct from ‘pure’ branches such as logic, metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. The title of Hegel’s book *The Phenomenology of Mind* (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) or *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel/Miller, 1977 and Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) challenges this distinction by suggesting an empirical study (phenomenology) of a putatively noumenal entity or ‘thing in itself’, Geist [mind/spirit].
philosophy has always straddled this divide (Singer, 1983; Pinkard, 2000), and the possibility of taking Hegel as more or less politically and socially relevant constitutes an important factor in the underlying ambiguity of his work and the many interpretations of that work. Subtleties of language in translations and secondary literature on Hegel are used to re-position or re-frame the text on one side of the ambiguity or the other.\footnote{Although the present analysis is couched in terms of Bourdieusian \textit{hexis}, the parallels with narrative theory, especially the concepts of ‘frame ambiguity’ and ‘frame space’ in the context of translation and conflict (Baker, 2006: 105 ff.) provide an alternative theoretical approach to this issue. The Bourdieusian approach is justified because of Bourdieu’s specific interest in the conflicts surrounding the changing roles of philosophy and sociology in the academic field.} In a sense, therefore, the Bourdieusian theoretical framework offers an appropriate conceptual tool for challenging the (hermetic) autonomy of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy and opening up this important sub-field for interdisciplinary discussion by drawing attention to its dependence on translation.

\section*{2.1 Bourdieu, habitus and the concept of translatorial \textit{hexis}}

A key publication drawing together previous research on Bourdieusian theory in the discipline of Translation Studies was the special issue of \textit{The Translator} (2005).\footnote{The wider context of sociological approaches to translation studies including those relating to Bourdieu has since been analysed in (Wolf, 2007).} In the introductory article, Inghilleri (2005) notes that increased interest in Bourdieu and other sociologists reflects a general trend away from an exclusive focus on textual products of translation ‘toward a view of translation and interpreting as social, cultural and political acts’ (ibid: 125). Inghilleri explains:

\begin{quote}
Bourdieu’s work has also made a significant contribution to attempts within translation studies to focus more attention on translators and interpreters themselves - to analyse critically their role as social and cultural agents actively participating in the production and reproduction of textual and discursive practices. In particular, Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, capital and illusio have made a valuable and unique contribution to the theorisation of the interaction between agency and structure… (ibid: 126)
\end{quote}

In theoretical terms, the elaboration throughout Bourdieu’s work of the concepts of habitus, field, capital and illusio mentioned here by Inghilleri represents a method ‘by
which to challenge the persistent dualism within the social sciences between subject and object’. (ibid: 129). Bourdieu’s approach to the subject-object dichotomy is valuable not because of its novelty – many philosophers and sociologists have addressed the same issue – but because it provides a novel vocabulary and set of conceptual tools with which to analyse intransigent philosophical antinomies in a broader context of social significance. Like Hegel’s *Geist*, Bourdieu’s habitus is a deliberately elusive, insubstantial term which illustrates the almost paradoxical interdependence between individual, human self-consciousness and the wider social context or field. Unlike Hegel, Bourdieu generated his descriptive vocabulary and especially his sense of self-reflexivity – the researcher’s awareness of her/his own part in the accumulation of apparently objective data – on the basis of detailed empirical, ethnographic field work (Bourdieu, 1964; Bourdieu, 1977; Jenkins, 2002; Bourdieu, 2012). In practice, Bourdieu’s approach encourages a research methodology which moves back and forth between the empirical and the theoretical in a self-critical and self-reflexive manner.

Accordingly, while Inghilleri (2005: 125) stresses the importance of moving forward from an exclusive concentration on the textual products of translation ‘toward a view of translation and interpreting as social, cultural and political acts’ (ibid. 125), this does not preclude the possibility of moving back again to consider linguistic details of the textual products of translation as firmly situated within a view of translation and interpreting as social and cultural acts. The present thesis exploits Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, especially the empirically derived concept of *hexis*, to accomplish just this move back into the detail of the text with an analysis of the translators’ (and other agents’) handling of Hegel’s uniquely dynamic, dialectical use of ambiguity, and then outwards from the text again, via the paratexts, to the wider social context.

The concept of *hexis* is closely related to the more familiar Bourdieusian term habitus and is introduced here with reference to this central concept. Some introductory texts present *hexis* and habitus and near synonyms (Jenkins, 2002: 75), explaining that Bourdieu developed his term habitus from the term *hexis* introduced into ethnography

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29 This central concern of contemporary sociology exhibits a homology with its own historical origins in German Idealism, especially with Hegel’s dialectically ambiguous treatment of *Geist* which encompasses subjective, psychological aspects, translatable in terms of ‘mind’ and ‘mindedness’, as well as objective, social aspects associated with mutual recognition and translatable in terms of ‘spirit’, either as a social phenomenon or as a (sometimes capitalised) metaphysical essence.
by Marcel Mauss (1973). A succinct definition of habitus in English, which was scrutinised and approved by Bourdieu himself, is to be found in Collier’s translation of *Homo Academicus*: ‘Habitus: a system of shared social dispositions and cognitive structures which generates perceptions, appreciations and actions’ (Bourdieu, 1988: 279). The most striking feature of this definition is that it avoids linking ‘perceptions, appreciations and actions’ with any kind of individual agent or self. This is surprising because perceptions, appreciations and actions are conventionally, especially within the ‘dualistic’ Western philosophical tradition associated with Descartes and Kant, strongly linked with the notion of an autonomous self which is capable of making independent judgements (appreciations) and responsible for its own actions. The habitus blurs this distinction by associating perceptions, appreciations and actions with a ‘system of shared dispositions and cognitive structures’. Accordingly, in this brief definition of the habitus, Bourdieu opens the door to an at least partially deterministic model of the individual. It is not clearly stated in the definition that all perceptions, appreciations and actions are generated exclusively from shared social dispositions and cognitive structures; the important point is that perceptions, appreciations and actions cannot be adequately understood without taking into consideration the inextricable involvement of the apparently independent agent or self in a network of shared social dispositions and cognitive structures of which the apparently independent agent or self may be more or less unaware. From a methodological point of view, the concept of the habitus shifts the focus of sociological research away from the apparently objective observation of autonomously acting individuals (subjects) and towards the ‘generative’ relationships between shared social dispositions and cognitive structures which give rise to, or at least contribute to the appearance (or illusion) of autonomy. The habitus can therefore only be understood adequately by attempting to understand the field or fields in which it exists.

Jenkins (2002: 74 ff) offers a wider and more detailed definition, identifying three distinct ‘meanings’ of the term ‘habitus’ as used in Bourdieu’s writing. This definition can serve as a basis for discussing the translator’s habitus and also sets the scene for the concept of a translatorial *hexis*. Firstly, the habitus ‘exists only inasmuch as it is ‘inside the heads’ of actors. Secondly, the habitus exists only ‘through the practices of actors and their interaction with each other and with the rest of the environment’. Jenkins gives the examples of ‘ways of talking, ways of moving, ways of making things’. Thirdly, the
‘practical taxonomies’\textsuperscript{30} - such as male/female, front/back, up/down, hot/cold - which underlie the generative schemes of the habitus are rooted in the body (ibid: 75). In each of these three senses, a translated text can be seen as an embodiment of the translator’s habitus: firstly, as an ‘expression’ of what is ‘inside the translator’s head’; secondly, in the sense of the translator’s ‘style’ or way of writing, spelling and organising information on the page; and thirdly, through the translator’s use of specific conceptual metaphors (Lakoff, 1979/2003) relating to the ‘practical taxonomies’ listed.

The textual products of translation encode, encrypt or embody a range of (possibly conflicting) dispositions of the individual who translated the text, not just with regard to the translator’s reading of that text, but also with regard to the translator’s reading of the world in which she/he lives and especially with regard to the translator’s self-image within that world. Many, but not necessarily all, of these dispositions are habitual, that is, learned and automated, which means, at least partially unconscious. In this thesis, the concept of a translatorial hexis is proposed primarily in order to distinguish between the habitus as a property of the translator and the hexis as a property analogous to the habitus but embodied (in a physical and gestural manner) in the text. Evidence for the association of the habitus with the person of the translator rather than with the translated text is provided, for example, by the title of Simeoni’s article ‘The Pivotal Status of the Translator’s Habitus’ (1998). In this article, Simeoni also discusses the habitual ‘subservience’ of the translator to the source text author: ‘Translators, not unlike the scribes of ancient or premodern civilizations, have always occupied subservient positions among the dominant professions of the cultural sphere’ (ibid.: 7). The translatorial hexis elaborated here also diverges from Simeoni’s conception of the translator’s subservient stance in that it refers to a specifically dominant stance of the translators of Hegel investigated here. This is not a denial of the subservient translatorial habitus per se, but rather a suggestion that aspects or components of the translatorial habitus are not subservient but pro-active, defiant, dominant and honour-seeking, especially in the case of the translators of philosophy under investigation here.

In \textit{Outline of a Theory of Practice} (1977), Bourdieu theorises the findings of ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Kabylia (Algeria) during the time of the Algerian

\textsuperscript{30} Jenkins (2002: 25, 41) explains that Bourdieu’s early structuralist ethnographic work in Algeria (Bourdieu, 1964; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu, 2012) described such pairs of opposite terms as ‘practical taxonomies’.
war. In particular, he questions critically the validity of ‘objectifying’ ethnographic research which portrays human cultures as objects of a detached scientific study without the all important step for Bourdieu of exercising self-critical, self-reflexive analysis of the researcher’s own position. In this book, Bourdieu returns to empirical data collected a decade previously on the spatial structure and allocation of gendered values in the interior of the (typical) Kabyle house. Meanings and values are determined with reference to homologous oppositions: ‘fire: water; cooked: raw; high: low; light: shade; day: night; male: female; nif: hurma,’ fertilizing: able to be fertilized (1977: 90).

Bourdieu reflects on the reciprocal relationship between the minds of the people living in these houses and the objects to be found there. ‘The mind is a metaphor of the world of objects which is itself but an endless circle of mutually reflecting metaphors’ (1977: 91). Focussing more closely on the objective embodiment of differences in male and female sexual and social honour (referred to in the list above as nif and hurma respectively), Bourdieu introduces the concept of hexis.

Bodily hexis is political mythology realised, embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking. The oppositions which mythico-ritual logic makes between the male and female and which organise the whole system of values reappear, for example, in the gestures and movements of the body, in the form of the opposition between the straight and the bent, or between assurance and restraint.

(Bourdieu, 1977: 93-94)

The term hexis as it is used here refers to the theoretical realisation that attitudes and values conventionally, in European philosophical terms, associated with the mind, such as assurance and restraint, are in fact inscribed or encoded in bodily gestures and stance. Ritualised distinctions between the sexes are articulated through an equally ritualised body language. ‘The manly man stands up straight and honours the person he approaches or wishes to welcome by looking him right in the eyes…. Conversely, a woman is expected to walk with a slight stoop, looking down…’ (1977: 94). These opposing stances reflect and embody the values encoded not only in the paired words of the practical taxonomies but also in the meaningful spatial arrangement of objects around the house. Crucially, the hexis embodies a person’s culturally determined

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31 These terms are explained briefly at the end of this paragraph.
expectations about what will be recognised within their culture as honourable or dishonourable.

Figure 2.1 shows a photograph of a Kabyle man taken by Bourdieu around 1958. The man wears traditional Algerian clothing and an expression of stern dignity compatible with his high social status in the pre-colonial, agricultural community. However, he is pictured out of this context, in a city. The woman and the younger men behind him are wearing ‘Western’ clothes. In this sense, his clothes and his stance embody his defiance of these challenges to his status, his defiance of the ‘uprooting’ of the traditional agricultural society.

Although the term ‘body language’ captures this sense of *hexis* in outline, *hexis* is a more precise term, because *hexis* articulates and manifests a culturally determined censorship and legitimation of bodily movements. It refers, in the case of the Kabyle people, only to a very narrow range of gestures which are associated with the preservation and expression of honour; all deviations from this norm are failures, expressions of something other than the honour aspired to by the honour-seeking man or, in this culture, the modesty-seeking woman. In this normative, recognitive sense, *hexis* can be seen as an embodiment of the rules of a game. In the case of the manly Kabyle man, the game is about honour; it is his honour which is at stake if he allows his body to lapse into prohibited postures or behaves in a manner excluded by the rules, in an unmanly manner. In this way, the *hexis* inscribes the rules of the game onto and into the body of the player. It is more than a habit because it expresses an inescapable commitment to participate in the game. The honour expressed in the *hexis* is also the
prize of the game. Honour is nothing unless it is recognised. In this reciprocal sense, the *hexis* can be seen as a structure, apparently within the individual agent, which actively structures the social field (in Kabyle society); but, as a structure within the individual, *hexis* is also structured receptively as a result of the individual living and growing up within the structured culture. By analogy with this early-Bourdieusian sense of the *hexis*, the Hegel translators can also be seen as working within a relatively narrow margin of translatorial freedom, within a professionally structured, honour-endowing community of philosophical peers. The translator’s lexical choices analysed in chapters 3 and 4 therefore reflect the translator’s sensitivity towards key oppositions in the sub-field, for example, with regard to the connotations of the target language terms *mind* and *spirit*, especially with regard to potential misunderstandings. The translator’s honour is gained through the exercise of judicious control, that is, a non-neutral, non-subservient dominance of this semantic potential.

Beyond the merely descriptive, objectifying account of *hexis* as a structure in Kabyle culture, Bourdieu’s demand for self-reflexivity logically necessitates an additional reciprocal consideration of the *hexis* of the ethnographic researcher, a self-questioning of the stance, bodily gestures and attitudes of social scientists in the field and in the academy.\(^{32}\) Bourdieu’s later work, especially *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu, 1988), *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Bourdieu, 1991a) and *Language and Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu, 1991b) pursues this self-reflexive challenge by considering the relationship between academic language and the struggle for distinction or status. In these books, Bourdieu analysed the elevated, (dominant) rhetorical style found in original and translated philosophy as an embodiment of the symbolic power invested in the academy. Accordingly, even the philosopher’s very precise use of language, including the details of spelling and punctuation, are seen as a means of competing in a struggle for distinction and honour. Such details also contribute to the translatorial *hexis* in the case of a translation of a philosophical text. They are not the only manifestations of the translatorial *hexis*, but in the context of the present data, they provide a powerful example. Through attention to textual and peritextual detail\(^{33}\), translators encode their allegiance to ideological values, the legitimacy and orthodoxy of structures within the target culture, such as the Church, the State, the Academy. (The honorific initial capitals

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\(^{32}\) As a student of translation studies, the present researcher provides an ‘outsider’ perspective on the world of professional philosophy which is objectified here in terms of Bourdieusian field theory.

\(^{33}\) The term peritextual used here refers to supplementary texts such as the translator’s introduction, footnotes and contents pages, as defined in (Genette, 1997: 16-33). See also subsection 2.2.3.
The value of the concept of a translatorial *hexis* is therefore that it draws attention to the physical embodiment (such as the initial capitals) of honour-seeking translatorial decisions in the text of the translation at a micro-level of analysis. At this level of analysis, translatorial decisions can be interpreted as gestures, like the gestural *hexis* analysed in Bourdieu’s ethnographic work and illustrated in his photographs (Bourdieu, 2012). The gesture of capitalising the word “Church” seeks honour with regard to values enshrined in the field, such as respect for the church. Through such small gestures, the translator adopts a stance with regard to the translated work, standing (up) for the work translated in an honour-seeking manner, defying challenges (of many different kinds) from the honour-endowing field of the target culture.

Analysing details of a translated text with reference to translatorial *hexis* reveals something about the complex, micro-level decision-making processes involved in this branch of translation. A translator is concerned with the relationship of equivalence between the ST and TT, but this sometimes extremely difficult task (especially in German philosophy) is not the only concern; the translator of a philosophical text is also concerned (in an honour-seeking way) with the philosophical coherence of the TT and its potential role and reception in the target culture. As discussed in a review of a translation of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (Stern, 1999), a translation of a philosophical text can be judged, for example, with reference to its fidelity to the original or accuracy; it can also be judged with regard to its literary merits or readability; thirdly, it can be judged with regard to the philosophical and/or interpretive position it occupies in the contemporary field. The translator can attempt to influence the reader’s judgment and therefore gain honour in subtly different ways, appealing, through the text and the peritexts, to different honour-endowing values.

A final valuable insight provided by the translatorial *hexis*, which relates to its origins in Bourdieu’s early work (especially, *Le Déracinement* [The Uprooting] (1964)), is that, as the dynamics of a given field change over time, an honour-seeking gesture can lose its power in that it is no longer recognised within the honour-endowing field. Figure 2.2 shows another of Bourdieu’s photographs from the 1950s in which a woman defies traditional customs by venturing out of the house. The exuberant gesture of defiance is symbolised by the liberating motor scooter but complicated, contradicted and ultimately resolved by her wearing the veil which symbolises her partial acceptance of some
traditional or transitional values. The photograph shows not just an act of defiance but also an act of skilful compromise between two opposing poles in an uprooted, transitional culture.

[This image has been removed because the copyright was not available]

Figure 2.2: Exuberant hexis of liberation in disguise

By analogy, with Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the translatorial hexis analysed in chapters 3 and 4 embodies each translator’s strategy for establishing and preserving honour, dignity and professional status not only by mediating between the culture of the German source text and the respective historical period of the translation but also against the background of disturbing cultural changes and differences within the translator’s immediate academic environment, the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy.

2.1.1 Academic language as an embodiment of hexis

In introducing Bourdieu’s views on language, Jenkins (2002: 153-157) contrasts the linguistic habitus – ‘the cultural propensity to say particular things, a specific linguistic competence (the capacity to ‘speak properly’) and the social capacity to use that competence appropriately’ – with the linguistic market – ‘which takes the form of sanctions and censorships, and which defines what cannot be said as much as what can’. For Bourdieu, therefore, language is situated within the social space and subject to the rules for the acquisition, distribution and recognition of capital, as the following quotation cited by Bourdieu’s colleague Wacquant illustrates:

… linguistic relations are always relations of power (rapports de force) and, consequently cannot be elucidated within the compass of linguistic analysis alone. Even the simplest linguistic exchange brings into play a complex and ramifying
web of historical power relations between the speaker, endowed with a specific social authority, and an audience, which recognises this authority to varying degrees, as well as between the groups to which they respectively belong. (Wacquant, 1989: 46) (also cited in Jenkins, 2002: 154)

Bourdieu’s remarks about language were apparently intended as a reply to Chomsky (Jenkins, 2002: 79), and the theoretical framework Bourdieu proposes goes beyond the (early) linguistic theories of Chomsky, emphasising the social nature of all linguistic interaction and the inevitable association of all social relations with relations of power. Even in ordinary communication, the negotiation and renegotiation of the relative social status of speakers is of fundamental importance; in order to speak at all, there must be an assumption of authority, an articulation of an assumed right to speak and a matching expectation of recognition (or rejection) of that right. The hexis plays an important part in theorising this process. The speaker’s or the translator’s stance, bodily gestures and homologous textual strategies express the assumption of the authority to speak or to write or the lack of that authority. In this sense, the speaker’s hexis embodies a claim to the right to speak. In conversational analysis, this is closely connected with the theory of turn-taking and relates directly to the speaker’s expectations about the audience’s willingness to accept the authority claimed. As Jenkins explains:

In this encounter between the linguistic habitus and the market for its products, it is the speaker’s *anticipation* of the reception which his/her discourse will receive (its ‘price’) which contributes to *what* is said and *how*. Thus it is the actor’s subjective expectations of the probabilities of the situation which produce self-censorship. This is one root of the inequalities of linguistic competence which characterise human communication. (Jenkins, 2002: 154)

If the speaker wishes her/his claim to the authority to speak to be recognised by the audience, she/he must adopt a stance (*hexis*) which she/he anticipates will earn that recognition. Dependent upon the power relations involved, this may mean assuming a

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34 In a powerful description of the education of the oppressed classes of Brazil in the 1970s, Paolo Freire (1985) anticipates Bourdieu’s theorisation of *hexis* suggesting that language and speech belong to the dominant classes of society while the underprivileged embody a ‘culture of silence’. In this sense, all speech assumes some level of (socially endowed) autonomy, entitlement or self-respect and accordingly anticipates recognition. The fully oppressed do not even expect to be listened to.
stance of humility, politeness and deference, for example, in order to have a request listened to by a dominant listener. Conversely, it may mean assuming a stance of dominance, a *hexis* recognisably associated with a position of authority, for example, in order to command an army or to teach a class of (potentially riotous) students.35

In the quotation at the beginning of this subsection (Wacquant, 1989), Bourdieu mentions the complexity of power relations involved in any act of communication. An important aspect of this complexity is the reciprocal judgement required by both parties to the communication in deciding precisely which stance or *hexis* is likely to achieve the desired response. Individual and cultural dispositions add to this complexity. As will become evident with regard to the data on the two translations of Hegel, historical factors also play an important part. For instance, the *hexis* adopted by Baillie in his 1910 translation reflects Baillie’s (and his publishers’) judgement regarding an appropriate tone for his anticipated readership as well as his desire to assert and defend a given position within the field. He could not possibly have anticipated the effect this tone might produce on readers in 2012, whether it would guarantee their respect for his authority or undermine his legitimacy; nor could he anticipate the changes in the field of philosophy which would alter the significance of the position he adopted. Pinkard’s modern translation of the same German text approximately two hundred years after the publication of the source text and approximately one hundred years after the publication of the first English translation reflects his perception of inadequacies in the older translations which can be remedied by adopting a different, in his eyes more appropriate stance towards the audience, but Pinkard also necessarily thereby adopts a new position within a different historical field.

Greater complexity is added to this picture when attention is diverted from ordinary-language relations to academic language, especially philosophical language. Bourdieu’s later works (Bourdieu, 1988; Bourdieu, 1991a; Bourdieu, 1991b) focus specifically on this issue of academic language and several points relate directly to the present comparison of how the translators handle dialectical ambiguity in their translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.

In *Homo Academicus* (1988), Bourdieu describes the university field as:

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35 Bourdieu’s work on academic language effectively constitutes an elaborate investigation of the sociology of the student uprisings of the late 1960s, especially in Paris in May 1968.
… like any other field, the locus of a struggle to determine the conditions and the
criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy, that is to determine
which properties are pertinent, effective and liable to function as capital so as to
generate the specific profits guaranteed by the field.

(1988: 11)

Accordingly, the activities of a member of the academic community, such as research,
writing papers, publishing books and translations, as well as teaching and attending
conferences and committees all constitute moves in a game or a struggle to secure
legitimate membership (such as obtaining a doctoral degree) and ensure continued
legitimacy (increasing status commensurate with age and rank) within the community.
These activities are ostensibly (officially) geared to the production of classified products
of the academy (students with appropriate qualifications), but this requires the
classifiers themselves to assert and re-assert their legitimacy as classifiers. Ultimately,
academic legitimacy is attained and maintained through the acquisition of reputation
and distinction, but reputation and distinction can be obtained in different ways, in
particular, internally, for example, within the hierarchy of a particular university
department, and externally (Jenkins, 2002: 158), through publication using an
increasingly diverse range of media and targeting diverse audiences.

The production of a translation of a major philosophical work, such as Hegel’s
Phenomenology, can be seen as an effective strategy, operating both internally and
externally, nationally and internationally, for acquiring a lasting reputation in a number
of overlapping fields. However, the power relationships are extremely complex. Not
only must the translator be capable of and prepared to carry out the immense work
involved. An existing reputation as a Hegel expert may seem to be an absolute
prerequisite, but the case of the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977) is exceptional in
this respect. A. V. Miller translated and/or revised six titles by Hegel without himself
being a member of the academic community. The problem of Miller’s lack of academic
status was avoided, in the case of his 1977 translation of the Phenomenology, by
peritextual framing36 of Miller’s translation with an introduction and lengthy analysis of

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36 The terms ‘paratext’ and ‘peritext’ used here relate to the work of Genette (1997) and will be discussed
more fully in Section 2.2.3 below.
the text by J.N. Findlay, an outstanding Hegel scholar of worldwide reputation. A string of letters (F.B.A., F.A.A.A.S.) after Findlay’s name on the title page furnishes the requisite peritextual *hexis*, demanding recognition and respect which is to be shared, to some extent, with the translator (in this case, the ‘subservient’ translator). Prior to undertaking their translations (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931; Hegel/Pinkard, 2008), Baillie and Pinkard, both professors of philosophy, published widely on Hegel and German Idealism. Their internal reputations, within the respective, historical fields of Hegelian philosophy, were relatively secure before undertaking the translation; the translations represent a widening and strengthening of an existing reputation to extend into and to draw upon the capital from neighbouring fields, in particular, the fields of religion, politics and political philosophy. In practical terms, the flow of economic capital is mediated through the international book trade; the choice of text, choice of translator, awareness of potential readership and adaptation of the style of the translation to meet the perceived needs of the target market is therefore co-constitutive of the translatorial *hexis* (Sapiro, 2008; 2010).

In the *Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (1991a), Bourdieu elaborates his view that the philosophical establishment had developed complex linguistic strategies for evading the issue of Heidegger’s association with the Nazi party. Bourdieu’s attack here is not directed primarily against Heidegger but rather against the collusion of philosophical readers in preserving silence about the social and political implications of Heidegger’s association with the Nazi party. In the following quotation, Bourdieu refers to *Sein und Zeit* [translated as *Being and Time*], Heidegger’s most famous work, which Bourdieu describes as ‘profoundly rooted in and dated by’ its time:

> And yet there are few works which have been read in such a profoundly ahistorical way. Not even the most ruthless investigators into the author of *Sein und Zeit*’s murky compromises with Nazism have looked at the texts themselves for indices, admissions, or hints liable to reveal or elucidate the political commitment of its author.

(Bourdieu, 1991a: 1-2)

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37 Interestingly, the fact of having translated Hegel caused several of Miller’s correspondents to assume that he must be a professor of philosophy and to address their letters accordingly. Two such letters are held in an archive of Miller’s papers at Essex University.

38 Fellow of the British Academy and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Bourdieu’s project, then, is to rectify this defect by looking in the text for ‘indices, admissions, or hints liable to reveal or elucidate’ Heidegger’s political commitment. Bourdieu identifies ‘euphemisation’ and the ‘elevated’ style as the key strategies identifiable in philosophical texts for avoiding the appearance of political commitment and thereby preserving the ‘purity’ of philosophy by distancing it from the ‘practicalities’ of ethical, social and political realities. In popular terms, this point could be summarised by the notion of philosophy being housed in an ‘ivory tower’.

Most importantly for the present thesis, Bourdieu also suggests that translations and translators are complicit in these strategies for preserving the immunity of philosophers from political involvement. Writing of Heidegger’s own euphemising attempts to disguise his political ‘origins’, Bourdieu complains that the (French) translation of *Sein und Zeit* systematically suppresses hidden political connotations:

> Indeed, in addition to the resistance to analysis offered by a work which is the product of such systematic strategies of euphemisation there is also in this case one of the most pernicious effects of the exportation of cultural products, the disappearance of all the subtle signs of social or political origins, of all the often very discreet marks of the social importance of discourse and the intellectual position of its author, in short, of all the infinitesimal features to which the native reader is obviously most vulnerable, but which he can apprehend better than others once he is equipped with techniques of objectification.

(Bourdieu, 1991a: 83)

The passage is quoted at length here because of its importance to the translation of philosophical texts. The key points for the present argument are that philosophical texts may contain ‘infinitesimal features’ which embody the political commitments of the author and that such features may be consciously or inadvertently ‘suppressed’ in translation. Bourdieu suggests therefore that ‘subtle signs’ of social or political origins in a source text which is already euphemised, can be euphemised into invisibility by the translation. The dialectical ambiguity of Hegel’s text and of the terms selected for analysis in this thesis are thus analysed with regard to the double process of euphemisation suggested here by Bourdieu.

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39 Please refer to footnote 26 in this chapter for a brief reference to the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘practical’ philosophy.
Another dimension of the same process of sequestration of philosophy from the neighbouring fields of sociology and politics in order to conceal or disguise the commitments of the author or translator is described by Bourdieu as the ‘elevated’ style. The spatial metaphor ‘elevated’ relates clearly here to the high/low distinction associated with bodily *hexis* and the status of honour discussed in the previous subsections. The spatial metaphor is also adopted in the popular metaphor of the ‘ivory tower’ mentioned above which elevates philosophers above mundane concerns. The elevated style reproduces the illusory legitimacy of the high social, political and academic status of philosophy.\(^{40}\)

The ‘elevated’ style is not merely a contingent property of philosophical discourse. It is the means whereby a discourse signals itself as an authorised discourse which, by virtue of its very conformity, becomes invested with the authority of a body of people and especially mandated to exercise a sort of conceptual magistrature (with its emphasis on logic or on ethics depending on the authors and the eras). In learned discourse as in ordinary speech, styles are ordered in hierarchies, but they also create hierarchies. For a thinker of high status an elevated language is appropriate … It is through the ‘elevated’ style that the status of a discourse is invoked, as is the respect due to that status. (Bourdieu, 1991a: 1-2)

In other words, it is the philosopher’s refusal to engage in sociological or political terms with the issues relevant to sociology and politics which creates a superior, elevated positioning or status for philosophy, from which philosophers are legitimately empowered to legislate on the theoretical concepts used in these putatively lower and less pure fields. By framing its discourse in terms of logic and ethics, philosophy detaches itself from and elevates itself above the mundane concerns of sociology and politics.\(^{41}\) In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the philosopher’s skilful, rhetorical use of philosophical language (especially Aristotelian, syllogistic logic) secured the elevated status, stance and *hexis* of the philosopher. Increasingly through the twentieth

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\(^{40}\) It is interesting that, in their respective peritexts, both Baillie and Pinkard refer to Hegel as a ‘genius’ thereby suggesting Hegel’s special, elevated status as well as their (obligatory) deference to this status.

\(^{41}\) The metaphoricity of Kant’s distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘practical’ is also relevant here. Like high/low in the list of practical taxonomies, pure/dirty plays an important part in defining status and stance and represents a metaphorical range along which translators can exercise a subtle suppression or inculcation of political allegiances. Science and logic are clean; sociology, politics and to some extent religion are dirty.
century, the Anglo-American, analytical philosopher’s appropriation of the ‘scientific’ discourses of symbolic or mathematical logic, linguistic analysis, psychology and even neuroscience fulfil a similar function.\footnote{The supporting role of translation in establishing and even extending the scientific credentials and therefore elevated status of translated authors is well known in translation studies through the work of Venuti (2010) who discusses an example pointed out by Bettelheim (1983) regarding Strachey’s over-scientific, technicalised translation of the German term Fehlleistung [‘faulty achievement’ or just ‘error’] in Freud’s work as parapraxis. What Venuti describes as ‘peculiarities in the diction of the translated text’ represent precisely the textual embodiments of translatorial hexas referred to in this thesis. Strachey’s over-scientific translation embodies an ‘autocratic’ hexas seeking to strengthen and unify the authority of Freud through closer association with the high status of science (in the 1960s when the translation was made); by contrast, Bettelheim’s ‘humanistic’, anti-scientific stance corresponds to a more democratically circumspect hexas.} By contrast, however, an impersonal, impartial or democratic style has become mandatory in modern academia but nevertheless fulfils some of the same elevating and distancing functions of securing the symbolic dominance of experts over practitioners.

In addition to ‘euphemisation’ and the ‘elevated’ style, Bourdieu also identifies at least two different kinds of ‘bad faith’ (Jenkins, 2002: 158),\footnote{Bourdieu’s ‘bad faith’ differs from that of J-P Sartre. This is also briefly explained in the cited Jenkins reference.} which further characterise the struggle for reputation and status in the academic field. The first relates to the way in which academics learn to adjust their aspirations to meet what is realistically possible.

Thus there are no doubt very few social worlds which provide as many objective supports for the process of bad faith which leads to the rejection of the inaccessible, or to the choice of the inevitable.

\begin{quote}
(Bourdieu, 1988: 114)
\end{quote}

Bourdieu’s rather harsh criticism of the academic world in this quotation and the associated paragraphs can be seen as primarily self-critical and part of his attempted self-reflexivity. One brief example of this kind of bad faith relevant to the translations of Hegel is given by Baillie’s claim in the Translator’s Introduction to the first edition (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) not to have attempted to improve the literary merits of Hegel’s style, which Baillie then scathingly criticises; in fact Baillie did try to improve Hegel’s literary style as evident from the example in section 1.4. As Jenkins explains, ‘[a]t its simplest [bad faith] means doing one thing while saying and thinking another’. (2002: 158)
The second kind of bad faith derives from the ‘symbolic violence’ which is inherent in the system of higher education and operates through ‘pedagogic action’ to reinforce or reproduce the existing distribution of power in society. By accepting or ‘misrecognising’ the authority of their teachers, students inadvertently also accept and therefore reinforce or reproduce the authority of the education system and the political and social structures which support and are supported by the education system (Jenkins, 2002: 158).

When applied to the translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, the concepts of ‘pedagogic action’ and ‘pedagogic work’ (Jenkins, 2002: 104-106) reveal a divergence or fissure in the translator’s habitus in the sense described by Lahire (2003). The divergent dispositions of the translator, as a philosopher and/or as an academic or pedagogue can be directed towards complex philosophical, educational and veiled political goals within the target field. These may include the simplification and popularisation of the source text and the strategic re-positioning of the target text in order to maximise the accrual of economic or cultural capital to the translator/pedagogue, but also to reproduce the power structures and legitimacy of the academy, for example, in relationship with the field of political power and other neighbouring fields, such as religion. Lahire’s approach to this kind of complexity or multiplicity of dispositions is to propose a move beyond Bourdieu towards a ‘sociology of the individual’ which is based on the concept of a ‘multiple habitus’ comprising complex and often contradictory dispositions. This post-Bourdieuian approach to the personal and professional habitus of secondary cultural agents, such as literary editors, has been successfully exploited by Philpotts and Parker (2009: 169) in analysing the divided political and aesthetic loyalties of periodical editors in the GDR and by Pasmatzi (2012) with regard to the difficulty of deciphering the political and ideological allegiances of translator and author in the Greek translation of Nicholas Gage’s *Eleni* (1983).

For the present analysis of Baillie’s and Pinkard’s differing approaches to the translation of dialectical ambiguities in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, the Bourdieusian concept of *hexis* is used to describe the textual outcome or embodiment of each translator’s attempt to combine and consolidate the divergences of the multiple habitus into a single, unambiguous, relatively authoritative and sincere stance resolving not only the dialectical ambiguities of Hegel’s text but also the problems of ‘symbolic violence’ and ‘bad faith’ inherent in the academic field as portrayed by Bourdieu. The honour of
the philosophical translator, especially internally within the field of Hegelian philosophy, depends upon the presentation of a rational articulation in the target language of a text which must, in the eyes of philosophers committed to the value of Hegel’s philosophy, at the same time preserve the supposed rationality of the source text. The translator has to find or invent a unified stance which fulfils these sometimes contradictory dispositions. This task is at its most difficult when the translator is faced with apparent contradictions or ambiguities in the source text, such as the terms *Geist* and *aufheben* selected here for closer investigation.

Another essential aspect of the translatorial *hexis* is therefore the translator’s self-reflexive reading or interpretation of her/his own role or agency within the process of translation. This key aspect of self-reflexivity is captured well through Bourdieu’s portrayal of the different *hexis* of the male and female Kabyle villagers who, in the eyes of the French ethnographic researcher observing them, seem to stand and move according to their cultural knowledge of what is expected of them. A similar self-reflexivity is required when considering the agency of the Hegel translators who must (at some level of objectivity) gauge their readers’ need for explicitness, taking into consideration factors such as the readers’ presumed level of education and philosophical expertise and including the readers’ knowledge or lack of knowledge of German or other relevant languages, such as Greek and Latin. However, alongside this primary consideration, the translators must also gauge their readers’ expectations of the role of a translator. Does the translator write from a position of absolute, expert authority projecting the illusion that no linguistic or philosophical nuance in Hegel’s book has escaped her/his understanding? Or can greater respect (and increased book sales) be achieved if the translator adopts a *hexis* of apparent humility, suggesting, for example, that certain terms or concepts do not make sense, or at least not to the translator? The answers to these questions demand a fine balancing of multiple and sometimes conflicting dispositions, personal, cultural and professional habits. Like the ethnographic researcher, the translator must to some extent try to absorb or become absorbed by the object of her/his work, the Hegel source text, the language and culture of Hegel’s time; but the translator brings to this task alien and anachronistic perspectives which must also be acknowledged. The traces of this balancing act are subtly but still discernibly embodied in the text and in the peritexts.

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Bourdieu refers to this balancing in the ethnographic context as ‘the objectification of the act of objectification’ (Jenkins, 2002: 47-52); when transferred to the context of a historical, philosophical
Bourdieu writes of the ‘imperceptible cues of body hexis’ (1977: 82) suggesting that the hexis contains information encoded or encrypted in such a manner that it can evoke a response, like a whispered prompt or cue, without the agent or the recipient necessarily being fully aware of the content. Facial expression and bodily gesture can thus communicate confidence or lack of confidence, dominance or subordination seemingly in advance of or in the absence of any words being spoken. Recent research in interpreting-studies using electronic imaging of the details of face-to-face communication reveals that such cues are not strictly imperceptible.\(^{45}\) By analogy, the present thesis argues that a printed text, such as the translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, also contains barely perceptible cues which, in spite of their ‘subliminal’ nature, still encode accessible information which is relevant for a theoretically-founded, radical contextualisation and comparison of the translatorial hexis of translators of philosophy.

Within the text, subtle lexical and grammatical shifts and manipulations, which may not be evident to a reader who cannot compare the translation with the source language text, can contribute to the sense that the translator has assumed the authority to make some things more explicit or prominent than others, to resolve some ambiguities rather than others. Two simple examples in the Hegel translations considered here reinforce this point. The first is the ‘expansion’ of pronouns, where the translator repeats the noun, for instance, in a very long sentence, because the reader may have difficulty in working out what a ‘she’, ‘he’, ‘it’ or ‘they’ refers back to;\(^{46}\) the second is the breaking up of long sentences into shorter ones, which may require a repetition of some of the words.\(^{47}\) Such strategies are almost unavoidable in translation but they nonetheless have the effect of foregrounding or ‘priming’ (Hoey, 2005) certain lexical items and thus emphasising certain points of the ST argument by increased repetition in the TT. At a subtler level of translation, it should perhaps be construed in terms of the extent to which the translator acknowledges or allows or encourages the reader to appreciate the historical and cultural distance between the translator and the source-text author. The translatorial hexis thus includes a balance between the performative, rhetorical, theatrical masquerade – the sense of deluding the reader into a belief that the translator is, or has a privileged knowledge of, the source-text author – and the diametrically opposed sense that the translator is somehow detached, scientific or impartial.\(^{45}\) For example, Seeber (2011) summarises the latest advances in neurological research on eye movements in response to visual cues in the context of conference interpreting.\(^{46}\) Translators from German into English frequently expand pronouns because grammatical gender and case structures in German preserve cohesion between nouns and pronouns in long sentences which tends to be lost in translation.\(^{47}\) Hegel sometimes uses extremely long sentences. See chapter 5 for a comparison of the two translators’ strategies in this respect.
analysis, grammatical differences between German and English in the specificity\footnote{This point will be discussed further in chapters 3 and 4 with reference to the data, but a simple question serves to orientate the issue at this stage: Is there a (significant) difference between ‘The Phenomenology of Spirit’ and ‘The Phenomenology of the Spirit’?} of the deictic can either be made explicit by the translator (because they are thought to be of philosophical significance) or they can passed over as insignificant details which can be taken for granted. In such cases, the translator adopts a stance or *hexis* in choosing how much or how little explicitness to include. The extent to which these and similar strategies are adopted and the manner in which they are executed contribute to the translatorial *hexis* in that they embody the translators’ negotiation not only with the text but also with their readers and with their own sense of responsibility for the (pedagogical) work they are doing.

Closely related to such intra-textual interventions are the various peritextual zones of the translated book, which provide a further opportunity for translators of philosophy to articulate or suppress the reasoning behind their translation strategies.

### 2.2 Analysis of fields, lexical patterns and peritexts

With reference to the concept of translatorial *hexis* described in section 2.1, section 2.2 outlines how the theoretical framework will be applied in chapters 3 and 4. The two data-analysis chapters are each structured in the same manner, analysing, firstly, in sections 3.1 and 4.1, the historical background to the translations, which is construed in terms of the micro-dynamics of respective historical sub-fields of Hegelian philosophy and associated fields of ideological or political power. This analysis identifies relevant oppositions within the fields which structure the distribution of capital and may therefore have influenced the translators’ self-positioning and ultimately the translatorial decisions investigated here. Secondly, sections 3.2 and 4.2 focus on lexical patterning in the translations of *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/preserve/sublate] in the respective target texts. The analysis is based on a simple counting of numerical data from the TT corpora which investigates terminological consistency in the translations of the key terms and includes every occurrence of ST term as defined in the relevant section of each chapter. This ‘tomographic’ approach takes a slice through the corpora with regard to each term and reveals various lexical patterns which shed new light on the supposed consistency/inconsistency of the
translations of these specific terms. Since the terms have already been identified in chapter 1 as ‘dialectically ambiguous’, the lexical patterning raises the questions of why the translators might have adopted the strategy observable through the patterning and how this might relate to their positioning in the field, in other words, how their translatorial decisions might embody their translatorial hexis as an honour-seeking response to the dynamics of the field. The discussion of these questions constitutes the ‘radical contextualisation’ addressed in the research questions. Thirdly, in sections 3.3 and 4.3, an analysis of peritexts to the translations provides further insights into the translators’ self-positioning thereby deepening the contextualisation. These three stages of analysis are now discussed in theoretical terms in subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.

2.2.1 Reconstructing the dynamics of the historical fields

The field of Hegelian philosophy is too large and too complex to summarise within the scope of the thesis. A recent and authoritative bibliographical summary is published in An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom Truth and History (Houlgate, 2005) but this does not explicitly address the work of the translators. Fortunately, the two translators considered here have themselves each published a considerable volume of work which allows a provisional orientation of their philosophical interests within the respective sub-fields. The primary sources consulted with reference to Baillie include Baillie’s own book publications and the journal Mind for the years surrounding the publication of the translations. An archive of Baillie’s papers held at the Brotherton Library Special Collection in the University of Leeds has also been consulted. Important secondary sources consulted in this context include the recently published British Idealism: A History (Mander, 2011), British Idealism: A guide for the Perplexed (Boucher, 2012) and A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Passmore, 1968), which, although now very old, contains detailed studies of many of Baillie’s contemporaries and corresponding references to Mind. An authoritative contemporary discussion of British Idealism is provided in Hegelian Metaphysics (Stern, 2009). None of these sources deals extensively with Baillie or his translation. With regard to Pinkard, the primary sources include not only Pinkard’s published work in books and periodicals, such as the Owl of Minerva and the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, but also Pinkard’s personal website which presents selections of articles, book chapters and the online draft of the new translation. Video footage of Pinkard’s lecture tour in Romania
(Pinkard, 2011) has also recently been published online.49 The researcher has also contacted Pinkard and his editor at CUP, Michael Baur, by e-mail.50 Many secondary publications mention Pinkard but very few references to the new translation have been found. Together with other texts referenced in detail in chapter 4, *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy* (Beiser, 2008) has been used as a secondary source providing an authoritative survey of the sub-field in 2008, the copyright year of the online-draft translation used for the corpus.

These texts allow a rough characterisation of the dynamics of the two historical fields which can be construed in terms of dominant, subordinate and homologous positions corresponding to Bourdieu’s definition of a social field in terms of power relations (Jenkins, 2002: 83). In very broad terms which will be investigated further in chapters 3 and 4, the translatorial *hexis* embodied in the English translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* relates to the field in that the translatorial *hexis* represents a textual response by the translators to fundamental, socially determined, ideological controversies surrounding the interpretation of Hegel’s work as a whole and the *Phenomenology* in particular. There are many philosophical and ideological ramifications to this discussion, but it can be articulated simply with reference to key ideological categories, such as conservative, progressive and neutral (Stern, 2006) or conservative, liberal and totalitarian, with various subdivisions within these categories (Freedeen, 2003). In the paper cited here, Stern argues for a neutral interpretation of Hegel’s famously ambiguous ‘double dictum’,51 pointing out the errors of previous interpreters in pulling Hegel towards their own (political and/or religious) viewpoint. However, the conservative and progressive positions, which also approximately correspond with the so-called Right-Hegelian and Left-Hegelian positions (Singer, 1983), are remarkably resilient and, however meticulously they are neutralised, seem to return in new guises. In fact the desire to neutralise such ideological polarities easily merges into the conservative or progressive position. Ultimately, therefore the ideological struggle between conservative and progressive positions can be construed as constitutive of the definition of the translatorial *hexis* in this context. The *hexis* embodies the translator’s and other associated agents’ desire for honour, distinction and respectability, so that translators (and commentators on Hegel) can seek honour and

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49 Pinkard gave a paper ‘Hegel to Marx: What Went Wrong?’ in Romania in May 2011 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KR7M1LsHgkE)
50 At the time of writing, Baur has unfortunately not yet replied to this e-mail.
51 ‘The rational is the actual and the actual is the rational’: For a full discussion, see (Stern, 2006).
academic respectability for themselves and their work either by construing Hegel as an agent for more or less radical progress or heterodoxy; or by construing Hegel as an agent for more or less reactionary conservatism or orthodoxy. Additional complexity is added to this discussion, especially with regard to twentieth century history, in that, for example, under communist regimes, interpretations of Hegel which would seem radical in non-communist settings are presented and perceived as orthodox. In this way, it is possible for a progressive ideology to become an orthodoxy, or for a conservative ideology to act subversively. The irony of this position can be visualised by considering the complex motives of a profit-making academic publishing company, which relies on an essentially capitalist economy, in publishing, for example, a radical revolutionary text which seeks to encourage the overthrow of capitalism. The self-confident stance of such a publisher in publishing such a work provides another relevant example of the *hexis* in a field closely related to philosophical translation.

As might be expected in view of Bourdieu’s discussion of the academic field (see section 2.1.1 above), such crude terms as conservative and progressive are seldom used within the contemporary field of academic philosophy, but appropriately ‘technicalised’ or ‘euphemised’ alternative pairs of opposites are found with reference to both of the historical contexts under study here. Terms such as ‘Neoplatonic idealist’ (Stern, 2009: 134) and ‘antiquarianism’ (Beiser, 2008: 8) can easily be cross-referenced as variants of the conservative position, while the terms ‘nonmetaphysical’ (Stern, 2009: 142) and ‘anachronism’ (Beiser, 2008: 8) can be linked with the more progressive, ‘practical’ (Pippin, 2008) or ‘social’ (Pinkard, 1994) readings of Hegel. While Stern (2009) argues powerfully against the imprecision of such binary oppositions, it is the existence of such (op)positions in the field of philosophical discourse which necessitates the more sophisticated but nonetheless still positional construction of a translatorial *hexis*, a stance which appears honourable or at least respectable in view of such polarised oppositions.

In both historical fields, the relationship of academic philosophy to surrounding fields, such as the fields of religion, education, book publishing and politics, is also significant.

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52 For example, Georg Lukács (1985)
53 Robert Stern’s work is exceptionally direct in this respect.
54 Stern (2009) echoes the point made above about the ironic case of radical orthodoxy under communist regimes when he suggests that the previously radical ‘non-metaphysical’ readings of Hegel have become a slightly outdated orthodoxy by contrast with renewed interest in (Arystotelian) metaphysics, which he describes as currently ‘fashionable’.
in shaping the translatorial *hexis*. With regard to the ‘conflict of the faculties’ (1988: 37-72), Bourdieu analyses such relationships in the context of the French academic scene in the late 1960s, demonstrating considerable differences in status between academic faculties dependent upon their relative proximity to or distance from economic and political power. In the context of academic philosophy, the distinction between continental and analytic schools of philosophy in the Anglophone world throughout the twentieth century (Critchley, 2001) adds a further dimension to this conflict. Developing Bourdieu’s analysis further, the relationship between book publishing and translation has been described by Sapiro (2008; 2010). This analysis also plays a part in defining the respective fields and will be discussed briefly in the relevant chapters. Both translators were/are aware of the historically changing significance of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* for religion and cultural politics, especially with regard to the concepts known as ‘Hegel’s ladder’ and the ‘March of the Spirit’ according to which races, religions and cultures supersede one another through history, leading towards the ultimate dominance of (protestant) Christianity, and both translators express views on this subject in their published work.55 These aspects of the field are also of great importance in determining the translatorial *hexis* and will be analysed in greater depth in the relevant chapters. Two brief examples are given below by way of concluding this part of the theoretical discussion.

In Baillie’s own, non-translated works, such as *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience* (Baillie, 1906: 15-24), ‘Idealism’, ‘Religion’ and ‘Philosophy’ are defended, while ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism’ are embraced cautiously, stressing the need for a ‘social’ sense of ‘unity’ which can only be achieved through a personalised, religious commitment to ‘Absolute Spirit’, but warning against the dangers of individualism inherent in pragmatism and humanism. In this manner, the dynamics of the field contribute to the shaping of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis* through his participation in the on-going discourse about these philosophical (and ultimately also ethical and ideological) positions. Dependent upon the position he adopts, the field thus offers opportunities and risks for the enhancement of the translator’s symbolic capital.

55 These phrases were probably coined by Hegel scholar H.S. Harris, who writes, ‘What we now know about the cultural movement of religious ideas (and especially about the spread of Buddhism) shows that the March of the Spirit is an unhistorical fiction; and Hegel’s interpretation of non-Christian cultures shows clear signs of the nascent cultural and economic imperialism of Western Europe in his time (and in the ensuing century)’ (Harris, 1995: 5).
In a book, *Democratic Liberalism and Social Union*, (Pinkard, 1987) published almost two decades before the appearance of his translation, Pinkard coins the admittedly ‘crude labels of the Aristotelian-Hegelian model and the Kantian-critical model’ in order to orientate his own position in this book. He summarises this position as follows: ‘Part of the view that I will be attempting to articulate here is the reintegration of what I would take to be the Hegelian legacy for democratic liberalism. Hegel’s reflections offer a good springboard for an explanation of what I take to be the type of social union that is democratic liberalism’ (1987: xiv-xvii). Investigating the precise implications and the development of Pinkard’s use of these terms as positions in the field of political philosophy provides an approach to understanding Pinkard’s position as adopted in the translation (2008). It goes without saying that Pinkard’s position may have changed and also that the field dynamics will have changed since 1987. In *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, for example, Pinkard adopts a more clearly ‘non-metaphysical’ position, “‘Spirit’ therefore denotes for Hegel not a metaphysical entity but a fundamental *relation* among persons that mediates their *self-consciousness*, a way in which people reflect on what they have come to take as authoritative for themselves’ (Pinkard, 1994: 9). Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*, it will be argued in chapter 4, is determined by his and his publishers’ negotiation of these subtle positionings and how they can be interpreted. The discussion raises questions regarding, for instance, whether democratic liberalism is a conservative or a progressive political theory and whether the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel, which once represented a progressive development, have in the meantime become a new orthodoxy. Leaving aside the complexities of the field for the moment, it is argued here that the translatorial *hexis* embodies, through textual and peritextual features of the translated text, a distinct historical stance within this socially construed arena of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy.

### 2.2.2 Lexical patterns as a symbolic embodiment of translatorial *hexis*

Subsection 2.2.2 presents the theoretical basis for the analyses of lexical patterning in the Baillie and Pinkard translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* in sections 3.2 and 4.2 respectively. An analysis of lexical patterning provides an objective basis for investigating elements in a text which may not be immediately evident to a reader.

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56 In Bourdieusian terms, the metaphysical is now posited (for example, by Stern (2009)) as the dominant (Stern uses the term ‘fashionable’), while the non-metaphysical has become subordinate.
Patterning may include a range of style markers, for example, repeated lexical, grammatical or cohesive features of the text (Leech, 1981), which can be used forensically, for example, to identify an unknown author of an anonymous text, but can also reveal something about an author’s, or more importantly here, a translator’s ideological commitments and stance with regard to the task of translation. By contrast with recent work on lexical patterning in translation studies which used large corpora of translated and non-translated texts (Dayrell, 2004; Dayrell, 2005), the lexical patterning analysed in the present thesis refers to patterning within small parallel corpora containing a single source text and two translations of the same text. The analysis focuses exclusively on two ST terms (Geist [mind/spirit] and aufheben [cancel/preserve/sublate] and their translations. While Baillie used several TL terms to translate each SL term, Pinkard used spirit for Geist and sublate for aufheben. Pinkard’s translation thus exhibited a greater degree of terminological consistency than Baillie’s translation. However, lexical patterning was found in Baillie’s translation, in the sense that the distribution of TL terms throughout the TT showed clear patterns. For example, Geist was generally translated as mind in the chapter entitled Reason but as Spirit (with a capital S) towards the end of the book in chapters entitled Religion and Absolute Knowledge (see section 3.2.1). Given the supposed ‘dialectical ambiguity’ of Hegel’s terms (see chapter 1), it is suggested that both Baillie’s more obvious lexical patterning with several TL terms translating a single SL term and also Pinkard’s norm-dependent pattern of one-for-one consistency can be theorised as embodying a ‘translatorial hexis’ as defined in section 2.1. This suggestion is supported with reference to Bourdieu’s original discussion of the hexis (in section 2.1) and also with reference to Bourdieu’s subsequent investigation of academic language (in section 2.1.1). The different types of lexical patterning found articulate divergent attitudes of the translators through ‘infinitesimal’ textual features, such as the difference between lower case and upper case letters, the presence or absence of the definite article deictic before mind and/or spirit, the connotations of mind versus spirit, the use of one verb or two to translate aufheben and the connotations of transcend and/or supersed, but also include Pinkard’s decision to adopt a norm57 of terminological consistency.

57 Reference is made here to the discussion of translational norms in (Baker, 2011: 191-192), especially Chesterman’s distinction between ‘accountability norms’, ‘communication norms’ and ‘relation norms’. Pinkard’s adoption of translational norms could be seen as reproducing his philosophical interest in ethical normativity (cf. Section 4.1).
While such features can be identified and described using textual analysis methods, the application of a concept of ‘translatorial hexis’ adapted from Bourdieu’s sociology, as already discussed in section 2.1, expresses a theoretical commitment to explaining the textual features described as products of a translatorial practice embedded in the social dynamics of the sub-fields in which the translators worked. A ‘radical contextualisation’ (Johnson, 1993: 9) of the lexical patterning recognises the patterning itself as a partly unconscious reproduction of values structured in the micro-dynamics of the sub-field. For example, Baillie’s contention that spirit is higher than mind (see chapter 3), and Pinkard’s view that terminological consistency provides a way of taking Hegel ‘seriously’ and recognising his philosophy as ‘scientific’ both reproduce ontological presuppositions embedded in the micro-dynamics of the surrounding field, which are thus embodied in the minutiae of the text.

Bourdieu’s analyses of the academic field (in the texts referred to in subsection 2.1.1) suggest that the minutiae of academic discourse are as intimately associated with the acquisition and (re)-distribution of reputation, distinction and power as are the metaphorically structured interiors of the Kabyle house and the bodily hexis of the honour-seeking Kabyle men and women. Textual features of an academic translation can thus also embody a translatorial hexis. In spoken lectures, political speeches and sermons, for example, changes in loudness and softness of the voice can be articulated by a skilled speaker to create sophisticated, persuasive effects, accompanied by gestures which increase the apparent physical stature of the speaker or reinforce the intensity or sincerity of their words, such as eye contact and gaze. By analogy, lexical choices and grammatical elaboration in a printed text can also contribute to such effects, thereby embodying the hexis. Typographical conventions, such as italicisation, bold typeface, the use of quotation marks and exclamation marks, and the use of upper case characters, either for initial letters or for whole words, can be used for a similar purpose (Fowler, 1996; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004; Baker, 2006). Typography structures a very small space, but, like the interior of the Kabyle house, the differences between large and small, high and low, straight and bent are charged with significance, for example, through **bold**, *italic*, underlined and BLOCK CAPITAL typefaces.\(^{58}\) Repetition within a text can be used for a similar effect to underline the importance of a concept within an

\(^{58}\) The use of illuminated initial capitals in medieval manuscripts prefigures the spatially more restricted conventions of capitalisation adopted since the invention of movable type. Marshall McLuhan’s *Counterblast* (1969) provides a well-known, modern-art exploration of the potential of typography for communicating cultural meanings in an unconventional manner.
argument. The binding of the book, the quality of paper and the use of gold leaf embossed onto leather covers, to name just a few examples, can serve a similar rhetorical purpose of symbolically augmenting the authority and status of the author or the publisher or other institutions with which the book is associated, for instance, with reference to given aesthetic values which contribute to the structuring of the field. In this sense, the lexical dimension of a text is always supported by the typographical and peritextual dimensions.

2.2.3 Peritexts and the myth of individual translatorial agency

The concept of paratexts (Genette, 1997) is appropriate for the analysis of translations of philosophy because it allows a structural classification of the various zones of a translated philosophical text, and also because it points the way towards a functional classification of the these paratextual elements. Genette’s classificatory system provides a structural and functional framework for further analysis of a translated text with reference to Bourdieu’s sociology and also a further basis, in addition to the textual analysis described in subsection 2.2.2 above, for comparison between translations. Accordingly, the primary structural distinction between peritexts, which are part of the translated book, and epitexts, which can include an almost infinite range of texts more loosely associated with the translated text, draws attention to the question of translatorial agency: to what extent can responsibility for the translated philosophy text be attributed (exclusively) to the translator? This also raises the question of ‘intertextuality’ in the sense introduced by Kristeva (1980) of cross-referencing between texts, for example, between two or more translations of the same text or between a primary text and the surrounding, secondary literature. Some peritexts relate intertextually to epitexts. Such interrelationships have the effect of reproducing, in and around the texts, the structures (for example, the hierarchical relationship of dominance and subordination between professors and students) of the surrounding sub-field.

59 In this thesis, the term ‘intertextuality’ is used as a portmanteau term referring, in general, to relationships between independent texts. Genette’s terminology of paratexts, peritexts and epitexts (Genette, 1997) offers greater specificity, but the precision of these structuralist terms is blurred somewhat when considering texts translated by translators who have also published critical works in the TL about the ST, in this case, Hegel’s Phenomenology. In the sense of this thesis, the translator’s TL works represent epitexts of the TT in that they articulate and exemplify the translator’s usage of specific terms, like spirit and sublate. They provide a logically related semantic resource for understanding the terminology of the translation. This is especially so when such epitexts are (intertextually) connected to the translation, for example, by cross-referencing on the same web-page. In this case, the translator’s epitexts can be classified as virtual peritexts.
In functional terms, the peritexts allow the construction of a translatorial agent who is formally responsible for the translation. The requisite formal gesture is conventionally performed in an academic translation under the heading of ‘Acknowledgements’ in which the named translator mentions and thanks various other agents who have helped in the completion of the work. The translator then conventionally articulates an ‘apology’ for any infelicities in the work for which she/he accepts full responsibility.60 This formal gesture functions in a number of ways. For example, it exonerates the publisher and the other acknowledged and unacknowledged agents (such as the proof-readers, printers, typesetters etc.) and at the same time strengthens the role of the translator as the agent with full responsibility for the translated work. However, along with the other peritextual elements in a translation of a philosophical work, the formal apology also disguises and in some cases permanently obliterates the real complexity of the translation process.61 The translator who speaks through the translator’s introduction, footnotes and other peritextual elements is, to some extent at least, a fictional character, a figurehead whose formalised stance or hexis incurs honour and respect by obscuring the complexity of the translation process from full view. In Bourdieusian terms the peritexts can be seen as another arena for symbolic violence; by masking its complexity, they transform the process of translation into a marketable product. The translatorial hexis is embodied in this product but still bears traces of the struggle. Analysis of the peritexts can therefore also contribute to an understanding of the translatorial hexis.

By way of example, the translatorial hexis of the Baillie translation can be seen as embodied in the manner in which Baillie and/or the publishers expanded Hegel’s table of contents adding a breakdown of main points in square brackets and a new sub-heading not found in the source text. In the footnotes, the reader’s attention is drawn to possible biblical references in Hegel’s text. In the long introduction, Baillie provides a

60 The author is indebted to Sumillera (2010) for her explanation (in the context of the IPCITI 2010 conference) of the role of translator’s apologies from 17th century onwards.
61 Research on the Hegel/Miller (1977) translation in the Miller archive held by Essex University revealed, for example, that at least some of the Miller translation derives from (Miller’s amendments to) an abortive collaboration with an American co-translator, Peter Fuss. No mention is made of this in the peritexts, i.e. in the translated book, for which Miller acknowledges full responsibility. Only reference to the epitexts (personal correspondence, in this case) reveals the involvement of this other translatorial agent.
potted biography and outlines Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. He foregrounds themes central to the British Idealist orthodoxy, such as the unity of philosophy and religion, and the ‘concrete universal’. The ‘Translator’s Introduction’ concludes with a flourish of literary and philosophical intertextuality with quotations from Dante’s Divine Comedy (in Italian), Wordsworth’s Excursion and a final reference to Aristotle, all in the last paragraph. Each of these interventions can be understood and investigated further with reference to Bourdieu’s concept of an honour-seeking translatorial hexis which is, however, the product of Baillie’s interaction with other agents.

Genette introduces the term ‘allographic’ (1997: 263) to describe peritextual elements written by authors other than the main author. In the context of a translation, this term would refer to an author other than the translator. The Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977), which is not considered in detail in this thesis mainly for reasons of space, provides a good example of a translated text with important allographic peritexts in the form of a thirty-page introduction preceding the translated text and an analysis amounting to around 100 pages following Miller’s translation, both written by J.N. Findlay, the well-known authority on Hegel mentioned in section 2.1.1 above. In the case of the Baillie and Pinkard translations, the absence of allographic peritexts intensifies the impression of individual translatorial agency, although a closer consideration reveals the indirect involvement of other agents and an indirect allographic presence at the level of intertextuality.

Two short examples further illustrate this point. Firstly, the Baillie translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) contains footnotes derived from the standard German editions edited by Dr. Georg Lasson. The footnotes embody Lasson’s Christian theological interpretation of Hegel in the peritexts to the Baillie translation and therefore represent an intertextual relationship. It would be incorrect to attribute this interpretation

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62 Bourdieu was particularly aware of the dangers of what he refers to as the ‘synoptic illusion’: the academic practice of summarising and tabulating data. It is this danger of over-objectification which necessitates self-reflexivity in sociological research (Bourdieu, 1992; Jenkins, 2002: 56-57).

63 The centrality of these themes to British Idealism is discussed in Stern (2009).

64 Anticipating the data from chapter 3 to reinforce this general theoretical point, Baillie was in fact honoured with the award of Knight Commander of the Italian Crown in 1933. The possibility of connections between the Italian quotation (added to the 1931, second edition), the flourishing of Italian Hegelianism in the 1930s and Baillie’s award demonstrates the potential value of such a line of enquiry based on translatorial hexis embodied in the peritexts. Perhaps Baillie anticipated Italian readers or wished to acknowledge collaboration with Italian Hegelians.

65 Baillie acknowledges his indebtedness to Lasson in his Translator’s Introduction, making specific reference to the origin of the footnotes in the first edition (Hegel/Baillie, 1910).
entirely to Baillie, although he was formally responsible for including this information in his translation. Baillie’s agency is therefore made more complex by the intertextuality of these peritexts. Secondly, both Miller (Hegel/Miller, 1977: xxxi) and Pinkard (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) refer to their predecessor translators. A relationship of intertextuality can be seen, for example, in Pinkard’s adoption of small ‘s’ for spirit, and his use of sublate to translate aufheben throughout his translation (in both cases, by direct contrast with his predecessor). These translatorial decisions refer to and are determined, at least to a certain extent, by the previous translations; the strategy is made explicit in the peritexts and represents Pinkard’s textual response to antecedent allographic epitexts in the form of a peritextual criticism of the previous translations. These features can therefore also be understood as manifestations of a translatorial hexis.

Epitexts can include letters, notes, articles and books authored by the named translator and provide a more direct glimpse of the translator at least potentially speaking with her/his own voice. Allographic epitexts (Genette, 1997: 337, 348), texts written by authors other than the translator, such as the detailed critical notes on Miller’s translation written by H.S. Harris, and the obituary to Miller published in the Owl of Minerva, the bulletin of the Hegel Society of America (Vol. 22, Issue 2, 1991, author not known) provide important insights into the production and reception of this translation, but will not be considered in detail here. As will be seen from the analysis of the online draft of Pinkard’s translation in chapter 4 together with numerous articles and links to books by Pinkard, the distinction between peritexts and epitexts will become increasingly blurred by the opportunities for increased multimediality offered by new technologies.

Like the lexical and grammatical decisions, which will be analysed in sections 3.2 and 4.2, the peritexts analysed in sections 3.3 and 4.3 embody a translatorial hexis in that they represent and articulate a stance adopted by the translator, possibly in collaboration with other relevant agents, at least partially in response to expectations about how this stance will influence the reception of the translation, the reputation of the translator, the publishing house and similar factors. Accordingly, Baillie’s considerably expanded Table of Contents (by comparison with the ST), Translator’s Introduction, Explanatory

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66 A 49-page document with notes and criticism of Miller’s translation has been published online (http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/2541/HSH00018.pdf) last accessed 22/11/2011.
Notes, and footnotes articulate the authoritative pedagogical mastery of the subject matter and rhetorical skill which Baillie and his publishers considered appropriate for a work of this kind. By contrast, Pinkard’s ‘Notes on the Translation and Small Glossary’ and in-text footnotes embody a very different, more circumspect stance reflecting contemporary, politically correct, liberal-democratic concerns for transparency and accountability. In their peritextual introductions both Baillie and Pinkard acknowledge that a translation necessarily involves a degree of interpretation; Pinkard is particularly concerned to limit the extent to which his interpretation of Hegel might interfere with the reader’s admittedly indirect access to Hegel’s ideas. The inclusion of a parallel German source text alongside the translation can be regarded as a major peritextual intervention in response to this concern. In this sense, the parallel source text can be classified as an allographic peritext authored by Hegel. The source-text author is invited back onto the stage to stand side by side with the translator. The presence of the source text is a gesture, a linguistic challenge to readers with differing knowledge of German to engage in further critical scrutiny of the relationship between the source text and the translation, as well as a practical aid for (German-speaking) teachers and students. Accordingly, this major peritextual feature of the translation also embodies a translatorial hexis.

2.3 Summary

In theoretical terms, the proposed concept of a translatorial hexis was introduced as a means of analysing translations of a philosophical text with regard to micro-level translatorial decisions, which can be construed as textual embodiments of a specific translatorial stance, within a Bourdieusian framework. Chapter 2 orientated the concept of a translatorial hexis within the wider context of Bourdieusian theory as a sub-category of the habitus in that it also embodies the reciprocal relationship between agent and structure, translator and field, with reference to the distribution of capital within a social space, which is analysed in terms of fields and sub-fields, which are, in turn, characterised by opposing positions vying for capital. The translatorial hexis theorised in this thesis is differentiated from the habitus in that it is embodied specifically in micro-level, textual and peritextual features of a translated text and that it embodies a specifically honour-seeking stance of the philosopher-translator, who consciously

67 (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xi) and (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) in the ‘Notes on the Translation’
and/or unconsciously reproduces the distribution of capital structured in the surrounding fields and sub-fields. While section 2.1 described Bourdieu’s early usage of the term *hexis* and located the concept in this framework, subsection 2.1.1 investigated Bourdieu’s later work, in which he analyses academic language, especially philosophical language, as a source of symbolic power. Bourdieu’s sociological focus on philosophy and philosophers was shown to support the choice of a Bourdieusian theoretical framework for the present radical contextualisation of textual and peritextual details of translated philosophical texts. Bourdieu’s insistence on the need for self-reflexivity in sociological research was taken as a further advantage in that it highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the present project which seeks to combine insights from German studies, translation studies, sociology and philosophy and to stimulate participatory dialogue between these disciplines, especially in view of the prominent role of translations and translators in the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy.

Section 2.2 set out the theory of translatorial *hexis* as a basis for analysing and comparing two translations of Hegel’s *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Subsection 2.2.1 explained how the philosopher-translators can be seen as agents acting in complex, overlapping sociological fields and sub-fields. An analysis of the dynamics, for example, of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy at a given historical time reveals significant oppositions, personal and conceptual rivalries, with reference to which the philosopher-translator necessarily adopts a stance, defending one position, defying others. The *hexis* embodies the philosopher’s personal and professional commitments with regard to the philosophical issues at stake and will inevitably be embodied to some extent in the text and peritexts of the translation. Although only a crude simplification of the field dynamics, based on research into the translators’ own writings and relevant secondary literature, is undertaken in the thesis, this will be sufficient to demonstrate the functioning of the translatorial *hexis*. Subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 explained the theoretical approach to the data analysis to be undertaken in the subsequent chapters, identifying lexical choices, lexical and grammatical patterning and peritextual details of the translated text as embodiments of the translatorial *hexis*. 
Chapter 3  Sir James Black Baillie’s translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*

... if ... the argument of this work is untenable, idealism ... may once for all be abandoned - and indeed any attempt to put a spiritual interpretation upon the fact of human life.

(Hegel/Baillie, 1910: xxx)

Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. Section 3.1 analyses the background to Baillie’s translation in terms of Bourdieusian field theory. Section 3.2 provides an analysis of Baillie’s translations of *Geist* and *aufheben*. Section 3.3 analyses the peritexts to the translation. The analysis presented concentrates on the second edition of Baillie’s translation (1931), which is still in print, but brief reference is also made to the first edition (1910) where relevant. The overall aim of the chapter is to show how textual and peritextual details of the translation can be theorised as an embodiment of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*, that is, his stance with regard to the field dynamics of the historical context in which he worked.

### 3.1 Historical background to the Baillie translation

Section 3.1 is subdivided into two subsections. Subsection 3.1.1 analyses the historical context in which Baillie worked with reference to two interconnected fields in the sense described in Bourdieu’s *Language and Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu, 1991b: 172-202) and discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. The central theoretical aim here is to investigate the relationship between Baillie’s honour-seeking *hexis* and the struggles for power and various forms of capital which define the honour-endowing fields.

Subsection 3.1.2 narrows the contextual focus to biographical texts written about Baillie and briefly summarises Baillie’s published work and archival material relating to Baillie. The intention is not to provide a comprehensive or exhaustive account, which would go beyond the scope of this thesis, but rather to use the Bourdieusian theoretical framework to analyse the dynamic relationship between Baillie’s agency as a translator and the changing forces in the surrounding fields.
3.1.1 Baillie and the field of British Idealist philosophy

Bourdieu describes university professors as ‘authorities’ whose ‘position in social space depends principally on the possession of cultural capital’ (1988: 36). Since cultural capital is a subordinate form of capital, this places university professors ‘on the side of the subordinate pole of the field of power’ so that they are ‘clearly opposed in this respect to the managers of industry and business’ (ibid.). However, as holders of institutionalised cultural capital in the form of their academic tenure, professors occupy a dominant position in the field of cultural production, for example, by comparison with freelance writers and translators. Bourdieu’s analysis thus reveals interesting tensions with regard to the positioning of a philosopher-translator such as Baillie working in the early decades of the twentieth century.

In addition to his now somewhat eclipsed fame as the first translator of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Baillie is perhaps best remembered as the vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds (1924-1938) whose collaboration with Lord Brotherton, a wealthy industrialist, led to the expansion of the university and the building of the architecturally famous Brotherton Library (Baillie, 1952; Smurthwaite, 2004). A Bourdieusian analysis of Baillie’s position in the field takes into consideration not only historical change but also the complex ideological and philosophical dynamics of the period. The two editions of the translation (1910 and 1931) were published, in each case, shortly before the two (world) wars, during times of momentous political and ideological change, including the breakdown of British colonialism, home rule for Ireland, developments within liberalism, the suffragette movement, the emergence of the Labour Party and the trade union movement, and the development of left and right-wing totalitarian ideologies (Freeden, 2003; Boucher, 2012). As explained in chapter 1, Hegel’s book engages theoretically and perhaps ambiguously with many of these matters of state ideology. Baillie’s position cannot be fully understood without also considering the changing relationship between religion and politics. In contrast with Bourdieu’s analysis of power structures in general, which places political power firmly in the dominant position, Baillie claims that ‘the Church is higher than the State, more enduring’ (1952: 111).

The historical context for the Baillie translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology coincides with the period known in the history of philosophy as British Hegelianism or British Idealism. Even the most famous philosophers of this period, Bosanquet, Bradley, Caird,
Ferrier, Green, Jones, McTaggart, Muirhead and Pringle-Pattison (Passmore, 1968; Honderich, 2005; Mander, 2011; Boucher, 2012) are not well known names outside specialist philosophy departments; they pale in significance, for example, against their immediate successors Russell, Whitehead and Wittgenstein. In very broad terms, these individuals all represented fine-grained distinctions between rival philosophical (as well as political, scientific and theological) interpretations, developments and refutations of Hegelian philosophy; they were also associated with rivalries between Oxford philosophy, Cambridge philosophy and Scottish philosophy (Honderich, 2005), reflecting the educational institutions with which they were affiliated. In literature, the work of Anthony Trollope, especially his portrayal of the schism between ‘high’ and ‘low’ factions in the Church of England in *Barchester Towers* (Trollope, 1982), to some extent also anticipates the divergent interests and allegiances of the British idealist philosophers. Baillie was a Scottish philosopher working towards the end of this complex period of rivalries and ideas (Mander, 2011; Boucher, 2012) which constitutes the honour-endowing field, against the background of which Baillie’s translatorial *hexis* was generated.

The term field is used here in the sense of a ‘field of forces’ and a ‘field of struggles’ as described by Bourdieu (1991b: 171-202), although adapted to suit the analysis of translatorial *hexis* in this thesis. The analysis seeks to characterise the complexity of the historical context with reference to tensions between polarised positions or salient concentrations of capital. With regard to the (re)-creation of political and/or philosophical capital, the ‘mimetic’ (ibid.) proximity between the sub-field of philosophy and the dominant field of political power is significant here, especially because the primary academic training for future politicians at the time was in university departments dominated by the ideas classified and structured within philosophy departments (Boucher, 2012: 76). This distribution of power within the academy contrasts with the twentieth century which has witnessed a shift of emphasis from philosophy to the law as the intellectual basis for political education and a drive towards impact and popularisation in academic style in general. Although Baillie cannot be classified as a famous philosopher, his work as translator of Hegel and subsequently as vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds places him close to the generative centre of public and academic discourse. The production and publication of the Baillie translation is taken here as ideologically significant because, as will be elaborated in the following paragraphs, the translation contributed to the discourse between field and sub-
fields construed in essentially ideological terms with regard to conservative, liberal, socialist and totalitarian ideologies (Freeden, 2003: 11-30). Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘zone of uncertainty’, which has been applied with reference to the ‘interpreting habitus’ in ‘weak positions located in the gaps between fields’ (Inghilleri, 2005a), is equally applicable to the ideologically uncertain, transitional context in which Baillie worked. Attempting to reconstruct the dynamics of the relationship between Baillie as a translatorial agent and the target-language fields receiving his translation answers one of the subordinate research questions underlying the thesis. In seeking to orientate Baillie’s conscious and unconscious responses to these complex dynamics, and especially to analyse the embodiment of these responses in the text and peritexts of the translation, it will be useful to refer not only to fixed ideological or philosophical positions, such as orthodox Hegelianism or new liberalism, but also to note changes in position or emphasis. Such changes can be described as processes, for example, of de-Germanisation or de-Hegelianisation, secularisation, Christianisation, spiritualisation, de-politicisation or indeed re-politicisation.

The start of British Idealism is conventionally (Mander, 2011: 18) given as 1865, the publication year of James Hutchison Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel (1865). This book began a tradition of Anglophone philosophical discourse including Hegel translations and commentaries on Hegel, as well as original British and American philosophical writings, all more or less closely related to Hegel’s philosophy (Passmore, 1968; Boucher, 2012). It is significant that the central (‘secret’ and therefore privileged) ideas of idealism and Hegelianism were enshrined in canonical texts written in German; the undeniable difficulty of the texts (especially the Wissenschaft der Logik [The Science of Logic (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010)] and the Phänomenologie des Geistes [The Phenomenology of Mind (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931)]) inevitably augments the symbolic power of those intellectuals capable of explaining, translating and controlling the meanings of these canonical texts. Here also, changes in the structure of power since this time have to some extent reversed the balance. Translation in its widest possible range of meanings therefore lies at the heart of the complex tradition of British Idealism. Given the immediate history of Anglophone Hegelianism, the timing of the

68 Several of Hegel’s books, sections from books and collections of lectures had been translated into English during the later years of the nineteenth century but by no means all. A list of historical Hegel translations with publication dates is contained in A Hegel Dictionary (Inwood, 1992: 315-317). The most recent translation of Hegel’s Science of Logic contains a useful section on the history of Hegel translations (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010: ixiii ff.) The most recent translations of Hegel’s Phenomenology are discussed in chapter 4.
Baillie translations can be seen as a re-Hegelianisation of an already somewhat de-Hegelianised, Anglophone field. The translation asserts the Hegelian origins of idealist philosophy while at the same time de-Germanising the philosophy by appropriating it for the target audience. However, the international balance of symbolic power involved in these processes is extremely subtle, as the following quotation from Baillie’s posthumously published private journal suggests:

To put philosophy in technical language would mean a marriage of death and life, darkness and light. This is the danger of German philosophy, especially in the hands of men like Kant. It is not a danger that seriously threatens, or has ever threatened, English or French philosophy. The Teutonic and the Saxon and Celtic strains in European philosophy thus check each others’ faults.

(Baillie, 1952: 246)

Baillie’s adoption of Hegel rather than Kant as an author to translate suggests that he saw more life and light in Hegel than in Kant, but also perhaps indicates that the translation of Hegel’s philosophy into English affords an opportunity for checking its faults. The quotation thus demonstrates Baillie’s somewhat critical stance toward German philosophy but it also suggests the means by which, as a translator, Baillie might try to ‘check’ its faults. The accusation especially against Kant is that his language is over technical. As will be shown through the course of the chapter, Baillie’s translatorial hexis pivots on the perceived need to check the over-technicalisation of German philosophy and to draw from it something simple and valuable; this suggests a dominant rather than a subservient attitude towards his source culture.

British Idealism can broadly be regarded as a reaction to the nineteenth-century emphasis on the natural sciences, especially a body of ideas associated with Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, and to the utilitarianism associated with Mill, Bentham and Sidgwick (Boucher, 2012: 30). Idealism also stands in contrast to the Scottish tradition of ‘common sense’ philosophy associated with Thomas Reid (Passmore, 1968: 30, 53). Such intellectual trends can be construed metaphorically as vying with one another for dominance of the field; at another level of analysis, it is agents, individuals and classes, which vie with one another for survival, dominance and honour. The particular appeal of Hegelian idealism in the philosophical sub-field was perhaps its (and/or Hegel’s) insistence on the centrality of the mind (Geist) in epistemology. Unlike
the more extravagant form of subjective idealism, verging on solipsism and generally associated with Berkley (and Fichte)\textsuperscript{69}, Hegelian idealism does not deny the existence of an objective world independent of the mind; it denies the intelligibility of any such apparently objective world without a mind. This position represents a challenge to empiricist and naturalistic epistemologies (such as social Darwinism and utilitarianism) which seek to bracket out the (subjective) influence of the mind. The Anglophone revival of Hegelian idealism sought to reinstate the mind, which had to some extent been disinheritied by nineteenth century progress in the natural sciences. The quotation at the head of this chapter (‘if the argument of this book is untenable … idealism may once for all be abandoned’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910: xxx)) articulates Baillie’s commitment to this project and thus to the ideological significance he attached to the translation. The spirituality associated with Hegel can be seen as a reaction to materialism in its many forms. The translation allows English-speaking readers to evaluate the claims of idealism, but, as we shall see, not quite directly from the horse’s mouth.

The idealist project is still in a sense unfinished and still has profound political and social implications because it raises difficult (still unanswered) questions regarding how minds develop and whether all minds are ontologically the same or in some sense ethically equal. For philosophers in the early years of the twentieth century, the stakes were very high because philosophical answers to such questions could impact, for example, on issues, such as racial and religious inequalities, which were relevant for the future of the British Empire. Much therefore pivoted on precisely how the mind or spirit was to be construed in this context. A philosopher’s honour or respectability depended upon how skilfully he (for most ‘professional’ philosophers were men\textsuperscript{70}) negotiated the very considerable difficulties involved in discussing the workings of the human mind or consciousness. Baillie’s particular skill was in navigating, through the (technical) difficulties presented by his task, an honourable and respectable course, in view of his own perception of his readership.

Within British Idealism, a distinction arose between, on one hand, Absolute Idealism or Absolutism, which was associated not only directly with Hegel but also especially with

\textsuperscript{69} Baillie himself groups Berkley with Fichte in a footnote to the translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1931: 137) thereby strengthening the distinction between Hegel and his more strictly idealistic predecessors.

\textsuperscript{70} Apart from the many, widely under-acknowledged nineteenth century ‘amateur’ philosophers, such as Marian Evans and Elizabeth Haldane, Iris Murdoch is perhaps the most notable British woman philosopher to enter and emerge from Oxford philosophy towards the end of the period under analysis (Honderich, 2005).
Bradley and Oxford philosophy (Passmore, 1968: 60-71), and, on the other hand, what was described as Personal Idealism or Personalism (Boucher, 2012: 38 ff.). Absolutism was considered the orthodoxy and, in spite of Bradley’s contribution, was still associated with German philosophy and especially with Hegel’s canonical texts, many of which were not yet available in translation. A translation of Hegel may therefore have seemed to support this orthodox position. However, the Personalists had become suspicious of the Absolutists’ idea of a ‘monistic’ metaphysical unity ‘above and beyond the individuals who comprise it and which has a will of its own’ (Boucher, 2012: 42). This metaphysical unity, which was (rightly or wrongly) associated with Hegel and sometimes referred to as the ‘God State’, (ibid.) encroached, especially through its application to moral philosophy, on the neighbouring fields of theology and politics, challenging traditional views about individuals’ relationship with God and with the political state, but perhaps more importantly, challenging common sense. Baillie expresses his opposition to Absolute Idealism in the following quotation:

Human experience seems an experiment or adventure for the conservation and fulfilment of our personality. Instead of the experience ultimately merging the individual in the Absolute, as is currently held by a certain type of philosophical theory, there seems good ground for maintaining precisely the opposite - that the process, under the conditions of space and time, consists in the emergence of the individual out of the Absolute or Nature into the definiteness of a substantive personality. The world provides the opportunity for the discovery of the Divine and the Human Spirit.

( Baillie, 1922)

L.T. Hobhouse, saw in Absolutism ‘a diminution of the individual and subordination to a “higher” entity’; Absolutism construed in this way was linked with German (Prussian) militarism in the 1914–18 war (Boucher, 2012: 45). One of the leading Personalists was Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, one of Baillie’s teachers at Edinburgh (Baillie, 1952: 7), who criticised Hegelianism and the British Absolutist developments of Hegel for

71 Spirit monism asserts that the primary substance in the universe is spirit as opposed to matter. The idealists were concerned with the ‘modalities’ of mind or spirit, that is, the ways in which the one substance becomes differentiated into the complex world of nature (Boucher, 2012: 57 ff.).
72 The extent to which individual British Idealist philosophers actually subscribed to this kind of ‘monistic’ or ‘holistic’ view is discussed in detail by Robert Stern (2009: 60 ff).
73 In Hegel Myths and Legends (Stewart, 1996), Jon Stewart defends Hegel against this and many other accusations.
their ‘identification of the human and the divine consciousness’ (Boucher, 2012: 45), that is, for suggesting that the ‘finite’ human mind or spirit is in some way the same as God’s ‘infinite’ mind or spirit.74 This almost blasphemous suggestion is important outside the field of theology because of its complex bearing on individual human freedom. To put the matter very crudely, if individual human minds are identified with God’s mind, in which sense can individual humans be thought of as free or autonomous? In view of the tension between Absolutism and Personalism and Pringle-Pattison’s linking of Absolutism with Hegel, Baillie’s translation can be seen as an invitation to critics of Hegelian idealism and to anti-Hegelian Personalists to read their Hegel more carefully, in order to appreciate Hegel’s particularly relevant answers to these questions. Even in the short and necessarily selective index added to the 1931 edition of the translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1931: 477-481), Baillie includes important references to ‘Personality’ which can be regarded as Baillie’s Hegelian answer to the anti-Hegelian Personalists: however Absolutist Hegel may seem, he did not ignore Personality; Hegelian answers to Personalist questions are to be found in the Phenomenology. For example, ‘The totality or actuality which is revealed as the truth of the ethical world, the world of social order, is the self of the Person [the legal self]; its existence lies in being recognised and acknowledged’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1931: 372). The words in square brackets were added by Baillie. Note also the emphatic capitalisation of ‘Person’ here. Baillie’s use of capitals is discussed in section 3.2; his use of the peritexts, such as index entries, is discussed in section 3.3. Baillie’s mission was to present Hegel in a de-technicalised manner compatible with the Personalist versions of idealism and, as we shall see later, compatible with simple Christian values.

The metaphysical and theological tensions between Absolute and Personal Idealists also resonate with British-Idealist political theory. Many of the British Idealist philosophers were actively engaged in social and political projects, especially with regard to the evolution of liberalism (Freeden, 2003: 78-93) from nineteenth-century classical liberalism to the new liberalism of the early twentieth century (Boucher, 2012: 97-99). The social-contract theory of the older liberalism relied on a ‘thin’ conception of citizenship, prioritising individual life, liberty and property in an essentially negative, non-interventionist manner. The role of the state was merely to prevent interference

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74 It is significant that the distinction between the (finite) self and the (infinite) Self was sometimes marked using capitalisation. As will be shown below, a distinction between spirit and Spirit plays an important part in the present analysis of Baillie’s translatorial hexis.
with the interests of atomistic individuals. Conservative resistance to liberal policies led to major parliamentary and electoral reform, for example, in the Act of Parliament of 1911 (Lang, 1999: 103-158). In view of such constitutional changes, the new liberalism developed the notion of a ‘thick’ individualism characterised by the interdependence of individuals within a community based on mutual recognition (ibid.). Interestingly, the roots of this new conception of social or positive individualism can also be traced back to Hegel’s theory of the social, recognitive development of self-consciousness, for example, in the well-known discussion of mutual recognition between master and slave in the *Phenomenology* (Hegel/Miller, 1977: 111 ff.). The new liberalism with its thick conception of individualism acknowledged ‘the deep social nature of humans, rooted in the idea of citizens having a common social identity and substance and actually recognising a sense of common good’ (Boucher, 2012: 98). Accordingly, in spite of misgivings about Absolute Idealism among some British philosophers, certain aspects of Hegelianism resonated strongly with progressive, political concerns of British Idealist philosophers, especially regarding the development of self-conscious, personal identity through socialisation and education. A return to Hegel which emphasised these broadly ‘social’ aspects of Hegelianism would occupy a very different ideological position in the field from the conservative, ‘God-State’ view of Absolutism against which some of the Personalists were reacting. Baillie’s translation supports a balanced view, preserving the stability of a Christianised spirituality while, at another level, encouraging a secularised re-interpretation of the social meaning of spirit which anticipates the ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations of Hegel (Pinkard, 1994) analysed in chapter 4.

British Idealist philosophers including Baillie (1911) openly espoused the concept of the common good as a social and political ideal. They collaborated and competed with British politicians of the time in a struggle to define precisely what was to be understood by the common good and how it should best be achieved. In brief, the concept of the common good promised to combine and reconcile a perceived need for urgent and radical social and political change through controlled reform within the framework of the existing institutions of the nation-state (Boucher, 2012: 87-94). Conservative tendencies within the new liberalism and within British Idealism stressed

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75 In view of the importance of the term *Spirit* in this thesis, it is interesting to note that the Lords Spiritual (that is, the bishops in the House of Lords) played a significant part in these changes. The term *Spirit* was therefore highly politically charged at the time of the translation, in a sense analogous to that described by Hoey as ‘lexical priming’ (2005).
the need to preserve the institutions of the Empire, the Monarchy, Parliament, the Church and especially the education system; progressive tendencies stressed the need for major structural changes in the empire (de-colonisation, home rule for Ireland), in the social responsibilities of the state (moves towards a welfare state), in the electoral system (suffrage and parliamentary reform), in industrial relations (trade unions) and in education (university extension programme, developing universities in the north of England) (Boucher, 2012: 76 ff.). The principal challenge facing the élite classes of aristocrats, politicians, academics and administrative officials was to restructure the social institutions in such a manner as to encourage individuals as well as groups or communities to fulfil their potential for the common good. The extent to which the common good is construed in material or spiritual terms, and the relative weighting accorded to individuals and the community, to human law and to divine or natural law, are crucial issues, central to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.

Many of the difficulties encountered in politics and in philosophy during this historical period have remained intractable. For example, one primary realisation among philosophers and intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century, especially in view of the second Boer War (1899 - 1902), was the grave injustice which had been inflicted in the name of the British Empire on non-European races and non-Christian religions. The intractable problem was to devise and justify a humane and ethical manner of proceeding into the new century (Boucher, 2012: 138). Opinions were divided over whether the common good would be served better by breaking up the empire, allowing greater autonomy to former colonies or by applying even greater energy to the improvement of living conditions and education in dominated territories. Although Hegel’s philosophy can be misunderstood as narrowly Christian and Eurocentric in its apparent espousal of a hierarchical model of historical progress, a closer reading (Houlgate, 2005: 18-25) shows that Hegel’s philosophy is primarily concerned with analysing the breakdown of such hierarchies in speculative philosophical terms rather than with recommending them to politicians. Baillie occupied a conservative position within the Personalist ranks (Mander, 2011: 48) and, as will be shown in section 3.2, he does seek, through the translation, to preserve the stability of the hierarchical model, but

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76 The influence of British Idealism on the foundation of the British ‘welfare state’ in the late 1940s is also well documented (Boucher, 2000; Boucher, 2012).

77 The special appeal of the verb *aufheben* [sublate/cancel/preserve] can be understood in this light: balancing the (apparently) opposing needs of cancelling the bad while preserving the good was and still is a central political and social concern. Hegel’s philosophy seemed to offer a theoretical framework within which such questions could be addressed.
at the same time, he attempts to make room for a more socially progressive, ethical interpretation of Hegel’s book. The apparent tension here suggests that Baillie may have been addressing professional and popular readerships at different levels. This suggestion is also considered in greater detail later in the chapter.

In home affairs, questions of education and social class further exemplify the paradoxical difficulty of implementing the common good. The British Idealist philosophers represented an educational élite. Possibly influenced by Hegel’s portrayal in the *Phenomenology* of the quasi evolutionary, hierarchical development of *Geist* [mind and spirit] throughout the history of the world (viewed from Hegel’s potentially Eurocentric perspective), such philosophers seem convinced of their intellectual and spiritual superiority over the lower classes, over the majority of women and over most foreign races. Baillie certainly expresses such views in his unpublished and posthumously published writings (Baillie, 1952: 145 ff.). However, as members of an intellectual and spiritual élite, these philosophers were equally committed to ideals of social and political justice, if not actual equality. The most direct resolution to these dilemmas, and therefore the realisation of the common good, was to be found in the dynamic expansion of education (Boucher, 2012: 110-114) and social welfare (ibid. 115 ff.). As will be seen with reference to Baillie’s working life, Baillie was directly involved with academic administration and industrial relations (Baillie, 1911) as well as with German philosophy.

Another contextual factor relating directly to Baillie’s Hegel translations in 1910 and 1931 was the radical change in Anglo-German political relationships. If a knowledge of German and an expertise in German philosophy represented a major cultural asset during the Edwardian era (1900–1910),78 considerable personal skill must have been required to preserve the value of such an asset in the years leading up to the 1914-1918 war. During time of war being an expert in the enemy language and culture is likely to arouse suspicions of divided loyalties. An anecdote about the Hegelian philosopher-statesman R. B. Haldane, who was Lord Chancellor in Asquith’s Cabinet at the beginning of the war, exemplifies this well. In 1916, Haldane was forced to resign from office because ‘[a] hue and cry had been raised against this statesman who had once

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78 The shift in British sympathies away from Germany is symbolised in the change to the family name of the British monarchs from Saxe-Coburg (Edward VII) to Windsor (George V), his son. The name was changed in 1910, the publication year of the first edition of Baillie’s translation of Hegel.
said that Germany was his “spiritual home” (Honderich, 2005: 953-954).\textsuperscript{79}

Furthermore, a naval arms race between Germany and Britain had been under way since 1904, leading to the building of the ‘Dreadnought’ class of British battleships. Against this background, the first edition (1910) and the second edition (1931) of Baillie’s translation both embody a deep commitment to the abiding value of Hegelian philosophy (in its Personalist interpretation), in spite of deteriorating Anglo-German relations in both historical periods.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Richard Burdon Haldane’s sister, Elizabeth Haldane, translated Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy from 1892-96 (Hegel/Haldane, 1892).

\textsuperscript{80} In German Philosophy and the War, J.H. Muirhead, who was series editor for Baillie’s translation (1910 edition) argues that it was a crude, popularised misunderstanding of German philosophers, such as Hegel and Nietzsche, which led to the culture of militarism (Muirhead, 1915). In particular, Muirhead attacks Haeckel’s misappropriation of Darwinism.
3.1.2 Biographical and bibliographical profile of Baillie

Section 3.1.2 provides a short analysis of biographical and bibliographical material, focusing more specifically on Baillie’s positioning in relation to the field dynamics described in section 3.1.1. Although the biographical, bibliographical and archival material discussed here seems to provide an ‘objective’ basis of documentary evidence, a note of caution in line with Bourdieu’s demand for an ‘objectification of the act of objectification’ (Jenkins, 2002: 47) should be expressed. While every effort has been made to research as much of the material available on Baillie as possible, the information presented necessarily represents a selection. The criterion for selection was relevance to the argument of the chapter and the thesis as a whole, and this inevitably involves an element of subjectivity on the part of the researcher. These materials are used tentatively in order to reconstruct the field dynamics in a manner which allows a theoretical contextualisation of textual and peritextual details to be analysed in sections 3.2 and 3.3.

Biographical

Two published biographical texts, the introduction to Reflections on Life and Religion written by Baillie’s colleagues, Sir Walter Moberly and Professor Oliver Selincourt, (Baillie, 1952) and the entry entitled ‘Sir James Black Baillie (1872-1940)’ published in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and written by the librarian at the University of Leeds, (Smurthwaite, 2004) are short, and the texts diverge very little in (factual) content from Baillie’s curriculum vitae held in the University of Cambridge archive (ACAD, 2012). In general, the texts construe Baillie’s life formally in terms of his relationship with the honour-endowing academic, administrative and aristocratic establishment. However, particular reference is also made to his ‘eloquence’, ‘elevation of thought and distinction of style’ and ‘urbanity’ (Baillie, 1952; Smurthwaite, 2004). Such references to Baillie’s style certainly resonate with the elevated, rhetorical style of the translation and provide documentary evidence of how Baillie’s style was perceived by readers and listeners. Especially with regard to their honour-endowing function based on recognition by the audience or readership, Baillie’s stylistic elevation and eloquence thus constitute key elements in the construction of his translatorial hexis.

81 The online archive is available at: http://venn.lib.cam.ac.uk/cgi-bin/search (accessed 17/04/2012).
The curriculum vitae from these sources can be summarised as follows: Baillie received numerous awards for a range of achievements and services, from his first degrees leading to a DPhil from the University of Edinburgh in 1904 to his OBE in 1919, British knighthood in 1931 and the Order of Knight Commander of the King of Italy in 1933 (Smurthwaite, 2004). His books, including the translation, and articles were published by important academic publishers, Swan Sonnenschein, George Allen & Unwin, Macmillan New York and the philosophical periodical *Mind* amongst others. Baillie was vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds from 1924 to 1938. In 1938, two years before his death, Baillie was appointed Chairman of the Arbitration Tribunal on wages and conditions of labour in the oilfields at Trinidad, Island of Tobago in the Caribbean. He also served on a tribunal assessing the claims of pacifists and conscientious objectors seeking to avoid military service. His professional trajectory can be seen to move from German philosophy and the academic world closer to the ‘field of power’ in the sense that his professional responsibilities became ever more public and more closely linked with larger amounts of economic capital. For example, during his time at

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82 A brief history of these publishing companies (Mumby, 1955) contains the names of several of Baillie’s colleagues, indicating the close relationship between the fields of philosophy and publishing.
Leeds, Baillie was responsible for major expansions of the university. The building of the Brotherton Library is a monument to Baillie’s successful collaboration and friendship with the wealthy industrialist Lord Brotherton.

Beyond its factual content, the Smurthwaite biographical piece (2004) attempts to discredit Baillie by suggesting, on the basis of personal acquaintance gained through his work at the University of Leeds, that Baillie’s elevated style was linked with an overbearing and self-righteous attitude combined with racist views.

Baillie had a commanding presence, and on public occasions displayed a gracious manner; unfortunately he did not see fit to deploy it in dealing with his colleagues at Leeds, where his abrasive and overbearing style aroused considerable ill feeling, and his abrupt volte-faces caused bewilderment. His private diaries teem with vitriolic abuse against his staff. Unswervingly convinced of his own rightness, he reacted with baffled rage to any opposition. It is unsurprising therefore that he failed to gain an extension of his term of office beyond the official retiring age. Baillie held the conventional prejudices of his day: he commented disparagingly on the supposed ‘black blood’ in Lord Harewood’s family, and expressed distaste at the appointment of John Rothenstein, a Jew, as director of the Leeds Art Gallery. He combined a dour prudery with a taste for salacious gossip. (Smurthwaite, 2004)

As Smurthwaite comments here, such prejudices were conventional, presumably among a certain group, at this time. However, for the purposes of this thesis, especially the elaboration of the concept of *hexas*, it is interesting that Baillie is described as asserting his will in this ‘overbearing’ manner; that he was ‘convinced of his own rightness’ and expressed baffled rage at any opposition. Baillie’s abrasive disparagement of people he presumably took to be his inferiors is relevant here because these traits suggest that Baillie’s self-confidence was built upon an autocratic, hierarchical model of society according to which those at the top of the hierarchy must maintain their status in spite of opposition. His ‘vitriolic abuse’ of his staff in his diaries and his ‘baffled rage’ at any opposition were presumably attempts to consolidate his position of authority. This view of Baillie’s hierarchical understanding of the world is further supported by several apparently anti-semitic statements in Baillie’s *Reflections on Life and Religion*, for example, where Baillie uses the word ‘parasitic’ to describe relationships between the
'Jewish community’ and the political ‘State’ within which they live. Baillie’s argument is that ‘the “law” under which the Jews live is incompatible with the very nature of a political State’ (Baillie, 1952: 223).

A somewhat different reference to Baillie’s relationship with the Jews appears in the fictional portrayal of Sir David Evans in a whodunit novel The Weight of the Evidence by Michael Innes (Innes, 2001), which can be classed as a secondary biographical source. Michael Innes is the penname of Michael Innes Mackintosh Stewart who lectured on English at the University of Leeds while Baillie was vice-chancellor (1924-38). The book and its association with Baillie are mentioned in the Smurthwaite biographical piece (2004). The series of ‘Inspector Appleby Mysteries’ were published during the early 1960s. This particular story relates to the murder of a professor at the fictional, provincial university of Nesfield in the north of England during the mid-1930s. One of several final twists in the denouement of this story is that the vice-chancellor, Sir David Evans (allegedly based on Baillie), who turns out to have been innocent of the murder, has in fact been covertly involved in helping Jewish refugees escape from the Gestapo in Germany. Archival research at the University of Leeds suggests that the real Baillie adopted quite a different position from his fictional counterpart.

In July 1933, Baillie was asked to join the Leeds Academic Assistance Committee which was set up to assist Jewish scientists to escape from Nazi Germany, initially by raising funds (Jones, 1933); however, Baillie declined (Baillie, 1933). Baillie’s reply, giving his reasons for declining this invitation, is reproduced in Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2: Baillie’s reply to an invitation to join the LAAC in 1933

Baillie’s reasoning here provides interesting insights into his sense of professional status, as well as his practical handling of a politically and morally sensitive issue. Such insights also contribute to the theorisation of Baillie’s translatorial hexas. In this letter, Baillie argues that his joining the committee (as vice-chancellor) might make other members of the university staff feel obliged to contribute because he was a member. ‘The matter should be entirely voluntary on the part of members of the staff’. With reference to the ‘classical liberal theory’ mentioned in section 3.1.1 above, this position is commensurate with a ‘thin liberalism’ or a negative, non-interventionist sense of liberty. Baillie considers intervention from above as a potential obstacle to the freedom of choice of his staff. Their voluntary contributions, as autonomous acts of generosity,
would presumably support the common good; a mere slavish act of obedience (mimicking the vice-chancellor) would not, regardless of the consequences. While wishing the committee success, Baillie suggests that ‘the necessary assistance should come from one or two well-to-do Jews, or from the Jewish community’. In keeping with the classical liberal position of seeking to promote social change through gradual reform within existing institutions, Baillie opts here in favour of preserving the existing racial or religious lines of demarcation between communities and preserving what he takes to be the political neutrality of the academy. In a second letter sent two days later (Baillie, 1933), Baillie advises his colleague that it would be better to identify one or more ‘distinguished scientists’ and invite them to join the university staff if funding were provided ‘from outside’. While seeming to assist the aims of the committee, this suggestion actually attempts to de-politicise or ‘euphemise’ (see section 2.1.1) the issue. No mention is made of Jews or Nazis in the second letter, merely the appointment of ‘distinguished scientists’ supported by external funding. There is perhaps a certain firmness of tone in Baillie’s concluding sentence, ‘It would be well, I think, if you considered this suggestion carefully before deciding to go further with your present arrangements’ (ibid.).

Baillie’s attempt to de-politicise this issue and to preserve the neutrality of the university as he understood this, resonate in a particularly relevant manner with Bourdieu’s views on the political immunity or ‘ivory tower’ of philosophy expressed in The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (Bourdieu, 1991a: 95-96). The growing professionalism of philosophy at this time (Mander, 2011: 35-36) served to keep it aloof from active or practical involvement in ‘popular’ political issues; by contrast, Baillie’s work for the Admiralty Intelligence, that is, for the Establishment, in no sense undermined his status in the academy. In view of his official status and presumably in keeping with his training as a moral philosopher, Baillie decided to adopt a high moral position in this case, as an apparently impartial judge. It is especially Baillie’s rhetorical emphasis on the high moral position of his and Hegel’s philosophy which is discernible within the text of the translation as Baillie’s translatorial hexis. Baillie also adopts a high moral position in response to criticism of his published works, as the following examples show.
Bibliographical

Not only the content but even the titles of Baillie’s published books show a progression from a direct promotion of Hegel, in *The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic* (Baillie, 1901), towards a gradually de-Hegelianised perspective in *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience* (Baillie, 1906), the title of which conceals the fact that this book deals extensively with Baillie’s (pre-translation) reading of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. The phrase the ‘idealistic construction of experience’ could, in fact be taken as a near synonym or an approximate translation for the ‘phenomenology of mind’. The title of *Studies of Human Nature* (Baillie, 1922) and also Baillie’s comment on Absolutism quoted in section 3.1, which is taken from this book, suggest a move away from the Absolutist interpretation of Hegelianism, idealism and theoretical philosophy and towards ‘common sense’. For example, Baillie claims ‘[i]t is not the purpose of these papers to defend or support any of the familiarly accepted theories, whether of idealism or realism. Human nature is far more interesting and much more important than any theory’ (Baillie, 1922: viii). Baillie also explains his re-orientation with reference to the recent (1914-18) war and the need for renewed, creative, human action: ‘For, apart from the shock which optimistic idealism has received from the international catastrophe of the recent war, the elaboration of a theory of a completed and perfect universe … leaves too little for the creative spirit of man to do’ (Baillie, 1922: vii).

It is important to stress that this does not constitute an abandonment of idealism or of spirituality or of the Personalist version of Hegel to which Baillie remained committed; it represents a call for an urgent reassessment of philosophical optimism in view of the catastrophic historical realities. The common good will no longer be served by optimistic theoretical speculation; practical answers are required. This quite radical change of stance can indeed be interpreted as a response to the field dynamics as discussed in section 3.1. The theme of the posthumously published book *Spiritual Religion* (Baillie, 1940) confirms Baillie’s commitment to a very simplified, de-

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83 ‘We best avoid the defects of one-sided theories if we follow the path of what Sidgwick used to call critical common sense, and hold to the natural solidarity of human experience to which it clings.’ (Baillie, 1922: viii).

84 This short book was originally published in 1931 as a series of articles in the *Hibbert Journal*, the publication year of the second edition of the translation. It was re-published in 1940 presumably under the
philosophised set of religious ideals: Faith, Hope and Love, which he equates with religion (faith), science and education (in their hope to discover the truth) and society (the social and political institutions and the concept of human fellowship or love). In the introduction to the also posthumously published *Reflections on Life and Religion* (Baillie, 1952), Baillie’s colleagues, Moberly and Selincourt, specifically mention a change of focus in Baillie’s interests after the completion of *Studies of Human Nature* (Baillie, 1922): ‘[f]or though he had many years of active life before him, his attitude towards academic philosophy in general and the Hegelian school in particular, had by this time become somewhat detached and critical and his energies were becoming more and more absorbed in practical affairs’ (Baillie, 1952: 7). However, in spite of this apparently sweeping change in Baillie’s interests, the biographers’ suggestion that Baillie’s concentration on practical matters was associated with a move away from Hegelian philosophy could, in fact, be based on a misunderstanding of Baillie’s interpretation of Hegelian philosophy, which, perhaps surprisingly, sees the ‘concrete’ and the ‘actual’ as ‘higher’ than the ‘abstract’ and the theoretical (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xxi).

One feature of Baillie’s *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience* (Baillie, 1906) deserves closer analysis because it illustrates the embeddedness of Baillie’s work in the pedagogical framework of higher education and suggests the influence of Baillie’s pedagogical habitus. The following excerpts from this book in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide an interesting view of the textual means adopted by a Scottish professor of philosophy (and his editors) in 1906 to get his point across to his readers in the most accessible manner possible at that time. The synoptic layout of the page is more relevant here than the actual content of the text.

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supervision of Baillie’s widow, Lady Helena Baillie, who dealt with many similar matters relating to Baillie’s estate.

85 In the *Translator’s Introduction* to the 1931 second edition of the translation, Baillie writes, ‘… the development of the notion is described by Hegel as a development from abstract to concrete’. The *Translator’s Introduction* is discussed in detail in section 3.3 below.
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CHAPTER I

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The dualism within individual experience—The problem thence arising—
The solution found in Purposiveness in general—Statement of this solution
—Pragmatism or Humanism—Its idealistic elements—Its defects—(1)
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We must start, in interpreting objectivity and necessity of knowledge, from this Absolute Individuality as found and expressed in Philosophy and Religion—All restricted forms of experience inadequate, and cannot serve as a basis for constructing experience—The value of this position—
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CHAPTER II

DUALISM AND THE NEW PROBLEM

The formulation of the problem of Knowledge—The factors in knowing (1)
active relation of subject and object, (2) with truth as end—The problem
of Knowledge has to consider the relation between these two, between actual and ideal.
Figure 3.4: Marginal notes from Baillie’s *Idealistic Construction of Experience*

The contents page shown in Figure 3.3 and the marginal notes shown in Figure 3.4 provide a pedagogically simplified, synoptic view of the complex content discussed and elaborated in the main body of the text. The first words of the synoptic contents page and the first marginal note both single out the main idea that modern idealism starts with Kant. Baillie’s opening sentence in the body text elaborates this simple point rhetorically, ‘It can hardly be doubted …’ (Baillie, 1906: 1). The idea of a simplified, skeletal version of a philosophical text, which might be useful to students, for example, for exam revision, suggests the possibility of reading philosophy at more than one level. The thrust of Baillie’s rhetoric here provides an objectified, synoptic, pedagogical reading, designed for students who need to understand philosophy only sufficiently well
to write essays and pass examinations. However, the text also functions at a more professionalised level, perhaps addressing fellow philosophers, for whom the experience of reading philosophy forms part of an enduring intellectual experience of their own evolving consciousness. In the context of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, this second level of reading can be referred to as a phenomenological reading because it reflects the serious philosophical purpose behind Hegel’s book rather than merely the pedagogical requirement to express something objective or synoptic about the content of the book.\(^{86}\) However, Baillie’s pedagogical strategy in this book met with some adverse criticism from his contemporaries. This suggests significant historical changes in the values of the academic field and the means of communicating these values.

The opening gambit of R.F. Alfred Hoernlé’s review of Baillie’s *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience* (Baillie, 1906), “Professor Baillie’s ‘Idealistic Construction of Experience’” in *Mind* (Hoernlé, 1907) is to locate Hegel and Baillie within the field of contemporary philosophy as Hoernlé saw it. He describes Hegel as an ‘awe-inspiring colossus but still a colossus with feet of clay’. Hegel is already old-fashioned, and ‘[n]o one has accepted his system in all its details’. However, even the ‘diluted “Hegelianism” born of selection and compromise, which forms the substance of so much modern thought, stands convicted of ineradicable difficulties’. Against this background, Hoernlé asks rather ironically, ‘[m]ight a whole-hearted “return to Hegel” not be the best defence against the onslaughts of hostile critics and the more insidious grumblings of the malcontents in its own camp?’ This comment is followed by a pithy assessment of Baillie as ‘in many respects, the most “orthodox” of present-day Hegelians’ (Hoernlé, 1907: 549).

In his reply, ‘Some Notes on Mr Hoernlé’s Criticism of Idealism’ (Baillie, 1908),\(^{87}\) Baillie does not immediately take up the charge that he is the most orthodox of Hegelians; instead, he suggests looking at the subject ‘from a somewhat different angle’ (ibid.). In fact, Baillie provides a skilfully crafted, de-Hegelianised (or at least ‘de-Absolutised’), socialised and modernised account of idealism, with particular reference to the ‘individuality’ and ‘self-consciousness’ of society and the ‘working relation of

\(^{86}\) Houlgate explains the phenomenological purpose of the book as follows: ‘The *Phenomenology* is essential reading, however, for those who are deeply attached to the ordinary view of the world as something which stands over against us and who want to know why they should be persuaded to give up that common-sense view and adopt the standpoint of ontological logic (2005: 50).

\(^{87}\) It is interesting that Baillie’s title here deftly shifts the emphasis away from Hoernlé’s criticism of Baillie’s book to a criticism of idealism *per se*. 
the mind of the unit [of society] to the social mind’, ‘the total system of ends which constitute the spiritual life of a society’ (1908: 79-82). In other words, Baillie claims that he and Hegel had been aware of the modern, social implications of idealistic theory all along; the real problem is that Hoernlé’s criticism has ‘failed to grasp the principle of the argument’ and, turning the tables on Hoernlé at this point, ‘consists for the most part in the reiteration of objections that have been all too freely used in the past by the orthodox opponents of Hegel or of idealism’ (1908: 84). In a characteristically confident manner, Baillie rises above the challenge, claiming the high ground of superior knowledge and understanding. ‘Mr Hoernlé’s repetition of the familiar objections to thorough-going idealism calls for no reply’ (ibid.). Confronted with the dynamics of the sub-field of philosophy, in this case, the (relatively) petty struggles for power and distinction played out in the pages of Mind, Baillie’s oratorical hexis skilfully elevates him above the two-dimensionality of the sub-field.

In a review of the second edition of Baillie’s translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1931), Loewenberg (1931) criticises Baillie’s work on two grounds. Firstly, the translation fails to do justice to the ‘untranslatable’ and ‘polysynthetic’ words, phrases and puns (he mentions Aufheben among others), thereby removing the irony and subtlety of Hegel’s mode of analysis, so that ‘there is in the English version no trace of the comic spirit which so obviously pervades the original’. Hegel’s book allegedly portrays a ‘comedy of errors’ (the various forms of life discussed by Hegel) ‘masquerading as the absolute’, and Baillie’s ‘attenuation of Hegel’s polysynthetic language’ is inadequate to this central theme. Secondly, especially in the Translator’s Introduction and Explanatory Statements, Baillie allegedly tries to force Hegel’s ‘imaginative and dramatic’ Phenomenology into the same mould as later works such as the Logic, which, according to Loewenberg, exhibit a ‘specious rigour’ and ‘spurious synthesis’.

By conflating criticism of the translation with a poorly argued rejection of Hegel’s system, Loewenberg lays himself open to a curt reply from Baillie in ‘Hegel’s Phenomenology’ (Baillie, 1932). Baillie regrets that the only reference to the Phenomenology (or his translation of it) to appear in Mind should be so misleading. Subtly confirming his allegiance to the intellectual hierarchy, Baillie divides the

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88 Loewenberg concedes that the book ‘professes to offer an argument for idealism’. In seeking to treat the Phenomenology outside Hegel’s mature system, as a demonstration of un-philosophical or pre-philosophical thinking, Loewenberg, to some extent, anticipates modern readings, such as that of Houlgate (2005).
readership (in this case of *Mind*) into two groups: those who already understand, and those who may be in need of assistance. ‘I do not suppose that those who are acquainted with the work will have been misled by the reviewer. But as many may not be familiar with it, perhaps it may be worth while to try to remove an erroneous impression’ (ibid: 407). Once again adopting the high ground, Baillie argues that, after reading Hegel’s *Preface* and *Introduction* (to the *Phenomenology*), ‘every competent student of philosophy’ could ‘furnish a complete refutation of the reviewer’s (Loewenberg’s) interpretation’. Baillie stresses the seriousness of Hegel’s approach and the continuity of the *Phenomenology* with the rest of Hegel’s system. He quickly dismisses the criticisms of his translation as follows: ‘There is perhaps no need to deal with the reviewer’s comments on the translation’. The implication here is that since the reviewer obviously does not understand Hegel, his remarks about the translation are not even worthy of comment. Nevertheless, Baillie does briefly discuss two words, firstly, to make the reviewer seem ridiculous because of his apparent failure to understand a key word (*Thierreich* – animal kingdom) and secondly, to restore the discussion of idealism to the seriousness it deserves.89

Accordingly, Baillie seems to gain dominance of the field through his ability, possibly acquired through careful study of Hegel’s dialectical method, to defend certain positions, such as that of ‘orthodox’ Hegelianism, without being cornered. When accused of being (nothing but) an orthodox Hegelian, he was able to turn the tables adopting an apparently de-Hegelianised (or de-Absolutised) position based on the sociality of self-consciousness, and from this new, elevated position to show the validity of his original Hegelian starting point, thereby reducing the stature of his opponent and augmenting Baillie’s capital. In this sense, Baillie’s hexis shows an affinity with Goffman’s concept of ‘poise’ (Goffman, 1955) and can be seen to reflect a multiple or complex habitus, a learned ability to occupy and move freely between opposing high and low positions in order to maximise personal and institutional honour and advantage. The characteristic features of the hexis, though, are the assumption of a dominant position and its physical embodiment, in this case in the text of Baillie’s response to the reviewers. The spatial metaphor of elevation and height in its several different senses symbolises Baillie’s translatorial hexis and also recurs in Baillie’s translation.

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89 Through a brief discussion of the notorious difficulty of translating *die Sache* [mattet/subject/facticity] in Hegel. ‘Facticity of individual consciousness’ is suggested as a translation for *die Sache selbst* in (Hegel/Shannon, 2001: vii).
3.2 Baillie’s translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* and the translatorial *hexis*

“...But spirit is mind at a much higher level of existence...”
(Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 250)

Section 3.2 analyses Baillie’s translations of the German terms *Geist* [mind/spirit] and *aufheben* [cancel/sublate/transcend] in *The Phenomenology of Mind* as embodiments of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*. Accordingly, it is argued that the actual printed outcomes of Baillie’s translatorial decisions can be seen as embodying an underlying stance, a specific, dominant attitude, not just about the Hegel text he was translating but also in response to the social dynamics analysed in section 3.1. The whole translation and all of its parts also embody the same complex translatorial *hexis* in a manner homologous to that according to which the physical objects around Bourdieu’s Kabyle house embody the gendered roles of the people living there (See chapter 2.1 with reference to (Bourdieu, 1977)). The present tomographic focus on two key words is designed to allow a detailed theoretical analysis of how this relationship of physical embodiment can be articulated. Scrupulous attention to textual detail is one of the features of professional academic discourse which distinguishes it from popular discourse, endows legitimacy to philosophical texts and symbolic power to their authors. In this context, it is Baillie’s judicious handling of textual details which constitutes his authority and defines his translatorial *hexis*.

The translated text analysed is the second (1931) edition of Baillie’s *The Phenomenology of Mind* (Hegel/Baillie, 1931), which is currently available in paperback in the Dover Philosophical Classics series, published in 2003. This second, revised edition was originally published by Macmillan in 1931. The first edition of the translation was published in 1910 in two volumes by Swan Sonnenschein. A copy of this first edition, which has also been consulted for comparison, is held in the John Rylands Special Collection at the University of Manchester. Baillie’s translation is based on the 1841 second edition (Schulze) of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the first edition having been published in 1807. Baillie also made use of the newer 1907
(Lasson) edition of Hegel’s works for the 1910 edition of the translation and consulted the second (1921) and third (1928) Lasson editions for his 1931 revision.\textsuperscript{90}

For the collection of data for this chapter using WordSmith 5.0 concordancing software, an online version of the source text published in text format by the Gutenberg Project was used. A plain text version of the Baillie translation was also downloaded from www.marxists.org in September 2009.\textsuperscript{91} All of the data shown in tables in the present chapter have been checked against the printed (Dover) edition of the translation; the electronic corpora were used as navigational tools for orientation within the published, printed texts.

The Preface and Introduction have not been included in the corpora under analysis because the Preface relates to Hegel’s planned system as a whole rather than to the content of the remaining chapters of the Phenomenology, and the intention in this thesis is to analyse the progression through the six main chapters of the book (Westphal, 2009: 1-36).\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, as was shown in Figure 1.1, the chapters are of very unequal length.

In the Translator’s Introduction, Baillie complains (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xvii) that Hegel’s chapter on Religion is ‘fragmentary, and inadequate to the theme’ and the chapter on Absolute Knowledge is ‘brief and elliptical to the verge of obscurity’ (ibid.). Baillie’s comment on the unequal length of the chapters exemplifies his critical attitude towards the structure of Hegel’s book, in particular, its alleged lack of attention to the theme of religion, and suggests that Baillie may have intentionally made some subtle improvements to these supposed defects.

The data on Baillie’s translations of the dialectically ambiguous\textsuperscript{93} terms Geist [mind/spirit/Spirit] and aufheben [cancel/sublate/transcend] show lexical patterning in Baillie’s translations of these two terms. In other words, Baillie uses more than one TL term to translate a single SL term, and there are discernible patterns in Baillie’s use of one TL term rather than another. Baillie uses mind, spirit and Spirit in a selective

\textsuperscript{90} Baillie specifies the sources in the Translator’s Introduction to both editions (1910 and 1931) with additional information in the Prefatory Note to the Second Edition. (1931) (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xi) The Suhrkamp Taschenbuch edition (Werke 3) (1986) has been consulted for cross reference with the digital (Gutenberg) version of the ST; the older editions of the German ST have not been consulted.

\textsuperscript{91} This website now provides a link to Pinkard’s online draft translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) instead of the full text of the Baillie translation.

\textsuperscript{92} The structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology, including the relationship between the Introduction and Preface, the rest of the book and Hegel’s system as a whole, is discussed in detail in Westphal (2009: 1-36).

\textsuperscript{93} The term ‘dialectically ambiguous’ has been defined and discussed in chapters 1 and 2.
manner to translate *Geist*; and *cancel*, *sublate*, *supersede*, *transcend* and several other verbs to translate *aufheben*. Detailed analysis reveals an underlying patterning at the level of lexis (and grammar) which is not explained by the immediate context and which the translator does not fully explain. For example, although Baillie explains in the quotation at the head of this section that *spirit* is higher than *mind*, he makes no attempt to explain the sense in which *mind*, which translates *Geist* throughout the chapter on *Reason*, is lower than *spirit*, which translates *Geist* in the next chapter. Baillie thus tacitly articulates and reinforces a hierarchical relationship between different levels of consciousness. He does not explain the use of the capital *S* for *Spirit* in the later chapters and he does not explain his choices of different English verbs as translations for *aufheben*. This means that the reader of the translation is presented with a structuring of Hegel’s ideas which derives from Baillie rather than from Hegel and that, without considerable effort, the reader cannot distinguish between Hegel’s line of argument with *Geist* and *aufheben* and Baillie’s superimposed structuring. It should also be mentioned that there are presumably other examples of this kind of lexical patterning in the translation. The present focus on just two examples allows a detailed analysis. It is Baillie’s stance with regard to the re-structuring of Hegel’s text which is described here as his translatorial *hexis* and which requires further explanation, not only with regard to the reasons Baillie explicitly indicates, but also with regard to reasons discernible in the micro-dynamics of the surrounding social context.

In the footnote (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 250) quoted at the head of the section, which constitutes a partial explanation of Baillie’s strategy for translating *Geist*, Baillie uses the spatial metaphor ‘high-low’ to distinguish between mental and spiritual experience.

> The term “Spirit” seems better to render the word “*Geist*” used here, than the word “mind” would do. Up to this stage of experience the word “mind” is sufficient to convey the meaning. But spirit is mind at a much higher level of existence.

(Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 250) (Underlining added)

This footnote suggests a conceptual framework for interrogating Baillie’s lexical patterning with *Geist* and also with *aufheben*. The HIGH/LOW spatial-metaphorical framework suggested in the footnote not only matches the Christian theological distinction between the low, temporal world of humankind and the high spiritual world
of God, Heaven and the after-life; it also matches Baillie’s elevated positioning within the hierarchically structured social, political and philosophical fields analysed in section 3.1 above. This homology suggests a metaphorical link between the field dynamics and the lexical structuring within the text which contributes to the radical contextualisation of Baillie’s translatorial *hexit*.

### 3.2.1 Baillie’s translations of *Geist*

Baillie’s translations of *Geist* include *mind, spirit* and *Spirit*, plus one occurrence of the combination ‘*Mind or Spirit*’. Although this offers a fairly limited lexical range for analysis with only one term in the ST and three in the TT, it still reveals at least one interesting pattern. Baillie uses *mind and spirit* at different places in the book, and, in the later chapters, he uses *Spirit* with an initial capital S.

The data in Table 3.1 below were collected by manually matching concordance lines taken from the digital version of Hegel’s source text with the corresponding translations in Hegel/Baillie (1931). Two sets of concordance lines with *Geist* and *Geiste* at the node were generated for each of the six chapters. The first set (*Geist*) showed only the uninflected noun *Geist*; the second set (*Geiste*) employed the feature known as a wildcard, so that inflected forms such as *Geistes* [genitive = of the spirit] and *Geister* [plural = spirits] were also included. The separate token counts have been combined in Table 3.1 to provide an overview. For the purpose of the analysis shown in Table 3.1, only the lexical component of the token is relevant; the grammatical inflections (the possible endings for *Geist* are: -e; -es; -er; -ern; -s) have been ignored. In analysing the translations of *Geist*, the token counts for *spirit* therefore include some grammatical shifts, such as *spiritual*, where *das Wesen des Geistes* is translated as *spiritual essence*.

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94 The adjectival form *geistig* [mental/spiritual] was not included in the analysis.
95 It should also be noted that the data in the tables show only Baillie’s actual translations of *Geist/Geiste*. Baillie also adds the terms *mind* and *spirit* occasionally, for example, when he breaks up a long sentence or instead of a pronoun. These additional occurrences have not been included in this data set. A more detailed analysis is provided in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6 below. Only 3 occurrences of the variant genitive form *Geists* were found; these were included in the count.
Table 3.1: Baillie’s translations of Geist (uninflected) and Geiste*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geist+Geiste* in ST</th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
<th>Self-consciousness</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Spirit</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Absolute Knowledge</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mind</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spirit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Target Text</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.5 below visualises the lexical patterning in Baillie’s translations of Geist as analysed in Table 3.1. The bars represent percentages of the number of times Geist is translated as mind, spirit or Spirit with a capital ‘S’ within each chapter.

Figure 3.5: Relative proportions of mind, spirit and Spirit as translations of Geist

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96 The discrepancy between ST and TT word counts here reflects the fact that Baillie translated Geist in paragraph 177, the first occurrence of Geist in the chapters analysed, as Mind or Spirit, i.e. two TT types for one ST token.
The analysis shows that Hegel does not use the word *Geist* in the *Consciousness* chapter at all. In *Self-consciousness* and *Reason*, Baillie translates *Geist* as *mind* in 60% and 80% of cases respectively. In *Spirit*, more than 80% of occurrences of *Geist* are translated by *spirit* with a small ‘s’. Towards the end of the book, in the *Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge* chapters, Baillie increasingly translates *Geist* with a capital ‘S’; this increase in Baillie’s use of *Spirit* with a capital S through the last three chapters is clearly visible from the graph. It is also evident that Baillie’s preferred translation in the *Self-consciousness* and *Reason* sections is *mind*. In numerical terms, occurrences of *mind* are clustered around the chapter on *Reason* (cf. Table 3.1). In the chapters on *Spirit, Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge*, Baillie’s preferred translation is *spirit*. Part of the way through the chapter on *Religion*, Baillie begins to use *Spirit* with a capital S. In fact, the occurrences of *Spirit* increase sharply from paragraph 763 onwards, at a point in Hegel’s account of the history of religions which Baillie seems to associate with a reference to the Christian religion. Capitalised *Spirit* appears alongside *God, the Divine Being, He* and *Him*. The convention of capitalising nominal and pronominal references to the Christian deity was and still is widely established in British English and runs ambiguously alongside the convention of capitalisation for emphasis. There is therefore an implicit suggestion in the translation (communicated subliminally through lexical patterning) that the forms of Hegel’s *Geist* occurring later in the book in some sense correspond with the Christian notions of God and Spirit, while the earlier references to *Geist* correspond to various precursor stages of which *mind* is one. It is important to note that Baillie does not make this point explicit. The meaning of the lexical progression from *mind* to *spirit* and *Spirit* with its Christian connotations remains implicit. Accordingly, Baillie’s strategy here reinforces a theologically-based hierarchical structuring by reproducing it in the English translations of *Geist*.

If the book as a whole is taken as showing a progression from ‘lower’ forms of the experience of consciousness to ‘higher’ forms, Baillie’s *mind* corresponds to a ‘lower’ form, while *spirit* corresponds to a ‘higher’ form. The reader is left to assume that *Spirit*

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97 It is surprising that Hegel uses the key term *Geist* so little in the opening section of his book. This lexical feature can be taken as indicating a narrative progression from the non-existence of *Geist* at the outset to its full development at the end. Baillie’s strategy intensifies this effect. In the earlier chapters, Hegel discusses *Bewusstsein* [consciousness] and *Selbstbewusstsein* [self-consciousness], but, although these could be considered precursors of *Geist* in some sense, this conclusion would represent a not-explicitly-Hegelian interpretation or a resolving of a potential ambiguity (e.g. the putative identity of consciousness and mind).

98 The percentages reflect the proportions of *mind, spirit* and *Spirit* as translations of *Geist* in each chapter. The absolute values range from 9 occurrences in *Self-Consciousness* to 268 in *Religion*. The total occurrences of *Geist/Geiste* amount to 635.
corresponds to ‘the highest’ form. Since these variations are superimposed over Hegel’s use of *Geist*, Baillie’s lexical patterning must be seen as a translatorial intensification and dramatisation of the progressive structure suggested in the German text. Foregrounding the progressive structure of the book and especially the unidirectional progress from lower to higher forms of consciousness, mind and spirit – sometimes referred to as the ‘March of Spirit’ (Harris, 1995: 5, 106-107) – could be taken as mimicking or reproducing social-Darwinian narratives of historical progress, according to which superior races or nations, classes or individuals have already progressed to a cultural high-point and represent an élite, or respectively, according to which liberal education and social welfare measures are seen as a controlled (rational) way of raising lower minds to a higher level. However, the suggestion prompted by Baillie’s diverging translations of *Geist* that the rational *mind* (concentrated in the chapter on *Reason*) is somehow not as high as, for example, the ‘the national spirit’ considered in the *Spirit* chapter\(^99\) verges dangerously close to more extreme forms of political ideology and to a misunderstanding of Hegel (Stewart, 1996: 53-167).

Within the symbolic space of the printed lines of text, the large size of the capital S, which serves, in every case, as a rhetorical gesture of emphasis, can also be compared with the upright, honour-seeking *hexis* of the manly Kabyle man discussed in section 2.1 in connection with Bourdieu (1977). In this sense, the translator acquires honour by bestowing honoriﬁc status on the term *Spirit*. Baillie ennobles himself through the translation by articulating the elevation of *Geist* to *Spirit*.

While Table 3.1 shows every occurrence of *Geist* and *Geiste*\(^*\) alongside the associated lexical item in the translation, and clearly illustrates the lexical patterning discussed above, this still does not account for every occurrence of the English lexical items *mind* and *spirit* (with and without capitals). Table 3.2 shows the total occurrences of *mind*, *spirit* and *Spirit* in Baillie’s translation, including direct translations of *Geist* as well as translatorial additions:

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\(^99\) For example, if contextualised in this manner (taking *national spirit* as higher than rational mind), the passage, ‘But government, as the single soul, the self of the national spirit…’ [das Selbst des Volksgeistes] (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 274), could suggest this kind of totalitarian rhetoric. However, notice that Baillie does not use capitals either for *Self* or for *Spirit* here.
Consciousness
Self-consciousness
Reason
Spirit
Religion
Absolute Knowledge
Total

mind 4 9 95 41 5 5 159
spirit 0 4 19 213 248 41 525
Spirit 0 1 0 29 79 34 143
Total in TT 4 14 114 283 332 80 827

Table 3.2: Occurrences of mind, spirit and Spirit, including Baillie’s additions

Figure 3.6 visualises the totals from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, showing the combined token counts for mind, spirit and Spirit as translations of Geist and including additions by Baillie.

The additions do not show any striking patterns and can be explained by two factors.\textsuperscript{100}

Firstly, in many cases, probably for reasons of fluency, in order to break up Hegel’s sometimes very long sentences (thereby also de-technicalising the text to some extent)

\textsuperscript{100}Baillie’s translation (1931) includes peritextual running page headers with the book title The Phenomenology of Mind on every odd-numbered page. These additional occurrences of Mind have not been included in the data illustrated but have a bearing on the ‘lexical priming’ effect of familiarisation by repetition (Hoey, 2005).
and to compensate the lack of grammatical gender in English, Baillie translates a
pronoun \[er = \text{he/it}\] with a noun \[\text{mind/spirit/Spirit}\] or repeats the noun in a new
sentence. Secondly, however, Baillie also uses the term \textit{mind} when it is not directly
related to an occurrence of \textit{Geist} in the German text. For example, in paragraph 523,
Baillie not only translates \textit{Geist} as \textit{mind} and \textit{spirit} in the same paragraph, but also
translates \textit{das gerade Bewusstsein} [literally = the straight consciousness] as \textit{the
unsophisticated mind}. \textit{Glaube} [belief/faith] has a negative connotation in the \textit{Religion}
chapter, and, in paragraph 569, Baillie translates \textit{das glaubende Bewusstsein} [literally =
the believing consciousness] as \textit{the believing mind}. These selected examples support
the argument that Baillie was consciously \textquote{profiling} the lexical terms used in the
translation by associating them judiciously with more or less positive value judgements
which could lead to an inference that \textit{Spirit} is in some sense superior to \textit{mind}.\footnote{101} In
general, however, Baillie’s strategy here also tends to confuse his own superimposed
distinction between \textit{mind}, \textit{spirit} and \textit{Spirit}.

\textbf{Grammatical patterning: the specific deictic and the \textquote{concrete universal}}

Another feature revealed through a microscopic focus on individual words in the ST and
TT is the frequent colligation\footnote{102} of the deictic \textit{der}, \textit{den}, \textit{des}, \textit{dem} [the] with \textit{Geist} in the
German text.\footnote{103} Taken out of context, the colligation \textit{der Geist} is potentially ambiguous.
Without any wider context, it is not possible to determine whether Hegel is referring to
a specific \textit{Geist} or to \textit{Geist} in general, whether the deictic here functions anaphorically
(referencing to a preceding context), cataphorically (referencing to a following context) or
homophonically (referencing outside the text to a generally known context, e.g. the Sun, is
\textit{specific} because it can be assumed that there is only one possible referent) (Halliday,
1964: 11 and 2004: 552 ff and see Section 2.2). English differs from German in that,
with some uses of \underline{abstract} nouns, such as love, peace, war, reason, power, fire and

\footnote{101} The sense suggested here is, for example, that \textit{mind} is somehow narrow as in \textquote{narrow-minded’}; while
\textit{spirit}, especially in its non-religious senses, is positive, strong and happy, as in \textquote{high spirits’}, the \textquote{team
spirit’} and more ominously perhaps, \textquote{the spirit of the nation’}. Baillie’s concentration of \textit{mind} in the
\textit{Reason} chapter, as shown in Figure 3.1, may suggest a negative dryness or abstractness of \textit{mind} by
contrast with \textit{spirit} (in its social as well as religious senses). Baillie’s translation therefore negotiates
creatively with the lexical and semantic resources of English.

\footnote{102} Colligation is defined (Olohan, 2004: 198) as \textquote{[t]he likelihood that a grammatical pattern or feature
will occur near another grammatical feature or lexical item’ plays an important part in the theory of
\textquote{lexical priming}’ (Hoey, 2005)

\footnote{103} The four forms of the deictic shown here correspond to grammatical cases in German. \textit{Geist} is also
occasionally used in the plural (\textit{die Geister}). With only two or three exceptions in the entire SL corpus,
\textit{Geist} is always preceded by some form of deictic in German.
spirit, the homophoric function of the deictic (referring to the general or universal sense of the term) is indicated by omitting the definite article altogether. Sometimes the distinction is very clear even without much context, for example, the difference between *the war* (referring to a specific war) and *war* in general. In philosophy, and especially in the context of logic, such distinctions are often far from straightforward. Hegel’s philosophy and the British Idealist tradition with which Baillie was associated were both concerned with delicate distinctions between ‘the individual’, ‘the particular’ and ‘the universal’. Indeed, as Robert Stern has recently argued (Stern, 2007), the idea of a ‘concrete universal’ played a major and as yet not fully appreciated role in the British Idealists’ re-interpretation of Hegel. The difference between *mind* and *the mind* and *spirit*, *the spirit* and *the Spirit* is therefore not insignificant in a translation of Hegel published during the time of the British Idealists. Because it has a bearing on the recent (further) development of ‘non-metaphysical’ readings of Hegel, the distinction is still important today (ibid.). Once again, Baillie’s translation exploits the narrow range of possibilities in full, using *mind* and *spirit* with and without the definite article, but does not articulate in any explicit manner how the distinctions are to be interpreted. Two examples illustrate the problem here.


The spirit of beneficent wealth can furthermore be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness receiving charity and must be considered separately… [my translation].

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104 In addition to Stern’s discussion referenced above, the following quotation from an entry on the ‘concrete universal’ briefly contextualises the term, which for Aristotle and Locke contained a contradiction because the universal must be abstract: ‘… The deliberate use of the idea of a concrete universal is due to Hegel, for whom the ‘I’, the ‘now’, the ‘spirit of a free people’, etc. are either both concrete and universal or in some sort of transition in between. Hegel would not have minded a reading of ‘concrete’ and of ‘universal’ which would make the phrase combine logically conflicting ideas. This would be part of his theme of the dialectical combining of opposites’ (Honderich, 2005: 155).
The spirit of well-doing that characterizes the action of wealth may, further, be distinguished from that of the conscious life accepting the benefit it confers, and deserves special consideration... (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 303).  

and

Der wahre Geist ist eben diese Einheit der absolut Getrennten,… (Hegel, 1970: 386).

The true spirit is just this unity of the absolutely separated,… [my translation]

Spirit truly objective, however, is just this unity of absolutely separated moments,… (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 306).

In the first example, Baillie uses the cataphoric force of the deictic not to strengthen spirit itself but rather to emphasise the beneficent action of wealth. The role of spirit is diminished to the extent that the word could almost be dispensed with in this phrase. In the second example, Baillie foregrounds Spirit not only by omitting the deictic but also through the sentence-initial position, the marked, inverted word order with adjectives following the noun and the rhetorical however. The overall effect here, achieved by a combination of linguistic and rhetorical tactics, is to augment the role of Spirit. Through hundreds of repetitions of this kind of strategy throughout the book, Spirit becomes gradually reified as a proper noun apparently referring to a specific, metaphysical entity. Baillie’s profiling of Spirit as a metaphysical entity diametrically opposed to ‘free concrete mind’ (see Section 3.3 on peritexts) through judicious uses and omissions of the deictic in English can be compared with his choices between the word-pair the god/God.

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105 Note that Baillie replaces the second occurrence of Geist with the demonstrative pronominalisation ‘that of the conscious life.’ This further diminishes the role of spirit in this context. For Hegel, spirit is present in a different form in the giver and in the receiver of charity. For Baillie, the action of wealth seems to be characterised by beneficence.
... und erkennt den Gott in ihm (Hegel, 1970: 551).

... and recognises the god in it [my translation].

... and recognizes God in it (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 444).

In this case, the wider context of ‘revealed religion’ (i.e. Christianity) in paragraph 758 prompts Baillie to take the step of resolving the potential ambiguity associated with the deictic in German. Hegel could have written ‘und erkennt Gott in ihm’ [and recognises God in it] but he did not. This potential ambiguity could be described as a dialectical ambiguity, if it is assumed that Hegel intended his readers to question the specificity and/or universality of the deity referred to here, rather than to assume that the term Gott necessarily (always) refers to the Christian God. By analogy, Hegel’s usage of der Geist by no means necessarily bears the same religious connotations as Baillie’s Spirit, especially in sentence initial position as in the example quoted. Table 3.3 summarises Baillie’s uses of the deictic with mind and spirit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
<th>Self-consciousness</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Spirit</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Absolute Knowledge</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geist + Geiste* in ST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deictic + mind</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deictic + spirit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spirit/other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Target Text</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9\textsuperscript{106}</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>635\textsuperscript{106}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Baillie’s use or omission of the deictic in translations of Geist

The categories deictic + mind and deictic + spirit include specific, non-specific and demonstrative deictics (a, the, this, that) and one case of a possessive (‘his own spirit’). Although a clear pattern does not emerge from this table, it is evident, especially if the data on spirit/Spirit from Table 3.1 are borne in mind, that Baillie makes use of the

\textsuperscript{106} The discrepancy between ST and TT word counts here reflects the fact that Baillie translated Geist in paragraph 177, the first occurrence of Geist in the chapters analysed, as Mind or Spirit, i.e. two TT tokens for one ST token.
distinction albeit not in a systematic or patterned manner. Once again, the problem is not merely inconsistency but rather the fact that Baillie does not articulate the reasons for his choices explicitly. Readers of the translation are therefore presented with a concealed narrative or sub-text through lexical and grammatical patterning, so that by the end of the book, when Baillie repeatedly refers to ‘the Absolute Spirit’ (translating der absolute Geist), there is little doubt left that this is the one and only, all-encompassing analogue of the Christian God. The important point for Baillie is to re-articulate Hegel’s Geist in order to remove or weaken the relationship of identity between an individual, finite mind and God, which had so intrigued the Absolutists. For Baillie, individual minds have a long way to go before they approach the spiritual.

In philosophical terms, Baillie’s translation of Geist as a progression from mind to Spirit also engages with the concerns of British Idealist philosophers to differentiate between scientific enquiry, especially scientific psychology and the scientific study of the mind and the metaphysical and theological concerns with the spirit; but in doing so, it attributes this distinction to Hegel. Baillie’s subdivision of Geist and re-assignment to mind, spirit and Spirit is possibly intended to designate mind as a referent for a semantic field accessible to scientific enquiry 107 while reserving spirit and especially Spirit for a (noumenal) semantic field patently inaccessible to such enquiry. As mentioned in footnote 26 in chapter 2, the strategy could therefore also be seen as undermining Hegel’s attempt to overcome Kant’s dualistic distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms (Bowie, 2003: 26-27). A crucial semantic tension in Hegel’s title plays on the apparent incompatibility between Phänomenologie and Geist, which Hegel’s book is designed to overcome by pointing the way forward from (the errors of) phenomenology as a starting point through to the (spiritual truth of the) ‘science of logic’ developed in Hegel’s later work (Houlgate, 2005: 50-51). Baillie’s translation strategy could therefore be seen as effectively eliminating this dimension of Hegel’s argument and silencing further discussion by presenting English readers, especially the non-specialist reader, with a translatorial fait accompli.

107 Note here that Mind was the leading philosophical/psychological journal at the time. With reference to ‘lexical priming’ (Hoey, 2005), the historical association of the term mind with modern scientific enquiry, especially the new psychology associated with Dewey and James in the USA, could be investigated using the techniques of contrastive diachronic corpus linguistics. This contrast between mind/spirit thus constitutes part of the contextual meaning of spirit.
With regard to the debate between the Absolutist and Personalist positions at the time of the British Idealists, Baillie offers a compromise. Baillie’s translation suggests different ways of looking at Hegel’s *Geist*; while *Spirit* and *Absolute Spirit* in the later chapters of the book preserve the metaphysical and religious connotations associated with Absolutism, the possibility of seeing *Geist* in individual (psychological and Personalist Christian) terms and in social or cultural terms takes into account the Personalists’ criticisms of Hegel and of orthodox Absolutism. In his *Translator’s Introduction*, for example, Baillie links Hegel’s *Phenomenology* with Hegel’s system as a whole, distinguishing between various ‘degrees of completeness’ in Hegel’s logic of the Absolute. Alongside ‘mind as creating “experience”’, these include ‘(a) mind as “objective,” as the source of social and moral activity, (b) mind as expressing itself in the realm of art, (c) mind as realised in the life of religion’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xxv). The Absolutist version is simplified or ‘euphemised’ and made more accessible: *Spirit is God*; this is spelled out with the assistance of Baillie’s lexical structuring; it is also compatible with orthodox Christian (e.g. Trinitarian) values. The professionalised, more sophisticated (intellectualised and secularised) version requires greater differentiation between different ways of thinking about *mind, spirit and Spirit*.

While Baillie’s translatorial *hexis* is based on the correct assumption that Hegel’s term *Geist* covers a range of meanings, such as those listed by Inwood (1992) and discussed in chapter 1, which can be translated by *mind* and/or *spirit* with different shades of meaning in different contexts, Baillie also assumes that this potential ambiguity requires the authority of the translator/philosopher/pedagogue to guide the reader/student from one meaning to the other, thereby avoiding the ontological uncertainty suggested by Hegel’s dialectical ambiguity. This critical evaluation of Baillie’s translatorial interpretation of Hegel’s *Geist* should, however, also be tempered with caution. It is important not to overstate the role of personal agency as a motivating factor behind these lexical choices. Although Baillie is responsible for his translatorial strategy, his personal and professional dispositions are also the products of wider social influences structured in the micro-dynamics of the sub-field. *Hexis* is not necessarily a conscious attitude.

As Houlgate (2005: 8-9) explains, the different ‘shapes’ of *Geist* discussed by Hegel represent different paradigms of thought from different ages and different cultures; they cannot be simplified into a general principle. Baillie’s ‘popularisation’ and ‘euphemisation’ tend towards this.
3.2.2 Baillie’s translations of aufheben

Section 3.2.2 analyses the data on Baillie’s translations of the dialectically ambiguous verb *aufheben* [cancel/sublate/transcend] and refers to recent philosophical research on the subject of ‘sublation’ which confirms the continuing relevance of comparative, historical research on the translation of this term.

Baillie’s increasing use of verb pairs including *transcend* to translate *aufheben*

Analysing Hegel’s use of *aufheben* [cancel/sublate/transcend] in the source text is complex because *aufheben* is an inflected and separable verb which can also form various more or less complex nouns. Section 3.2.2 again focuses on the six main chapters of the ST corpus and the corresponding chapters from Baillie’s translation. Table 3.4 shows a lemmatisation of verb forms and nominalisations of *aufheben* identified initially in the ST. With separated forms of the finite verb, such as *hebt... auf*, the search term *hebt* was used, and the separable prefix had to be located manually in the co-text.

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109 The German infinitive *aufheben* is made up of two parts, the separable prefix *auf* [up] and *heben* [to lift]. When used as a finite verb, for example, in the present tense, the separable prefix is positioned at the end of the clause with the direct object between the finite verb and the post-positional separable prefix. The verb *heben* is an irregular verb. For example, the past tense is indicated by modifying the vowel: *ich hebe* [I lift]; *ich hob* [I lifted]. This difficulty facing researchers is also mentioned by Palm (2009). In his thesis, Palm includes only four verb forms but researches a larger corpus of several of Hegel’s works in German.
Table 3.4: Lemmatisation of aufheben in the ST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-</th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
<th>Self-consciousness</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Spirit</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Absolute Knowledge</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aufgehoben</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufgehobene*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufgehobensein/werden</td>
<td>5/0</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufgehobne*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufheben</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufhebend*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufhebt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufhebung</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufhob*/aufhöbe</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aufzuheben</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hebe…auf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heben…auf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hebt…auf</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>308</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baillie uses a range of different verbs to translate *aufheben* in addition to his first choice of *cancel*; sometimes, especially towards the end of the book, Baillie uses two similar or contrasting verbs to translate *aufheben*, such as *cancel and transcend*. However, as with *Geist*, Baillie’s apparently inconsistent translation of this verb also reveals an underlying lexical patterning. Table 3.5 provides an overview of Baillie’s translations of *aufheben* including all the ST tokens tabulated in Table 3.4.
Table 3.5: Overview of Baillie’s translations of aufheben in the TT

One point shown by these data is that, if Hegel’s aufheben represents the single, specific, logical process of sublation, as has recently been argued (Palm, 2009: 43 ff), a serious student of Hegel’s philosophy could not possibly identify and follow the
occurrences of this single process from Baillie’s translation. In fact, Baillie’s uses of *sublate* and *sublation* are concentrated in the chapter on *Self-consciousness*, where Hegel provides a theoretical explanation of the term (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 105), but Baillie does not carry through the use of this term in the much longer, subsequent sections of the book. There is no explanation for why this strategy was adopted. Accordingly, Baillie’s strategy once again precludes a critical understanding of this important concept. This finding exemplifies well the distinction between the translatorial habitus, associated by Simeoni (1998) with norms of translation, and the translatorial *hexis* theorised here. Baillie is not attempting to mediate Hegel’s *aufheben* in a subservient manner; he is placing himself in the dominant role of professional philosopher.

As in the case of *Geist*, Baillie responds to the potential ambiguity of *aufheben* and the relative obscurity of the technical or ‘professionalised’ term *sublation*, which would have been familiar only to ‘trained students of philosophy’, by simplifying, expanding and explaining Hegel’s supposed meaning or meanings to his target readership of humanities/theology students. Baillie’s ‘popularising’ strategy of sometimes using one verb and sometimes providing two, once again, allows him greater freedom as a translator to assert his ‘professional’ and ‘popularising’ prowess as a philosopher/pedagogue in controlling the lexical structuring of Hegel’s argument in English and the reception of Hegel’s ideas in the Anglophone world. Although the patterning is complex, and a full analysis would go beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief consideration of the most salient verb pairings from Table 3.5 is sufficient to support the argument.

As can be seen from Table 3.5, *cancel* is the most frequent translation for *aufheben* with 113 tokens when it occurs alone and a grand total of 154 occurrences including combinations with other verbs. *Cancel* is most often paired with *transcend*, so that, for example, Hegel’s *aufgehoben* is sometimes translated as ‘cancelled and transcended’. The combination of *cancel* and *transcend* occurs 22 times in the chapters analysed.

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110 The phrase is used in the *Translator’s Introduction* and is discussed further in section 3.3 below. Inwood (1992) and Pinkard (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) also mention that ‘sublation’ is a specialised term.

111 See Section 3.3 for Baillie’s reference to ‘students of religion’.

112 The asterisks here and elsewhere in the chapter indicate that the data include all forms of the verbs including nominalisations. They correspond to the wildcard function in Wordsmith 5.0 according to which a search term *cancel* will register *cancellation* and *cancels* as well as *cancel*. 
As shown in Figure 3.7 below, Baillie’s use of paired verbs to translate *aufheben* is not inconsistent; it exhibits lexical patterning.

**Figure 3.7: Baillie’s increasing use of verb pairs to translate *aufheben***

Drawing on the data from Table 3.5, Figure 3.7 compares the occurrences of single verbs as translations for *aufheben* with the occurrences of verb pairs, usually *cancel* plus another verb. The figures are shown as percentages of the total occurrences of *aufheben* in each chapter in order to compensate the difference in length of the chapters. The graphic visualises Baillie’s increasing use of verb pairs towards the end of the book. The increase in lexical density brought about by Baillie’s use of pairs of verbs could be a response to the structural ‘defects’ in Hegel’s book criticised by Baillie in his *Translator’s Introduction* (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xvii). Baillie’s strategy may have been intended to give more weight to *Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge* and also to increase fluency or other rhetorical parameters. If the verb pairs are intended as a response to the ambiguity of *aufheben*, the semantic difference between the verbs is not readily classifiable, especially not as negative/positive. For example, the combination of *cancel* [negative] with *preserve* [positive] occurs only once in the chapters analysed;\(^\text{113}\) *transcend* and *supersede*\(^\text{114}\) are not unequivocally ‘positive’. Both verbs communicate a

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\(^{113}\) This distinction between negative and positive senses of sublation is discussed in detail by Palm (2009: 8-17).

\(^{114}\) After *transcend*\(^*\) (22 pairings), *supersede*\(^*\) (12 pairings) the next most frequent pairing with *cancel*\(^*\).
sense of moving beyond and above that which is transcended or superseded, thereby reinforcing the narrative of upward progression.

Figure 3.8 below shows that Baillie assigned different verbs to different chapters of the book.

Figure 3.8: Baillie’s choice of different verbs to translate "aufheben" in each chapter

Baillie’s use of cancel* is preferred throughout. Sublate* is focussed in Self-Consciousness; while transcend* increases markedly in Spirit and Religion. Supersede* is relatively frequent in Consciousness, then declines, and then rises again in Absolute Knowledge. Figure 3.8 combines all occurrences of each verb, including those used in verb pairs.

Although it is not possible to draw any very definite conclusions from this data, the patterning is undeniable. The term transcend deserves particular attention because transcend itself is potentially ambiguous, especially in the context of German Idealist philosophy.\textsuperscript{115} In its non-Kantian sense transcend carries a connotation of dynamic movement upwards and beyond that which is transcended.\textsuperscript{116} Baillie’s progressive

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\textsuperscript{115} For example, ‘transcendental philosophy’, as discussed by Kant, is concerned with the ‘conditions of possibility’ for what we know rather than with anything ‘transcendent’ in the sense that it is ‘beyond’ normal experience (Bowie, 2003: 280).

\textsuperscript{116} The Collins Dictionary (McKeown, 2008) defines the verb transcend as follows: ‘1. to go above or beyond (a limit or expectation, etc.) as in degree or excellence. 2. to be superior to’. It can be assumed that these core meanings also applied in the first decades of the twentieth century.
introduction of *transcend* therefore possibly reinforces the sense that the book progresses from lower to higher forms of experience. In particular, Baillie’s increasing use of *transcend* suggests that the theoretically pivotal, logical process denoted by *aufheben*, somehow also progresses from lower forms to a higher, transcendent form, especially in the context of *Religion*.\(^{117}\)

Once again therefore, Baillie’s lexical patterning with *aufheben* constitutes a position-taking with regard to the political field and the philosophical sub-field under discussion here. By subtly foregrounding the upwardly rising progression of the book towards a transcendent climax in *Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge*, Baillie promotes a ‘euphemised’ and humanised version of Hegel as a philosopher, whose work is essentially compatible with conservative, Christian beliefs, cautiously embracing the new liberal ideals of progress through education and social reform, thereby appeasing some if not all of the Personalist philosophers. The progress of the verb *aufheben* throughout Baillie’s translation could, for example, easily be interpreted in terms of self-denial (*cancel/negate*) leading ultimately to transcendence and spiritual salvation. At the same time, however, a more technicalised understanding of *aufheben* is preserved through the verb *sublate*, which is reserved primarily for the *Self-Consciousness* chapter with its potentially subversive engagement with the social psychology of the master-slave dialectic. Baillie possibly used this lexical patterning to allow different readings of Hegel, but Baillie’s mastery of language, and especially the rhetorical style, allowed him to keep a measure of control over the translated text. It is this dominant, autocratic sense of the translator (benevolently or pedagogically) controlling the reader’s access to the content of the text which is theorised here as Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*.

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\(^{117}\) In spite of the fact that the literal meaning of *aufheben* is to *raise or lift up*, Pinkard (*Hegel/Pinkard, 2008; Pinkard, 2011*) stresses the point that Hegel never uses the verb in this ‘third sense’, presumably in order to avoid the suggestion implied by Baillie’s translation that Hegel’s system is (necessarily) hierarchically structured. This point is taken up in chapter 4.
3.3 Analysis of peritexts to the 1931 edition of *The Phenomenology of Mind*

Section 3.3 analyses the peritexts to the 1931 edition (Dover reprint, 2003) as a further embodiment of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*. These include the title page and the colophon page which refers to the 1910 first edition, followed by a seven page table of contents which provides a translation of Hegel’s contents pages with explanatory material between square brackets which has been added by the translator. This added material serves the pedagogical purpose of synopsising the content of the various chapters in a manner similar to that illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 and discussed in section 3.1.2 with reference to Baillie’s *Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience* (1906). The contents pages can therefore be read as a brief synopsis of the book or used as a selective aid to memory after reading the book. Baillie’s explanatory contents pages even contain an additional, block-capital heading to the *Reason* chapter.

In the 1910 edition, Baillie headed this chapter ‘[CONCRETE MIND]’; in the 1931 edition this added title was further expanded to ‘[FREE CONCRETE MIND]’. The addition contributes to Baillie’s pedagogical re-structuring of Hegel’s text emphasising the opposition between *mind* in the *Reason* chapter and *spirit/Spirit* in the *Spirit, Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge* chapters. The terms ‘free’ and ‘concrete’ resonate with the ideological concerns of the new liberalism and with the metaphysical interest of the British Idealists in the ‘concrete universal’, as discussed in section 3.2.1 with reference to the omission of the deictic with *spirit* (Stern, 2007; 2009: 143-176).

Accordingly, the contents pages can be seen as a further embodiment of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*, in the sense that they also embody Baillie’s engagement with the micro-dynamics of the sub-field.

Baillie’s *Preface* to the first edition (1910) and *Prefatory Note to the Second Edition* (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xi-xii) both refer to the German editions of Hegel’s book and support Baillie’s transcultural legitimacy and authority as a translator on the basis of his

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118 No doubt at least some of the peritextual material is not directly attributable to Baillie. For example, in the *Introduction* to the first edition, Baillie mentions that some of the footnotes are based on those added to the German edition by Dr. Georg Lasson, a Hegel expert and editor of Hegel’s works in German with a ‘theological’ position. However, in collaboration with the series editor J.H. Muirhead, Baillie must have endorsed such editorial decisions, which are therefore also components of the translatorial *hexis* embodied in the peritexts.
acquaintance with Dr. G. Lasson, the editor of the 1921 and 1928 German editions of Hegel’s works. The prefatory material in the second edition is followed by a 30-page 
Translator’s Introduction which represents a re-writing and considerable expansion of the original 1910 introduction. The introduction is subdivided into four sections; the second section being further subdivided into subsections II(a) and II(b). In section I, Baillie provides a brief history of the book and its place in Hegel’s life; he also uses this as an opportunity to criticise its structure (as mentioned in section 3.2) and thus to distance himself somewhat ironically from Hegel. This strategy possibly gives Baillie ascendancy over Hegel in the eyes of his Anglophone readers. Section II, which is analysed in greater detail below outlines Hegel’s system as a whole referring to English translations as well as works in German in order to locate the Phenomenology within this framework. Section III provides a summary and discussion of the content of the book. Section IV addresses the reception of Hegel’s philosophy and its potential usefulness in facing philosophical problems ‘which have been raised by the novelty, the complexity, and the range of modern science, by the freshened interest in morality and religion, and by the immense expansion of historical knowledge’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xli). Like the other peritextual elements discussed here, Baillie’s introduction and 25 Explanatory Statements interspersed throughout the translated text assert and maintain Baillie’s pedagogical/translatorial authority. The 239 footnotes also remind the reader of the translator’s presence. Some 40 of the 239 footnotes point towards relevant passages in the Bible or explain the Christian religious significance of passages in the text. An index was added to the second edition, but this is somewhat selective; in other words, the index provides a further opportunity for Baillie (and his editors) to retain a measure of control over how the book is used. When Baillie comments towards the end of the Introduction that, ‘[t]he composer and the conductor of the orchestra are as necessary to the performance as the various instrumentalists’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xlii), he presumably casts Hegel and himself as ‘conductors’ in the sense of philosophical guides through the ‘fundamental problems of human experience’ (ibid.).

Throughout the four sections of the Translator’s Introduction, Baillie emphasises the systematic unity of Hegel’s philosophy, thereby foregrounding the Whole, the Absolute. The principle of ‘synthesis’, Baillie writes, was ‘at once the presupposition, the
outcome, and the completion of his theories’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xiv).\(^{119}\) In section II, Baillie also makes special reference to the *Science of Logic*, which had recently been translated (Hegel/Johnston, 1929), and spells out his modified Personalist view of Hegel’s philosophy. ‘In Hegel’s view the object of philosophy is described in general terms as the Whole, the Absolute, or God. This is reality without qualification, and hence, abstractly considered, can only be described as what *is* simply, or what is not finite, not a part’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xx). While this statement seems to align Hegel with Absolutism, it can be taken in different ways. The quotation exemplifies Baillie’s pedagogical style of rhetorical emphasis; he spells out the general idea in the simplest possible terms. The initial capital letters stress the identity of God with the Absolute and the Whole, but when Baillie inserts the phrase ‘abstractly considered’, this suggests that reality can also, by contrast, be considered ‘concretely’, that is, with the differentiation associated with particularity and individuality. This more nuanced reading perhaps answers the Personalists’ criticism of Hegel by suggesting (to those more advanced or professional philosophers who understand the distinction) that Hegel does in fact embrace individualism at the (higher) level of the concrete.

This is just one example among many of the way in which Baillie’s peritext can be read at two levels: as a strong commitment to Hegel’s philosophy including the Absolute, but in a Personalist sense which is compatible with Christian conceptions of God; at the same time, however, Baillie also suggests a more sophisticated, (more progressive, perhaps even potentially subversive) reading which, in this case, considers the relationship between abstract and concrete conceptions of individuality. The simpler reading is reinforced or spelled out throughout the other peritexts, for example, through frequent additional references to the Bible in the footnotes and, as explained in section 3.2.1 above, in the translated text, through the gradual introduction of the term *spirit*, culminating with *Spirit* in the final chapters, as a translation of Hegel’s term *Geist*. These features thus reassure Anglophone readers that Hegel is not to be seen as the austere, monistic philosopher of Absolutism, for whom nothing matters but the metaphysical entity called ‘the Absolute’. This role is perhaps reserved for Bradley. Contrary to Pringle-Pattison, who links Hegel and Bradley as proponents of the Absolutist view (Mander, 2011: 357-364), Baillie’s translation, especially the Christianising and humanising peritexts, seeks to reinstate Hegel as a German

\(^{119}\) For a discussion of the misleading oversimplification according to which Hegel’s dialectic can be described in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, reference is made to Mueller (1996: 301 ff).
philosopher whose merits, especially as a Christian philosopher, outweigh his faults as an over-systematic or over-technical philosopher. The lexical re-structuring of Geist and aufheben analysed in section 3.2 serve the same purpose.

A full discussion of the British Idealists’ understanding of the concrete universal and its relationship to the Whole, the Absolute and God, which underlies the differences between Absolutists and Personalists and is still controversial (Stern, 2009: 143-176) would go beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, one example relating to this issue may be sufficient to reinforce the point that the peritexts also embody Baillie’s translatorial hexis. In section II(a) of the Introduction, Baillie explains the relationship between abstract and concrete with reference to Hegel’s term Begriff (translated by Baillie and others as notion, but by more recent translators as concept). The notion resolves the tension between the universal and the particular which gave rise to the split between Absolutists and Personalists. ‘It [the notion] is a universal, but is a concrete universal, that is, holds within itself the particular and is the organic unity of universality and particularity. It is a single identity in and through difference’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xx). The concept of identity in and through difference suggests a more nuanced level of understanding than the monism associated with Bradley’s version of Absolutism. In this manner, Baillie enlists the concrete universal on the side of the Personalists.

It is significant that Baillie introduces the HIGH/LOW spatial metaphor into this discussion. Hegel, Baillie explains, describes the development of the notion as a process from the abstract to the concrete. ‘Looking at the process as a growth from a lower to a higher degree of articulation of the nature of the whole, it is spoken of as a process from “potentiality” to “actuality”’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xxi). Although Baillie is dealing with complex metaphysical meanings, his spatial metaphor is used here to simplify Hegel’s point and make it more accessible to a wider readership. The metaphor reverts to the ‘euphemised’ reading, according to which Hegel’s system describes a process of upward growth through logical processes (of sublation), which can be thought of (loosely) as a ‘cancelling and transcending’ of opposition by rising to ever higher levels of spirituality, thereby picking up (and in a sense, popularising) the spatial

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120 A politicised reading of this distinction between the whole and the parts might construe the whole as the nation and the parts as individuals or classes. The Christianised, de-politicised reading presented by Baillie thus reserves the political dimension to the professional readership.
metaphor of *auf* [up] from the non-figurative meaning of *aufheben* [lift up]. The metaphor HIGH thus conflates logical, religious, academic, social and political hierarchies.

With regard to dynamic relationship between Absolutism and Personalism, Baillie does therefore at one level embrace the orthodox, Absolutist position, as suggested in Loewenberg’s review of the second edition discussed in section 3.1.2, (Loewenberg, 1931) but Baillie rebuts the accusation that this orthodoxy is in some way limiting, by claiming that, at a higher level, Hegel’s philosophy encompasses the Personalist view of its critics as well as the Absolutist view. This is in fact also the stance Baillie adopts in his reply to Loewenberg (Baillie, 1932). As explained in detail in section 3.1.2.

Accordingly, when Baillie considers the various stages of *mind* leading upwards towards the unifying idea of a self-comprehending *Spirit*, in section III of the *Translator’s Introduction*, the concept of *Spirit* in its highest form can also be interpreted more and less rigorously as an impersonal, metaphysical/logical necessity or (perhaps more reassuringly for some readers) as a near synonym for the personal, Christian idea of God.

By referring to his own article on Hegel in the *Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Baillie, 1928) in the text and in a footnote to the *Prefatory Note to the Second Edition* (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xi), Baillie uses the peritexts to draw attention to the religious content of the *Phenomenology* and further alludes to the possibility that readers of the translation might in fact be students of religion. The reference to students of religion is repeated, for example, in a footnote at the end of the *Translator’s Introduction*, which reads, ‘Students of religion will doubtless recognise that such a view is in agreement with the essential doctrines of the catholic faith of Christendom. This was no accident of Hegel’s scheme of thought: it seems to have been one of the purposes which provided a controlling motive for his work’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xlii). Baillie therefore stresses the Christian purpose of the book and appeals directly to theology students. His Christianising re-positioning of the translation is strengthened, as already mentioned, through numerous Biblical and religious footnotes in the body of the translation and through Baillie’s criticism of Hegel’s inadequate attention to religion in the *Religion* chapter of the book as a defect (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xvii).

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121 As explained in detail in section 3.1.2.
122 The looseness in Baillie’s conceptualisation here is reminiscent of (and possibly influenced by) the conveniently vague position of Lotze, as discussed in Passmore (1968: 49-51) and Mander (2011: 22-24).
Accordingly, Baillie uses the peritexts to the translation to support his dominant translatorial *hexis*, his defiant transcendence of Absolutism and re-instatement of the appropriately translated Hegel as a potential champion of a kind of Christian, Personalist Idealism.

The change in Baillie’s attitude towards Germany and towards Hegel has already been noted in connection with the titles and content of Baillie’s published monographs (Section 3.1.2). A similar point can be made with reference to the peritexts. The opening sentence of the *Translator’s Introduction* to the 1910 first edition reads, ‘The work here translated and offered to the English philosophical reader has long been recognised as an unique product of Teutonic genius, and as, on the whole, perhaps the most remarkable treatise in the history of modern philosophy’. In the second edition, published in 1931, the phrase ‘Teutonic genius’ is conspicuous by its absence; a quotation from Goethe’s *Faust* in German (translated in a footnote) is also omitted in the second edition; in fact, the words German and Germany do not appear anywhere in the peritexts. German towns and cities, (Berlin, Leipzig, Jena) German philosophers and writers (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Goethe, Schiller) are mentioned but not the fact that these are German people and places, and that the writers expressed themselves in German. German titles of books and articles are given (sometimes in abbreviated form) but without a gloss in English. By contrast with this relative de-Germanisation, the peritexts contain a short quotation in Italian from Dante’s *Divina Commedia* (not translated) and a longer quotation from Wordsworth’s *Excursion* in English. At one level, these foreign language quotations (including a Greek quotation from Aristotle on the cover page of the first edition) suggest that Baillie himself was conversant with several languages, thereby asserting his superior cultural capital; at another level (especially in the second edition), they suggest that the Germanness of Hegel’s writing is not as important as its participation in a shared European (Classical and Christian) culture. Baillie reinforces this point in several places: ‘…Hegel’s mind exercised by Greek thought…’ and ‘… he reminds us of Plato and Aristotle rather than of any modern thinker…’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xix). Baillie’s de-Germanisation of the peritexts can be seen as a response to popular British suspicions of Germany in the

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123 Such abbreviated references to German titles must be addressed to a relatively ‘professional’ readership, thereby lending support to the view that Baillie was addressing different levels of readership.

124 The title page of the first edition contained a quotation in Greek from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. This quotation is (partially) translated into English and incorporated into the *Translator’s Introduction* in the second edition.
wake of the 1914-18 war and in anticipation of the 1939-1945 war. However, it is worth noting that, while suspicious of German militarism, British intellectuals did not necessarily harbour suspicions against German intellectuals. The de-Germanisation therefore also reflects an awareness of divergent levels of understanding and misunderstanding of philosophy and its relationship with politics.

Baillie’s criticisms of Hegel can be taken as further examples of the same de-Germanising trend. The translator distances himself from the author (and his nation) partly to allay suspicions that he is in some way pro-German but also to suggest a kind of ‘common-sense’, British (especially Scottish) superiority to the German Hegel, however much ‘Teutonic genius’ he had. For example, Baillie scoffs at a letter Hegel sent to Schelling explaining that the ‘composition of the book was concluded at midnight before the battle of Jena.’ Baillie continues, ‘This sounds rather fanciful’, and, having further exposed the impossibility of Hegel’s claim with reference to the historical facts, Baillie concludes, ‘[t]he real explanation was much more commonplace. Hegel had made an unfortunate arrangement with his publisher.’ So, Hegel may have been a genius at philosophy but he was not so good in business matters and tended towards the ‘fanciful’. This kind of debunking of Hegel through the peritexts again appeals at a popular, humorous level, possibly humanising the philosopher in the eyes of students struggling to understand the basics of his philosophy. At the same time, however, it augments the hexis of the translator/pedagogue who is able to look down even on the mighty.

Many of the peritextual features of the translation suggest a hierarchically structured academic field. Reference has already been made in section 3.1 to the close relationships or rivalries between philosophy and theology, philosophy and science, philosophy and political and social theory. Baillie’s addition of further sub-sectional headings to Hegel’s contents page, the inclusion of an index in the second edition, and especially the extensive translator’s introduction and in-text explanatory statements

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125 Reference is again made to German Philosophy in Relation to the War (Muirhead, 1915) in which Muirhead, who was the series editor for the first edition of Baillie’s translation, attempts to defend German philosophy from serious misunderstandings inside and outside Germany which link German philosophy with the rise of militarism. Muirhead’s defence rests on a distinction between popular misunderstandings of valid or interesting philosophical positions.

126 Bourdieu analyses the ‘Conflict of the Faculties’ (Bourdieu, 1988: 36-68) with particular reference to the historical dominance (‘imperialism’) of philosophy and the modern challenges to this status, especially from sociology. Baillie seems to assume the dominance of philosophy in the academy but, as mentioned in section 3.1.1, suggests the dominance of the Church above the State and presumably also above the Academy.
represent peritextual aids to the student reader. These are also found in Baillie’s other published works. Although they are primarily intended to be helpful, the presence and manner of articulation of these aids to understanding also suggests a hierarchical distinction between the extremes of a professional, philosophically trained readership (most of whom would be expected to read the German source text anyway) and a wider, more popular readership comprising students of philosophy but also students of other related subjects such as theology, politics, history, who may be interested in Hegel but not necessarily able to read the German original or to follow esoteric philosophical arguments. Baillie alludes to this kind of distinction throughout the peritexts, for example, when he writes in section II of the Translator’s Introduction that the argument of the Phenomenology ‘presents unusual difficulties even to the trained student of philosophy’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xix), and in section IV, that ‘The value of a philosophical system is therefore not to be measured by its general acceptance but by the success and consistency with which it expresses a specific view of the world; by the extent to which it stimulates the mind to enjoy the liberty of pursuing thought for its own sake; and by the light it affords in solving problems which the world presents in a different form to everyone who possesses the philosophical frame of mind’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xli). The criterion of value is not general acceptance; an appreciation of the value of philosophy is reserved for those ‘who possess a philosophical frame of mind’ and who ‘enjoy the liberty of pursuing thought for its own sake’ (ibid.). Summing up the value of the Phenomenology, Baillie notes that it ‘will doubtless have much to give for generations to come to those who understand’ (ibid.). The implication here is that there will also doubtless be many who will not understand, in spite of the translation and its attempts to assist the reader.

In parallel with its evident pedagogical intentions, Baillie’s position seems to assume the dominance of philosophy in a hierarchy of academic subjects. Those who do not possess a philosophical frame of mind will come away from the study of philosophy with a partial, synoptic picture, but the full picture is reserved for those with a philosophical frame of mind. Through the peritexts, therefore, the spatial metaphor of progress from lower to higher forms of Geist [mind/spirit/Spirit] noted in the text of the translation is carefully dovetailed together with a parallel progression from lower to higher levels of academic achievement within and across the faculties. At the popular level of understanding, i.e. especially for those who do not possess a philosophical frame of mind, this repeated suggestion of upward progression through various levels of
various hierarchies consolidates an essentially hierarchical world view, affirming the
authority of the Church, the State, the Academy and especially Philosophy.

While this interpretation of the peritexts suggests a criticism of Baillie’s strategy from a
more modern, democratic point of view, it is important to realise that Baillie was
committed to (a rather conservative interpretation of) the new-liberal ideal of education
as a means of achieving the common good. From this (idealistic and spiritual)
viewpoint, education must be presented as ‘high’ and ‘good’; philosophy must be seen
to transcend the lower and partial concerns (including those of politics, art and science,
for example), ultimately in order to preside benevolently (and professionally, as a
rational and secular partner to religion) over society’s evolving (popular and possibly
erroneous) conceptualisations of the human experience of consciousness. In Bourdieu’s
terms, the role of the academy is to ‘classify’; for Baillie’s generation, by contrast with
present-day hopes for egalitarianism, such intellectual classification seemed to
necessitate a philosophical elevation above the social and political world; the requisite
sense of elevation – embodied in this case in the translatorial hhexis – is achieved largely
through the judicious use of language.

3.4 Summary

Chapter 3 presented a radical contextualisation of Baillie’s translatorial hhexis by
combining macro-level, ideological and philosophical field dynamics, in section 3.1,
with the forensic textual analysis of Baillie’s translations of selected, dialectically
ambiguous terms, in section 3.2, and the peritextual analysis, in section 3.3, to provide a
tentative explanation of Baillie’s translatorial practice. Baillie was shown to have
participated directly in the micro-dynamics of the rivalry between Absolutist and
Personalist versions of British Idealism adopting his own interpretation of the
Personalist position. Challenging Pringle-Pattison’s suggestion that Hegel and the
Oxford Idealists together represented an extreme form of Absolutism analogous to spirit
monism, Baillie sought to demonstrate a different, additional side to Hegel’s philosophy
by re-appropriating Hegel in support of a Christianised version of Personalism. In this
context, Baillie’s choice of Hegel’s the Phenomenology (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) as a
text to translate was justified through Hegel’s concern in this text with practical
philosophy, history, ethics, religion and society, by contrast with the more theoretical
concerns of the Logic (Hegel/Wallace, 2005), which was already available in translation
at the time of Baillie’s first edition in 1910. In addition to the Christian religious interpretation of the later chapters of the book, which Baillie was shown to emphasise through his translation strategy, the practical, ethical component of the *Phenomenology* also revealed an aspect of Hegel’s philosophy which resonated with the new-liberal political and ideological concerns of British Idealist philosophers.

One pivotal concept identified in the field analysis was the spatial metaphor HIGH/LOW which appeared in many guises and at many levels of analysis and provides a link between levels. With regard to the textual analysis in section 3.2, the primary finding was that the lexical patterning identified here cannot simply be dismissed as inconsistency. It was shown, for example, that Baillie distinguishes between *mind*, *spirit* and *Spirit* as translations of Hegel’s *Geist* in different chapters of the translation. Similarly, with reference to Baillie’s handling of Hegel’s *aufheben* [cancel/sublate/transcend], a patterning was observed, firstly with regard to Baillie’s increasing use of pairs of verbs such as *cancel* and *transcend* towards the end of the book. Secondly, Baillie’s choice of translations for *aufheben* also assigned certain English terms to specific chapters of the book, notably, *sublate* appeared clustered in the *Self-Consciousness* chapter, while *transcend* predominated in *Religion*. This patterning was shown to relate to the HIGH/LOW metaphor by suggesting and reinforcing an upward progression through the six chapters of the TT analysed. Emphasising this upward, hierarchical progression from *mind* to *Spirit* and from *cancellation* to *transcendence* was interpreted, in the light of the micro-dynamics of the sub-field, as a ‘euphemised’, popular version of Hegel’s argument superimposed over the ST through Baillie’s translations of terms like *Geist* and *aufheben*. However, in addition to the essentially Christian narrative of the translation, directed largely towards a supposed readership of Anglophone theology students, Baillie’s gradual progression from *mind*, through *spirit* to *Spirit* also allowed him to articulate through the translation a more nuanced, professionalised reading of Hegel. For serious students and teachers of philosophy, the translation and especially the lexical patterning with *Geist* and *aufheben*, re-position Hegel on the side of the Personalists. The suggestion that Hegel was proposing a form of spirit monism is undermined by emphasising the hierarchically organised progression of modalities of *mind* and *spirit* through history and through the course of the book, which articulate different stages in the relationship between human and divine consciousness.
Baillie’s commitment to the complex re-appropriation of Hegel suggested here was further supported by the analysis of peritexts to the translation in section 3.3. Baillie used the contents pages, footnotes and interspersed *Explanatory Statements* as well as the long *Translator’s Introduction* to guide the reader towards his own interpretation of Hegel which was shaped by his involvement with the micro-dynamics of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy as well as by the changing distribution of cultural capital (especially German language and German philosophy) in the wider fields of national and international political ideology. The emphatic, elevated, rhetorical style of Baillie’s writing in the various peritexts is mirrored in the style adopted in the translation and constitutes ‘pedagogical work’ in the sense explained in chapter 2. The symbolic elevation of this rhetorical style (including the honorific and emphatic uses of capitalisation in the text and peritexts) reproduces the hierarchical structuring which Baillie found not only in Hegel’s work but also in the political, professional and social structures in which he participated. In this sense, the translatorial decisions embodied in the text and peritexts can be theorised as textual embodiments of Baillie’s translatorial *hexis*. **
Chapter 4  
Terry Pinkard’s translation of Hegel’s  
*Phenomenology*

4.1 Ideological and philosophical background to the Pinkard translation

Chapter 4 applies the theory of *hexis* developed in chapter 2 to the analysis of data from the Pinkard translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. In section 4.1, the historical context surrounding the Pinkard translation is analysed, identifying opposing ideological and philosophical positions as characterising features of the honour-endowing sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. As in chapter 3, references to the micro-dynamics of the sub-field refer to the complex rivalries between philosophers regarding their respective interpretations and appropriations of Hegel’s philosophy. The central argument of the chapter developed in section 4.2 is that microscopic analysis of the translated text, specifically the translations of *Geist* and *aufheben*, provides evidence for the socially and culturally determined historicity of the translation, and its embeddedness in the sub-field described in section 4.1. The text of Pinkard’s translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* embodies a historically determined translatorial stance or *hexis* which, in turn, reflects the translator’s non-neutral participation through the act of translating in the micro-dynamics of the sub-field. An analysis of lexical data is presented in section 4.2, and this forms the basis for the theorisation of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis* which is then supported, in section 4.3, with further evidence of the translatorial *hexis* as embodied in the peritexts of the translation.

4.1.1 Pinkard, Hegel and the communitarian challenge to liberalism

In spite of the complexity of the contemporary political and ideological field, subsection 4.1.1 identifies salient structural features, rival positions and dynamics which impinge on the sub-field under analysis in section 4.1.2. Since the late 1970s, the dominance of the political ideology of liberalism in the political field (Bourdieu, 1991b: 25-29) has been increasingly challenged by the ideology of communitarianism which is historically associated with the philosophy of Aristotle and Hegel (Bell, 2012). Twentieth-century
Communitarianism had its roots in the work of Anglo-American political philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer who challenged the vision of liberalism presented in John Rawls’ book *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971). Their challenge can be summarised with reference to two central themes (Bell, 2012). Firstly, the version of liberalism presented by Rawls seemed to require the acceptance of universal principles, that is, principles which must be accepted by everyone because they are universally right, regardless of differences between people. Communitarians rejected this view arguing that political and legal principles must be derived from the internal logic (or *Geist*/*spirit*) of particular communities and may therefore vary from culture to culture. This position can be described as pluralism. Some commentators, such as feminist Hegelian Hutchings, make a parallel distinction between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, also including minority and majority groups other than nations under the definition of a community (Hutchings, 2003). Secondly, communitarian philosophers argued that Rawlsian liberalism placed too much emphasis on individual freedom, especially freedom of choice and the autonomy of the self, at the expense of social values (*Geist* and *Sittlichkeit* [ethical life]) inherent in the concept of community. The communitarian view is therefore theoretically opposed to the emphasis on individual rights associated with libertarianism (Nozick, 1975). While the German philosopher Immanuel Kant is particularly associated with the history of liberal thought and the (deontological) ethics of individual rights and duties investigated by Rawls and Nozick, certain aspects of Hegel’s philosophy were seen to provide precisely the critical and theoretical move forward from Kant required in support of the communitarian position.

As will be described in greater detail in section 4.2.2 with reference to Pinkard’s published work, Pinkard has been associated with the communitarian position and especially with the elaboration of the Hegelian aspects of this position. For example, Pinkard was one of the ‘Founding Endorsers of the Responsive Communitarian Platform’ a sub-group of ‘The Communitarian Network’. Pinkard’s work as a leading Hegel expert and especially as translator of the *Phenomenology* (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) and biographer of Hegel (Pinkard, 2000) can be regarded as a position-taking with reference to this political field. Through its commitment to pluralism rather than

127 Communitarianism is not synonymous with pluralism but shares with it the rejection of a single, ‘one-theory-fits-all’ approach to ethics and political theory.
128 The website of this organisation can be found at: http://communitariannetwork.org/ and contains full policy statements as well as a list of supporters, including Pinkard.
universalism (or cosmopolitanism), the communitarian position exhibits a theoretical openness towards other cultures and at least an intellectual desire to benefit from transnational exchange. Pinkard’s recent lecture tours to Romania and China provide evidence that he is himself actively engaged in explaining and promoting Hegel’s philosophy\textsuperscript{129} in an international academic context but also suggest that there may be a communitarian ideological dimension to this work. Although communitarianism is not aligned to the major right-wing and left-wing political parties, it does represent a powerful ‘third force’ in American and world politics, perhaps especially because of its rootedness in the wider academic field (for example, in political theory and jurisprudence) and the philosophical sub-field. Given the party-political polarisation of American politics, it is also evident that communitarian values can be enlisted in support of either of the major parties.

As such, however, communitarianism is not without its enemies on both sides of the political spectrum and especially in the non-academic arena of public political discourse. Popular discourse in the contemporary political field is readily accessible through the Internet which provides insights into this debate. For example, not only does the Communitarian Network have a website as referenced above, critics of communitarianism have also set up an Anti-Communitarian League associated with the work of Raapana (2012). Another website\textsuperscript{130} equates communitarianism with communism and quite incorrectly lists Pinkard as a representative of what its authors perceive as this dangerous trend.\textsuperscript{131} In view of this public rhetoric, it is not surprising that Pinkard distanced himself even from the term ‘community’ in Democratic Liberalism and Social Union, where he introduces ‘social union’ as an alternative term: ‘The term itself, “social union,” is taken from Rawls. I use it if for no other reason than to avoid all the connotations of the already overworked notion of ‘community’’ (Pinkard, 1987: 25). Understandable though it is, this terminological finesse, which contributes to Pinkard’s circumspect hexis, comes close to Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘bad faith’ and ‘pedagogic work’ in the sense of saying one thing but doing another, as discussed in chapter 2. Regardless of how it is described, much depends upon what is actually

\textsuperscript{129} According to the news page on the website of Pinkard’s home university, Georgetown, in Washington, Pinkard’s commentary on the Phenomenology (Pinkard, 1994) is to be translated into Chinese (http://www.georgetown.edu).
\textsuperscript{130} http://www.middletownca.com/LIBERAL-EQUALS-SOCIALIST.htm. The unnamed author states: ‘It’s a short walk from Communitarianism to Communism and you can stop by Community on the way’.
\textsuperscript{131} The list of names is simply a copy of the list of ‘Founder Endorsers of the Responsive Communitarian Platform’ mentioned above.
entailed by the concept of community. However, as will be discussed in section 4.1.4 in connection with Democratic Liberalism and Social Union (Pinkard, 1987), Pinkard amply fulfils the responsibility to define the social union and/or community in distinctly Hegelian terms.

Against this background, the Pinkard translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology can be contextualised as a manifestation of a second revival of interest in German philosophy in the Anglophone world following the first Anglophone revival associated with British Idealism and the Baillie translation analysed in chapter 3 of this thesis. One important difference between the two revivals is the geopolitical shift in political power from Britain to America. In international relations, this shift in emphasis is defined in terms of ‘hegemonic stability theory’, according to which worldwide political stability is preserved by the existence of a hegemon (Keohane, 2005), a single most powerful state. At the time of the Baillie translations, the British Empire was the hegemon, and British hegemony was challenged by Germany in the two so-called world wars. Since around 1945, this quasi imperial role has been occupied by the USA. Recent political and economic discussion in the US media around 2008 considered the possibility of a further change, in which China will take over the role of hegemon from the USA (Halloran, 2008; Rodrik, 2009). In this context, a significant ideological element contributing to Pinkard’s translatorial hexis could therefore be seen in the fact that Pinkard will be the first American translator of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Although the concept of a hegemon is anchored in the metaphysics of universality and is therefore antithetical to the principles of communitarianism, Pinkard’s recent lecture tour to China and his receipt of the Guang Hua Award from Fudan University in Shanghai could be interpreted in hegemonic terms as a dialogue or negotiation between symbolic representatives of superpowers rather than as an intellectual exchange between homologous academic communities. In micro-textual terms, the inescapable embeddedness of Pinkard’s translation in the field of international politics, as suggested here, is embodied, for example, in Pinkard’s American spelling which contrasts with the British-English orthography used in the older Baillie (1910/1931) and Miller (1977) translations of the same text. In this sense, the publication and public acceptance of this US translation of Hegel would mark a victory of US English over UK English in dominating the academic field. One criticism of Pinkard’s (online draft) translation, which further suggests this kind of rivalry between UK and US Englishes, comments

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132 See Figure 4.2.
that Pinkard tries to ‘make Hegel speak American’. The critical implication here was presumably that making Hegel speak UK English, as the previous translators had done, was in some sense more acceptable. In view of this UK-US dimension of Anglophone Hegelianism, it is easy to lose sight of the German origins of Hegelian philosophy.

However, Pinkard’s association with the communitarian critique of liberalism, especially in his early work, which is discussed further in section 4.1.4 and the closely related international or transnational dynamics of the translation are somewhat eclipsed, at least within the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, by Pinkard’s association with the so-called non-metaphysical readings of Hegel.

### 4.1.2 Micro-dynamics of the non-metaphysical Hegel

In a more exclusively philosophical sense and in spite of the transnational rivalries mentioned in section 4.1.1, the second, late-twentieth century Hegel revival also actually reconciles or ‘sublates’ a division between Anglo-American philosophy and Continental philosophy which characterised twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy (Critchley, 2001). The Anglo-American or Analytical tradition, associated in its origins, for example, with Russell and Wittgenstein in Cambridge and with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James in the US, was broadly anti-Hegelian, pursuing interests in mathematical or symbolic logic, linguistic philosophy, pragmatism and Kantian ethics (ibid.). Continental philosophy, which relied more heavily on the translation of philosophical texts largely from German and French, pursued a path more obviously influenced by Hegel, leading from phenomenology through existentialism to wider interests in social and political theory, literary and art criticism. This (European) continental tradition encompasses the work of French philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists who were influenced by Hegel in various ways, and also includes Pierre Bourdieu. The second, increasingly US-led Hegel revival incorporates insights from the historical, German Hegel with an accumulation of twentieth-century German, English and French interpretations (Crossley, 1995; Pinkard, 2007).

133 This view was expressed in conversation at the annual conference of the Hegel Society of Great Britain in 2010 and also reported as a commonly held criticism among Hegel scholars in a personal e-mail from Jim Devin, a Hegel scholar based in Toronto (Devin, 2012).

134 The two articles referenced here briefly discuss these connections. Crossley (1995) reviews a new (1995) book by Frankfurt professor Axel Honneth and draws a links between Hegel, Habermas and
internationalisation or globalisation within the field of philosophy is still in the early stages, the gradual trend towards an expansion outwards from the narrow confines of national philosophies can also be seen as an honour-endowing aspect of this second Hegel revival. The honour-seeking *hexas* of philosophers and translators working in this new tradition accordingly also embodies this sense of historical and geopolitical inclusiveness which, at the same time, however, supports the hegemony of the (increasingly US-English) Anglophone academic culture.

In certain respects, the second Hegel revival can be seen as a continuation of the first in its unswerving commitment to the value of Hegel’s philosophy, including many of the broadly liberal, generally Christian and Eurocentric positions adopted by the British Idealists and sometimes referred to as right-Hegelianism (Singer, 1983; Stern, 2009; Boucher, 2012). However, as analysed in this section, it also involves a new and radical departure from traditional Hegelianism in the English-speaking world which links the second Hegel revival more closely with developments in Continental philosophy and sociology, sometimes referred to as left-Hegelianism. Accordingly, the philosophical context of the Pinkard translation, from the mid-1990s up to 2008, can be analysed in Bourdieusian terms as a sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, within which dispositions and stances are defined by the micro-dynamics of the sub-field, the internal power struggles between agents, primarily Hegelian philosophers, working to establish positions of dominance and subordination. In spite of the considerable complexities of this sub-field, it is possible to identify a broad polarisation between key positions during this period. These will be discussed in detail below. Although the analysis represents a simplification of a very complex subject, it does provide useful insights into the micro-dynamics of the sub-field which could form the basis for further research and, even at this stage, allows a theorisation of aspects of the text and paratexts of the translation as an embodiment of the translator’s *hexis*. A full characterisation of the debates involved would go beyond the scope of this thesis; the intention here is to suggest the outlines of the sub-field as a framework for analysing the text.

Bearing in mind these limitations, the distinction between ‘traditional metaphysical’, ‘non-metaphysical’ and ‘revised metaphysical’ readings of Hegel, as explained in the

Fukuyama. He specifically mentions the liberal/communitarian debate at the time as well as ‘post-metaphysical social theory’. Pinkard (2007) reviews the entire field of Hegelianism in the twentieth century from e.g. Croce, Gadamer, Gentile, Kojève and Lukács up to the non-metaphysical phase, mentioning inter alia Findlay, Taylor, Pippin and Brandom.
online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Redding, 2010) and mentioned briefly in chapter 2, provides a well-documented basis for characterising the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy in the period leading up to Pinkard’s translation of the *Phenomenology* (Beiser, 2008; Stern, 2009). The distinction relates directly to Pinkard, who has been widely associated with the non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel (Pinkard, 1994, 1996; Beiser 1996), but, as will be explained, also relates to the wider issue of the autonomy/heteronomy of the field of philosophy (Gouanvic, 2005) and its relationship with the fields of political theory, theology and politics (Houlgate, 2005; Pinkard, 1987, 1994).

Firstly, the traditional metaphysical interpretations of Hegel emphasise the identity of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit with the Christian conception of God and therefore seem to draw on a pre-Kantian or pre-critical conception of philosophical metaphysics; secondly, a group of non-metaphysical readings, which, by contrast, see the importance of Hegel’s philosophy in its development of Kantian critical philosophy in new directions which reject some or all of the metaphysical claims about Absolute Spirit and are (thus) potentially relevant to political and social theory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; and, thirdly, a set of revised metaphysical readings, which reassert the essential metaphysical nature of Hegel’s philosophy while modifying some of the more extravagant metaphysical claims of the traditionalists and incorporating some of the non-metaphysical discourse (Kreines, 2006; Redding, 2010). With regard to the micro-dynamics of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, this further analysis highlights the (heteronomous) dependence of the sub-field on its more or less direct antecedents in German idealistic philosophy and Christian theology. In Bourdieusian terms, the interdependence of one field on its neighbours is described as a heteronymy of the respective field (Gouanvic, 2005). Accordingly, some philosophers highlight the autonomy of Hegel’s philosophy within its own historical context, while others emphasise the heteronomy of the Hegelian sub-field, or its dependence, to a greater or lesser extent on surrounding fields. Traditional metaphysical readings stress the historical association of Hegel with Christian theology, while non-metaphysical readings emphasise the dependence of Hegelian philosophy on Kantian critical

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135 For example, Houlgate suggests a relationship of heteronymy between Hegelian philosophy and the field of contemporary Anglican theology by quoting the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, in his *Introduction to Hegel* (Houlgate, 2005: 250). See below.
philosophy and tend to stress its relevance to (and therefore dependence upon) contemporary political and social themes.

A parallel distinction has also been described in the *Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy* (Beiser, 2008) as the difference between ‘anachronistic’ and ‘antiquarian’ approaches to Hegel, as also mentioned in chapter 2. The alliteration between the two terms anachronistic and antiquarian suggests that Beiser is using language rhetorically here and therefore adopting an ‘elevated’ style in his philosophising as described in chapter 2 with reference to Bourdieu’s discussion of Heidegger (1991a: 88). This point will be taken up later in this section in the context of a public dialogue between Beiser and Pinkard (Beiser, 1995; Pinkard, 1996). Beiser’s 2008 analysis assigns the non-metaphysical readings to the set of anachronistic approaches because they appear to select from Hegel’s philosophy only those aspects which are applicable or relevant to present-day, twenty-first century concerns, especially about social and political philosophy, thereby misconstruing the true or historical Hegel. Beiser therefore challenges the dominance and orthodoxy of the non-metaphysical position, established relatively recently especially in the US. Such tensions within the sub-field allow an analysis in terms of honour-endowing positions and honour-seeking agents. By emphasising the importance of source-language historical data, Beiser adopts a position opposite to that of the non-metaphysical writers. His position or stance is defined by his assertion of the autonomy of the historical sub-field which relies on archival, historical research (*Konstellationsforschung*). This position seeks to undermine the authority of the non-metaphysical writers by suggesting that their misappropriation of Hegel for use in contemporary philosophical contexts lacks historical credibility, fidelity to the source texts and especially fails to pay attention to the relationship between Hegel and his less well-known contemporaries, for example, as documented in correspondence between these philosophers (Beiser, 2008: 10). Pinkard’s publication in 2000 of *Hegel: A Biography*, the only recent, detailed biography of the philosopher to be published in English (Pinkard, 2000), could be taken as a reply to Beiser’s insinuation (Beiser, 2008: 5) that the non-metaphysical philosophers lack biographical correctness and detail.

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136 Redding (2010) associates Beiser with the traditional metaphysical interpretation of Hegel.
137 Beiser refers specifically to the work of Henrich, who, together with Fulda, collected and published detailed background material on Hegel’s works, for example, in *Materialien zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* [Materials on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit] (Fulda, 1973).
Beiser further distinguishes three sub-types of non-metaphysical reading of Hegel associated respectively with Klaus Hartmann (1966; 1972), Robert Pippin (1989) and Robert Brandom (2000). According to Hartmann, Beiser explains, ‘Hegel’s philosophy is not speculation about mysterious entities such as the absolute or spirit, but an attempt to develop a system of categories, the most basic concepts by which we think about the world’ (Beiser, 2008: 4). Hegel’s references to God should, according to this view, be taken as merely metaphorical. Beiser’s claim here could be taken as divisive of the sub-field in the sense that there may be Hegelians, for whom Hegel’s conception of God is not metaphorical. The Hartmannian, non-metaphysical reading of Hegel is grounded in internal considerations inherent in the concepts or categories used to articulate Hegel’s logic. This position in the sub-field therefore seeks to establish its autonomy or independence from, for example, theological categories; it can be construed as a secularisation of Hegel.

Beiser goes on to characterise Robert Pippin’s approach in terms of Kantian transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, Hegel’s idealism is a theory ‘about the necessary conditions of possible experience. The subject that is at the heart of Hegel’s idealism lies not in any conception of a self-positing spirit but in Kant’s unity of apperception, the principle that self-consciousness is a necessary condition for all experience’ (Beiser, 2008: 4). Once again, Beiser polarises the sub-field, introducing a micro-dynamic or struggle between those contemporary philosophers who see Hegel as primarily concerned with the workings of a ‘self-positing spirit’ and those for whom ‘self-consciousness’ is the central concern. According to this view, the concept of self-consciousness can be generated without recourse to theological concepts.

Finally, Beiser explains that a more recent kind of non-metaphysical reading has been worked out by Robert Brandom, who ‘sees Hegel as fundamentally a theorist about the normative dimension of life, experience and discourse, and claims that all his talk about spirit has to be understood in terms of the mutual recognition implicit in such norms’. Beiser introduces a tension here between Brandom’s concern with normativity and Hegel’s concept of spirit. The implication is that Brandom’s approach is in some sense dismissive (‘all his talk about spirit’) of one of Hegel’s central concepts, and that Brandom’s approach is therefore not fully in tune with the true or complete Hegel but rather seeks to draw from Hegel only what is relevant to Brandom and his contemporaries.
Pinkard was a student of Hartmann (Engelhardt, 1994) and also acknowledges his indebtedness to Pippin and Brandom (1996). Pinkard’s own closely related, non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, especially the view elaborated in *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (1994) evolved within the relatively recent orthodoxy of this (late twentieth-century) sub-field. Pinkard’s reputation as a non-metaphysical Hegelian in the mid-1990s may influence the reception of his translation in that the translation may be taken, by adherents of the traditional as well as the revised metaphysical view, to be biased in favour of the non-metaphysical position. The historical tension between, for example, Beiser and the non-metaphysical approaches to Hegel, including Pinkard’s, will therefore be analyzed somewhat further as a basis for approaching the text of the translation, and in particular, the translatorial *hexis* embodied in that text. The public dialogue between Beiser and Pinkard mentioned above dates back at least to 1995 when Beiser published a review article in the *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* which led to a response from Pinkard and a further response from Beiser (Beiser, 1995; 1996; Pinkard, 1996). The original review (Beiser, 1995) related to a *Festschrift* for Klaus Hartmann, *Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State*, edited by Engelhardt and Pinkard (Engelhardt, 1994). Beiser concludes his polemical review as follows:

"My final verdict on Hartmann’s interpretation is that it is profoundly, indeed blatantly, anachronistic, forcing Hegel into the mould of modern preconceptions, now dated by post-modern standards. It does not mark an advance but a decline in Hegel scholarship, a deep drop in standards of historical accuracy and philosophical sophistication. There is nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, by simply ignoring it."

(Beiser, 1995: 12)

Overall, the review offers a detailed but scathing criticism of the non-metaphysical position anticipating many of the points mentioned in the *Cambridge Companion* (Beiser, 2008). In Pinkard’s response to Beiser, ‘What is the Non-Metaphysical Reading of Hegel? A Reply to Frederick Beiser’(1996), Pinkard specifically addresses Beiser’s polemical style. Beiser’s article (1995) is entitled ‘Hegel, A Non-Metaphysician? A Polemic’. The question mark here indicates a rhetorical question expressing astonished laughter at the absurdity of such a suggestion. The term ‘polemic’ indicates Beiser’s
aggressive *hexis*. Pinkard begins his reply by acknowledging that Beiser has raised interesting questions in his criticism and continues:

Beiser’s tract is also a polemic, a rare form of philosophical writing nowadays, which lends it a certain dash that is sometimes lacking in the form of the impersonal academic article. If nothing else, Beiser’s polemic certainly *sounds* much more like the real, historical Hegel writing about, for example, J.F. Fries than anything any so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians typically do. (Pinkard, 1996: 13)

This brief comment gives a good insight into Pinkard’s own contrasting *hexis* which can also be detected in the text and peritexts of the translation. Pinkard concedes that the modern ‘impersonal academic’ style sometimes lacks excitement by comparison with the older, rhetorical style of the polemic and also admits that Beiser’s style may ‘sound’ more like the ‘historical Hegel’ than the style of modern philosophers. However, these two comments are more subtly damaging than they may at first seem. Pinkard relegates Beiser to an old-fashioned and perhaps over-inflated generation, the generation embodying the style referred to by Bourdieu as ‘elevated’; Pinkard also suggests that this elevated style is ultimately hollow. The arguments may ‘sound’ convincing, but real (modern) philosophy has to do more than this. Pinkard’s *hexis* in this philosophical stand-off is based on his invocation of the modern and the impersonal, the cool and analytic. Later in his reply, Pinkard gives his own concise definition to clear up ‘the fuss about the non-metaphysical reading’ (1996: 20).

According to Hartmann, Pinkard explains, Hegel should be seen as continuing a central, transcendental line of argumentation from Kant’s critical philosophy rather than as reverting to a pre-Kantian, metaphysical philosophy. Pinkard refers specifically to Hartmann’s 1966 article ‘On Taking the Transcendental Turn’ published in the *Review of Metaphysics* (Hartmann, 1966). As mentioned with reference to Beiser (2008) above, Hartmann provides a ‘categoreal’ reading of Hegel, which pivots on justifying the claim that the categories of thought postulated by Kant are necessary for an

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138 In the article, Hartmann spells the term ‘categoreal’ rather than the conventional ‘categorial’. It is interesting that recent commentators on Hartmann’s work (such as Beiser) have ‘corrected’ this spelling variant without comment, thereby revealing a somewhat autocratic *hexis*, not only taking for granted the correctness of contemporary spelling but imposing it on Hartmann, who may perhaps have been playing on the last syllable ‘catego-real’.
understanding of the experience of consciousness. Unlike his fellow post-Kantians, Fichte and Schelling, Hegel did not seek to justify the necessity of the categories with reference to the priority of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘objectivity’ respectively (Bowie, 2003: 79-80).

For Hartmann, the justification of the categories was the issue in Kant ‘to which Fichte and Schelling had responded, although inadequately’ (Pinkard, 1996: 14). In Hartmann’s view ‘it was Hegel who first saw that the justification could not rely on “intellectual intuition” but had instead to be a circular, self-justifying argument’ (ibid.). Accordingly, it was this kind of self-justifying argument which Hegel began to develop during his Jena years, i.e. leading up to and including the publication of the Phänomenologie des Geistes in 1807. As Pinkard continues, this position acknowledges the relevance of further historical and philosophical research into the precise nature of the Kantian project and therefore (in Bourdieusian terms) recognises the heteronomy of the sub-field (i.e. the dependence of Hegel upon the neo-Kantian sub-field), but at the same time suggests that the central concern of Hegel’s philosophy, namely, the need for a ‘circular, self-justifying argument’, is already understood well enough to assert its relevance to modern philosophy and indeed to the surrounding contemporary, target-language fields of ethics, politics, jurisprudence, for example. The orthodox, non-metaphysical readings of Hegel are thus construed as occupying a (relatively) autonomous position within the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. The idea that there is an already well-understood, central logical or theoretical core to Hegel’s philosophy to some extent releases modern Hegelian philosophers from their dependence on the ‘source’ culture and licences their application of the core ideas (the circular, self-justifying argument, or, more specifically, the role of self-consciousness in the generation of normative, ethical values based on mutual self-recognition) to contemporary social and political problems. However, as Pinkard goes on to explain, the idea of a central core to Hegel’s thought also raises the question of Hegel’s own self-consistency.

\[139\] Bowie defines the specialist use of ‘intuition’ [as a translation of Anschauung] as follows: ‘intuition in German philosophy refers to the contact one has with something: our empirical contact with the world takes the form of ‘sensuous intuition’ (2003: 276); by contrast, intellectual intuition (in the sense used by Schelling) ‘posits some kind of inherent link between knower and the known. It connects the cognitive basis and the real basis of the subject, linking the subject as that which forms concepts to the subject as that which exists as part of the world in relation to which it forms those concepts. Crucially, Hegel rejects this concept as inadequate (Bowie, 2003: 83) [my underlining].
What propelled the rest of Hartmann’s reading was his belief that the entire Hegelian system had to be built on such a basis, and if it were to be true to itself, only on such a basis. His [Hartmann’s] argument thus centered around both what Hegel said and claimed and what, on the basis of his ‘methodology’ he was entitled to claim. Hartmann concluded that despite Hegel’s intentions, his pronouncements on religion and history could not be squared with the ‘methodology’ on which Hegel relied to make those claims.

(Pinkard, 1996: 14)

Accordingly, if the self-grounding nature of Hegelian logic is taken to be the central part of the system, some of Hegel’s statements about religion and history, statements, such as those in the *Phenomenology* relating to the historical (evolutionary) progression of various religions towards the most developed (‘highest’) state of protestant Christianity or the (subordinate) role of women in civil society,¹⁴⁰ may not be justifiable in Hegel’s own terms. That is, some of Hegel’s judgements may not follow consistently from the logic of his system so construed. Pinkard mentions the specific point regarding the superiority of Christianity over Judaism.

But the crucial question remains: how much can Hegel rightfully assert on the basis of his own principles? It is relatively clear, for example, that Hegel thought that Christianity was a ‘higher’ religion than Judaism; there’s probably little doubt that he held that view. But many (myself included) want to know if that really follows from Hegel’s views, or if it is more of a display of something that Hegel wanted to justify but actually could not, perhaps a reflection of his times but not a necessary consequence of his thought.

(Pinkard, 1996: 15)

The deadlock in the sub-field between (antiquarian) metaphysical and (anachronistic) non-metaphysical readings referenced in the preceding paragraphs was eventually overcome (‘sublated’) through the acknowledgement that Hegel did indeed make (extravagant) metaphysical claims which should not be allowed to undermine the contemporary relevance claimed for Hegel by the non-metaphysical generation. In a

¹⁴⁰ Hutchings, for example, sees a potential within Hegel’s philosophy for a ‘feminist’ interpretation which could provide a valuable compromise between ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘communitarian’ approaches to social and international relations. Hegel himself did not see this potential (Hutchings, 2003).
characteristic manner, Pinkard has subsequently distanced himself from the term non-metaphysical, as discussed in the next paragraph. The revised metaphysical view (Redding, 2010) can be seen (crudely) as a compromise position seeking to reconcile the intractability of the metaphysical versus non-metaphysical debate.

One recent commentator on the debate between Beiser and Pinkard refers to the article quoted above and points out that Pinkard ‘offers no defense of the idea that Hegel offers a metaphysically-neutral analysis of concepts; Pinkard instead refocuses attention on the core idea that Hegel aims to complete Kant’s critical project rather than to revive specifically pre-critical forms of metaphysics’ (Kreines, 2006: 7). The thrust of Kreines’ article is that the debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical positions has become ‘unconvincing’. In fact, ‘[t]he most promising directions for future research, for those on both sides of recent debates, will require recognising that Hegel’s theoretical philosophy includes a metaphysics, and engaging new debates about the specific character of that metaphysics’ (Kreines, 2006: 2). Kreines also mentions Pinkard’s renunciation of the term ‘non-metaphysical’ in a footnote to an article published in 1999 (Pinkard, 1999: 230). These references indicate that the sub-field of Hegelian philosophy was experiencing changes at this time and, as will be shown with reference to Pinkard’s published work in section 4.1.2, Pinkard’s self-positioning relative to the metaphysical-non-metaphysical polarisation can also be seen to have undergone a significant shift between 1995 and 1999.

The idea that the non-metaphysical orthodoxy had already been superseded by a return to metaphysics by 2009 is expressed by Robert Stern, another important exponent of the ‘revised metaphysical’ position. Stern suggests here that, in the early years of the twentieth century, positivist philosophers (verificationists) had used the argument that metaphysics was meaningless in order to discredit Hegel and his followers; however, metaphysics (and Hegel) is now back in fashion:

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141 Kreines is an exponent of the ‘revised metaphysical’ reading (Redding, 2010). His paper ‘Hegel’s Metaphysics: Changing the Debate’ lucidly explains the need for this transition. Kreines uses the terms ‘traditionalist’ and ‘nontraditionalist’ to shift the emphasis away from the distinction between metaphysical and non-metaphysical approaches (Kreines, 2006: 7).

142 The key sentences from the footnote read: ‘I prefer the term ‘post-Kantian’ to the term ‘non-metaphysical’ that I have previously used to characterize my work. The latter term was famously used by Hartmann to describe his reading of Hegel, and the use of the very term itself raised more controversy than the interpretation helped to settle’ (Pinkard, 1999: 230).

143 Stern is possibly thinking of Popper, who attacked Hegel in his The Open Society and Its Enemies (1974).
On the very general question, of whether seeing Hegel as a metaphysician is to associate him with a discredited research programme, it might actually be argued that the very opposite is the case: in fact, it could be said, metaphysics is going through a period of conspicuous revival after the dark days of verificationism had consigned it to the oblivion of meaninglessness, so that to see Hegel in metaphysical terms is nowadays to put him in the vanguard of philosophical fashion and progress.

(Stern, 2009: 2)

Stern also resorts to rhetorical metaphor to support his case in this quotation. The ‘dark days’, the ‘vanguard’, ‘fashion’ and even ‘progress’ are emotionally charged terms which embody a particular, historically determined *hexis*. The change in trend welcomed by Stern here is also discernible at a relatively superficial level, for example, in the titles of books and articles. Given the non-metaphysical orthodoxy of the sub-field in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the publication during the first decade of the twenty-first century of such titles as ‘Hegel’s Metaphysics: Changing the Debate’ (Kreines, 2006) and *Hegelian Metaphysics* (Stern, 2009) can be interpreted as a deliberate and even defiant countering of the non-metaphysical orthodoxy. According to the Bourdieusian analysis presented in this thesis, these writers can therefore be seen as exhibiting a *hexis* through their choice of titles. The historically determined stances adopted here are not readily intelligible without a prior understanding of the micro-dynamics of the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 will examine the manner in which lexical and peritexual elements of Pinkard’s translation also embody a translatorial *hexis* relative to the dynamics of the sub-field. The text and peritexts were written with an expectation of being understood in particular ways, especially by specific groups of readers who were more or less aware of the complex philosophical issues and social micro-dynamics embodied in this particular branch of academic language.

To summarise the sub-field, the trend throughout the twentieth century was towards a non-metaphysical orthodoxy, which challenged the traditional metaphysical readings of Hegel associated with Christian theology, Spinozian monism (see Kreines, 2006), Eurocentrism and the right-Hegelian position which had evolved in Germany after Hegel’s death (Singer, 1983). The new non-metaphysical orthodoxy, which extends
back as far as the British Idealists (Stern, 2009; Mander, 2011; Boucher, 2012), provided opportunities for investigating the social and political claims and implications of Hegel’s philosophy, some of which had been anticipated by the nineteenth-century left-Hegelians, such as Feuerbach and Marx (Singer, 1983). Although Pinkard was originally openly associated with the non-metaphysical orthodoxy, as will be discussed in the next sub-section with reference to his publications, he also shows increasing circumspection, if not in his relationship with the non-metaphysical reading, then at least with the term ‘non-metaphysical’ and, by the late 1990s, he was prepared to renounce the rhetoric and vocabulary of this position, while retaining his adherence to key components developed under the non-metaphysical aegis, especially the centrality to Hegel’s thought of a self-generating, self-legitimating logic deriving from the nature of rational, human (individual and social) self-consciousness. Accordingly, the relationship between Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel and the theorisation of a specifically communitarian form of democratic liberalism remains intact.
4.1.3 Biographical profile of Pinkard

At the time of writing, Pinkard is a professor of philosophy at Georgetown University in Washington DC. He was born in Lafayette, Louisiana, studied philosophy at the University of Texas and took his PhD in philosophy at Stony Brook University in New York in 1975. His PhD title was ‘The Foundations of Transcendental Idealism: Kant, Hegel and Husserl’. He participated as the first US research student in a pilot academic exchange with the University of Tübingen. Tübingen is Hegel’s birthplace, and Hegel also attended the Tübinger Stift, a famous protestant seminary there. Tübingen provides many resources for the study of Hegel and his associates. Pinkard has therefore been associated with Hegel and his work throughout his academic career. However, as will be shown with reference to Pinkard’s published work, it is still possible to discern through Pinkard’s work a professional trajectory which moves from a broad interest in ethics, political and jurisprudential theory, especially in the late 1980s, towards an increasing focus on Hegel’s life and works, especially the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Pinkard is a member and the Hegel Society of Great Britain, although he is not currently a member of the Hegel Society of America. He is also Honorary Professor in the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Tübingen. In

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144 Image downloaded from: http://www.wikoberlin.de/index.php?id=95&no_cache=1&tx_wikofellows_pi1%5B (accessed 22/07/2011)
145 http://ms.cc.sunysb.edu/~hsilverman/PLACEMENT/SB-PhilosophyDoctorates.htm
146 This was checked online on the website of the Hegel Society of America on 22 May 2012.
2011, Pinkard gave a lecture entitled ‘From Hegel to Marx: What Went Wrong?’ at the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile (IICMER) in Romania. In January 2012, Pinkard received a Guang-Hua award for distinguished scholarship from the Fudan University in Shanghai, China.

Figure 4.2: Pinkard on tour in Shanghai

Pinkard’s personal website contains very little biographical detail apart from the following brief statement under the heading ‘About me’: ‘My interests are largely in exploring the German tradition in philosophy from Kant to the present. I am interested in both how that tradition has historically taken shape and how it still has much to say to us’.

Having already published widely on Hegel, Pinkard is eminently qualified to undertake the task of (re)translating Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes. In Bourdieusian terms, Pinkard’s curriculum vitae can be regarded as a continuous accumulation of very specifically targeted cultural capital, which equips him to act within the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. Pinkard’s expertise in Hegelian ethics is also transferable to the wider fields of political and jurisprudential theory. However, in spite of his expertise in the Hegelian sub-field and his low-key presentation of himself through the internet, it cannot be assumed that Pinkard’s translation is in some sense

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147 http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/en/
148 http://philosophy.georgetown.edu/264452.html. The photograph in Figure 4.2 is downloaded from this site.
neutral or that Pinkard’s wider philosophical and political interest in Hegel’s ethics is simply suppressed in the translation. As shown in the introduction to this chapter, the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy at around the time of the translation was characterised by a lively debate in which Pinkard was an active participant quite definitely on the non-metaphysical side. Moreover, the micro-dynamics of this sub-field reflect the wider dynamics of the neighbouring fields of philosophy as a whole, political theory and any number of other fields, including, for example, the significance of Hegelian philosophy in the former communist state of Romania or with regard to the changing international (hegemonic) status of China. As will be shown in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the text and peritexts of the translation embody Pinkard’s honour-seeking hexis in response to these dynamic social and cultural fields.

4.1.4 Bibliographical profile of Pinkard

The central argument of the present thesis is that, at various levels, the translation embodies signs of the translator’s engagement with the field dynamics which can be theorised as a translatorial hexis. Before turning to the details of Pinkard’s translations of the dialectically ambiguous terms Geist and aufheben in section 4.2 and the stance adopted by Pinkard in his (peritextual) Notes on the Translation in section 4.3, sub-section 4.1.4 briefly considers the relationship of intertextuality between Pinkard’s published works and the translation. Through their association with the micro-dynamics of various historical stages in the debate between the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel, Pinkard’s other philosophical works engage indirectly with the creation and shaping of meanings in the translation itself. To use Genette’s terminology, Pinkard’s own works can be theorised as ‘authorial epitexts’ to the translation. Associated works by other philosophers, such as Kreines (2006), Beiser (2008) and Stern (2009) mentioned above, can be regarded as ‘allographic epitexts’, to the extent that they too influence the meanings of the key terms spirit and sublate used by Pinkard to translate Geist and aufheben.

A selection of Pinkard’s published works is posted and updated on the personal website referenced above. These include thumbnail images of the covers for the selected books, book chapters and journal articles. The German source text for Hegel’s Phänomenologie

Please refer to footnote 59 in Section 2.2.3 for a discussion of intertextuality, epitexts and peritexts.
The two books which do not appear on the webpage, *Democratic Liberalism and Social Union* (Pinkard, 1987); *Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility* (Pinkard, 1988), provide an insight into Pinkard’s initially broad interest in jurisprudence, political theory and the development of his own post-Hartmannian interpretation of the non-metaphysical position. In *Democratic Liberalism and Social Union* (1987), Pinkard investigates the applicability of Hegelian philosophy to some of the problems encountered in US political theory at the time. The book can be read as a communitarian, broadly Hegelian response to the major debate over liberal and libertarian ethical positions surrounding John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971) and Robert Nozick’s *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Nozick, 1975). Pinkard invokes a Hegelian-inspired conception of *spirit* to counter the one-sidedness of utilitarian and deontological ethical principles conventionally used in support of classical liberalism. ‘Following Hegel, we can call the interconnected set of ideals, and norms by which a given culture understands itself the *spirit* of that culture’ (Pinkard, 1987: 17). *Spirit* is therefore taken to be an essentially social concept; *spirit* represents the way the people in a given culture understand themselves. *Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility* (Pinkard, 1988), which is also currently out of print, provides an interpretation and a ‘reconstruction’ of Hegel’s philosophy in essentially post-Hartmannian, that is, non-metaphysical terms. The blurb on the book-cover includes an endorsement of Pinkard’s analysis by Klaus Hartmann himself: ‘Pinkard’s book is a thoughtful and original study of Hegel. It is friendly to Hegel where there is reason to be so. … It is modern in supplying reasons for moves in Hegel which restate what he must have had in mind without having said so…. In all, a very wonderful achievement – Klaus Hartmann, Tübingen University’. The appearance of Hartmann’s name and affiliation with Tübingen significantly contributed to Pinkard’s cultural capital, especially at a time when the non-metaphysical view of Hegel represented a strong, orthodox position in the sub-field. Hartmann’s comment also underlines the selectivity of the non-metaphysical view (as criticised by Beiser (2008)), suggesting that there are things Hegel should not have said as well as things he should have said but did not.
*Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Pinkard, 1994) presents a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments of Hegel’s text based on Pinkard’s own reading, which is, as already mentioned, influenced by the non-metaphysical positions associated with Hartmann and Pippin. The last section of the book also offers a reconstruction of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (Hegel, 1952). In summarising Hegel’s *Phenomenology* in the introduction to his book, Pinkard gives a brief definition of *spirit*:

Spirit – *Geist* – is a *self-conscious* form of life – that is, it is a form of life that has developed various social practices for reflecting on what it takes to be authoritative for itself in terms of whether these practices live up to their own claims and achieve the aims that they set for themselves. Put more metaphorically, spirit is a form of “social space” reflecting on itself as to whether it is satisfactory within its own terms (with what it takes to be the “essence” of things, in Hegel’s terms). “Spirit” therefore denotes for Hegel not a metaphysical entity but a fundamental *relation* among persons that mediates their *self-consciousness*, a way in which people reflect on what they have come to take as authoritative for themselves.

(Pinkard, 1994: 8-9)

This is quite evidently a non-metaphysical definition of *spirit* which highlights human, social relations with a special emphasis on the normativity associated with social relations. Pinkard follows this definition with an explanation of the role of *spirit*, thus construed, in European history:

Accordingly, the *Phenomenology* is supposed to take its readers, the participants in the modern European community’s form of life, through the past “formations of consciousness” of the European “spirit” - the ways in which that “spirit” has both taken the “essence” of things to be and the ways in which it has taken agents to be cognitively related to that “essence” - and demonstrate to them that they require the kind of account which the *Phenomenology* as a whole provides, that the *Phenomenology*’s project is therefore not optional for them but intrinsic to their sense of who they are.

(Pinkard, 1994: 16-17)
Pinkard’s sub-title, *The Sociality of Reason*, also points towards the central thrust of his reading of Hegel; freedom derives from the relationship between *Reason* and *Spirit*, the titles of the two large, central chapters of Hegel’s book, and therefore demands a rational account of the way self-consciousness has developed within the specific, historical European social context. Rationality is inextricably connected to the society in which rational agents have evolved. In order to discover the rationality of our own society and therefore to enjoy freedom in this sense, we (referring here to European/US readers of Hegel) have to grasp the sociality of reason. Pinkard also indicates in the quotation that the project of the *Phenomenology* is rooted in its historical European context. This conception of freedom does not require a metaphysical essence; instead, in an apparently circular manner, it requires a reflective understanding of how we (people in a given society) have come to understand things in the way that we do understand them. Although the terms *essence* and *spirit* are traditionally associated with metaphysics, Pinkard’s reconstruction relocates them in a social and ethical context. For example, Pinkard explains that Hegel’s idea that freedom must be understood socially is, in fact, ‘the Greek conception of freedom as Hegel reconstructs it in the *Phenomenology* and gives it a fully social, non-metaphysical form’ (Pinkard, 1994: 272). Pinkard’s emphasis on the social nature of *reason* and *spirit* has political implications aligning him with a communitarian rather than a cosmopolitan position; that is, prioritising the values of the particular community over those of some kind of universal, neutral legislating power, such as abstract reason, which might insist on (abstract) cosmopolitanism.

Critics of Pinkard’s position have targeted the book, as the following comment shows:

Pinkard tends to interpret Hegel as a social critic, and as such he tends to omit or obscure many of Hegel’s arguments on the identity of the Self and its relation to Nature and World. For those who wish to see and read Hegel as a precursor to Habermas and, generally the New Left’s critique of social conservatism, this interpretation [*Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Pinkard, 1994)] would be useful.

(Hegel/Shannon, 2001: 229)

This comment provides a further example of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘bad faith’ discussed in chapter 2. The apparent recommendation is intended to warn readers that
Pinkard’s interpretation is biased against social conservatism and the true or full range of Hegel’s arguments. Accordingly, Pinkard’s book acts as a textual participant in the micro-dynamics of the sub-field. In this context, Pinkard’s use of terms such as spirit according to his own (socialised and secularised) interpretation embodies Pinkard’s hexis; he uses the term to assert his position in the sub-field. When transferred to the translation, Pinkard’s usage of the term retains this sub-field-dependent, socially determined meaning. That is, the meaning of the term spirit in the subsequent translation (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) depends on its prior usage within the sub-field, through intertextuality with reference to this authorial epitext.

In *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (1994: 17-19), Pinkard also refers briefly and critically to the Baillie translation (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) and the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977). This suggests that Pinkard may have already been considering translating the *Phenomenology* himself. He notes that, in quoting from the Miller translation, he has changed some terms in order to preserve consistency, for example, ‘I have rendered all occurrences of Aufheben as “sublate,” and noted the places where I do not’ (ibid.). The reference to Aufheben is followed by a lengthy footnote, in which Pinkard distances himself from controversy about the term: ‘Much (really too much) has been made of Hegel’s use of the term Aufhebung’. He also cites Michael Inwood (1992) and notes the ‘three sided meaning’ as well as the ‘ambiguity’ of the term.

In a positive sense, the publication of *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Pinkard, 1994) augmented Pinkard’s cultural capital as the author of the most comprehensive commentary or reconstruction of Hegel’s book available in English. However, it also identified Pinkard in a potentially damaging way as an exponent of the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, which, as already mentioned, was soon to be superseded, at least according to some commentators (Stern, 2009). The next two books listed on the website, *Hegel: A Biography* (Pinkard, 2000) and *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Pinkard, 2002) redress this imbalance. In a sense,
as already suggested above, these books respond to the demand made by Beiser (1995; 1996) that detailed historical research should precede an interpretation or application of Hegel’s philosophy. Pinkard provided the (non-metaphysical) interpretation first, but followed it with extensive research into the life of Hegel (Pinkard, 2000) and his contemporaries (Pinkard, 2002). In so far as his *hexis* is determined by his reputation within the honour-endowing sub-field, the publication of these books can therefore be regarded as strengthening Pinkard’s *hexis*; that is to say, the philosophical authority and cultural capital embodied in the words he uses.
On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany (Pinkard, 2007) is a translation of works by the German-Jewish poet and philosopher Heinrich Heine, who was at one time a student of Hegel. The translation was done by Howard Pollack-Milgate; Pinkard provided the introduction. Again, perhaps responding to the point mentioned in the dialogue with Beiser (Beiser, 1995; Beiser, 1996; Pinkard, 1996) regarding Hegel’s presumed belief in the superiority of Christianity over Judaism, to which Pinkard objected, Pinkard presents Heine and Hegel in their philosophical relationship with their mutual friend Eduard Gans, who was a German-Jewish philosopher. With their Jewish answers to Hegel’s somewhat extravagant claims about Christianity, Heine and Gans are shown to have progressed beyond Hegel and Christianity, anticipating Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity.

Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (Pinkard, 2012) is Pinkard’s most recent work. The content of the book is summarised on the back cover as follows:

No book has treated Hegel’s concept of being-at-one-with-oneself in this depth.
No book has argued for Hegel as being an Aristotelian naturalist in this fashion.
The author advances the view that Hegel’s conception of the nature of philosophy bears a passing similarity to that of Wittgenstein’s, in that both think that the

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154 Downloaded from: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/157064-1. The website shows a video clip of the talk Pinkard gave.
kinds of conceptual puzzles that animate philosophy are fundamentally irresolvable, even though Hegel argues for a much different social role for philosophy than does Wittgenstein.

(Publisher’s blurb from back cover of Pinkard’s latest book, (2012))

Once again, the ‘social role’ of philosophy is highlighted. Pinkard refers to this book and its central ideas in the video clips from his lecture tour in Romania, and a link to the OUP website is provided on the Georgetown University website announcing Pinkard’s award from Fudan University in China (See Figure 4.2). This website also quotes from the book, claiming that Hegel’s Aristotelian conception of naturalism ‘provides the framework for explaining how we are both natural organisms and also practically minded (self-determining, rationally responsive, reason giving) beings’. With regard to the discussion of Pinkard’s translation of Geist in the Phenomenology as analysed in section 4.2.1 of this thesis, it is interesting to note that, in this more recent work, Pinkard uses the term ‘Mind’ in the title rather than ‘Spirit’. The term ‘minded’ in the quotation given here is also presumably a reference to Hegel’s Geist.

Pinkard’s webpage also lists a selection of book sections and journal articles which he has published in recent years. Each of these texts can also be taken as an authorial epitext to the 2008 translation in the sense mentioned above, according to which they might be consulted by a future researcher seeking to deepen her/his understanding of Pinkard’s use of terms such as spirit and sublate in the translation. However, sufficient detail about Pinkard’s positioning within the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy has now been given as a preparation for the analysis of the translated text provided in section 4.2.
4.2 Pinkard’s translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* and the translatorial *hexis*

Section 4.2 analyses the data in the Pinkard translation as a basis for the theoretical claim that Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*, which reflects his conscious and/or unconscious positioning within the sub-field defined in section 4.1, is embodied in the text and peritexts to the translation. Sub-sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 analyse Pinkard’s translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* respectively. These initial paragraphs of section 4.1 address general points about the translation with examples of Pinkard’s style. The overarching argument presented here is that, while Pinkard’s overt commitment to making the translation more consistent and up-to-date (analysed in greater detail throughout the chapter) may, at face value, seem like a self-evident and neutral improvement of the older translations, this view is an oversimplification. Alongside the analysis of Baillie’s translation, the present analysis provides a second example of how the translator of a canonical philosophical text necessarily participates in the social dynamics surrounding the work. The new consistency, subdued rhetoric and impersonal style\(^{155}\) of the Pinkard translation in fact contribute to a (re-)secularisation of Hegel’s work, an active countering of some of the presuppositions of the traditional metaphysical reading, a powerful gesture in support of the core arguments, method of reasoning and ideological commitments of the non-metaphysical view. The new translation draws its energy and significance from the intertextual relationship with its immediate predecessors (Baillie, 1910 and Miller, 1977) as well as the wider (epitextual) discourse within the sub-field.\(^{156}\) On the negative side, Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis* is predicated on the inadequacy and inconsistency of the Baillie and Miller translations and on the logical weakness of some of the more extravagant claims of the traditional metaphysical view; on the positive side, it is predicated on the historically-determined necessity for something like a non-metaphysical move, i.e. the (urgent) need to subject Hegel to internal scrutiny in order to examine what Hegel is entitled to say according to his own commitments. This move is necessary if the theoretical value of Hegel’s core

\(^{155}\) The reference to ‘impersonal style’ here relates to Pinkard’s comment on the modern academic style which Pinkard contrasts with Beiser’s polemical style, as discussed in section 4.1.3 above (Pinkard, 1996: 14).

\(^{156}\) This includes the various incomplete and/or less authoritative translations of the same text. Pinkard’s lexical consistency contributes to the status of the translation alongside all of the other tokens of Pinkard’s cultural capital, especially in an academic context which values consistency as a token of philosophical accuracy and rigour as well as translatorial fidelity.
philosophical insights is to be upheld and appreciated in the new (metaphysically sceptical) century. In other words, this translation must (through the logic of its telos or raison d’être) demonstrate that it is rationally possible to take Hegel’s philosophy seriously in a modern, twenty-first-century world which is already very different from the world at the time of the Baillie and Miller translations.

The TT contains a number of stylistic features which identify the translation as a product of a specific time and place and distinguish it from its predecessors. For example, a number of distinctively US English spellings occur in the online draft under consideration here, including color, honor, labor, neighbor, fulfillment and skepticism. The US colloquial form gotten also occurs in the translation. Whether or not Pinkard was conscious of these spellings as indicators of US style, their occurrence in the text does distinguish the draft of the new translation from the Baillie and Miller translations as an identifiably US translation.\(^{157}\) This certainly contributes to the impression that the translation has been up-dated and that signs of the old-fashioned, ‘elevated-style’ and rhetorical wordiness of the older versions have been removed. Conservative readers who are more familiar with British English translations of historical philosophical texts may object to the Americanised spelling, as expressed in the comment that Pinkard is trying to make Hegel ‘speak American’ (Devin, 2012). The US spellings could also be regarded as a reflection of the revival of interest in Hegel in the USA associated with the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel and of the connections between this revival and the communitarian ideology discussed in section 4.1. By contrast, the forthcoming publication of another new translation by the British translator Nicholas Walker\(^ {158}\) in preparation for Routledge could be regarded as a competitive response between academic publishers to the imminent publication of the Pinkard translation.

\(^{157}\) One interesting example from the epitexts is the occurrence of the American-Yiddish slang term ‘kvetching’ in Democratic Liberalism (Pinkard, 1987: 150) which indirectly associates the author with the Jewish community. This reference is relevant to the reconstruction of the translator’s hexis if it is taken in conjunction with Pinkard’s interest in arguing that Hegel came to change his view on the superiority of the Christian religion over the Jewish religion, for example, through his contact with Eduard Gans (Pinkard, 2000: 530 ff.; Pinkard, 2007). At a microscopic level, the text embodies an authorial stance through such features.

\(^{158}\) The forthcoming translation by Nicholas Walker is referenced in Westphal (2009: xi, 297). Nicholas Walker has revised and/or translated several philosophy texts from German, for example, Kant’s Critique of Judgement (Kant/Walker, 2007), which is a revision of James Creed Meredith’s 1952 translation. In his Introduction to the Kant volume, Walker articulates his commitment to preserving the literary merits of his predecessor’s translation. It has not yet been possible to determine whether Walker’s new translation of the Phenomenology will be a revision (of Hegel/Miller, 1977) or a completely new translation.
One grammatical feature of the draft translation which is also interesting from a philosophical point of view is the frequent use of the Saxon genitive apostrophe ‘s with inanimate nouns. The following examples occur in the *Absolute Knowledge* chapter. Other examples occur elsewhere in the translation. In constructions such as, *the self’s own activity* (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 724); *which belong to substance’s self-consciousness* (ibid.: 726); and *the concept’s movement* (ibid.: 731), it is controversial and in a sense germane to the metaphysical-non-metaphysical debate whether *self, substance* and *concept* can, according to standard UK-English grammars, be used with a possessive ‘s because they are not ‘animate’ and cannot therefore possess. English-language teaching grammars recommend that apostrophe ‘s should be used only with ‘a person or an animal’ and that although it is possible to break this rule, it is ‘safer and more usual to use … of …’ (Murphy, 1993: 158-159). By contrast with this grammatical norm, Pinkard’s usage is marked in that it either does not distinguish between animate and inanimate nouns, or it (subtly) suggests that the terms *self, substance* and *concept* are, at least in Hegel’s philosophy, more like animate nouns, and capable of possession, than like inanimate nouns. The suggestion that *substance* and *concept* are animate or even conscious would seem to resonate more with the traditional metaphysical reading of Hegel than with the non-metaphysical view associated with Pinkard. For example, the idea that a concept can move or have the attribute of movement, would seem to be a quintessentially metaphysical idea. Like the one example of a split infinitive found in *Absolute Knowledge* (*to obstinately cling* (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 731)), these are microscopically small grammatical features of the text, but they still embody a particular (translatorial) stance with regard to grammatical norms observed by the predecessor translators, and, as such, they contribute to the general style and character of the translation and thus also to the translatorial *hexis*.

Pinkard also uses modern clichés such as *come on the scene; coming on the scene* as a translation of *auftreten* (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 722) and *wraps up* as a translation of *beschliessen* [close/decide] (ibid.: 720). While *Collins Dictionary* classifies *wrap up* in this sense as ‘informal’, the phrase is very often used colloquially in academic circles, for example, in the context of ‘wrapping up’ a lecture or a seminar but would be

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159 The English grammar referenced here is a teaching grammar used for teaching English to speakers of other languages. This seems appropriate because, bearing in mind Pinkard’s recent lecture tours to Romania and China, English may indeed be a second language for many potential readers of the new Hegel translation.
exceptional in a written academic text. The expressions taking a reflective turn (ibid.: 730) and even taking-the-inward-turn into itself from out of that substance (ibid.: 731) can also be analysed as variations of the cliché expressions the linguistic turn and the cultural turn currently (over-)familiar in academic discourse in the humanities. Beyond this, however, these expressions also resonate loudly with the title of Klaus Hartmann’s article, ‘On Taking the Transcendental Turn’ (1966), which Pinkard cited as the birthplace of the non-metaphysical view, as mentioned above in section 4.1.2. Pinkard’s use of such expressions situates the translation in time and space, but also, most importantly for the argument of this thesis, within the sub-field of contemporary Anglophone Hegelianism. The relationship between Hartmann’s article (1966) and Pinkard’s (1996) citation of its title, on the one hand, and Pinkard’s 2008 translation, on the other, can be described as a relationship of intertextuality (Kristeva, 1980), as mentioned in section 4.1; these texts function respectively as allographic and authorial epitexts (Genette, 1997). Accordingly, the translation embodies Pinkard’s translatorial hexis with regard to the micro-dynamics of this sub-field through his use of these intertextually allusive cliché expressions.

Pinkard’s commitment to terminological consistency relates not only to the specifically Hegelian philosophical terms included in the glossary, which will be discussed in section 4.3 below, but also covers terms such as that is for oder [or]; Hegel frequently uses oder to coordinate a rephrasing of the term preceding oder, for example:

Für uns oder an sich ist das Allgemeine als Prinzip das Wesen der Wahrnehmung;
For us, that is, in itself, the universal is, as the principle, the essence of perception,
(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 99) (underlining added)

Pinkard’s strategy removes the potential ambiguity inherent in the ST wording. This strategy accounts for the large number of occurrences of the phrase that is, which is a striking feature of the translation to a reader unaware of this strategy. The phrase that is occurs 1,233 times in the approximately 200,000 words analysed; not always, however, as a translation of oder.

Another typical Hegelian grammatical construction is the use of the dative reflexive in expressions such as:
… und ist sich nun ein Zweifaches.
… and is in its own eyes now something twofold
(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 187) (underlining added)

Pinkard consistently translates this dative-reflexive construction (which could be translated more literally as to itself or (as a pseudo-ablative) as for itself) as in its own eyes and similar expressions. This added BODY metaphor, with variations of it such as in her own eyes or in their own eyes, occurs 128 times in the text as a whole. The metaphor physicalises the very abstract idea of the self’s relationship with itself, and thus arguably facilitates understanding. 160 Perhaps more than any of the lexical features of the translation, Pinkard’s consistent use of this phrase suggests the language of self-determining normativity associated with Pinkard’s non-metaphysical, Brandomian reading of Hegel. At least, the phrase in its own eyes suggests a sense of self-legitimation which resonates with the discourse on self-legitimating normativity.

Pinkard consistently translates the German verkehrt [wrong, inverted, topsy turvy] as topsy turvy. The TL term occurs 59 times in the text as a whole, and Pinkard’s consistent usage leads to some interesting results:

… sie war daher auch nicht gegen die Wirklichkeit als eine allgemeine Verkehrtheit und gegen einen Weltlauf gerichtet.
…Hence it was neither oriented against actuality as a universal topsy-turvy invertedness nor against the way of the world. 161
(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 348)

Pinkard’s lexically almost consistent translation of the noun Verkehrtheit [topsy-turviness] here combines a technical sense of universal invertedness with a more general, almost humorous or post-modern sense of topsy-turvy incongruity. This contrasts with Baillie’s ‘a general perversity’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1931: 221) and Miller’s ‘something generally perverted’ (Hegel/Miller, 1977: 234); Pinkard possibly wished to avoid the distracting suggestion of sexual perversity at this point in the predecessor translations.

160 Reference is made here to Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff, 1979/2003). Lakoff uses capitals to indicate the use of metaphor.
161 Pinkard usually scrupulously reproduces Hegel’s italicisation. The omission of italics for way of the world is a rare exception to the rule.
In general, Pinkard’s commitment to terminological consistency distinguishes his translation strategy from the more ‘literary’ approach adopted by his predecessors, according to which lexical variety and aesthetic considerations predominated over consistency. Accordingly, while it does more consistently reflect Hegel’s usage throughout the text, the terminologically consistent, sometimes lexically repetitive, style of this translation, with its occasionally awkward (or post-modern) phrases (*universal topsy-turvy invertedness*), differs markedly from the rhetorical and literary styles and tradition of academic writing found in the previous translations of the *Phenomenology*.

With reference to the examples of American-English spellings, grammatical constructions, clichés and terminological consistency analysed here, Pinkard’s engagement with the target language of the translated text can be seen to reflect his involvement with the dynamics of the sub-field at different levels and therefore to embody a translatorial *hexis*. While the US spellings in themselves are relatively few in number, they do demarcate the translation from its predecessors and mark it as a product of (growing) American interest in German philosophy; they also symbolically mirror the shift in international hegemony from Britain to the USA which characterises the international political field during the time between the Baillie translation and Pinkard’s translation. Pinkard’s use of the Saxon genitive with nouns normally construed as inanimate may also reflect American English usage but was shown to engage (surprisingly) with issues central to the metaphysical-non-metaphysical debate used here to characterise the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelianism in the period leading up to the translation. Clichés associated with modern, informal academic discourse were shown not only to contrast with the elevated style discussed in connection with Baillie, but also to engage through intertextuality with a specific, public dialogue in which the translator was personally involved (Pinkard, 1996). Pinkard’s emphasis on terminological consistency is an important characterising feature of the translation which distinguishes it from its predecessors. It reflects a move in philosophy away from rhetorical and literary considerations towards linguistic analysis, which, by analogy with modern science and technology, demands terminological consistency. Without the rigour (and word-processing technology) required to achieve this level of terminological consistency, the translator could not expect to gain respectability and honour in the eyes of the honour-endowing fields of modern (analytical) philosophy, legal and political theory. To some extent, even the post-modern humour of the phrase *a universal topsy-
turvy invertedness might gain respect in the eyes of a generation which has become suspicious of the elevated style.

4.2.1 Pinkard’s translations of Geist

Pinkard’s strategy is to translate Geist consistently as spirit. Pinkard’s translatorial hexis can accordingly be theorised as deriving primarily from the intertextual shift implemented in Pinkard’s new translation, away from Baillie’s apparently inconsistent use of mind, spirit and Spirit162 and from Miller’s (and Findlay’s)163 more or less consistent use of Spirit, towards Pinkard’s consistent use of spirit. The meaning of Pinkard’s spirit, in the sense of how the term is used and understood, is determined at least partially by the difference between Pinkard’s use of this term and the uses of this term in the immediately surrounding, intertextual environment. It is this move which distinguishes Pinkard’s work from that of his predecessors and therefore functions as an honour-seeking gesture, seeking honour from the contemporary sub-field of Anglophone Hegelianism for initiating a semantic and conceptual renewal and for contributing to a further understanding of Hegel’s philosophy in English. Pinkard’s use of the term spirit reflects contemporary usage in the sub-field164 but, at the same time, also appropriates the term by associating it with Pinkard’s own specific understanding of spirit as elaborated in his publications. Accordingly, the use of spirit retains the lexical item familiar from the Miller translation, which is also the standard translation cited in most recent books on Hegel (Stern, 2002; Houlgate, 2005; Westphal, 2009). The shift from Spirit to spirit may not even be noticed by many readers; for others it may represent a move towards a more sober, scientific approach to philosophy which relies less on rhetorical emphasis through the use of capitals and more on the precise definition of consistently used terminologies. In practical (pedagogical) terms, the choice may therefore be welcomed as being less disruptive to the status quo (teaching materials) than, for example, retaining the German term Geist throughout the translation.

162 As analysed in section 3.2.1 of this thesis.
163 The capitalised form Spirit is used throughout the Miller translation, including the approximately 130 pages of peritextual Introduction and Analysis written by J.N. Findlay (Hegel/Miller, 1977). A detailed analysis of the text of the Miller translation has not been provided here but will, it is hoped, form the subject of a future project.
164 Some contemporary Anglophone commentators on Hegel still use Spirit; others prefer to keep their options open and use mind/spirit (Bowie, 2003: 80) or gloss the term in some other manner.
or coining some new orthographic convention. However, by subtly challenging the language of the older translations, the new translation as a whole does suggest that more is being challenged than just the spellings of individual words. A serious response to the publication of a new translation must at least consider the possibility that words such as *spirit* are being used in new and different ways, that the new translation actually says something discernibly different from the older versions rather than merely saying the same thing in a different way. This thought necessitates an understanding of what Pinkard himself means by *spirit*, how Pinkard uses the term *spirit* outside the translation.

Pinkard refers to *spirit* many times in the course of his books and articles. The definition quoted below was written in 1987, and Pinkard may therefore have modified his understanding of *spirit* since then, however, this definition gives a further indication of how *spirit* was construed within the framework of a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel:

I am using “spirit” in what I take to be its basic Hegelian sense minus the metaphysical associations that Hegel gave it. I am not using it to denote any kind of metaphysical entity, as he did. For some, this might, of course, disqualify the usage as being “Hegelian”. Not much hangs on that, so I shall not belabour the point.

(Pinkard, 1987: 188)

The non-metaphysical understanding of *spirit* is construed as less than the full, metaphysical Hegelian understanding. Pinkard does not attempt to argue that his or the non-metaphysical reading is the correct or authentic Hegelian understanding. For Pinkard at this time and in this book (Pinkard, 1987), Hegel’s precise meaning is not the important issue: ‘Not much hangs on that’. In fact, Pinkard has deliberately subtracted the metaphysical dimension from Hegel’s *Geist* (‘minus the metaphysical associations’) in order to use the term *spirit* for his own non-metaphysical reconstruction of what Pinkard took to be the core argument of Hegel’s philosophy. Since the Bourdieusian

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165 Another recent online translation of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* by David Healan translates *Geist* inconsistently as *mind/spirit* alongside terms such as *mindful spirit* and just *spirit* in different places in the translation (Hegel/Healan, 2007).

166 It is interesting that Pinkard does not include a definition of *spirit* in his translator’s introduction, at least not in the online draft version available at the time of writing (August, 2012).
Theorisation of *hexis* presented here is directly concerned with symbolic values, it is particularly significant that *spirit* with a lower case *s* is effectively *smaller* than *Spirit* with an upper case *S*. The small *s* of *spirit* as used in the translation (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008) symbolises not only a curtailment of the scope of Hegel’s *Geist* but also a change in the stance or *hexis* of the philosopher/translator. Pinkard’s stance is deliberately more modest; while the translatorial *hexis* still seeks honour and respect, it does so not through over-inflated rhetoric or extravagant metaphysical claims which are difficult to substantiate in a sceptical, scientifically orientated modern world, but rather by curtailing the extent of the claims made in order to render them more reasonable.

While the above quotation is contained in a footnote, the text to which the footnote refers (Pinkard, 1987: 23) presents Hegel’s analysis of *ethos* [*Sittlichkeit*] and *spirit* as an essentially communitarian theoretical alternative to the kind of Kantian-inspired liberalism envisaged by Rawls in his *Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971). Pinkard explains:

> One can take Hegel’s distinction of *ethos* and *spirit* in the following way. The *ethos* of a culture includes its moral ideals, its ideals of character, of proper behavior, of human relationships, of legitimate aspirations, and so on. The *spirit* of a culture, on the other hand, philosophically explains the *ethos*. (Pinkard, 1987: 23)

*Spirit* is construed here as a rational (philosophical) explanation of the (culturally determined) ethical values held or presupposed within a culture.

In using the word *spirit* to translate Hegel’s *Geist*, Pinkard retains the lexical item familiar from the later pages of Baillie’s translation and from Miller’s translation and does not therefore attempt actively to undermine the possibility of the older, metaphysical or religiously inspired readings of Hegel. Indeed, as is evident from the footnote quoted above, Pinkard admits that for Hegel, *Geist* did refer to a metaphysical entity (Pinkard, 1987: 188). However, in view of Pinkard’s position within the subfield, and particularly with reference to the definitions quoted here, it is evident that the *spirit* which appears in the translation is, at least potentially, a secularised, non-metaphysical *spirit*. It is a streamlined, demystified, socialised and politicised *spirit* capable of providing a ‘philosophical explanation’ in the context of contemporary
ethical theory, American and world politics, especially the politics of communitarianism.

In numerical terms, the analysis of Pinkard’s translations of Geist shows a considerable difference between the number of occurrences of Geist in the ST and the number of occurrences of spirit in the TT. In the six main chapters of Hegel’s Phäneomenologie des Geistes, the ST analysed in chapter 3, the search terms Geist and Geiste were found a total of 635 times. In the Pinkard TT, the search terms spirit and spirits were found 841 times.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Geist and Geiste in ST</th>
<th>spirit/spirs in TT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-consciousness</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute knowledge</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
<td><strong>841</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Occurrences of nominal forms of Geist and spirit in the ST and TT

Apart from the exceptions mentioned in the footnotes to Table 4.1, the approximately 206 (841–635) occurrences of spirit which do not represent word-for-word translations of Geist can be explained primarily with reference to the translational strategy of substituting the noun spirit for a pronoun [er: he/it] in a very long sentence where, for example, the reader may have lost the connection between the nominal subject of the sentence (spirit) and a pronoun (it) occurring considerably later in the sentence. This is particularly problematic when translating from German which has grammatical gender, because the gender of the pronoun helps to preserve the coherence between noun and pronoun, and this coherence is lost in English if, for example, the pronoun it could refer back to several different nouns. The following example illustrates Pinkard’s explicatory translation strategy:

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167 This figure includes all occurrences of Geist as a noun in the ST, singular and plural, except for compound nouns, such as Volksgeist [folk-spirit; 9 occurrences]; Weltgeist [world-spirit; 4]; Erdgeist [earth-spirit; 2]; Nationalgeist [national-spirit; 1]; Begeistung [spiritualisation]. It also excludes adjectival forms, such as geistig [spiritual; 115] and geistlos [spiritless; 22].

168 This figure includes all nominal forms in the TT, singular and plural, and also excludes adjectives, such as spiritual [122] and spiritless [14] as well as verbal and nominal forms derived from the adjective, such as spiritualisation [3] and spiritualized [4]. However, it includes nominal paraphrases, e.g. of the adjective geistlos [spiritless] as devoid of spirit [5].
Auch da dies vermeinte Wissen, das mit der Wirklichkeit des Geistes sich zu tun macht, gerade dies zu seinem Gegenstande hat, daß er aus seinem sinnlichen Dasein heraus sich in sich reflektiert, und das bestimmte Dasein für ihn eine gleichgültige Zufälligkeit ist, so muß es bei seinen aufgefundenen Gesetzen unmittelbar wissen, daß nichts damit gesagt ist, sondern eigentlich rein geschwatzt oder nur eine Meinung von sich gegeben wird;

Since this alleged knowledge takes it upon itself to deal with the actuality of spirit, it also has as its object precisely the following. Spirit is reflected out of sensuous existence back into itself. For spirit, determinate existence is an indifferent contingency, and so it must immediately know that in the laws which it has stumbled upon, nothing has thereby really been said. Rather, it must immediately know that these laws are in fact just pure chatter, that is, they merely amount to saying what is on one’s mind. (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 287) (underlining added)

As shown by the underlining, the genitive des Geistes occurs only once in the ST passage quoted; Hegel then refers to Geist with a nominative pronoun er [he] and then with an accusative pronoun ihn [him]. In the TT, spirit occurs three times corresponding to these three references in the ST. The English pronominal forms it, its and itself occur a total of eight times in the TT referring back to different nouns. The confusion here would have been considerably greater if Pinkard had used it instead of substituting spirit. Pinkard also breaks up this part of the ST sentence into four TT sentences, starting one new sentence with Spirit and another with For spirit. This approach accordingly also accounts for the occurrences of Spirit with a capital S in the Pinkard translation. Figure 4.1 visualises the data from Table 4.1 above. Figure 4.1 does not distinguish between spirit and Spirit.
Figure 4.4: Translations of Hegel’s *Geist* with Pinkard’s additions

Figure 4.4 shows that Pinkard uses *spirit* proportionally more than Hegel uses *Geist*. This can be explained with reference to the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph regarding Pinkard’s desire to clarify or simplify long and difficult sentences. This desire, in turn, can be theorised as a component of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*. Strictly within the framework of his commitment to remain consistent to Hegel’s terminology, Pinkard nevertheless seeks to make the TT as accessible as possible. Pinkard explains in his *Notes on the Translation*, which will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.3, that the reason for his general commitment to terminological consistency is to allow a reader using the parallel text to follow Hegel’s line of argument by seeing the relevant term, such as *spirit*, occurring in the same places in English as it occurs in German. The addition of *spirit* instead of a pronoun [it] to some extent over-strengthens this line of argument because the reader encounters the word *spirit* many (205) times more in the English than in the German. However, foregrounding the term *spirit* does not alter the overall shape of the graph; it does emphasise the role of *spirit* in the book as a whole, but this is (arguably) equally compatible with metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings of Hegel.169 These general considerations deal with Pinkard’s strategy for

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169 It should also be mentioned that Pinkard has included peritextual running page headers in the online draft translation (2008) which repeat the chapter headings on every page in the chapter. These additional occurrences of *Spirit* have not been included in the data. By contrast, Baillie’s translation (1931) shows the book title *The Phenomenology of Mind* on every odd-numbered page. These findings have a bearing on the ‘lexical priming’ effect of familiarisation by repetition (Hoey, 2005).
translating Geist fairly comprehensively, however, a number of more detailed points also require analysis.

It may have been noticed that the quotation given above also contains the TL term mind in the idiomatic expression what is on one’s mind. The search term mind* was found 17 times in the six chapters of the TT corpus analysed. Apart from two instances, these occurrences of mind* are not translations of Geist; they occur in figurative expressions such as vaguely in mind [ihm…vorschwebte] (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 249), noble-minded [edelmütig] (ibid.: 453), peace of mind [Beruhigung] (ibid.: 669) and mindful [wissend] (ibid.: 645). Seven of the 17 occurrences of mind* are glossed in footnotes. The two occurrences of mind associated with Geist are also glossed in footnotes: mindlessly translates geistlos (ibid.: 272) and mindedness is suggested in a footnote as an alternative translation for Geistigkeit which is translated as spirituality in the body text (ibid.: 460). These examples indicate a degree of translatorial uncertainty about the rigidly consistent use of spirit throughout the TT. In spite of his choice of spirit and commitment to consistency, Pinkard does not suppress the word mind entirely, neither does he completely sever the association between Geist and mind; in fact, as mentioned in section 4.1.2 above, Pinkard uses Mind in the title of his latest book (Pinkard, 2012).

The concept of mindedness suggested as an alternative to spirituality in the example quoted plays an important role in ethical theory, especially with regard to culpability for a crime: a person under the influence of certain drugs cannot be considered fully responsible for their actions. Mindedness in this sense could refer to a person’s ability to take responsibility for their actions; this sense of mindedness diverges from any normal understanding of the term spirituality with its religious connotations. Pinkard’s footnoted suggestion here (discreetly) points towards the possibility of a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel according to which Geist and Geistigkeit are taken in this limited, socialised, legalistic or politicised sense. It is important that Pinkard gives priority to the traditional, metaphysical choice (spirituality) here. He could equally have offered spirituality as an alternative to mindedness rather than vice versa. Had he done so, he could have been accused of biasing the translation towards the non-metaphysical reading. As this example shows, Pinkard’s translatorial hexis is characterised by a high degree of sensitivity to the micro-dynamics of the sub-field in which he is working.

Another significant point regarding Pinkard’s translation of Geist relates to the use or omission of the deictic. As already mentioned in connection with the Baillie translation
(Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) in section 3.2.1, Baillie seems to be inconsistent in his use of the definite article and other forms of the deictic. For example, some sentences begin with *The spirit* (as the subject of the sentence), while others begin with *Spirit*. Apart from very few exceptions,\(^{170}\) every occurrence of *Geist* in German is preceded by a deictic, usually the definite article. Pinkard is generally consistent in omitting the deictic before *spirit* according to conventional usage with certain abstract nouns in English used in a universal rather than a particular sense (such as *reason, love, beauty* or *fire*), however, the details of Pinkard’s usage deserve closer scrutiny. Although most occurrences of *spirit* stand alone, without any form of deictic, Pinkard does use the definite article, especially in structures with ‘of’, such as *the spirit of a people* [der Volksgeist] (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 657) where -geist is qualified by Volks-. Of the 68 occurrences of *the spirit*, 32 occur in phrases with ‘of’; in the remaining 36 cases, *Geist* is qualified by some form of relative clause, such as *the spirit which exists in and for itself* [der an und für sich seiende Geist] (ibid.: 725-726). However, not all occurrences of *spirit* qualified by a relative clause are specified by a deictic, for example, *and it is spirit which is certain of itself* [und ist der seiner gewisse Geist] (ibid.: 589).\(^{171}\)

Accordingly, there still appears to be some uncertainty regarding the ontological or metaphysical status of *spirit*. Is spirit always abstract and universal or only sometimes? Is *spirit* (without the deictic), which is qualified by its certainty of itself, the same as (in terms of its universality) or different from *the spirit*, which exists in and for itself? This point becomes clearer on consideration of the following examples of *spirit* preceded by an adjective.

The concordance lines printed below show every occurrence of *universal spirit* (Figure 4.5) and *absolute spirit* (Figure 4.6) in the corpus. It is evident from the data for *universal spirit* (Figure 4.5) that, with two exceptions (lines 1 and 8)\(^{172}\), *universal spirit* is preceded by the definite article, in all cases except line 3. By contrast, consideration of the data for *absolute spirit* (Figure 4.6) shows that none of the occurrences of *absolute spirit* is preceded by any form of deictic. Comparison with the ST concordance

\(^{170}\) For example, Hegel writes ‘Die Vernunft ist Geist, indem die Gewißheit alle Realität zu sein, zur Wahrheit erhoben und sie sich ihrer selbst als ihrer Welt und der Welt als ihrer selbst bewußt ist’ [Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been elevated to truth and reason is conscious of itself as its own world and of the world as itself (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 392)].

\(^{171}\) This elliptical formulation occurs three times in the ST. The wording: ‘der seiner selbst gewisse Geist’ is more explicit and occurs more frequently.

\(^{172}\) The two exceptions refer to *universal spirit* as a universal term in the context of syllogistic logic.
lines for *absolute* Geist* (Figure 4.7) shows that, with two exceptions, all of the German examples are preceded by the definite article der.

Figure 4.5: Concordance lines for all occurrences of universal spirit in the TT
1. eternal essence in parity with itself; however, its meaning is not this abstract meaning of essence but rather that of absolute spirit. Yet spirit is this, namely, not to be a meaning, not to be the inner, but rather to be the actual. Hence, the
and what is inward in faith has vanished, because that would be the concept knowing itself as concept. 772. Absolute spirit, represented in the pure essence is indeed not the abstract pure essence. Rather, as a result of its being

2. für sich 55 begriffen 766. This content is now to be examined in the way it exists within its consciousness. – Since absolute spirit is content, it exists in the shape of its truth. However, its truth is not merely to be the substance of the
revel of nature in a self-conscious shape. 724. But what has been betrayed to consciousness is still merely absolute spirit, the spirit of this simple essence and not the spirit which exists in itself as spirit, that is, it is merely its consciousness for the first time, and enters into it as truth. How that came about was explained above. 758. That absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness in itself and thereby has also given itself that shape for its
is the work which spirit accomplishes as actual history. The religious community, insofar as it is initially the substance of absolute spirit, is the brutish consciousness which, the deeper its inner spirit is, both has an existence all the
knowledge. Both together are conceptually grasped history:20 they form the recollection and the Golgotha of absolute spirit, the actuality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it would be lifeless and alone; only –

3. , in the former shape, the form is the self itself since it contains the self-certain acting spirit, the self putting the life of absolute spirit into practice. As we see, this shape is that former simple concept, but one which surrenders its eternal
69 Begreifen ... nicht ein Ergreifen 785. What belongs to the element of representational thought, namely, that absolute spirit represents the nature of spirit in its existence as an individual spirit or, rather, as a particular spirit, is it generally belong to representational thought and the form of objectivity. The content of representational thought is absolute spirit, and the sole remaining issue is that of sublating this mere form, or, rather, because the form belongs to

4. individual self. – The content of this, its own individual language, results from the universal determinateness within which absolute spirit as such is posited in its religion. – The universal spirit of the sunrise, which does not yet have its
content lies its eradication of error, for that alienation of itself is equally its positive reality. – In what was for faith absolute spirit, the Enlightenment apprehends whatever sort of determination it discovers there merely to be wood,
it in the pure knowledge of itself as individuality existing absolutely inwardly160 – a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit. 671. Absolute spirit comes into existence only at the point where its pure knowledge of itself is the
knowledge of contingent occurrences. However, the ground of knowledge is the knowing universal, and in its truth it is absolute spirit, which, in abstract pure consciousness, that is, in thought as such, is merely absolute essence, but develop themselves, and their goal and result will be the emergence of the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit. A. True spirit, ethical life 443. In its simple truth, spirit is consciousness, and it pushes its moments away, contingent consciousness. In this determination, the ethical substance is thus the actual substance, absolute spirit realized in the plurality of determinately existing consciousnesses. The spirit is the polity, which, when we

5. the I the permeation of all thought and all actuality. 686. In the first, immediate estrangement of self-knowing absolute spirit, its shape has the determination that corresponds to immediate consciousness, that is, to
as abstract being-for-itself. Since the in-itself is, by virtue of opposition, debased into a determinateness, it is no longer absolute spirit’s own form; rather, the in-itself is an actuality which finds its consciousness opposed to itself as a

6. same as its shape, and spirit as essence is not the same as its consciousness. Spirit is initially actual as absolute spirit, when, in its own eyes, it also exists within its truth as it exists within the certainty of itself, or, when the
of itself as individuality existing absolutely inwardly160 – a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit. 671. Absolute spirit comes into existence only at the point where its pure knowledge of itself is the opposition and

7. the object of its consciousness have at the same time the form of free-standing actuality. However, the spirit which as absolute spirit is in its own eyes an object is the only spirit which is likewise in its own eyes a free-standing actuality,

Figure 4.6: Concordance lines for all occurrences of absolute spirit in the TT
N Concordance

gleiche, ewige _Wesen_ , das aber nicht diese abstrakte _Bedeutung_ des
Wesens, sondern die Bedeutung des _absoluten Geistes_ hat. Allein der Geist
ist dies, nicht Bedeutung, nicht das Innre, sondern das Wirkliche zu sein. Das
Totes, das _innerliche_ desselben aber ist verschwunden, weil dies der Begriff
wäre, der sich als Begriff weiß. Der _absolute Geist_ , im _reinen Wesen_ 
vorgestellt, ist zwar nicht das _abstrakte_ reine Wesen, sondern dieses ist
oder an sich geschehen ist. Dieser Inhalt ist in der Weise, wie er in seinem
Bewußtsein ist, zu betrachten. --Der _absolute Geist_ ist _Inhalt_ , so ist er in
 der Gestalt seiner _Wahrheit_ . Aber seine Wahrheit ist, nicht nur die Substanz
umherschweift, der ungebändigte Taumel der Natur in selbstbewußter Gestalt
. Noch ist aber dem Bewußtsein nur der _absolute Geist_ , der dieses einfache
Wesen, und nicht der als der Geist an ihm selbst ist, verraten, oder nur der
Wissen auch in sein Bewußtsein, und als Wahrheit ein. Wie jenes geschehen
hat sich oben ergeben. Dies daß der _absolute Geist_ sich die Gestalt des
Selbstbewußtseins an sich und damit auch für sein _Bewußtsein_ gegeben,
, ist die Arbeit, die er als _wirkliche Geschichte_ vollbringt. Die religiöse Gemeine
, insofern sie zuerst die Substanz des _absoluten Geistes_ ist, ist das rohe
Bewußtsein, das ein um so barbarischeres und härteres Dasein hat, je tiefer
Wissens ; beide zusammen, die begriffne Geschichte, bilden die
Einrunen und die Schädelstätte des _absoluten Geistes_ , die Wirklichkeit, 
Wahrheit und Gewißheit seines Throns, ohne den er das leblose Einsame wäre;
da selbst selber, denn sie enthält den _handelnden_ seiner selbst gewissen
Geist, das selbst führt das Leben des _absoluten Geistes_ durch. Diese Gestalt
ist, wie wir sehen, jener einfache Begriff, der aber sein ewiges _Wesen_ aufgebtt,
Gemeine lebt, in ihr täglich stirbt und aufersteh. Dasjenige, was dem Elemente
 der _Vorstellung_ angehört, daß der _absolute Geist_ als _ein einzelner_ oder
vielmehr als ein _besonderer_ an seinem Dasein die Natur des Geistes vorstellt,
Momente fallen in das Vorstellen und in die Form der Gegenständlichkeit
. Der _Inhalt_ des Vorstellens ist der _absolute Geist_ ; und es ist allein noch
um das Aufheben dieser blosen Form zu tun, oder vielmehr weil sie dem
, denn jene Entfremdung ihrer selbst ist ebensoweit ihre positive Realität
--An demjenigen, was dem Glauben _absoluer Geist_ ist, faßt sie, was sie
von _Bestimmung_ daran entdeckt, als Holz, Stein und so fort, als einzelne
als der absolut in sich seiernden _Einzelheit_ _anschaut_ --ein gegenspieligem
Anerkennen, welches der _absolute Geist_ ist. Er tritt ins Dasein
nur auf der Spitze, auf welcher sein reines Wissen von sich selbst der
zufälligen Bewußtseins. Die sittliche Substanz ist also in dieser Bestimmung
die _wirkliche_ Substanz, der _absolute Geist_ in der Vielheit des
daseienden _Bewußtseins realisiert_; er ist das _Geheimwesen_ , welches _für
der Sittlichkeit_ auf. Denn diese ist nichts anders als in der selbstständigen
_Wirklichkeit_ der Individuen die _absolute geistige_ _Einheit_ ihres
Wesens; ein an sich allgemeines Selbstbewußtsein, das sich in einem andern
Selbst des Geistes sich entwickeln, und als deren Ziel und Resultat
das wirkliche Selbstbewußtsein des _absoluten Geistes_ herotreteten wird. A.
Der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit Der Geist ist in seiner einfachen Wahrheit
Indem das An-sich zu einer Bestimmtheit durch den Gegensatz herabgesetzt ist
, ist es nicht mehr die eige Form des _absoluten Geistes_ , sondern eine
Wirklichkeit, die sein Bewußtsein sich entgegengesetzt als das gemeine Dasein
--Der Inhalt dieser eignen und einzelnen Sprache ergibt sich aus der allgemeinen
Bestimmtheit, in welcher der _absolute Geist_ überhaupt in seiner
Religion gesetzt ist.--Der allgemeine Geist des Aufgangs, der sein Dasein noch
es die Durchdringung alles Denkens und aller Wirklichkeit. In der unmittelbaren
ersten Entziehung des sich wissenden _absoluten Geistes_ hat seine Gestalt
diejenige Bestimmung, welche dem _unmittelbaren Bewußtsein_ oder der
daß der _Gegenstand_ seines Bewußtseins die Form freier Wirklichkeit zugleich
hat; aber nur der Geist, der sich als _absoluer Geist_ Gegenstand ist, ist sich
eine ebenso freie Wirklichkeit, als er darin seiner selbst bewußt bleibt. Indem
 Diese _Erfüllung_ ist auf diese Weise ihrer _Gestalt_, er als Wesen seinem
Bewußtsein nicht gleich. Er ist erst als _absoluer Geist_ wirklich, indem er, wie
er in der _Gewißheit seiner selbst_, sich auch in seiner _Wahrheit_ ist, oder die

Figure 4.7: Concordance lines for all occurrences of absolut Geist in the ST
The analysis of concordance lines provides a brief insight into the level of detail required in a translation of a philosophical text. Although there may be some inconsistencies in Pinkard’s use of the deictic here, Pinkard also evidently intends to articulate a distinction between the specificity of *the universal spirit* and the unspecificiability (indeterminateness) of *absolute spirit*. He articulates this essentially metaphysical (logical) distinction through his selective use of the deictic. This suggests that, although Pinkard does not consider the metaphysical extremity of *absolute spirit* to be relevant to the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel (Pinkard, 1987: 188) and by extension to his own interest in certain core ideas in Hegel’s philosophy as a theoretical basis for communitarian political and jurisprudential theory (ibid.), Pinkard makes a strenuous effort in the translation to acknowledge the textual exigencies of the metaphysical readings (traditional and revised) of Hegel. In spite of Pinkard’s reputation in the sub-field as an exponent of the non-metaphysical position, his translation accordingly seeks honour (even in the eyes of his putative opponents) by scrupulously respecting the demands of metaphysical readings of Hegel as well as doing justice to the core ideas of the non-metaphysical view. The quest for honour and respectability within the sub-field can be seen as constituting a moral imperative for Pinkard; it is necessitated, with regard to the micro-dynamics of the sub-field, as a means to the end of Pinkard’s re-appropriation of Hegel, and it is embodied in the minutiæ of the text. Within the theoretical framework of the thesis, it therefore embodies the translator’s hyper-sensitive awareness of the micro-dynamics of the sub-field and constitutes Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*.

### 4.2.2 Pinkard’s translations of *aufheben*  

Section 4.2.2 addresses the theorisation of Pinkard’s translation of *aufheben* [*sublate*] as an embodiment of translatorial *hexis*. The general points made at the beginning of section 4.2.1 about consistency, demarcation from the previous translations of the same text and the intertextual relationship between the new translation and the various levels of epitext also apply to the present analysis of *aufheben* and will not be repeated here. However, there are some important differences which allow a further development of the analysis. By contrast with *Geist*, which Pinkard does not specifically mention in his peritextual notes, Pinkard’s strategy for translating *aufheben* is explained in some detail in the translator’s notes and this explanation will be analysed in section 4.3 below.
Section 4.2.2 focuses on the occurrences of *sublate* and *sublation* in the TT corpus and how these can be analysed as an embodiment of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*, especially, therefore, with reference to the micro-dynamics of the sub-field as described in section 4.1. However, subsection 4.2.2 makes reference to authorial and allographic epitexts (in addition to the peritextual material) which might inform an interested reader’s understanding of Pinkard’s use of the term *sublation* in the translation. The relevant paragraphs of section 4.3 refer to Pinkard’s own explanation of his translation strategy in the peritextual translator’s notes. There will inevitably be a certain degree of overlap between these two sections which address the same lexical usage from different perspectives of the analysis, but this will be kept to a minimum.

Pinkard’s consistent translation of *aufheben* as *sublate* contrasts with Baillie’s (and Miller’s) primarily in that it removes the inconsistency of using several TL verbs to translate a single SL verb; it also removes the rhetorical emphasis introduced by Baillie especially in the later chapters of the book by using two verbs (such as *cancel* and *transcend* or *cancel* and *supersede*), as analysed in section 3.2.2; and it removes the spatial metaphors of height and transcendence connoted by Baillie’s selective use of *transcend* across the chapters of the TT. However, these shifts by comparison with the previous translation(s) are not merely neutral improvements rendering the translation more impartial, scientific and modern; they also relate to Pinkard’s *hexis*, in particular, with regard to the honour-endowing fields of politics, higher education and especially to the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy.

The pedagogic work performed by Pinkard in translating *aufheben* consistently into English for the first time brings with it direct advantages for Hegel scholars studying the *Phenomenology* in English. By contrast with the data for *Geist*, the numerical difference between the 308 occurrences of the 13 different forms of the separable verb *aufheben* in the six chapters of the ST corpus and the 326 occurrences of the search term *sublat* in the TT is relatively small (difference of only 18 tokens). As in the case of *Geist/spirit*, the exceptions can be explained as repetitions introduced to break up or elucidate long and difficult ST sentences. This means that a computer generated plot of occurrences of *sublat* in the TT gives an unprecedented overview of Hegel’s use of this term in the German text. This would be considerably more difficult to achieve with the German text because of the 13 verb forms involved. Not only does the translation allow the normal reader to follow Hegel’s argument with reference to *aufheben/sublate*, the consistency
of the Pinkard translation also opens up the possibility for a more sophisticated analysis of this philosophical text using text analysis tools. This will allow further research into Hegel’s use of the concept of sublation along the lines begun by Palm (2009) but with considerably enhanced detail.

Figure 4.8: Pinkard’s translatorial additions of *sublate*

Figure 4.8 shows the close match between all forms of Hegel’s *aufheben* and all forms of Pinkard’s *sublate*. The ST data correspond to those shown in Table 3.4 and include 13 forms of the German verb. The TT data were collected with the search term *sublat* which covers all forms of the verb and nominalisations. However, there are also clearly additional occurrences of *sublat* in the TT, especially in the *Self-consciousness* chapter, which require explanation.

In spite of the theoretical and pedagogical advantages mentioned above, Pinkard’s choice of *sublation* also has the effect of technicalising this concept in a manner similar to that described in chapter 2 with reference to Venuti’s discussion of the translation of Freud’s term *Fehlleistung* as *parapraxis*, as mentioned in chapter 2 (Venuti, 2010). Alongside its dialectically ambiguous, technical usage in Hegel’s writings, the German verb *aufheben* is widely used in non-technical registers;\(^\text{173}\) by contrast, *sublate* is used exclusively in the technical context of Hegelian philosophy. In spite of his explanation

\(^\text{173}\) As mentioned in chapter 1, it even occurs in the German title of a Hans Christian Andersen story ‘Aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben’ [literally: postponed is not cancelled].
for his choice of this term, which will be discussed in section 4.3, Pinkard’s technicalisation of *aufheben* can be seen as deflecting readers of the new translation from connotations and interpretations associated with the German term and the rival English translations, including its dialectical ambiguity, which have become established in the literature surrounding Hegel. This act of (pedagogical) deflection, or in Bourdieusian terms ‘pedagogical work’ (see section 2.1.1) contributes to Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*. The following excerpt shows two short paragraphs containing a dense concentration of occurrences of *aufheben/sublat*: 

180. *It must sublate its otherness. This is the sublation of that first two-sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity. First, it must set out to sublate the other self-sufficient essence in order to become certain of itself as the essence by way of having sublated the other. Second, it thereby sets out to sublate itself, for this other is itself.*

181. *This double-edged sense of the act of subating its double-edged sense of otherness is likewise a double-edged sense of a return into itself. This is so in the first place because it gets itself back by way of sublation, for it comes to be in parity with itself once again by way of the sublation of its otherness. However, in the second place, it likewise gives the other self-consciousness back to itself, since it existed for itself in the other, but it sublates its being in the other, and it thus sets the other free again.*

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: 165)

**Figure 4.9: Effective technicalisation of *aufheben***

The two paragraphs in the ST contain 8 occurrences of *aufheben*; the TT contains 9 occurrences. In the first paragraph Pinkard adds an extra *sublated* by translating the SL term *dadurch* [literally: in this manner] as *by way of having sublated the other*; in other words, he expands the adverbial *dadurch* to make its contracted reference more explicit. However, in spite of this addition, any understanding of this text (especially taken out of context, but even after a careful reading of the preceding several paragraphs) depends upon what the reader understands by *sublate*. Since this is a completely unfamiliar and therefore exclusively technical term in English, the TT reader cannot rely on any kind of recognition or familiarity. By contrast, the German reader meets a familiar verb but
evidently used in a technical and ambiguous sense. To the English reader, the precise manner in which *sublate* is supposed (by Hegel) to be ambiguous is not at all self-evident from the translated text alone. Accordingly, the TT demands a further peritextual or epitextual explanation of this term. In this case, therefore, contrary to his general policy outlined in the translator’s notes and discussed in section 4.3, Pinkard does not allow readers to decide for themselves, but subtly forces them, through the technicalisation of *aufheben*, to consult external sources. In this sense, even the explanatory expansion of *dadurch* with the addition of an extra *sublated* could be seen as further intensifying this demand for a proper explanation of what this so-often-repeated, obscure term actually means. Accordingly, readers are deflected from the text towards the peritext, where an explanation is indeed to be found. However, the reasoning behind this deflection strategy, which amounts to a pedagogic intervention, must be sought beyond the text and the peritexts in the more uncertain domain of the epitexts. As will be explained with reference to the next examples, Pinkard seems to adopt this strategy in order to prevent misunderstandings of *aufheben*. Two closely related examples of such misunderstandings deserve further analysis.

Firstly, as already mentioned in chapter 1, Samuel Moore’s 1888 translation of the Manifesto of the Communist Party by Engels and Marx, which was checked by Engels (Engels and Marx, 1977: 15), translates the verb *aufheben* in the purely negative sense of *abolish*, most famously in the slogans ‘abolish private property’ and ‘abolish the family’. This overtly revolutionary, negative or destructive interpretation of the Hegelian/Marxian term *Aufheben* [sublate/abolish] is still evident in popular online political discourse. ‘Aufheben’ is the title of a British Libertarian-Communist magazine, the editors of which state:

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174 This point is also mentioned by Palm (2009) but not the reference to libcom.org.
There is no adequate English equivalent to the German word Aufheben. In
German it can mean “to pick up”, “to raise”, “to keep”, “to preserve”, but also “to
end”, “to abolish”, “to annul”. Hegel exploited this duality of meaning to describe
the dialectical process whereby a higher form of thought or being supersedes a
lower form, while at the same time “preserving” its “moments of truth”. The
proletariat’s revolutionary negation of capitalism, communism, is an instance of
this dialectical movement of supersession, as is the theoretical expression of this
movement in the method of critique developed by Marx.

(libcom.org, 2012)

Pinkard’s choice of sublate can be seen as deflecting readers from this kind of
politically oriented discourse, encouraging a more technical, philosophical understanding of
Hegel rather than a revolutionary politicisation of this term which might be supported
by translations such as abolish, annul, do away with or even cancel or negate. In his
translator’s notes, Pinkard writes about taking Hegel’s terminology ‘seriously’ (see
section 4.3), however, in addition to this seriousness, Pinkard’s translation of aufheben
could also be seen as embodying a de-politicising effect, at least with regard to this
level or style of political discourse. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of
re-politicising Hegel’s philosophy at a different (higher?) level.

Secondly, in addition to the danger of an over-politicised reading of aufheben, the
spatial metaphor of HEIGHT (the non-metaphorical meaning of aufheben is lift up or
raise up) is also relevant to Pinkard’s understanding of aufheben in more purely
philosophical terms. Once again, reference to the epitextual domain illustrates this
context. In YouTube video clips from his 2011 lecture tour in Romania (Pinkard, 2011),
Pinkard refers specifically to the ambiguity of the term aufheben. In particular, he
explains that three meanings of aufheben (cancel/preserve/lift up) are conventionally
suggested in the literature on Hegel. The third of these meanings, lift up, Pinkard
continues, has been used to support the idea (associated with Marx’s reading of Hegel)
that Hegel’s philosophy is concerned with a kind of totalising idealism according to
which there is a historical progression through ever ‘higher’ levels towards the totality

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175 As shown in chapter 3, all of these terms were used by Baillie to translate aufheben.
176 Pinkard is possibly thinking of A Hegel Dictionary (Inwood, 1992) which he references in Pinkard (1994).
of Absolute Spirit. Pinkard points to the danger of this view but then very emphatically makes the point that Hegel never refers to the third of these meanings. ‘… aufheben has only two meanings, negate and preserve. Forget about raising up.’ (Pinkard, 2011: clip 3, 17:20). Although Pinkard’s discussion of aufheben in this lecture repeats some of the points contained in the translator’s notes discussed in section 4.3, it is very clear in this context that there are strong reasons for suppressing the third meaning of aufheben: firstly Hegel never refers to this meaning, and secondly, it has dangerous political associations. Pinkard very clearly wishes to change the popular misunderstandings of Hegel based upon these associations. Given the title of his lecture: ‘From Hegel to Marx: What Went Wrong?’ (Pinkard, 2011), it is evident that Pinkard attributes these misunderstandings of Hegel at least partially to Marx and his followers. The following transcription illustrates Pinkard’s positive understanding of aufheben as a ‘wonderful metaphor’ concerned not with rising to ever higher levels of metaphysical totality but rather, for example, with the kind of circumscription of property rights associated with democratic-liberal, communitarian politics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>Comments on gestures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instead of thinking of this process as going upwards think of it as going from side to side horizontal rather than vertical that’s a metaphor but nonetheless to aufheben something is to circumscribe its authority something is aufgehoben sublated in Hegel when the authority it has over you or it has over someone else is cancelled circumscribed limited by moving to a new context where where you are not exactly denying the old claim but you’re now limiting it in a certain way so that you are both cancelling it and preserving it so for example Hegel says I have a right to private property this is changed in morality it’s not that I lose all my property but no it turns out that I can’t do anything I want with it particularly if it means the violent harming of another person in fact, it’s a wonderful metaphor</td>
<td>Flat hand gestures extending out to the sides Rounded hand gestures, circumscribed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177 The quotation occurs in video clip 3, approximately 17 minutes from the start of the clip.
Although Pinkard does not wish to force his interpretation of Hegel onto readers of the translation (or indeed attendees at his lecture), he does seek to keep open the possibility of this positive, politically and socially promising, democratic-liberal concept by deflecting attention away from the potentially dangerous spatial metaphor of ‘height’ and ‘lifting’ or ‘raising up’ with its negative connotations, for example, of Christian élitism, Eurocentrism and totalitarianism. The bodily gestures of lateral rather than vertical extension and of circular enclosure and protection or preservation shown in the video clip therefore also contribute to the translatorial *hexis*. Pinkard’s concept of *sublation* in the TT is circumscribed and defined by these considerations. Pinkard’s circumspect but nevertheless dominant, democratic-liberal *hexis* can thus be shown, through radical contextualisation, to be embodied in his translation of Hegel’s dialectically ambiguous term *aufheben*. 
4.3 Pinkard’s peritexts and the translatorial *hexis*

With regard to Genette’s classification of paratexts (1997), the online draft of the Pinkard translation provides unique and innovative peritextual features, in addition to the conventional *Footnotes, Glossary and Notes on the Translation*, which distinguish it as a work embedded in the communicative dynamics of early twenty-first century academic publishing. The most obvious of these are the two-column parallel-text arrangement of the translation, which is uncommon in a translation of a philosophical work and to some extent serves to re-Germanise Hegel’s philosophy reminding readers of its German origins,\(^{178}\) and the appearance of an online draft version of the complete translation, on the translator’s own website, since the copyright date of 2008. The draft translation is available for download from the website, as are several of Pinkard’s published articles.\(^{179}\) Pinkard refers directly to the provisional nature of the draft and to the involvement of the series editor from CUP, in the editorial process.

This is the draft of my translation of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. When published, the text will be substantially modified from the form it takes here. This will bring it in line with the rest of Cambridge’s series on Hegel according to the wishes of the editor of the series. In the meantime, I am providing the English/German draft both in its complete form and as broken up into various chapters. It is available for use in classes. There are bound to be some errors here and there, but since I have put the English text on the left and the German on the right, most of those blunders will, I hope, be easily caught.

(Pinkard, 2009)

Pinkard’s comments here suggest the involvement of the translation in the field of academic publishing but also refer to its role in philosophy classes, that is, in the field of higher education. Although not explicit, there is an allusion here to the inherent conflict between the profit-making field of publishing with its reliance on copyright and property rights and the field of education, which to some extent seeks to evade the constraints of property. The draft text is available free of charge for use in education;

\(^{178}\) Many of the footnotes act in the same manner, glossing problematic terms in German, and possibly inviting comment from German speaking peers.

\(^{179}\) With reference to footnote 59 (2.2.3), these articles could be classified as peritexts to the online draft of the translation; when the book is published, they will be virtual epitexts to the printed version.
the published translation will be a costly product.\textsuperscript{180} The gesture implied by the publication of the free online draft translation in itself constitutes a major component of the translatorial \textit{hexis} projected into the (online) peritexts. Pinkard’s confession that there are ‘bound to be some errors’ goes considerably beyond the traditional translator’s formal apology, portraying himself as human and humorous, through his reference to ‘blunders’, rather than aloof and unapproachable. The text is therefore also portrayed as potentially variable, not yet set-in-stone; readers are effectively invited to participate in catching any blunders before it is too late. This apparently democratic \textit{hexis} embodied in the peritexts reflects Pinkard’s pedagogic habitus, his lecturing and teaching style.\textsuperscript{181} It can be theorised as a translatorial \textit{hexis} in the sense of this thesis in that it is employed in the peritexts as an effective strategy for gaining capital in the form of acceptance, reputation and ultimately honour in the eyes of the putative readership.

As mentioned in the introduction, the data analysis in section 4.2 is based on the two-column, parallel-text version of the 2008 online draft of Pinkard’s translation. However, during the period of this research project, from 2009 to 2012, the publication of the translation has been delayed, apparently, originally because a US editor for CUP died.\textsuperscript{182} There have also been significant changes to the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit Page’ on Pinkard’s website associated with major changes to the details of publication. Shortly after Pinkard had explained in an e-mail dated 27/01/2011 that the reason for the delay in publication at that time was that ‘the editor was not happy with some things in it’, the following, amended paragraph appeared on the webpage explaining that the translation was now to be a joint translation:

\begin{quote}
… When published, the text will be substantially modified from the form it takes here. The final version will be a joint translation by myself and the editor of the Cambridge series on Hegel, Michael Baur. In the meantime, I am providing the English/German draft in its complete form. It is available for use in classes or for citation. There are bound to be some errors here and there, but since I have put the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{180} Pinkard has also kindly given permission for me to convert the PDF version of his online draft into text format in order to carry out the concordance analyses presented in this thesis.\textsuperscript{181} This suggestion is supported by students’ largely positive comments on Pinkard as a professor on the Rate My Professor website: www.ratemyprofessor.com.\textsuperscript{182} This was mentioned in a personal interview with Stephen Houlgate, current President of the Hegel Society of Great Britain on 20/06/2012. Houlgate mentioned that some of the issues involved were sensitive but suggested contacting the editor.
English text on the left and the German on the right, most of those blunders will, I hope, be easily caught.

The version here is an updated version of the one I originally published on this site. The changes are rather small.

(Pinkard, 2012a)

Further questions about the planned translation addressed to Michael Baur have so far remained unanswered.

Pinkard’s *Notes on the Translation* begin with a brief translator’s statement, the first part of which fulfils some of the *hexis*-determining functions of the traditional translator’s apology mentioned in Chapter 2.4 and will be discussed in detail below. The remainder of the *Notes on the Translation* provide detailed examples of Pinkard’s strategy for handling of various translation difficulties. The section on *aufheben* will also be considered in detail here. Unfortunately, Pinkard does not specifically discuss the translation of *Geist* in the peritexts.

After a nod in the direction of Hegel’s genius, Pinkard mentions that the *Phenomenology* is ‘not a clearly written book’ and that the translator is always ‘under the temptation to make the author more easy-going in the translation than he was in the original’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: i). However, giving in to this temptation means that ‘more of the translator’s interpretation of the text will be introduced than is otherwise desirable’. Pinkard’s use of the word ‘desirable’ here indicates that the statement has a normative dimension. Indeed, while conceding that all translations are interpretations of a sort, Pinkard goes on to stress that this concession ‘is still no excuse to transform the normal amount of interpretive give and take into a license of sorts to make a book mean what the translator wants it to mean’ (ibid.). Once again, the phrase ‘the normal amount of give and take’ suggests a normative dimension to translation according to which the translator is an agent bound by norms. However, at this stage, Pinkard does not indicate the basis for such normativity. The mention of ‘a license of sorts’ again links Pinkard’s argument here with precisely the language of contemporary American ethical philosophy, in particular the language of Robert Brandom.183 The suggestion here is that Pinkard’s predecessors, Baillie and Miller, but also ‘many of Hegel’s other translators’

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183 Brandom’s inferential semantics relies heavily on concepts of entitlement (licence) and commitment in the context of having, giving and accepting reasons (Brandom, 2000).
have gone too far and have taken a ‘license’ to which they were not entitled. Pinkard’s criticism is very carefully and tactfully worded. It gently undermines his predecessors’ status, but this, of course, calls for a counter commitment from Pinkard assuring readers that he has not taken out a licence to which he is not entitled and explaining the normative basis on which these subtly critical claims are based.

At this point in the argument, Pinkard switches to the first person singular to articulate his personal commitments: ‘I too have often been tempted…’; ‘I hope that in all instances I will have resisted that temptation.’; ‘I of course have my own interpretation of this book,…’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: i). These statements represent a declaration of Pinkard’s intention or ‘hope’ to abide by the norms which he explains as follows:

I of course have my own interpretation of this book, but I hope that the current translation will make it easy for all the others who differ on such interpretive matters to be able to use this text to point out where they differ and why they differ without the translation itself making it unnecessarily more difficult for them to make their case.

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: i)

This formulation constitutes an explicit articulation of Pinkard’s stance or hexis through the peritexts to the translation. The position can be characterised as a hexis of ‘democratic-liberal circumspection’ which is strongly influenced by Pinkard’s non-metaphysical, communitarian reading of Hegel’s recognition philosophy. As a translator, Pinkard takes his critical readers’ ability to ‘use this text to point out where they differ’ as a criterion or norm for his own agency. According to this criterion, his success as a translator is dependent upon his (serious) critics being able to use the translation against Pinkard’s own view in support of his critics’ different view. If Pinkard’s interpretation, which he concedes is a necessary component of all translations, makes it more difficult for his critics to argue their opposing point of view, then the translation has, in some sense, failed. The particular sense in which the translation would fail under these circumstances relates strongly to Pinkard’s reputation especially in the academic sub-field of Hegel studies. To have produced a translation biased in favour of one’s own interpretation in full knowledge of the existence of many subtly conflicting interpretations of Hegel would be dishonourable. It is this dynamic relationship between the translator as an apparently autonomous agent and the
reputation or status-endowing forces of the surrounding sub-field which constitutes the translatorial *hexit* of democratic circumspection. The democratic demand is closely allied with the need within the academic community for peer-recognition. However, this naturally raises the question of demarcation of the peer group. Although the democratic principle is in place, the translator seeks recognition only from a very select group of (serious) philosophical peers.

The second part of Pinkard’s statement relates to terminological consistency. Pinkard explains that one of the suppositions he has used in undertaking the translation is that ‘Hegel is serious about his terminology’ and that Hegel’s claims to ‘make philosophy into a “science” (*Wissenschaft*, the systematic pursuit of knowledge) are fleshed out in his choice of terms’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: ii). Once again, behind these words, there is a veiled criticism of Pinkard’s predecessors; the implication being that through their terminological inconsistency Baillie and Miller had failed to take Hegel’s terminology seriously. Pinkard’s use of the word ‘science’ also reveals another aspect of the translatorial *hexit* being asserted here. The eclipse of Hegelianism in Anglo-American philosophy through most of the twentieth century is attributable not only to the success of the analytical and linguistic schools, but also to the accusations made by exponents of these branches of philosophy that Hegel’s philosophy is allegedly unscientific, as mentioned in section 4.1.

Pinkard’s further suggestion, then, is that inconsistencies in the previous translations of Hegel may not only have contributed to Hegel’s reputation as an obscure and difficult philosopher, but, more importantly, may have undermined Hegel’s reputation as a ‘serious’ and scientifically reputable philosopher. In terms of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexit*, this new translation seeks to restore some of Hegel’s tarnished reputation in the modern, scientifically-orientated field of American, democratic-liberal philosophy. Again, Pinkard articulates this point explicitly. If a German reader of the original text can follow certain phrases and key terms as they appear regularly through the text, ‘[a]s far as possible, the English reader should be able to do the same thing and make up his or her own mind about whether there really is a distinct line of thought being put on display or whether Hegel is switching meanings or whether something else altogether is going on’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: ii). Pinkard is here referring to inconsistencies such as Baillie’s use of *mind, spirit* and *Spirit* as translations of *Geist*, as explained in section 3.2.1. The same essentially anti-autocratic, democratic-liberal *hexit* is evident here also.
The reader should be allowed or empowered to make up her/his own mind. In the contemporary academic world, as in the world of politics, this is an almost unassailable, default position which must be adopted if the agent is to avoid the accusation of political incorrectness. Accordingly, the hexis of democratic-liberal circumspection articulated in Pinkard’s Notes on the Translation is determined by the expectation of peer-group approval or disapproval, by the expectation of honour or dishonour.

Pinkard explains his strategy for translating aufheben [sublate] in some detail noting initially that ‘there simply is no good translation’ for this and a number of Hegel’s other usages. Pinkard takes up the point made in the preceding paragraph that Hegel uses the term ‘in a technical way’ and that consistency in translating such terms is the only way a reader could follow Hegel’s argument; he acknowledges the ambiguity of aufheben but, perhaps judiciously, avoids using the word ‘ambiguity’. Instead, Pinkard refers to Hegel’s own explanation of the term.

As Hegel himself notes, the German term carries two senses in different contexts, namely, “to cancel” (as in cancelling one’s insurance policy) and to save or preserve (as in “save a place for me”). Hegel tells his German readers that he intends to use the word in both senses…

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: iv)

Pinkard’s approach here is ‘domesticating’ in Venuti’s sense of the term (Venuti, 2010: 266-267). Instead of problematising and foreignising the term as an obscure or difficult ambiguity, Pinkard explains the ‘two senses’ (Doppelsinn) with examples relating to the modern-life contexts of ‘cancelling’ an insurance policy or ‘saving someone a place’, perhaps in a restaurant or academic conference setting.184 The same disarming approach is evident in Pinkard’s reassurance that ‘in the context in which he [Hegel] usually employs the term, he most often clearly means “cancel” or “negate,” whereas in other cases he clearly means something more like “preserve”‘ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: v). This

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184 Pinkard’s approach to the translation of aufheben possibly relates to a feeling that other commentators have made too much of its ambiguity. In a footnote, Pinkard states ‘Much (really too much) has been made of Hegel’s use of the term, Aufhebung. There obviously is no natural term in English with which to translate Aufheben, and one must therefore make a clear self-conscious choice that will allow readers to make up their own minds as to what is being said without making the text unreadable…’ (1994: 349). Of course, the bracketed phrase ‘really too much’ could refer to many different contexts which Pinkard does not make explicit; it could refer to the link between Hegel’s usage and the use of the same term in the Communist Manifesto mentioned by Palm (2009) in the sense of ‘abolish’, as referenced above, but Pinkard’s footnote speaks indirectly here, assuming that philosophical colleagues will understand what he means.
leaves the question of ambiguity open without over-problematising it. Once again, Pinkard’s strategy aims at empowering the reader by providing just sufficient information to allow the reader to feel involved in the decision-making process. Although, as an expert with considerably more information at his disposal, Pinkard is still in control, the reader is invited to participate in the translation process albeit to a limited, circumscribed extent.

Pinkard introduces his chosen term *sublate* in a similarly open-handed way, referring to the Latin origins of the term and its early usage in nineteenth century English philosophy, notably by Sir William Hamilton. Pinkard explains that Hegel’s first translators,\(^{185}\) ‘simply stipulated that it [the term ‘sublation’] was intended to carry both of its German meanings’. The somewhat critical implication of this ‘simply stipulated’ is that unlike Pinkard, these early translators did not attempt to involve their readers in the meaning-making process. This critical tone is continued in a humorous sense, when Pinkard states that

‘many have suspected that their [the earlier translators’] motives for using this term were a little suspect (one cannot avoid the suspicion that they thought it was supposed to indicate just how *esoterically* profound Hegel really was), it has nonetheless stuck, and there is no other very good alternative.

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: v)

Here, Pinkard distinguishes himself from the earlier translators precisely by suggesting that they were attracted by the esoteric profundity of Hegel’s thought, while he (Pinkard) seeks to achieve a more democratic openness by demythologising the terminology and explaining at least some of the reasoning behind his translatorial choices. There is a definite pragmatic connotation to the suggestion that Pinkard chose the term *sublate* in the absence of any other alternative. Pinkard briefly discusses one alternative *supersede* which he, however, dismisses because it ‘avoids the idea of “preserving”; and in many contexts, it is in fact misleading’.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{185}\) Pinkard is presumably referring here to Caird and Stirling who translated parts of Hegel’s texts and Wallace who translated the *Encyclopaedia Logic* in 1875 (Hegel/Wallace, 2005) but not the *Phenomenology*.

\(^{186}\) It is worth noting that both Baillie (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931) and Miller (Hegel/Miller, 1977) use ‘supersede’ as a translation of *aufheben*. Pinkard’s comment therefore acts further to demarcate his position from that of his predecessors.
Pinkard follows these introductory remarks with a positive suggestion for understanding the term *sublation*:

One way of understanding Hegel’s usage here is to think of “sublation” as figuring in the kind of philosophical conversation in which one might say to an interlocutor, “Your claim, X, is, as you have phrased it, not right; but if we reformulate it as, say, “X₂”, we can preserve the main point of your idea without having to buy into all of its problems.” This is a typical move in a philosophical argument,…

(Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: v)

Pinkard’s example is particularly interesting because he locates the quasi definition of *sublation* in the context of a modern philosophical conversation using informal terms such as ‘buy into’ and even making use of the subscripted ‘Xₙ’, a typographical notation familiar from the analytical tradition of philosophical logic. Accordingly, Pinkard links Hegel’s term with a neighbouring philosophical sub-field thereby suggesting a relationship of heteronomy between the (formerly rival) sub-fields of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy and Anglo-American analytical philosophy. The association of *sublation* with its defunct and potentially obfuscating, ambiguous historical origins is replaced by this new linking. The effect here could also be described as a ‘re-framing’ of Hegel’s terminology within contemporary Anglo-American philosophical discourse (Baker, 2006: 105 ff.). As with Baillie’s capitalisation of *Spirit* discussed in Chapter 3, the physical space defined by typographical constraints provides a subtle opportunity for rhetorical gestures and for projecting a translatorial *hexis*, in the present case, into the peritext. The visual appearance of the page is discreetly modernised and legitimised by the use of the subscripted symbol. However, this process of modernisation and legitimisation of Hegel is not only a matter of stylistic subtlety, it relates quite directly to Pinkard’s commitment to the belief that Hegel’s philosophy has something positive to offer to twenty-first century philosophical and political discourse and that the older translations stand in the way of a proper understanding of the abiding value of Hegel’s work.

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187 See, for example, Guttenplan (1986) which explained the language and terminology of symbolic logic, or Brandom (2000) which uses similar sentence-analytical notation in the context of ‘inferentialist semantics’. 
Pinkard concludes his discussion of *aufheben* by referring to a ‘third sense of “aufheben,” where it means to “raise up” and many interpreters of Hegel have thought that this simply also had to be at work in Hegel’s usage’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: vi). To ‘raise up’ is the literal meaning of the German separable verb *auf-heben*, but the way in which interpreters of Hegel have sought to combine this third sense with the other two [cancel and preserve] is in the spatial metaphorical sense of to ELEVATE or to TRANSCEND, as discussed in section 4.2.2, according to which *aufheben* is construed as a progressive developmental or historical process.\(^\text{188}\) It is this third sense of *sublation* which is the least compatible with Pinkard’s own ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretation of Hegel and which may also stand in the way of modern readers’ coming to understand the potential value of Hegel’s philosophy in the contemporary world because of the implication of a hierarchical, historical progression of the world-spirit towards the high-point of Eurocentric, Christian values. Accordingly, Pinkard re-routes the discussion about the ‘third sense’ back to Hegel. Following directly on the assertion that many interpreters have thought that the ‘third sense’ must also be at work in Hegel’s usage, Pinkard continues: ‘That may be, but Hegel himself only speaks of two meanings of the word in those places where he discusses why he has chosen that term. Whether the third meaning of “to raise up” is also at work is something the reader will have to decide for him or herself…’ (Hegel/Pinkard, 2008: vi). Pinkard’s intention here is possibly to parry accusations that he is trying to bias the translation in favour of his own interpretation, however, as discussed in section 4.2.2, Pinkard’s technicalisation of *aufheben* faces the reader with difficulties (see Figure 4.6) which are effectively insurmountable without the further guidance offered by Pinkard himself, and Pinkard’s guidance actively seeks to deflect the reader from misunderstandings by suppressing the ‘third sense’, and therefore does not actually leave the reader completely free to decide.

Pinkard discusses twelve or thirteen further examples of difficult-to-translate terms in a similar vein, always stressing that he is leaving access for divergent interpretations but at the same time projecting his own *hexis* of democratic-liberal circumspection and pragmatic domestication. The *Notes on the Translation* are followed by a glossary, which again, in addition to providing the reader with an explicit list of consistently

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\(^{188}\) ‘Like many other Hegelian terms, *Aufhebung* applies both to concepts and to things. The concepts of being and nothing are sublated in determinate being, and in general lower determinations in the *Logic* are sublated into higher ones. Earlier stages of a temporal, developmental process are sublated into later stages: e.g. earlier philosophies are both destroyed and preserved in Hegel’s philosophy (Inwood, 1992: 284). Notice Inwood’s evident espousal of the HEIGHT metaphor here.'
translated terms, reinforces the sense that once the difficulties have been discussed to some extent, they no longer represent difficulties. A line around democratic participation evidently has to be drawn somewhere.

4.4 Summary

Section 4.1 analysed the historically determined background dynamics to the Pinkard translation with reference to Bourdieu’s field theory, focussing specifically on the opposition between liberal and communitarian ideologies in the field of international politics and US political theory, and on the opposition between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings of Hegel in the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. These positions were construed in terms of Bourdieusian fields because they relate to specific, honour-endowing rivalries or struggles for power and recognition within the respective fields. To this extent they simplify a complex situation but highlight structures and dynamics of the fields which are relevant to the translation, in particular, to the stance adopted by the translator, the translatorial hexis.

In general Pinkard’s strategy is characterised by his commitment to terminological consistency and democratic accountability, in the sense that he tries to make his translatorial practice transparent by giving reasons for the decisions he has made. This can be described as democratic because the strategy is intended to allow readers with different levels of understanding of Hegel to make up their own minds without undue interference by the translator. However, on closer analysis, it is evident that there is more to this strategy than simply consistency and explicitness.

The analysis of Pinkard’s translations of Geist in section 4.2.1, for example, did show a high degree of terminological consistency. It was also evident that Pinkard repeated this key term in order to make long and difficult sentences more readily comprehensible. However, when the translation is considered against the background of its two predecessors Hegel/Baillie (1910/1931) and Hegel/Miller (1977), the wider semantic and ideological significance of Pinkard’s choice of spirit with a small ‘s’ and indeed his commitment to consistency become apparent. Pinkard’s spirit is subtly secularised and demystified by the choice of spirit rather than Spirit, especially by contrast with the Miller translation which consistently uses Spirit. In view of Pinkard’s discussion of the concept of spirit in his own works, summarised in section 4.1.4, it is also evident that
Pinkard’s *spirit* is a socialised and even politicised form of spirit, or at least Pinkard’s use of the term allows this non-metaphysical interpretation to be adopted without the interfering suggestion that *Spirit* can only be understood as some kind of metaphysical essence. Of course, Pinkard’s translation does not preclude the possibility of a metaphysical reading of Hegel; it merely removes certain obstacles which might interfere with a non-metaphysical reading. These moves support the association of Hegel with the communitarian ideology. Hegel’s credibility (as a theoretical reference point in US and international politics and a counterbalance to the neo-Kantian ethics of individualism) is preserved by curtailing the metaphysical dimension of his philosophy. The move from large ‘S’ to small ‘s’ symbolises this *hexis* of circumspection and restraint in the very body of the text. The translator seeks and to some extent gains honour through his more modest claims for Hegel.

Similar conclusions are drawn with regard to *aufheben*. Pinkard seeks to level down the potentially misleading metaphors of ‘height’, ‘raising’ and ‘transcendence’ found in the previous translations. Part of Pinkard’s strategy here is his humorous account of the historical obfuscation of the term *sublation* in the hands of his predecessors. This helps to reinforce his own more open but no less serious rhetorical intentions. The Americanisation of certain spellings and examples of ‘down-styling’ discussed in section 4.2 also contribute to rendering Hegel more credible and more creditable in the post-modern world of early twenty-first-century international Anglophone academia. If some of these strategies meet with disapproval from more historically minded, ‘antiquarian’ and traditional metaphysical readers of Hegel, Pinkard’s somewhat dismissive phrase ‘not much hangs on that’ may, in fact, capture the sense that Pinkard is really interested in the political and ideological uses which can be made of Hegel’s philosophy in future rather than in any kind of stylistic nostalgia. In summary, Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis* can be described as unemotional, impartial, non-emphatic and understated; but Pinkard ultimately seems to adopt this sophisticated anti-rhetorical stance in order to secure a greater honour through his skilful application of rational philosophy to the intractable dilemma of achieving a democratic basis for social and political ethics.
Chapter 5  The translatorial *hexit* in context

5.1  Comparison of the Baillie and Pinkard translations

The aim of section 5.1 is to compare the two translations on the basis of the radical contextualisation of translatorial *hexit* discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Similarities are addressed in subsection 5.1.1 and differences in subsection 5.1.2. Section 5.2 answers the research questions posed in the Introduction. Section 5.3 offers a self-reflexive evaluation of the Bourdiesian theoretical framework as a conceptual tool for analysing the social embeddedness of textual and peritextual details of translations of philosophy which encourages participatory communication between the disciplines of translation studies, philosophy and sociology. Section 5.4 draws these conclusions together and points the way forward for possible further research.

5.1.1  Similarities

Apart from relatively minor editorial details, both TTs are translations of the same SL text, in each case the most recent, complete edition of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. The two translators considered here were also both professors of philosophy and, although separated by approximately one hundred years of history and a considerable geographical and cultural distance, both show a remarkable dedication to Hegel and to this one text. With regard to their translatorial *hexit*, similarities can be seen in their popularising, pedagogical (and indirectly, commercial) stance towards the translations as a means of mediating between Hegel’s ideas and the putative, contemporary readership of students of philosophy as well as the various disciplines drawing on philosophy (theology students for Baillie; students of legal and political theory for Pinkard).

In both cases, the choice of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* as a text to translate must be considered bold, not only because of the scale and complexity of the work and its

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189 Scholarly work on the German source text has progressed considerably since the Lasson editions (1907, 1921 and 1928) which Baillie used. The suggestion that the editorial changes made have been minor is not intended to be dismissive, but rather to indicate that they have had only minor impact on the data on *Geist* and *aufheben* collected here.
language but also because of its ideological significance and especially its ideological ambiguity (see section 1.3). Although Baillie’s translation was a pioneering work – it was the first complete English translation of this text – Hegel’s work had already accumulated great symbolic value in the Anglophone world through the dependence of British Idealism on its German (Kantian and largely Hegelian) origins. The translation thus fulfilled several functions, appropriating and popularising the German original as well as creating an opportunity for wider and more detailed criticism of Hegel’s ideas by British intellectuals not fluent in German (see section 3.1). By analogy, although Pinkard’s translation is not the first translation of this text, it shares not only the functions of appropriating and popularising the German original for a modern (student) readership but also the sense that this new translation will encourage a new level of criticism of Hegel’s ideas, not least from the non-metaphysical, scientifically sceptical perspective of that prospective new readership (see section 4.1.1). In this sense the two translations invite criticism from opponents as well as admirers of Hegel; they both seek to expose a new side of Hegel to new audiences. Their translatorial *hexes* can thus be seen to embody an assertive, dominant component in addition to an element of subservience towards the source-text author. To achieve this assertive goal, the translators also both required sufficient cultural and symbolic capital as Hegel experts and university professors, because their most damaging critics were likely to share this status with them. Translations by less authoritative translators would be unlikely to fulfil the function of encouraging a critical reappraisal of Hegel, at least without the support of a leading academic (as already discussed in the case of the Miller – Findlay collaboration).

In view of this re-positioning function of both translations, the pedagogical habitus of the translators represents a further similarity between Baillie and Pinkard and a further contribution to their translatorial *hexis*. Although the respective readerships and pedagogical styles differ widely, both translators direct their translations primarily towards a generation of students who will be the future (critical) beneficiaries of the new reading of Hegel. However, both Baillie and Pinkard acknowledge the presence and even the former dominance of an older generation of Hegelian peers, the Absolutists for Baillie and the ‘antiquarians’ and ‘polemicists’ for Pinkard, who will not necessarily welcome the changes of perspective suggested by the new translation (see sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.4). As shown by way of example in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below,
both translators demonstrably simplified Hegel’s long sentences attempting to make the central ideas more accessible.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reproduce Figures 3.2 and 4.2 from the relevant chapters. The comparison shows the similarity in the number of translatorial additions of *mind, spirit* and *Spirit* introduced to break up long sentences and make the text easier to read. However, the analysis according to translatorial *hexis*, that is, including a radical contextualisation of the reasoning behind the translators’ choices, shows profound cultural differences behind these superficial similarities, which will be discussed in subsection 5.1.2.

![Figure 5.1: Occurrences of mind, spirit and Spirit, with Baillie’s additions](image-url)
Underlying the similarities is the unifying factor of the translators’ strong personal commitment to the value of Hegel’s philosophy. For many years before undertaking the translation, both philosophers had engaged with Hegel’s ideas directly in German as well as through the associated secondary literature in English (and possibly also in Italian, in Baillie’s case), so that the act of translating also expresses an intimate familiarity with the source language and source text (see sections 3.1.2 and 4.1.3). Arnold Miller, who translated and/or revised the translations of six Hegel titles, expresses this sense of intimacy with the source-text author in his article ‘On translating Hegel’. The opening sentence reads: ‘Anyone who aims to translate Hegel into readable English should bear in mind what he [Hegel] said in an early essay, viz. that before the living spirit which dwells in a philosophy can reveal itself it must be brought to birth by a kindred spirit’ (Miller, 1983). In this sense at least, Baillie and Pinkard can be considered kindred spirits. In addition to their social and pedagogical functions, the translations therefore also have a deeply personal connection with each translator’s own intellectual trajectory. The act of translating can be seen as an honour-endowing as well as an honour-seeking gesture in the personal development and satisfaction of the

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Baillie’s quotation from Dante’s *Divine Comedy* in Italian (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xlii) as well as his receipt of an honour from the King of Italy during the period of Mussolini (as mentioned in chapter 3) both suggest that Baillie was familiar not only with the Italian language but also with the work of Italian Hegelian philosophers Croce and Gentile. Further research, especially with regard to the *Private Journal of Sir James Baillie* (1936) may shed light on this.
translator. Each translator becomes ontologically identified with the author. With regard to the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, to be recognised and remembered as a translator of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is, in itself, an honour. Both translators also share this deeply personal aspect of the translatorial *hexis*, although there is some evidence that Baillie’s commitment to Hegel and to *The Phenomenology of Mind* waned in the 1930’s, for example, when he wrote in his *Private Journal* for 17th June, 1930, with reference to the final stages of editing the second edition of his translation, ‘I shall be glad to be done with this book’ (Baillie, 1936).

### 5.1.2 Differences

Sections 3.1 and 4.1 analysed the two historical, honour-endowing fields within which the translations were produced, selecting salient ideological and philosophical differences as theoretical poles of opposition. The tensions or struggles between rival positions were referred to as the micro-dynamics of the field and the sub-field. It was also shown that the fields themselves were engaged in a state of dynamic change. Against very different historical backgrounds, the philosopher-translators’ attitudes or *hexes* were portrayed as a complex, honour-seeking position-takings. Baillie adopted a Personalist position, opposed to the philosophical orthodoxy of Absolutism, aligned with the political and religious establishment but still capable of entertaining a controlled, new-liberal commitment to progress (see section 3.1.1). Pinkard adopted a democratic-liberal position embracing the communitarian ‘third way’ in political and jurisprudential theory and purposefully integrating an adapted, non-metaphysical reading of Hegel into this framework (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Although both translators adapted their translatorial *hexis* – the textual and peritextual embodiment of these position-takings – to these differences and changes in the field, there are significant differences in translatorial *hexis* which embody a divergence in the ideological, religious and philosophical positions of the translators in spite of this superficial similarity and the similarities discussed in subsection 5.1.1.

With regard to the translators’ handling of the dynamically ambiguous terms *Geist* and *aufheben* in the text of the translations, the most prominent difference was in the translators’ approach to terminological consistency (see sections 3.2 and 4.2). Figure 5.3 illustrates this difference.
Figure 5.3 combines the data shown in sections 3.2 and 4.2. Baillie very occasionally used other terms in addition to *mind*, *spirit* and *Spirit*, such as *esprit* (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: 306), which translates *Geist* in a part of the text relating to the French philosopher Diderot. Note, however, that if the peritextual running page headers are taken into consideration, Baillie’s translation (1931 edition) further emphasises *Mind* by repeating the book title *The Phenomenology of Mind* on every page odd-numbered page. Chapter headings and subtitles appear at the top of the pages of the 1910 first edition of Baillie, so that the repetition of the term *Mind* does not recur in this manner (see section 3.3). Figure 5.3 also shows that Pinkard translated every occurrence of *Geist* in the ST as *spirit*. The data shown does not take sentence-initial capitalisation of *Spirit* into consideration. Furthermore, the graphic does not show Pinkard’s additions as mentioned with reference to Figure 5.2 above. It should also be mentioned that, in the online-draft translation, Pinkard repeats the specific chapter headings on every page, so that *Spirit* is also repeated at the top of every page in the *Spirit* chapter (see section 4.3).

For Pinkard, terminological consistency can be described as a norm; Cambridge University Press even declares consistency with key terms as a distinguishing feature of
their series (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010). Pinkard’s paratextual *Notes on the Translation* and *Glossary* reinforce his commitment to this translational norm as a means of taking Hegel’s terminology seriously, of treating Hegel’s text as a ‘scientific’ text (see section 4.3). In addition to aligning Pinkard’s translation heteronomously with the field of modern science, in which terminological consistency is normative, Pinkard’s commitment to terminological consistency also aligns the translation with the fields of jurisprudence and political and ethical theory, because terminological consistency is also important in these contexts, for example, in the case of terms like ‘basic rights’, ‘human rights’ and ‘natural rights’ (see section 4.1.4, especially the references to (Pinkard, 1987)), but also with regard to *mind, mindedness, spirit and spirituality*, and even *sublation*, to the extent that this term refers to an ideologically significant sense of *progress, evolution or development* (as discussed respectively in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). By contrast, terminological consistency, in the sense of rigorously matching one TT word with a ST equivalent, was evidently not a central concern for Baillie. Instead, Baillie takes Hegel’s dynamic, dialectically ambiguous use of the terms *Geist* and *aufheben* as an opportunity for reinforcing what Baillie sees as crucial distinctions, for example, between *Geist* as *mind* (especially in the *Reason* chapter) and the ‘higher’ experience of *Geist* as *spirit* and *Spirit* (in the chapters on *Spirit, Religion* and *Absolute Knowledge*). Through his imaginative (but not inconsistent) use of different translations for the same ST lexical item, Baillie also exploits the ambiguity of *aufheben* to emphasise (even further than Hegel does) a perceived narrative of ‘upward’ hierarchical progression through the course of the book.

Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below reproduce Figures 3.5 and 4.5. While Figure 5.4 shows patterning in Baillie’s use of different translations for *aufheben* throughout the six chapters of the TT corpus, Figure 5.5 shows Pinkard’s more consistent translation of *aufheben* with *sublate*, but juxtaposed in this graphic with Pinkard’s additions, that is, occurrences of *sublat* (all forms of *sublate*) in the TT which are not direct translations of parts of *aufheben*, i.e. where Pinkard has repeated the verb in order to increase clarity or as a result of breaking up long sentences.

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191 The translator’s introduction and also the CUP advertising materials for this most recent translation of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (Hegel/Giovanni, 2010) mention the publisher’s commitment to terminological consistency for key terms throughout the series of Cambridge Translations of Hegel.
The graphs illustrate the difference in the two translators’ attitudes towards terminological consistency. While Baillie uses the ambiguity of *aufheben* to assert his interpretation of Hegel by articulating different readings in different parts of the text, Pinkard adheres to strict norms, deviating from the norm of terminological consistency only in observance of the secondary norm of readability. However, the comparison of
graphs also indicates an interesting pattern in the *Self-consciousness* chapter. While Baillie uses the verb *sublate* almost exclusively in this chapter, there are also clearly more additions of *sublate* in this chapter of the Pinkard translation. In raw figures there are 55 occurrences of *aufheben* against 60 of *sublat*. While Pinkard’s additions could be explained fairly easily with reference to two rather complex sentences (see Figure 4.6) in this chapter which, it could be argued, demanded simplification and repetition, this explanation fails to take into consideration the real significance of the verb *aufheben* for Pinkard’s interpretation. A radical contextualisation based on an analysis of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis*, that is, the assumption that minor textual details embody aspects of the translator’s stance with regard to the dynamics of the sub-field, suggests that Pinkard does in fact have a particular interest in averting misunderstandings of *aufheben*, especially with regard to the ‘third sense’, the sense of hierarchical, upward progress, which Pinkard seeks to diminish or underplay. Informed by the theory of translatorial *hexis*, the data analysis thus reveals a more nuanced explanation which takes into consideration broader contextual factors.

The differences with regard to terminological consistency point towards another, related but more general divergence between the translators which can be described as a difference in rhetorical stance. Baillie’s more rhetorical strategy for influencing the reader’s experience of Hegel’s book (for the benefit of the ‘common good’) is particularly evident in the peritexts and is in strong contrast with Pinkard’s desire to let the reader make up her/his own mind (see sections 3.3 and 4.3). These differences justify the distinction suggested in this thesis between Baillie’s translatorial *hexis* of (benevolent) autocratic control and Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis* of purposeful, norm-governed, liberal-democratic circumspection. Baillie’s approach is to emphasise, to intervene, to assert and to argue as a philosopher-translator. As Baillie points out in his *Translator’s Introduction*, translation and interpretation are inseparable, and ‘[t]he composer and the conductor are as necessary to the performance as the various instrumentalists’ (Hegel/Baillie, 1910/1931: xi and xli). Baillie, who, with regard to this metaphor, evidently sees his translatorial role as akin to that of the ‘conductor’, is committed to the correctness of his own view, complex and compromised as it may at times seem; the personality of the translator is very much in the foreground. The fluency of Baillie’s style betokens this throughout the text; especially with regard to Baillie’s rather wordy, literary and sometimes alliterative style, the (modern) reader is perhaps conscious of reading and being persuaded by Baillie rather than by Hegel.
For Pinkard, the fact that he has and is known to have his own (non-metaphysical) interpretation of Hegel is rather a hindrance to his credibility as a translator, something which has to be acknowledged but kept judiciously in the background, if not eliminated entirely. Pinkard’s stated aim is to allow readers direct and as far as possible unmediated access to Hegel’s thought; his textual and peritextual strategy is certainly designed to create the impression that this is the case. Pinkard’s under-stated rhetoric is therefore very different from that of Baillie. Although Pinkard’s personality hardly intrudes into the (online-draft) translation in any stylometrically obvious sense (except perhaps with regard to a certain carelessness with spellings and grammar which will probably be removed before publication), the seriousness and rigour with which he approaches Hegel’s text nonetheless reveals an authorial mind (whether Pinkard’s own or Pinkard’s translatorial reconstruction of Hegel’s mind) which is entirely focused on the processes of dialectical reasoning elaborated in the text. Pinkard’s Hegel thus achieves an ‘anachronistic’ (Beiser, 2008) integrity and authority through understatement and rigorous argument rather than through any attempt at stylistic elegance.

It is evident from Pinkard’s *Notes on the Translation* that the reader may find ideas in the text which are problematic or disagreeable (such as Hegel’s views on non-European cultures and religions other than protestant Christianity). Pinkard does not vouch for these; he leaves room, through mildly humorous detachment from Hegel and his followers, for readers to reserve judgement on particular aspects without abandoning Hegel altogether (see section 4.3). Pinkard presents a Hegel, some of whose arguments may be convincing and useful, while some may have to be rejected by critical modern readers. While Baillie’s rhetorical stance can be seen as eminently compatible with the benevolent, hierarchical authoritarianism typical of his age, Pinkard’s stance is adapted to a more democratic and heterogeneous age in which power and authority depend more upon the purposeful manipulation of consensus over a variety of disparate issues than on overtly powerful persuasion and unity of political purpose.

192 The delay in the publication of Pinkard’s translation and the switch to a joint translation with Michael Baur, the CUP series editor, working alongside Pinkard is possibly attributable to the publisher’s desire to eliminate any such minor errors. [Interview with Houlgate; e-mail from Pinkard; and, I have contacted Baur to ask about this].
Alongside such rhetorical and ideological differences, there are also differences between the two translators with regard to their philosophical and theological stance. These more complex differences are also embodied in the text and peritexts of the translations as further aspects of the translatorial hexis. In fact, the complexity of the issues involved suggests that particular caution is required in attributing fixed positions to the translators and their translations. There is little doubt, for example, that Baillie’s reading of Hegel as an essentially Christian philosopher corresponds with the traditional metaphysical view of Hegel according to which the Absolute is in some sense synonymous with God. Baillie’s Spirit denotes man’s recognition of the divine in his own finite self and of his finite self in the divine after the long, logical and phenomenological processes of mental and spiritual experience; Spirit represents a metaphysical completion and consummation to which man must (logically and ethically) aspire, although many will never reach the position of Absolute Knowledge (see section 3.1.1).

Moreover, the dialectical process, denoted by the verb aufheben and its associated grammatical metaphors, is not simple. The lexical variety adopted by Baillie in his translations of Geist and aufheben embody Baillie’s own dialectical struggle with Hegel’s text through the act of translation. Baillie incorporates the divergences and contradictions in Hegel’s argument into the translation; the translation leaves space for a non-metaphysical or even a non-Christian interpretation, although these interpretations are relegated to a lower level of experience of consciousness. In this way, Baillie manages to articulate and preserve his own dignity and authority in the face of serious ontological uncertainties with regard to his own changing social and political allegiances (for example, to Germany during the wars with Germany), at the same time as acknowledging that others, in different places and times, and at different stages of personal development (or experience of consciousness) face different uncertainties.

By contrast, the very consistency of Pinkard’s lexical choices masks underlying theological and philosophical tensions. Pinkard’s choice of spirit as the translation for Geist reflects standard modern usage in the Anglophone sub-field of Hegelian philosophy, in spite of the fact that most philosophy teachers quote from the Miller translation (Hegel/Miller, 1977) which uses Spirit throughout. Many writers,

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193 Personal conversations with Houlgate (Warwick), Schlösser (Toronto) and Stern (Sheffield), professors who regularly teach Hegel, confirm this.
including Houlgate (2005) and Pinkard (1994) mention the inconsistency of Miller when they quote from his translation or explain that they have changed the translation where necessary. Some writers, such as Bowie, use *mind*, *spirit* as well as *Mind/Spirit* relatively freely in their own writing (Bowie, 2003: 80). However, in spite of the conventionality of *spirit*, the previous translations constrain Pinkard’s choice by representing opposite poles relative to which the new translation must differentiate itself. Baillie offered a lexical and semantic range, rising from the finite to the absolute, from the individual to the universal: *mind* – *spirit* – *Spirit*; Miller chose *Spirit*. For Pinkard to choose *spirit* can, in a sense, therefore never be seen as a neutral decision; through the text of the translation and its historical context in the series of translations, Pinkard’s choice of *spirit* with a small *s* articulates the same sense of sceptical ‘subtraction’ from the metaphysical which is to be found in Pinkard’s interpretive philosophical writing and lectures (see especially the discussion of Pinkard (Pinkard, 1996) in section 4.1.2). In view of the previous translations, the choice of *spirit* will always seem like a curtailment, something more than *mind* but less than *Spirit*.

This choice also embodies the precautionary scepticism expressed through Pinkard’s horizontal hand gestures in the Romanian video clip with regard to the rising, ‘third’ sense of *aufheben* as cited in chapter 4 (Pinkard, 2011). Hegel’s philosophy may have something useful to offer the modern world, especially in terms of political and legal theory; Hegel’s discussions of human communities as self-legislating, normatively creative (and potentially self-destructive) entities is of central importance to some branches of US political philosophy. But if these aspects of Hegel’s philosophy are to carry any weight in the modern, non-metaphysically minded, materialist world, it must be possible to separate them from less useful, potentially destructive, extravagant metaphysical claims associated with Hegel and the more traditional Anglophone readings of Hegel. For Pinkard, Hegel is a potentially useful ally in the theorisation of the modern democratic-liberal state, but Hegel’s trustworthiness must be ensured by subjecting his philosophy to a purposeful, critical analysis, his foreignness must be kept at arms’ length. This approach seriously challenges the position adopted by Hegel scholars who seek to promote Hegel’s philosophy intact. Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel also challenges Hegelians for whom Hegel’s philosophy endorses the superiority of Christianity over other religions and of European (and indirectly US) culture over other cultures.
Although Pinkard’s challenges are embodied discreetly in the text of the translation, and less discreetly in Pinkard’s interpretive writing, they do represent a position-taking by Pinkard. While Pinkard tries not to allow his reading of Hegel to intrude in the translation, his reputation as a philosopher with a particular view on the role of Hegel in modern philosophy in a sense pre-empts the posture of translatorial neutrality. By contrast with Baillie, therefore, Pinkard does not offer a compromise. Pinkard’s rigorous terminological consistency and underplayed rhetoric constitute effective instruments in securing the validity of the translation in the contemporary world and in augmenting Pinkard’s cultural capital as an authoritative interpreter of Hegel’s works, in spite of opposition to his ‘anachronistic’ view of Hegel by representatives of a more ‘antiquarian’ reading (see especially the discussion of (Beiser, 2008) in section 4.1.2).

5.2 Discussion of findings

The initial research question combined three components asking how and why the Baillie and Pinkard translations of Hegel’s Phenomenology differ in their translation of the terms Geist and aufheben and questioning the extent to which such differences can be theorised as an embodiment of translatorial hexis. Chapters 3 and 4 provided detailed analyses of how the translations differ in their translations of these terms, as summarised in section 5.1.2. The idea of a radical contextualisation of these differences construed as embodiments of a translatorial hexis was invoked to address the question of why the translators adopted the strategies identified.

The research question relating to the rhetorical and philosophical role of ‘dialectical ambiguity’ in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes and how this presents a challenge to translators was addressed primarily in chapter 1. It was argued that Hegel lived and worked in a highly literate culture preoccupied in different ways with ‘Witz’ [wit] and ‘Humor’ [humour], with wordplay, multiple and double meanings, which provided entertainment but also played a part in more serious philosophical discourse. However, it was possible to distinguish between a literary sense of ambiguity or indeterminacy and a specifically Hegelian, ‘dialectical ambiguity’ which plays on the potential overlap and ambiguity between different categories of abstraction: individuality, particularity and universality (see section 1.2.1). It was argued that Hegel exploits the potential for this kind of ambiguity in structuring his arguments through the course of the Phenomenology by gradually revealing the fuller senses of the terms he uses. In view of
Hegel’s special use of ‘dialectical ambiguity’, it was suggested that investigating how the translators dealt with this problem would provide a good basis for the radical contextualisation of their translatorial decisions, because the reasoning behind translators’ choices could reveal their stance not only with regard to their interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy but also with regard to their positioning relative to the dynamics of the philosophical and ideological fields in which they worked.

The next research question asked whether there are any significant patterns in the Baillie and Pinkard translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* which support their theorisation as an embodiment of the translator’s *hexis*. Chapters 3 and 4 showed several patterns with the lexical items investigated. There was very clear evidence of Baillie having structured his translations of *Geist* and *aufheben* (see Figures 3.2 to 3.5 and Figures 5.1 to 5.4.). These patterns demonstrated that Baillie’s translations were not inconsistent but, on the contrary, revealed relatively clear distinctions between different uses of the key terms at different places in the text. This certainly supported the idea that, although a complete explanation would probably not be attainable, it would be worth pursuing the question of why Baillie made the choices he made by examining the wider context. Although Pinkard’s terminological consistency with both *Geist* and *aufheben* does not provide such an obvious structuring as the patterning found in the Baillie text (see Figures 4.2 and 4.5), Pinkard’s commitment to the translatorial norm of terminological consistency is not without significance and also supports the idea of further investigation with regard to the context. The qualification explained in chapter 2 that the translatorial *hexis* embodies a dominant rather than a subservient stance of the translation highlights the close connection between the translatorial decisions and the status of the translator in the sub-field, especially with regard to the challenges to that status. Pinkard’s high status in the field (see sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4) correlates with his ability to articulate Hegelian philosophical ideas in a style compatible with modern analytical philosophy and its transferability to the related fields of political and legal theory; the dynamics of the contemporary academic field demand consistency and accountability.

Another research question related to the extent to which the translatorial *hexis* is also embodied in the peritexts (see sections 3.3 and 4.3). To the extent that the peritexts are written by the translator, they also embody and articulate the translator’s stance at several levels. The difference in length between Baillie’s 30-page *Translator’s*
Introduction and 26 in-text Explanatory Statements and Pinkard’s considerably shorter, 16 typed pages of Notes on the Translation and Glossary, for example, shows a pronounced difference in their understanding of the translator’s role. These peritextual features also reflect a more conscious positioning by the translator. In the peritexts, the translators show only the public side of their involvement with the translation and with the text. For example, Baillie addresses ‘students of religion’, and Pinkard down-styles his discussion of ‘sublation’ as if appealing to a general readership. These gestures divert attention from the fact that both translators were also aware of a professional readership, for whom such comments were unnecessary. In this sense, the peritexts do embody the translatorial hexis, but the more complex position-takings suggested by the analysis of textual details, such as lexical patterning, embody and reveal further, less explicit commitments with regard to the honour-endowing potential of the professional, philosophical sub-field. While the translators can use the peritexts to give explicit reasons for their translatorial decisions and overall stance, these are not necessarily the only reasons involved in the decision-making process. The radical contextualisation of lexical patterning engages with reasons which the translators may have had for their translatorial decisions but did not necessarily wish to acknowledge to a wider public.

A further research question questioned the extent to which the relationship between the translator’s hexis and the dynamics of the surrounding fields can be described as reciprocal. In theoretical terms the hexis has been theorised as a specific sub-category of Bourdieu’s habitus and stands in the same reciprocal relationship to the fields as the habitus, but subject to two differentiating features, namely that the hexis is used to describe a specifically honour-seeking, dominant stance of the philosopher-translators under investigation, and that the hexis embodies this stance in the minutiae of the text (see section 2.1). Throughout the thesis reference has been made to the honour-seeking stance of the translators and the honour-endowing potential of the fields in which they worked. The reciprocity of this relationship is expressed neatly in the formulation: ‘the subjective expectation of objective probability’ (see especially the discussion of Jenkins, 2002) in section 2.1. According to this view, the translators seek honour by selectively reproducing those values discernible in the field which seem most likely to earn them honour, in the sense of professional recognition for their work. Given the dynamic structure of the sub-fields examined, this means that the translators were to some extent constrained to take sides in on-going debates within the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, specifically with regard to the opposition between
Absolutists and Personalists in the context of British Idealism (see subsection 3.1.1) and with regard to the opposition between traditional metaphysical readings of Hegel and non-metaphysical readings of Hegel in the context of the Pinkard translation (see subsection 4.1.2). Their reputation as philosophers depended upon how well they represented the side they decided to support.

More generally, however, the translators were also constrained to acknowledge the involvement of Hegel and Hegelian philosophy in wider, ideological debates, especially, for example, with regard to Hegel’s importance as a Christian philosopher at the time of the British Idealists and with regard to the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy to the development of communitarian political and legal theory at the end of the twentieth century. The reciprocal relationship between the translatorial hexis and the dynamics of the surrounding fields was demonstrated in the highly ideologically charged nature of the micro-level decisions surrounding the translations of Geist and aufheben, that is to say, the translatorial decisions were shown to be highly sensitive responses to the respective field dynamics and thus to be textual embodiments of a pro-active, generative participation by the translators in the micro-dynamics of the sub-fields. Accordingly, in addition to responding to the dynamics of the field, the translators contributed actively to the discourse at the microscopic level of semantic renewal (Cooke, 2006) and re-appropriation of these terms in the target culture.

The final research question asked how the concept of a translatorial hexis facilitates a radical contextualisation of multiple translations of the same work. By construing micro-level textual and peritextual details as embodiments of the translators’ participation in the field, the concept of the translatorial hexis was designed as a conceptual tool to focus attention on micro-level differences between the translations and to facilitate the analysis and explanation of such details with reference to the micro-dynamics of the respective historical fields. In essence, the concept of the translatorial hexis postulates the possibility that textual details necessarily embody the translator’s stance with regard to the dynamics of the sub-field. Given this conceptual tool, the researcher must attempt to explain the relationship postulated. The translatorial stance embodied in the text fixes a momentary response to a historically mobile, social space and thus invites the researcher to re-animate the fixed relationship by investigating the dynamics, that is, the motivating forces, perceptible and comprehensible in relevant portrayals of the field, such as the secondary literature about the sub-field of
Anglophone Hegelian philosophy, the translators’ own writings and biographical and bibliographical texts relating to the translator and the translation. The analysis in terms of a translatorial hexis facilitates a radical contextualisation of each translation by pointing to essentially logical connections between the distribution of capital in the field (the honour-endowing aspect of the field) and the translator’s honour-seeking stance relative to the given field dynamics. Accordingly, the micro-level differences between two translations of the same text are posited as necessarily connected to the dynamics of the specific sub-field and wider surrounding social fields through the exigency of the translator’s quest for honour within that sub-field. The researcher’s task is to identify plausible accounts which can explain the textual differences as products of the logical relationship between the specific translator and the specific field dynamics as understood by the researcher, taking into account as much relevant detail as possible. In this sense, it is always possible for further information to change the account given or for a different perspective of a different researcher to provide different criteria of relevance or a different explanation, without this undermining the validity of the first explanation, which relies on the specific, perspectival analysis achieved by the first researcher.

5.3 Self-reflexive evaluation of theoretical framework and methodology

Section 5.3 evaluates the adaptation of Bourdieu’s concept of hexis as a basis for a comparative analysis of translations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* with reference to the self-reflexivity of the translation-studies researcher. Accordingly, the focus is shifted towards the perspective of the author of the thesis as the agent carrying out the objectifying investigation of the translations, the translators and the sub-field of Anglophone Hegelian philosophy. The reflexive, Bourdieusian approach encourages the active, self-reflexive participation of the researcher in cross-disciplinary dialogue between German studies, translation studies, sociology and philosophy. For example, collecting the data for the thesis has involved the researcher in explaining the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, hexis and field to correspondents in philosophy departments and at seminars in German studies, translation studies and philosophy. The thesis itself combines research in all four disciplines. Carrying out this research project has augmented my personal, intellectual capital, given me a sense of my own
translatorial *hexit*. My analysis and contextualisation of details of the Hegel translations have given me an audible voice capable of participating in these sub-fields with an increased awareness of the radical engagement of translation, in every sense of the word, in the wider political and ideological fields.

However, with Bourdieu’s self-reflexivity in mind, it is important not to overstate the achievements of the present research and to consider possible objections. For example, it could be objected that the analysis of translatorial *hexit* in some way distorts or distracts from more important aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. It may be argued, for example, that Hegel’s terms *Geist* and *aufheben* are not in fact ambiguous at all or that their apparent ambiguity is a result of an incomplete understanding of Hegel’s system. However, this objection is based on untenable assumptions. Firstly, it cannot be claimed that anyone has a ‘complete’ understanding of Hegel’s philosophy, not only because of the historical and cultural distance between Hegel and the present day, but also because, as already explained, Hegel offers a system which evolves dynamically; furthermore, it has been argued, in chapter 1, that ambiguity and indeterminacy play a significant part in the dynamic evolution of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. The translatorial *hexit* was designed to show how the objectively fixed details of a translated text, the printed words of the target text, embody more fluid aspects of meaning creation; the words used in a translation represent a kind of frozen, momentary gesture in response to a number of dynamic uncertainties, not just ambiguities in the philosophical source text (such as the dialectical relationship between universal, particular and individual aspects or ‘moments’ of *Geist*) but in the social space surrounding the translator. The translator’s reading of the text and of the field is at best provisional; however, the translator is constrained (by numerous expectations) to produce an actual, completed, translated text. Far from distorting the content of the source text, which may be misrecognised as immutable, the analysis in terms of translatorial *hexit* seeks to show that the fixed marks on the pages of the source text and the target text encode dynamic processes of semantic exploration and experimentation.

The metaphor relating to a frozen moment in time can be extended and elaborated by a brief reference to the homology between Bourdieu’s use of *hexit* and the translatorial *hexit* postulated in the thesis. Bourdieu’s use of the term *hexit* in his early ethnographic work coincides with his use of still, black and white photography to record the socio-dynamics of the Algerian war. A collection of his photographs from this period was
recently exhibited in Austria and published together with selections from Bourdieu’s early writings (Bourdieu, 2012). As exemplified by Figures 1 and 2 from chapter 2, these photographs show men, women and children sometimes posing for the camera, sometimes going about their daily business. One of the most striking features of the collection is how Bourdieu captures on film a society in transition or rather a number of more or less incompatible or incongruous social phenomena which embody a sense of radical social upheaval. By way of homology with the socialised activity and bodily gestures which Bourdieu photographed, the examples of translatorial hexis analysed in this thesis are also characterised by their provisional, improvisatory adaptation to social and cultural change. The photographs show a multiplicity of sometimes conflicting hexes, makeshift attempts to reconcile traditional, rural cultural values with the need to survive and live honourably with self-respect in relatively hostile urban settings.

Although these photographs seem remote from a comparison of the translations of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the homology is less surprising if one considers the wide linguistic and cultural differences between Hegel and his translators and the depth of cultural change and uprooting which has occurred during the intervening years. However, legitimate they may seem, the word-processed text, crisp white paper and machine binding of a new Hegel translation, Baillie’s rhetorical authority and Pinkard’s terminological consistency will always be culturally remote from the historical Hegel and his world and can ultimately do no more than to offer provisional, translatorial gestures, improvisatory attempts to reconcile gaping cultural differences and to discover new meanings by translating ideas embodied in a historical source text into a new target culture.

A crucial difference between the two sides in this homology is the distribution of power and resources. While Bourdieu’s photographs show poor people adapting from one form of domination to another, the analysis of Hegel translations refers to a more subtle, symbolic form of domination; even as dominant, honour-seeking agents within their respective sub-fields, Baillie and Pinkard were institutionally constrained to reproduce the structures of their own symbolic domination. The translator’s honour is necessarily a shared honour. Pinkard’s hexis of purposeful, normative, liberal-democratic circumspection, no less than Baillie’s autocratic, rhetorical hexis, represents a provisional gesture adapted to a time-specific reading of the already-changing, transitional social, political and commercial fields, as well as to the micro-dynamics of the philosophical sub-field analysed in chapters 3 and 4. Given the dynamic nature of
the fields surrounding a new translation of a culturally sensitive text such as Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, it is particularly important for participants, that is, readers, philosophy teachers and the translators themselves, to attempt to understand the motives and issues surrounding the translations and to participate in as open a dialogue as possible. The possibilities for misunderstanding a book like Hegel’s *Phenomenology* are considerable. Accordingly, the translations should not be treated as fixed, stand-alone artefacts but rather as dynamic, evolving cultural products. As the analysis based on a radical contextualisation of translatorial *hexis* has shown, translation studies can contribute to an interdisciplinary dialogue by explaining how the details of the text relate to the honour-endowing social context of the philosopher-translators, thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of what is or was at stake in the translation of such a work. The self-reflexive value of the approach adopted here is therefore that it also encourages the researcher to engage with the philosophical sub-field in an active, participatory manner, investigating and articulating, so to speak, from the outside, sociologically informed perceptions of the philosophical field which are not possible from the inside.

### 5.4 Summary of conclusions and outlook

In summary, the analysis and comparison of the Baillie and Pinkard translations of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* based on a radical contextualisation of translatorial *hexis* provided an appropriate theoretical framework for investigating translatorial mediation between details of the translated text and salient oppositions in the sub-field. The analysis showed Baillie’s translatorial *hexis* to embody a stance of benevolent, autocratic control over the re-conceptualisations of Hegel’s *Geist* and *aufheben* in English, articulating Baillie’s interpretive strategy for re-appropriating Hegel’s philosophy, releasing Hegel from the association with Absolutism and monism suggested by Pringle-Pattison (see section 3.1.1) and re-consecrating Hegel as a Christian philosopher whose concept of *Spirit* is shown, through the translation, to be compatible with a Personalist version of Idealism. The analysis of Pinkard’s very different translatorial *hexis* demonstrated a norm-based approach to translation, especially with regard to terminological consistency, which reflected a perceived need, determined by the dynamics of the sub-field, to preserve the credibility of certain non-metaphysical aspects of Hegel’s philosophy (see section 4.1.2), especially in the eyes of modern student readers, in order re-appropriate Hegel’s ethics of rational sociality for use in the context of communitarian political and legal theory (see section 4.1.1).
particular, Pinkard’s evident desire to minimise or ‘subtract’ the religious and hierarchical connotations of Hegel’s *Geist* and *aufheben* from their English translations as *spirit* and *sublate* was explained with reference to the radical contextualisation of Pinkard’s translatorial *hexis* embodied in these terms.

As explained above, sections 3.1 and 4.1 of the thesis provided only a starting point for analysing the social context of the translators, Baillie and Pinkard, in terms of Bourdieusian field theory. Considerably more data was collected than could be presented here, and the field is still in the process of change. The Pinkard translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* has still not been published by CUP. When it is, it will be a joint translation incorporating the work, and the translatorial *hexis*, of another philosophy professor, Michael Baur. An investigation of the differences between the 2008 online draft by Pinkard and the final published version by Pinkard and Baur would provide valuable insights into the *hexis* of editors and publishers in the contemporary philosophy scene and can readily draw on the analysis of translatorial *hexis* offered in this thesis. A radical contextualisation of the Miller translation (*Hegel/Miller, 1977*) along similar lines to the present analysis is already planned by the present author. A new translation (or possibly a revision of one of the older translations) by Walker (*Hegel/Walker, in preparation*) is to be published by Routledge (*Westphal, 2009: 297*). This too can be analysed within the same Bourdieusian frame of reference. The translatorial *hexis* can also be used for the analysis of different texts in different sub-fields wherever the sense of translatorial *hexis*, the translator’s pro-active participation in the dynamics of the field can be identified in the minutiae of the text. It is hoped that wider application of the concept of translatorial *hexis* in different contexts will lead to greater refinement of this conceptual tool.

The concept of translatorial *hexis* is also eminently compatible with and can contribute to other approaches used in translation studies and sociology. For example, the software tools used in social network analysis (*Crossley, 2008*) could be readily applied to the historical networks of philosophers and publishers surrounding Baillie and Pinkard, providing a more comprehensive and objective visualisation of the major participants in the sub-field.\(^\text{194}\) The Bourdieusian analysis of translation in the international book trade

\(^{194}\) Social network analysis now provides the possibility to develop Beiser’s (2008) call for research on Hegel and his contemporaries along the lines of *Konstellationsforschung* to include, for example, diagrammatic representations of the social networks surrounding the translators of Hegel.
provided by Sapiro (2010) is also relevant to the Baillie translation, in view of the growth of the US publishing market in the first decade of the twentieth century, especially the expansion of Macmillan & Co. (see section 3.2), and to the Pinkard translation, in view of the worldwide distribution networks of academic book publishers and the rivalry between these increasingly globalised organisations. Further research beyond the scope of this thesis could combine such approaches with an analysis of translatorial hexis in a continued investigation of the Hegel translations and translators and/or more broadly with regard to the history of Anglophone translations of German philosophy in general.

The analysis of linguistic data in chapters 3 and 4 also represents only a starting point for further research. The development of historical corpora, like the GerManC corpus (Durrell, 2007) but focussing specifically on philosophical texts in German and in translation, would allow a fuller analysis of terms such as Geist and aufheben in diverse (diachronic) contexts which could shed light on the extent to which these terms can realistically be thought of as ambiguous or vague, or as having conveyed double or triple meanings in their contemporary Hegelian setting. The availability of increasingly large corpora of UK and US English will allow further empirical and radical analysis of the wider (philosophical and non-philosophical) usage of the key terms mind, spirit, Spirit and sublate investigated here, including, for example, occurrences of the term spirit in President Obama’s inaugural speech in 2008 and Queen Elizabeth II’s Christmas message in 2011. It is therefore hoped that the conceptual tool of the translatorial hexis developed in this thesis will provide a starting point for further interdisciplinary research on translation and philosophy with particular reference to the social context and ideological positioning of translators of philosophy.
References


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