Understanding Contemporary Development: Tanzanian Life Narratives of Intervention

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

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ACRONYMS

CCM: Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution)
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CS: Civil Society
CSOs: Civil Society Organizations
CUF: Civic United Front (Tanzanian Opposition Political Party)
EU: European Union
GEM: Gender Empowerment Measure
HDI: Human Development Index
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
PRA: Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ROs: Religious Organizations
TANU: Tanganyika African National Union
TLP: Tanzania Labour Party
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
URT: United Republic of Tanzania
GLOSSARY OF KISWAHILI TERMS

Azimio la Arusha: Arusha Declaration
Bibi: Older woman (Grandmother)
Doladala: Minibus
Elimu: Education
Fundi: Workman
Kijiji/Vijiji Vya Ujamaa: Ujamaa Village/Villages
Kijiji/Vijiji Vya Zamani: Old/Original Village(s)
Kilimo Kwanza: ‘Agriculture First’ (Tanzanian Government Programme)
Kimakonde: Makonde language (first language of many people in Mtwara)
Kipindi Cha Nyuma: the past/long ago
Kipindi Cha Ukoloni: Colonial Era
Kiswahili: Swahili language
Kopa Mbuzi, Lipa Mbuzi: Loan a goat, pay with a Goat (RIPS Project)
Kujitawala: Self-rule
Kujitegemea: Self-reliance
Kuleta Maendeleo: ‘To Bring Development’
Kushiriki: To Participate/Participation
Kushirikiana: To Cooperate/Cooperation
Likaunga: poor quality cassava flour
Maendeleo ya Mtu Binafi: Personal or Self Development
Maendeleo: Development/Progress
Mashirika Madogo Madogo: Small Organizations
Matofali: Bricks/Tiles
M(i)radi ya Maendeleo: Development Project/Projects
Msaada: Aid/Help/Assistance
Mzee: older man (Grandfather)
Mzungu: A White/European Person
Oporesheni Vijijini: Operation ‘in the Villages’ (Villagization)
Raia: Citizen/Subject
Rudi Nyuma: ‘To Go Backwards’/’To Return to Long Ago’
Shamba: Farm/Field
Shirika Lasiyo la Serikali: Non Governmental Organization
Udongo: Dirt/Soil
Uhuru: Freedom/Independence
Ujamaa Vijijini: Ujamaa ‘in the Villages’
Ujamaa: Familyhood (associated with socialist villages and politics)
Ulaya: Europe/’the West’
Umoja: Unity
Vitambua: Rice Cakes
Vitu: Things
Wageni: Guests/Strangers/Foreigners
Wamakonde: Makonde people (indigenous to Mtwara and Mozambique)
Wananchi: Citizens
Wazee: Older People (also a term of deference, a reference to status)
Wazungu: White/European people
ABSTRACT

“Understanding Contemporary Development: Tanzanian Life Narratives of Intervention”

By Robert M Ahearne,
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This thesis investigates the perceptions of development held by the supposed beneficiaries of various interventions over time. Development (or maendeleo) has been central to Tanzanian political discourse since the late-colonial era and is still drawn on by government, Civil Society and Non-governmental Organizations alike. This research investigates the period from late-colonialism until the present day, discussing the way in which wazee (older people) in South-Eastern Tanzania interpret development. In other words, this thesis centres on the views held by a group often overlooked in development research in a region that is similarly sidelined. In order to delimit the study in certain important ways, this thesis is framed by three dimensions that are seen as critical to reading development: materiality, place and ‘the past’.

Material aspirations are seen as significant herein and are placed alongside the material inequalities between people and places that help to frame older people’s readings of development. These inequalities are partly played out in the differences between places, as in two proximate villages in South-Eastern Tanzania, and the perceptions of place and space are also fundamental to interpreting development. History/‘the past’ and the way in which this is understood and represented is a third and equally important dimension which structures the way in which development is understood by older people, based on their experience of ‘the past’ rather than through historical distinctions imposed from ‘outside’.

This thesis offers a multi-disciplinary approach to investigating development, and demonstrates that a thorough engagement with people who have lived through numerous different eras and experienced various interventions, generates complex, place-specific readings of development. Through ethnographic research I have been able to demonstrate the importance of ‘localized’ knowledge although many of those who were interviewed draw from attendant discourses at regional, national and global scales in order to exemplify their arguments. Development is largely understood through absence rather than presence by wazee in South-Eastern Tanzania and with far greater complexity than is often allowed for in more mainstream research into development. Expectations for development have been created over time by various promises of intervention but the perceived failure of many such attempts is seen to further emphasize the absence rather than the presence of development, with older people arguing that they are isolated and ostracised and written out of contemporary development and materially poor. The value placed on uncovering voices that are otherwise lost from debates cannot be overemphasized and this illustrates that development tropes appear far different when the perspectives of wazee are fully analyzed. This thesis, then, challenges mainstream discourse and conventional histories of development and argues for a more engaged and grounded reading of the concept.
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CHAPTER ONE

Imagining Development: Why Older People in South-Eastern Tanzania?

“Development... means many different things to many different people... The term is so imprecise and vulgar that it should be removed from any proper lexicon of technical terms. With it should go concepts like modernization and modernism. Despite its (and their) shortcomings, however, this will not happen. They and their assorted intellectual baggage will remain key concepts of social analysis. Whether one is for or against, believer or cynic, they are here to stay. The best thing about them is that their content changes and their meanings alter. That being the case, development is a continuous intellectual project as well as an ongoing material process.”

David Apter (1987: 7)

“... we do not yet know enough about the global, regional and especially local historical geography of development... Not only are the objects of development stripped of their history, but they are then reinserted into implicit (or explicit) typologies which define a priori what they are, where they've been and where, with development as a guide, they can go.”

Jonathan Crush (1995: 8-9)

“There are people with development and those without. I don’t have development and he doesn’t have development [referring to Jaylani – Tanzanian research assistant]. Development means to have money. You see my house? There are big holes here, I don’t like them but they are there because I don’t have development... There is no development. I don’t know how to get money, where can I get it? There is no way to get any money, what can I do? I can’t make money by selling 100 coconuts or a bag of charcoal, you can’t sell fish to get development, when you sell these things you don’t make money.”

Mzee Marijani – Interview 9 Mikindani, 28th April 2009
1.1 INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEVELOPMENT

The term development is frequently employed to highlight entrenched forms of poverty around the world, alongside some of the main ideas which seek to address this phenomenon. The degree of contestation surrounding the term is reflected in the above passages and debate continues to rage over the meaning and measurement of development. The flexibility and fluidity of the term can call into question the extent to which the term ‘development’ sustains analytical utility and while Apter argues that the term is ‘vulgar’ and ‘imprecise’ in nature, development remains extremely significant, both as a term and as a related set of processes. The mutability of the term development can also represent a principal strength, allowing for development to be seen as both an “intellectual project as well as an ongoing material process” (recalling Apter, above). Indeed, almost regardless of the way in which it is perceived, people from around the world clearly maintain aspirations for development (Corbridge, 2007; Green, 2003; Simon, 2006), even in spite of the manifold misguided attempts which have ostensibly set out to improve the lives of people across the world. Wide-ranging forms of interventions have ostensibly set out to improve the material conditions of people from across the world, yet massive inequalities persist at all scales and in many instances these are growing, even in spite of seemingly sustained attempts to reduce global poverty.

The scope, spread and contemporary influence of ‘development’ is vast and this is further witnessed in the exponential growth in university courses that address the phenomenon and by the thousands employed and millions affected by development projects on a daily basis (Crush, 1995; Bernstein, 2007). Notwithstanding a well
documented ‘impasse’ in academic ‘development’ theories (Booth, 1985; Sklair, 1988; Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1996), it remains one of the most important ideas and terms in national and international political and economic lexicons. Development refers to anything from: government strategies to support export earnings, microfinance schemes in the rural areas of poorer countries, post-conflict reconstruction, and postcolonial state formation. In popular discourse ‘development’ often refers to specific targets and this is pointedly the case with the eight ‘time bound’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) launched in the year 2000. The targets include income poverty, hunger, maternal and child mortality, disease, inadequate shelter, gender inequality, environmental degradation and the creation of a ‘Global Partnership for Development’, measured by twenty-one quantifiable global targets and sixty indicators which are said to provide concrete, numerical measures of success (UNDP, 2010a). The globalized application of ideas pertaining to development came to the fore when the development industry was established, both during and following the conclusion of the Second World War when the idea of development was ‘internationalized’ (Bernstein, 2006).

There is a mass of literature on ‘development’ and investigating the meanings of the term is by no means novel. Gillian Hart (2001), for example, usefully identifies two particular readings of development, with ‘big D’ Development referring to direct interventions, while ‘little d’ development highlights the spread and growth of capitalism over time. This effectively builds on Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) historiography of development, wherein they divide between imminent/intentional development (with a ‘big D’; interventions) and the immanent development of capitalism, a distinction drawn on in this thesis. However, it remains comparatively rare for the supposed beneficiaries
of interventions to be involved in discussions pertaining to the meaning of development. While ‘participation’ is now central to many academic perspectives and development interventions, this often involves supposed beneficiaries in a piecemeal manner and does not take into account their worldviews or consider their overarching understandings of ‘development’ (Briggs and Sharp, 2004; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). With this in mind, this thesis is framed by the question “How is development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?” This is clearly informed by Crush’s view (above) that there is a necessity for local “historical geographies of development” and the three areas below partly reflect my own perceptions of development. In order to investigate the central research question three specific elements are considered, with history and geography placed alongside materiality.

**Figure 1: Research Question and Dimensions**

How is Development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?

**Three Dimensions:**

a) How significant is materiality to contemporary readings of development?

b) What role does place and space play in perception of development?

c) How do understandings of history and the past inform readings of development?

To the extent that I feel that the term can be defined, I argue that development constitutes an idea that serves to create realities it only claims to describe; materially, spatially and historically. This overlaps with Castree’s (2004) perception of economy and culture as creative of certain realities, while it has elsewhere been argued that
‘development’ does not represent an objective term that exists outside of the world that it aims to describe but is an integral part of that world (Corbridge, 2007). This thesis investigates some of the principal ways in which older people (wazee) in two villages in the Mtwarara region of south-eastern Tanzania understand development. This not only to ‘uncover’ their opinions, but also to convey that their experiences and astute remarks can help to reconfigure development by focussing on the perceptions of supposed beneficiaries of various interventions. Indeed, perceptions of past interventions support one of the key findings of this thesis; that development is largely understood through deficiency rather than proficiency, through absence rather than presence. This is manifest in the absence of material wealth and welfare, which is projected onto others within the village at hand, onto other places, or onto the past, as demonstrated throughout the thesis.

1.2 THE FOCUS OF THE THESIS

This thesis emphasizes the role of materiality, place and ‘the past’ in the perceptions of development held by older people in south-eastern Tanzania and it is necessary to briefly discuss the decisions to delimit the study in this manner, as well as the location and target research group.

Why Tanzania?

The decision to focus on Tanzania is partially based on previous experience within the country and on numerous conversations that I had with people (especially older people) prior to starting this research project. Tanzania has a unique history and Askew (2006) divided the recent past into three specific eras: pre-socialist, socialist and post-socialist
times and I made a similar assertion at the outset, albeit referring to the late-colonial era, the postcolonial/socialist period and the post-Nyerere, neoliberal era. I sought to investigate the extent to which these divisions are not matched by the views of older people in Mtwara (south-eastern Tanzania) which, in general, they were not. However, development has been central to government agendas in each of these eras, having emerged during the latter stages of the British colonial era. The manifold ways in which development has been referred to in Tanzania supports an investigation of perceptions of the term, since it has been employed to refer to various, often quite distinct interventions and policies over time.

*Why Materiality?*

Material differences exist in the world and they are central to globalized development discourse, however, the extent to which development interventions and theory seek to challenge or undermine these inequalities remains unclear. While inequalities are an important concern, it can also be argued that major shifts in development theory and policy, especially since the ‘impasse’ (discussed in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), have moved the focus away from material realities. Materiality was a central theme of this thesis from the outset and during the research process it became abundantly clear that individual material advancement (alongside material improvements to infrastructure) is pivotal to many perceptions of development. Objects clearly matter in the sense that they are desired in and of themselves (some have clear symbolic capital) and the materiality of certain things informs readings of development. Perceptions of place-based material inequalities are also significant to readings of place, another important feature in perceptions of development.
**Why Place?**

Development is often related to progress (particularly in conventional readings of the term) and a sustained focus on space and place is worthwhile given that ‘change’ is always located somewhere. In recent times, the ‘development community’ has begun to recognize that the likely success of interventions and the potential for positive changes relies on some degree of embeddedness in place, with culture a central concern. Despite this acknowledgement, ‘places’ must be simultaneously understood as local, regional, national, and perhaps even global, and perceptions of development are likely to differ according to scale. The idea that development partially creates realities it only claims to describe is manifest in the way large sections of the world (and the places therein) are labelled as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’. At more local levels, rival interpretations of place can affect the sorts of interventions that take place, with power central to determining whose voices hold weight. ‘Outside assistance’ has long been central to ideas of development and this further emphasizes a focus on place, perceptions of which are further informed by understandings of the past.

**Why History/’the past’?**

The relevance of past interventions is too rarely considered in the theory and practice of mainstream development, which is largely ahistorical in nature. The emphasis on change, progress, and the future reflects this and sustained considerations of the past are rare. This is in spite of the fact that the experience of attempts to bring about change associated with ‘development’ (in a given place) inevitably affect perceptions of present and future interventions (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Moreover, experiences are likely to affect understandings of the term development (or equivalent linguistic terms used
around the world). As demonstrated in the “Why Tanzania” section above, development (or the close Kiswahili equivalent maendeleo) has been important to various overlapping discourses. Thus it was assumed at the outset of this project that understandings of ‘the past’ (kipindi cha nyuma) are likely to be central to the readings of development offered by older people and this turned out to be the case.

Why Older People?

Older people are often sidelined when it comes to ‘development’, both as an intellectual field and as a material process (Apter, 1987), possibly an outcome of the aforementioned focus on the future. In other words, they are ostracised from ‘development’ interventions and their views are not often central to academic theorizations. This is in spite of the fact that older people are uniquely placed to discuss development having experienced or witnessed different forms of intervention over time. Post-colonial theories emphasize ‘subaltern’ readings of history and the parallel focus on ‘lost voices’ is equally significant herein. The voices of older people are often ‘lost’ and considering their perceptions of development based on their experiences and views of the past, as well as emphasizing place and materiality is part of an attempt to foreground an alternative history and to focus on voices that might otherwise be lost from development debates.

1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE

In spite of multifarious problems with ‘development’, this thesis is guided by the principle that the term maintains a high degree of significance. The opinions and experiences of the supposed beneficiaries of numerous ‘development’ interventions
ought to be placed more centrally in discussions pertaining to the meaning of
development. Moreover, the ‘lost voices’ of older people are of particular significance
and in order to help frame and digest the perspectives from two villages in the south-
east of Tanzania, emphasis must be placed on the history of that region, the specificities
of Tanzanian history and existing perceptions of the concept of ‘development’. With this
in mind, the first four chapters of this thesis largely reflect pre-existing conceptions of
development and offer histories of the ‘development’ and of Tanzania, which further
justify and explain the three key dimensions of the research.

This first chapter has offered key reasons for the focus on development and the
three dimensions around which the perceptions of older people are framed. The second
chapter builds on this and reviews much of the pre-existing literature on development. It
gives a sense of how the term has mutated over time before analyzing literature on
materiality, place and ‘the past’ and its significance to perceptions of development,
leading into the broad theoretical framework. An introduction to Tanzania is sketched in
the third chapter, beginning with a potted history of the territory and one which
emphasizes the focus on ‘development’ which traversed the period before and since
independence. Following this, a brief overview of current development indicators and
some relevant geographical statistics are offered, before an extended conclusion which
reveals some of the perceptions of development uncovered in other research projects,
particularly in Tanzania. The fourth chapter conveys the key research methods employed
and explains my research methodology, although it begins with an explanation of the
decision to conduct research in two villages in the south-eastern region of Tanzania,
detailing the benefits of comparative analysis.
The four chapters which follow focus on the principal research findings and are again divided by the three key themes of materiality, place and ‘the past’, although there are clear overlaps between each of these dimensions. The fifth chapter focuses on materiality and demonstrates that certain objects are seen as central to development. The concept is understood both on an individual and on an overall level (although the former predominates), yet is largely seen to be absent, especially in the lives of older people. This theme of absence continues in the sixth chapter, which sets out some of the key differences between the perceptions from the two villages at hand, and interviewees consider place, and development, at various scales. In the seventh chapter the projection of development is again witnessed, albeit in a temporal sense, rather than the spatialized ‘othering’ of development from the sixth chapter. The chapter considers perceptions of ‘the past’, demonstrating that imposed historical distinctions (like independence) do not inevitably reflect lived experience and the symbolic material changes that happened in an unspecific past and are often associated with development. The eighth chapter sets out to re-imagine development and locates the main findings of this thesis within the broader academic field. It demonstrates that individual material concerns is often absent from mainstream development debates and while the term is contingent, development is largely understood through absence and projected in various ways and particularly spatially, temporally and read in terms of material inequalities. The ninth and final chapter offers some general conclusions, highlighting some of the main contributions and some ways in which it might be built on in future research.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

This thesis investigates the concept of development based on the premise that the supposed beneficiaries of interventions over the past sixty years or so are rarely asked their views on the meanings of development. This is in spite of the fact that they are uniquely placed to discuss development. ‘Development’ has been continually invoked in order to justify various projects and interventions since the late colonial era in Africa and the term is employed by a range of actors: governments, Non-Government, Civil Society and Religious Organisations (NGOs, CSOs and ROs), individuals and International institutions. Intense debate surrounds the meaning of development, a term and an idea which dates back as far as the Enlightenment (Bernstein, 2006; Cowen and Shenton, 1996), yet research rarely analyzes the perspectives of ‘developees’, as Sundet (1994) describes the Tanzanian population (as opposed to the ‘developer’ state in the early postcolonial era).

This chapter addresses some conventional understandings of development within key theoretical paradigms in order to contextualize the research findings. The thesis, as a whole, is framed and structured by three key focus areas, and this chapter highlights the significance of materiality, place and ‘the past’ in an attempt to answer the overarching research question “How is development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?” The decision to focus on these three areas is alluded to in the previous chapter; however it is important to build on this and to consider the significance of the three dimensions specifically researched and their significance to contemporary readings of development (see Figure 1 above). First,
materiality is a significant concern given that development is often related to progress and material advancement, whether as an individual or collective/cooperative endeavour, or both. While it might be assumed that the political history of Tanzania leads to the predominance of the latter conception, this is not necessarily the case in reality, while competing and overlapping readings of development co-exist around a personal/societal divide, with material welfare central to the former.

Second, place and space are important considerations given that development interventions are often applied in similar ways, a set of policies and practices that are seemingly transplanted from one place onto another regardless of context and place-based specificities. At all spatial scales (village, region, country and continent) place is likely to be significant to readings of development and especially from the perspective of supposed beneficiaries, significant here given that this thesis focuses on the necessity to uncover voices that are often lost from development debates. This also serves to justify the decision to focus on Tanzania and two villages in the South-Eastern region (see chapter four). Moreover, considerations of place (along with time) are often absent from mainstream development debates.

The third and final dimension of this research is the specific focus on the role of history, or more accurately what Tonkin (1992) refers to as ‘representations of pastness’ and the potential significance of history in many interpretations of development. While temporality maintains some importance within mainstream development debates, the focus tends to be more on the future than on the past, which therefore highlights the relevance of asking older people their opinions, especially in south-eastern Tanzania, a region that is often sidelined from intervention and research. These three facets are
discussed in this chapter, but are preceded by a synopsis of some of the main historical and contemporary invocations of the idea of development.

This chapter is divided into six main sections that roughly correspond with the structure of the thesis and the first three are framed by Apter’s (1987) view that ‘development’ is both an academic field and a material process. The first section briefly historicizes the idea of development and addresses some key trends since World War Two, while the second focuses on the shifting terrain of development, especially since the ‘impasse’. The third conceptualizes ‘materiality’ before considering its significance to ‘development’. Material inequalities between places and the significance of place and space in readings of development are highlighted in the fourth section, and in the fifth section the importance of temporality and the potential role of history/the past in interpreting development is discussed, partially drawing from post-colonial theory. The sixth section argues that many of the mainstream conceptions and theorization of development are not particularly relevant and continues to construct a theoretical framework which draws heavily from development geography and anthropology and again emphasizes the three key dimensions.

The first section on the study and interpretation of development traces the origins of the term in ‘Western’ discourse, covering theories of ‘modernization’ and dependency (their theoretical counterweight), which represent two crucial perspectives on ‘development’ in the late-colonial/early postcolonial era. However, both are deterministic, expressing a ‘spatial over-aggregation’ (Corbridge, 1994), and failing to reflect the African political realities of the time.
The ensuing ‘impasse’ in development theory, which shifted focus onto more localised scales and empiricism (Booth, 1985) is considered in the second section, alongside concomitant movements in social theory away from metanarratives. Neoliberalism took centre stage after the ‘impasse’, although participation and civil society discourse are considered in more detail since they represent perspectives that ostensibly seek to highlight the views of recipients of development interventions.

The third section draws on work from many different academic spheres (from ‘Western’ consumer research to anthropology) in order to interpret materiality before considering the continuing significance of materiality in conceptions of development. This section continues to discuss material aspirations across the world, especially in terms of the desire for ‘things’, coupled with the fact that the differences between places are often understood through material inequalities.

Place is discussed in the fourth section, which considers both the materiality of place and conflicts over space. The importance of place and space in perceptions of development are detailed, especially in light of Crush’s (1995) view that ‘development studies’ is an inherently geographical discipline. This precedes a discussion of the way in which certain places, and by extension the people within those places, have been seen to require ‘development’ (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). This also feeds into a discussion the ways in which the world is divided into areas that are either seen as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’.

In discussing history, the fifth section helps to establish why there is differential development between places and so-called ‘underdevelopment’. The reading and writing of history is detailed in order to demonstrate that the views of ‘subalterns’ are rarely
considered but might be useful, especially when it comes to conceptualizing
development. While the benefit of subaltern histories, voice and place are highlighted in
post-colonial theories, these tend to overlook material concerns.

The sixth section concludes the chapter and constructs a broad theoretical
framework within which the overall research question is investigated. With this in mind,
it is also important to focus on other areas, not least development geography,
anthropology and history. These key disciplines reflect the relevance of the three key
dimensions which frame the thesis and which underpin the overall research question.

2.1 STUDYING AND THEORIZING DEVELOPMENT

‘Development’ is both an academic field and a material processes (Apter, 1987) or, more
accurately, a set of processes and policies which are seen to hold the potential for
improving the lives of people in certain parts of the world (Crewe and Harrison, 1998;
Jones, 2000). Precisely since it is such an all-encompassing discourse and drawn on by so
many actors with different goals and politics, development must be seen as a significant
idea, yet it is difficult to offer an exact explanation of what it means. ‘Development’ is
often used as shorthand to refer to various interventions that seek to improve people’s
lives through; service provision (health, education and water supply), individual
opportunities for material benefit and economic improvement, political freedoms and
rights, guaranteed food and water supplies and tackling absolute poverty, in rural and
urban areas. This briefly covers only a handful of the manifold ways in which
development is understood, but it helps to frame some readings of development that are
relevant to this thesis.
There is often a presumption within the field that ‘development’ is inevitably desired by the intended recipients of many different forms of intervention (Simon, 2007), however the views of recipients and supposed beneficiaries are too rarely considered. This is the case both in terms of the desirability of certain interventions (by local, national, state and international actors) that have often taken place, and continue to take place with minimal consultation, and without considering the broader meaning of development. Thus “the credo of development aid remains that ‘we are doing this to help you’ (because you cannot help yourselves)” (Bernstein, 2007: 18). Development Studies, then, is marked by a geographical/ideological boundary and refers to the ‘Third’ or ‘developing’ world as the principal area of analysis and ‘development’ is thus an inherently geographical discipline (Crush, 1995; Power, 2003). Indeed, almost anything that takes place within this imagined territory might be related to ‘development’ in some way (Mkandawire, 2010).

Development Studies investigates the livelihoods and opportunities available to “poorer people in poorer countries” (Närman and Simon, 1999) and is characterized by relatively porous boundaries. The field is therefore almost infinite in scope, including “everything from international economic relations and the politics of global governance to, say micro-credit schemes for urban women or new cash crops – in short everything that can affect the livelihoods and prospects of poorer people in poorer countries” (Bernstein, 2007: 13). While the scope and breadth of the discipline might suggest that the opportunities to actually improve livelihoods are interminable, the extent to which practical successes have flowed from the field remains questionable. This relatively singular “focus on other, poorer territories and societies” also separates the discipline
from other academic fields, and the boundlessness of Development Studies means that “some development authors are now increasingly convinced of the need for a more frank disclosure of personal experience and positionality” (Närman and Simon, 1999: 8). This reflects the importance of this research, which follows this apparent trend by investigating perceptions of development amongst older people in a relatively remote region of south-eastern Tanzania. ‘Development Studies’, on the other hand, emanated from the work of “intellectual pioneers” who analyzed the “conditions, mechanisms, nature and effects of development as the transformation of individual countries/societies” with change often seen as a result of “the development of capitalism and, for Marx, above all industrial capitalism” (Bernstein, 2005: 113, emphasis in original). Thus, the historical emergence of the idea of ‘development’ is briefly analyzed below.

2.1.1 The Historical Emergence of ‘Development’

‘Doctrines of development’ during the eighteenth and nineteenth century outlined explicit attempts to compensate for the negative propensities of capitalism, acting as a safeguard against the chaotic nature of ‘progress’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Thus, ‘development’ was discussed by European intellectuals dating back to Smith, Marx, Weber (Harrison, 1988), Comte, Malthus and John Stuart Mill (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Each of the social theorists and philosophers had cause to question the nature of ‘progress’ in light of the problems that ‘industrialization’ wrought, yet all drew heavily on the Enlightenment which saw “the West was the model, the prototype and the gauge of social progress. It was Western progress, civilization, rationality thought and development that were proclaimed” (Slater, 1993: 421). Indeed, as Marx himself maintained, the “country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less
developed the image of its own future” (Marx, 1976: 91 in Bernstein, 2005: 124). The idea and practice of ‘development’ therefore existed prior to the formalisation of the academic discipline of Development Studies, challenging assumptions that development is a purely a post-second world war idea and discourse as argued both by Escobar (1995a and 1995b) and Hart (2001) (Bebbington, 2005 on Hart; Corbridge, 2007 on Escobar). Nevertheless, the central focus on the future when discussing ‘development’ has a clear historical legacy.

During the nineteenth century, development was seen as a means of ameliorating the negative effects of ‘progress’ and capitalist expansion, while concurrent anthropological theories of development argued that different societies were following separate paths. It was argued that ‘natural’ and ‘organic’ forms of development happen in some places, while this had to be instigated from outside in others (Ferguson, 1997). This reflects the views of nineteenth century imperial advocates who saw the diffusion of European knowledge and capital as the most “efficient way to develop material forces of unused or underutilized areas of the world” (Hodge, 2007: 7). This clearly resonates with colonial and post-colonial readings of development alike, many of which argued for intervention and ‘imminent’ or ‘intentional’ development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996) after the conclusion of World War Two. ‘Developmentalism’ in the post-war period has been characterised as follows; an unquestioned belief in ‘progress’, which was to be instigated within separate nation-states, usually within an essentialized and undifferentiated ‘Third World’ (Schuurman, 2000). While the meaning of ‘development’ was contested, especially in light of socialist readings and the fermentation of the Cold
War (Hoogvelt, 2001), modernization theories\(^1\) emerged as a paradigmatic approach to (capitalist) development.

### 2.1.2 Theorizing Modernization

The post-war era was marked by numerous theories based on the logic that modernization was necessary, achievable and desirable throughout the world. Generally speaking, these theories argued for the domestic transformations of pre-capitalist agrarian structures, industrialization and the introduction of ‘modern’ state systems. Truman’s famous address of 1949 saw technological and economic aid as the first step on the path to modernization (Harrison, 1988), later formalized by Rostow (1960) in his highly influential thesis. These transplantations from the ‘West’ were also to be accompanied by “wider and consistent social, cultural and political changes” (Hoogvelt, 2001: 35, emphasis in original). Modernization theories offered a teleological view of historical development, premised on the broad Durkheimian division between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ (Taylor, 2001/2002), with the former expected to mimic the ‘path of the West’ (Power, 2003). Indeed, within this theoretical configuration “the societies of the West were characterized as being modern, advanced, the centres of scientific and technical progress, as efficient, democratic, rational and free” (Slater, 1993: 422). Modernization theories offered all-encompassing planned social change as the ‘solution’ to the perceived problems in ‘Third World states’ (Preston, 1982) against the backdrop of a superpower rivalry (Bernstein, 2006). Many formerly colonized states were concurrently earning independence at the time and Africa was therefore seen as a key battleground during the Cold War (Blake, 2005). Modernization approaches represented

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\(^1\)This is pluralized since no singular theory of modernization emerged (Harrison, 1988).
the zenith of capitalist approaches to ‘development’, a point that is exemplified by the suffix of Rostow’s (1960) highly influential text: *The Stages of Economic Growth – A Non Communist Manifesto*.

**Modernization and Development in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa**

For most modern-day African states, the late colonial era refers to the period from the 1940s until independence. This time that was marked by larger capital investments by some European powers than had been made than previously for Cooper (1997), who further argues that colonial bureaucrats focussed on “modernization” prior to eponymous academic theorizations\(^2\). Major interventions were often described with the term ‘development’ prior to the independence of many African countries between 1957 and 1965. Promises of ‘modernisation’ and improved social services were the pivotal means by which colonial states attempted to justify the continuation of colonialism (Cooper, 1997), however, the idea of ‘development’ was regularly seized upon by anti-colonial nationalist movements, which argued that it would represent an almost natural outcome of self-determination and the term was used in an attempt to garner popular support for independence (Abrahamsen, 2003). Both ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ were therefore at the forefront of many postcolonial government agendas across Africa (Schneider, 2006), while the ‘Western’ education of many postcolonial African leaders, Cabral, Senghor, Nkrumah (Adi, 2002) and Nyerere, for example, might have heightened the relatively Eurocentric focus on ‘modernization’ during the 1960s. Thus, there was a relative shortage of independent African thinking, which therefore often failed to challenge modernization as a neo-colonial project which precluded “history, culture,

\(^2\)At the time, some effectively saw this as a ‘second colonial occupation’ (Hodge, 2007).
geography, and other contextual factors” and the significant role that these features played in problems that were either peculiar, generic, or both (Olukoshi and Nyamanjoh, 2007: 98).

The question of whether or not ‘modernization’ was particularly distinct “from the ideology of the ‘civilizing mission’ on the basis of which colonialism was justified” was rarely considered at the time (Olukoshi and Nyamanjoh, 2007: 99), although this does not mean that the development discourse of African states immediately following independence was therefore determined solely by Eurocentric and capitalist influences. While development policies and discourse in Tanzania might not have been particularly distinct prior to 1967 (Jennings, 2003) it can be argued that the Arusha Declaration clearly set forth alternative, non-capitalist path to development with the state attempting to apply customary relations between household and family members for the transformation of national society (Hyden, 1980). While this seemingly socialist path to development might seem alternative (land was nationalized and private ownership largely removed), Samuel Mushi argued that the principle of ‘modernization’ remained central and that *Ujamaa* represented a “modernization by traditionalization” (in Hyden, 1980: 98). *Ujamaa* was eventually seen as a massive failure (at least economically) and modernization theories similarly failed to deliver promised material benefits, which lead to disillusionment (Power, 2003). The practical application of modernization theories was also greatly contested throughout the ‘Third World’, with one of the foremost critical responses emanating from Latin American *dependistas*, who argued that ‘modernization’ served to increase technical, cultural and financial forms of dependency (Slater, 1993).
2.1.3 Theorizing Dependency

Dependency Theories emerged in the post-war era, and partly re-applied classical Marxist theories of imperialism to explain continued imperial domination following the formal conclusion of empire (Hoogvelt, 2001). Unequal relations were seen as a remnant of the economic exploitation of slavery, colonialism and imperialism (Slater, 1993) and Dependency Theories were based on a premise of unequal development in the capitalist world economy, distinguishing between the ‘core’ (i.e. states in Europe and North America) and the ‘periphery’ (i.e. states in Latin America, South Asia and Africa). It was often argued that dependency refers to “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy” (Dos Santos, 1970: 231), which highlights the idea of a prior domination, in “the market and the global division of labour” (Leys, 1996: 148). Former colonies in the ‘periphery’ were deemed unable to transcend poverty and ‘technical backwardness’ through trade or by adopting advanced capitalist modes of production (as was proposed in modernization theories). Dependency Theories gained credibility following the failure of Import-Substitution Industrialization to reduce the dependency of numerous Latin American countries on the ‘core’ economies during the 1950s and 1960s (Harrison, 1988; Hoogvelt, 2001). Marxist academics also utilized the idea of dependency to highlight the weighted nature of aid and planning in modernization approaches (e.g. Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).

The ‘South Theorizes Back’, But With ‘Northern’ Concepts?

Latin American examples were usually employed to demonstrate so-called core-periphery relations of domination and subordination (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Dos
Santos, 1970; Frank, 1967), although ‘underdevelopment’ was universalised to explain structural inequalities in the ‘world system’ (Hoogvelt, 2001). The specificities of African capitalism were framed similarly by Amin (1976) (see also Rodney, 1972) and while manifold problems exist when it comes to universalizing context-specific examples, Slater (1993) maintains that dependency theories present an example of ‘the South theorizing back’. The idea of ‘dependency’ is also seen to have played an important role as a moral critique in Africa (Ngũgĩ, 1985; 1986), illustrating that economic and political control is built on a mental and cultural subversion (Fanon, 1967; Rodney 1972; see also Slater, 1993). Indeed, Nyerere (1967: 186) argued that of all the crimes he associated with colonialism, nothing was more damaging than “the attempt to make us believe we had no indigenous culture of our own, or that what we did have was worthless – something of which we should be ashamed, instead of a source of pride”. Dependency theories had real ideological significance, especially given the frequency of radical Marxist and socialist agendas at the time, yet they played less of an important practical role, or in terms of state policy (Larrain, 1989).

Individual dependency theories were, to some extent, constituted as a panacea for development (Slater, 1993) yet they tended to be both radical and highly pessimistic (Sylvester, 1999), arguing that ‘delinking’ from the world economy was the only option available to dependent countries (Leys, 1996). This was particularly unlikely given that international aid and foreign technology were deemed vital to the various processes of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ that were central concerns of many postcolonial African states. One of the great strengths of dependency theories lay in their overt criticism of modernization theories, yet this led some to suggest that perspectives which
relied on ‘dependency’ largely mirrored Rostow’s (1960) hypothesis, even if they drew contradictory conclusions (Olukoshi and Nyamanjoh, 2007). These seemingly opposite approaches also shared evolutionist assumptions about the necessity for technological advancement (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Apter (1987: 26) further argues that a desire for ‘modernism’ remained among dependency theorists who were “desperate” for development. Modernization theories were often criticised for being too deterministic, yet it has also been argued that the idea of ‘dependency’ became so widespread that it was oversimplified and lacked analytical clarity (Rist, 1997). Kapoor (2002) further argues that this tendency is also witnessed in dependency approaches which compress the ‘periphery’, thus ignoring the wide range of social and cultural variations therein. People in the ‘periphery’ are therefore either ‘without history’ (mirroring Wolf, 1982), or have a history determined solely by relations with (Kearney, 1995), or by the encounter with (Slater, 1993), ‘the West’.

There was a general assumption in Dependency Theories that the power of the ‘core’ over the ‘periphery’ was overarching and totalizing (Kapoor, 2002) but this was to be challenged by post-structural conceptions of power, inspired by Foucault, which undermined such determinism, while post-colonial challenges to ‘subjectless’ portrayals of world history also challenged dependency theories (Schuurman, 1993). ‘World Systems Theory’ eventually superseded ‘dependency’ perspectives as the predominant Marxist reading of global inequalities, sharing many of the same central tenets but analyzing the relationship between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in more detail and introducing the idea of ‘unequal exchange’ and the third category of a ‘semi-periphery’
Dependency theories were largely popularized as a critique of modernization and were eventually (and perhaps inevitably) seen as similarly dogmatic and deterministic, leading to an ‘impasse’ in development theory.

2.2 THE ‘DEVELOPMENT IMPASSE’ AND BEYOND

“In a sense, the impasse of development theory in the 1980s represented a stalemate between modernisation and dependency approaches” (Munck and O’Hearn, 1999: xiv).

Booth (1985) asserts that modernization and dependency theories were constrained by excessive generalization, teleology and dogmatism, while empirical research was seen to have been freed from these limitations. The sense of ‘impasse’ in development theory was further heightened by the failed application of previous development theories, when measured against their stated objectives (Blaikie, 2000a). Moreover, the core-periphery model of dependency theories (a reassertion of the traditional-modern dichotomy of modernization theories), meant that ‘development’ theorizing was marked by ‘spatial over aggregation’ and tended towards determinism, oppositionalism and epistemological confrontation (Corbridge, 1994: 93). The sense of impasse was enhanced by corresponding academic trends; the postmodern rejections of metanarratives (Hoogvelt, 2001); feminist challenges to the masculine nature and gender-biased outcomes of development policies and post-colonial critiques that sought to decentre ‘the West’ and expose the connection between development and colonialism (Schuurman, 1993). It is

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3This paradigm was also dogmatic and notwithstanding the emergence of a ‘third’ category, *World Systems* approaches also failed to challenge highly structural readings of the global political economy.
also important, however, to recognize that such debates are relatively esoteric and had less relevance\(^4\) in terms of the real workings of African states, the \textit{realpolitik} of the time.

Following decolonization, ‘development’ remained an important concern (at least discursively) of many African states and authoritarianism was often justified on the basis that ‘development’ was a national(ist) project, not least by Nkrumah in Ghana (Young, 2004) and Nyerere in Tanzania (Cooper, 2008). Resistance to development was therefore deemed anti-nationalist and Joseph Ki-Zerbo (a leading historian of Africa) astutely remarks that “development had become so all encompassing that the feeling was palpable across the continent that the entrances to state houses were emblazoned with the notice: ‘Silence! Development in Progress!’” (Olukoshi and Nyamanjoh, 2007: 94-5).

Many states continued to follow state-led paths to development, at least until the economic and political crises of the late 1970s (Olukoshi and Nyamanjoh, 2007). These crises, coupled with the perceived limitations of ‘grand narratives’ and the eventual preclusion of a socialist alternative (Dirlik, 2002), largely undermined developmentalism. Simultaneously, neoliberal ideology shifted from a pariah economic worldview and rapidly became seen as a mainstream set of political-economic principles during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Harvey, 2005). This ideology has also been central to reshaping the development field during and since the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s.

\section*{2.2.1 Beyond the ‘Impasse’: Neoliberalizing Development}

Neoliberal ideology essentially reworks many of the long-standing ideas associated with classical economics and liberal philosophy (Peck, 2004). Individuals are self-interested,

\footnote{While this ‘impasse in development theory’ is widely acknowledged, these crises in European or ‘Western’ readings of development may not have had an impact on the workings of African states at the time with conceptions of development in the non-aligned movement more durable (see Mkandawire, 2010).}
markets are more effective at determining the flows of goods and capital than states (Chang and Grabel, 2004: 15), while “the economic role of the nation-state” is downplayed with privatization and deregulation seen “as the essential prerequisites for progress and development” (Slater, 1998: 663). ‘The free hand of the market’ (echoing Adam Smith) must be guided by a state primarily required to guarantee security (Harvey, 2005) with the dramatic remodelling of the state central to neoliberal ideology and one of the ‘core’ and ‘necessary’ foundations of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Peck, 2004). SAPs were, and remain, an important policy tool of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) which have, arguably, inserted African states into neo-colonial relationships wherein the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) effectively “map out their futures” (Ahluwalia, 2001: 54). Thus greater external control of the economies of ‘sovereign’ states (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002) is guaranteed, fostering a form of postcolonial dependency (Katz, 2004).

The ‘neoliberal counter-revolution’ has depoliticized development (Toye, 1987) as reflected in the preference for technical know-how rather than context-specific geographical and cultural knowledge in many contemporary development projects (Kothari, 2007). Nevertheless, it must be stressed that power is not absolute and overarching and that “places and identities are never completely reshaped by capitalism and development, there are numerous points of resistance and contestation which lead to their re-making” (Power, 2003: 150). With this in mind, participatory approaches and civil society approaches are two of the most ‘alternative’, popular perspectives that emerged out of the ‘impasse in development theory’. These approaches aim to focus on

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5 Elsewhere Crush determines the ability to map out futures as The Power of Development (1995).
the nature of ‘local’ interventions and have relevance to this research project given that, outwardly at least, they both emphasize the views of supposed beneficiaries.

2.2.2 Beyond the Impasse: Participation and Civil Society in Development

Participatory approaches emerged as a challenge to positivist forms of enquiry in the social sciences (Reason and Rowan, 1981) and ‘participation’ is one of the foremost ideas to enter the jargon-ridden field of development recently. Hickey and Mohan (2004) situate ‘participation’ as a critique of top-down modernization and while development projects and processes are keenly contested, advocates argue that participatory approaches are less extractive than non-participative strategies (Chambers 1997). Moreover, participation is seen to encourage ‘local’ people to contribute voluntarily, both through dialogue with project staff and through direct involvement in preparing, implementing and monitoring projects that are seen to be supportive of self-determined change (Mikkelsen, 2005: 53-4). While far from an exhaustive list, this is a useful general definition of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which seeks to involve those “people affected by intervention, in order to gain a common understanding of a situation and agree on relevant actions” (Mikkelsen, 2005: 348). Chambers (1997) adds that PRA aims to utilise and enhance ‘local’ people’s capabilities, to create sustainable ‘local’ action and institutions. This, in theory, leads to empowerment and ‘community-led’ development and allows for the articulation of ‘new’ (and previously hidden) worldviews (after Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Participatory approaches reflect the shift in emphasis away from national developmentalism within broader development debates and theory and

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6PRA is only one of many participatory techniques employed in development (as argued by Hickey and Mohan, 2004) but there is only sufficient space here to detail one approach.
towards localised attempts to enact positive social change with so-called Civil Society/Social Capital approaches further reflecting this change (Ferguson, 2006).

Modernization and dependency theories were clearly state-centred approaches to development, while neoliberalism focuses on ‘the market’. This dualism has recently been challenged by those who espouse the importance of ‘civil society’ in development “as an alternative, third path to progress” (Power, 2003: 117). Gramsci saw ‘civil society’ as a potential battleground outside of the state (Hearn, 2001), wherein organizations and groups crucial for democratic society and economic efficiency are located (Baylies and Power, 2001). It is unnecessary to engage in complex definitional debates (see Keane, 1998; Van Rooy, 1998), but it must be said that ‘Civil Society’ is often an important factor in current visions of development, with ‘social capital’ often located centrally (Hyden, 1997), seen as the ‘glue’ that holds civil society together (Putnam, 1993). ‘Social capital’ is significant to contemporary development discourse, with civil associations and social relations often seen as ‘win-win ties’ which correlate positively “with higher incomes and favourable development” (Radcliffe, 2004: 519). ‘Social capital’ is understood in a variety of ways, yet its meaning can be enclosed to the extent that it presents an economistic approach to social theory (Fine, 1999). While interpreting social issues through an economic model is problematic, the concept has allowed for social issues to penetrate mainstream development debates, not least at the World Bank (Bebbington et al, 2004).

2.2.3 Beyond the Impasse: Towards Alternatives?

The co-optation of ‘alternative’ approaches by the neoliberal mainstream damages credible claims that they offer something substantially different (Pieterse, 1998) and
participatory approaches are now fully integrated in mainstream development thinking, despite their ‘radical’ origins (Kothari, 2005a). Indeed, the participatory elements of a given research project are often curtailed in favour of methods preferred by funding bodies (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), while ‘civil society’ and ‘social capital’ have also been adopted by mainstream institutions and absorbed within orthodox understandings of development (Fine, 1999; Hearn, 2001). Some argue that colonial subjection and domination has limited the development of ‘civil societies’ in postcolonial Africa, disputing the relevance of what is a European concept in defining the sphere of societal organisation outside of both the state and commerce (Young, 1994). While social capital is differentiated from financial, physical and human capital, Fine (1999: 5-6) suggests that economic resources and forms of capital are required and social capital therefore “seems to be able to be anything ranging over public goods, networks, culture, etc. The only proviso is that social capital should be attached to the economy in a functionally positive way”. Thus, the prevalence of economic and quantitative analysis in international development suits the mainstream neoliberal agenda.

Participatory and civil society approaches oppose the central tenets of post-war ‘developmentalism’ and eschew the emphasis placed on the state and national level in favour of more localized approached. While intentional development has “been about the local in the mundane ways that projects, clinics, schools have to be physically located somewhere” the shift in emphasis means that localized development strategies are often divorced from the larger project of ‘national development’ (Idahosa and Shenton, 2006: 70). This valorization of scale has effectively been reversed since the ‘development impasse’ with the national level (or “the state”) now “corrupt, patrimonial, stagnant, out
of date, and holding back change” as opposed to the local level (or “civil society”) which is more often seen as “dynamic, emerging, a bustling assemblage of progressive civic organizations that could bring about democracy and development if only the state would get out of the way” (Ferguson, 2006: 96). ‘The local’ is therefore often understood through simplistic readings of a harmonious ‘community’ (Mohan and Stokke, 2000) which overlooks power dynamics (Vincent, 2004). Indeed, the singular emphasis on the ‘local’ within participatory approaches also means that “broader, more structural patterns of injustice” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 9) remain unchallenged. These pre-existing structural inequalities also affect who is prepared to contribute locally and what they are prepared to say (Mosse, 1993). Those who learn the language of development projects (often the powerful) are therefore able to enhance their level of participation, further exacerbating inequalities (Mosse 2001).

Cooke and Kothari (2001) describe participatory approaches as a ‘new tyranny’ and while this is clearly provocative, it is less controversial to argue that participatory (and ‘civil society’) approaches can serve to obscure more than they reveal, especially in terms of pre-existent community dynamics. ‘Civil societies’ are often consulted apropos targets for poverty reduction and the means of achieving these, yet the extent to which these actors are genuinely involved is questionable (Power, 2003). This is also reflected in the tokenism of participation in broader neoliberal strategies (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) as in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), for example. Based on the evidence offered, participatory and ‘civil society/social capital’ approaches are seen to have reshaped development discourse without transcending it. Before it is possible to ‘put the last first’, for example, it is necessary to make “prior judgements about a given place or society
concerning inequalities and injustices which often derive from discourses of feminism, environmentalism, social democracy or Marxism itself” (Corbridge, 1994: 110). This, in a sense, redraws the distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’ that participatory approaches ostensibly attempt to tackle. Despite the apparent ‘impasse in development theory’, many attempts to instigate ‘progress’ or ‘development’, and much of the research conducted in the name of development, mirrors broader anti-state sentiment and many approaches have been effectively co-opted by the neoliberal mainstream.

The two previous sections outline some of the foremost understandings of development since the idea emerged in nineteenth century philosophical discourse and more recent theories that emphasize the ways in which it might happen. The ‘grand narratives’ of modernization and dependency were important theoretical paradigms before and after independence was won across much of Africa and while those ideas and theories that have emerged since the ‘development impasse’ and focus on localised interventions are equally significant, it seems that an inability to move beyond certain parameters remains. ‘Post-development’ might seem genuinely different (as an esoteric set of critiques without much practical application) and seeks ‘alternatives to development’ rather than ‘alternative development’ (Escobar, 1995b) although many of the scholars identified with this field share unexpected common ground with the anti-state, pro-local rhetoric of neoliberal discourse and fail to unpick the concepts of ‘locality’ or ‘traditionalism’ fully (Idahosa and Shenton, 2006; Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Overall, this section highlights some of the manifold conceptions of development, which is itself an extremely heterogeneous notion. The approaches covered herein fail to account for the perceptions of development that exist amongst those on the receiving
end of various interventions over time, which is the central focus of this thesis based on the dimensions of materiality, place and the past, the first of which is considered greater detail below.

2.3 STUDYING MATERIALITY

A good starting point for the study of materiality is the *Journal of Material Culture*, launched as an interdisciplinary forum in 1996. The journal broadly defines the study of material culture as “the investigation of the relationship between people and things irrespective of time and space. The perspective may be global or local, concerned with the past or the present, or the mediation between the two” (Introductory Editorial, 1996: 5). Given the simultaneous emphasis on space and time in this thesis it seems that this offers a useful starting point for discussing materiality which “stresses our limited control over the forces that create us. In the case of Marx this led to an empathy with those who were most oppressed by history and least able to see themselves in the world created around them” (Introductory Editorial, 1996: 10). Addressing materiality in this context therefore demonstrates the continued significance of some Marxist arguments, given that the contemporary world is beset by resilient and deeply embedded material inequalities at global, regional, national and local scales. These also have clear relevance in discussions pertaining to ‘development’. Studies of materialism (as opposed to materiality *per se*) and ‘material culture’, however, often tend to draw from ‘Western’ perspectives and ignore large parts of the world.

In studies from Europe and North America consumption is often associated with “individualistic and self-indulgent” behaviour, set in opposition to “altruism and social
welfare” (Ger and Belk, 1999: 184). This has particular relevance here given that the ‘development field’ is littered with charity organizations, NGOs and state actors that all display a high degree of self-determined ‘altruism’, usually focussing on social welfare. Moreover, it is far too simplistic to assume that the enjoyment of conspicuous consumption (or what might otherwise seem to represent ‘non-essential expenditure’) is the preserve of the ‘developed’ or ‘Western’ world and with this in mind, it is useful to highlight that studies of materiality are increasingly common outside of ‘the West’ and particularly in India (for example Appadurai, 2003; 2006 and Norris, 2004). Appadurai argues that “the materiality of objects in India is not yet completely penetrated by the logic of the market... objects are not yet seen primarily as material repositories of monetary or exchange value” (Appadurai, 2006: 18). He further suggests that “there is a certain chaotic materiality in the world of things that resists the global tendency to make all things instruments of representation, and thus of abstraction and commodification” (Appadurai, 2006: 21). India must not be seen as a homogeneous container of cultural attributes (as Appadurai recognizes), yet the argument that ‘things’ can be understood in ways that are not be solely determined by the market, or by commodity or exchange value, might have relevance in other contexts. Moreover, the ways in which objects are perceived might connect or differentiate places, with manufactured products at times “identified with use – or perceived symbolically” (Campbell, 1996: 6). It is important to recognize that symbolic material changes may be seen as significant, regardless of the extent to which they have practical utility or clearly improve people’s lives.
2.3.1 Materialist Readings of Development

Materiality is often obscured from view in contemporary development, both in theory and practice. Evidence of this obfuscation exists across the world, with some of the more compelling arguments made in the field of anthropology with specific reference to Nepal (see Pigg, 1992; 1996), Zambia (Ferguson, 2006) and Tanzania (Green, 2000). These examples provide clear evidence that materiality remains central to perceptions of development, while symbols of modernity can also play an important role in notions of development at local levels (Ferguson, 2006). Thus, ‘development’ and ‘the modern’ (or modernization) are often closely associated\(^7\) and while ‘modernity’ cannot be used to simply and exclusively describe ‘the West’, (Appadurai, 1996; Bhabha, 1994; Hannerz, 1990), Ferguson adds that attempts to equalize all forms of modernity around the world might overlook:

“local discourses on modernity [which] more often insist on seeing a continuous lack – a lack that is understood not in terms of cultural inferiority but of a political-economic inequality. For this reason, the question of modernity is widely apprehended in Africa in relation to the concept of “development” and the issue of social and economic standards of living” (Ferguson, 2006: 33).

At the same time people across Africa, in rural and urban areas alike, do possess “institutions of modernity – schools, churches, mosques, NGOs, political parties” (Maddox and Giblin, 2005: 2) and health centres/hospitals. However, the quantity and the quality of such ‘institutions’ (especially schools, NGOs and health centres) is often seen to emphasize the real material differences that exist between places.

\(^7\)Apter (1987) uses ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ interchangeably, as does Hyden (1980) with specific reference to Tanzania.
At the local level, a clear shift in the discourse of NGOs and development projects has been witnessed and with specific reference to Tanzania, Mercer (2002: 102) argues that these often favour “vague notions of community empowerment” over individual material welfare. Moore et al. further question the extent to which poor people (in South Asia) would trade-off food in times of hunger for empowerment (in Camfield, 2006: 7). Indeed, there exist real and durable “inequalities that leave most Africans today excluded and abjected from the economic and institutional conditions they themselves regard as modern”, with modernity effectively understood as socioeconomic advantage (Ferguson, 2006: 167). There might, as Paolini (1997: 103) argues, be an “ambivalence at the heart of Africa’s relationship to modernity” which is mediated by processes of creolization and indigenization, but this does not undermine modernist and material aspirations, which often frame discussions of development and related inequalities. This is in spite of Dube’s (1988: 114) view that “modernization has been able to make inequity legitimate, stating that ‘around small islands of dazzling affluence there is a cheerless ocean of poverty and degradation’” (in Närman and Simon, 1999: 2). The recent ‘localization’ of development has superseded the internationalized project of the late-colonial/early postcolonial era with a change in emphasis within the development field away from approaches which stress globalized (and localized) inequalities towards those which highlight absolute poverty.

2.3.2 Material Aspirations and Development

Development is often related to personal and collective material aspirations (Appadurai, 2004; Ferguson, 2006; Green, 2000; Pigg, 1992) and material objects can positively affect “terminal goals such as life satisfaction, happiness, and social progress” (Claxton and
Murray 1994: 422). This is perhaps most relevant in formerly socialist societies like Tanzania (along with Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, for example) given the history of collectivization. Private property ownership in Tanzania was effectively forbidden following the Arusha Declaration in 1967 (Hyden, 1980), and there is a widespread view that policies and processes relating to Ujamaa largely failed to bring about improved material welfare (see 3.1.3). While a clear retreat from socialism in Tanzania took place during the 1980s, marked by the cuts to public expenditure as part of the first Structural Adjustment Programme, reductions in the material support of the state (Kamat, 2008) further explains the significance of materiality. Shortages of basic commodities have been associated with socialist systems across the world (not least in Tanzania; Askew, 2006), which is seen to have unleashed a wave of material aspirations after the formal dissolution of socialist state structures. For example, the 1989 revolution in Romania has been described as an historical marker before which “people could be happy with few material goods because there were no alternatives and everyone had few things. But now as some become better off materially, others who fail to do so feel worse about their condition. Materialism is always relative” (Ger and Belk 1999: 190-1). This relativized reading of materiality also overlaps greatly with development which, as we have seen, is often framed by notions of inequality, which is clearly a relativistic phenomenon.

Relativized readings of material welfare are highlighted by Simon and Närman (1999: 271) who argue that poorer people’s aspirations are often partially framed “by the conspicuous consumption of their wealthier compatriots” while a keen sense of frustration surrounds the “prolonged inability to meet their aspirations, particularly
when recession or structural adjustment policies and their associated hardships bite deep”. The sorts of aspirations that people hold, and this is true of material desires, are formed in certain ways and this process is described by Appadurai (2003; 2004) as the ‘capacity to aspire’. This, he argues, is similar to any complex cultural capacity in that it “thrives and survives on practice, repetition, exploration, conjecture, and refutation. Where the opportunities for such conjecture and refutation in regard to the future are limited (and this may well be one way to define poverty), it follows that the capacity itself remains relatively less developed” (Appadurai 2004: 69). If aspirations are greatly informed by the opportunity for “conjecture and refutation”, it is seen as more likely that these will be more functional and materialist when there are seen to be few available opportunities. This is not the same as suggesting that a less complex “capacity to aspire” is a sign of some degree of cognitive deficiency (a point emphasized by Appadurai, 2004) but that the complexity of aspirations is heightened by “practice, repetition, exploration, conjecture, and refutation”. Thus Appadurai (2004: 68) suggests that “the poor” tend to aspire to “specific goods and outcomes, often material and proximate, like doctors for their children, markets for their grain, husbands for their daughters, and tin roofs for their homes”. Readings of development are mutually constituted in conjunction with other factors and the “work of the imagination” is central to “the capacity to aspire”. It is therefore crucial to recognize that development is “profoundly material (and more than just about telling stories) we are recognising that the term is more than just a ‘plastic’ word” (Power, 2003: 8), yet individual material welfare is absent from many readings of development today (excepting Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme, 2010) and often ignored in development interventions and projects.
The introduction of ‘development’ projects in localized areas of large parts of the world have often been seen as a means by which recipients are able to access material resources that are otherwise unavailable (Pigg, 1992). This perception is especially pertinent when it comes to the establishment of NGOs which explains why interventions of this nature are rarely rejected outright (Green, 2003; Simon, 2007). Procuring employment for an NGO or as part of a project is often preferred to the potential outcomes of any given project, since jobs are seen to offer greater long-term personal benefits (Green, 2000; Marsland, 2007; Pigg, 1992). Of course, development interventions do not take place in a vacuum and their success is likely to be informed by previous interventions (Crewe and Harrison, 1998) with ‘local communities’ “adroit in adapting and adopting new technologies, concepts and ideas to their own circumstances” (Simon, 2007: 209). While many ‘development projects’ might not utilise the meaning of development in the sense that it is understood by the supposed beneficiaries, with subaltern histories useful in interrogating such notions, the emergence of projects within a place often increases material resources and informs perceptions of development in some way (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Places, much like individuals, are not only materially distinct but are unique as a result of the various forms of interconnections (or the lack of these) that exist with other places (Power, 2003; Massey, 1994). Place and space often play significant roles in conceptions of development and not least in terms of the clear material differences that exist within and between places at varying scales and therefore constitute the second key dimension of this thesis.
2.4 PLACE IN DEVELOPMENT

“It is clearly a good time to take a fresh look at the geographies of development, to go back to the drawing-board in order to interrogate further the geographical imagination of the local, national and global development mosaic” (Power, 2003: 17).

Materiality is an important to discussions of place, since material aspects are often cited as the key determinants of a given place while material inequalities often frame comparisons of different places. This is closely related to the idea of uneven development across the world, which not only refers to income and unemployment levels (although these are important) but also to the “interconnected differences produced by the inequality of social relations over space” (Massey and Jess, 1995a: 224). Material differences exist between and within places and at all scales but uneven global development informs the perceptions of two distinct global blocks; the ‘developed’/‘First’ and ‘developing’/‘Third’ World. While this territorialization is here seen as deeply problematic and overly deterministic (and is consistently undermined in studies of mobility) these concepts are resilient and still inform a great amount of development research and practice, which tends to take place in given regions of the world (Jones, 2000). In spite of the fact that changes (whether social, political, cultural or economic – or any combination of these) happen in all places, development research tends to refer to “a particular subset of development processes and structures in particular parts of the world” and does not interrogate the term in any broad sense (Humble and Smith, 2007: 14). The term development is often employed, therefore, to denote certain parts of the (Third) world, and can create realities and distinctions that it only aims to describe.
One of the most significant ways in which place is imagined is through material realities and places must be seen as “active agents of identity rather than pale reflections of pre-existing ideas and socio-political relations. Having real material and ideological effects on persons and social relations, things and places can then be regarded as much subjects as objects of identity” (Tilley, 2006: 17-18). Places are, therefore, defined by material resources/physical things and by the specific interconnections that exist with other places (Massey, 1993; 1995; 1995 with Jess; 2006). A discussion of materiality in relation to place follows in conjunction with the inherent contestation over the meaning and future of places. The idea of development is clearly informed by place, and vice versa, with Africa and Tanzania deemed to be part of a broader sphere of ‘development’ and often understood (in an unproblematic manner) as places that require changes, which are to be induced through external interventions of one form or another.

2.4.1 Contesting the Meaning and Future of Places

One of the central tenets of Crush’s (1995) highly acclaimed volume is that The Power of Development refers to the authority to define and determine the futures of people and the places that they inhabit in certain parts of the (Third) world. This partially reflects modernization theories and the belief that underdeveloped places required material and capital investments in order to dramatically alter them, which remain central to many readings of development. Indeed, Pigg (1992: 499) describes development as mediating relationships “between local communities and other places” seen to enter “local areas from elsewhere; [since] it is not produced locally”. However, the ways in which such change is to be introduced is often greatly contested, as witnessed in social and protest
movements forming opposition to mines and dams, for example, across the world. Different individuals and groups often understand place differently and rival interpretations of place and of the past are often “mobilized in battles over the material futures of places” (Massey and Jess, 1995b: 2). The basis for change is, therefore, often based on some vague notion of development which is greatly contested at all scales, although the perceptions of the powerful are most likely to predominate.

Individual positioning within localised and broader social structures is an important determinant in readings of place, often understood on a variety of registers, some of which inevitably conflict. What this means is that places are experienced differently by people and at times and that “the same person may even, at a given moment, hold conflicting feelings about a place. When, in addition, one considers the variable effects of historical and cultural particularity, the permutations on how people interact with place and landscape are almost unending” (Tilley 2006: 7). This exemplifies the fact that contestation over place is determined by many factors, and not least by ‘historical and cultural particularity’. Place is conceived as more than material things and is partially “constructed out of the meeting and mixing of social relations” (Massey and Jess, 1995a: 222). Thus differences between places are also important, they “matter to capital which exploits the different characteristics of place – in other words, uneven development; and they matter to people because of our senses of belonging and identification” (Massey and Jess 1995b: 4). In whatever way development is conceived it is often a central concern of people around the world and an important idea in determining desired changes that are enacted within places.

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There is not sufficient space to investigate this point, suffice to say that while global, national, regional and local perceptions of development may overlap, the way in which these are enacted is often greatly contested.
All places are, to some extent, constructed through interconnections although these are not necessarily even and equal (Ferguson, 2006; Katz, 2004; Massey, 1993), which is reflected in the maintenance and expansion of inequalities between places. It is far too simplistic, for example, to separate ‘the village’ from development and a contradiction exists in the discourse where the ostensible aim of development “is to make villages developed” but villages are located “on the periphery of development” (Pigg, 1992: 511). Interactions between ‘global’ and ‘local’ scales are important and the two should not be placed in opposition since this can lead to a view of the ‘local’ as related to traditionalism, opposed to modernism and ‘development’\textsuperscript{9}. Villages must not be viewed as closed containers of cultural attributes wherein “ideas become metonymic prisons for particular places” (Appadurai, 1988: 40) since manifold interconnections exist between places at various scales, even though these are often profoundly unequal. This is an important point in relation to the place(s) of development and central to the following section.

2.4.2 The Places, Spaces and Territories of Development

“There is, then, a geography of power which structures the inequalities of uneven development. And individual places – whether trading blocs, or nation-states, or regions or small villages – are each positioned in different relations to that geography” (Massey, 1995: 70-1).

Uneven development plays out at numerous scales with the village more recently seen to be something approaching the ‘natural’ scale for discussing development (recalling Pigg, 1992) and the apposite scale for ethnographic research (for Caldeira, 2000). Indeed,\textsuperscript{9}This has partially reversed since the ‘development impasse’ with ‘the local’ level valorized (section 2.2.3).
development is something that is often seen to be introduced into villages from the outside (see Green, 2000; Pigg, 1996). However, development is not simply imposed on people and its meaning is contested at local levels and can denote the way in which people and groups see themselves and their places in relation to other people and places (Kothari, 2006). The ‘Third World’ is understood largely in oppositional terms to the ‘First’, whereby the latter represents the fullness of what can be achieved through, and by, development and this distinction is both spatial (with the sites of development ‘out there’) and it is temporal (‘back then’). The distinctions drawn between these two imagined territories are therefore geographical and historical (Kothari, 2007), as well as economic.

Development discourse represents large sections of the global population in certain ways, homogenizing difference into a dualistic model and building on the very idea of ‘the West’ as separable from ‘the rest’ (Hall, 1992). This representation of “the people and places of development” is crucial since people construct places but are also “constructed by places and thus there is a reciprocity and relationality between peoples and places... In a whole variety of important ways the media play a role in building a spatial imagination of the globe and globalisation, enframing the way Third World others are viewed in Western societies” (Power, 2003: 6) (and vice versa). This builds on Slater’s (1993) view that development theory is ‘occidentally enframed’ (as in modernization and dependency theories) adding that people are constitutive of place, and vice versa. The territories of development are represented in certain ways, yet the ‘reciprocity and relationality’ (Holloway and Hubbard, 2001, cited in Power, 2003: 6) between peoples and places presents a challenge to the global dualisms of development discourse that are
also destabilized by the work of Massey (1993; 1995). Notwithstanding such academic challenges, differential levels of ‘development’ still underpin global distinction between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ Worlds. “Africa” is often seen as the apogee of what it means to be ‘underdeveloped’, the most obvious part of the ‘Third World’, from within and from outside (Ferguson, 2006).

From a historical perspective, Africa has often been apprehended as Europe’s “radical other” a space onto which opposite characteristics are projected in order to enhance the constructed view of Europe as civilized, enlightened, progressive, developed and modern. Indeed, as “Mbembe (2001: 2) puts it, Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Ferguson, 2006: 2). It is interesting, based on this legacy, to determine whether or not this is also the case in the perspectives of people from within Africa. While it is deterministic to refer to continental blocks in such a way, the central focus on development herein might effectively see such views inverted. Development is also inflected within parts of the world identified as poorer or less developed, reminiscent of Žižek’s (2008) argument that it is important to be careful when such views are expressed for the answer to Orientalism is not an equally crude Occidentalism. Widespread, entrenched material inequalities inform development debates and the views of stakeholders, yet the academic obsession with globalization fails to accurately place Africa within such debates (Ferguson, 2006; Paolini, 1997). The manifold interconnections that exist across space are often profoundly unequal, however, this is not the same as arguing that Africa (a continent of roughly one billion people) is therefore entirely cut-off from the rest of the world.
Given that regions and the places therein are constantly changing, history should be an important consideration when it comes to defining development. Indeed, “hegemonic conceptualizations of time understand it as the ineffable dimension of change, as internal to things and as intangible” and in what Massey refers to as “a kind of philosophical ‘response’, space has frequently come to be defined as time’s opposite... It is thus that we have space as the material world, as the given, as the great out there” (Massey, 2006: 46). It can therefore be argued that time is opposed to space in some ways, but taking the two together allows for a fuller investigation of the problem that is under consideration here, especially given that space is intimately related to the material world. Materiality is often central to perceptions of development and while these are likely to differ over time, understandings of the past are also highly relevant to readings of development since ‘change’ has a clear temporal dimension. Space and time overlap and place is both spatial and temporal “connected to history, the past, and hold[ing] out the promise of a desired future. As such they are in flux rather than static nodes or points in a landscape, and their qualities and character can only be understood relationally, with reference to other places” (Tilley, 2006: 21-2). Thus, it is necessary to discuss history and perceptions of the past more directly and while the historical lineage of the notion of development was covered previously, the ways in which history is constructed is a crucially important consideration.

2.5 HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

This section discusses the writing of history in relation to ‘development’ rather than a history of the concept (how the chapter begun). Major challenges to forms of historical interpretation have emanated from Post-colonial theory, with personal histories deemed
both important and relevant since it is acknowledged that there is a great amount to gain from talking to ‘subalterns’ (Reef, 2008; Spivak, 1988). For example, solely focussing on the views of elites or focussing on more liberal and nationalist readings of History might not be that relevant to the lives of the majority of Tanzanians (Lawi, 2005). History, or ‘the past’ is afforded a high degree of importance here since ‘development’ is largely a ‘presentist’ discourse, emphasizing the contemporary period and the future and only offering stylized, abstracted versions of the past. This section begins with a discussion of temporality in readings of development, before discussing the reading and writing of history, and particularly considers some of the some of the benefits and disadvantages of integrating Post-colonial theories and focussing on ‘subaltern histories’.

2.5.1 Temporal Readings of Development

Development is understood herein as a largely ‘presentist’ discourse, and has elsewhere been described as a largely unreflective and future oriented discipline, distanced from imperial histories and focussing mostly on quantifiable targets and goals (Kothari, 2007: 34-5). This reflects the prescriptive power of contemporary development which relies on normative assumptions of ‘progress’ informed by modernisation theories (Slater, 1993), and often precludes histories other than those of ‘the West’ (Power, 2003). Thus more “dominant groups have always had the tendency to define their own subjectivity as dynamic, flexible, plural and complex, whereas the subjectivity of their others remains traditional, unproblematic, unsophisticated and transparent” (Slater, 1998: 669). There is nothing new in merely pointing out multifarious problems with development discourse, although considering this temporal dimension more fully allows for a consideration of the role that readings of the past might play in perceptions of development, especially
among so-called ‘subalterns’. Moreover, oral history is also described as a counter-weight (see Geiger, 1996; Thompson, 2000) to opposite and equally problematic universalizing trends when historicizing development.

The widespread focus on the future within development also enhances the view that interventions take place in a vacuum and yet it is abundantly clear that previous interventions inevitably affect the outcomes of future interventions (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Moreover, the temporality of development is also reflected by the ways in which the past is mapped onto the present in development discourse (Crush, 1995), with other parts of the (Third) world placed at a prior stage on something of a linear path to development (Kothari, 2007), which has clear overtones of Rostow’s (1960) idea that modernization can be mapped by *Stages of Growth*. Space and time are simultaneously understood as opposite and parallel and a ‘Third World’ that is both ‘over there’ and ‘back then’ (Kothari, 2007) is constructed in development discourse, strongly influenced by certain ideas about people in certain parts of the world (Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Eriksson-Baaz, 2005; Kothari, 2006). However, temporal readings of development are also offered by the people who are defined as ‘developing’ with places seen at different stages of the same process (Pigg, 1992). This also reflects a reading of development that emerged in nineteenth century anthropological theory (Ferguson, 1997) and temporality is often central to discussions of development. It is necessary to move beyond considerations of past events and the history of the concept and to highlight some of the main ways in which history is written and understood, with a particular focus of the concept of ‘life history’.
2.5.2 Reading and Writing History

“Biographies are usually written about people deemed significant actors on the stage of specific histories... Conversely, scholars have also focussed biographical treatment – or more often a subset of it, the life history – on so-called ordinary people. Rather than being exceptional, however, the ordinary person’s biography or life history must be typical or representative... expected to stand for, or represent, a category of people: peasants, slaves, workers, sharecroppers” (Geiger, 1996: 466).

The problem with many historical investigations that draw on a life history method is the tendency to do one of the following, either; to focus on the role of elites and seemingly ‘important’ historical figures, or to generalize the views of non-elites as the view of all “peasants, slaves, workers, sharecroppers”. While discussions of methodology follow in the fourth chapter, it is important to emphasise the role of history and the past in the main ways development is perceived, especially by older people. Indeed, there is a clear necessity to ‘ground’ explorations of development, to root them “in the ‘everyday’ practices, movements and behaviours of individual people based in particular places” (Power, 2003: 5). Alternative constructions of history are important, especially given the focus on individual perspectives and the role history and past experiences play in contemporary interpretations of development. An important distinction has been raised between “memory-as-process” and as an inscription, initially by Husserl but taken on by Morton who argues that “memory is immediate and redolent of temporality rather than history... where history is not a chain of causal antecedents, but a combination of ‘retensions’ of the past and ‘protensions’ of the future in the present, a process that enables people to mediate temporal relationships” (Morton, 2007: 159). One of the most interesting things about memory and the personal experiences on which perceptions are
often based is that history is not necessarily understood in a linear manner, meaning that it is possible to compare events from different eras and to effectively flatten out time.

Contestation over history and the significance of certain events differs depending on the positioning of an individual within broader power structures (Stewart, 1988) and this research looks to fill a gap in the literature by focussing on older people in southern Tanzania and their perceptions of development. These are likely to be affected or at least informed by their readings of history or, more accurately, their ‘representations of pastness’ (Tonkin, 1992). Some might describe this as a ‘subaltern’ reading of history, although there is no attempt to generalize about a specific sub-group herein (as Geiger warned against). One of the key principles of Post-colonial theories is the focus on the voices of what Spivak (1988) famously referred to as the ‘subaltern’, coupled with a “commitment to restore the voices of people who have been excluded and thus silenced” (Reef, 2008: 422). Thus, a brief overview of some of the ways in which history is understood within Post-colonial theories is useful alongside a sustained engagement with materiality which is often overlooked from such perspectives.

2.5.3 History Through a Post-colonial Lens

Post-colonialism is a heterogeneous field and refers both to the continuation of colonial relations since the formal conclusion of empire and the ongoing process by which the colonial period is constructed and compressed. Indeed, colonialism was hegemonic without being homogeneous (Kapoor, 2003) and as such a singular ‘post-colonial condition’ frames ‘others’ in certain ways (Mercer et al., 2003) and compresses certain peoples and histories. This leads Mishra and Hodge (1994) to argue that it is more
appropriate to refer to ‘post-colonialisms’ in the plural. Within the post-colonial field, a challenge is often issued to the continued dominance and “agenda-setting power of Western Enlightenment traditions and the capacity to make abject... the histories and priorities of those on the receiving end of decolonisation, rationality and development” (Sylvester, 1999: 704). Indeed, one of the key strands of post-colonialism is the clear attempt to Provincialise Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000), by marginalizing Eurocentric knowledge claims and making them ‘ordinary’ rather than hegemonic. This discursive challenge is often based on the alternative, non-Eurocentric readings of history that stem from ‘subaltern’ perspectives.

Allowing ‘subalterns’ to speak is itself a highly contested notion given that individuals are conscripted into a (post-colonial) discourse (Spivak, 1988) once they have spoken. Moreover presenting the testimonies “of those who have been misunderstood or marginalized” might lead to greater emphasis on the perceptions of ‘subalterns’ however this must not silence the voice of the author (Reef, 2008: 432). In spite of these caveats, the idea that the voices of older people are often ‘lost’ within development debates is central to this thesis, with the idea that ‘subaltern’ histories also important and useful since they allow for a consideration of the past from the perspective of individuals that might otherwise be seen as passive actors in ‘top-down’ readings of history. Moreover, the obsessive focus on the future within the field of development means that the past is all too rarely considered. The focus on domination, resistance and difference within the post-colonial field are helpful given the focus of this thesis although the outward celebration of difference must not oversimplify the multiple identities held by people from around the world (Power, 2003).
In spite of the fact that the potential for a positive engagement between post-colonialism and development studies was mooted more than a decade ago, it seems that the two remain critical of one another, albeit at arm’s length (recalling Sylvester, 1999). Simon (2006: 14) suggests that “a gut-level antidevelopmental rejectionism remains the basic – if unfortunate – reason for the persistent and substantial lack of engagement between development (studies) and postcolonialism” while the central concern of the latter is the “ordinary or ‘subaltern’ people scripted out of conventional histories and development narratives”. This thesis emphasizes the importance of accounting for the views of those whose are all too often denied a voice when it comes to development.

Post-colonial theories, to some extent, foreground the debate concerning “what should be the first question(s) of development studies: what is development? Who says this is what it is? Who is it for? Who aims to direct it, and for whom?” (Corbridge, 1994: 95). Indeed, post-colonialism also questions “universalising strokes that have, until very recently – and unfortunately – characterised development studies” (Sylvester, 1999:714). The challenge to standardized conceptions of history marks a major inconsistency with the linear notion of progress on which notions of ‘development’ are often predicated and while the idea of ‘giving voice’ or allowing ‘the subaltern’ to speak is contested, such ideas can form part of a novel approach to discussing development. However, it must be acknowledged that the post-colonial theorists are often reticent on material realities.

One of the main aims of this thesis is to connect the materialist concerns of Development Studies with the subaltern histories associated with Post-colonial theories. Subjectivity and identity politics often take precedence over matters of material well-being in post-colonial studies and the way in which “the colonial and postcolonial era
affects the way people label and think of themselves, and fight among each other, is, to put it meanly, seemingly more important in postcolonial studies than questions of whether people eat” (Sylvester, 1999: 715). Post-colonialism offers a counterweight to mainstream history and subaltern histories present a challenge to hegemonic, Eurocentric theories and practices and their reliance on ‘modernization’. Notwithstanding this important contribution, post-colonial theories often overlook more material geographies (Blunt and McEwan, 2002), failing to account for the place-based disparities which remain significant. Developmental narratives “have long dominated thinking about Africa’s place-in-the-world” and while Ferguson (2006: 33) acknowledges that these narratives are often seen as problematic and overly deterministic, they “explicitly rank countries from high to low, from more to less “developed” – [and] do at least acknowledge (and promise to remedy) the grievances of political-economic inequality and low global status in relation to other places”. The following theoretical framework is interdisciplinary and draws important ideas from post-colonial theories and development studies in order to investigate perceptions of development. However, the fields of history, anthropology, and development geography are perhaps more important, as this chapter attests.

2.6 CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This chapter has demonstrated the relative merits of three distinct dimensions in order to frame the overall research question “How is Development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?” The role of materiality, place, and readings of ‘the past’ are discussed with reference to development and are drawn on to frame an investigation of the perceptions of older people in South-Eastern
Tanzania. The previous section emphasizes the importance of a productive engagement between development studies and post-colonialism, especially concerning ‘subaltern histories’ and materiality, although the literature covered in this chapter is taken from many fields and disciplines. It is therefore vital to highlight the key theories covered in the sections of this chapter that highlight the three dimensions, although it is useful to consider the extent to which the theories and policies covered previously to offer a brief history of development (in 2.1 and 2.2), help to address the overarching research question.

2.6.1 The Relevance of Past and Present Approaches to Development

Castree (2004) sees economy and culture as powerful ideas which partially create realities that they only claims to describe and ‘development’ is understood in a similar manner herein. This is not to deny that development refers to real things “but it is to insist that reference is conventional and also to recall that ideas have a force in their own right, rather than being mirrors of supposed ontological givens” (Castree, 2004: 206). This can be aligned with the view of Corbridge, who argues that the discipline of Development Studies does not just describe worlds but helps to produce them and this field of study “is not exterior to the world it describes, but is constitutive of that world” (Corbridge, 2007: 200-201). This is not to deny that profound material inequalities exist within and between continents, countries, regions, cities, towns and villages, but to reflect that perceptions of development differ depending upon where the viewer stands in relation to the ideas and processes relating to ‘development’, where they are located in what Stewart (1988) calls ‘the landscape of the present’. Perceptions of the past, and of place, have been carefully considered with respect to readings of development, which
often highlight materiality, yet the history of development offered above (see 2.1 and 2.2) also reflects a penchant for ignoring both the discursive power, and the material basis of development, as well as and the multifarious nature of the concept.

The idea of ‘development’ predates modernization and dependency theories, but these two metanarratives are significant and built on previous theories, seeking to address inequalities and development in radically different ways (perhaps best described as inclusive versus exclusive global perspectives). Both circumscribe the ‘Third World’/‘periphery’, flattening out differences within and between the individuals and countries that are seen to constitute these amorphous groupings. These metanarratives were rightly discarded owing to their dogmatism and since they bore little resemblance to the lived realities of the time in which they were popularized. While they are largely seen as anachronistic, they remain a significant part of the history of the concept and further highlight that development “is not just about attitudes but about materialities”, a point which is often overlooked today (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 253). Given that this thesis ostensibly seeks to investigate perceptions of development among older people, it is important to bear in mind that modernist desires were fomented when the idea of development entered the mainstream political lexicon across Anglophone Africa during the late-colonial era and in the early postcolonial era. It is likely that development is still keenly desired by many across Africa (Ferguson, 2006), which also enlightens current debates which eschew the idea of a link between modernism (or modernist desires) and development. Theories and approaches to development that have emerged since the ‘development impasse’ often focus on small-scale, localized forms of poverty, ignoring (global) material imbalances previously highlighted by the ‘grand narratives’.
The oft-cited impasse in development theory allowed for the fermentation of alternative, small-scale approaches to development, in policy, theory and in research, although this took place alongside the concomitant rise of neoliberalism which reworks some of the central tenets of modernization theories (Smith, 1997) with the market replacing the state as the institution seen to guarantee the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources. This anti-state sentiment is shared by participatory and civil society/social capital approaches, which tend to valorize ‘the local’ and prefer interventions at the level of ‘the community’ often through working alongside ‘local’ organizations. Broader structures of power are therefore overlooked at times, although aiming to involve of people in self-determined change is seen as positive, when compared with the idea that development is inevitably imposed from outside\(^\text{10}\). The extent to which participatory and civil society approaches are genuinely inclusive has, however, often been questioned. Green (2003: 124-5) highlights some of the recent anthropological writing on development (she cites Ferguson, Crewe and Harrison, Crush and Kearney) which views the lack of success as an outcome of the failure to properly employ or integrate ‘local’ knowledge. This is reflected by a lack of participation in project design which also means that the problems addressed by a given interventions are often irrelevant to local realities. This thesis specifically highlights three key areas from which the research question is addressed and these largely make up the theoretical framework.

The simultaneous focus on materiality place/space and the past highlight the relevance of research from Development Studies, Anthropology, (Development)

\(^{10}\)However, the level of training often required of the perpetrators of ‘participatory’ projects might challenge this argument (Briggs and Sharp, 2004; Kothari, 2005).
Geography and History, which deepens understandings of, and broadens the focus on development, also allowing participants to draw from the past while also focusing on the future.

2.6.2 Theoretical Framework: materiality, place and time

While ‘materialism’ has often been seen as the preserve of research in ‘Western’ contexts, it is argued in this thesis that materiality, material wealth and inequalities have relevance when it comes to personal readings of development from the perspectives of the supposed beneficiaries of past and current interventions. ‘Things’, in south-eastern Tanzania, might not be wholly commodified or understood solely in terms of market value (as Appadurai argues is the case in India; see 2.3.2) and symbolism can serve to outweigh practical use. Indeed, symbols of modernity are often highlighted in localised readings of development (Ferguson, 2006), while numerous anthropologists challenge the idea that ‘modernity’ can only be related to ‘the West’ (not least Appadurai, 1996: Hannerz, 1990). It has been consistently argued that material concerns have recently been overlooked in development theory and practice (Green, 2000; Mercer, 2002; Pigg, 1992). These material desires are likely to be intensified in post-socialist societies, given the restrictions often in place and controls on private ownership. Of course, material welfare is often understood in relative terms, which highlights the importance of inequality and this is most clearly expressed between places. The focus on older people may also expose inequalities within place, which are often age-based (Barrientos, 2002), while there is a common failure to involve older people in development interventions (Beales, 2000; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000).
Place is another important dimension of this research since it represents one of the predominant ways in which pronounced material inequalities are evidenced at all scales, from the very local to the global level. Places are, however, more than material things and are partially generated by a complex history of interconnections with other places (Massey, 1993; 1995; 1995 with Jess; 2006) and in terms of ‘development’ research this is usually based on a geographical understanding rather than interrogating the notion of development in and of itself (Humble and Smith, 2007). ‘Development’ is often used to refer to the idealized futures of a given place and while contestation is common, the views of the powerful often predominate and development interventions are rarely rejected outright since they are seen to bring needed material resources (Green, 2003; Pigg, 1992). They are, however, often manipulated to meet local ends and space for agency remains (Simon, 2007). With this in mind, it is important to highlight that development has often been seen as something that is inevitably brought into villages from outside. This thesis therefore focuses on two proximate villages in south-eastern Tanzania, in order to investigate the extent to which these associations between development and place are borne out in reality. This is especially the case since one of the villages has experienced recent NGO involvement on a larger scale, while the other was dramatically affected by villagization, a government scheme purportedly aimed at bringing ‘development’ during the 1970s.

The third dimension of this research draws on history and views of the past (and past development interventions) to investigate personal readings of development. The past is rarely considered in conjunction with development, which is therefore seen as a ‘presentist’ discourse and the focus on the life histories and experience of (supposed)
beneficiaries of past interventions is seen as a way past this problem and one of the principal contributions of this research. While history is largely absent from mainstream discourse, temporality still plays a significant role in interpreting development with the past often mapped onto the present in a geographically specific manner (Crush, 1995) and the extent to which this is mirrored by the constituents of the so-called ‘developing world’ is worth considering. ‘Subaltern histories’ are seen as a means of involving the past and reflect the necessity to ground development in the everyday (Power, 2003) so that it is not esoteric. Development Studies and post-colonialism are important to this thesis yet the considerable reference to Massey, Power and Simon (geography); Appadurai, Ferguson, Green and Pigg (anthropology) demonstrates the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of this project. In emphasizing place, the past, and materiality in readings of development I draw from each of these fields which have different disciplinary requirements and allow for various forms of analysis. This assists with the construction of a framework in which to investigate the many ways in which development is perceived by older people in south-eastern Tanzania.
CHAPTER THREE

Tanzania: In Focus

Figure 3: Political Map of Tanzania

This thesis investigates the perceptions of development held by older people who are supposed to have benefitted from various interventions over the course of their lives in south-eastern Tanzania. The two preceding chapters illustrate some of the many ways in which development has been understood over time and how it is seen and employed in
various forms of intervention today. It is necessary and worthwhile to consider some of these with specific reference to Tanzania and the most obvious way to do so is by sketching a recent history of the territory that constitutes the mainland area of modern-day Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania emerged out of the unification of post-revolutionary Zanzibar and newly-independent Tanganyika in 1964. In spite of widespread popular dissent (especially in Zanzibar; Askew, 2006) the close relationship that existed between Nyerere (the leader of Tanganyika) and Karume (the leader of the Afro-Shiraz Party in Zanzibar) lent a great deal of support to the union. While independence is self-evidently an important moment in the history of Tanzania (allowing for the emergence of an independent nation-state), it is only part of a longer historical trajectory of political, military, economic and cultural influences on the mainland area of Tanzania, which are considered throughout this chapter and with a particular emphasis on ‘development’.

An overview of Tanzania requires a consideration of history which makes up the substantial element of this chapter but this has to be placed alongside geography and ‘development’, both in terms of existing perception and mainstream indicators. Once again, these are three of the central themes of this thesis and together offer a fuller picture of the country. Data from the south-eastern Mtwara region (see Figure 3 above) are also offered in order to investigate the extent to which the region might be seen as ‘different’, given that this is a point often raised with respect to the south and one of the reasons for conducting research within that part of Tanzania (see 4.1.1). The chapter concludes by considering existing interpretations of development from across Tanzania in order to move beyond mainstream histories, geographies, and statistical analyses. This
chapter is divided into three sections and prefaces the following chapter which analyses in greater detail the selection of case studies and research methods in south-eastern Tanzania.

The first section of the chapter offers an historical overview of modern-day Tanzania, starting with the formalization of colonialism after the Berlin Conference, through the German and British colonial periods until independence. Major political changes took place in each of these eras and, of course, continued prior to and following independence in December 1961, while the pace of change intensified following the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Nyerere ruled for twenty-five years (1961-1985) and a similar timeframe thereafter is here described as the post-socialist period with significant political-economic changes instituted, alongside the recent rise of NGOs within Tanzania which is important to this research project.

The following section highlights Tanzanian geography and considers mainstream development indicators and measures of the national economy and wealth before comparing these with regional data. It goes on to discuss some key geographical facts, including the total population and the location of the country, in order to broaden the picture sketched of Tanzania. Population demographics are also considered, and especially in terms of the gender imbalances in the Mtwara region which were a significant consideration prior to conducting this research since they might have affected potential interviewees.

Following this, an extensive conclusion is offered which demonstrates that statistical and historical overviews do not offer a full picture and therefore emphasizes some of the ways in which development is perceived across Tanzania. This allows for an
examination of the extent to which the findings of this research are mirrored in other research conducted in Tanzania and prefaces the following chapter which discusses the specific location and methods of primary research, as well as the three subsequent chapters which situate the research findings around the three key dimensions referred to throughout.

3.1 A HISTORY OF TANZANIA

This thesis seeks to challenge mainstream historical narratives of development and does not subscribe to conventional linear versions of history; neither in relation to East Africa, or in relation to the concept, meaning and implementation of ‘development’. However, such narratives are common and it is important to reference these before it is possible to compare them with the views held by older people in two villages in the Mtwara region. Tanzanian or Tanganyikan history did not begin with the ‘scramble for Africa’ (as the conventional historical narrative often does) and the people of East Africa are neither ‘without history’ nor should the history of people anywhere in the world be determined solely by the encounter with the ‘West’ (see Slater, 1993; 1995). Pouwels (2002) further argues that there has been at least two millennia of trade between East Africa and Asia, and a long history of intercontinental migrations is reflected in major debates surrounding the spread of Bantu people and languages (Ehret, 2001). However, development narratives and histories tend to begin after 1945 (with the notable exception of Cowen and Shenton, 1996) and focus more on imminent, post-war practices of Development (with a big ‘D’) (Hart, 2001) rather than imagining development as an immanent, long-term process, relating to the geographically uneven development of capitalism.
In spite of the problems with circumscribing Tanzanian history, the specific focus on perceptions of development from those who have experienced various interventions means that it is prescient to go into greater detail on the recent past. The brief timeline sketched below thus consider some key historical events in; German East Africa, Tanganyika and latterly Tanzania, but focuses specifically on the post-war period and therefore the sort of historical timeframe usually offered in work ostensibly concerned with ‘development’. This also has relevance given that the idea of development emerged and took shape in Tanganyika following the Second World War. This section offers a potted history of modern-day Tanzania, which tracks some key events that took place before and after the formalization of colonialism and the time since independence in 1961. The ensuing ideological struggles are then considered alongside various ‘development’ interventions that have taken place over the years since independence.

3.1.1 Colonial and Pre-Colonial History

The vast majority of the African continent was effectively ‘carved up’ by the European imperialist powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, commonly referred to as ‘the scramble for Africa’\textsuperscript{11}. The area covered by modern-day Tanzania (excluding the islands of Zanzibar) along with Rwanda and Burundi became German East Africa after the establishment of a German protectorate in 1885. The entire colony was conquered in 1898 and held until the close of WW1 (Harlow and Chilver, 1965), although this is not to suggest that ‘African natives’, to use the parlance of the time, were necessarily passive and subservient. In spite of the apparent loyalty shown to Germany by some Africans in

\textsuperscript{11}While this is the conventional view, it is acknowledged that these boundaries are not as arbitrary as is often assumed since they largely map onto prior European trading routes and territorial claims (Mbembe, 2000).
the First World War (Farwell, 1989), the Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905-7 in the south of the territory counted among the most “catastrophic anti-colonial uprisings in early colonial Africa” (Becker, 2004: 1). The Maji Maji research project of the late-1960s offers a narrative study of this early physical expression of inter-ethnic, anti-colonialism in Africa (Becker, 2004) and Sunseri (2000) adds that promoting the ‘rebellion’ as a sign of ‘African nationalist fervour’ is a subsequent statist narrative that forwarded to highlight the unity of ‘the people’ which therefore overlooks the complicity between some German forces and African leaders. Thus, even in what may seem to be an incontrovertible series of events, utilised for a nationalist purpose in both colonial and post-colonial times, the Maji Maji ‘rebellion’ is also greatly debated amongst historians and represents the key battleground, both figuratively and literally, in the relatively early stages of formalized European colonialism.

Following the conclusion of WW1 (although hostilities continued in East Africa after the war was officially concluded in Europe), the vast majority of what made up German East Africa became a British protectorate. The British mandate of Tanganyika was set out by the League of Nations as part of the ‘agreement’ at Versailles, modern-day Rwanda and Burundi were ‘integrated’ into the Belgian Congo (Harlow and Chilver, 1965) and the village of Kiunga (now Quionga) became part of Portuguese East Africa. British colonial Tanganyika, much like the German predecessor, was never a white settler colony on the same scale as Kenya (for example) although many thousands of British settled there following the 1922 League of Nations mandate. It therefore seems a stretch to refer to administrative control in British colonial Tanganyika as “Indirect Rule” (see Lugard, 1965) in spite of the fact that this was ‘only’ a League of Nations mandate. The main objectives
of the mandate were to reduce hunger and malnutrition on the one hand, and to promote economic well-being among the ‘natives’ on the other (Rizzo, 2006). After the Second World War Tanganyika became a ‘UN Trust Territory’ and remained a British protectorate, with rulers who demonstrated a Fabian vision of colonialism, holding metropolitan views which focussed on the desperate importance of ‘improving the natives’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1991). While this discourse remained, the means by which ‘change’ was to be enacted were transformed across British colonial Africa during the 1940s and especially following the conclusion of the war. Dramatic increases in large-scale capital investment took place alongside the enlarged provision of certain social services.

3.1.2 A Shift in Colonial Policy Following the War?

The period following the Second World War was marked by a shift both in the perception and management of African colonies by British and French governments, who sent “waves of experts” to re-invigorate colonialism by transforming farming and working methods, education and welfare (Cooper, 1997: 64). These changes were enhanced in Britain following the election of an interventionist Labour government in Britain following the War, which forwarded the idea of a greatly expanded welfare state and introduced the infamous Groundnut Scheme (Myddelton, 2007). The Scheme covered large areas in the south of the colony (as well as parts of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia) and was one of the clearest attempts at a major ‘development intervention’ both in Tanganyika and in British Colonial Africa more broadly. Without going into
extended detail\textsuperscript{12}, it is useful to offer a brief overview since it took place in southern Tanzania (and is often referred to in interviews) and demonstrates the more interventionist ideology of Britain in the latter stages of the formal colonial era in Africa.

The Groundnut Scheme was initiated to reduce Britain’s food imports by growing groundnuts over vast “areas of sparse population, unencumbered by native or other rights” (Myddelton, 2007: 68). High levels of capital expenditure were thought to guarantee a massive yield of groundnuts, which would then be converted into food oils to break the global American monopoly and to reduce prices (Rizzo, 2006). Moreover, it was politically expedient for a newly elected post-war Labour government in the UK to introduce such a scheme in order to reduce the price of food oils to the British working classes. Vast tracts of land in the interior of southern Tanzania (around Nachingwea in Lindi region) were demarcated as huge farms for the production of groundnuts and a train track was built to the coast in preparation for the transportation of the abundant crop. It was also deemed necessary to build a port in the south-east of Tanzania and this was constructed at Mtwara (previously a sisal estate according to many interviewees in Mikindani) given the natural occurrence of very deep water. Large numbers of people were employed directly as part of the Groundnut Scheme or as part of ancillary schemes in preparation for the inevitable success of such (Rizzo, 2006).

Rizzo argues that the scheme and its related projects meant that more Europeans came to southern Tanzania than previously which “brought ‘a big boom to trade in the little township of (Old) Mikindani’... All forms of revenue increased, and... Despite a disappointing agricultural season, the local population seemed to be contented with

\textsuperscript{12}For a basic overview of the logistics of the Scheme, the money spent and its outcomes see Myddelton (2007; 64-84) and Rizzo (2006).
‘plenty of money available’, the effect of ‘the unlimited demands for labour of all sorts’” (Rizzo, 2006: 217). Nevertheless, it is important not to over-emphasize the significance of the Scheme on local employment patterns since it generally only offered employment to men and was but a small part of a longer history of labour migration in the region. Indeed, “men circulated throughout the region to work at sisal plantations in Mikindani and what became the town of Mtwara on the coast, on smaller private farms in the interior as hired laborers, or on infrastructure projects catalyzed by the Groundnut Scheme of the late 1940s” (Lal, 2010: 10). The agency of the local population can get lost in historical narratives if there is a myopic focus on ‘top-down’ readings of History and it is useful to emphasize the increasing frustration of colonial authorities when it came to the acute shortage of unskilled labour in 1951 (Rizzo, 2006). While this was officially put down to the inherent laziness of the population, there was a tacit awareness that seasonal labourers were also seasonal farmers and therefore tended land or harvested crops when necessary, rather than working as permanent labourers for colonial authorities that, nonetheless, required a consistent labour supply (see Rizzo, 2006: 233-4).

The fact that more groundnuts were actually imported than were produced supports the narrative that the scheme was a total ‘failure’ although this is not merely owing to an inconsistent labour supply and the scheme partially ‘failed’ as a result of the fact that no soil analysis was conducted (Myddelton, 2007). Moreover, tractors continually broke down leaving much of the land barren while Myddelton (2007: 82) highlights a White Paper published in the latter stages of the scheme which thoughtfully added that “[t]he groundnut is not a plant which lends itself readily to mass methods
over vast acreages”. Determining the Groundnut Scheme as a total failure, however, offers a largely Anglocentric perspective and while it may have failed when compared to its stated objectives, it is interesting to note that many interviews cite the availability work available at the time. This is considered in detail in the seventh chapter, wherein interviewees associate these changes with ‘development’. The idea of ‘development’ was also central to debates over the continuation of colonialism or the alternative of independence, both in Tanganyika and across British colonial Africa.

*Competing Discourses: Colonial or Independent Development?*

The marked shift in British colonial policy in Africa during and following the conclusion of the Second World War heightened the focus on development that was briefly alluded to previously (see 2.1.2) and interventions like the Groundnut Scheme represent clear practical examples of this change in emphasis. At the time, British-American economist Edith Penrose argued that the Scheme represented a new form of colonial venture, or might even be seen as non-colonial in outlook and wrote of the:

“large numbers of people [in America and elsewhere] who apparently believe that all colonial policy is “imperialist” in some vague sense and therefore sinister. The chief difference between modern colonial policy and older imperialism is the emphasis in the former on the importance for its own sake of the social, economic and political development of the native peoples.’ Clearly this appealed to Creech Jones and his [Labour] cabinet colleagues. They wanted the groundnut scheme to show the natives what could be done” (Myddleton, 2007: 69).

This clearly places the Groundnut Scheme at the forefront of what was seen to be a new form of colonial policy, seemingly less extractive and more about including ‘the natives’
and facilitating ‘their development’. This was relatively prominent since the *Colonial Development and Welfare Act* of 1940, although did not diminish colonial paternalism but shifted emphasis onto the potentially transformative role of work (and education and healthcare) which might ‘improve the natives’. The scheme should not be seen as philanthropic since the primary objective was to cut the cost of food imports to Britain (Rizzo, 2006) and to limit rural disquiet, but it does highlight a clear change in emphasis.

The increased funding of social services and especially water, health, housing and education (Schneider, 2006) further reflects this shift in emphasis. Cooper (1997) sees this as a clear attempt to maintain colonial relations wherein ‘development’ is presented as something that could only be brought by the colonial state, and this was clearly reflected in Tanganyika (Monson, 2000; Schneider, 2006). Development became a key ideological battleground between colonial rulers and opposition movements which sought total independence and not least TANU (Tanganyika Africa National Union). Jennings (2003) argues that much of the anti-colonial rhetoric of TANU was based on the premise that the colonial state had failed to bring development to the vast majority and popular support for independence was framed by the twin aims of freedom and development (*uhuru na maendeleo*). Thus the period which straddled independence (from the 1940s to the 1970s) might be taken as a whole, given that development was a “key discourse of the African state” with “the unfulfilled promise of development” seized on by political elites “arguing against colonial rule and for a better future under their own stewardship” (Schneider, 2006: 109). Elites in the late colonial and early postcolonial eras therefore shared more than mere ‘slogans’ and “development structured state elites’ political imagination as deeply paternalistic and hierarchical, with their own
“knowledge” and “modern” agency juxtaposed to the “ignorance” and “backward conservatism” of the masses” (Schneider, 2006: 109). The extent to which these debates filtered down into more remote and rural areas is dubious, yet ‘development’ was one of the key ideas that TANU employed in an attempt to garner widespread (urban) support.

The independence movement aligned national sovereignty with development but also emphasized the existence of positive pre-colonial cultural attributes around which greater support for independence was garnered. Women activists in the 1950s “performed the nationalism that Nyerere needed to make TANU a credible and successful nationalist movement” and while this is often written out of Tanzanian history (Geiger, 1996: 469), the performance of culture added another dimension to calls for independence that became increasingly amplified through the 1950s. Nyerere (1967) also criticized the failure of the colonial state to recognize the relative merits of pre-colonial cultural forms and social structures, which further increased support for independence. Much like the discourse of independence movements, postcolonial Tanzanian political discourse was largely framed by development.

The focus on development is a “direct connection between the postcolonial state and its late colonial predecessor” (Schneider, 2006: 106-7) with development consistently associated with nationalism and modernization (Monson, 2000). TANU fostered popular support for independence during the 1950s by highlighting widespread demands for high quality social services and the “failure of the colonial state to provide for these demands, had formed one of the rallying calls for nationalism” (Jennings, 2003: 13).

Mamdani (1996) argues that many postcolonial African states continue to draw legitimacy from urban society, largely subordinating and ignoring people in rural areas.
Independence generated expectations, especially in terms of development, yet meeting these was difficult owing to the lack of resources that was a common feature of postcolonial African states: “as time went by and the fruits of independence failed to materialize, this ‘development imperative’ turned to an increased sense of urgency” (Abrahamsen, 2003: 190). This is further reflected in the words of Nyerere, who famously claimed that “we must run while other’s walk” (Jennings, 2003: 163).

3.1.3 Postcolonial Political Action and Discourse

Tanganyika was declared independent on December 9th 1961, with Tanzania formed three years later, yet the early stages of independence were largely marked by a continuation of the colonial model of government and of approaches to ‘development’ (Jennings, 2003). The central state initially encouraged ‘self-help’ schemes in rural areas which called for villages to rely on themselves, and community members were to work “together to build schools, roads and village health posts using their own labour and materials” (Marsland, 2007: 69). Cooperation was seen as central to the success of these ‘self-help’ schemes and to ‘development’ in the early post-independence period, a so-called ‘improvement approach’ to deal with the majority of the rural sector. This took place:

“alongside the transformation strategy, undertaking small-scale and limited changes, incrementally improving day-to-day lives until peasants were willing to accept modern (i.e. western) farming methods. The policy was little different from colonial rural development policy from 1956, with its stress on ‘focal point development’. Indeed, perhaps the sole distinction between the focal point and transformation approaches was the financial commitment that the state was prepared to make” (Jennings, 2003: 164).
This sense of continuity was also witnessed in other areas and the education system, for example, largely remained under British control since nationalist forces were unable to gain full control until around 1968 (Lawi, 2005: 296-7). A degree of continuity should be expected given that wide-ranging shifts in policy require a great amount of organization, yet distinct moves away from colonial policy did begin to emerge later in the 1960s.

In the period after independence Nyerere insisted that “the struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic one which necessarily leaves no room for difference’, and he practiced what he preached” (Cooper, 2008: 191). A very particular government agenda was established around the guiding principle of development, which also supported the constitutional inscription of Tanzania as a one-party state in 1965 (Brennan, 2006). This shift is further demonstrated by the Arusha Declaration, which set out a clear shift away from colonial policy as witnessed in the calls for widespread nationalization and the reorganization of society based on (African) socialist principles. While the state was also central to colonial development models (and had some of the same outward goals) Ujamaa (familyhood) discourse stressed the importance of hard work and ‘self-reliance’ at all scales (in theory if not in practice) and the amalgamation of various strands of political ideology led to a relatively singular ‘African’ socialist political discourse and agenda.

**The Arusha Declaration in Theory: Ujamaa and Self Reliance**

“The rhetoric associated with Nyerere’s nation-building strategies of the 1960s and 1970s, embodied in the Arusha Declaration (1967) and ujamaa, made their mark on the national consciousness... He called for the pursuit of modernization, progress and development through the increased production, self-reliance and egalitarianism of and
among the people. Moreover, Nyerere’s ‘fatherly visions of guided participation’ (Sundet, 1994: 43) not only entreated Tanzanians to ‘build the nation’, but constructed a Tanzanian national identity based on the notion of ‘the African extended family writ large’ (Rubin, 1996: 264). In this way, Nyerere’s ideas about development, participation and self-reliance became central to Tanzanian national identity” (Mercer, 2002: 111-2).

The Arusha Declaration prefaced the state capture of some of the foremost sectors of the economy (buildings, banks and farms) as part of a socialist model (Hunter, 2008) and officially on behalf of Tanzanian peasants and workers, the government nationalized the major means of production and exchange (Askew, 2006). Nyerere himself explained this decision as recognition of his view that “in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production” (Nyerere, 1968: 231-232, in Holtom, 2005: 559). With this in mind, it is perhaps not a surprise to find that the Arusha Declaration has often been understood as the point at which Tanzania diverged from the sorts of development models being followed in many other postcolonial African states. This was described as something of a ‘third way’ by Kiondo (1995), while Jennings (2002: 510) refers to Tanzania as “the original ‘third way’” when it comes to planned alternative development models. Nyerere invoked “African traditions” as the basis for this new social and economic organisation, arguing that “[m]odern African socialism can be drawn from its traditional heritage, the recognition of ‘society’ as an extension of the basic family unit” (Nyerere, 1966: 170). Ujamaa outwardly represents an attempt to decrease reliance on external support and increase domestic productivity (Hunter, 2008) and should certainly be seen as a national development strategy.

The Arusha Declaration and the subsequent dissemination of Ujamaa philosophy and ideology saw the Tanzanian state re-align itself, actively encouraging and enforcing a
seemingly African form of socialism. There was a discursive valorization of rural life which reflects colonial representations that tended to celebrate the rural over the urban in ‘African life’ and “Tanzanian nationalism as envisioned in the Arusha Declaration encouraged Tanzanians to pick up a hoe and build the nation” (Hunter, 2008: 478). Nyerere (1968) argued that agriculture should be the basis of development and added that too much emphasis had previously been placed on industrialization, although only a few years later he again argued that development did require industrialization alongside rural agricultural cooperation (Nyerere, 1973). This reflects a country clearly caught between socialism and international capitalism; with ‘villagization’ elsewhere seen as a clear attempt to stifle class conflict in preparation for a national accumulation process (Moore, 2006).

*Maendeleo* or development represents a cornerstone phrase in Tanzania’s postcolonial politics “which, along with ujamaa and kujitegemea, constituted Tanzania’s brand of nationalist developmentalism” (Harrison, 2008: 177). So ‘familyhood’ (*ujamaa*) and ‘self-reliance’ (*kujitegemea*) were central to TANU’s socialist development discourse. This focus on ‘self-reliance’ did not mean that foreign aid was therefore unwelcome but demonstrates the ostensible prioritization of the agricultural sector over capital intensive forms of “industrialization that required huge amounts of foreign capital and technology” (Kaiser, 1996: 229). Roughly a month after the Arusha Declaration the *Public Ownership Act* was published, it “clarified that self-reliance meant that foreign capital was still welcome as a contribution to the national development effort and reflects the government concern over the perceived shortage of capital. Self-reliance thus referred to political control over investment rather than economic self-reliance (as suggested by
the Declaration)” (Sundet, 1994: 46-7). In fact the discourse of ‘self-reliance’ served to attract aid from some donors who were keen to assist a recipient (Nyerere) in a country wherein people wanted to ‘help themselves’ (Holtom, 2005: 552). This support continued even in spite of government actions and a shift from voluntary to compulsory villagization demonstrates, which contradicted Nyerere’s previous arguments that Ujamaa villages could only be populated voluntarily (Schneider, 2006).

The Arusha Declaration in Practice: Villagization

Villagization\textsuperscript{14} refers to a large-scale reorganization of rural life desired by the TANU government (and demanded after 1973). The idea was that all rural people should live in Ujamaa villages, which were based on the idea of communal land, pooled labour, collectivized agriculture and the distribution of small-scale industry and commerce based on socialist principles. Ujamaa villages were therefore seen to “allow for the division of labour and specialization, the provision of social security and a better use of government assistance and training, and they would facilitate the communication between the peasants and the administration” (Von Freyhold, 1979: Xii). The process was introduced in order to instil three key benefits; enhancing communal agricultural production to bring about rural self-reliance (Schneider, 2004), allowing for previously remote rural populations to receive government services and training (Schneider, 2007), and creating and entrenching nationhood and patriotism in the relatively new nation of Tanzania (Kaiser, 1996). This final latter point is further illustrated in the eventually successful

\textsuperscript{14}Villagization is also referred to as ‘Operesheni Vijijini’ (Operation in the villages), ‘ujamaa vijijini’ (Ujamaa in the villages) and ‘vijiji vya ujamaa’ (Ujamaa villages).
attempts to turn Kiswahili into a *lingua franca*, the language of instruction for primary education and in far-reaching adult education programmes.

Villagization was seen at the most appropriate way in which statist ‘development’ objectives for rural people might be achieved and was initially voluntary. While Nyerere (1973) espoused that it was essential for the process to remain voluntary, only 15% of the rural population was “villagized” by 1973 (Jennings, 2002), which led to a shift in policy. The voluntary occupation of *Ujamaa* villages was replaced with compulsory resettlement at the behest of Nyerere after the TANU decree that “to live in villages is an order” (Bernstein, 1981: 45). Mamdani (1996: 176) refers to the increased authoritarianism in Tanzanian from the late-1960s onwards as a “centralized despotism” and compulsory villagization reflects both the authoritarianism of the government and a paternalistic attitude regarding the rural majority, many of whom chose not to move when it was voluntary and resented forced resettlement (Jennings, 2002). Around ten million were affected by villagization (Askew, 2006) and the significant effect that the process had on the lives of many of those involved cannot be over-emphasized. The elusiveness of self-reliance is reflected by villagization which was initiated to enhance agricultural productivity but actually led to a food crisis in Tanzania, and the country went from being one of the largest exporters of agricultural products in Africa, to the largest importer by 1976 (Maier, 1998). By this time “95% lived in official villages” (Jennings, 2002: 511) and the clear material limitations of the Tanzanian state were becoming increasingly evident (Lal, 2010).

The purported failure of *Ujamaa* villages against their stated objectives led to a subsequent shift away from self-sustaining accumulation processes, also demonstrated
by an ever-increasing reliance on foreign aid throughout the 1970s (Bernstein, 1981). Many policies relating to *Ujamaa* had disastrous consequences for people in rural and urban areas alike and not least the widespread shortages of key commodities (Askew, 2006). The absence of genuine self-reliance and the eventual retirement of Nyerere saw Tanzania retreat from a largely socialist political-economic model although Hunter (2008: 472) accurately asserts that the “Arusha Declaration and the principle of *ujamaa* has acquired a particular importance, less as a development strategy to be judged according to economic successes (or, more accurately, failures), than as a key political turning point which introduced a new lexicon of political metaphors”. Thus, *kujitegemea* (self-reliance), *kushirikiana* (cooperation) and *umoja* (unity) helped to shape the meaning of *maendeleo* at the time and in some cases continue to do so. However, *maendeleo* now takes on many meanings in Tanzania, depending on who you ask and it is a term often used strategically (Mercer, 2002; Harrison, 2008) and has been employed to refer to various interventions that have taken place over the past twenty five years or so.

### 3.1.4 The Retreat from Socialism: The Rise of IFIs and NGOs

“In 1985 Nyerere resigned. His inexperienced successor - Ali Hassan Mwinyi - was left facing a deepening economic and political crisis. With the Tanzanian government facing bankruptcy and with no prospect of aid without reform, Mwinyi was forced to capitulate in the face of the coercive power wielded by the Bank and Fund” (Holtom, 2005: 555).

The “deepening economic and political crisis” and the prospect of national bankruptcy was an outcome of numerous different factors which included; the cost of supplements to cover for insufficient harvests, the expensive war with Uganda (1978-9), the ease with which officials extracted resources from the state (usually through parastatals), dramatic
increases in global oil prices, and the increasing reliance upon foreign aid which was to become conditioned by IMF approval. This shift really took hold in the mid-1980s and despite the fact that the economic crisis in Tanzania began in the mid-1970s, this did not initially translate into a political crisis and Nyerere continued to gain support within the Party and the state (Holtom, 2005). The Tanzanian state began to move away from socialist ideals during the latter stages of Nyerere’s presidency and on his eventual retirement famously asserted that Tanzania’s economic policies had largely failed under his leadership (Maier, 1998). The change in state policy was far more dramatic during the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi from 1985 onwards with the first Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) initiated in 1986 (Nord et al., 1993). This brought about significant reductions in social service expenditure and oversaw the removal of a host of subsidies which had the outward aim of ‘getting the prices right’ (Bryceson, 2002).

It is easy to discern the clear shift in government policy during the 1980s as an outcome of the political and economic crises Tanzania was experiencing, but this was coupled with the widespread condemnation of state-led developmentalism across the world (see Chapter two). This meant that the governing Party (in 1977 TANU had merged with the Afro-Shiraz Party of Zanzibar to become CCM – Chama Cha Mapinduzi) also had to undergo a clear change in ideology (beyond the change in leadership) if continual international support was to be received. However, in stark contrast with socialist transformations in other parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe), CCM “did not collapse under reform, but successfully negotiated the transition by transforming themselves from defenders of socialism to champions of neo-liberalism” (Pitcher and Askew, 2006: 6). The most obviously example of this is perhaps the implementation of
many of the measures suggested by SAPs, which had been largely rejected (since the costs were seen to outweigh the benefits) between 1978 and 1984 and the relatively passive acceptance of aid conditionalities (Holtom, 2005). Radical and sweeping changes were quickly introduced following the retirement of Nyerere (in reality these had begun a few years previously), with goods and businesses allowed to enter the country more freely from abroad, tight capital controls loosened and prices no longer tightly state controlled. In effect, the previously closed Tanzanian economy was opened up (with some disastrous consequences).

Prices spiralled following liberalization and while the level of choice on offer was clearly expanded, this was superficial for the majority of Tanzanian consumers (especially in rural areas) since the wider range of goods available were largely unaffordable (Bryceson, 2002). Social service user fees were a key outcome of SAPs in Tanzania which meant that accessing doctors was increasingly difficult for many in Tanzania (Langwick, 2007) and primary education initially became unaffordable for many (officially, school fees have since been removed). The removal of subsides from key commodities as part of the ‘Economic Recovery Programme’ (following the first SAP) and an enforced currency devaluation brought about a further and rapid increase in prices: inflation touched 30% and the real price for maize and rice increased 50 fold between 1974 and 1991 (Tungaraza, 1992: 84). These changes are largely economic and had a profound impact on the lives of many Tanzanians and it is also important to highlight “cultural understandings of how reforms affect people’s sentiments and feelings, which are equally important for survival and well-being” (Kamat, 2008: 376). Kamat continues to argue that there are two specific changes which had a major impact on “people’s
perceptions of their lives, including their everyday discourse in the contemporary context: (1) the proliferation of private health facilities, and (2) the commoditization of land in urban areas” (Kamat, 2008: 377). While these directly refer to economic liberalization in the early 1990s, it is sensible to take the period after Nyerere’s retirement as one long period of reform, with multipartyism introduced in time for the 1995 election.

It has been argued that multipartyism in Tanzania was necessary by the early 1990s in order to disentangle CCM from the government, given that the Party had been in power since independence (Snyder, 2008). Moreover, it was expedited by the fact that multipartyism was conditional to receiving aid from donors (Chachage and Chachage, 2003). Thus, in spite of a 1992 poll which found that around eighty percent of Tanzanians were against multipartyism\(^\text{15}\) (Askew, 2006), multiparty elections were introduced in 1995 and saw CCM returned to power with a massive majority. Benjamin Mkapa followed Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the third president of the United Republic and ruled for the following ten years. This period also saw the number of NGOs in Tanzania increase exponentially (Jennings, 2008), with the proliferation of NGOs and development projects often seen as a result of the apparent ‘withdrawal of the state’ from social provision. This was further enhanced by the conditions of SAPs across the world (Ferguson, 2006; with Gupta, 2002; Slater, 1993) and specifically in Tanzania (Chachage and Chachage, 2003; Kiondo, 1995; Tungaruza, 1992).

It can be argued that both national and international NGOs, to some extent (and in some senses unwittingly), seek to fill the void in social provision left by the state. NGOs

\(^{15}\)As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, regardless of who is in power (colonial or post-colonial government) it seems that paternalism has consistently prevailed over popular will in Tanzania.
did not appear ‘out of nowhere’ at the time of structural adjustment in the mid-1980s and as Jennings (2002) reminds us, Oxfam was heavily involved in Tanzanian state policy from the late-1960s onwards. By the early 1980s, and in parallel with various political and economic crises around the world, NGOs were emerging and “fed off the collapse of social provisioning and the donor restructuring of aid, which supported regional development plans (as “local level” development) in the 1970s” (Chachage and Chachage, 2003: 6). In many cases NGOs became government partners, often focussing on building schools and health centres rather than assisting through sponsorship or subsidies and their spread was made more rapid by donor policies which sought to feed money directly into development projects rather than through governments which are often assumed to be corrupt (Ferguson, 2006). The second chapter of this thesis demonstrates that the ‘development impasse’ and the parallel shift away from state-led projects, towards smaller-scale and more localized projects. NGOs are clearly part of this broader shift in development theory and policy.

Cooper (2008: 185) astutely remarks that while some problems are best dealt with outside of the state or foreign aid projects, “the most likely alternative to state provision of public services of general utility – public health services, education, security, roads – is misery and incapacity, and there has been plenty of both since the downsizing of governments under structural adjustment in the 1980s”. This is certainly a relevant criticism in the context of Tanzania during the 1980s, 1990s and at least the early part of the new millennium. While some measures may illustrate that things are improving across the country, these rarely take into account regional disparities or the increasing breadth of inequality. Therefore the following section offers a brief overview of
contemporary geographical statistics and development indicators in order to sketch an outline of Tanzania and to give a cursory demonstration of the current situation within the country.

3.2 TANZANIA: GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

This brief section offers a statistical overview of some of the main features of Tanzania, initially focussing on demography and on the geographical realities of modern-day Tanzania. The size and demography of the population are seen as important especially given the focus on older people specifically within the Mtwara region in the south-east of Tanzania. The physical location of the south-eastern region within the country is also important alongside the geographical position of Tanzania within East Africa. Following this, some of the more significant (and available) ‘development indicators’ are offered and placed alongside more quantitative measures of the Tanzanian economy. This is not to equate the two but instead to offer a brief overview of the current situation within Tanzania from a conventional perspective.

3.2.1 Geographical Data

The national-political map at the start of this chapter (see Figure 3) demarcates the twenty six regions that make up modern-day Tanzania, which shares a border with nine other countries. Tanzania is the thirty-first largest country in the world and, as of July 2010, the CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov) estimated the population at 41,048,532. While this estimate is far greater than that made by the Tanzania government (33,461,849 according to the URT National Bureau of Statistics, 2010a), it is more in line with the World Bank (2008) estimate of 42,483,923. The population of Tanzania is, then,
roughly forty million and although it is difficult to be sure of population at independence (many estimate it to be around nine million), it seems fair to suggest that it has more than quadrupled in the past fifty years. One of the most significant population statistics to consider is the demographic breakdown by age (since this research focuses on older people) and only 2.9% of the Tanzanian population are over the age of 65 (CIA World Factbook, 2010), the rough age group that this research focuses on\(^\text{16}\). The ratio of males to females is largely similar across all age ranges, up until the ‘over 65 category’, at which point the male to female ratio drops to 0.78, which is roughly echoed in the Mtwara region according to the 2002 National Census (URT National Bureau of Statistics, 2010a).

Mtwara is the most southerly region on the east coast of the Tanzanian mainland, surrounded by the larger Ruvuma and Lindi regions and sharing a long border with Mozambique along the Ruvuma River (see the map in Figure 4.1.3 below). Mtwara is the third smallest region of the Tanzanian mainland, with a population estimated at 1,124,481 at the end of 2009 (URT National Bureau of Statistics, 2010b). The population of Mikindani is around 11,000 while the population of Dihimba (when taken in conjunction with Mpondomo, since the two are in essence the same place) is around 4,000 and the two villages are roughly thirty-five kilometres apart (a more extensive comparison is offered in the following chapter while the perceptions of development from each place are highlighted in the chapters five, six and seven). Specific statistics for Dihimba and Mikindani seem relatively rare and are often included as part of the total figures given for the entire Mtwara region. Therefore the following section considers some national development indicators before focussing on ‘the south’ and the Mtwara region specifically.

\(^{16}\)Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that most interviewees were unsure of their age.
3.2.2 Tanzanian ‘Development’ Indicators

According to a 2009 UN measure (based on figures from 2007), Tanzania has a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.530 (out of 1), which equates to a ranking of 151st out of the 182 countries for which data are available (UNDP, 2010b). Tanzania is ranked in the latter stages of a list of countries seen to have a ‘Medium’ Human Development Index, calculated by ranking and averaging four measures; life expectancy at birth (55 years = 150th), adult literacy rate (72.3% of those over 15 = 111th), combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (57.3% = 143rd) and GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity US$ 1208 = 157th, statistics from UNDP, 2010c). While these figures differ slightly with those listed on the CIA World Factbook, the UN figures are utilised here since they are used to calculate the HDI measure. The UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) incorporates some of the key differences between men and women into this discussion and Tanzania is ranked 69th out of the 109 countries for which data are available. The GDP growth rate for 2009 is estimated at 6% (CIA World Factbook, 2010) while the World Bank suggests that the national level of unemployment currently sits at 4.3%. While this figure seems low, it is likely that it only accounts for outright unemployment, rather than allowing for the high levels of underemployment (Garcia and Fares, 2008) that beset much of the Tanzanian workforce. Indeed, underemployment might be a bigger issue than unemployment for those whose livelihoods are largely based on agriculture since paid work in rural areas is often seen as an activity engaged in by the poorest (Killian, 1998; Wedgewood, 2005).
Tanzania relied on coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco and cashew nuts, for around sixty percent of its exports until recently, although this reliance on a few commodities has been diluted by increases in the:

“value of exports of minerals (mainly gold and diamonds) and fish. Invisible earnings from the tourism industry are now also very important and amount to almost as much as all merchandise exports together. In the period 1995-2006 an average of about 28% of Tanzania’s gross foreign exchange resources were derived from merchandise exports and 24% from tourism. However the biggest source was foreign aid (38%) with net foreign direct investment providing the other 10%. Although Tanzania does not rely quite as heavily on aid as it did in the 1980s and early 1990s it is still a highly aid dependent economy” (Tanzania Development Trust, 2009; online resource).

While Tanzania is still largely dependent on aid for foreign exchange resources, it is also worth mentioning the continued national dependence on agriculture which contributes more than a quarter of GDP, 85% of exports and employs 80% of the national workforce\textsuperscript{17}. This is in spite of the fact that only 4% of the entire land in the country is cultivable.

The extent to which these measures accurately represent the lived reality of people in such a diverse country as Tanzania is questionable, especially since they do not allow for major regional disparities. However, the HDI is more suitable a measure than simply relying on GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, since it encapsulates more varied measures. It would be possible to write extensively, and to offer in-depth statistical analysis of the extensive data available on Tanzania, however this is not particularly

\textsuperscript{17}This is reflected in the available data from Dihimba wherein 60% are subsistence farmers and 20% commercial.
relevant here. The statistics which have been focussed on give a brief overview of Tanzanian economic indicators to foreground the relatively conventional historical narrative of Tanganyika and latterly Tanzania (after the union with the Zanzibari islands of Unguja and Pemba) sketched previously. While this research is plainly not quantitative, and focuses on perceptions and not measurements of ‘development’, the sheer volume of statistical data on Tanzania (and seemingly on all countries), held by the World Bank, IMF, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), European Union (EU) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (for example) serves as a very basic overview and prefaces the statistical comparison of the Mtwara region with the rest of Tanzania.

3.2.3 Development Indicators in ‘the south’

In reality, the two regions (Mtwara and Lindi) often seen to constitute southern Tanzania (but more accurately described as south-eastern Tanzania) may not be as different to other regions, which: “seem to share more or less the same level of development as that of Mtwara and Lindi, yet they are not cursed as such” (Killian, 2003: 3). However, there exists a widespread perception that ‘the south’ is clearly underdeveloped, both within and outside of the region. This perception is discussed in more detail later (briefly in the following chapter and in detail in chapter six) but it is necessary to document the extent to which Mtwara region differs from the other regions within Tanzania, based on government statistics.

A cursory glance over the limited regional statistics available\(^\text{18}\) does not seem to demonstrate a large degree of difference between Mtwara and many other regions in Tanzania. It is clear that Dar-es-Salaam region fares much better than the rest of the

\(^\text{18}\)All statistics in this paragraph from: URT (2010b).
country and has the most potential employers and employment opportunities (in spite of the fact that it is the smallest region), the highest levels of access to electricity, and the second highest level of primary school enrolment. Dar-es-Salaam region also has the lowest: reliance on agriculture, number of uneducated adults, and numbers of working children. Mtwara region sits somewhere in the middle of the twenty-six regions according to these same measures, although is much lower when it comes to accessing the materials with which houses are built and the number of houses with ‘modern walls’ and a metal roof is therefore much lower than in most other regions (with the exception of Lindi in the south-east and Singida, Tabora and Shinyanga – three bordering regions in the central-north).

The above statistics do not categorically prove that ‘the south’ is therefore ‘as developed’ as most of the rest of the country (an abstract notion in itself), especially given that there is an over-reliance on government ‘development statistics’ which do not represent Mtwara as much of an ‘outlier’ (URT, 2010b) and has no reason to do so. The continual underdevelopment of ‘the south’ and the failure to complete the road between Mtwara and Dar-es-Salaam (Mesaki and Mwankusye, 1998) is one example given to exemplify this. Other research in Tanzania highlights the significance of badly maintained or incomplete roads according to many Tanzanians who often cite these as the main reason for relative isolation and the subsequent difficulty to sell agricultural produce on larger markets (Da Costa and Price, 2009; URT, 2007). This perception of underdevelopment and isolation, whether or not the so-called ‘hidden agenda’ is recognized empirically, can still have a significant impact on attitudes concerning authority (Wembah-Rashid, 1998), possibly causing resentment for the state which is
seen to have continually failed people over time. In order to investigate the extent to which emphasis is placed on ‘development’ as much as isolation (although the two may well be related), it is useful to conclude this chapter with a discussion of some of the main ways in which development is understood in Tanzania.

3.3 CONCLUSION: READING DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

This chapter set out to offer an overview of Tanzania, in terms of history, geography and based on some of the more conventional measures of development. The section on history is useful since it demonstrates the way in which Tanzania was formed and some of the debates of the time from the end of the Second World War until the late 1960s, with many arguments framed by ‘development’. Attempts to maintain colonial relations, and those aimed at breaking these both employed the idea of ‘development’ and while independence eventually won out, the extent to which things were instantly different is questionable. Processes relating to villagization are often seen as a key marker yet some still question the extent to which these were radical and in spite of a discourse of ‘self-reliance’ (kujitegemea), closely related to Ujamaa and maendeleo (development), aid flowed at an ever-increasing rate during the 1970s. Widespread (near universal) social provision was introduced but this was done at great cost by a state without the material resources to commit to such huge projects of social engineering. The post-socialist reversal in philosophy is stark and assisted the growth of the NGO sector which has largely replaced state social provision in a number of areas. This also reflects the clear change in broader development theory and policy and possibly in the way development is perceived. This led into the section on geographical statistics and realities and development indicators, which highlight rapid population growth as well as demographic
change. Tanzania (and the south-east particularly) is ranked in the lower echelons of the world’s countries when it comes to conventional indicators of ‘development’ described as one of the poorest and least developed.

The two previous sections, however, only partially explain the contemporary situation in Tanzania. While the more extensive historical section highlights some of the most important interventions that have been made in the name of development (in very different ways and by a host of different actors), it is necessary to consider the predominant ways in which it has been recently understood in Tanzania. These help to determine whether the state is still seen as central to development (as it was in the colonial and socialist periods), whether the rise of NGOs and individualism have changed perceptions dramatically, or whether both of these views is too deterministic and our focus should be broader, approaching the concept of maendeleo in a different manner entirely.

3.3.1 Perceptions of Development in Tanzania

“The meaning of maendeleo has been differently interpreted (Mercer 2002; Nyerere 1974), but one key political practice that it has encapsulated is the political advocacy of local representatives who aim to capture resources from higher levels of government for their constituency. The ability to ‘bring development’ to one’s home area provided a way of shoring up legitimacy both during the single party period and into the present day” (Harrison, 2008: 177).

This quotation highlights that development (maendeleo) is understood in a variety of different ways across Tanzania. The decision to use the Kiswahili term maendeleo is detailed in the following chapter (in conjunction with research methods and
methodology) and later to preface the research findings (see 5.1.1), but it is enough to suggest here that, much like the English word ‘development’, the term is extremely fluid (Mercer, 2002). Some recent research projects which emphasize that ‘development’ is understood in a variety of ways within Tanzania, often reached similar conclusions and a brief selection of these arguments is offered below. Given the socialist legacy of Tanzania, it might come as a surprise that perceptions of development do not always place the greatest emphasis on the role that ought to be played by the government, the Party or the state (institutions which are often left undistinguished). This, in spite of the fact that the maendeleo was one of the key promises made by TANU prior to independence, and has remained central to the Tanzanian political lexicon until this day (in spite of manifold political changes). Green (2000) suggests that while emphasis is not often placed on the role that the government ought to play in development, the apparent absence of development among the rural population is often blamed on a state unwilling to support its rural constituents. While the government may not be ideologically wedded to social service provision to the same extent as the socialist predecessor, local (and at times national) government actors often challenge the autonomy of development projects in an attempt to be associated with seemingly positive changes experienced by their constituents and to access scarce resources (Marsland, 2007).

The overall shift towards localized projects and away from the state in development theory and policy is matched by many understandings of maendeleo across Tanzania, in light of previous state interventions made in the name of ‘development’, which “had often left people poorer and more bereft than they had been prior to villigization”
(Green, 2000: 77). More localised conceptions of development in Tanzania often emphasise individualistic and materialist concerns and it is common for Tanzanians to refer to ‘development’ as the ability to make capital investments, and understood in terms of specific small-scale external interventions which bring individual material benefits, rather than as state social provision (Green, 2000; Kamat, 2008). Green (2000) adds that the emphasis on the personal and individual nature of development is common across Tanzania, while access to ‘development interventions’ implemented by external agencies has also been understood as a form of ‘development’. With a highly thoughtful and enlightened comment, Pitcher and Askew (2006) argue that the shift towards individualism and away from collectivity really highlights the ‘self’ in self-reliance (kujitegemea).

3.3.2 Development in Tanzania: Material and Individual Advancement

In terms of the actual changes that are understood as development, numerous scholars highlight that specific, small-scale changes in people’s lives are generally understood as ‘development’. For example, regular reference is made to the type of house that is lived in and how this acts a measure of prosperity and ‘progress’. Thus, “houses made of udongo (mud-sticks-fronds with a thatched roof)” often demonstrate a lack of personal progress, while moving “to a matofali house (a stronger structure made of permanent bricks with corrugated iron sheets)” is a clear sign that one has “advanced in life” (Kamat, 2008: 372). Material self-sufficiency is often seen as an essential forerunner for development, especially in the Mtwara region (Lal, 2010), and food security is often seen as essential to development. Development is not only understood in terms of certain material desires (although these seem to maintain a high degree of significance) and it is
elsewhere argued that *maendeleo* is often understood as a part of local identities with “social traits which are frowned upon, such as laziness and ignorance, are regarded as the preserve of those who are ‘undeveloped’” (Mercer, 2002: 114).

There are certain key features of the ways in which *maendeleo* is understood across Tanzania (based on the numerous studies highlighted above) and the individualized and material readings of development seem common, with specific reference to the sorts of houses people live in, as much as the resources that are available as part of development projects and interventions. Materialist readings of development seem strikingly common and these are investigated further in the fifth chapter, wherein the tendency to focus on the absence, rather than the presence of development is illuminated. As is the case with ‘development’, *maendeleo* remains a highly contested term, which is fiercely debated by academics, NGOs, government, and the supposed beneficiaries of various interventions alike. Indeed, Kamat (2008) supports such diversity, arguing that the stability of the notion of development forwarded by some literature from anthropology and Development Studies is not reflected by the internal variability in opinions, even in the smallest rural communities. This view is certainly shared here and is expanded upon throughout the remainder of this thesis, especially in the following chapter which discusses the research methods and methodology, offering the main reasons for conducting sixty interviews with older people, alongside five focus groups in two villages in south-eastern Tanzania.
CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology and Research Methods

As this thesis has so far shown, ‘development’ is a highly heterogeneous concept, means a variety of things to different people and interventions that pertain to ‘development’ are enacted in multiple ways and seen to hold the potential for improving the lives of people throughout the world. This is clearly relevant in the context of Tanzania, and more specifically south-eastern Tanzania given the specific history of interventions and their impact (or the lack thereof, see Seppälä, 1998a) over the past sixty years. The previous chapter offered a sketch of recent Tanzanian history (and the continual focus on development therein), geographical data and contemporary development indicators to present an overview of the country. This chapter builds on the historical-geographical overview of the previous chapter and lays out exactly how and where (specifically) this research was conducted. It highlights the aims, objectives and importance of the thesis and the particular significance of uncovering voices that may otherwise be ‘lost’ to mainstream development theory and policy.

At the outset, I saw recent Tanzanian history as marked by three distinct macro-historical eras; the late-colonial era, the postcolonial, socialist era (roughly 1961-1985) and the era of (neo)liberalization, marked by the proliferation of NGOs, often replacing the state as the predominant ‘development’ actors in everyday life. Each of these periods have been marked by ‘external’ interventions which vary in scale and which have been instigated by different actors and affect people’s lives in different ways. Personal experience often plays an important role in the manner in which interventions are understood in Tanzania (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) and the focus on older people increased the
likelihood that personal experiences of numerous interventions would be drawn on. With this in mind I decided to emphasize the ‘life histories’ of interviewees. This chapter is divided into three distinct sections. The first section discusses the decision to conduct research in two villages in the Mtwara region of south-eastern Tanzania. The second discusses methodology and the possibilities and pitfalls of research in a postcolonial setting. The third moves onto to discuss the exact methods used to investigate the central research question and the process of selecting interviewees.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the decision to conduct this research within Tanzania, before the first section specifically focuses on the Mtwara region in the south-east of the country, an area that is often overlooked in academic research with the notable the advantages (and problems) of conducting comparative research and demonstrates some of the key differences and similarities between the two villages at hand. Following this, there is a brief overview of the way in which participants were selected, which goes beyond the decision to exclusively conduct interviews with wazee (older people).

The second section highlights some of the key debates surrounding methodology with an initial discussion of the overlapping ‘fields’ in which this research co-exists, thus offering a broader perspective than simply considering the methods used. Placing the ‘field’ of research alongside the academic ‘field’ highlights some of the power dynamics that exist within the various ‘fields’ of research, both as part of the academy and when conducting fieldwork in a postcolonial context. The desire to uncover otherwise ‘lost voices’, a foremost contribution of post-colonial studies, is drawn on here while
investigating perceptions of development and of past and present interventions (especially in postcolonial contexts) requires a great deal of researcher reflexivity.

The third section details the specific research methods used to investigate the central research question: “How is development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?” Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were the main methods employed in discussing development, framed by materiality, place/space and history/the past as ‘lived’ by older people in south-eastern Tanzania. Some of the techniques associated with ‘life history’ approaches were also employed as part of the semi-structured interviews while the secondary strategy of conducting focus groups is also discussed, with the principal aim of broadening views on offer. This also allowed for the perceptions of some younger people to be voiced, although age is not the only axis of identity that needed to be taken into consideration prior to conducting research. The chapter concludes with a brief section reflecting on the entire research process.

4.1 LOCATING THE RESEARCH

The decision to conduct this research in Tanzania was based on what I considered to be some numerous key features of the country and its history, alongside the fact that I had previously spent a substantial period in the country. I had numerous friends and contacts from time spent in Tanzania (prior to starting my PhD) who were able guide me along the way and to assist me. The overview of the recent past in Tanzania offered in the previous chapter (see section 3.1) takes into account some of the key political changes and significant interventions in the country, both prior to and following the eventual
formation of the country of Tanzania in 1964 (with Tanganyikan independence won by 1961). This conventional historical narrative demonstrates that development has clearly been crucial in shaping political discourse as well as numerous government policies and various interventions by numerous actors. Development remains central to political discourse across Anglophone Africa (as has been the case in many countries), yet Tanzania is specifically focussed on since it followed a very unique path to development following the Arusha Declaration. The change in policy since the retirement of Nyerere represents an equally radical departure.

Development remains central to government rhetoric and nationalist discourse, although it is abundantly clear that national developmentalism is no longer a strategy employed by CCM and development often refers to small-scale interventions by NGOs and to foreign direct investment. NGOs often focus on health and education and some build schools and health centres/hospitals as part of ‘development projects’. Infrastructure remains an important concern for citizens and government alike and the construction of roads, for example, is largely funded through bilateral partnerships with aid donor governments (often China or Japan). Ancillary projects relating to the infamous Groundnut Scheme focussed on infrastructure (a new port was built at Mtwara and a train track connected it to Nachingwea in the interior) and this was contemporaneous with the early citations of ‘development’ in the latter stages of British colonialism in Tanganyika. Demonstrating the shifting terrain of ‘development’ in Tanzania is one of the key objectives of this project, and it is important to decipher some of the important ways in which development is understood from the perspective of the purported beneficiaries of more recent interventions (whatever these might be), since these views are often
overlooked. The contingent nature of the term *maendeleo* (Mercer, 2002) offers further justification for the focus on older people, who are likely to have seen the term used in numerous ways and to refer to a wide variety of different interventions which may (or may not) have profoundly affected their lives. The Groundnut Scheme (and related projects) partly explains the specific focus on the southern region, enhanced by the sense of apparent remoteness that marks the region.

### 4.1.1 Selecting south-eastern Tanzania

*Based on the evidence the history of interventions can be summarized as follows: the encounters with the external world have been many and embraced a multitude of aspects of life. However, the impacts created have been either sporadic, fading away without trace, or location specific. In other words, they have not led to the accumulation of economic change that has altered the overall organization in a major way. When external commentators make hurried statements on southern Tanzania, they tend to overlook the history of interventions. Yet the number of interventions and cultural encounters is as high as anywhere. The picture is even more complex when the local perspective on the intrusions is introduced into the discussion. (Seppälä, 1998a: 18)*

Seppälä (1998a) argues that there is a long history of ‘external’ interventions in southern Tanzania which have had very little impact or a limited, location specific benefit. This perspective refers specifically to ‘big D’ external ‘Development’ interventions (i.e. those from outside of the country, not just the village or town) since it would be difficult to argue that the impact of villagization in Mtwara, for example, was “sporadic, fading away without trace, or location specific”. While villagization tended not to bring about the “accumulation of economic change” (the process actually increased poverty) it would be facile to suggest that ‘the overall organization’ of southern Tanzania was not profoundly
affected. Despite being the third smallest region in Tanzania, more than an eighth of all *Ujamaa*’ designated villages were created in Mtwara (Voipio, 1998), which leads Killian (2003) to suggest that Mtwara (along with Lindi region) effectively represented a test-ground for this government experiment in social reorganization. This ‘development intervention’ (villagization) clearly represents a significant moment in Tanzania’s past and particularly in ‘the south’ which is likely to affect the way in which older people in south-eastern Tanzania understand development. Villagization thus represents one of the key reasons for conducting research within the Mtwara region of south-eastern Tanzania and this process was one of a number of factors highlighted to explain major reduction in cashew nut production in the region and across the country (Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998)\(^9\).

This research problematizes mainstream readings of development, stressing the continued significance of place and materiality and investigates the ways in which different forms of ‘external’ intervention have been understood on reception in two villages within the Mtwara region. It is often argued that the south of Tanzania has been consistently ignored and is isolated from the rest of the country, a phenomenon that began in the colonial era (Liebenow, 1971) and has largely continued until the present day (Killian, 1998; 2003; Green, 2000). This psychological sense of isolation is highlighted by research into the continuing failure to construct a paved road from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam, which had been promised since independence (Mesaki and Mwankusye, 1998; Wembah-Rashid, 1998). The fact that this road is now close to completion may also be

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\(^9\)The number of tonnes of cashew nuts produced in the Mtwara region in 1973/4 was 60,376 while this fell to 14,928 by 1979/80 and was as low as 6,414 by 1986/7, owing to villagization, land shortages and cashew nut diseases which brought about a “systematic collapse of the rural economy” (Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998: 227).
significant when it comes to perceptions of development, and this is cited by some interviewees (see chapter six). Along with challenging mainstream historical overviews of development, this thesis uncovers some of the fundamental ways in which older people in southern Tanzania understand the numerous external interventions in their lives and therefore how they apprehend such a slippery term as development (with maendeleo similarly fluid). Materiality remains crucial to perceptions of development in Mikindani and Dihimba, and place and space also play a significant role in understandings which are often framed by material inequalities. It is now necessary to turn our attention to some of the key features of the two villages at hand, whilst also offering an overview of the benefits and problems with comparative case studies.

4.1.2 Comparative Case Studies

Prior to offering a comparison of Mikindani and the nearby village of Dihimba, it is necessary to address some of the key reasons for deciding to conduct comparative research. The extensive quotation below largely shapes this debate and demonstrates many of the benefits of comparative studies, both during the research process and as part of the analysis:

“Each step in the research process poses its challenges... [and] there is much to be said for using a comparative case method to answer questions and provide explanations about negotiations, focusing on the basic question of how outcomes are obtained... Comparative case studies lie at the crossroads of reality and theory; they present their evidence through the eyes of a knowledgeable specialist and they test it against the hypothetical constructs of a creative conceptualist” (Zartman, 2005: 4).
In this instance there is a clear recognition of the difficulties and challenges that are to be expected at every stage of a research process with comparative case studies seen as a key means of establishing a negotiation at ‘the crossroads of reality and theory’. While this research does not develop generalizable theory from comparative case studies, the benefits of comparing distinct cases does allow for numerous realities and perceptions to be considered, when place is firmly established as the axis of comparison.

In discussing *The Future of the History of Ideas in Africa*, Ekechi (1987) astutely remarks that the introduction of comparative studies in African societies, and especially comparative history, has often relied on the United States as the benchmark, marking ‘the norm’ against which comparison is made. Moreover, he continues to suggest that in translating directly from African languages into English assumes that similarities in terms of experience exist between, in his example, the experiences of the Kung (of the Kalahari) and Americans (Ekechi, 1987: 68-69). While such problems are acknowledged, they are largely ameliorated by the fact that the comparison offered here is relatively localized and between two villages within the same region of Tanzania. Some comparisons are made with other parts of Tanzania, yet the benchmark for comparison rarely exceeds the country or region of the two case studies at hand. While Ekechi (1987) highlights the potential benefits of pan-African comparisons, this focus of this thesis is largely on more local and national comparisons which highlight both the differences and similarities between the views held among people in Mikindani and Dihimba and make this comparison both instructive and valid.

While comparative case studies can be beneficial, it is important that “similarities and differences [exist] between and among the selected elements for comparison” given
that obviously similar cases (for example between two villages in southern Tanzania) can often expose largely discordant views across a range of issues, and vice versa (Green and Luehrmann, 2007: 4). This research specifically focuses on two villages within the same part of Tanzania which might lead to a prior assumption that the similarities will outweigh the differences. The commonalities and discrepancies between the two cases are discussed below, mindful of the view that a “comparative case study exhibits the advantages of in-depth analysis of reality while overcoming the weaknesses of focusing on one case alone” (Zartman, 2005: 7). While he adds that it is important to consider “how and what” should be compared, Zartman (2005) adds that entirely random decisions make little sense, since they rarely lead to research that is operationalizable or applicable, salient and relevant, which are all characteristics that ought to be considered when it comes to comparative case studies. This is discussed below with relation to the two villages in which this research was conducted and further highlights some of the outward differences and similarities between the two places, as well as the relative ease with which I was able to conduct research in Mikindani and Dihimba.

4.1.3 Selecting the Villages: Similarities and Differences

The sustained periods of time that I had spent in the village of Mikindani prior to starting the primary research for this thesis helps to explain why I decided to conduct research of this nature in the first place. Through general conversation in Mikindani, especially with wazee (older people), I became fascinated by the idea of investigating perceptions of maendeleo, especially since numerous European NGOs espousing ‘development’ had recently been established there. Trade Aid was the first European NGO established in Mikindani and the first project undertaken was to renovate an old colonial German
prison and to turn it into a luxury hotel and (apparently) a training college for villagers to learn key skills for the hospitality industry (Trade Aid, 2009). The views people held of this NGO and some of the projects themselves further enhanced my interest in conducting research in Tanzania, especially among older people since the recent arrival of *wazungu*\(^2\) within the village is sometimes understood in tandem with the historical resonances of colonialism.

Mikindani was, therefore, the first village in which I decided to conduct research and based on previous time spent there, I was able to enjoy a good support network and lived with a friend on the edge of the village. This also meant that I could spatially separate myself from the NGOs within the village, an important consideration since interviewees might otherwise have assumed I was planning to introduce a development project and I did not want to be seen to be offering something that I would not be able to deliver. However, most interviewees disentangled the two with great ease thus undermining presumptions that I felt might be held about me and it turned out that few held out much hope of support from NGOs.

Once I had decided to conduct research in Mikindani, I felt that it was important to offer a case study from another place for comparison in order to triangulate my findings and to illustrate the importance of place, at the local scale, in interpreting development. I had already decided to focus solely on the Mtwar\(\text{a}\) region and felt that the same amount of interviews should be conducted in another village located within a short distance of Mikindani. This was both for logistical reasons and to ensure that enough similarities (as well as obvious differences) existed between the two places to make a

\(^2\) *Wazungu* is the plural of *mzungu*, which refers to white or European people.
comparative study both relevant and useful. Dihimba, situated inland from Mikindani but within forty kilometres (see Figure 4.1.3 below), provided the second case study and is both one of the biggest villages within the vicinity and has a distinct recent history when compared to Mikindani, especially considering the fact that it seems to have been greatly affected (at least in terms of population size and the subsequent availability of land) by villagization processes during the 1970s. This is seen as one of the key differences between Mikindani and Dihimba more of which follow an overview of some of the similarities between the villages.

Figure 4.1.3: Mtwara Region

The two villages are situated relatively near to one another and given the history of migration within the Mtwara region (Lal, 2010), and in light of villagization, many people in each place had visited or lived within the other place. Thus, in terms of the flows and
interactions between places that go some way to creating the specific nature of a given place (Massey, 1993; 1995), Mikindani and Dihimba are relatively closely linked. Moreover, almost all people within both villages are Muslim, the vast majority self-identify as Makonde (the ethnic group from the Mtwara region of Tanzania and from the north of Mozambique, directly south across the Ruvuma River) and could speak Kiswahili. This is certainly not the case across the Mtwara region wherein Kimakonde (the first language of most in the region and certainly in Dihimba) predominates and Kiswahili is not universally spoken\textsuperscript{21}. Both villages have a similar structure of power, with a committee and secretary (all Party members) from whom I had to obtain research clearance. Cashew nuts represent the principal cash in each of the two villages, the production of which was reduced dramatically following the 1970s; not least because of villagization (see section 4.1.1; Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998). While production again increased dramatically during the 1990s, partially owing to the liberalization of the industry, production fell away again in the 2000s (Cooksey and Shao, 2008) and this is reflected both in Mikindani and Dihimba, at least according to the anecdotal evidence offered therein.

The colonial Groundnut Scheme had a significant impact in southern Tanzania and (see 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) drew workers from Mikindani and from the Mtwara region more broadly (Rizzo, 2006), both for the scheme itself and for ancillary infrastructural projects (building the port at Mtwara and the train track to the interior). Dihimba is situated near to the route of the train track that ran from Nachingwea to the coast during the early 1950s, which was established as part of the Groundnut Scheme. Lal (2010) suggests that

\textsuperscript{21}Interviewees slipped into Kimakonde in both villages, thus it was very important to have Jaylani alongside. While I am relatively proficient in Kiswahili I do not speak or understand Kimakonde at all.
elders in the Mtwara region often refer to Dihimba (and Nanyamba – a village further south and inland) as a *vijiji vya zamani* (original or ‘old’ villages) and this term is also used by *wazee* to describe Mikindani. While Dihimba was not an official *Ujamaa* village and (much like Mikindani) existed a long time before villagization processes began in the late-1960s (continuing apace from 1973 and officially concluding in 1976), it was dramatically affected by the process since Mpondomo was established within the existing parameters of Dihimba (on the other side of a now non-existent track) and many people moved there during the 1970s\(^{22}\). This marks one of the key differences between the two villages, which are now to be considered in far greater detail.

Both villages have some experience of development projects and interventions over time, although the differences between these clearly outweigh the similarities, as witnessed by the permanent presence of NGOs in Mikindani against the affect that villagization had in Dihimba. Mikindani was selected given that it is a village with high levels of recent NGO involvement, especially for its size, and at the time this research was conducted (March to August 2009) Mikindani had four permanently resident NGOs while various other projects have been established in the village (for example, The Agha Khan Foundation, Amref and RIPS\(^{23}\)). Dihimba, on the other hand, has no permanently resident NGOs and while some projects have been established there in the past (for example a RIPS goat-loaning scheme and water projects by Finnwater and a Japanese-Tanzanian government initiative), these are seen to be few and far between (see 6.2.2). There are likely to be many reasons for such variability when it comes to recent

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\(^{22}\)Throughout this thesis ‘Dihimba’ also includes Mpondomo since they are usually described as one place.

\(^{23}\)RIPS (Rural Integrated Project Support) was a joint initiative of the Tanzanian and Finnish governments, in Mtwara and Lindi regions (Killian, 2003; Mongula, 2005).
interventions, however it is no coincidence that this pattern reflects the major infrastructural differences between the two places.

Mikindani is located around twelve kilometres from Mtwara (the largest town in south-eastern Tanzania) and officially part of the ‘Mtwara Urban’ area. Moreover, the road from Mtwara to Mikindani is paved and is the first section on a road which is now mostly paved to Dar-es-Salaam (except for a short section near the Rufiji River). This means that transport to Mtwara is relatively straightforward with around three *daladala* (minibuses) completing the round trip every hour during daytime, while Dar-es-Salaam can be accessed within one day (providing it is not the height of the rainy season) and for those who can afford it, electricity is available within offices and houses. Mikindani has four primary schools and a secondary school (others schools also lie on the outskirts of the village) and two health centres. These features, alongside the fact that Mikindani is a picturesque fishing village situated on a horseshoe bay giving onto the Indian Ocean, perhaps help to explain why European NGOs have been drawn to Mikindani in the recent past. Moreover, there seems to be something of a network effect when it comes to the establishment of NGOs in Mikindani and having spoken with some of those involved in these organizations, it is clear that they have all been established since Trade Aid began operating in the late 1990s. While a ‘network effect’ has supported the growth of the NGO sector in Mikindani, relatively nearby villages like Dihimba are largely unaffected.

Dihimba is situated on a reasonably main route although the road is not paved and the village does not possess many of the features of Mikindani listed above. For example, Dihimba has no mains power supply and while there are a few generators in the village;

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24 This seems to reflect Ferguson’s (2006) arguments concerning the nature of globalization wherein he questions the relevance of aquatic metaphors concerning African experiences of globalization.
this represents a clear and significant difference. The village does have a primary school, and a secondary school was completed recently (in 2006), yet at the time this research was conducted, there were no permanently resident NGOs and transport to Mtwara was difficult. Only one truck did a daily return trip to Mtwara town (via Mikindani) and the only bus that traversed the route was, according to many, irrecoverably broken ("basi ni mbovu kabisa"). While the road to Dihimba is of reasonable quality, the fact that it is mostly unpaved means that the village is often impassable during the rainy season hence it is more remote than Mikindani. Agriculture remains the predominant source of employment and wealth creation in both villages, with figures of both broadly reflecting the national average (see 3.2.2), yet there seem to be more obvious opportunities in Mikindani. This is not least because of the proximity to Mtwara, but also owing to the potential for employment as part of an NGO, fishing as a result of the coastal location and working with or selling things to the limited but consistent flow of tourists and business people that pass through Mikindani. The relative remoteness of Dihimba also means that it is rarer for people to have cause to pass through the village.

Given the similarities and differences between the two villages, it was therefore assumed that there would be overlaps as well as distinct, place-based differences in the data accumulated. This was indeed the case and these key differences, coupled with their varying histories, go some way to explaining place-specific readings of development within the sixth chapter. The overlaps between the views from each place are mostly in terms of materiality, and perceptions of the past, which are covered in the fifth and seventh chapters. This was only one part of conducting the research and it was not
enough to suggest that I would simply interview wazee (older people) in both villages, however, and I had to consider some other, relevant factors.

4.1.4 Selecting Participants

There is always a degree of chance in selecting interview participants yet the decision of whom to interview had to be delimited in some way. While the research was conducted in villages, each had a sizeable population with Mikindani inhabited by around 11000 people, and Dihimba-Mpondomo by around 4000 (URT, 2009). Thus, they might be akin to small towns rather than more conventional images associated with ‘the village’. Given these populations, I was unable to interview everyone in each village and decided that thirty interviews and a handful of focus groups were manageable (given the limited time available) and offered a broad enough range from which to extrapolate useful findings and to draw conclusions. I also took the “theoretically motivated decision” (Valentine, 2005: 112) to restrict interviewees and focussed specifically on older people, given that they are often neglected especially when it comes to Development policy and research, which usually highlights progress, the future and moving forward, and not the past or older people.

It was not enough, however, to simply focus on wazee (older people) who might have experienced (or been on the receiving of) many of the processes that I wanted to discuss. Other factors had to be considered in tandem and even using the Kiswahili term wazee (older people) proved problematic, given that this refers to status as well as age. While most were unsure of how old they were, based on their responses it was possible
to work out that many were somewhere between sixty and ninety. This is clearly a broad age range, with inherent differences therein:

“Men and women after 60 are likely to experience changing roles and responsibilities in line with changes in their own abilities and environments. Whereas the productive capacity of women and men in their early 60s is unlikely to have deteriorated dramatically in comparison with their capacity in their late 50s, people in their 70s and 80s are likely to contribute less in the way of household income” (URT and HelpAge, 2010: 13).

Older people, then, do not represent a homogeneous group and there were clearly age-based differences between interviewees, although factors beyond age were considered and in an attempt to cover the range of perceptions on offer and I wanted to interview an equal number of men and women.

When it comes to development interventions, Crewe and Harrison (1998) argue that the presumption of equality within households leads to ‘development’ research and ‘work’ being conducted predominantly with men. This was a problem that I sought not to repeat although striking a balance in the number of interviewees conducted with women and men was difficult. This is explicable given the (understandable) distrust of *wazungu* (white or European people) especially among women, possibly heightened by the fact that I am a male researcher, and worked alongside Jaylani (research and translation assistant) who is a man from Mikindani. With cultural sensibilities at the forefront of my mind, however, I was able to conduct interviews with women from this age range, although women were generally less inclined to being interviewed than men. This is especially interesting when reflecting on Geiger’s (1996) view that Tanzanian postcolonial national history has largely been re-written, precluding the crucial role
played by women in the anti-colonial Tanganyikan nationalist movement of the 1950s and in the founding of TANU. This represents a re-writing of history which I did not want replicate hence it was necessary to approach many more women for an interview than men. This was not, however, only a means of avoiding or creating historical inaccuracies but was also to ensure that as broad a selection of views and individuals as possible were offered from both villages.

The vast majority of people on the coast of south-eastern Tanzania are Islamic and this meant that, without making a conscious decision, all interviewees were Muslim. Tribal/ethnic distinctions were also considered at the outset and while the eastern part of the Mtwara region is largely inhabited by Makonde people, migration was possibly even more common in the recent past than it is in the present (Lal, 2010). The majority of interviewees were from the village in which the interviews were conducted or at least from somewhere in the region. Wamakonde (Makonde people) also originate from the far north of Mozambique so a number of interviewees either came from Mozambique or had spent a period of time there. With all of these considerations in mind, I decided to employ a spatial strategy in both villages in an attempt to cover all of the various areas of each village and interviewees were selected at random, based on their availability and by approximating their age before interviews took place. It was also important to ensure that people were aware of the project, why I was conducting it and what were required to do. In a research trip at the end of 2008 I was able to tell numerous people of my plans and this laid a useful platform for my fieldwork, both in Mikindani and Dihimba.

25 Out of the sixty interviews conducted, twenty-four were with women; eleven in Dihimba and thirteen in Mikindani, respectively. It was common for women to refuse interviews although only one man did so during the time spent in the two villages.
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK CONTEXT

The terms method and methodology are often used synonymously, however it is important to distinguish between the two. The methods of research refer specifically to “the techniques or procedures used to collect and analyse data. Methodology on the other hand, refers to discussions of how research is done, or should be done, and to the critical analysis of research” (Blaikie, 2000b: 8, emphasis added). The methods used will be considered in more detail in the third section of this chapter while a full discussion of methodology is detailed below. Methodology, then, entails all of the techniques and processes utilised to achieve certain specified research goals and Padaki (below) offers a useful diagram to understand the key features of any methodology.

**Figure 4.2: Explaining Methodology**

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\text{Methodology} = \text{theory + principles + tools/techniques + operating skills for reliable outcomes}
\]

(taken from Padaki, 2007: 66)

Before conducting any research it is vitally important to ensure that the theory and principles that underpin the research project are well established, and that they fit with the research techniques/methods proposed. The first three chapters along with the first section of this chapter have ascertained the theory and principles that underpin this research and in investigating views of development, the primary research sought to uncover the views of older people in two villages within south-eastern Tanzania. The justifications for a case study approach involving interviews and focus groups are given below, however, it is also important to illustrate that research of this nature clearly fits
into a certain methodological framework, informed by a specific epistemology and ontology which together support the use of the primary research methods employed.

4.2.1 Defining the Field(s)

“In order to have conversations and do research it is necessary to have “a field”: marked off in space and time. Through this localizing strategy by which a physical space is marked off for a period of time, “we” – ethnographers – define a site of inquiry that is necessarily artificial in its separations from geographical space and the flow of time. In most cases it is the ethnographer who draws the lines, defining in and out. Each focus, of course, excludes as well as includes” (Katz, 1994: 67).

This is a useful excerpt with which to begin a discussion of the fieldwork conducted although I go slightly beyond this description in referring to two field(s) as a doctoral researcher; both the localized fieldwork area (of Katz, above) and the broader, more abstract field of academia. The constraints and logistics of doing doctoral fieldwork meant that I had to ‘draw the lines’, defining the ‘ins and outs’ of this research and to frame the selection of Mikindani and Dihimba, which has been discussed. This marked out the physical space (and a time period of five months) of ‘the field’ although this does not mean that each village is defined as a vessel of given cultural attributes, which Appadurai (1988) guards against. Nevertheless Clifford (1997) adds that ‘informants’ should neither be seen as unique individuals or cultural types but an amalgamation of the two (Clifford, 1997), what I take to mean the bearers and makers of culture. Katz (above) refers specifically to ‘ethnographers’ and while this thesis is not an ethnographic study of Dihimba and Mikindani, ethnographic research forms a small part of the broader research strategy (see 4.3.3). This is especially relevant in an academic terrain wherein positivism “still holds sway” while “ethnographic and other forms of qualitative research
have been required to conform to standards that are external to their constitution” (Katz, 1994: 69). Thus, quantitative research standards (from other disciplinary contexts) have often infiltrated qualitative methods.

As a doctoral researcher, I inhabit a lowly status in the academic field, even in spite of my relatively privileged position in the research ‘field’ (in terms of wealth and access to opportunities as opposed to the majority of people in both villages). Indeed, the ability to define the ‘research field’ is inhibited by a lack of status in the academic field given the necessity to conform to certain requirements and protocols in order to succeed. Thus it is the “hegemony that the academy holds over its members, especially students and others who feel disadvantaged within the academy (due to their class, race, gender backgrounds, perhaps?) to ‘speak’ in a certain way can trouble and delimit the scope of much development research” (Raghuram and Madge, 2006: 276). Nevertheless, I have been able to conduct the research in the manner that was initially set out, and in spite of this academic power play, employing post-colonial approaches in postcolonial contexts offered a clear way forward. Fields of power clearly exist when it comes to fieldwork, especially in a postcolonial context and it is the “power to define “the field” which imposes me/the fieldworker on the time-space of others. I am an outsider in this context, but once there, of course, am not outside the power dynamics of the space so marked” (Katz, 1994: 68). The next section investigates the problems, challenges and advantages of doing research in a postcolonial setting, partially drawing from post-colonial perspectives and methodologies.
4.2.2 Fieldwork in a Postcolonial Setting

In spite of many problems with the idea and theories of post-colonialism (some of which are discussed in 2.5), it is not seen as particularly problematic to describe Tanzania as a postcolonial context, accepting that this refers to the formal dissolution of the colonial period as well as continued (neo)colonial relations. When it comes to doing fieldwork in postcolonial contexts, some argue that the relationship between the researcher and the researched can appear representative of “asymmetrical transcultural relations” and an obvious historical comparison can be made with the “interactions between coloniser and colonised” (Butz and Bezio, 2004: 351). Skelton (2001) accepts that the colonial past can affect the relationships that ‘we’ (presumably referring to people from former colonial powers or Northern institutions) are able to establish during the research process, but adds that deference of some interviewees who feel that they have to give an interview, is likely to be matched by others who flatly refuse given that ‘we’ represent the exploitative colonial past. It is also highly plausible that many of the people who live where research is planned to take place “decide to keep an open mind about us as individuals, wait until they get a sense of who we are and what we are like and then choose whether or not to get involved with the research” (Skelton, 2001: 89).

Some elements of post-colonialism are useful and suit the epistemology of this research in part because of a recognition of the political ramifications of speaking about or on behalf of people whose voices are excluded from academic discussion, whether because of access, intelligibility, visibility or even contemporary existence (Spivak, 1999). Given that the field of post-colonialism is influenced by some of the central tenets of post-structuralism, a post-colonial methodology (even if such a notion seems strange)
must seek to deconstruct the subjectivity-objectivity binary associated with positivist approaches. Thus, there is a degree of overlap between this research and post-colonial studies; first because this research took place in a postcolonial context, second, and possibly more importantly, since it shares some of the ontological and epistemological foundations of post-colonialism. This is most clearly witnessed in the argument for “a radical reconstruction of history and knowledge production, demanding attention to a diversity of perspectives and priorities” (Raghuram and Madge, 2006: 277). This is not to suggest that the post-colonial field is central to this thesis or that it is preferred above all others (see chapter two), but it does illustrate that some elements of post-colonialism are useful for this research methodology and the particular focus on otherwise ‘lost voices’. Researcher reflexivity is vital and it is important to remain aware of the likelihood that researcher’s hold a privileged position in terms of wealth, education and so on, especially in postcolonial contexts (Valentine, 2005).

Katz (1994; 2004) argues that researcher reflexivity is essential and in terms of her own fieldwork feels that she benefited by not being affiliated with any group or project during her time in Sudan. While Sudan is clearly a postcolonial context, she argues that the relatively “light touch” of colonialism (which she compares with the depth of colonial penetration in Kenya) meant that most did not see her background as a significant concern. This partly overlaps with this research and while I would not advocate that colonialism had a relatively “light touch” in what constitutes modern-day Tanzania, most of the people that I approached (in each village) were prepared to entertain my thoughts, possibly owing to interest or boredom, whether in spite, because, or regardless of the postcolonial context. Two of the biggest issues that I faced were; managing to
interview enough women twenty-six (see 4.1.4 above) and my oft-assumed connection with an NGO (especially in Mikindani). However, after a brief explanation of the project, most of those approached agreed to be interviewed. Thus, I feel that I was largely seen as autonomous in both villages, as Katz (1994) felt in Sudan.

This research, then, analyzes the validity of my ontological assumption that there are numerous ways in which development can be understood, especially by those on the receiving end of various interventions in a postcolonial context. Of course, I am keenly aware that my own culture and education played an important part in determining the character of the research that I conducted and throughout I have attempted to maintain a high degree of critical self reflection and to appreciate that the interview data collected is inherently influenced by my involvement, particularly as an mzungu (white or European) researcher in Tanzania. Thus, my overall methodological approach, how I seek to investigate what I believe can be known, is built on “epistemological and ontological foundations” which determine “the research methods chosen” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 201). The specific foundations led me to the decision that semi-structured interviews and focus groups were the key methods to use for my primary research.

4.3 RESEARCH METHODS

This section reveals the techniques employed in this thesis, which challenges normative understandings of development by discovering the different meanings attributed to the term by those on the receiving end of various interventions. In an effort to delineate narratives of numerous past and present interventions this research employed numerous

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26 Some women were reticent about being interviewed and often replied with statements like “I don’t know anything about politics,” “ask my husband” or “I can’t remember.”
techniques with semi-structured interviews seen as an exemplary means for uncovering (and partially creating) the breadth of views on offer. These methods were also used in an attempt to ensure that it was the views of interviewees, rather than those of the interviewer, that were garnered. Moreover, the partial focus on history meant that some of the methods associated with oral or life histories were employed and while interviewing clearly represents the primary research strategy, this was supported by a few other methods, and not least five focus groups which serve to ‘thicken’ descriptions.

**4.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews**

Interviewing is one of the most common qualitative research methods and there are many different ways in which they can be conducted. These range from interviews that are almost totally unstructured, to those that are extremely regimented and structured, often favoured by positivist researchers seeking generalizable and quantifiable data (May, 2001). Semi-structured interviews fit somewhere between these outliers and draw elements from both and allow for a broad list of themes or a number of pre-defined questions (as expected in structured interviews) to be sketched to assist the researcher. These themes and questions can be subtly manipulated by an interviewer who is keen to expand on certain points and especially those not considered from the outset. Thus, I did not produce a full list of pre-determined questions since this reduces the likelihood that issues are understood “on the interviewees’ own terms”, yet it was “important to work out a list of themes that you want to cover in each interview” (Valentine, 2005: 119). Semi-structuring allows interviewers “to probe beyond the answers in a manner which

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27 Flick (2002: 74-95) offers a useful overview of numerous different types of semi-structured interview and refers to different levels of structuring. There is insufficient space to give this more than a cursory glance here.
would appear prejudiced to the aims of standardization and comparability” (May, 2001: 123), which is clearly in line with the methodology that I sought to employ.

It seems fair to suggest that most of the interviews conducted were forms of social construction, which progressed in the manner of a conversation. This allowed interviewees to relax and conducting interviews within or outside of their houses enhanced this. I feel that this was a good decision, particularly given that there is no “sterilised context” in which researchers can provide “a ‘mirror reflection’ of social reality” with all interviews “obviously and exclusively an interaction between interviewer and interview subject” (Miller and Glassner, 1997: 99). Interviews were interactive and while they also involved Jaylani (research and translation assistant from Mikindani), this further facilitated dialogue and, I feel, enhanced conversations, leading to broader findings than would have been garnered through questionnaires or structured interviews. However, it is also important to acknowledge that by working with an interpreter, to whatever extent this is done, might mean that some information is missed or misunderstood. This is perhaps more significant when it comes to semi-structured interviews given that the researcher seeks to guide the interviews in some way. While I was able to do this for the most part, on occasion it was difficult to follow the thread, especially if interlocutors began to speak in Kimakonde (a more localized language). At the outset of each interview we also asked interviewees about level of education, previous and current forms of employment, whether they were born in the village at hand or had moved there and their religion. However, these did not seem to lead to correlate significantly with particular findings.
The open ended nature of the interviews meant that analyzing that data was a large and time consuming task and one that I grappled with once the sixty interviews had taken place and I had returned to the UK. Initially, I distilled each transcript (which were transcribed and translated as immediately as possible, see section 4.4) into a one page overview and then coded the data so that I could highlight the most common themes. These fitted neatly around the three dimensions that are highlighted to interpret the perceptions of development on offer throughout this thesis, namely: materiality, place and history/‘the past’. Given the particular focus on history from the outset, it was also useful to draw from life history approaches. This research drew from oral history methods and while this not an oral history project that looks many generations into the past, oral history is one of the more common methods of detailing national and family histories across Africa and a life history methodology might therefore have relevance in a Tanzanian context (Thompson, 2000). However, a clear distinction has “to be made between personal oral histories – eye-witness accounts – which are relatively easy to evaluate, and oral traditions – which are handed down by word of mouth to later generations” (Thompson, 2000: 166). Thus, I chose to focus on the life history of participants, based on their memories and not on anything prior to their life to help construct more detailed explanations of the meaning of ‘development’ in south-eastern Tanzania.

4.3.2 Life History Approaches

Slim and Thompson (1998) present an overview of the numerous approaches to life history interviews, but the two focussed on here are “life history interviews” and “single-issue interviews”. The former are described as individual life stories, usually through a
one-to-one encounter(s), allowing for someone “to narrate the story of his or her life in all dimensions: personal, spiritual, social and economic (Slim and Thompson, 1998: 116). This proved useful in trying to get a sense of people’s lives and how they understand key processes in their ‘representations of pastness’, a more useful phrase than ‘history’ for Tonkin. These representations are “made in interaction, situated in real time and space... they are purposeful social actions. This is so whether the past-oriented reference is a long, structured discourse, or just a brief comment or allusion” (Tonkin, 1992: 3). The particular focus on development, however, meant that elements of the “single-issue interview” proved more useful. This approach allows for investigations “into a particular area of knowledge or experience” (Slim and Thompson, 1998: 117), which formed part of the techniques employed. It was useful to draw from life history methods in an attempt to include perceptions of some of the major external processes that have influenced people’s lives in south-eastern Tanzania over the past sixty years or so.

Life history approaches seek to understand history in the terms laid out by the interviewee, allowing for individual agency in the interview process and not intending to force conventional or academic views of the past. Tonkin (1992) argues that personal histories tend to impact understandings of the present and future, while in his research in Tanzania, Kamat argues that “memories of the past that are socially reconstructed to make sense of and negotiate the present” (Kamat, 2008: 360). Without meaning to attribute too much to potential interviewees prior to conducting the research, I did assume that older people would have something to offer, in an attempt to “understand how history-as-lived is connected to history-as-recorded” which requires us “to look at the actors concerned, who are living and developing in times that also change” (Tonkin,
1992: 12). The relationship between the interviewer and interviewee is important, especially in postcolonial contexts, and this is equally true of life history interviews (indeed of most non-positivist research) which involve the active participation of the researcher. Regardless of how minimal that involvement is, it inevitably affects the data gathered and to ignore this is to risk the interviewer infusing the interview process with their own view of the past (see Grele, 1998: 44-48). At the same time narrators are not powerless in the construction of a narrative and may also have their own agenda (Yarrow, 2008), often taking interviews in the specific direction that they choose.

Yarrow (2008) argues that life-history approaches, while important and revealing, may not be deemed to be as important in ‘other’ contexts as they are considered to be in ‘Western’ academia. The postcolonial era has been marked by the increasing use of oral history as a source, yet this “has been predominantly Anglo-American; and it was surprisingly slow to include social history recording the experience of ordinary African people” (Thompson, 2000: 68). While this is seen as a problematic phrase, this research does attempt to counter this trend by investigating ‘the experience of ordinary African people’, albeit through the lens of development interventions and, taking my lead from Geiger (1996; see 2.5.2), I try not to generalize too much about a given group (older people) based on my findings. While life history interview methods proved useful as part of the semi-structured interviews conducted, these are further supplemented by focus groups, which uncovered both similar and different findings and serve to increase the thoroughness of the research.
4.3.3 Focus Groups

Focus Groups were conducted in support of the primary research strategy of semi-structured interviewing, in order to discover whether perspectives differed dramatically when questions were asked in a different, more public environment. Conradson (2005) suggests that focus groups are a means of setting up conversations between participants, a way of artificially establishing debate around certain issues. Such an approach thus helped to generate findings which differed in some ways to those gathered during interviews. Implementing a small number of focus groups served to enhance the findings and helped to produce different sorts of data, capturing the interstices of participant’s views and allowing for the inclusion of groups of young people. Each focus group contained between four and six participants (suitable numbers for Bloor et al., 2001). Even though only five focus groups were conducted in total, these yielded more varied perspectives and initiated dialogue, which both supported and challenged the views of fellow participants. Focus groups thus allowed for individual and more collective (or contested) perspectives to emerge alongside the more exclusive views generated from interviews. Indeed, focus groups can also dilute the researcher/researched power dichotomy, encouraging greater participation as a result (Laws, 2003). Setting up focus groups of some the same individuals, to discuss similar issues, meant that power dynamics which might preclude some from full participation (Conradson, 2005) were also circumvented. However, Jaylani and I had to play a more active role in facilitating debate and while this necessity remained rare, our involvement (as with all facilitators) might establish a power dynamic between the researchers and participants (Laws, 2003) and
such a dynamic might seem particularly flagrant in the context of research in the postcolonial world.

The five focus groups conducted further increase the rigour of this research, both ‘thickening’ the description of social reality and allowing for further reminiscing, which affirms shared experiences that can only be garnered through focus groups (Kamat, 2008). Focus groups represent an important dimension of my overall research strategy at the outset and it is important to acknowledge that the three focus groups conducted with older people tended to reflect the most common findings from the interviews conducted in each village and they are therefore largely integrated within the overall findings in the following three chapters. The two focus groups conducted with younger people (one in each village) do not offer a representative account of the views of this cohort; however, they are drawn on at times, in order to highlight similar perspectives on certain issues or to emphasize clear intergenerational differences. This is particularly salient when it comes to the idea that age has effectively cast aside older people’s ‘capacity to aspire’ (see section 5.4.2), as argued by some of the younger people involved in focus groups. Elsewhere younger people largely agree that the microfinance scheme regularly referred to by wazee was both ill-conceived and badly designed (see section 6.2.1). Indeed, it is of interest that only one of the sixty wazee interviewed had been involved in a microfinance project, while individuals in both of the focus groups conducted with younger people had some experience of these small-scale loans. This perhaps adds some weight to claims that older people are sidelined when it comes to contemporary ‘development’ interventions. While these were not central to the overall
research design, they benefit the analysis of the perceptions of development held by wazee in these ways.

**4.4 CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS**

This chapter illustrates some of the key decisions that I had to make before conducting my primary research. As an investigation of the perceptions of development from the perspectives of older people – who have lived through numerous eras and are likely to have witnessed numerous different forms of intervention – deciding to conduct this research in south-eastern Tanzania was extremely appropriate. The emphasis on ‘development’ in Tanzanian political discourse was demonstrated previously (see 3.1) and represents a forerunner for the strategic choice of researching in the south-east. This is coupled with numerous related factors considered and not least because; the Groundnut Scheme seemed to have had a major impact in the early 1950s, and while Mtwara is the third smallest of Tanzania’s twenty-six regions, it was the most extensively ‘villagized’ containing around one eighth of all of the Ujamaa villages formed (Killian, 2003). It has also been argued that ‘the south’ is in some ways less ‘developed’ than other parts of the country, not least owing to the perception that the region is beset by a poor level of infrastructure, especially regarding the road to Dar-es-Salaam. Outward differences in the level of infrastructure seem to be one of the clear differences between Mikindani and Dihimba, the two villages in which this research was conducted.

Given that perceptions of development are central to this thesis, the differing levels of recent intervention in the villages and the different histories, in terms of development projects, permanently resident NGOs and the impact of villagization and liberalization,
are seen to further support this research. However, it must also be recognized that prior knowledge of the area and contacts also gave me assurances that I would be able to conduct such research. I had a reliable support network in Mikindani, Dihimba and Mtwara town and knew that there would be plenty of potential participants. While it might seem that the place (at various scales) in which I conducted the research has determined the shape of this research, it was more of a reciprocal process wherein the type of research, the research methods employed, and the location of that research were all continually informed and overlapped so that it is too simplistic to suggest that prior knowledge of Tanzania and specifically the south-east was the only determining factor in the research undertaken. Indeed, considerations of methodology and methods were as important as deciding on research locations.

Locating the research also required me to effectively ‘define the field’ and once this was done, it was important to acknowledge that places are not as easily definable as suggested in the section which analyzes the similarities and differences between Dihimba and Mikindani. It was also important to acknowledge that research in a postcolonial context might generate further fields of power beyond those associated with the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee. However, it was once again important not to assume too much about interviewees prior to conducting interviews, or to forward and favour my own opinions over and above those of participants. The focus on lost voices mean that some elements of post-colonial theories were drawn upon, not least in the partial attempt to re-construct history and to understand it from the perspective of interviewees at all times framed by the idea of ‘development’ and certain interventions. Reflexivity was at the forefront of my mind
throughout this research both in terms of the postcolonial context in which the research took place and the actual methods employed.

I conducted sixty semi-structured interviews, thirty in Mikindani and the same number in Dihimba, which were deemed as the most appropriate method to use based on my epistemology and ontology. Semi-structured interviews allowed me to identify a broad range of themes prior to conducting each interview and with Jaylani (research and translation assistant) sketched a few general questions and topics for discussion, which allowed for further investigation of significant points that arose, especially pertaining to *maendeleo*. This was further supported by drawing from life history approaches and some of the components of a “single issue interview” (Slim and Thompson, 1998), which meant considering the term from historical and contemporary perspectives. While power dynamics were considered and cited as a potential problem with this research, they didn’t seem to present too much of a problem in reality, especially given that Jaylani did all of the interviews with me. He is from Mikindani but also has family connections in Dihimba and his presence seemed to put interviewees at ease. I also conducted three focus groups in Mikindani and two in Dihimba (one in each place was with younger people) which further conveyed the heterogeneity of opinions on offer and further supported the emergence of certain key themes, thereby enhancing the rigour of the research.

Focus groups and interviewing represent the predominant research methods employed but were supplemented by numerous approaches to ensure that the time spent in ‘the field’ was used as fully as possible. During five months of fieldwork I lived in Mikindani but regularly travelled to Dihimba and spent numerous days there during each
trip. It was therefore inevitable that I conducted a degree of participant observation, the method ‘par excellence’ of ethnographic study in villages for Caldeira (2000: 11), more a felicitous outcome than a deliberate research strategy. I did not conduct ‘an ethnography’ of each village, but rather I did some degree of ethnographic research within each village (this distinction is emphasized by Caldeira in research into the neighbourhoods of São Paulo). Being based within the two villages at hand certainly added to the findings and informal conversations again highlighted many of the most common views on offer, particularly among wazee. My closest friends in the Mtwara region largely backed up the findings from the focus groups with younger people in each village, while they many were pleased about the sort of research that I was undertaking. There were high levels of deference when it came to investigating the views of older people and their life experience. This might seem ironic in some senses, given how regularly older people referred to the clear fact that younger people no longer had the same degree of respect, while at the same time some youth felt that development maendeleo should indeed focus on the young, as many wazee argue.”

Data was fully analysed once the fieldwork was completed, but each interview that took place in Mikindani was fully transcribed and translated immediately afterwards with Jaylani. This process was slightly different in Dihimba given that there is not a mains power supply and transcription and translation had to take place in Mikindani. This meant that I made regular trips to Dihimba to conduct interviews and returned to Mikindani to transcribe these. However, this problem was mitigated by the fact that all interviews were digitally recorded so that little was lost in the delay to transcription and translation. I took a case study approach to tackle the overall research problem and
spent five months in Tanzania, the vast majority of which was spent in Mikindani, with regular trips made to Dihimba. These findings are discussed in the next three chapters, with the following chapter focussing specifically on the role of materiality in perceptions of *maendeleo*. 
CHAPTER FIVE

Development as Inaccessible Material Change

Development is like this: if I have chickens or goats and they give birth and I sell them I could get things and I would progress. The town is developing but I am not, have we developed? Don’t you see this mud hut? Above here I was helped [he received a metal roof from the government] but maybe now I should get money to build a door, here there are no doors.

Mzee 28 Bashir – Interview 28 Mikindani, 12th July 2009

I am too old. For development, it is preferable to help young people who are strong. It is not only my child but all children within a village that must go to school... I can say that here in Dihimba there are certainly no NGOs, I have seen nothing like that. We heard about loans but we were unsure of the benefit of these. This year young people have begun taking loans but we know that after three months you will see the young people who took the loans selling the table that they got last year to make the repayments. Old people like us could take a loan but it is difficult because there is no support for old people, we do not get our share. Elders would know how to arrange repayments after getting loans because we are experienced but we get nothing.

Mzee Mohammedi – Interview 23, Dihimba 30th June 2009

Only a few people are developed and they are happy but God has arranged that we should be poor and we live without happiness. I can’t say that I am happy, poor people like us are not looked after. Rich people do not think about us and don’t worry about our development. I don’t get anything, no help from the government even though I am not farming. I should farm to cover my basic needs but I can’t at this age. If I could produce more crops I would sell them and get money and build a better hut to sleep in.

Bibi Mariamu – Interview 21 Mikindani, 19th June 2009

28Real names are not used in order to maintain anonymity. Bibi refers to older women and Mzee to older men.
5.1 INTRODUCTION: MATERIALITY AND SYMBOLISM

Development is defined in many different and overlapping ways by interviewees in Mikindani and Dihimba, the two villages in south-eastern Tanzania in which interviews were conducted. The above extracts reflect the centrality of material concerns in the perceptions of development held by wazee (older people), with material welfare an important element of many of the facets of maendeleo. It must be acknowledged that interlocutors are keenly aware of material inequalities based on wealth, age and power and associate these with an attendant discourse of maendeleo at local, regional, national and global levels. This chapter documents readings of development in relation to ‘things’, money and services (usually education, healthcare and water), either seen as a process which enables access to these ‘things’ or understood as individual material improvement in a literal sense. However, it was consistently argued that this had not been the experience of many older people interviewed who felt that their ‘time has passed’. Wazee invariably argue that development is only accessible to young and powerful people within the village, or that it is associated with other places or with the past. Time and place are considered in more detail in the following chapters, and the focus on materialist readings of development here underpin the spatial and temporal perspectives that follow. It is also important to briefly preface the chapter with an overview of the past livelihoods of those interviewed.

While there are key historical and contemporary differences between the two villages within which research was conducted (see section 4.1.3 for more on this), when it comes to the past livelihoods of the residents these tend to be similar between Mikindani and Dihimba, especially given high levels of historical migration within the
Mtwara region (Lal, 2010). Most have relied on farming both for subsistence and for income generation within both villages for much of their lives and particularly cashew nut production for the latter within Mtwara. During the late 1940s and early 1950s many highlighted the employment created by the colonial Groundnut Scheme and by ancillary projects relating to this, particularly building the train line from the coast to the interior and the new port and town at Mtwara, while sisal estates were a source of work before and following independence (see sections 4.1.3 and 7.3.2). A minority of those interviewed had some experience of working for the state (colonial and post-colonial) in some capacity and it seems clear that these have had some impact on perceptions of development, particularly in terms of the materiality of development (see section 5.2).

This chapter initially analyzes the importance of materiality in perceptions of *maendeleo* and the widespread focus on the need for ‘things’, including: technological improvements to farming tools, more and better quality food, a ‘good’ house, and access to money. Material welfare is often at the forefront of readings of development, with the potential for development often seen to be underpinned by a culture of education and hard work. However, the extent to which development is achievable is continually questioned. The third section reflects the continuing influence of Nyerere and of *Ujamaa* discourse, yet the reality is that the standard of education (espoused as crucial for development by Nyerere) is too low and ‘hard work’ is only possible if employment is guaranteed. In the fourth section the widespread distinction made between personal and overall development is explored; the former is encapsulated by much of the previous section while the latter is understood on a more general level, often connected with social services. Many argued that while overall development is possible and has been
witnessed, individual/personal development is largely absent and is only accessible to young and powerful people. The fifth section builds on this and illustrates that the specific development projects and NGOs experienced also preference the young, powerful and comparatively wealthy. However, a minority of informants were reticent concerning development projects and interventions and this was equally the case with *maendeleo*.

It is important to begin with an analysis of the word *maendeleo* employed herein as a synonym for development, a notoriously difficult word to translate. The specific history of the Kiswahili term *maendeleo* is highlighted given that it has been employed to refer to various things by many different institutions over time. While most interlocutors held a range of views on the meaning of development, a minority either refused to offer an explanation of the meaning of the term or were largely unaware of it. This is clearly an important finding in a research project seeking to uncover voices that might otherwise be lost from development debates.

### 5.1.1 *Maendeleo* as Development

‘Development’ is a particularly difficult word to translate (Woolcock, 2009) and the close Kiswahili equivalent of *maendeleo* is employed herein. The root of *maendeleo* is the verb ‘-endelea’ which effectively means to progress/to go forward, and this etymology largely mirrors the effective alignment of development with progress, as witnessed in post-war developmentalism (see 2.1.1). The connection between development and progress is inherent in the term *maendeleo*, which has elsewhere been determined as relevant to localised readings of development in Tanzania (Green, 2000; Marsland, 2007). While it is
important to illustrate this etymology, this term has acquired numerous meanings in the recent past and “although *maendeleo* is widely used in East Africa and often denotes similar ideas about development and progress, *maendeleo* is not a unitary, fixed discourse over time and space, but rather is mutable, contingent, and open to local reinterpretation and appropriation” (Mercer, 2002: 111). Thus, *maendeleo* can be used to refer both to: interventions by ‘external agents’ (the establishment of ‘development’ projects and the work of NGOs), and private investments (Green, 2000) reflected in the view that: “to have a shop and to have enough money is the meaning of the word development” (Bibi Ausi, Dihimba). *Maendeleo* has clearly taken on many meanings, and it is necessary to juxtapose this with a brief overview of the historical significance of the term, which remains central to postcolonial Tanzanian political discourse and has been referred to from the late colonial era onwards (see 3.1).

*Maendeleo* has a particular historical inflection in Tanzania, resonating with the political and economic thought of Nyerere and related to self-reliance (*kujitegemea*), unity (*umoja*) and cooperation (*kushirikiana*) (Harrison, 2008; Hunter, 2008) all of which featured heavily in the ideology of *Ujamaa*. Connections are often made between these three characteristics, which are together seen as precursors for development today: “people have to unite and cooperate, no development can be made by one person” (Mzee Nguruwe, Mikindani). This legacy is echoed throughout many of the interviews, seemingly involuntarily at times: “*maendeleo* is unity, *maendeleo* means unity. For *maendeleo* citizens must improve and rely on themselves” (Bibi Lukia, Mikindani). The importance of citizenship is also a common theme, with many consistently referring to their rights as citizens (*raia* or *mwananchi*) but adding that their expectations are not
being met. Many feel that the symbiotic relationship between citizens and the government should lead to development, but “if the government fails to work with the citizens, it will fail” (Mzee Karimu, Mikindani).

In spite of attempts made by Tanzanian political leaders (in CCM – the main political party) to distance themselves from the socialist ideology and policies of TANU (latterly CCM) and the rhetoric of Nyerere (Askew, 2006), the term *maendeleo* seems inextricably bound up within this discourse. While the historical legacy of the term might pose a challenge to the legitimacy of utilising *maendeleo* in a research project of this nature, the various ways in which the term has been employed over time and the meanings attached to it is in fact the central question, through an investigation of the personal experience of wazee. Moreover, as illustrated in the second chapter, development was central to political discourse prior to and following the (supposedly) crucial historical moment of independence (Schneider, 2006). The focus on older people is intended to allow historical understandings to emerge given that their views are often overlooked within mainstream development discourse with a clear preference for focussing on the present or the future. *Maendeleo* has numerous general and context-specific meanings, which depend both upon who is speaking and where they are speaking from (literally and figuratively). The focus on older people (a group that is under-researched in the development field) in south-eastern Tanzania (often sidelined in academic research; see Seppälä and Koda, 1998) is novel and has uncovered some unique findings, illustrating the breadth of views offered concerning *maendeleo*, however this research inevitably shares similar findings with other studies (see 3.3). Nevertheless, a minority within each
village were either unaware of *maendeleo* or felt unable to discuss the idea and this is briefly highlighted below.

5.1.2 “*Maendeleo?*” – Development as Less than Omnipresent

“Development? I have just heard the word. I don’t know the meaning of development” (*Mzee Asabana, Mikindani*).

A handful of interviewees were largely unaware of the word *maendeleo* or felt unable to explain its meaning. This is evidenced above and in the words of Bibi Furaha (Mikindani):

“development? I don’t know what development is, I have heard people farm, or that development is to work, development is to do what?” In spite of regular references to *maendeleo*, some interlocutors were unaware of ‘development’ and of interventions that might have utilised the term *maendeleo* in the past or in the present. This must not be underestimated in research that strives to expose alternative readings of development and to overlook these might repeat narrow, well-edited elite histories of Development and of Tanzania (as in chapter two and three). Nevertheless, it might be surprising that a reasonable minority of participants were largely unaware of the word *maendeleo* and of ideas and views usually related to this term, given the pervasiveness with which it has been employed over time.29 *Maendeleo* was promised by the colonial government, drawn on as part of calls for independence and by the post-independence socialist government and more recently taken on to describe the work of NGOs and through *miradi ya maendeleo* (‘development projects’).

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29 This might say something equally significant concerning the supposed ostracism and the idea that ‘the south’ has been deliberately underdeveloped.
Individuals who refused, or felt unable to offer explanations of development also tended to hold very particular, non-linear readings of history, and tended not to present the nostalgic reading of ‘the past’ as the ‘time of development’ that are analyzed later (chapter seven). If *maendeleo* is seen as progress or positive change, it is reasonable to argue that those who do not interpret history in a linear manner are likely to have fewer opinions when it comes to putative differences. A lack of knowledge or experience when it comes to development is also explained with reference to age and education: “I don’t know the benefits and meaning of development because my time has passed. If I was young I might know, but for now I do not understand development” (Bibi Lukia, Dihimba). Confusion is another factor to consider, given the numerous meanings that have been attributed to development and the manifold ways in which the term has been employed: “I do not understand the word development because some are saying development is to get something, others that development is to know something and others still that it means to do something. So this thing [*maendeleo*], I don’t know what it is” (Mzee Mustafa, Dihimba). The two previous citations both convey an awareness of development and of the term *maendeleo*, but this is coupled with a refusal to explain it: age is the prohibitive factor in the former, whereas the overuse of the term is seen to make it vacuous in the latter. These are significant and highly astute points to make and one which mirror broader debates among academics, policymakers and practitioners alike concerning the meaning of development, a term that is widely employed often without delimiting its meaning.

The small proportion of interviewees that are unaware of the term, know little of the ideas pertaining to development, or feel that these were so discrepant that a singular
idea of ‘development’ is problematic are an important group and represent ten of the interviewees (out of sixty). This thesis represents a sustained investigation into the perceptions of development held by older people and failing to recognize this small but significant minority would weaken this research. While, at times, this group raised some of the same arguments concerning personal material gain, for example, the fact that they did not frame their views with the term maendeleo is significant, especially given the importance placed on the term throughout. Emphasis is placed on the absence of material wealth and resources, however, both by those interviewees that attach meaning to development and those that do not. Regardless of whether individuals feel that they know and understand the term or not, it is often seen as something of a bogus concept to many of the wazee involved (since they have not experienced it) and the focus of the following section is on those who feel able to explain the term maendeleo and to explain the related absence of material welfare.

5.2 THE MATERIALITY OF MAENDELEO: PERSONAL PROGRESS AND ‘THINGS’

“Development means to succeed, to prosper. It means that if I do something today, I will improve my house or have a big farm with cows. But for us there is nothing” (Bibi Salima, Mikindani).

“I must work for myself to get development. I should grow crops to eat and to sell and with money from these crops I can get clothes, feed my children and if I need a bicycle I could buy one. To be in this state is to already have development” (Mzee Liundi, Dihimba).

The excerpts above reflect the common observation that development refers to improvements in personal material welfare understood as the increased access to money and through the greater availability of vitu (‘things’). Development, in the above
excerpts, is finite and quantifiable and specific reference is made to small-scale outcomes and improved individual material welfare. This reflects the views of many interlocutors and echoes the idea of ‘maendeleo ya mtu binafsi’, or ‘personal/self(ish) development’ that Green (2000) found to be prevalent in southern Tanzania\(^\text{30}\), as opposed to more collectivist readings of development. This is further reflected in the widespread view offered above that: “I must work for myself to get development” (Mzee Liundi, Dihimba). Many wazee reflect such perspectives but emphasize that their inability to rely solely upon themselves reflected the absence rather than the presence of development in their lives. Agricultural surpluses are seen to hold the potential to generate wealth and therefore ‘bring development’, which starts “with farming. If you harvest enough food you can sell some and become wealthy but this has not happened in Dihimba, there has not been development... Development means a good house in order to sleep well and good food, but for me there is nothing” (Bibi Shuwea, Dihimba).

Agriculture remains the main source of employment in the Mtwara region and is widely apprehended as essential for development. Maendeleo is partly understood in a symbolic sense and particularly related to improving the quality of interviewees’ housing, with poor quality housing often cited as a sign of the absence of personal development. A house with brick walls and a metal roof is often seen as a symbol of maendeleo, with similar arguments made throughout Tanzania and across eastern and southern Africa (Ferguson, 2006; Green, 2000; Kamat, 2008). Thus it is argued that the materialization of development would be marked by some kind of “sign but I still live in this broken house” (Mzee Muksini, Dihimba). These examples demonstrate the widespread view that development, when related to personal material benefit, is not something that

\(^{30}\)Some interviewees used this exact phrase to focus on development as personal, rather than public gain.
interviewees feel they have experienced. Indeed, the inaccessibility of other material resources, clothes and farming tools for example, are given as signs of the absence of development.

Interviewees consistently argue that Tanzania’s second President Mwinyi ‘opened the borders’ after the retirement of Nyerere and allowed more ‘things’ (especially clothes) to flow into the country from abroad (referring to liberalization in the mid-1980s). Clothes and shoes are often as things which have emerged and improved, although most interviewees argue that these cannot be accessed by older and poorer people, especially given dramatic increases in the prices of all food and goods. The lack of improvements to the farming tools of older people is also presented as emblematic of the absence of personal development. Each of these examples signify the widespread view that maendeleo relates more to absence than to a process of positive material change. It would seem that changes were expected, but seemingly not witnessed during the lives of the interviewees. Indeed, many suggest that things have effectively gone backwards (-rudi nyuma).

5.2.1 Development Through Farming: Tools and Technology

*I don’t have development... Me and my wife farm using a small hoe, we work hard and farm one hectare to harvest three or four bags of millet. There are five children in the house and the food is not enough for a year. There is no development. (Mzee Marijani, Mikindani)*

This extract encapsulates many previous points and not least the fact that absence is important in definitions of development, and ‘modern’ farming tools are seen as essential. This is a common view, especially in Dihimba, wherein a collectively-owned
village tractor purchased in the early stages of villagization is no longer in use, a source of resentment to many. This localised historical example certainly informs many in Dihimba: “in the past we had a tractor, this was good for the activities of the village but now it is gone and people just farm for themselves. We shared things then but now people only farm for themselves” (Mzee Jakaya, Dihimba). Thus, cooperation and technological advancements are associated more closely with ‘the past’ (see chapter seven), while the present is marked by individualism and a failure to procure new (‘modern’) farming tools today. Ferguson (2006) adds that connecting development and modernity is common across Africa and while there are manifold pitfalls in making generalizations of this nature, a similar point has been made with explicit reference to southern Tanzania (Seppälä, 1998a). Interlocutors often argue that, in many ways, their lives had regressed not progressed with improved agricultural technologies not only essential for development but also to maintain the status quo in light of population growth.

Population growth is often seen to have reduced available land, which further limits the potential for development. While such views might be expected in the Ujamaa village of Dihimba31, they were also proposed in Mikindani: “when we got independence we were nine million people, now we are how many? Forty million, so is development possible? Can we provide for so many people?” (Mzee Selemani, Mikindani). This exemplifies the well-established difficulties with sustained development in conjunction with rapid population growth. If ‘development’ is contingent upon an agricultural surplus, as many wazee argue, increases in population serve to demonstrate that maendeleo is increasingly difficult for all people to achieve. Land shortages owing to

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31In light of the enforced migrations as part of the villagization process during the 1970s which dramatically increased the population of Dihimba.
population growth are seen to have made productive land usage a necessity, arguments also offered by some of the young people consulted: “there is no development because we have poor equipment. Our elders used small hoes in the past and this has not changed. You can still only get small amounts of food from farming and young people grow old quickly because of continually bending down” (Focus group 1 Dihimba).

The lack of material improvements is often understood in relation to development and many argued that personal development would be possible if appropriate farming tools were made available: “to get development you need to give me equipment to farm; pangas (large machetes), hoes, tractors, assistance to do work, in our place there is so much potential wealth” (Bibi Hadija, Mikindani). This builds on the previous arguments and the various citations offered demonstrate that equipment is literally understood as development, while tools are essential if development is to follow. Moreover, the quotation below highlights the potential role of microfinance in improving farming tools and thereby facilitating development: “we could progress with a loan because we could buy a big hoe, we can’t continue to use these small hoes. It would be good to use a tractor for digging; I know that farming with a tractor will kill all weeds” (Bibi Asha, Dihimba). This clearly represents a materialist and individualist reading of development, however, it is crucial to illustrate the widespread notion that agricultural output can only improve, and that ‘development’ is made possible by utilising technology from, and mimicking the practices of, other parts of the world and usually ulaya32 or Europe (see also Ferguson, 2006). Interviewees often cite a relationship between development, people and place, and some further highlighted such views by referring to my use of a Dictaphone as evidence of the association of technological advancement to ‘certain

32This is often taken to mean Europe, although I feel it is more closely translated as ‘the West’.
types of people’ who usually come from elsewhere (reflecting the views of Crewe and Harrison, 1998).

5.2.2 Gender Differentials: Development, Agriculture and Culture

Clear differences exist between the perceptions of men and women when it comes to certain aspects of ‘development’. While this thesis does not analyze gender to any great extent, it is necessary to briefly emphasize these differing readings. The emphasis on agriculture and the supposed links between farming and *maendeleo* seem to go beyond recounting the different perspectives of men and women and are framed by different cultural expectations. Given the focus of this research it is also relevant to remember that the “denial of voice and agency to the unofficial actors of development takes a particularly intense form when it comes to women” (Kabeer, 1994: xi). It has often been argued that a gendered dimension to development theory and planning is essential (Kabeer, 1994; 2005; Moser, 1993; Rai, 2002; Scott, 1995). While some progress has been made, this may do little to challenge some deeply embedded cultural norms, which partially reflect the differing perspectives of men and women.

Numerous women respondents suggest their low status means that they come up against more obstacles than their male counterparts in pursuing improved material welfare. Women interviewees argue that they are precluded from engaging in certain (economic) activities, thus inhibiting individual development: “for us old women to improve ourselves we cook *vitambua* (rice cakes) to sell. People ask us: ‘who is cooking’, ‘what are you doing?’ They come and say ‘you should not do that’... If I wanted to become a leader, as an old woman, I can’t” (Bibi Mwajuma, Dihimba). While women
interviewees tended to explain the absence of development as an outcome of age rather than gender, in this instance cultural expectations are seen to limit the sale of rice cakes, one of the few remaining opportunities for income generation. Age and convention are presented as factors inhibiting development and when discussions moved onto leadership, ‘becoming a leader’ was regularly seen as a means of accessing ‘self-development’ and predominantly the preserve of men. While men and women both see improvements in agricultural technology as crucial to development, further gender-based differences emerged concerning the likelihood of such changes.

Women tend to refer to ‘the past’ in highly nostalgic terms, as a time with a more stable and predictable climate (amongst many things) which meant harvesting food was easier than today. Men, on the other hand, tend to highlight the transformative role of technology, offset by the fact that positive changes have only been witnessed in ‘the past’. The discrepancy between men and women can be summarised thus; men feel that technological changes might lead to development, while women are more fatalistic when it came to the likelihood of such changes. Men are not necessarily more optimistic concerning the potential of maendeleo, yet they tend to hold higher expectations than women. This further indexes cultural norms surrounding the household division of labour in Mikindani and Dihimba, wherein women do the bulk of labour-intensive farming, the nature of which is seen to have changed little over time. This long-term exposure to demanding physical work might also explain why women place less emphasis on potential technological changes. In other words, the lack of obvious technological change, or a regression in terms of technology (see chapter seven), again highlights the absence of development. Nevertheless, the views of women and men from both villages
often converge when it comes to hard work and education, which are widely held as essential for development, reflecting the continuing significance of the socialist discourse of TANU and Nyerere.

5.3 NYERERE’S DEVELOPMENT LEGACY: EDUCATION AND ‘HARD WORK’

*Development means to live well without worries. When Nyerere was here, he told us that we need to agree with each other, to work hard together in order to get development.* *(Bibi Mariamu, Mikindani).*

The historical legacy of the term *maendeleo* has been discussed (see 3.1.3 and 5.1.1), yet it is important to move beyond political and economic thought, which associated ‘development’ with self-reliance, unity and cooperation as part of *Ujamaa* ideology, and to briefly consider how such ideas were applied in practice. While each of these elements were forwarded as essential to the ‘African socialist’ view of development, they were tied in with the necessity for real life, modernist and material changes not least in terms of access to state services for people in the most remote regions of Tanzania. While this is analysed with reference to villagization later (see chapter seven), Nyerere’s TANU government underlined the importance of social services (both education and healthcare) through ‘modernist development planning’ which was framed by an ‘African Socialist’ discourse (Hyden, 1980; Scott, 1998). Nyerere’s influence transcends his time and, as we shall see, his posturing remains influential to the perceptions of *maendeleo* referred to herein. This is especially evident in the widespread connections made with education which was also central to *Ujamaa* philosophy and popularized by Nyerere. Indeed, Nyerere was a trained schoolteacher and is often referred to simply as *Mwalimu* (Kiswahili for teacher).
5.3.1 Education as (Crucial for) Development

Education is often central to discussions of development in Tanzania, perhaps symptomatic of the view that: “there is only one way in which you can cause people to undertake their own development. That is by education” (Nyerere, 1973: 61, in Schneider, 2006: 107). Nyerere’s ‘Africanized’ view of maendeleo focussed on ‘self-reliance’ and education (elimu) was central to this discourse. The education system is widely regarded as one of the outstanding successes of his government and fifteen years of heavy investment following independence meant that mainland Tanzania had the highest levels of literacy and primary school enrolment on the continent in 1980 (Askew, 2006). Nevertheless, this was followed by a sharp decline in government expenditure owing to the ‘crisis’ of the 1980s and coupled with the introduction of school fees (as mandated by the World Bank and IMF) this undid some of the previous successes (see Askew, 2006: 30). Many interviewees cite reductions in the level of state resources directed towards services that were better funded in ‘the past’ and the supposed deficiencies with the education system today are forwarded as another explanation of the absence of development. This is similar to the arguments made concerning the dearth of ‘modern’ farming tools and the related perception that development is absent.

Education is not seen as symbolic of development, but as a pre-requisite for individualistic processes of material improvement and “these days development requires education, without education you can’t develop” (Mzee Ismaili, Mikindani). The following passage further exhibits the significance placed on education through a nostalgic reading of colonialism:
“I went to school in the colonial era and even though my education was only to standard four, you can’t compare this with a child who reaches standard seven today. In that time you could get a job without education, but now, even though all young people are educated, there are no jobs” (Mzee Rashidi, Dihimba).

A clear connection is made between education and development with past educational opportunities seen as crucial. In spite of the relatively short period that Mzee Rashidi spent at school, the education he received was considered by him to be favourable to that received by children today, which is seen to take longer and to be of inferior quality. Perceptions of ‘the past’ often inform interpretations of the specific dynamics of the present (see chapter seven) and education is seen as especially important to those interviewees who went to school. However, many argue that the poor quality of education offered today, coupled with the absence of opportunities following schooling, limit the importance that young people place on education today. This also reflects the conclusions of a research project comparing childhood in southern Sudan and New York, wherein the education received by children may not be appropriate for the reality that they face, once they leave school (Katz, 2004: xii). Wazee sometimes highlighted the importance of manual or technical skills, especially related to farming while at the same time acknowledging that young people are often disinterested in farming and instead want to migrate to bigger towns and cities. This reflects a story common across the world wherein urban areas there are seen to hold far more opportunities and it is especially common for men from the south to move to Dar-es-Salaam in search of prosperity and wealth (for more on this phenomenon see Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998).

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33Most did not go to school; 11 out of 30 in Dihimba and 10 out of 30 in Mikindani received primary education. Only four out of twenty-three women interviewed received formal education as children.
5.3.2 Schools, Jobs and Development: “education is important if jobs follow”

“The lack of development here means that children do not value their education and without development they will not remain in school. If education does not guarantee a good life, why stay in school? Where are the jobs?” (Mzee Mohammedi, Dihimba).

A strong connection is made here between education and work. While Nyerere remains highly influential, his arguments that education has inherent benefits in and of itself (a view shared by many pedagogues – see Fine and Rose, 2001; Freire, 1972; Rose, 2003; Samoff, 1996) is not shared by interlocutors if employment opportunities do not follow formal education. Education is seen as necessary and important, yet many added that this did not inevitably lead to employment and the primary concern of wazee seems to be the potential employment opportunities for educated young people, over and above the importance of education. The emphasis on education in Tanzanian political discourse came to the fore in the Arusha Declaration (Azimio La Arusha), which also highlighted the importance of ‘hard work’ for development. Thus development was to be achieved on a national level by increasing domestic production and minimising the reliance upon foreign aid, and individually through waged employment, education or agricultural production (see Hunter 2008: 479). Nevertheless many wazee thoughtfully argue that ‘hard work’ requires a job and the scarcity of work precludes the possibility of development. Thus it is consistently argued that development is inaccessible to all and only: “for a few people because now our country has no work, I am a real fundi [workman], a welder, but I have had no work for years” (Mzee Saidi, Mikindani).

Another prominent perception relating to ‘work’ is that farming is often excluded from such a categorization. This is perhaps the case since agriculture is predominantly
subsistence-based, the domain of women, and largely unpaid: “I think someone from each family in this village is farming but very few are working” (Mzee Kembo, Dihimba).

The idea that *farming* is not seen as *working* mirrors a division made in the Arusha Declaration, wherein it is suggested that the absence of waged employment might be alleviated by ‘self-reliance’, through increasing agricultural production or through education (Hunter, 2008). A deep-seated conviction exists that development is impossible without additional jobs and while the views of interviewees are, to some extent, shaped by historical legacy and the well articulated and widely known opinions of the “Philosopher President”[^34], they are also indelibly marked by historical and contemporary events and life experiences outside of mainstream political discourse. This makes for complex, individual and place-specific, temporal interpretations of *maendeleo* in south-eastern Tanzania and the following excerpt brings together many points made until now: “we need to know more useful things but can do nothing without tools. It is difficult for us to develop but easy for *wazungu* who have technology. We have been failed and don’t even have the tools for small works” (Mzee Mustafa, Dihimba). Indeed, development is seen as possible but requires new equipment and knowledge, material improvements which are seen to come from outside, through ‘other’ people (see chapter six).

Discussions have so far focussed on meanings of development from a personal perspective, since informants predominantly understand development as an individual and materialist phenomenon. However, this reference to social provision (with the focus on education) adds further complexities of the ways in which development is understood by *wazee* in south-eastern Tanzania. A distinction is made between personal and ‘overall’

[^34]: This is how Schneider (2004; 2006) describes Nyerere.
forms of development, simultaneously at village, district, regional, national and global levels. In arguing that ‘we have been failed’, the quotation above highlights the political contract or social relationship that shaped Tanzanian political history and which is central to more collective, ‘overall’ perceptions of development. Development is seen to be ‘easier for wazungu’ with a lack of political will partially explaining the absence of ‘overall’ development.

5.4 ‘OVERALL’ VERSUS INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

The problem with this word is that there is overall development and the development of a person by themselves. Overall development is like this, even though I don’t have a metal roof, if my colleague has one then a few people are progressing and development is possible. So, when some take steps forward, this is overall development (Mzee Rashidi, Dihimba).

Development is seen as an individualistic process by the vast majority of interlocutors but the personal progress of others is understood as development, albeit in more of an ‘overall’ form and many of the same arguments are put forward when it comes to ‘overall’ forms of development, which: “means to progress, yourself, your family, and others. If fifteen or twenty people progress, development will come to the village. Our unbearable weakness is that development has not arrived here” (Mzee Kembo, Dihimba). This reflects previous arguments, not only in the fact that it is argued that development takes place at an individual or familial level but also given the similar levels of pessimism forwarded in previous arguments which relate to the absence of individual material benefits. Thus, development is not understood solely in the personal manner discussed, while it is important for people to ‘develop themselves’ by “working hard for
yourself to support their children at school and get things; money, a good place to sleep and enough food” (Mzee Liundi, Dihimba). Following this, argues Mzee Liundi, the “development of the society might be possible with better roads, more health dispensaries and schools”.

The two previous excerpts above (Mzee Rashidi and Mzee Liundi, Dihimba) build on the individualist interpretations of *maendeleo* and introduce the notion of an ‘overall’ form of development. The view that positive material change had come for others is understood as a sign of ‘overall’ development for some, which tends to reflect a slightly more positive outlook than is witnessed in many of the previous perceptions. This is especially the case when it comes to the potential benefits of social services, often included as part of the same picture. However, the distinction drawn between *maendeleo* on a personal and on an overall level reflects that individualistic development is not seen to be available to all, while overall development might serve as a benefit to poor and older people in some ways. This issues a challenge to the extent to which such views should be viewed as positive, especially given the limited and poor quality service provision that *wazee* invariably emphasize.

5.4.1 Services as the Basis for Development

*Ujamaa* villages were founded on the premise that an otherwise unreachable population could receive “services, such as schools, safe water, and health facilities” (Schneider, 2007: 12) and it is these very services that are consistently related to development, particularly in the *Ujamaa* village of Dihimba. Widespread references to education have been covered, but it is also the case that health facilities are symbolic of development:
“Now we have water in towns, primary and secondary schools, we got these without any problem. The problem is that the dispensary never has any medicine” (Mzee Hassani, Dihimba). This begins from a relatively positive viewpoint, with the availability of services seen to represent some degree of ‘overall’ development in Dihimba, although the lack of medicine is unquestionably problematic. Indeed, many are scathing when it comes to the reality, rather than the idea of social provision. The lack of medicine, the poor training teachers receive, their lack of motivation (seen as a result of low wages and a lack of support), and shortages of necessary resources in schools (books, pencils and so on) are given as evidence that increased numbers of schools, hospitals and health centres are mere symbols of development which fail to induce positive changes in reality. Despite the fact that older people are supposed to have been protected from the social services user fees that followed structural adjustment in the 1980s (Tungaruza, 1992; URT, 2007), many cited the cost of services inhibiting their access, especially when it comes to healthcare. Elsewhere in Tanzania this is understood as a key problem with health facilities today (Kamat, 2008), while few interviewees were aware of their right to free healthcare (similar findings emerge in a more widespread government study; URT, 2007).

This research was conducted during a period of protracted struggle and dispute in Tanzania wherein teachers went unpaid for many months and some offer this as a clear evidence of the dramatic underfunding of services by the government: “even those who work do not get development but trouble. Teachers work for three, four, five months without pay. This is not development but poverty. [President] Kikwete is causing poverty, teachers have to take loans and when their salary comes, they just pay debts” (Bibi Hadija, Mikindani). The perceived lack of state spending is again seen to damage
teachers’ capacity to educate (owing to minimal resources). Previous reference to ill-equipped dispensaries further demonstrates that services have also come to represent the absence, rather than the presence of *maendeleo*. The failure to provide good quality services is emblematic of the absence of development, with ‘the past’ and other parts of the country (or the world) often referred to in glowing terms when it comes to service provision. The failed application, poor quality, and resource shortfalls of social services are also widely regarded as responsible for, and not merely symbolic of, the absence of development. Thus, development is not just symbolised by services, but it is widely held that services (education, healthcare and access to water) underpin individual development, which is impossible for all to achieve.

5.4.2 “*Maendeleo? Hayawezekani.*” The Impossibility of Development for All

>You work to get food and money but there is little of it here. On the other hand, those who had power from the start do business; they get money and therefore have development. (Mzee Marijani, Mikindani)

This excerpt again presents an individualistic understanding of development, which highlights the significance of personal power, which is rarely associated with domination alone (partly echoing Foucault) and more closely related to material wealth, access to resources, and government work. Thus: “civil servants, presidents, MPs and ministers, all the people who work for the government have development. They get paid once they are elected by poor people – who don’t get development. Without government work, you can’t develop” (Mzee Ali, Mikindani). This perhaps reflects the work of Bayart (1993), wherein political office is seen to be equated with greatly increased personal wealth across the African continent, although power is more closely associated with young
people herein and age seen as a determining factor in which sorts of people can develop.

The powerful are seen to be already developed and can enhance this condition by wielding their power, while everyone else, especially older people in villages effectively ‘left behind’: “development is only for the young but development for old people is not here, there is absolutely nothing for us” (Mzee Masoud, Dihimba). Many wazee feel that development is plainly unavailable to them and the preserve of others: “nowadays there is happiness, people are getting good things, people are working and have an income, but not me. Only powerful people are developing” (Bibi Fatu, Dihimba). Age and power are therefore seen as forerunners for maendeleo, although any form of individual material advancement is also seen as development.

Wazee often argue that they ought to benefit from greater support and assistance or aid (msaada) citing things such as: improved houses, better quality tools and more food. Thus they highlight the lack of material support received from the community and particularly from family members, whether nearby or at some distance. Thus improvements in material welfare are only deemed possible for wazee through ‘overall’ development or owing to the “knock-on effect” of younger relatives experiencing material benefits. Development is, then, projected onto others:

“Those who have power get things, and why shouldn’t they? The youth develop themselves but old people are unable. My children live far away; they know development but I don’t. The youth who study know and have development and they should help their wazee. Old and young should cooperate for development, but we have no power” (Bibi Bahati, Mikindani).

The loss of opportunities and power amongst older people is a concern herein, while positive material changes (personal development) have primarily been witnessed among
powerful and younger people. This is a multi-layered understanding, which projects development onto educated young people locally and specifically onto her children who ‘live far away’. This introduces space into the equation (see chapter six) and concludes by drawing from the discourse of shirikiana ni maendeleo (cooperation is development), a veiled reference to Nyerere, wherein the powerlessness of wazee is seen to prevent productive collaborations with young people which might ‘bring development’. This again demonstrates the importance placed on cooperation, indexing a sense of nostalgia for ‘the past’ as a time of ‘cooperation’ and therefore development (see chapter seven).

The fact that young people have power is often utilised to explain why they are able to access development, while they are also seen to possess attributes which mean that they hold more sway over the sorts of changes that might come about: “If I was young I could say we need a tractor and people might listen because they go to school. But we just farm with our hands, we need tractors and tools but get nothing” (Bibi Fikiri, Dihimba). This extract draws together the key strands of the argument that wazee are powerless and therefore precluded from development with the only option left for old people to farm ‘with their hands’ as they have always done. The need for ‘modern’ agricultural equipment is made even more urgent by old age and it is widely held that development follows power and youthfulness, while perceptions of younger people as ‘better educated’ signifies that their demands are more likely to be met. Younger people (in focus groups) often suggested that older people’s aspirations are too low, understood in light of Appadurai’s (2004) notion that aspiration is a complex cultural capacity (see 2.3.2) and in this instance, profoundly influenced by old age.
Perceptions of development as absent and the lack of aspirations amongst older people seem to be connected and partly informed by experiences of past interventions: “how will an old person develop without power? I just sit here and eat. Old people can never take loans... If I did, then what could I sell?” (Bibi Mwanahamisi, Mikindani). This typifies the widespread view that old people cannot develop; they do not have collateral and are unable to access services and, in this instance, the Mikindani microfinance scheme. This prefaces the following section which discusses recent development projects and interventions in both villages, largely seen as similarly dismissive of wazee. The association of ‘white’ people with development is considered in greater detail in the following chapter (see 6.4.1), but it is important to appreciate that NGOs and development projects have affected and informed perceptions of maendeleo in certain ways in both villages. Indeed, the lack of access to the potential benefits that NGOs offer is another argument used to demarcate the absence of development among wazee. Development projects (miradi ya (ki)maendeleo) and NGOs are utilised to offer tangible examples of some of the ways in which old, poor and powerless people are seen to be systematically excluded from accessing maendeleo.

5.5 MAENDELEO THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OR NGOs?

Green (2000) contends that maendeleo has been literally understood as the actions of external agents and NGOs in southern Tanzania, a view reflected in some of the findings here. NGOs and development projects (miradi ya maendeleo) are seen to involve young, powerful and already wealthy people (not mutually exclusive attributes) almost exclusively. With this in mind, it is important to consider perceptions of development projects and NGOs in some detail, especially since they play an important role in
understandings of development among older people. It also stands to reason that a lack of involvement in ‘projects’ might limit the potential of development (as improved personal material wealth). Very little reference to ‘overall’ forms of development is made in conjunction with recent interventions and Mikindani-based NGOs are widely referred to as ‘mashirika madogo madogo’ (‘small organisations’) since the sort of projects established (similar to some of those in Dihimba) offer direct support to small groups and individuals rather than to everyone.

Many interviewees are suspicious of NGOs and argue that the institution with the primary responsibility to ‘citizens’ remains the state, reflecting a sense of national pride and a nostalgic view of the culture of rights and entitlements associated with the socialist period of Tanzanian history and the colonial government alike. As one Bibi argues: “I am not interested in what these organisations are doing, the government should help me, not these wazungu” (Bibi Muhene, Mikindani). The extent to which NGOs and ‘development interventions’ are seen to have had a positive impact or to have induced any form of maendeleo is analyzed below with particular reference to the more widely cited interventions; for example, the non-participative nature of microfinance and livestock loaning. Indeed, the presence of NGOs in Mikindani seems to have brought a wealth of unfulfilled expectations, supporting the common perception that development is absent amongst wazee.

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35 The wariness surrounding NGOs in Mikindani might be an outcome of persistent sexual scandals which have damaged their reputations. While this might be presented as rumour and idle gossip by the NGOs involved, there is evidence to support such claims.
5.5.1 Livestock Loans: “A Good Idea, Badly Implemented”

When it comes to discussing NGOs and development projects in Dhimba, perceptions are often informed by the potential of interventions given their perceived absence (section 6.2.2) while experience is often informed by the RIPS goat loaning-scheme. On the face of it, Mikindani seems to have had more experience of interventions but Kopa Mbuzi, Lipa Mbuzi (“loan a goat, pay a goat”) was referred to with some regularity in both villages and the scheme was based on the premise that an individual would loan an adult female goat and pass it on to someone else once it had given birth (Habari Leo – Newspaper, 2009). The majority cited these projects as having failed since their very essence was ignored from the outset, given that there were not sufficient incentives or procedures to ensure that goats would be passed on: “I didn’t loan any goats. They told us the rules but goats were not passed on because powerful people saw they could just get more for themselves” (Mzee Hamza, Mikindani). Indeed, the powerful were seen to further ‘develop themselves’, subverting rules that were seemingly established to avoid nepotism.

It is argued with some consistency that development projects exacerbate pre-existing inequalities: “people took loans from RIPS, kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi, and intelligent people benefited. Those who were uneducated did not. Powerful people always benefit” (Bibi Hadija, Mikindani). Power and education are therefore seen to pre-determine access to loans while ‘powerful people’ and ‘leaders’ are also able to manipulate projects and entrench inequalities through localized forms of corruption:

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36 RIPS (Rural Integrated Project Support) was a joint initiative of the Tanzanian and Finnish governments, in Mtwara and Lindi regions (Killian, 2003; Mongula, 2005). Most associate this with goat-loaning scheme.
“I heard and saw *kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi*, but many did not get goats here, it depended on the street. Our leaders decided who got the goats and some paid bribes. If you had no money you could not get a goat, people were supposed to pass the goats on but they did not” (Bibi Shuwea, Dihimba).

A minority are seen to have received goats, reflecting previous views that development is only available and accessible to a few people, with ‘leaders’ seen as the decision makers in the project, benefitting with goats and through the “bribes paid for goats”. Corruption is widely seen to inhibit the potential success of development projects which benefit: “the powerful who develop themselves by stealing from the village and eat”\(^{37}\) while others suffer. Development has gone backwards” (Mzee Musa, Dihimba). In tying power and leadership together, this exemplifies the perception that only a minority benefit from development projects, while things have otherwise regressed for the majority.

It is relatively rare, in Dihimba and Mikindani, for *kopa mbuzi lipa mbuzi* to be seen in a positive light, which contradicts claims made elsewhere that this project ought to be seen as “one of the most successful” RIPS facilitated projects, covering “about 24% of the villages in Mtwar and Lindi,” providing over 12000 goats on credit “in over 450 villages [and] involving some 10000 households” (Killian, 2003: 17). The discrepancies between a statistical overview and the opinions of apparent beneficiaries could hardly be greater, which illustrates that notions of ‘success’ in analyzing development projects are often determined by individual positioning within hierarchies of power\(^{38}\). This raises a significant broader point concerning development interventions wherein the

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\(^{37}\)This reflects views associated with the work of Bayart (1993), wherein ‘eating’ and ‘feeding’ are seen as key political metaphors across the African continent, for what is often seen from the outside simply as corruption.

\(^{38}\)This point is reflected in the ‘success’ of a microfinance scheme in Mikindani, which can be judged by the repayment level according to some NGO workers.
implementation and design of projects themselves can serve to exclude wazee: “our street chairman hides things from us; old people are never told the truth. If we don’t know what is happening in the village, can we get development?” (Mzee Mlanzi, Dihimba). Once again, it is argued that older people are deliberately marginalized and overlooked when it comes to the few interventions that are seen to be taking place in Dihimba.

The symbolic potential of development projects is therefore often outweighed by the empirical reality that few seem to have gained, further witnessed by the fact that most interviewees failed to receive cows or goats (in both villages). Moreover, many wazee actually feel that the project was poorly conceived in the first place, given the clear lack of incentives when it comes to passing goats on and this perhaps reflects Green’s critique of “participatory development strategies by NGOs and donors, as well as the assumptions held by the Tanzanian state and external observers about the ‘traditional’ collectivist values of rural African communities” (Green, 2000: 81). RIPS had clear overtones of participation after 1993 (Vainio-Matilla, 2005), but the lack of such in “kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi” and in other development projects is widely criticised.

5.5.2 (The Lack of) Participation in Development Projects

The perception of development as a predominantly individualist phenomenon is one of the more prominent findings demonstrated so far (notwithstanding the arguments surrounding a form of collective or ‘overall’ development and the continuing influence of Nyerere) and this has also been demonstrated across Tanzania (see 3.3). This counters some of the ideological assumptions of participatory strategies and the logic of collective
benefit that underpinned the goat-lending scheme seems similarly incommensurate with prevailing cultural norms and the emphasis placed on individual and personal forms of development. Previously it was demonstrated that that ‘participatory’ projects (like RIPS’ goat-lending scheme) often exacerbate inequalities within places (see 2.2.3), given the existence of clear power dynamics prior to ‘intervention’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Kothari, 2005a; Mosse, 1993) and this view is reflected by many in Mikindani. The resident NGOs are largely seen as non-participatory with crucial decisions always made by wazungu who consistently occupy positions of authority39. This is often seen to be the case in other development projects (whether run by these NGOs or not) which deliberately exclude wazee. However, participation is also closely linked to cooperation, and both terms have a significant heritage in Tanzania political discourse which is reflected in some perceptions of NGOs today.

Participation (kushiriki) and cooperation (kushirikiana) are closely related both linguistically – the latter is the reciprocal of the former (Marsland, 2007) – and in terms of the specificities of Tanzanian political history. The significance of cooperation to Ujamaa discourse has been demonstrated while citizen ‘participation’ was central to the ‘self-help’ schemes of the early post-independence period and emphasized in the inaugural Presidential Circular of 1971 (Mongula, 2005). However, the extent to which supposed beneficiaries of a range of government interventions were able to ‘participate’ during the 1970s (especially in decision-making) is questionable (Vainio-Mattila, 2005) and this is also the case today. As previously argued (see 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), participation is

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39However, when the research was conducted the microfinance project was officially led by someone from the village. In a private conversation, this individual asserted that he was not autonomous since charity trustees did not trust him and would prefer an mzungu manager. He therefore found the project difficult to run.
fashionable in mainstream development, yet the extent to which ‘beneficiaries’ are genuinely involved in the practical application of miradi ya maendeleo is questioned by interviewees throughout with NGOs often seen to ‘help themselves’, rather than the purported beneficiaries. At least on a symbolic level, it is seen as crucial that people from Mikindani play prominent roles in NGOs with the collapse of DSP (Danish Schools Project) in 2007 cited by some as evidence for the necessity to involve villagers more fully.

DSP, an NGO solely working in Mikindani, was forced to cease operations owing to the fact that manager ‘ran away’ with everything owned by the charity. She was legally able to do since all charity assets were registered in her name. This story is well known in Mikindani and while some explained it through usually latent anti-Kenyan sentiment (the manager, Judy, is Kenyan which some offered as an explanation for her behaviour), this is largely understood as the outcome of a lack of cooperation and the failure to involve the ‘village’ in the day-to-day workings of the charity: “DSP should have worked directly with the community because we can look after NGOs. But they only worked with a few people, mostly from other places. DSP wanted to help but they failed because they didn’t work with the people of Mikindani” (Mzee Abdallah, Mikindani). This statement infers that without cooperation NGOs in Mikindani are seen to be seriously jeopardised. Indeed, the perceived importance of cooperation for maendeleo is cited throughout this chapter.

It is widely argued that a lack of village participation in development projects has reduced the expectations of wazee and some of the negative perceptions and problems raised with development and interventions are heightened by the fact that people felt so uninvolved in projects and are therefore apathetic regarding schemes that proclaim
beneficence. The excerpt below exemplifies this, with the goat-loaning scheme seen as the latest example in a long line of failed promises:

“I remember kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi but I didn’t register because lots of projects have come here, we are told they will help us but then we hear nothing more. When this happens five times you stop following it up, you presume it will be the same next time. They took our names but for their own benefit. I asked the Divisional Officer and Ward Executive Officer but got no answers. They just said ‘we like to write things down’” (Mzee Muksini, Dihimba).

This quotation offers a rather sad indictment of recent of development interventions and again reflects the fact that new projects never take place in a vacuum and perceptions are profoundly influenced by experiences of past interventions (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Nevertheless, and this reflects discussions surrounding the term maendeleo itself (see 5.1.2), a small number of participants were largely unaware of NGOs or ‘development projects’: “there have been projects, but we don’t know anything about them, only our leaders know. We should be more involved but we are not told about these things and therefore fail to benefit” (Mzee Dini, Dihimba). Such views are perhaps more common in Dihimba and place-specific differences between the two villages are analyzed in greater detail in the following chapter.

5.6 CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENT – FOR RICHER OR POORER?

This chapter has demonstrated that personal interpretations of development are complex and informed by materiality, or more accurately, that a distinct lack of material improvements symbolises the absence of development. In focussing on better farming tools, houses, increased wealth and greater access to ‘things’, perceptions of maendeleo
often centre on material concerns. Aspirations such as these might seem relatively straightforward although Appadurai reminds us that aspiration represents a complex cultural capacity which relies on “practice, repetition, exploration, conjecture, and refutation” to both “thrive and survive” (Appadurai, 2004: 69; see 2.3.2). Conditions of poverty are often seen to undermine more detailed aspirations, although this is less relevant here given that material deprivation only accounts for part of the story and development is also seen to require high quality education if individuals are to ‘work hard for themselves’. Perceptions are further complicated by the widespread distinction between personal and overall forms of development, with the latter, read as Nyerere’s legacy. This overall form of development is seen in a relatively positive light by some, although resource shortfalls and underfunded social services are seen to have brought about a reduction in quality. Lived experiences inform the perceptions of wazee and the absence of development was reflected in the fact that their lives have stagnated and regressed, further witnessed by their lack of involvement in development projects.

The predominant focus on individualism reflects a paradigm shift since the socialist period and the discourse of Nyerere which emphasized a collectivist society with active attempts made to engineer this. Many see development as a necessarily individualistic pursuit and while there is no comparative data available on past perceptions of development, this might be an outcome of the perceived failure of more collectivized forms of intervention and policy during the socialist period and particularly the processes associated with villagization (see chapter seven). This also reflects general trends for small government and the hegemony of a globalized neoliberal ideology, which preferences individualism, enshrined in the structural adjustment policies and
PRSPs that have been profoundly influenced Tanzania since the abandonment of the ‘non-capitalist approach to development’. While umoja (unity) is still an important identifying feature in the Tanzanian context, individualist conceptions of development maintain a high degree of relevance and are often compared with nostalgic memories of ‘the past’ as a time of cohesion, cooperation and development. However, the extent to which everyone believed in the socialist philosophy at the time is also questionable.

The apparent absence of development is also contrasted with other people, both within the village and in (other) places, wherein higher levels of maendeleo are deemed to be evident. In spite of the fact that this chapter focuses on materialistic perceptions of development, these could not be divorced from temporal and spatial readings. Time and space are key mechanisms through which development is understood and can be utilised in a similar fashion, in order to demonstrate the distinct lack of development in the lives of interviewees. With this in mind, the following two chapters interrogate readings of time and space and their relation to development, beginning with an analysis of the manner in which space, place and infrastructure are central to readings of development.
CHAPTER SIX

Development as Elsewhere I: place, space and infrastructure

I have heard of NGOs, for example the Aga Khan Foundation, which give small loans to already existing small businesses and another institution called Pride located in Mtwara town. Young people visit Mtwara but Pride has not yet come here, NGOs are only found in towns. Aga Khan could work here they have started to give loans in other places.

Development projects are always in other places.

Mzee Liundi – Interview 19, Dihimba 7th June 2009

The difference here is that we don’t have many things like in the north. A large number of people in the north have studied and there is a good economy there, they have many cows but there is little livestock here in comparison. The south has been ignored for a long time, and is always the last to benefit from the government. Only when other places have enough are things brought here. You can’t even find five farmers who have modern agricultural equipment here. They announce that farming is the most important thing in this country but only Songea region can produce enough food in the whole of southern Tanzania. There is not even a small place or district that produces enough in the south. A lot of our food comes from the north where they continue to progress through work.

Mzee Hamisi – Interview 3 Mikindani, 15th April 2009

Development means to succeed, to prosper. If I can do something today, my house will become good or I will have a big farm with cows but there is nothing for us in Jangwani. Development is there, where there are so many wazungu, the Boma hill. It starts there but does not reach here. Self-development is only possible for a few people but wazungu have it already. I hear they offer loans of goats and chickens too, which could help with self-development, they came from Mtwara to write our names but we never got these loans.

Bibi Salima – Interview 6 Mikindani, 21st April 2009
6.1 INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SPACE AND PLACE

This chapter focuses on the role of place and space and the extracts above illustrate the common association of development with other places at various scales. This overlaps with the materialist understandings of development set forth in the previous chapter with differences between places often framed by material discrepancies and inequalities. This is clearly witnessed in both villages, although the places of comparison sometimes differ between Mikindani and Dihimba. Further overlap with the previous chapter is witnessed in the projection of development and while individual material concerns and opportunities at the local level previously meant a projection of development onto the young, powerful and already wealthy within the village, this chapter demonstrates a similar pattern, albeit the main references herein are to the development of ‘other’ places. Development is seen to be connected with other places at a relatively localized scale, but also in terms of regional, national and global discrepancies. Indeed, differences are not only seen to exist between places but these differences are also, at times, seemingly embodied by the people that live in those places.

This chapter highlights the differences in perceptions of development between the two villages and how these are intimately related to perceptions of place and space. The second section addresses these place-based differences, with interviewees in Mikindani arguing that NGOs have not had a particularly positive impact, yet their potential is still held in a relatively positive light in Dihimba. The third section focuses on the widespread belief that a ‘hidden agenda’ has effectively withheld development from those in Southern Tanzania (Wembah-Rashid, 1998), while the fourth specifically addresses development as a national concern. This section demonstrates that in spite of the
election of a southerner (Mkapa) as president, the perceived infrastructural benefits have not impacted the everyday lives of interviewees, especially in the more remote village of Dihimba. The fifth section considers the way in which certain people from certain places, and specifically wazungu, have come to symbolize development and this is placed alongside ‘outside assistance’ which is also seen as crucial for development (clearly a spatialized reading of development).

In the following section of the chapter, it is necessary to consider the villages separately given that there are place-specific readings of development, particularly regarding NGOs and more recent development projects. While specific projects and interventions were highlighted in the previous chapter, there are more general discrepancies between the villages. For example, the presence of NGOs in Mikindani rarely seen to have brought benefits, especially since the projects instigated are not seen to have been beneficial and the small number of employment opportunities generated are not deemed available to wazee. In Dihimba, on the other hand, many argue that NGOs hold all manner of benefits and if they were to ‘arrive’ and remain in the village, they would inevitably instigate development.

The third section considers a view widespread in both villages that ‘the south’ has continually and consistently failed to receive the same degree of government support that has been forthcoming in northern Tanzania for a far longer period. Factories are more likely to be located in ‘the north’, more NGOs work in the northern region and development projects are seen to be initiated on a more equal basis, given that people in ‘the north’ are ‘better educated’. The poor quality of infrastructure in ‘the south’ is another key difference, seen as a result of the fact that national leaders have always
come from other areas and have therefore ‘looked after their own’ with ‘the south’ consistently failed. This is felt especially keenly in the more remote village of Dihimba and views in Mikindani are certainly more amenable to infrastructural changes that have taken place. Many such changes were understood as a result of Mkapa’s election to the presidency in 1995. Benjamin Mkapa is from Masasi (Southern Tanzania) and his leadership was superficially seen to have had positive outcomes, at least in terms of infrastructure. However, the extent to which changes in infrastructure improves everyday life or ‘brings development’ (kuleta maendeleo) is frequently questioned and often reflects a previously cited distinction between personal and overall development. Improved infrastructure is associated with the latter, but is not necessarily seen to have instigated any degree of personal or individual development, particularly amongst wazee.

The fourth section increases the scale at hand again, highlighting that spatial readings of development are closely related to ideas about people. Crewe and Harrison (1998) suggest that ‘Western’ development practitioners often have firmly entrenched ideas about the territories and peoples that require ‘development’, a view that is effectively inverted by interviewees who often make symbolic connections between development and other places. The arrival of people from such places, at a local scale, is also depicted by some as a sign of the arrival of development. In the previous chapter, better agricultural equipment and higher levels of technology were directly related to development and these are also associated with wazungu, as demonstrated in this chapter. In spite of the negative experiences with NGOs in Mikindani, wazee often share the view of their counterparts in Dihimba that outside assistance is essential to
development, which further reveals the centrality of space in the perceptions of development demonstrated throughout.

6.2 THE ROLE OF PLACE IN SPATIALIZED READINGS OF DEVELOPMENT

In the previous chapter the perceptions of wazee from the two villages were largely taken together and the minor differences between the meanings attached to interventions and NGOs were alluded to, yet they were not dramatic. The similarities and significant differences between the villages were documented previously (see 4.1.3) and these help to explain the differing perceptions of NGOs between Mikindani and Dihimba, which are highlighted in this section. Differences include, but are not limited to the fact that Dihimba is a more remote village, which was more profoundly affected by policies relating to Ujamaa, which does not have a mains power, paved roads, or permanently resident NGOs. Services (usually education, health and water) are often understood as crucial to ‘development’ and many in Dihimba felt that the new water pumps introduced as part of a joint Tanzanian-Japanese government initiative unquestionably represent a positive change. Interventions such as these are seen as too few and far between by most interlocutors, however, with the shortage of interventions seen as a result of the lack of NGOs which further supports the idea that development is absent. This spatial reading of development and of interventions is common in Dihimba, while in Mikindani the presence of NGOs is not seen to have had a particularly positive impact. The perceived lack of development is exacerbated by the fact that wazungu have not brought about changes which might justify their presence.
6.2.1 NGOs “do not bring development to Mikindani”

Mikindani is a place with a higher degree of ‘external’ involvement than in Dihimba, reflected in the number of small European NGOs based permanently in the village. Coupling this with the fact that Mikindani generally has a better level of infrastructure might therefore suggest that Mikindani is more ‘developed’ from conventional perspectives and measures. However, it cannot therefore be assumed that development projects or NGOs are central to everyday life and few interviewees point to their own participation in development projects or any involvement with NGOs. Most in Mikindani refer to Trade Aid as ‘the’ NGO (shirika lasiyo la serikali) and interviewees tend to focus on the microfinance scheme initiated by Trade Aid in 2006, over and above other projects (notwithstanding kopa mbuzi, lipa mubzi). Small-scale, individual and group loans are superficially regarded as positive since they increase an otherwise scarce money supply and present an opportunity to improve individual access to certain ‘things’: “now you can take a loan, if you need a bicycle for work and then you get one, isn’t this maendeleo?” (Mzee Ali, Mikindani). While Mzee Ali added that he did not buy his bicycle with the help of a loan, the very availability of small loans intimates a positive change and a sign of development in Mikindani (at least in some form). This sense of optimism, however, largely dissipated when discussions moved onto the practicalities of receiving loans, which are often seen as tokenistic given that few wazee receive support.

Opportunities to engage in activities that bring material benefits are seen as crucial, yet wazee feel precluded from accessing these in Mikindani: “I hear about loans, but only those with power and those with money can take loans, can I go to take a loan? No. They

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40 According to Trade Aid (2010) 35,000,000TZS (roughly $25300US) has been made available.
are for the youth” (Bibi Furaha, Mikindani). This reflects more general readings of development, while many questioned whether microfinance projects can improve the lives of most within Mikindani since it is only those who are not poor that “can get a loan because those who already have money can pay back on time. If you have a business you can pay, and those who give loans know this. If you have nothing, what can you get? Nothing.” (Mzee Hamisi, Mikindani). This echoes the views of many wazee that microfinance schemes exacerbate pre-existent inequalities, expressed as differences in power and wealth and framed by age and educational level. This is also reflected in the widespread view that NGOs prefer to work with young people rather than wazee in Mikindani. In this instance, the form of ‘outside assistance’ that has been offered by NGOs in Mikindani is not seen in a particularly positive light and reflects some of the findings in the previous chapter (see 5.5). Microfinance schemes have also been seen to compound local inequalities elsewhere (see Kabeer and Mosley, 2004), while more general findings from Mexico (and beyond) maintain that development projects often reproduce or aggravate the problems that existed prior to implementation (Kearney, 1996).

Only one interviewee (out of sixty) referred to receiving a loan and her depiction of the process was far from positive. She documents the experience of her particular loan group who chose not to make any attempt to use the loan productively because they were so fearful of the consequences of failing to profit:

“Five of us got 400,000 shillings [$290US], but we didn’t use it. We only had a short time to pay it back and worried about wasting it, so we returned it. They cheated us and told us that: ‘you can get another loan because you
have paid your debt’, but we did not. There are opportunities but we need more time to use the money well” (Bibi Mariamu, Mikindani).

In spite of the fact that loans are made in conjunction with “business education training” and applicants are ‘tested’ before receiving any money (according to Trade Aid staff), this perception is echoed by interviewees throughout Mikindani. Loans might be beneficial but rules inhibit productive opportunities, which also echo discussions with younger people: “loans can bring development but even with 600,000 shillings [$435US], the payback period is too short… Anyway, what sort of business can you start with 600,000?” (Focus group Two, Mikindani). It is perhaps unsurprising that many argue the principal beneficiaries of NGOs are those who are able to secure employment with NGOs.

In spite of the oft-cited microfinance scheme established by Trade Aid, discussions often touch on employment and the number of people who work at the luxury hotel that is run by the organization: “NGOs? Like Trade Aid? They bring development to the government because they pay rent to stay in the Boma. The only people from Mikindani that are involved are the workers, who benefit a little. But the development is for the government, not the citizens” (Mzee Shaibu, Mikindani). In this instance it is assumed that Trade Aid does bring benefits, but these are limited to the government (through rent) and to employees (presumably through wages). This is indicative of arguments proposed in the previous chapter wherein employment was seen as essential (see 5.3.2) for development and working for (or with) the government was understood as a means of accessing ‘development’ (see 5.4.2). General conversations with those who worked in the hotel or in an administrative capacity for the NGO (Trade Aid) did not seem to display a great amount of gratitude for their employment (usually owing to extremely low
wages) which demonstrates that the projection of development onto others by wazee is not necessarily reflected in the views of those who are seen to benefit. However, those employees do acknowledge that there were few alternative employment opportunities perhaps indicative of research from southern Sudan wherein exploitation by globalized forms of capitalism is seen as preferable to ostracism (Katz, 2004). Overall, NGOs in Mikindani are not seen to have had the significant impact expected at the outset and they are only seen to have brought about superficial changes. This marks a major difference with the perspectives that emanate from Dihimba wherein the absence of NGOs is intimately related to the absence of development by many respondents.

6.2.2 NGOs in Dihimba: “In other places, benefiting people there, not here”

When it comes to experiences of development interventions that have actually taken place in Dihimba, older people tend to offer nuanced views, coterminous with those in Mikindani (as witnessed in 5.5), although many cite interventions as too few and far between. The potential benefits of NGOs in Dihimba therefore outweigh the experience of interventions, with NGOs often argued to work almost exclusively in and with other places. Spatialized, place-specific readings of development are common in Dihimba as expressed herein: “elsewhere our fellows get tools, tractors and equipment, but we get nothing” (Bibi Fikiri, Dihimba). In this instance, msaada (help, assistance or aid) is received elsewhere in Tanzania while one Mzee (Salumu, Dihimba) assured me that older people in Mozambique also receive far higher levels of government support. These projections of development largely work on a symbolic basis and NGOs are often placed at the centre, seen as beneficial to other people in other places. In Dihimba, larger nearby towns and villages (such as Mikindani and Mtwara) and more distant places
(often in the north of Tanzania) are simultaneously understood as ‘places of
development’.

The material differences between the villages seem to support the discrepant views
of (‘Western’) NGOs, often established in places that are better connected. Thus, mains
electricity, paved roads, easy access to Mtwara, and good mobile telephone reception
are features of Mikindani but not Dihimba. Interviewees in Mikindani did not see these
things as particularly positive or as clear signs of development, yet infrastructure is seen
as important in Dihimba, especially amongst those who were from or had visited
Mikindani, Mtwara or other places in which NGOs are based. Some therefore connect
poor quality infrastructure in Dihimba with the absence of NGOs (see also 6.3.2), which
are seen by many with a sense of hope and aspiration, if only they would come and work
permanently in Dihimba. Indeed: “there are no NGOs here, they are in other places. If
people come to help us and work with us it will lead to development. To get money
would be useful, but it is better to get agricultural equipment for development and to get
schools and hospitals” (Mzee Amiri, Dihimba). This reflects previously cited material
aspects of development (money, equipment, schools and hospitals) but contradicts many
of the perceptions of NGOs in Mikindani, wherein little is seen to have changed as a
direct result of their presence. Expectations do not, therefore, reflect the experiences of
those interviewed in Mikindani and it was often argue that “life is better in places like
Mtwara, especially since there are NGOs, development projects and industry” (Mzee
Masoud, Dihimba).

The actual experiences of NGOs in Mikindani seem to have brought about a
pronounced cynicism, yet in Dihimba they generate a palpable sense of optimism. It
would be erroneous to therefore assume that wazee in Dihimba are less critical of the development interventions that have taken place, but accurate to suggest the projection of development elsewhere is based on readings of space and place as well as expectations. The previous chapter established that wazee often project development within villages onto young and/or powerful people, but in this instance it is projected beyond the village onto places which have resident NGOs and longer-term development projects. While the Japanese-Tanzanian government initiative, which brought easily accessible water pumps to the village, is an oft-cited example of a project with long-term benefits for all, projects with such long-lasting effects were seen as conspicuous by their absence in Dihimba. In order for development projects to have positive long-term outcomes, many argue that NGOs would have to make a long-term commitment to Dihimba which has not been forthcoming. While some seemed positive regarding my appearance in Dihimba, attempting to convince me that starting an NGO would be a good idea, once I established that I was there to conduct research, many continued to explain that they were not expecting NGOs to come to Dihimba, especially because of the low level of infrastructure and the low quality road that bisects the village.

In both villages, development is projected at various scales and this is explicitly evidenced by the absence of NGOs in Dihimba. The example below makes specific reference to the microfinance scheme in Mikindani: “people have the idea of taking a loan here, they think it could help. They take a loan and make repayments. But there are no loans here, they are in Mikindani but have not reached here. People get loans and can develop in other places, but we cannot” (Bibi Shuwea, Dihimba). Development is, then, projected directly onto Mikindani with specific reference to the same microfinance
scheme that was viewed so negatively by many of the wazee interviewed in Mikindani. While loans were superficially seen as positive in Mikindani, widespread doubts were raised concerning the practicalities of receiving loans and the ability for groups to use the money productively. Once again a clear discrepancy exists between the experience of certain development projects within place, and the perceptions held of these by those in other places. The expectations that surrounded development projects in Mikindani have not been met but these remain in Dihimba, perhaps since the village has less direct experience of such interventions.

Development was mostly seen as absent in both villages and many in Mikindani also understood maendeleo as something depicted by other places, although with less direct reference to the presence of NGOs. Thus, space and place are important in explaining the absence of development in Mikindani, yet in Dihimba perceptions were marked by the absence of NGOs, not by perceived deficiencies of them and the projects that they implement. It was often argued, in both villages, that one of the crucial determinants in explaining the absence of development was their location in the south of Tanzania, an area seen to have been deliberately ostracised and left underdeveloped for a long period.

6.3 UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN TANZANIA

“Situated in the South-Eastern part of the country, these two regions [Lindi and Mtwara] are often labelled as the ‘South’ implying more than just a geographical location but also in terms of the level of development. The ‘South’ is believed to be underdeveloped and poor, and the ‘North’ seems to be developed and rich. While this is partly the case, much of it seems to be perpetuated by external perceptions of the ‘South’ rather than the reality” (Killian, 2003: 2-3).
The idea, rather than the reality, that Southern Tanzania is less ‘developed’ than other parts of the country has been cited in other academic research (Green, 2000; Rizzo, 2006; Seppälä and Koda, 1998) and is prevalent among interviewees in Mikindani and Dihimba alike. Wembah-Rashid (1998) describes this as the belief in a ‘hidden agenda’ where ‘the south’ has been deliberately sidelined and consciously underdeveloped. In both villages, the government is seen to have forgotten ‘the south’ at least until Benjamin Mkapa, who is from Masasi (in the southern interior) was elected as president. It is important to offer a brief overview of research which has investigated the cultural significance of such perceptions in southern Tanzania, along with examples offered in interviews to sketch this perception of a ‘hidden agenda’. In arguing that ‘the south’ has consistently and unquestionably received detrimental treatment in comparison to the rest of the country, interviewees also draw on perceptions of past marginalization in order to support a spatialized reading of development.

Interviewees often cite infrastructural differences between ‘the south’ and the rest of the country, although comparisons are particularly drawn with ‘the north’. The developed nature of places in ‘the north’, particularly Arusha, Mwanza and Dar-es-Salaam, are offered as a clear sign of the ‘hidden agenda’ although this seems to be felt most strongly in Dihimba. Poor quality roads are seen to curtail the potential for development (Wembah-Rashid, 1998; URT, 2007) and this is reflected in perceptions from Dihimba. Interviewees in Mikindani were a shade more optimistic owing to the near completion of the road (which passes directly through the village) from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam. President Kikwete recently cited this as a milestone, marking “a new era for Lindi and Mtwara regions residents... We are now done with the tale that people
living in southern parts of the country were still Tanganyikans and those living in the southern part were real Tanzanians, that is now history” (The Citizen, 2009). Whether or not there is acceptance at the national level of government that ‘the south’ has consistently failed to receive enough support or has been overlooked, this quotation from the president clearly acknowledges the existence of such a discourse. The issue of leadership is also raised in relation to the underdevelopment of southern Tanzania, while the perceived benefits of infrastructure were usually tempered by the fact that roads, bridges, schools and hospitals have not brought about personal development. Some therefore suggested that development refers to improving ‘things’ but not people and where changes take place, these are not changes that all wazee equate with maendeleo.

6.3.1 Spatialized Historical Politics: The Underdevelopment of ‘the south’

Liebenow (1971) asserts that Tanganyika was the ‘Cinderella’ of the British Empire (the region which ‘never got to go the ball’), while the southern region was seen as the most remote part of this rather forgotten colony/protectorate. Some cite this ostracism as a result of the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-7 in ‘the south’ (Iliffe, 1979; Liebenow, 1971), with the German colonial regime wary of making infrastructural improvements that allow “people in the area to organize themselves into an effective resistance group” (Wembah-Rashid, 1998: 47). This ostracism is seen to have continued into the period of British rule, with Tanganyikan administration consolidating these “preferences for other districts already established by their predecessors” (Green, 2000: 76). In an investigation of perceptions of village-level poverty in southern Tanzania, Killian (1998) found that colonialism was understood to have created opportunities in certain regions while neglecting others. The underdevelopment of ‘the south’ is held as a historical
phenomenon by Tanzanians, both within and outside of the southern region (Green, 2000; Killian, 2003; Wembah-Rashid, 1998) and interviewees often argue that this is owing to post-independence political leaders ‘looking after their own’ both in terms of the regions that receive support and at times in terms of religious favouritism. A link is often made between the lack of support for the south and the predominant concentration of Muslims, especially on or near to the coast. This is an interesting point to raise, especially in light of claims that religion has only recently been seen as relevant in contesting state actions (Heilman and Kaiser, 2000).

Many invoke the idea of a ‘hidden agenda’ (without using this language) and while this is traced back to the colonial era, infrastructural projects associated with the Groundnut Scheme (a railway and a port at Mtwara) are offered as a sign of some efforts made to involve the southern region. Most agreed, however, that in the period following independence the ‘hidden agenda’ is clearly evidenced, especially by the failure to complete the road to Dar-es-Salaam which left ‘the south’ as a pariah, removed from the rest of the country with the only tangible differences brought about by villagization which is not generally remembered positively (see 7.4). The idea of a ‘hidden agenda’ is elsewhere explained as a result of the fact that Mtwara is bordered by economically underdeveloped areas (Northern Mozambique, Ruvuma) which have nothing to trade, share, or exchange but poverty (Killian, 2003). It may be the case that the government wants to hide such a reality (as suggested by Brian Cooksey, personal communication) and according to ‘development statistics’ recently collated by the government ‘the south’ is not obviously less ‘developed’ than most other regions in the country (see

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41Bayart (1993) argues that constituents often expect to benefit when someone from the region is elected to national political office.
Whether a ‘hidden agenda’ exists is, in reality, less important than if people believe “rightly or wrongly that injustice is being done to them” and when this perception is entrenched, it is common that people “form certain ideas and attitudes against authority, i.e., apathy and ‘arrogance’” (Wembah-Rashid, 1998: 48).

National cooperation is often seen as important but there is seen to be limited potential for such an engagement owing to the low levels of infrastructure which have kept ‘the south’ isolated. The failure to complete the road from Mtwara to Lindi and onto Dar-es-Salaam was previously found to be symbolic of a broader lack of political will to support and connect ‘the south’ (Mesaki and Mwankusye, 1998), although this seems to have changed recently given that the road was almost finished at the time of this research (after nearly fifty years). Some interviewees feel unable to demonstrate exactly why ‘the south’ is deficient since they had not visited other parts of the country, but maintain that other places (often in ‘the north’) are more ‘developed’. Thus, as Clifford (1997: 28) reminds us “literal travel is not essential, local/global relations can be gained from other sources”. At times development is understood quite functionally as “moving from one place to another” (Mzee Rashidi, Dihimba), although figuratively, not literally. Thus, other places within the country were widely seen as ‘places of development’.

It is interesting how prominent the sense of geographical injustice seems to be in ‘the south’, especially given that Tanzania is often portrayed as a country not blighted by the ethnic tensions and political problems associated with other African states (Bayart, 1993) and especially those seen to exist within neighbouring countries (Kaiser, 1996). Ranger (1983) argues that the partial invention of ethnic categories by British colonial states brought about a host of postcolonial political challenges, yet it seems that the
perception of the colonial state (whether German or British) ignoring ‘the south’ is prominent, at least when the Groundnut Scheme is excluded. Hence, geography is closely linked to power and leadership and while there may previously have been a national development agenda in the past, this is seen to have focussed on certain areas of Tanzania (at the expense of others) and to favour Christians (predominantly in the north) over Muslims (in the south). While these views of ‘the south’ are seen to have an historical basis, it could be the case that such tensions have been heightened by democratization and structural adjustment and that “the conditions of reduced socio-economic resources and opportunities created by debt and adjustment tend to intensify inter-group struggles” (Adekanye, 1995: 367). Directly comparing the situation as it was in Rwanda, Burundi or Nigeria (Adekanye’s focus) and Tanzania might be questionable; it might still be the case that recent far-reaching political change and national competition for resources have intensified a sense of regional injustice. These regional differences may also be marked the religious breakdown of the country and coastal regions, particularly in ‘the south’ are predominantly populated by Muslims, with Christians more common in the interior and in the north (Heilman and Kaiser, 2000).

6.3.2 The ‘Hidden Agenda’ as Infrastructural Inequality

The widespread notion that a ‘hidden agenda’ has precluded the development of southern Tanzania is borne out in the extract below, which draws together spatial and historical readings of maendeleo:

“Other places are getting help from NGOs. They are not in Dihimba and this is true across the Mtwara region. People in the north [of Tanzania] have gone to school since the start of the colonial era and now work with NGOs. Things
go to people who need them and there are not the same problems as in our area” (Mzee Kembo, Dihimba).

This passage reflects previous interpretations from Dihimba wherein development in ‘other’ places was seen as a result of the presence of NGOs, although in this instance Dihimba is taken as emblematic of the Mtwara region. This spatial interpretation of development cites differences at a national, rather than a local scale, although local and regional problems are alluded to with “things go to the people who need them” in ‘the north’. Hence, ‘the north’ is not beset by “the same problems as in our area”, a veiled reference to the corrupt practices within development projects that were highlighted previously (see 5.5.1). Education is seen to have been a priority for “people in the north” since the colonial era, meaning that a higher degree of cooperation with NGOs is possible and interactions are conducted on more of an equal footing than those in ‘the south’.

The perceived lack of cooperation between NGOs and ‘the people’ was a principal concern of interviewees in Mikindani (see 6.2.1) and is seen to have precluded development which is further hampered by poor, regionally biased leadership.

Leadership is often raised to explain why ‘the north’ of Tanzania is more developed that ‘the south’ and these perceived differences are seen to exist at various levels. The government is therefore seen to have consistently assisted those in ‘the north’ “with buildings, maybe cows, but in the south there is no help, they do not provide good services for the villagers. Our fellows in the north also have their own leaders to supervise development, but our leaders have not provided development for us” (Bibi Subira, Dihimba). This critique again subscribes to the view that the national government has continually prioritised ‘the north’ before shifting the focus onto the leaders within
‘the north’ who ‘supervise’ development more effectively than their southern counterparts, who therefore fail to ‘provide development’. This again reflects the view that those in ‘the north’ have consistently received better support and leaders are more able to support their constituents. While many see this as a result of the fact that national leaders have mostly come from ‘the north’ and therefore ‘look after their own people’, the different levels of infrastructure were often seen as both the symbolic representation and real outcome of the unequal distribution of resources from central government. The next section therefore continues this investigation of spatialized readings of development, with specific reference to the way in roads and transport and associated with development.

6.3.3 The Symbolism of Roads: Necessary for Development?

The failure to provide good roads and infrastructure is often understood as a problem with leaders, while good leadership is regularly referred to as a pre-requisite for development: “if the government will give us roads and electricity, this is development. If the government looks after us, if our leaders are good, this should mean development” (Mzee Yusufu, Mikindani). This builds on previous arguments that good leadership is an essential pre-requisite for maendeleo, adding that the government is responsible for the provision of roads and electricity specifically, symbols of modernity that are often closely associated with development in southern Tanzania (Seppälä, 1998a). Connections are made between a ‘good road’ and development in Dihimba and the absence of such marks a clear material difference with Mikindani. While wazee in Mikindani may not feel they have benefitted particularly from paved roads (or electricity), at the same time roads and transport are not often seen as a major problem with Mtwara town both
proximate and accessible. Indeed, Lindi and Masasi are accessible by paved road from Mikindani and the near-completion of the road to Dar-es-Salaam means that the largest city of Tanzania can be reached within a day. This is not necessarily the case from Dihimba, wherein transport and ‘the road’ is more of a pressing concern, intimately related to the absence of ‘development’.

The road which connects Dihimba to the main trunk road between Mtwara town and Dar-es-Salaam is often seen as one of the factors that constrains development in the village. The poor quality of this road is often compared to the paved roads in and around Mtwara town while many also argue that these problems with infrastructure are not found in the north of Tanzania. The relationship between development and tarmac roads is a common theme amongst interviewees in Dihimba and “roads are very important for development. They have tarmac roads across the whole Mwanza region but here there are very few tarmac roads. In Dihimba, cars could not pass for a year and it is still bad. People will not drive here because of the road” (Mzee Kembo, Dihimba). Development is again projected onto another region (this time Mwanza, also in the north of Tanzania) although the significance of roads is not explained, other than by the fact that cars are able to pass. It seems fair to suggest that roads therefore often play a symbolic role, and rather than an objective measurement of underdevelopment they represent more of a “culturally guided criterion to appraise development. Those who are cut off physically are often perceived to be cut off from the strivings toward change” (Seppälä, 1998a: 11). Nevertheless, roads are not only symbolic of development, and with particular relevance to older people and their reliance on children who have often migrated, they can also determine the likely return of those who have left (whether permanently or even for a
short visit). The perceived and real inaccessibility of Dhimba heightens the pronounced sense of isolation amongst wazee.

Better quality roads not only mean that children would be more likely to visit (leaving money and/or food), but also that additional buses and vehicles are likely to pass, with new ‘things’^42^ made available and industries more likely to be established. This again reflects a degree of optimism in Dhimba wherein the absence of development is often related to the absence of certain key features (electricity, roads and NGOs for example). In Mikindani, on the other hand, roads have improved and NGOs were present but it was access that was deemed the main problem by older people. Thus, it was often seen that development was possible in Dhimba but that poor infrastructure was a distinct limitation:

“To get development we need things here and the road has been a problem for a long time. There is one bus a day from Mtwara to Nanyamba, just one bus. When I hear this I am amazed, why isn’t there a second or third bus? Wealth passes on the road and our problem is that we can’t get to other places” (Mzee Mlanzi, Dhimba).

This extract typifies the argument that ‘wealth passes on the road’, while the poor quality road means that the flow of transport to and through the village is inconsistent and that resources remain constrained in Dhimba.

It is relatively difficult for people in Dhimba to get to other places, and this is in spite of the geographical proximity of Mtwara (within 50 kilometres), the largest town in south-eastern Tanzania. This is not to suggest that people are entirely constrained by

^42^‘Things’ are elsewhere taken to mean bicycles, cars, agricultural and other ‘modern technologies’.
space, or that they are effectively incarcerated (Appadurai, 1988), but illustrates uneven geographies of place and the importance of mobility. Poor transport infrastructure creates a “friction of distance” which is “both a barrier to and a defense against human interaction. It imposes transaction costs upon any system of production or reproduction” (Harvey, 1990: 258). This idea is relevant here, emphasizing the perception of clear differences between northern and southern Tanzania, while Wembah-Rashid (1998: 45) asserts that the “absence of reliable means of communication and transportation repels economic development efforts [in Southern Tanzania]. No meaningful economic activity can take place where there is no operative movement of goods, humans and ideas”. Good roads are not only symbolic of development, but their absence signifies a tangible problem and a constraining factor to ‘personal’ and ‘overall’ development for many interviewees (especially in Dihimba). The widespread focus on roads often leads to, or perhaps follows from, a spatial understanding of development, which is seen to exist elsewhere. This is clearly a place-based identity which was expressed more often in Dihimba than it was in Mikindani, especially given that some feel that these differences have been mitigated since the 1995 election of Mkapa as president.

6.3.4 The ‘Southern Leader’: Mkapa as Saviour and Villain

The extent to which the election of Mkapa as president made tangible differences in the lives of people in southern Tanzania is open to debate; however the symbolic impact of someone from ‘the south’ being president cannot be understated. His appointment is often seen to have brought an end to the marginalization of ‘the south’ and infrastructural projects which are seen to have benefitted the region and which forwarded to justify the positive impact that Mkapa’s presidency had in southern
Tanzania. At the same time, however, positive views are tempered by the fact that these changes only happened recently, and some argue that infrastructural changes are for the long-term and older people might not benefit. Indeed, the infrastructural changes that have taken place (part of ‘overall’ development) are not seen to have had a significant impact personal development and individual material welfare. Some even question the extent to which ‘development’ and interventions have anything to do with people, since they often focus on the overall form of development, perhaps an interpretation of development as progress which highlights the continuing importance of modernization approaches (see Chapter two). Roads, bridges and the overall transport infrastructure have been improved albeit without corresponding advances in personal material welfare.

While Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Tanzania’s second president, is sometimes seen in a positive light, many feel that his presidency highlighted the historical exclusion of southern Tanzania by national leaders: “Mwinyi brought happiness to the people of Zanzibar not here” (Bibi Bahati, Mikindani). Once again, the fact that leaders (including Nyerere) inevitably came from other parts of the country buttresses arguments that ‘the south’ has been historically neglected, since leaders are inclined to support and ‘bring development’ (*kuleta maendeleo*) to ‘their own places’. These views were often revised when discussions moved onto Benjamin Mkapa, the third president in Tanzania (1995-2005), who is from Masasi (the largest interior town in south-eastern Tanzania) and had the ‘political will’ (Killian, 2003) to develop the south of Tanzania according to numerous interviewees.

The increased number of schools is seen as a positive change brought by Mkapa, but his presidency was predominantly associated with efforts made to connect ‘the
south’ to the rest of the country through road and bridge building projects: “Mkapa helped the people of Mtwara a lot and addressed our big problems. He built the road to Mozambique, which made people happy and the road which allows us get to Dar-es-Salaam easily is nearly finished” (Mzee Razaki, Dihimba). In this instance, Mkapa is directly associated with two roads; one that runs to Mozambique and the other to Dar-es-Salaam. Indeed, a bridge bearing the name of Mkapa is situated at the pivotal point in the journey from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam: “that person from Masasi is much better than Kikwete, Mkapa did things. He even built the bridge over the Rufuji [river]” (Bibi Hadija, Mikindani). This bridge has certainly made a big difference in the journey to Dar-es-Salaam, which is unlikely to be as arduous as it often was prior to the completion of the bridge, especially during the rainy seasons (based on personal experience). Those who argue that Mkapa had a positive impact emphasize his apparently central role in connecting southern Tanzania with the rest of the country, and this is heightened by the fact that such a crucial bridge bears his name. Mkapa is often seen to have ‘addressed the big problems in Mtwara’, although this is something that is argued without specific evidence to explain why his presidency was so positive for southern Tanzania (this is often seen to be self-evident). The symbolism of a southerner as president often outweighed any tangible results that his presidency is seen to have brought.

In spite of the widespread ambivalence and negative views of contemporary development among interviewees, Mkapa is often seen to have had a positive influence on ‘overall’ development, witnessed in improvements to roads and increased numbers of schools. However, this paints a relatively simple picture of Mkapa and some question whether these changes benefited everyone since they did not bring about individual,
personal development. Moreover, some argued that Mkapa had effectively developed himself, adhering to a view that he allowed pernicious corruption to spread during his time as president. Many argue that *rushwa inazuia maendeleo* (corruption/bribery prevents development) and while this has been illustrated with reference to localized development projects (see 5.5.1), this was also widely regarded as a (recent) national problem. Indeed, negative perceptions were almost as common as the more positive preceding view: “a few people steal lots of money and this happens at all levels, not only in the village. We complain that money is a problem, but the real problem is the men we choose to lead, first Mkapa and now Kikwete” (Bibi Hadija, Mikindani). This excerpt is indicative of numerous perceptions offered and reflects previous arguments wherein the absence of development is related to the shortage of money, exacerbated by corrupt national leaders.

Mkapa was simultaneously seen as a saviour, countering the apparent ostracism of southern Tanzania, as well as an unaccountable and corrupt president and he holds an interesting position in many of the perspectives offered:

“Mkapa started the southern corridor which makes Mtwara well known, one day Mtwara will be developed. But contracts today are unfair; people come from *ulaya* and just take our resources, as in the time before Nyerere. The government feed themselves, not the people. We must protect national resources but Mkapa didn’t believe this” (Mzee Nguruwe, Mikindani).

Here a connection is made between development and the ‘southern corridor’, a major international project which aims to improve transport links so that southern Tanzania and surrounding countries (Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia), can utilise the deep sea
port at Mtwara to support economic development efforts (Lawrence, 2009: 59). In the quotation above, the potential of improved transport links is acknowledged although this is juxtaposed with major criticisms of the way in which resource extraction contracts are signed today, which allows for corruption, for the government to feed themselves.\textsuperscript{43} It is important to briefly summarise that changes to infrastructure (buildings and roads) are seen to have recently taken place and are viewed as intrinsically positive, although this has not correlated with personal development amongst \textit{wazee} informants. This leads some to argue that development refers to ‘things’ and not people.

6.3.5 “Development is for things and not for people”

A distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘overall’ forms of development is common with access to the former often seen as difficult, especially among older people who self-identify as powerless and poor. While the ‘overall’ form of development was sometimes understood to offer positive ‘knock-on’ effects for this clearly marginalised group, many suggested that this served to benefit the already powerful, wealthy and young, especially when it came to infrastructure. The following extract, indicative of the common view that changes within a place are part of the ‘overall’ form of development, illustrates that recent changes have not brought about improvements to personal welfare or material wealth:

“Roads, bridges and buildings are built for the country but not the people.

Look at my house, I don’t have development, but towns are developing,\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{43}This mirrors the ‘politics of the belly’ in the subtitle of Bayart’s renowned book \textit{The State in Africa} (1993). He argues that ‘eating’ and ‘feeding’ are common political metaphors across the African continent and that political office is often seen to allow individuals to ‘feed themselves’, given their access to resources. However, this not only a question of corruption for Bayart who argues that: “the “African way of politics” suggests an ethic which is more complicated than that of lucre.” (Bayart, 1993: 242).
Mtwaran and Dar-es-Salaam are also very different. This town now has cars, buildings, roads, but most people have problems, not development. For me, development means improving things but not for most people” (Mzee Ibrahim, Mikindani).

In spite of the growth of towns and cities of various sizes (with evidence reference made to Mikindani, Mtwaran and Dar-es-Salaam), wherein public goods (roads, bridges) have improved and private wealth (cars, buildings) increased, the majority are not seen to have benefited and have ‘problems’ rather than development. Thus, development is seen to refer to improved ‘things’ but, once again, not for the majority. While some connected ‘overall’ and ‘personal’ development, in this instance Mzee Ibrahim draws a concrete separation between them and refers to his own material depravation and to that of ‘most people’. This again projects development onto others, both at the local and at the national scale.

The capacity to aspire is inhibited by the view that places have developed (given that infrastructure has improved), but most people have not: “The town is developing but I am not. Is this house suitable for a person? Development is not for all people but things like roads and buildings. Some people have good houses and eat well, but old people just have no power” (Bibi Mariamu, Mikindani). This reflects an early justification for the formation of Ujamaa villages “based on the post-Arusha declaration understanding that we need to develop people, not things, and that people can only develop themselves” (Nyerere, 1973: 67). Many argued that in reality ‘things’ have developed but old people in villages are powerless and are left behind, in spite of the recent focus on southern Tanzania and the improvements made to roads, buildings and so on. Most wazee hold largely negative views of development, even if some degree of
‘overall’ development is seen to have taken place. The projection of development witnessed throughout this chapter at local and national scales also exists on a global scale, with *wazungu* (white or European people) in Mikindani perhaps symbolic of the ‘global in the local’. Therefore, the final section of this chapter investigates spatial readings and projections of development at global scales, also addressing entanglements of ‘race’ and development.

6.4 SPACE, ‘RACE’ AND OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

‘Outside assistance’ is often seen as essential for personal development, in spite of the fact that NGOs are not seen to have brought individual development to Mikindani (and especially not for older people), and improvements to infrastructure were either minimal (as in Dihimba) or had failed to instigate personal development (as in Mikindani). Thus it is argued that factories, industry and improvements in farming tools are forms of outside assistance that could be beneficial. Moreover, the presence of *wazungu* in Mikindani, in and of itself, is understood to represent development although of an unobtainable form. This is witnessed in the observation that “development is there, where there are so many *wazungu*, the Boma Hill” (Bibi Salima, Mikindani). Development is spatialized, seen to exist within a specific area in Mikindani and reflected by the people associated with the luxury Boma Hotel, which is also the operational base of Trade Aid. This implicitly refers to globalized, ‘race’-based inequalities, which are also reflected in the apathy among those who employed in the hotel, one of whom astutely remarked to me that a month’s wages would not cover the cost of a one night stay in the hotel. Global
inequalities of this nature and obvious differences in labour markets also inform widespread views that development exists in ‘other places’. Indeed, these spatialized readings of development draw on global inequalities and connect ‘development’ with certain ‘types’ of people.

6.4.1 Wazungu as symbols of Maendeleo

Ferguson (1999; 2006) suggests that connections are often made between modernity (and symbols of such) and development in southern African and without seeking to homogenise, this cannot always be understood as playful mocking or cultural hybridity and confers aspirations on the potential of neo-colonial modernity. This is a point that Ferguson believes anthropologists are often loath to admit and one exemplified in the following passage, which patently projects development onto ‘other’ people: “For a person to develop he needs good things, for me to progress I need more things, my own things. Development for us is to be like wazungu, to progress is to have your [the researcher’s] good things, to be in front of where we are now” (Bibi Rahamati, Dihimba).

While views of this nature might seem abhorrent and have been academically undermined (Biccum, 2002), ‘race’ has not been totally written out of development (Kothari, 2006) and the perceptions of many interlocutors are intimately related to ‘types of people’. With this in mind, Kothari (2006) recounts the story from a black NGO worker in Zimbabwe who failed to command the same credibility as his white counterpart, before adding her own experience while working in Bangladesh wherein she divided up tasks with a colleague, a ‘racialised’ distinction based on ‘who would be taken seriously’.

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44 Countless problems with the idea of First and Third worlds should not blind us to the real differences that exist between the labour markets of poorer and richer countries (Ferguson, 2006).
Elsewhere ‘whiteness’ was coded as a beacon of progress, part of a robust development discourse during a school meeting in Zimbabwe (Moore, 2005: 27), while Shrestha (1995) recalls that he intimately associated development with whiteness whilst growing up in Nepal.

The experience of NGOs and recent interventions in Mikindani did not mean that the ‘arrival’ of Europeans today guaranteed real, tangible material benefits for the majority, yet wazungu are still seen as symbolic of development. While this might reference a power dynamic in the interviews and focus groups (with me as a white, male researcher), my research assistant (Jaylani) argued that that such comments are likely a back-handed complement, as much as a description of the way in which some symbols of development are also signifiers of modernity (for example cars, tractors, technological equipment and industry). These material endowments are projected onto other places at various scales, onto ulaya, the parts of the world inhabited by wazungu which are associated with development. This reflects a keen awareness of the uneven geographies of place relating to the formal period of colonial rule and when certain people, who come from specific parts of the world (that are seen as symbolic of development), arrive in places that are seen to require development (both by outsiders and often by the people within those places) their presence can create expectations as bearers of some form of maendeleo.

Interlocutors often argue that I should inform them, rather than the other way around, of the meaning of development, perceptions that have been expressed to me outside of formal research settings in Tanzania. Such views clearly impact this research and this takes on some degree of cultural significance: “development is here because we
see many *wageni* [foreigners]. For example, this man [the researcher], I didn’t see him in the past, we are progressing because we see *wageni*, therefore Mikindani is developing” (Mzee Shaibu, Mikindani). The mere presence of *wageni* (a term denoting guests, strangers or visitors and often used interchangeably with *wazungu*) is seen to denote *maendeleo* to a greater extent than anything these *wazungu* do, a clear example of the projection of development onto ‘other’ people from ‘other places’ (albeit in a localised setting). This mirrors the idea of a ‘Third World’ that is both ‘over there’ and ‘back then’ (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). The presence of *wazungu*, along with clothing, cars and mobile phones which come from *ulaya*, are often seen as symbols of development (especially in Mikindani). *Maendeleo* is, then, directly related to outside assistance, further reflecting the centrality of space to many interviewees’ perceptions.

**6.4.2 Village Development Requires Outside Assistance**

The perceived shortfall of employment opportunities in both villages indicates that while development is desirable, it is not likely be achieved by all: “if you see and evaluate this town, are there enough factories for people to work in Mikindani? No. Now there are too many people in Mikindani and no industry, no jobs, so can people work and get development? No.” (Bibi Zainabu, Mikindani). Major employment opportunities and development, it is often argued, have to be instigated from ‘outside’ and this view was prevalent in both villages. The above excerpt also reflects the widespread perceptions that jobs are essential for development, exhibiting a Eurocentric, modernist notion of work wherein jobs are bounded, industrial and paid. This mirrors findings from the previous chapter (see 5.3.2), wherein farming (the principal source of employment) was not widely regarded as work. Moreover, views of this nature seemingly resonate with
‘African socialist’ conceptions of work and in spite of the fact that *Ujamaa* discursively favoured the rural sector and celebrated ‘African traditions’, Nyerere also placed great emphasis on industrialization: “factories bring progress; a factory is a place where many people work together... But unfortunately it is true that many peasants still think that the way to progress is for every individual to have his own little shamba [field]. But such shambas cannot bring progress” (Nyerere, 1973: 155-56).

Government interventions also seem to be a part of ‘outside assistance’ with the support of citizens seen as crucial to development. Good leadership is understood to lead to the equitable spread of resources (at local and national levels) although it has already been demonstrated that few feel that this happens in reality and that corruption inhibits development. Indeed, further doubt is often cast over whether this has happened in recent times given that: “leadership here is not good. We have a municipal system but Mtwara is the municipal town so there is nothing official here. We get no government support, which is necessary for people to develop themselves” (Mzee Selemani, Mikindani). Here reference is made to the fact that leadership in Mikindani is weak, and that the town lacks government support owing to its subservient relationship with Mtwara, while government support is essential, if people are to ‘develop themselves’. This projects development elsewhere in a similar manner to widespread perceptions in Dihimba and adds a specific, localised issue in Mikindani, where people feel ignored in favour of Mtwara, the municipal town situated around ten kilometres away. The high level of expectation surrounding government assistance is not borne out by the experience of such, again stressing the focus on individualism in contemporary understandings of development is southern Tanzania.
6.5 CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENT AS ELSEWHERE

Space and place are invoked in different ways in order to explain the meaning of *maendeleo* and it is clear from the evidence offered throughout this chapter that many interviewees see them as significant. The fifth chapter highlighted the projection of development at a local scale and this chapter further reflects this projection albeit at increasing scales. The second section highlights the widespread ambivalence concerning the projects established by the NGOs amongst *wazee* in Mikindani, although this does not mean that interviewees are against outside assistance, which is often seen as essential to development. In Dihimba, on the other hand, the absence of *maendeleo* is often seen as a symptom of the lack of permanently based NGOs with development understood as something that inevitably comes from outside the village. This mirrors the findings of Pigg (1992) in rural Nepal with outside assistance deemed essential for development. In Dihimba, there are expectations concerning the potentially positive impact of NGOs while in Mikindani there is more of a focus on industry (perhaps since NGOs are not seen to have delivered any great changes). Nevertheless, few expect development to ‘arrive’ for all people and basically understand this as inaccessible to *wazee*. This is especially seen as an outcome of the poor quality road to Dihimba.

In spite of the fact that development is often seen as something people should do ‘by themselves’, *wazee* cite the shortage of opportunities generated within villages as evidence of the fact that assistance from ‘external’ agents is essential for development, whether through businesses, the government or NGOs. Indeed ‘other’ people, often in other parts of the world, are symbolic of development while spatial metaphors are fundamental to explanations of the absence of *maendeleo*. Projecting development onto
other parts of the world in this manner, however, does not reflect “cultural inferiority but [recognition] of a political-economic inequality,” such that “local discourses on modernity more often insist on seeing a continuous lack” (Ferguson, 2006: 33). This discrepancy is seen to exist at national levels (as in the ‘hidden agenda’) and at local levels (as demonstrated previously) in both villages.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Development as Elsewhere II: Nostalgia, ‘The Past’ and Ujamaa

I was an adult when [Queen] Elizabeth ruled and I had my first child. The second and third children were with Elizabeth, but the fourth was in Nyerere’s time. I don’t remember the colonial era because I was very young. They called it Tanganyika then, I don’t understand why it became Tanzania. I heard of uhuru [independence] and remember the siku kuu [special day] when Nyerere came. That time was better compared with this: now it is difficult to eat and to live, we live with trouble, that time was better. I mean, that was my time and now is the time for our children and grandchildren. Development was there in the past, have you heard? Food and clothes were cheap. Now there is lots of money but we cannot develop, we are unable. Last year we harvested enough food, but this year there is too much sun and there is no food in the fields. Here in Mikindani the main changes from the past are with food and clothes, but now nothing changes.

Bibi Muhene – Interview 5 Mikindani, 20th April 2009

In the past I was involved with village projects I was the representative in a shop in Nyerere’s time, I ran the village shop because they trusted me. There are problems when things are owned by many people because everyone has their own opinion and people would accuse you of stealing if they didn’t like how you ran the shop, so I decided to retire.

Mzee Kembo – Interview 26 Dihimba, 20th July 2009

Development? It would be good for me to progress but I have not, I receive no help. We live in poverty but in the past food was abundant and development followed. I get upset thinking about the past, when we had development. Now there is no development, just problems and poor people like us are dying! Fuel, sugar and rice are unavailable so we eat likangua [low quality cassava flour]. Is this a good life?

Bibi Rahamati – Interview 15, Dihimba 4th June 2009
7.1 INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT IN ‘THE PAST’?

Conventional and elitist histories of development, of Tanzania and of southern Tanzania respectively, tend to offer teleological versions of the past (see chapters two and three). These readings are not, however, necessarily reflected in the personal interpretations of specific events and the views held of supposedly distinct eras in which development or maendeleo has been used to refer to different events and interventions. These include, but are not limited to; the Groundnut Scheme during colonialism, socialist power structures at national and local levels following independence, the ‘time of Ujamaa’ (as described by many informants), villagization and the following period, especially since Nyerere retired. However, beyond specific events, many focus on ‘the past’⁴⁵ in more general terms and it is constructive to consider “representations of pastness”, a more exact phrase than “history” (Tonkin, 1992: 3) since interviewees often forward well-formed yet temporally unspecific views of ‘the past’ as a time closely associated with maendeleo. A minority of interviewees do not seem to understand history in a linear manner whatsoever, although most offer relatively ordered readings of ‘the past’ and this is significant given that some degree of linearity in readings of history is essential for the fomenting of nostalgia (Bissell, 2005). A sense of longing is evident across most interviews, among women and men in Dihimba and Mikindani alike, focussing on the period traversing what many see as the insignificant moment of independence but more importantly prior to villagization processes. Thus, maendeleo is often understood as a ‘thing of the past’.

⁴⁵’The past’ (with speech marks) is differentiated from the past (without speech marks). The latter refers to history in more general terms, while the former specifically refers to the way in which many interviewees divided ‘the past’, as before and after villagization. This is demonstrated throughout this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections, and that which follows details readings of ‘the past’ and challenges the imposition of historical distinctions (such as independence), principally since many interviewees do not see this as a significant moment in their lives. The third section specifically addresses the phenomenon of nostalgia, given that development is often understood as something that took place in ‘the past’. The fourth section analyzes perceptions of Ujamaa villagization, largely since it seems to signify an epoch-defining event in the lives of many interviewees.

Interviewees rarely see independence as momentous, and some were largely unaware of what this might have meant (as in the excerpt which starts this chapter – Bibi Muhene, Mikindani) which marks the central focus of the first section. Those who do refer to *uhuru* (independence) see it as insignificant, as an event which brought about unrealistic expectations or as a sign of independence without freedom, with *uhuru* often employed to denote both. This is most profoundly witnessed by compulsory villagization, seemingly a more significant moment than independence. The terms development and *maendeleo* were central to political discourse either side of independence which further explains the blurring of this divide. With this being the case, those who tend not to see ‘the past’ in a linear manner rarely offer the same level of nostalgia as their counterparts who remember ‘the past’ more fondly, without necessarily attaching significance to the same events as those highlighted by imposed readings of history.

The third section focuses directly on nostalgia, initially sketching an overview of other research that directly discusses colonial/imperial nostalgia. While interlocutors sometimes refer to the specific benefits of colonialism, most referred to ‘the past’ (in more general terms. In order to reflect the most common views, this chapter takes ‘the
past’ to mean as the period traversing independence and prior to villagization. ‘The past’, then, is represented as a time of low prices, clear technological advancement (the colonial train and the ‘tractor of Ujamaa’), greater mutual respect, political stability, and guaranteed employment. ‘The past’ is continually drawn on to compare to the situation that faces old people day, as documented in the previous two chapters, and witnesses the absence of development which is projected temporally in this instance, associated with ‘the past’, rather than other places or ‘types of people’ (whether young, powerful, rich or wazungu). The projection of development, however, does not change.

The fourth and final section conveys the most common perceptions of villagization, which brought about some of the most significant events in the lives of interviewees, especially in Dihimba. Nostalgia for ‘the time of Ujamaa’ is not uncommon, yet positive recollections of villagization remain rare among interviewees in both villages. It is useful, however, to separate perceptions from the two villages since each had a dramatically different experience of the process. People in Mikindani often argue that villagization was another sign of central (and regional) government ignoring the village, while their counterparts in Dihimba focus on the process itself, on food shortages, the lack of production incentives and the violence that induced migration. Perceptions coalesce, however, around the idea that the process failed and did not bring maendeleo. Villagization is effectively seen as the antithesis of development, the point at which progress reversed, a regression that is seen to have continued until the present day.
7.2 INDEPENDENCE: AN IMPOSED HISTORICAL DISTINCTION?

Askew (2006: 16) makes a threefold distinction of recent Tanzanian history, citing the pre-socialist, socialist and post-socialist eras whilst adding that it is important to consider how these are “materially, ideological and rhetorically related to each other”. This seems a reasonable suggestion given that twenty-five years have elapsed since the retirement of Nyerere (and the formal conclusion of socialism in Tanzania), whose presidency lasted for roughly the same period following independence in 1961. While the “pre-socialist” (colonial) era lasted significantly longer, this periodization is useful and was drawn on prior to conducting the primary research. Most interlocutors, however, did not carve up ‘the past’ in such a way and it is crucial to recognize that periodizations are “utterly relative constructs, [which] reflect their own sense of the ‘style’ of the historical past” and both imagine and exclude (Toohey, 2003: 210). Interviewees tend to ‘represent pastness’ by theme rather than teleology, a framing of ‘the past’ which helps to explain why independence is not often seen as particularly important.

Development was central to late-colonial and nationalist independence discourse (see 3.1.3) which might partially explain why independence was not often seen as such a significant historical event by many participants. The continuities between colonial and postcolonial times help to explain why uhuru might not be seen as a significant rupture, especially given the emphasis on perceptions of development. Ujamaa villagization, on the other hand, is seen to have had a profound effect on everyday life, especially among interviewees in the Ujamaa village of Dihimba. Certain occurrences were situated squarely in their time; tax was often associated with colonialism and collectivized ownership with the socialist era of TANU (latterly CCM) and Nyerere, although this does
not mean that independence was seen as a vital moment in people’s lives. *Uhuru* (independence) is self-evidently significant to Tanzanian history (since it led to the emergence of the country) but it is important to attempt to understand why it is often seen as inconsequential, or at least why less emphasis is placed on independence than on other historical events.

### 7.2.1 Independence and Taxation in ‘the past’

Stephen Ellis (2002: 6) argues that sovereign independence was both desirable to many people and politically unstoppable across Africa, yet dividing African histories around this marker is problematic since it “was not a universal milestone, but is in reality a concept largely derived from studies of Europe and North America”. Indeed, this is reflected in the conceptions of some who ask questions such as: “colonialism, when the British ruled or when Nyerere ruled?” (Bibi Rahamati, Dihimba), and “the colonial era of Nyerere, or before Nyerere?” (Bibi Fikiri, Dihimba). Independence is not an epoch defining moment for all Tanzanians and periodizations can often reflect the culture of the researcher rather than those being researched (Toohey, 2003). Interviewees do not necessarily create a rigid colonial/postcolonial divide and this is significant given that these epochs are often circumscribed and seen as ontological ‘givens’ in Tanzania history. It seems however that most interviewees do not consider the interim period between independence and villagization to have brought about many changes, with the early postcolonial era only differentiated by the fact that “Nyerere replaced [Queen] Elizabeth” (Bibi Muhene, Mikindani). This serves to explain why *uhuru* was not inevitably marked out as significant, outside of the fact that independence brought an end to colonial taxation.
Interviewees often see independence as little more than a dividing line between differing tax regimes: “before uhuru people ran from tax, after uhuru people were not having the same problems and no longer slept in the wilderness to hide from tax” (Mzee Hamza, Mikindani). Tax is certainly one of the most common themes discussed in relation to colonialism and while the fear of non-payment is often mentioned, many argue that paying tax guaranteed the sort of government support that is largely absent today: “if we paid tax the world was good, we could go to find a person like this [interviewer] and he would say: ‘what is your problem?’ You told him and he helped. Now the government says: ‘come later’, ‘come tomorrow’, the government doesn’t care about us anymore” (Mzee Amiri, Dihimba). This refers to the colonial era, although some associate this with the early post-independence era, again blurring the divide. Moreover, others also argue that paying tax in ‘the past’ led to entitlements, meaning: “you could go anywhere; you just had to show your certificate” (Bibi Haridi, Dihimba), which guaranteed free transport and healthcare according to many. Indeed, one interviewee recalls not being able to enter the hospital “because I didn’t have a tax certificate, my child was sick on my back, but I arrived and they didn’t help, you couldn’t go anywhere without it” (Bibi Zainabu, Mikindani). Thus government provided services that were seemingly assured by the payment of taxes in ‘the past’, are today seen as costly and inaccessible. In terms of healthcare, this mirrors the work of Kamat (2008) in another region of Tanzania who also found nostalgia for free healthcare in ‘the past’, although reference was often made to the socialist period, again reflecting the blurring on the divide.
Tax is seen as a salient feature of the colonial era and some argued that the new government effectively ended this: “after we began to rule ourselves tax was rubbed out, we paid nothing. Money was taken to places all over this country and we helped ourselves. We could build schools, hospitals and roads” (Mzee Hassani, Dihimba). Thus, some see the post-independence era as a time in which colonial tax was “rubbed out” but also a time in which money was distributed across the country, in this instance connecting independence with the nationalist “development” agenda that focused on schools, hospitals and roads. Independence therefore brought some expectations although differences between this and the preceding era are rarely highlighted. The government might have been able to spread wealth across the country and build schools, hospitals and roads, yet this was not seen to have happened to the necessary level in all parts of the country (as demonstrated in the previous chapter). Moreover, villagization represents an event (or series of events) that effectively curtailed the expectations brought about by independence, the compulsory form of which was seen to have removed freedom (also denoted by uhuru). While independence is the defining moment from a macro-nationalist perspective, villagization is often demarcated as more significant to the everyday lives of interviewees.

### 7.2.2 Two Readings of Uhuru: independence or freedom?

When informants refer to uhuru (although independence is not a universal reference point), it is often associated with politics, Nyerere and/or TANU. However, some make a divide between two distinct forms of uhuru and while political independence is seen to
have arrived, another form of *uhuru*\(^{46}\) (as freedom) had not. This is emphasised below with reference to the forced resettlement, or mandatory villagization: “after *uhuru*, I remember they moved us to Dihimba from our villages. When we ruled ourselves Nyerere said we cannot stay in the bush. They transported our goats and chickens to Dihimba where we camped until the village was built. Many people were forced to leave the bush” (Bibi Fikiri, Dihimba). Following the Arusha Declaration, the Tanzanian state took an increasingly “hands on” approach to rural development, as opposed to national ‘self-help’ projects through the 1960s (Jennings, 2003) and some describe the Ruvuma Development Association as the forerunner of *Ujamaa* villages but this functioned mostly outside of the remit of government (Ergas, 1980; Jennings, 2002; Schneider, 2004). It is therefore difficult to see villagization as a direct outcome of independence\(^{47}\), although interlocutors associate forced resettlement (especially in Dihimba) with independence. Perceptions of ‘the past’ often compress certain events, meaning that ‘pastness’ is represented in certain ways (Tonkin, 1992).

Independence is not seen to have guaranteed freedom for people and this was most clearly witnessed by villagization processes, particularly after the process became mandatory in 1973 (Jennings, 2002; Lorgen, 2000). Interviewees regularly present the view that the government effectively owned and controlled everything following the Arusha Declaration, standing in contradistinction from a colonial government which, while exploitative, was unobtrusive once tax was paid. Indeed, on asking one interviewee “were you happy with *uhuru*?” his rather telling response was “we did not have *uhuru*

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\(^{46}\)Monson (2000: 545) cites two uses of *uhuru* in southern Tanzania, as both national liberation and freedom. Her example refers to freedom from the slavery of chiefdom, but the same linguistic distinction is made.

\(^{47}\)This is the case in spite of the fact that voluntary villagization began eight years following independence in 1961, and was not completed until 1976.
[freedom] but self-rule [kujitawala] and we were told to be happy by the government” (Mzee Bashir, Mikindani). The distinction between freedom and independence is commonplace and is certainly understandable given the high degree of government involvement in everyday life, especially in rural areas. While postcolonial government activities in rural areas were different to preceding colonial ‘development strategies’ (at least following the Arusha Declaration), they were built on a similar logic and attempted to control the ‘backward conservatism’ and ‘ignorance’ of the masses (Schneider, 2006).

In Dihimba, Ujamaa villagization is often perceived to have removed previous freedoms and seen as extremely disruptive: “we were happy in the colonial era because the only bad thing was tax. If we paid tax we were free and had no problems. Then Nyerere told us to move, this was a problem for many people” (Mzee Dini, Dihimba). Villagization and Ujamaa are widely held as the most obvious sign of independence but are associated with a lack of freedom and the curtailment of expectations: “after uhuru we had Ujamaa villages, which were not a bad idea. The idea was to live and work together, to find development together, but for us Africans it is so difficult because uhuru brought so many expectations” (Mzee Abdallah, Mikindani). This refers to expectations for personal development, when in reality the postcolonial Tanzanian government attempted to institute socialist development through a wide-range of interventions, especially in rural areas and authoritarian modes of rule are clearly seen to demarcate the removal of freedom (uhuru). Nevertheless, a minority do not refer to these expectations, nor do they subscribe to anything resembling a linear reading of history.
7.2.3 Non-linear Histories and Development

Understandings of history clearly affect the way in which memories are constructed and while non-linear readings of history are less common, they are nevertheless present. The minority of interviewees who do not view history in a linear manner are, for the most part, the same individuals who were either unaware of, or felt unable to explain the meaning of the term *maendeleo* (see 5.1.2). Since interviews and focus groups place *maendeleo* at the centre of discussions, it might seem that linear readings of history are particularly appropriate since it is difficult to envisage ‘moving forwards’ without a point against which change can be measured. However, the complexity of this term and the way in which *maendeleo* has entered the mainstream political lexicon in Tanzania means that it is rarely understood in such a manner. Those interviewees largely unaware of *maendeleo* also tend not to distinguish between colonial and postcolonial times: “Tanganyika became Tanzania and our flag changed, Elizabeth left and Nyerere arrived. The leaders knew about these changes but nothing changed for me, I’ve always been a farmer” (Bibi Lukia, Mikindani). This reflects previous arguments which suggest that independence was relatively insignificant, a view intensified by the fact that there is genuinely no difference drawn between the two, other than a change in leadership.

The example below (offered by *Mzee Asabana*, who was unaware of *maendeleo* – see 5.1.2) demonstrates an awareness of the fact that ‘the past’ can be divided up in a certain manner, yet ‘changes’ that have taken place have had little or no bearing on him:

“In colonial times they forced us to do things and after independence I did as Nyerere said. We volunteered, if they told us to dig the community *shamba* [field], then we dug, we harvested food which was divided between everyone. If the road was dirty, we cleared it. These are the rules; I have
always followed their rules. I have never made a decision” (Mzee Asabana, Mikindani).

From this example it is clear that Mzee Asabana feels he has been dictated to throughout his life and does not express nostalgia but instead illustrates a life marked by a lasting subservience to those in power. Little distinction is therefore made between the colonial and postcolonial period and the change in leadership is not seen as significant since the majority are seen to have remained subservient to rulers, albeit in an independent state, reflecting previous arguments that independence did not bring freedom. With this in mind, it is clear that a minority of interviewees do not, therefore, judge the colonial period and ‘the past’ in a particularly pejorative or nostalgic sense.

Interviewees who do not seem to see history in a linear manner suggest, for the most part, that ‘nothing has changed’ during their lives. This also helps to explain why they seem unaware of development, which is often concerned with changes: “I have not seen differences or development because I am still a farmer. I farm, I get food and I eat, I don’t think much has changed” (Mzee Shaibu, Mikindani). While aware of some national level political changes (independence, for example), many question whether these had much of a local impact, in the same way that the benefits of recent NGOs and development projects were questioned previously (see 5.5). Indeed, these seemingly distinct points are tied together below: “I didn’t get anything during the colonial era or from Nyerere, we asked about goats but I didn’t get any. Then later a goat project came here and I got nothing. You had to pay a bribe to get anything then and this is the same now” (Mzee Jakaya, Dihimba). This further demonstrates that imposing historical distinctions is a problem, especially since these often fail to explain a lived reality. While
some may feel that ‘nothing has changed’ others consistently argue that things had worsened significantly and this marks a key distinction between those who hold non-linear readings of history and those who compare the present to a nostalgic past. The majority of interviewees see ‘the past’ as a marker against which to measure the present and their perceptions of development as a ‘thing of the past’ are emphasized now.

7.3 LOCATING (COLONIAL) NOSTALGIA: DEVELOPMENT IN ‘THE PAST’?

“In the colonial era life was better, there was discipline and people had respect, old and young people respected each other greatly. That period was better than this one, nowadays young people have no respect. There was little money in that time but money had a very high value then, compared to now” (Mzee Liundi, Dihimba).

Colonial or imperial nostalgia has often been seen as a particularly ‘Western’ issue (Rosalsdo, 1989), dismissed in some academic circles and especially in anthropology (as argued by Ferguson, 2006). Bissell, focussing on Zanzibar however, argues that colonial nostalgia should not provoke reactions of “embarrassment or distaste” and should be considered in line with any other cultural phenomenon, especially given the regularity with which people hark back to a better colonial age, which is the case with interviewees herein. Thus he poses the question of what “social and political desires are postcolonial Africans giving voice to when they speak well of the colonial past?” (Bissell, 2005: 217). This demonstrates some of the key issues when it comes to analyzing colonial nostalgia, with the colonial era or ‘the past’ seen as a marker against which the contemporary era is measured and deemed inferior. With this in mind it is also important to recognize that nostalgia “does not flower in just any soil. Certain factors are necessary for its emergence. A sense of linear historical time is essential... The flow of time also must not
only be irretrievable, but tinged with loss” (Bissell, 2005: 221). This highlights a further distinction with the previous section, demonstrating that, much like conventional ideas of development, the fomenting of nostalgia requires relatively linear readings of history.

The selection criteria meant that all interviewees are at least sixty and were at least born in the colonial era, while many remember the time well. Women and men from both villages often recall the time of their youth with a clear sense of nostalgia and often see ‘the past’ (sometimes making direct reference to the colonial era) as the ‘time of development’. Nostalgia clearly represents “a cultural practice, not a given content; its forms, meanings, and effects shift with the context – it depends on where the speaker stands in the landscape of the present... an essential, narrative, function of language that orders events temporally and dramatizes them” (Stewart, 1988: 227). Thus, the focus on older people may increase the likelihood of nostalgia, especially given previous discussions which convey the widespread sense that wazee are marginalized and therefore occupy a weak position in the ‘landscape of the present’. Some hold negative views of “kipindi cha ukoloni” (the colonial era), although most related maendeleo to ‘the past’ and (without wanting to appear a colonial apologist) it must be stressed that the colonial era is often viewed positively.

7.3.1 “People had respect and everything was cheap”

The idea that development is inaccessible to wazee was one of the key findings in each of the previous chapters and this is also seen to be the case given that their ‘time had passed’. While personal/selfish development was possible in ‘the past’, it was only available to the young and powerful today: “development is bad, it is difficult to eat and
things are different, not like in the past. Long ago we lived well, without injustice. Everyone had their own house and if a stranger came we received him. Now trust is gone and things are bad” (Bibi Pili, Mikindani). It is often argued that ‘things are different’ and the focus on the shortage of food and absence of justice and trust today is common, especially among women interviewees. The idea that respect was a ‘thing of the past’ is often aligned with memories of things being cheap and plentiful: “in the past one shilling could buy a lot of food or four yards of cloth... All people respected each other, when we were young old people had our respect but today, there is nothing” (Bibi Rahamati, Dihimba). In this example a clear comparison is made between ‘the past’, as a time in which things were cheap and respect was widespread, and ‘today’ where ‘there is nothing’, no respect or affordable goods.

Interviewees generally acknowledge that there are far more ‘things’ available today, often seen as an outcome of when Mwinyi ‘opened the borders’ (liberalization, in other words) but they are not accessible to cash-poor older people, given their prohibitive prices. This is particularly argued by women who often control household budgets and consistently argue that: “we had enough money in the past, but now 100 shillings [$0.07US] is not enough to buy anything. In those days it was enough” (Bibi Muhene, Mikindani). Key commodities (clothes, sugar, rice, tea, and so on) that were both affordable and relatively plentiful in ‘the past’ (prior to villagization) were in short supply during and following the era of villagization and Ujamaa (Askew, 2006; Bernstein, 1981; Ergas, 1980). It is therefore often argued that things have not improved or have progressively worsened, intensified by the price rises that were the outcome of liberalization from the mid-1980s onwards (Bryceson, 2002). Once again this conveys a
degree of linearity in readings of history, essential for a discourse of nostalgia (Bissell, 2005) which highlights widespread respect, cheap and affordable commodities prior to villagization. These are more often emphasized by women and while their male counterparts are often similarly nostalgic, they tend to stress the role of technological advancement (see 5.2.2) and employment in bringing about development. Progress in these areas is, however, associated with ‘the past’ and reminiscing about the (colonial) train introduced as part of the Groundnut Scheme is equally common amongst women and men interviewees. The train symbolizes a clear technological advancement, a sign that development happened in ‘the past’ and also recalled as a cheap and effective means of transport.

7.3.2 Employment and Technology in the (Colonial) Past

The train represents one of the most common referents of the colonial Groundnut Scheme among wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba. It is largely understood as a clear sign of ‘development’ and recalled in a highly positive manner, juxtaposed with the reliance on relatively expensive ‘broken buses’ today (especially in the more remote village of Dihimba). This is a sign that things have clearly regressed and while the train only ran for a handful of years during the 1950s, many reminisce over this cheap, fast and effective means of transport and the presence of such technological advancement in ‘the past’ left an indelible mark on many participants: “I was happy because I used it to travel, as did many people. The train was like development for us, before we could not travel long distances cheaply, and this is no longer the case. The train was good, much better than what we have now” (Mzee Liundi, Dihimba). The train was both cheaper and more efficient than transport today and some suggest that it was free for those who had a tax
certificate (as in 7.2.1). With this in mind, it is unsurprising that many see the train as a sign of development and the lack of such today as a clear sign of regression. This offers another example of the commonplace perception that development was a ‘thing of the past’ and further supports previous arguments which referred to the deliberate infrastructural underdevelopment of ‘the south’, both by the socialist state and since. Opportunities for work in ‘the past’, often as part of the Groundnut Scheme or ancillary projects, are also remembered fondly, especially by men.

The colonial era is often referred to as a time in which work was abundant, once again compared with the limited and irregular nature of work today. In the preceding chapters the shortage of employment opportunities were related to the absence of industry, partially seen as a consequence of the historical mistreatment of ‘the south’. However, for a short period in the latter stages of the colonial era, this is seen to have been effectively reversed with a variety of jobs created as part of the Groundnut Scheme or on one of the several sisal plantations (one of which was on the outskirts of Mikindani) in the region (Lal, 2010). Thus it is argued that: “we collected soil and stones for the railway, or worked on the sisal estate... Companies were coming to Mtwara with different machines, I used to go to Mtwara to work, but the jobs have gone” (Mzee Asabana, Mikindani). It is unnecessary to detail the Groundnut Scheme again (see 3.1.2 and 3.1.3), often seen as one of the great colonial mistakes, both in Africa and beyond (Myddelton, 2007; Rizzo, 2006), yet it is important to appreciate that many saw the potential to procure casual employment as a clear benefit.

The passage below demonstrates the variety of work on offer as part of the Groundnut Scheme and illustrates that the port also had an impact on postcolonial
employment patterns (especially since the “Southern Corridor” was established – see 6.3.4):

“My first work was building the train line. From 1947 I built the port [Mtwara] until it was finished in 1956... I worked again after some years and in 1960 I did manual labour at the port. After 1967 I was employed there again, at the port as a winch operator. I continued with that work until I retired” (Mzee Yusufu, Mikindani).

Many men gained employment in Southern Tanzania as part of the scheme and it is mostly this group that refer to work on infrastructural projects; clearing land for the train line and constructing a ridge on which the railway line from Nachingwea (the central hub of the project in the interior) to the new coastal town of Mtwara was to be laid. Indeed, as in the extract above, employment was also generated on the coast, especially during the construction of the port48. The prevalence of work is held in relatively nostalgic terms by many of the men interviewed here, in spite of the fact that the work done was entirely casual, low wage manual labour. Regular reference is also made to Kabisera, which is situated a few miles outside of Mikindani and was a large sisal estate and major employer in ‘the past’ but is now a cattle station which employs very few people from Mikindani.

References to the abundance of work in ‘the past’ again draw from a trope of nostalgia which occurs throughout the interviews and reminiscing about colonial work is a reference point against which the lack of employment opportunities today is criticised.

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48In spite of the fact that past employment opportunities are regularly cited, most seem unaware that their work was connected with the Groundnut Scheme in the interior.
While it is acknowledged that the wages paid were low and exploitative, most who refer to colonial work give the impression that it was better than farming, the only alternative at the time and the main source of food and income generation today. It may be that ‘past’ exploitation by global capitalism is seen as favourable to ostracism (recalling Katz, 2004), or to what Ferguson (1999) describes as ‘abjection’ in contemporary Zambian context. Some are even nostalgic for the entirely arbitrary daily selection of workers, where “the British” effectively lined people up, chose some and discarded others: “choosing workers was fairer in the colonial era because wazungu didn’t know anyone and didn’t allow us to choose who would work but Swahili people choose their friends and family now or people pay for work” (Mzee Ismaili, Mikindani). This alludes to more recent problems with corruption and presents ‘the past’ as a time in which work was more easily accessible owing to greater fairness and stability.

7.3.3 The (Colonial) Past as a Stable Time

‘The past’ is often defined as a more stable and fixed time as opposed to the vagaries and instability of today. This reflects a general “sense of loss – the feeling that everyday life no longer has its taken-for-grantedness” (Werbner, 1998: 1). This ‘sense of loss’ reflects the ‘longing’ and ‘loss’ that Bissell relates to nostalgia (see 7.3), emphasized further by the supposed stability of the past: “we were happy in the colonial era. In that time things were not changing, we just lived. We had a government but we knew nothing about government, we didn’t know about these things until the British left and the

49In spite of this, a minority of interviewees (perhaps correctly) assert that exploitative wages for impermanent employment were symptom of labouring in the colonial era. Thus, “workers were getting one shilling a day, for hard labour which was not enough” (Mzee Nguruwe, Mikindani).
government forced all of us to move” (Mzee Jaylan, Dihimba). Independence is again associated with villagization (see 7.2.2) and seen as a destabilising and disruptive process with instability also a common referent for the present. This has clear overtones of the: “search for a simple and stable past as a refuge from the turbulent and chaotic present” (Lowenthal, 1989: 21). Stability is a common referent for ‘the past’ and the colonial era in particular, contrary to the ensuing ‘chaos’ of villagization caused by Nyerere, according to one interviewee, who destroyed the “farms and houses of people who were living in the wilderness and caused them to come together to build something called ‘the nation’” (Mzee Bashir, Mikindani). This demonstrates a keen understanding of the nation-building ideology of Ujamaa, partially enacted through villagization and forced removal from rural villages. This is seen to have disrupted the perceived stability and ‘freedom’ of the time traversing independence and particularly of the colonial era, providing taxes were paid (see 7.2.1).

A number of wazee perceive the power structures in the colonial era as more straightforward in the colonial era given that it was wazungu who were wealthy and powerful, providing both employment and rules (this view is partially reflected in perceptions of European NGO workers in Mikindani today). Many therefore argue that the stability offered by colonialism was worth the racialised structure of power which meant that “we worked but our salary was small... good work should mean a good salary but there were different salaries for Indians, wazungu and Africans” (Mzee Selemani, Mikindani). While this offers one of the few critical arguments voiced concerning colonialism (outside of problems with taxation), it also demonstrates the ease with which power structures were defined by the marginalized, differing from the fragmented
nature of power today (at least outside of the obvious associations with CCM, business, industry and NGOs). In more general terms, Ranger (1996: 273) adds that while it is common for Africans to express “a preference (as they often disconcertingly do) for the apparent authoritarian stabilities and disciplines of colonialism... I believe myself that these dichotomies are misleading. I believe that colonialism was much less coherent, simple and lucid than such dualism suggests”. Across the continent, Ranger’s research offers some of the foremost examples which illustrate that dualisms were plainly not in place during the colonial era, however many informants maintain this supposed stability. This cannot simply be ignored and serves to signify a criticism of the changes and instability associated with villagization.

Nostalgia for past forms of rule, however, is not limited to the colonial era and some felt that the one-party state in Tanzania also guaranteed stability and a singular focus on *maendeleo*. In the extract below the one-party state is seen as the foundation on which development should be built:

“After uhuru we were sent a commission which told us about teamwork in society. There was one party then so we only saw development ideas, and development was the only concern. Now there are opposition parties like CUF [*Civic United Front*], who just want power. In the past, CCM, TLP [*Tanzanian Labour Party*] and so on worked together for development. Parties are just parties, the government is different. CCM is the government” (Mzee Razaki, Dihimba).

Here the apparent political unity associated with the one-party state is seen to have galvanised everyone around a ‘development’ agenda (one of the main reasons offered to justify one-party states in Africa – see 2.2; and in Tanzania after 1965 – see 3.1.3). Today
opposition parties are seen to have effectively diluted this, and while the introduction of multipartyism represents an attempt to disentangle CCM from the government (Snyder, 2008) this is not always well understood at local levels, reflected in the view that “CCM is the government”. According to Chief Justice Francis Nyalali, who conducted extensive research across Tanzania in 1991, around eighty percent of Tanzanians were against multipartyism (Askew, 2006). Indeed, this change to the political system is seen to have negatively affected development herein and elsewhere seen to have reduced choice given that the process was initiated without consultation and that competing parties are more interested in being elected than helping ‘the people’ (Kamat, 2008). Therefore stability is seen as crucial for development and is seen in a nostalgic manner and associated with the period traversing independence in 1961, which yet again blurs the divide between two supposedly distinct eras. Many argue, however, that this stability was dramatically undone by villagization processes.

7.4 UJAMAAN VILLAGIZATION AND MAENDELEO

Migration has long been a common feature of the Mtwara region and of southern Tanzania more broadly (Lal, 2010). It cannot therefore be assumed that interviewees in Dihimba necessarily had more direct experience of villagization, despite the fact that an Ujamaa village was formed within its parameters and, on the surface, Mikindani seems to have been less dramatically affected. Additionally, Mtwara is the third smallest region in Tanzania (URT, 2010b) but was the most intensely “villagized” with around one eighth of the national total by 1976 (Killian, 2003) and the high density of Ujamaa villages mean that most wazee are likely to have some knowledge or experience of villagization. Notwithstanding these points, there were some clear differences which seem to have
been informed by experience and perceptions of place. Views from Mikindani tend to be doubly negative: villagization processes meant the forcible removal of people from formerly profitable land, but also meant that government assistance was only channelled to the affected people and areas with Mikindani effectively overlooked. Those interviewed in Dihimba, on the other hand, who often had more first-hand experience of this process, presented some more nuanced views with the absence of incentives and difficulties in obtaining personal wealth after villagization, juxtaposed with the beneficial social services that emanated from the process. Nevertheless, in Dihimba, much like in Mikindani, the overriding interpretations are negative. It is therefore worth investigating these separate perceptions, based on place, followed by the similarities which draw on the problems with compulsory villagization, largely seen as the antithesis of maendeleo.

7.4.1 Recalling Villagization in Dihimba

The memories of those who are likely to have had first-hand experience of villagization offer a useful starting point and much like the colonial nostalgia cited previously, some argue that: “today there is no respect, but in the past when we formed Ujamaa villages people knew and respected each other. We built with respect but now there is none” (Bibi Mwajuma, Dihimba). Respect is again seen as an historical phenomenon, in this instance as a marker of the time in which Ujamaa villages were formed, while nostalgia for past forms of cooperation and attempts to bring about ‘overall’ development are also common: “things have changed. In the past, people worked together and helped each other but this no longer happens. We should farm together but nowadays everyone wants their own development, this is not just a problem in this village” (Bibi Ausi, Dihimba). Hence cooperation has evaporated in favour of self(ish) development, whereas
in ‘the past’ people worked together in farming which was the basis for development (reflecting the Ujamaa discourse). The comparison between past and present forms of organization is seen as a shift in the potential for development; in the past maendeleo was a collective goal, and today it is personal or selfish. This reflects previous arguments wherein access to personal development is seen to preclude older people today and given that overall development is sometimes seen as the only option available for poor and old people (see 5.4). This again indexes a keen sense of nostalgia, in the sense of “aspiration without possibility”, a phrase Bissell (2005: 226) used to describe nostalgia.

Many in Dihimba thus remember ‘the past’ as a time in which villagers worked together: “we shared everything, we farmed together and we decided to buy a tractor together, for the village” (Mzee Jakaya, Dihimba). Nostalgia for the “time of Ujamaa” and for the outcomes of villagization is not particularly common, but is more widespread in Dihimba than in Mikindani: “I was very happy with the Ujamaa system, even though I didn’t have money to buy a car or tractor we got a village tractor and a village mill, but now the tractor is gone and the mill is owned by a rich man” (Mzee Mohammedi, Dihimba). The lack of a train was previously understood as a sign that development had regressed, and the lack of a tractor today is understood in similar terms but also symbolizes that the collective ownership of ‘the past’, seen by many as a fairer economic system, had ended. While the “Ujamaa system” banned private property ownership the village procurement of a tractor and a mill reflects the sense of an ‘overall’ form of development in ‘the past’ and their absence today is seen by many as symbolic of the absence of development. Thus the view presented herein is that sharing everything and collective decision-making were a positive social outcome of people living together,
specifically in the *Ujamaa* village of Dihimba. While this does not reflect the majority view, it is important to appreciate that nostalgia was not uncommon for the idea of *Ujamaa*, if not the practices associated with the discourse.

The two previous chapters demonstrate that ‘services’ are often seen as central to ‘overall’ forms of development and *Ujamaa* is associated with increased schools and dispensaries, as well as accessible water. That these positive changes took place in ‘the past’ is often juxtaposed with the absence of such changes in more recent times. The reduction of ‘natural hazards’ as a positive result of increased village populations are also seen as a positive outcome of villagization: “we left places with those dangerous animals to come here and live together, now animals are scared to enter this place. Services were also made available; schools, water and a dispensary” (Mzee Rajabu, Dihimba). This offers a different benefit of villagization, alongside the usual reference to service provision in *Ujamaa* villages. This section illustrates the nostalgia for certain elements of the ‘time of *Ujamaa*’, with ‘safety in numbers’ a welcome, although perhaps fortuitous benefit of villagization. The positive views expressed here both support the mainstream historical narrative and supplement it, however, it is important to realise that favourable views of villagization were far from universal in Dihimba and were rarer in Mikindani.

### 7.4.2 Remembering Villagization in Mikindani

In Mikindani, villagization is often recalled as a well-conceived idea in principle given that when people live together, rather than separately, they share ideas which benefit everyone. The logic of villagization is rarely challenged in Mikindani, but disappointment at the process surrounds the fact that the village failed to benefit. Mikindani is seen an
'old' (or 'original') village and was not involved in villagization and the advantages of the process are projected onto ‘other’ people in ‘other’ places (a historicized reflection of the perceptions of NGOs in Dihimba; see 6.2.2). It is therefore uncommon for wazee to see villagization positively in Mikindani: “I had very bad luck. They didn’t form an *Ujamaa* village here in Mikindani because it’s a natural village... I understand *Ujamaa* villages and know the government supported them with schools and dispensaries and dug wells, but we got nothing” (Mzee Hamisi, Mikindani). This quotation cites three specific areas in which villagization is seen to have brought benefits, with the provision of schools, dispensaries and wells (services), which represent one of the central bases on which villagization was justified by the government. These social services, it was argued, could only be provided for geographically proximate and centralized populations and not in remote rural hamlets (Schneider, 2007: 12). Perceptions of villagization in Mikindani are therefore relatively specific and place-based, with the lack of involvement in the process seen as tantamount to the government ignoring certain places in favour of newly formed *Ujamaa* villages. It is important to realise that positive views of the services associated with villagization are common in both villages, but in Mikindani ‘other’ places were seen to benefit.

*Mzee Abdallah* (below) argues that the national outcomes of villagization, to some extent, mitigated the failure to support Mikindani although he starts from a similar position and argues that Mikindani was “damaged because we didn’t receive support. But *Ujamaa* also created friendship and unity; before people lived in their own areas, with their own ethnic group, but after *Ujamaa* people lived outside of tribal lines. The government moved people to be together, but could not provide everything required”
(Mzee Abdallah, Mikindani). This summarises many views of villagization, comparing problems and benefits at varying scales while also citing local and national migration as the blurring of ethnic divisions and the role that this played in ‘nation-building’. At the same time the government failure to provide for all is criticized, juxtaposing the positive and negative features of villagization and reflecting common arguments that, on a national level, the process should be seen as a social success but an economic failure (Kaiser, 1996: 230). This would seem to represent a relatively mainstream view of villagization and does not reflect the sheer volume of criticism and the breadth of arguments against processes often referred to simply as Ujamaa. Referring to villagization simply as Ujamaa also highlights the transformation of the process “during the mid-1970s” from voluntary migration “into mass resettlement, Ujamaa into villigization”, itself a result of the fact that only 15% of the total population chose to resettle by 1973 and the state desperately desired a faster rate of resettlement (Jennings, 2002: 511-512). At the end of the same year TANU thus decreed that all rural people should live in Ujamaa villages (Bernstein, 1981; Lorgen, 2000).

Negative views massively outweighed some of the preceding positive comments in both villages and the views from each are now considered collectively, principally since the majority from each village had little that was particularly positive, over and above those points that have been made so far, to say about the process. ‘The past’ is often seen as a ‘time of development’ but many of the arguments raised to justify this perception refer to events prior to the major upheaval that villagization processes are often seen to represent.
7.4.3 Recalling Ujamaa; Social Disruption, Property Destruction and Absent Incentives

“In the past people walked to Mikindani or Mtwara and nothing scared them except lions, leopards and snakes. If you saw a person you were happy and you could walk together without fear. But now it is not lions, snakes, or leopards that we are scared of, but people. Before villagization our only fear was animals and we trusted each other. There was no robbery; people just lived with their families. When you closed your house at night you did not worry but now there are dangerous thieves and your neighbours are scared to help when they hear you cry” (Bibi Lukia, Dihimba).

This extract offers a very different take on the villagization process than those documented so far in this section, but represents the more widespread views on offer from both villages. Previously villagization was seen as a safety net against predators (see 7.4.1), but in this instance animals are seen as less threatening than the people that now inhabit Dihimba. The increased likelihood of theft is seen to have brought about a lack of trust, previously seen as a remnant of a nostalgic past, prior to villagization. Indeed, some wazee in Dihimba display nostalgia for the remoteness of their lives prior to villagization. Dihimba existed (on a far smaller-scale) prior to villagization, yet many interviewees who had moved to the village maintain their farms in their ‘old’ villages and have done so ever since moving to Dihimba: “when we came here, we still went to our old farms and we still do today. Before we lived there and now we live here like guests, there is no [spare] land. All that we had, we left there” (Bibi Halima, Dihimba). Views of this nature are commonplace and many continued to cultivate their ‘old’ farms and in spite of the fact that resettlement is likely to have happened close to forty years ago, Bibi Halima still describes herself as a ‘guest’ or ‘stranger’ in Dihimba.
The shortage of spare land in Dihimba today, possibly a result of the distinctly arbitrary land tenure system associated with villagization (see Schneider, 2006: 106), further explains this habitual return to ‘old’ farms and villages. Official *Ujamaa* status required the overall dominance of communal production and at no point was one of the registered villages, of which there were close to eight thousand, officially designated as an ‘*Ujamaa* village’ (Ergas, 1980; Schneider, 2007). To put it simply, and this is echoed throughout these interviews, rural Tanzanians were not prepared to work solely on communal farms since this did not generate a private food supply or personal income. Villagization thus failed when measured against one of its principal objectives, which was to halt private farming (Bernstein, 1981). Coulson (1977) adds that the government also sought to create a major of agricultural surplus, although interviewees associate *Ujamaa* villages with food shortages\(^5\). These are often cited as a consequence of (or at least in conjunction with) villagization and: “moving here, to a place with so many people, meant that there was not enough food. All of our wealth was left in the forest” (Bibi Tatu, Dihimba). Many add that moving from relatively profitable land to *Ujamaa* villages meant that they produced less and relied on support that was not forthcoming. In more general terms, it was also common for *Ujamaa* villages to be formed in previously uninhabited areas, often with poor water access, which induced further problems with food production (Wembah-Rashid, 1998).

‘Resettlement’ during the latter stages of villagization often became permanent forced removal through the destruction of crops and property. Both in Dihimba and in Mikindani it was regularly declared that some did not want to move but: “it was an

\(^{5}\)Villagization is seen to have caused major food shortages between 1973 and 1975 (see Ergas, 1980: 404-5) and a dramatic reduction in cashew nut production in Southern Tanzania (Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998).
obligation and they were moved by force, the soldiers came, they came to worry the people, and they were taken, all of their things were put in a truck” (Bibi Subira, Dhimba). In addition, some cited the destruction of private property and, perhaps unsurprisingly, those who had direct experienced of villagization saw it as a particularly nefarious process and only those people who had nothing chose to move to Ujamaa villages. This also reveals why voluntary villagization rapidly became compulsory resettlement: “at the start people decided whether to go. Many stayed with their wealth; buildings, cashew nut, coconut and mango trees. People who had nothing went to cooperate, to build, and to live in Ujamaa villages. Then the government then forced everyone to go” (Bibi Bahati, Mikindani). Here the argument is framed around the notion of incentives, only those with nothing had a reason to move, while most did not want to jeopardise the profits generated from agriculture by moving to an area that was either inhabited by many (meaning land was scarce), or totally uninhabited (meaning that everything had to be started from scratch), regardless of any other potential benefits of resettlement. While few referred directly to the historical and contemporary importance of cashew nuts in the local economy, as reflected more broadly in Mtwara (Cooksey and Shao, 2008), the dramatic reductions in production across the Mtwara region certainly coincided with villagization, and the process was arguably one of the main reasons for the collapse in cashew nut production across the country (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3).

Many thus argue that the incentives to move to Ujamaa villages were not strong enough, which also explains why voluntary villagization was fairly unpopular (outside of those who ‘had nothing’) and compulsory villagization introduced. However, this is seen to have had a further impact on incentives with interviewees in both villages recalling the
mandate to move. This led to a sense of paralysis in new villages wherein those who had moved did not want to invest time and labour into land given that an ‘increasingly authoritarian government’ (Schneider, 2006) may relocate them again without notice:

“After people moved to the Ujamaa village, their old houses, farms and cashew nut trees were burnt. People didn’t work hard and prepare new farms quickly because they were scared these would be destroyed like the old farms. The village chairman told us not to plant more than five trees in the Ujamaa village because we might be moved again” (Mzee Mustafa, Dihimba).

This represents an indictment of the entire process, wherein the destruction of private property is seen to have instigated the absence of incentives to farm in ‘new’ villages. It is further argued that the village chairman (always a Party member) was unable to assure villagers that they would not be moved again. This clearly demonstrates increased authoritarianism, wherein Party representatives in villages were at the whims of central government, whose forceful methods to induce migration undermined incentives to cultivate land. The most draconian methods used might be “put down to the actions of a few ‘over zealous officials’” (Jennings, 2002: 513), the first-hand, localized experiences of villagization certainly had a profound and lasting impact on many wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba. Villagization is widely seen to have brought about a regression in terms of maendeleo and as one of the central themes of this project, it is important to investigate these perceptions further.
7.4.4 Villagization as the Antithesis of Maendeleo

In whichever ways wazee conceive of development, it is seen as inaccessible or largely unavailable in southern Tanzania today. Maendeleo is more easily attainable, and more often observed by ‘others’ both within the village (chapter five), in ‘other’ places (chapter six), or is seen to have existed in ‘the past’ prior to the formation of Ujamaa villages: “we wanted village development, but it [villagization] failed and if you compare this time to the past, in the colonial time there was development, it was not a good time but we did not bring development through villagization” (Mzee Mohammedi, Dihimba). This demonstrates a concrete separation, a definitive ‘before’ and ‘after’ moment framed around villagization. While the colonial period was ‘difficult’, it is seen to have offered more in terms of ‘development’ than witnessed during or since villagization. Some suggest that villagization continues to have a detrimental effect on the potential for personal development in Dihimba and the legacy of Ujamaa is “that you must be close to the village chairman. If you are far from village leaders you can’t get help and maendeleo is impossible” (Mzee Amiri, Dihimba). Wazee often argue that a close relationship with leaders is one potential avenue to development, yet in this instance, and according to many others, these relationships date back some time and continue to preclude development today.

Criticisms of villagization are pervasive and while it was supposed to benefit the rural population, predominantly made up of farmers, the opposite view is expressed below and farmers are seen as the group most adversely affected. Many of the problems cited are summarised neatly below, together seen as a regression in terms of maendeleo:
“Villagization had an extremely negative effect on those who farmed. Coconut and orange trees were growing, our farms were improving but then we were told to leave and everything died. *Ujamaa* was not good and reduced development. The government said that after *Ujamaa* we could expect our needs to be met and Nyerere provided communal shops, but nothing was available. People went back to their old fields where everything had died” (Mzee Yusufu, Mikindani).

In spite of promises that “needs would be met” in *Ujamaa* villages, the shortages associated within communal shops following villagization demonstrate that things had regressed and it is elsewhere argued that: “Nyerere’s time was very difficult. The government arranged villagization and people joined together but there were problems, things were no longer available” (Mzee Ali, Mikindani). Villagization is tied in with the “difficult” time of Nyerere, wherein many cited a widespread shortage of “things”; clothes, fuel and basic foodstuffs (rice, sugar, tea, meat, cooking oil), of which there was a major national shortfall during the most intensive period of villagization, from 1973-75 (Ergas, 1980).

Coupling major and crippling shortages with the fact that people had to return to their ‘old’ farms, which were bereft of their previous natural wealth (trees, crops and so on had often perished) and their old buildings (destroyed to induce resettlement), means that many see this as a clear regression in terms of development. The point at which the effects of compulsory villagization were being felt most keenly, seems to mark the distinction made between ‘the past’, prior to villagization, as a time of development and the time since which is full of ‘problems’, marked by the conspicuous absence of development in the lives of wazee.
7.5 CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENT NOT VILLAGIZATION

This chapter contrasts the tendency within mainstream development literature to focus solely on the future (as cited in Appadurai, 2004; Crush, 1995; Ferguson, 1994; Kothari, 2005b), given that many wazee partially understand development through nostalgic glimpses into ‘the past’. It can therefore be argued that older people’s capacity to aspire (see 2.3.2) has been altered or diminished since it is ‘the past’ rather than the present or future that symbolises maendeleo. This nostalgia offers a sense of “aspiration without possibility, deploying sensibilities and values drawn from the past in the context of current struggles” (Bissell, 2005: 226). Many represent ‘the past’ in contradistinction from ‘the present’ which is marked by the absence of personal development and it is often seen as unlikely (or impossible) that the lives of older people will improve. Wazee often argue that their “time had passed” and it is also important to recognise that interviewing this specific group is likely to uncover a degree of nostalgia, not least for a lost youth and for the time in they identify as their ‘prime’. While some proffered aspirations as part of their interpretation of maendeleo; good houses, more ‘things’, better agricultural tools, education for their children and access to cash and loans, these were often aspired to in a general, societal sense and not often seen as accessible to wazee.

A range of views were offered in the interviews and while some cited the injustices of colonialism (the British benefited more than Tanganyikans through exploiting natural resources and utilising cheap labour), the predominant view remains that the lack of freedoms and exploitation were worth tolerating in exchange for employment, cheap and accessible ‘things’ and stability. Indeed, villagization was often understood as the
point at which life worsened, previous certainties disappeared, and instability ruled. During villagization there were shortages of many ‘things’ and while more is available today it is mostly unaffordable, especially given that employment opportunities have also evaporated. Each of these is closely associated with ‘the past’, conveying a real sense that development took place prior to villagization but has not happened since. Villagization was a process which lasted for more than seven years and the legacy of such is felt to the present day, yet this event, or series of processes, seems to stand above all others as the key rupture in the lives of many informants, the moment at which development began to ‘go backwards’ (*rudi nyuma*).
CHAPTER EIGHT

Reimagining Development

This thesis set out to uncover perceptions of development from the perspectives of older people, whose views are too often obscured or overlooked when it comes to analyzing the meanings of ‘development’. Older people have lived through numerous (seemingly distinct) periods of Tanzanian history and experienced various forms of intervention, and this remains one of the three central tenets of the thesis. ‘The past’ alongside place and materiality create a framework within which it is possible to co-construct the development narratives of wazee in south-eastern Tanzania. These three areas were considered significant at the outset, but really came to the fore during the interview process. Development is seen as conspicuous by its absence among older people and is projected in three overlapping ways; firstly development is the preserve of the young and powerful within the village that are materially endowed and able to access available opportunities. Secondly ‘other’ people, often in ‘other’ places, are seen as clear examples of development, while the third dimension considers development as a thing of ‘the past’, widely held as a time of progress and a time in which more opportunities were available. This reflects the main research question and three dimensions established in the second chapter, which map onto the three preceding chapters. These cover the most common elements of the well-rounded, comprehensive, and robust readings of development offered by interlocutors throughout. This chapter seeks to frame these findings within broader development (and academic) debates.
Figure 8: Recalling the Research Question and Key Dimensions

How is Development understood by those who have, over time, experienced various forms of intervention?

a) How significant is materiality to contemporary readings of development?

b) What role does place and space play in perception of development?

c) How do understandings of history and the past inform readings of development?

These three areas are thoroughly analyzed in the three following sections of this chapter, each of which offers substantial analysis in an attempt to locate the key findings within the development field and within broader debates. Continual reference is made to the experience and understandings of older people, as highlighted in the central research question, although the divide between the three key dimensions of the thesis is in some ways artificial and acts as a means by which to frame the findings. In reality, perceptions of development were framed by materiality and material inequalities, which are central to many of the ways in which wazee understand development in Dihimba and in Mikindani, yet place and temporality were a means of demonstrating the absence, rather than the presence of development. A fourth section analyzes the particular emphasis on older people, relating the findings herein to broader debates surrounding age discrimination, especially in the development field.

8.1 DEVELOPMENT AS MATERIAL CHANGE?

This thesis emphasizes the importance of placing a renewed emphasis on material welfare when it comes to perceptions of development, as demonstrated in Tanzania (Green, 2000; 2003; Kamat, 2008; Seppälä and Koda, 1998) and elsewhere in southern
and Eastern Africa (Ferguson, 2006). The role that material objects can play in terms of self-worth, happiness and a sense of social advancement is common in research into ‘Western’ consumer culture (Claxton and Murray 1994), yet the symbolic significance of material resources is less often analyzed when it comes to perceptions of development. The symbolic and practical benefits of material resources and ‘real’ material concerns (Ferguson, 2006) have often been sidelined in contemporary development research, policy and planning, in favour of relatively “vague notions’ such as ‘community empowerment’” (Mercer, 2002: 102). Research from South Asia also cites a general consensus among psychologists that “people focus first on basic material needs, then material security, and then less tangible objectives such as affinity, recognition and self-actualisation” (Moore et al, 1998, in Camfield et al, 2006: 7). While older people in south-eastern Tanzania did seek recognition in some ways, and greater respect, their aspirations were generally framed by ‘things’ and by desired improvements to individual material welfare.

Material self-sufficiency and food security were essential elements of maendeleo in Ujamaa discourse (Lal, 2010), which also reflects the earlier ‘mandate’ of Tanganyika wherein colonial officers outwardly sought to ‘protect colonial subjects’ from the ravages of the market (Rizzo, 2006). The absence of a secure food supply across Tanzania today can exacerbate deprivation given that material assets are often sold when immediate food needs fail to be met, for example, when harvests fail (Da Costa and Price, 2009). It seems as though the experience of past and present food shortages, and individual material deprivation, is more influential in the perceptions of development offered by many wazee than the collectivist discourse of Ujamaa. This is particularly prescient given
that policies relating to *Ujamaa* and villagization are often seen to have enhanced material depravation.

### 8.1.1 Material Inequalities: ‘Overall’ or Personal Development?

Interpretations of *maendeleo* are contingent and context-specific (Mercer, 2002) and the personal, materialist readings of development included herein might seem surprising given the national history of Tanzania and the continuing influence of Nyerere and the socialist *Ujamaa* discourse of TANU (Tanganyika Africa National Union – later CCM). Pitcher and Askew (2006: 11) argue that state socialisms are grounded by “universal themes – modernism, industrialization, previous exploitation, future emancipation, solidarity, unity, work”. These are mirrored in contemporary discourse and iconography “only with newly substituted referents for the previous exploitation, future emancipation and – in the case of Tanzania – the ‘self’ in ‘self-reliance’ (formerly the nation or community and now the individual). Survival remains a leitmotif, as do modernity, family, solidarity, unity and work” (Pitcher and Askew, 2006: 11). This shift away from collectivism towards individualism has been witnessed since ‘the impasse’ in broader development theories (see 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) and this is mirrored by emphasizing the ‘self’ in ‘self-reliance’, which clearly reflects many of the perceptions of development offered by *wazee*. The very notion of *maendeleo ya mtu binafsi* (Green, 2000; see chapter five), ‘the development of a person by themselves’ further reflects this point.

Interviewees often emphasised physical changes to the landscape and the creation of new schools, health centres and public buildings (in both villages). These are symbolic material changes that have been witnessed in each village, with roads and bridges
specifically highlighted in Mikindani. Such changes are seen as symbolic of development in some ways, although the extent to which they provide tangible benefits was regularly questioned. There exists a widespread feeling that government services are of a particularly low standard and lack resources since the government is not interested in providing for the whole population. Social services have been central to development discourse in Tanzania since the colonial era (especially after the *Colonial Development and Welfare Act* of 1940, see Schneider, 2006) and while this was intensified in Tanzania after independence, the introduction of user fees during the 1980s is seen to have reduced universal access. This seems particularly prescient amongst older people, both in my interviews and in research from across Tanzania, which demonstrates that these services are largely unaffordable for *wazee* (Kamat, 2008; Langwick, 2007; URT, 2007).

While investment in social services has certainly returned to mainstream development agendas in the past ten years or so, this tends to focus on younger people, as witnessed in the removal of user fees for primary education in Tanzania inspired by the discourse of *Education for All*, enshrined in the MDGs.

The MDGs have ostensibly placed social provision at the forefront of mainstream development agenda but this can skew spending priorities since setting dates for certain social development targets might mean that short-term goals are favoured over longer term infrastructural projects. Thus, data from the World Bank demonstrate that:

“in the first half of the 1990s the share of aid to Africa spent on infrastructure and economically productive projects (in sectors such as agriculture, industry and services) was 53%. Ten years later (in the period 2000–04) the proportion of aid spent in these areas had dwindled dramatically, to only 31%. Meanwhile, spending on social sectors (such as
health and education) had risen as a proportion of aid to Africa from 33% to 60%” (Glennie, 18th October 2010; The Guardian).

While it might be the case that across Africa a large amount of available resources have been re-employed in social service provision, this does not seem to be reflected in the views of interviewees herein. They highlight the lack of resources in social services, and refer to health centres which lack medicine and schools that are deprived of requisite pens, pencils and textbooks, not to mention the failure of the government to pay the wages of teachers (see 5.4.1). This is coupled with the fact that too little is seen to have been spent on infrastructure, which matches the argument above, and those material changes which have taken place as part of the ‘overall’ form of development (schools, health centres, roads and government offices) often fail to improve the lives of wazee.

The emphasis placed on the changes associated with ‘overall’ development allude to the historical legacy of TANU and Nyerere, however they are seen to have had a minimal impact on the lives (or ‘development’) of wazee. Interviewees tended to focus more on the potential of small-scale affects on their lives than on overall changes, mirroring broader shifts in development thought and policy (see 2.2.3) and in government ideology (or lack thereof). While the small-scale nature of localized interventions, and the resources at the disposal of NGOs, are still seen to hold some potential by wazee, it was regularly argued that in reality wazee are ostracised and that development projects and NGOs serve to exacerbate inequalities. Material inequalities remain central to many post-Marxist perspectives (see Corbridge, 1994; Slater, 1992) and wazee in Mikindani (and to a lesser extent in Dihimba, perhaps given the limited experience of such) argue that development projects offer a clear example of the way in
which pre-existing inequalities are exacerbated. Throughout the interviews it was reiterated that material imbalances exist at local, national and global scales, and while global discrepancies in wealth and access to material resources are central to development discourse, localised inequalities are often analyzed less fully. In spite of the prominence of approaches which focus on the ‘local’ level in recent development policy and research (see 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), the idea of ‘community’ or ‘locality’ is too rarely seen as a site of power relations and pre-existent inequalities in participatory, civil society and neoliberal approaches alike (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Mosse, 2001; Vincent, 2004). The breadth of material inequalities thus remains significant to perceptions of development with modernist and materialist changes also central to the development discourse of wazee in Dihimba and Mikindani.

8.1.2 Modernist Desires and the Tenability of Development

Materiality is central to many of the perceptions of development offered by wazee who often focused on the importance of ‘things’, complementing some of the work of Ferguson (2006) who argues that many of the poorest people in southern Africa clearly hold modernist desires. Both from an historical perspective, and contemporaneously, material welfare is central to many of the ways in which development is understood and materialist and modernist aspirations cannot simply be cast aside as is often assumed within post- or anti-development criticisms and post-colonial theories alike (Blunt and McEwan, 2002; Simon, 2006; Sylvester, 1999). It is possible to glean any number of problems with the idea and tenability of ‘development’ from critical academic perspectives, yet “replacing the term and underlying concept”, does not “address the basic problems of inequality, poverty, powerlessness and so forth. It is therefore more
useful to differentiate between the conventional and widely rejected versions of modernization-as-development and progressive, empowering visions” (Simon, 2006: 17). While interviewees cited problems, both with projects that have been established and the lack of support they receive, ‘development’ is still a common concern amongst wazee with material desires remaining significant. Thus Chaterjee maintains “that development cannot be wished away”, in spite of the fact that it has been “impossible for ex-colonies to follow the path to development of the ex-colonizer”, what Corbridge (2007: 194) refers to as the ‘false promise’ postcolonial modernity. It is important to appreciate that promises of development and modernization have not often been met in the eyes of the people who were supposed to benefit and this failure to meet expectations (generated by colonial and postcolonial regimes, NGOs and smaller-scale interventions alike) is important to the fomenting of nostalgia.

The promise of development was one of the key means by which African nationalist movements garnered popular support for independence (see 2.1.2) and this is certainly true of TANU in Tanzania (see 3.1.3). Hannerz adds that modernity can empower ‘Third World’ peoples and cultures, allowing intercultural dialogue and providing access to technological and symbolic resources which mean that recipients can deal with problems on their own terms and are able to ‘manage’ their culture. This is elsewhere seen as an admission that post-colonialism and materialist critiques of globalisation are loath to make (Paolini, 1997: 95). Wazee in Dhimba placed great emphasis on the tractor that was purchased by the village in the late 1960s (which rapidly became functionally redundant according to numerous interviewees) and this clearly represents a symbolic, modernist change which took place in ‘the past’. On the other hand, the absence of
certain commodities today echoes the sense of ‘backwardness’ that dominates the way in which interviewees understand the villages in which interviews took place. Indeed, development is often closely associated with improvements to personal material welfare, not least in terms of the clear desire for ‘things’ (vitu) higher quality housing with metal roofs and this is the case in Tanzania (Green, 2000; Kamat, 2008) and beyond (see Ferguson, 2006 on Zambia; Morton, 2007 on Botswana).

The specific focus on material resources and the desire to increase the quality of farming tools as well as to improve housing both has symbolic relevance (‘others’ are often associated with ‘development’) and practical significance. Improved housing was clearly significant on a symbolic level (and closely related to development), yet Da Costa and Price (2009) also illustrate that a metal roof with brick walls allows for the effective storage of household food for long periods of time. Better farming tools and clothes are also closely associated with maendeleo, the former hold a symbolic value but are also seen as essential on a practical level since it is seen as difficult to produce the food required for a greatly expanded (and expanding) national population, which has grown from nine million at independence to around forty million today (see 3.2.1). A recent shift in government rhetoric, however, is marked by the policy of Kilimo Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’), which has ostensibly placed fresh emphasis on agriculture and led to an increase in the percentage of the national budget spent on agriculture (Da Costa and Price, 2009). While Kilimo Kwanza also promotes “a change from hand-hoe farming to farming using new technologies and tractors, to increase national bank lending on concessionary terms, address problems in land markets and unused land [sic]” (Da Costa and Price, 2009: 17), few mentioned this or any appreciable change in tools, land use or
access to loans on favourable terms (outside of much derided microfinance schemes). Indeed, such ‘developments’ were often associated with ‘the past’, perhaps demonstrating the limited extent to which central government policies affect the people and places that are supposed to benefit.

_Ujamaa_ discourse reflected the apparent necessity for technological advancement and while villagization was generally derided, many interviewees in Dhimba were in favour of the tractor procured at the time. Nyerere also proffered the necessity for an ‘African form of socialism’ in rural areas, which focussed on improving agriculture through cooperation and unity. Some argue, however, that the degree of planning that went into villagization, and the apparent necessity for industry (see 6.4.2), means that _Ujamaa_ was a highly modernist philosophy (Mamdani, 1996; Scott, 1998). Materiality remains central to the manifold ways in which development is interpreted and material inequalities inform perceptions that development, which is available to the young, powerful and wealthy within villages, but is also in other places.

**8.2 THE PLACES AND SPACES OF DEVELOPMENT**

In many ways, place represents an arena in which the absence of development can be clearly demonstrated by interviewees who often emphasized the clear material inequalities that exist between both people and places. This allowed for the projection of _maendeleo_ beyond the village at hand, reflecting a relational understanding of place that Tilley (2006) argues is one of the more common ways in which people make sense of the meaning of place. Critical approaches in development geography aim to imagine space and place in new ways, while at the same time acknowledging the inherent power
disparities that underpin the remaking of place and space (Massey, 1993). When it comes to the specificities of each of the places considered herein, it is clear that the reasons given for the lack of development sometimes differ. However, it is equally common for development to be projected onto other places by wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba, with maendeleo seen as something that largely comes from ‘outside’. When place is brought into the equation, it seems that development is understood relationally, reflecting the discourse of development which consciously ranks places from high-to-low (see Ferguson, 2006 and chapter two). Place seems to bridge a gap that exists between local perceptions of unequal access to opportunities, highlighted in the previous section, and the interventions by NGOs or government that are in some way related to development but only seen to benefit the young, powerful and already wealthy. This section divides perceptions of development by three of the most common spatial scales, namely; the local, the national and the global.

8.2.1 Framing the ‘Local’ Level

Green (2000) argues that in southern Tanzania, maendeleo is often understood as localized forms of intervention, in a relatively straightforward manner. This certainly reflects a widely held view in Dihimba, although it is the lack of interventions that demonstrate the absence of development. This also shares common ground with views expressed in Nepal, wherein development is understood as something that can only be administered from outside “by people posted to local projects from other places. From these associations grows the popular notion that bikas [development] is concentrated, to varying degrees, in other places and that villages are places of relatively little bikas” (Pigg, 1992: 499). While interventions are locally manipulated to fit certain priorities and
circumstances, and do not totally re-shape places (Simon, 2007), Pigg continues to argue that the ideology of modernization closely associated with development (see chapter two) is assimilated and incorporated “into local social identity” (Pigg, 1992: 502). Certain characteristics that are frowned upon in another part of Tanzania are associated with ‘underdevelopment’ (Mercer, 2002; see 3.3.2) and some of the meanings attached to maendeleo are inevitably highly differentiated even at the smallest-scale (this is the case on any issue according to Kamat, 2008).

Development is clearly conceived of as something that can be brought into Dihimba from the outside and while the same significance is not placed on direct interventions by NGOs in Mikindani, Green (2003) argues that it is extremely rare for development projects to be rejected outright in southern Tanzania. This is significant to perceptions of development from both places and ‘outside assistance’ is fundamental to the development discourse of wazee. This is even the case in Mikindani where the NGOs and development projects that have been established are not seen to have been particularly beneficial, other than through of much needed employment opportunities generated. There is a clear overlap with the work of Pigg who found that “becoming one of the salaried workers who implements bikas [development]” in Nepal, is often highlighted over “the benefits of its programs (though no one minds if an agency decides to bring them piped water, build a clinic, or install electricity)” (Pigg, 1992: 511). However, as Crewe and Harrison (1998) argue, perceptions of previous interventions affect the views of current and future interventions which therefore never take place in a vacuum. The negative views of kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi might have reduced expectations when it comes to the likely successes of future projects.
Kopa mbuzi, lipa mbuzi, the phrase used to refer to the goat-loaning scheme that was often cited in both villages (see 5.5.1), is seen to have exacerbated inequalities in both villages, given that it was controlled by the powerful few who therefore supported their own families and friends. Interestingly, this overlaps significantly with research conducted in the Kilwa region of Tanzania, with the perceived failure of previous development projects clearly influencing perceptions of current and future interventions, bringing about “cynicism and withdrawal from participation. This should not be construed as indicating that local people do not want development. On the contrary, many (although not all) are highly desirous of the commodities that come with development” (Marsland, 2007: 78). In spite of the negativity regarding many past interventions, development was still keenly sought after by the vast majority of interviewees in much the same way as Marsland (2007) found to be common in Kilwa, although the perceived ostracism of older people from the benefits of interventions remains significant. There are discrepancies and continuities between the readings of development offered in the two villages; however it is also important to focus on national-historical processes and not least the alleged ostracism of ‘the south’, the villagization processes instituted in the region and massive population growth, all of which significantly affect perceptions of place and space in relation to development.

8.2.2 Framing the National Level

It is certainly relevant to discuss infrastructure with reference to southern Tanzania, an area that is seen as ‘different’ to the rest of the country and often as ‘less developed’ (Killian, 2003; Langwick, 2007). While this is not an obvious conclusion that can be drawn from a few mainstream development indicators (see 3.2.3), Langwick (2007) and
Wembah-Rashid (1998) discuss perceptions of the region as in some ways ‘resistant to development’. These accusations have been consistently levelled by those outside of ‘the south’, firstly by various “colonial administrators” and “more recently by Tanzanian government officials” (Langwick, 2007: 91). It might be the case that any ‘resistance to development’ reflects the fact that the perceptions of supposed beneficiaries run counter to those of the actors involved in implementing any number of projects and interventions. Given that this research ostensibly aims to demonstrate and expose some of the main ways in which development is understood by older people, based on their experiences of various interventions in the south-east of Tanzania, it is important to emphasize how often the region is seen to have been deliberately underdeveloped (often from the inside), or as resistant to development (more likely from the outside).

Throughout Tanzania, and especially in rural areas, many feel relatively cut-off from the rest of the country and this is often attributed to poor quality or unmaintained roads (Da Costa and Price, 2009; Wembah-Rashid, 1998) and as Rajani (2010) recently discovered, this sense of isolation is often as keenly felt in the north of Tanzania albeit outside of major urban centres. A wide-ranging national survey (URT, 2007) found that poor road conditions and a lack of road maintenance was one of the primary concerns of rural respondents, given that this led to difficulties in reaching markets and accessing services that could only be found within towns and cities (a problem in southern Tanzania, for Langwick, 2007). The authors of the report claim that this constrains rural economic growth (URT, 2007: IX-X) as Wembah-Rashid (1998) argues with reference to south-eastern Tanzania. Thus, it is necessary to return to a point initially raised in the second chapter, whereby development is understood to partially create realities it is only
otherwise seen to describe (drawing from Castree, 2004; Corbridge, 2007), marking out ‘the south’ as different, regardless of the extent to which it is underdeveloped (see 3.2.3). Notwithstanding the ‘development impasse’, the focus on ‘national’ and ‘global’ levels remains in mainstream development discourse, while interviewees in Dihimba and Mikindani often focus on regional inequalities. Indeed, perceptions in Kilimanjaro region effectively mirror those from southern Tanzania wherein increased “wealth and access to education had seen a particular local identity develop which stressed the area’s progress in relation to the rest of the country” (Hunter, 2008: 473). Development, then, much like place, is often understood relationally (Tilley, 2006).

Developmental inequalities and material imbalances are often referred to globally, yet interviewees in the southern region often highlight the national scale and perceived discrepancies between regions. In more general terms, Massey (1993) argues that there is a power-geometry of time-space compression, and that regions, as well as the varied social groups and individuals therein, are distinctly positioned in relation to flows and interconnections. This is not merely concerned with migration, and the issue of “who moves and who doesn’t, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation to the flows and the movement” (Massey, 1993: 61, emphasis in original). Space, therefore, mediates the flows and interconnections which might be significant when interpreting ‘development’, especially given that persistent emphasis is placed on ‘outside assistance’. While NGOs and development projects are not necessarily fundamental to readings of development, maendeleo is consistently understood as something that comes from outside of the village and the flows of ‘things’ between newly interconnected places are likely to increase material welfare and available
resources, in spite of the fact that older people do not have access to these. Thus interconnections, whether at regional, national or global scales, can have significant knock-on effects, exacerbating place-based inequalities in relation to globalized flows and movements. While NGOs are seen as a sign that Dihimba has effectively been ‘left behind’, in Mikindani emphasis is often placed on the beneficial treatment received by Mtwara town, thus projecting development based on flows and movements, albeit not referring to the expansion of NGOs specifically but instead focussing on the resources allocated from central government.

8.2.3 Framing the Global Level

Ferguson (2006) argues that the language of global ‘flows’ employed to explain globalization is largely irrelevant in many African contexts. Thus it is often seen as more accurate to talk of “point-to-point connectivity and networking enclaves that confront us when we examine Africa’s experience of globalization... the “global” does not “flow”, thereby connecting and watering contiguous spaces; it hops instead, efficiently connecting the enclaved points in the network while excluding (with equal efficiency) the spaces that lie between the points” (Ferguson, 2006: 47). While this argument originally referred to the extraction of mineral resources, it is relevant in discussing the impact of globalization on readings of development and marks one of the key distinctions between Mikindani and Dihimba. While NGOs are not often seen to have had a particularly significant impact on the lives of wazee, and might even serve to exacerbate localized inequalities in Mikindani, they are continually related to increased resources. NGOs are seen from a global perspective by many interviewees and their absence in Dihimba reflects perceived inequalities at regional, national and global levels.
Katz (2004) argues that the notion of ‘time-space expansion’ is more appropriate than ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey, 1989), or ‘time-space distanciation’ (Giddens, 1991) when considering the impact of globalization in southern Sudan, and this seems relevant to Dihimba. Perceptions that the distance has increased between southern Sudan and “global centres whose concentration and interconnections have been intensified through practices and processes associated with time-space compression” (Katz, 2004: 227) could equally be argued in relation to Dihimba. Moreover, the perception that some other places within a relatively localized region (not least Mikindani and Mtwara) are, on the face of it at least, receiving greater international support than Dihimba seems to enhance the sense of isolation felt by wazee in Dihimba. Interconnections are, thus, unequal and certain places and parts of the world are becoming increasingly distant from the centres of capitalism, a distance that has grown since the colonial era where ‘the south’ of Tanzania was exploited but seen to have been more globally interconnected in some ways. It is often the places and the people who inhabit such places that are associated with development.

Connecting certain people and places with development combines material realities with spatialized ideas about people and the places they come from. This effectively mirrors the views of Crewe and Harrison (1998) and Kothari (2005) who argue that development is often associated with certain places, as a process that needs to take place ‘over there’ and ‘back then’. Development geography has recently taken up this focus on history (Slater, 1993; Crush, 1995; Power, 2003; Kothari, 2005b) and the idea of ‘outside’ assistance (whether from a regional, national or international level) is clearly a spatial metaphor. Notwithstanding the fact that wazungu are not seen to have had a
particularly positive impact in Mikindani (through NGOs and development projects), many felt that development could only be instigated through people, ideas and objects, from outside of the village. This reflects Pigg’s argument that development discourse “creates a paradox” by locating villages outside of development, yet aiming to make them developed (Pigg, 1992: 511). ‘Development’, once again, serves to create realities it only sets out to describe (Castree, 2004; Corbridge, 2007; see 2.6.1) and interviewees in Tanzania who, to some extent, maintain the dichotomy between development and the village, between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ Worlds, the ‘developing’ and the ‘developed’. While this has been challenged in recent times (Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Jones, 2000), this distinction is maintained by many of the older people interviewed in South-Eastern Tanzania, especially given how central material inequalities are to perceptions of maendeleo.

8.3 ‘REPRESENTATIONS OF PASTNESS’ IN DEVELOPMENT

Development is often understood to be future oriented and this is explicable given the close connection often made with ‘progress’ (see chapter two). This is afforded further relevance by other research in Tanzania (Marsland, 2007; Mercer, 2002) especially given that maendeleo has etymological roots in the Kiswahili word for progress (see 5.1.1). The discipline of Development Studies is largely ahistorical, belying the long history of development as both an ideological field and a material process (recalling Apter, 1987; see 2.1) and respondents in this research included a clear temporal dimension in their readings of development. Kothari argues that a “history of development is not simply about what events took place in the past, the charting of a historical trajectory of dominant ideas and approaches, but also how the past is imagined and mapped onto
other places in the present” (Kothari, 2007: 37). Within this research the latter point is effectively inverted and interlocutors effectively map progress onto ‘the past’, and other places, conveying the view that “everyone's tomorrow will (or should) look like some people's present... This temporal theme is elaborated more generally in the way social and societal differences are portrayed” (Pigg, 1992: 501). However, sustained research into the relevance of history and ‘the past’ in ‘development’ remains rare and this research partially counters this trend by specifically focusing on ‘representations of pastness’ (Tonkin, 1992), the way in which ‘the past’ is divided (or not) and the importance of nostalgia in interpreting *maendeleo*. At the same time, historical interventions which have utilised the language of *maendeleo*/development offered a further avenue of investigation.

**8.3.1 Valorizing ‘the past’**

Linear readings of history are essential both to the idea of ‘development as progress’ and for the fermentation of nostalgia (Bissell, 2005), although this is not the same as arguing that *wazee* therefore divide epochs in the manner of liberal-nationalist histories (Lawi, 2005). They do not often pose a distinct separation ‘before and after’ independence, in spite of the fact that this brought national leadership, the end of colonial forms of taxation and formal chieftainship (chiefs often collected British colonial taxes) finished (Feierman, 1990: 5). While independence was both desirable and politically unstoppable across Africa during from late 1950s, it does not necessarily signify an important moment in many people’s lives (Ellis, 2002). Arguing that independence inevitably marks a clear and total historical rupture can serve to “obscure colonial and neo-colonial inequalities that persist today” (Blunt and McEwan, 2002: 3), while the focus on ‘development’ also
traversed independence (Schneider, 2006). Thus it can be argued that “Development in Tanzania was then, according to much of the historical literature, neither Tanzanian, nor substantially distinct, prior to 1967 [and the Arusha Declaration]” (Jennings, 2003: 165). These represent a clear continuation of pre-independence policies by the postcolonial state, thus offering further explanation of the fact that independence was not often seen to be particularly significant by many interlocutors, especially when compared with villagization, a process which is seen to have had a major impact on the lives of many interviewees.

While interlocutors regularly associated development with ‘the past’, a minority were largely unaware of the idea of maendeleo. Five people (out of the thirty interviewed) in each village felt that they were either unable to explain development, or were entirely unaware of the term maendeleo and, interestingly, these tended to be the same individuals that offered more cyclical readings of the past. The widely travelled journalist Ryszard Kapuściński (2001) associates cyclical readings of the past with ‘African culture’ (in the singular) and, in generalizing about the entire continent, argues that designations such as ‘long ago’ and ‘very long ago’ (perhaps equivalent to invoking ‘the past’ in this research) highlight the way in which time is understood by Africans. Thus, he argues that Africans do not understand time in the sense of a linear progression, but as mimicking “the circular, uniform revolutions of our planet. In this view of time the notion of development does not exist; it is replaced by the notion of the abiding. Africa is eternal abiding [sic]” (Kapuściński, 2001: 318). This research is not far-reaching enough to discuss the entire African continent, yet such views do not seem to reflect the predominantly linear readings of history, which both allows for the fomentation of
nostalgia and for the emergence of the idea of development, rather than reflecting a sense of ‘eternal abiding’. While ‘the past’ is compressed to include a great many different eras, wazee cited tangible differences (the tractor and the train) to illustrate a regression in terms of development, a clear example of a form of hindsight which allows for previous eras to be remembered differently to how they were experienced at the time. Hindsight and nostalgia do not therefore characterize weaker readings (also guarded against by Bissell, 2005) of history but instead help to index the widespread view that expectations have not, and are not, being met.

8.3.2 Development in ‘the past’; Nostalgia and Failed Expectations

Bissell contends that nostalgia should not be seen as “poor history”, but as a social practice that “mobilizes various signs of the past (colonial and otherwise) in the context of contemporary struggles” (Bissell, 2005: 218). This is significant, especially since wazee consistently claim to have been systematically sidelined with respect to the sorts of interventions and opportunities that they connect with maendeleo. Bissell’s view underlines many of the key arguments set forth within this chapter and within the thesis as a whole; the projection of development onto others (within and beyond villages) highlights “contemporary struggles”, which are also framed by memories of superior experiences in ‘the past’. This once again encapsulates the three key dimensions of this thesis, while some gendered differences were also witnessed: women tended to long for ‘the past’ in particular ways, often comparing tangible changes such as the inconsistent weather patterns and the size and quality of harvests today, with their consistency and abundance in ‘the past’. Men, on the other hand, tended to highlight greater employment opportunities in ‘the past’ and argued that while technological change was
still possible, major advancements seem to have taken place in ‘the past’. In spite of the fact that they offered different examples at times, men and women convey a clear sense of “aspiration without possibility” one of the ways in which Bissell (2005: 226) interprets nostalgia. Moreover, nostalgia may also be an outcome of cultural norms which dictate that women seem to undertake the bulk of labour-intensive farming in south-eastern Tanzania who might not therefore view technological change as likely or beneficial.

The emphasis placed on cheap prices in ‘the past’ also reflects nostalgia as a “social practice” in the “context of contemporary struggles”, with the inherent difficulties in generating enough money seen to inhibit the potential to buy basic commodities. The negative changes often highlighted are not fabricated, however, and there is evidence that prices were lower in ‘the past’, prior to liberalization (see 3.1.4). Climactic conditions may also have been more favourable and while the biggest droughts in the country may have beset the (interior) Morogoro region some distance from Mtwara, average rainfall has fallen in the south-east and is anticipated to fall by a further 25-50% in the future (Paavola, 2008). Indeed, rain patterns in the southern region of Tanzania were more regular and consistent in the past but a ‘drought corridor’ that existed further south during the period between 1979 and 2002 (Usman and Reason, 2004) has moved further north. Engelbrecht et al. (2009) also illustrate that rainfall levels closer to the coast have fallen sharply in recent times and the problems with an unpredictable climate are exacerbated by the fact that soil is often less fertile than it was in ‘the past’ with soil exhaustion one of the most damaging outcomes of villagization for Schneider (2007). This highlights the perceived necessity for agricultural equipment and other inputs, such as fertilizers, which are often seen to be prohibitively expensive given the dramatic price
rises in recent times. In turn, this means that over-used soil has little chance of being replenished (for Da Costa and Price, 2009).

8.3.3 Development Has ‘Gone Backwards’

The changes associated with *Ujamaa* are some of the most widespread and far-reaching in Tanzania. Villagization is often seen to have failed when set against the intended outcomes and given the economic problems engendered (Bernstein, 1981; Hyden, 1980; Mamdani, 1996; Scott, 1998). Drastic reductions in food production support such views (Ergas, 1980; Mihanjo and Luanda, 1998) although from a social perspective, villagization has often been seen as more of a success (Kaiser, 1996). This is also symbolized through national education, which aimed to foster a sense of nationhood, a national sense of community as part of a developmentalist agenda enacted at local levels. Interlocutors often argued that the associated provision of services (one of the central reasons offered by the government for the initiation of villagization processes) was positive in principal, but these were not well funded at the time and are even less well funded today. Resources were a major problem during villagization processes, for a state that could not draw from a material base which would guarantee long-term success (Lal, 2010).

“Indeed, during the final years of the ujamaa era, basic consumer goods were rarely available, the transportation infrastructure was collapsing, and the Government was unable to provide many of the basic health-care and education services that were promised immediately following the Arusha Declaration” (Kaiser, 1996: 231). Thus, the failure to meet expectations that were generated by the Arusha Declaration (and by independence) helps to explain why so many seemed to argue that development has ‘gone backwards’ and proffered such a high degree of nostalgia.
Despite the oft-cited failure of past interventions, they are not necessarily seen as wholly negative and rejected, as demonstrated by the specific reference to southern Tanzania (see 8.3.2) and the job opportunities and resources provided by NGOs. Development remains something exterior, to be introduced into villages from outside, and this also reflects the basis of villagization, with service provision one of the central aims of voluntary and forced resettlement. However, the methods used to forcibly remove people, once it became clear that the majority of rural peoples would not voluntarily resettle in Ujamaa villages, are often derided and viewed with great hostility. Many recall losing a great deal as a result of compulsory villagization after the TANU decree at the end of 1973 (Bernstein, 1981; Jennings, 2002), citing violent removal from their land and the destruction of property. However, not all interviewees remembered the process with such hostility, and reflecting the work of Lal (2010: 14-15), some do recall being forcibly loaded onto vehicles by soldiers “threatening to burn or destroy their homes and property” while “others merely recall a benign order to relocate”. While the state partly oversaw the destruction of property and crops and effectively took over all that remained, some of the more sinister acts surrounding relocation were officially put down to the actions of a few ‘over zealous officials’ (Jennings, 2002). This does not matter, however, when it comes to perceptions of those on the receiving end of forced relocation by state officials. It was also widely argued that the only people that chose to move were those who had nothing, reflecting the view of an informant of Green’s (2000) who saw villagization as the ‘nationalization of poverty’.

The eventual fallout of villagization and related shortages was liberalization, a clear feature of the post-socialist era in Tanzania, and many interviewees felt that there was a
far greater range of goods available today, which might help to explain why materiality and conspicuous forms of consumption are associated with development. The vast majority of interviewees, however, saw development as something absent in their lives, and liberalization (associated with cuts in welfare spending, price rises and the expansion of available commodities) is therefore often regarded to have expanded choice but only on a superficial level. Bryceson further argues that for rural consumers the wider range of goods available remain “at arm’s length, for much of the tantalizing merchandize came with unaffordable prices” (Bryceson, 2002: 729). The inability to access commodities and the absence of such changes understandably led many to argue that development has gone backwards. Most felt that they were unlikely to see such changes since the older people cannot access opportunities or the breadth of ‘things’ that have been made available, reflecting the ways in which older people are consistently sidelined, both in development theory and especially in terms of interventions. This is illustrated elsewhere in general terms (Barrientos, 2002; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000) and with specific reference to Tanzania (Tungaraza, 1992; URT, 2007).

8.4 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

This thesis is an important contribution to discussions surrounding development, both conceptually and, to some extent, in terms of practical interventions. As demonstrated in the fifth chapter (and previously within this chapter, see 8.1.1) many wazee divide between individual and overall forms of development, which reflects broader debates in development theory. However, the findings herein add to these debates in that most wazee argue that while ‘overall’ forms of development are seen as more likely or to have happened more recently, they have had little impact on the lives of older people and are
not seen to assist with personal development. Indeed, the materialist readings of development that proved so pervasive among *wazee* in south-eastern Tanzania also reflect this overall/personal distinction. While there is a clear preference for the latter among most interlocutors, this is not necessarily reflected in contemporary development theory and practice. Collectivized forms of development seem to predominate, as demonstrated by increased spending and focus on social provision and the reemphasised importance of infrastructural improvements. This thesis also highlights the importance of place in determining the ways in which development is understood, and the extent to which broader development theory acknowledges this, or accounts for these differences, is open to debate.

The appropriate role of certain institutions in providing, or attempting to instigate, development is also reflected in the views of the *wazee* interviewed (and younger people in focus groups). The state is no longer seen as the principal institution charged with bringing about development within mainstream theories and civil society is often seen as more effective in many ways and this is particularly in light of the ‘development impasse’ (see 2.2.3 for more on this), yet in south-eastern Tanzania the state is still often seen to be the institution charged with development. While NGOs are seen to provide some benefits, these are largely associated with increased resources within the local area and the employment opportunities created, rather than any grander notions of development or *maendeleo*. The extent to which major changes in theorizing development have had any impact among the supposed beneficiaries of interventions is therefore questionable and the state is still understood as the principal actor in bringing about substantial positive changes or ‘progress’. This is particularly understandable given the socialist past
in Tanzania, coupled with the widespread view that the south of the country has largely been abjected and sidelined from the resources and activities of the central state. Once again, place is an important consideration when it comes to perceptions of development.

8.5 CONCLUSION: THE ‘LOST VOICES OF OLDER PEOPLE’

As demonstrated previously (see 2.5) post-colonialism foregrounds alternative histories and silenced voices, emphasizing both the impact of the often forgotten colonial legacy, and the continuation of colonial relations following the dissolution of former colonial power structures across most of the world. Through discussions with wazee in each village this thesis sought to uncover voices that may otherwise be lost from development debates while also constructing ‘subaltern’ histories. Indeed, this thesis issues a clear challenge to mainstream histories of development by interrogating the concept and emphasizing the major ways in which older people understand it: materially, spatially and historically. While critics of post-colonialism argue that the “emphasis on discourse detracts from an assessment of the ways in which colonial power relations persist” it is also important to remember that “discourse itself is intensely material” (Blunt and McEwan, 2002: 5). This thesis draws on two of the central tenets of many post-colonial theories (lost voices and alternative histories) but the concomitant emphasis on development allows for a fuller discussion of materiality, particularly given that material resources and inequalities are central to the development discourse of older people in Mikindani and Dihimba. Some interviewees saw little difference between colonial and postcolonial times, yet ‘the past’ and material inequalities (between people and places), were both central to many of the perceptions of development forwarded by wazee. Given their past experience, wazee are uniquely placed to pass comment on the meaning
of ‘development’ and yet their views are rarely considered in ‘development’ theory, policy or practice, while the views of the supposed beneficiaries of interventions are also rarely considered.

Older people are not only under-researched in mainstream development, they also tend to receive less support (Barrientos, 2002), as reflected by the perceived actions of NGOs and government in both villages today. This is further reflected in the view that “most international development programmes fail to support older women and men as they make their substantial economic and social contributions. Indeed, policy-makers are often unaware that older people – particularly women – make a contribution at all” (Beales, 2000: 13). Interlocutors demonstrate a keen awareness of ageism, which is supported by further evidence from across the world (HelpAge International, 2010; Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002), which emphasizes the absence “of material family support for many older people, and made clear the threat that these pose to all aspects of their well-being. The evidence has thereby reinforced the initial concern and call for policy responses, and underlined the need for old-age economic-security policies” (Aboderin, 2004: 32). While it is more often argued that such support networks have partially disappeared in ‘the West’, given the individualist nature of society, they are often seen to remain active in the ‘developing world’ (Aboderin, 2004; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000). This conveys widespread presumptions made about rural sub-Saharan African communities by theorists and policymakers alike, which are neither reflected in individualistic readings of development or in the common belief that older people are under-supported.
Seppälä contends that economic differentiation within rural, peripheral communities is too rarely acknowledged and yet such places are inevitably marked by the same level of “cultural variation as in any other place – we just need to take a close enough look to notice the variation”; the “relative poverty of the majority of people” is not therefore the same as uniformity (Seppälä, 1998b: 8). The material support for older people has also diminished in conjunction with the outcomes of structural adjustment in the 1980s (Aboderin, 2004), with the introduction of user fees for social services and the removal of subsidies increasing the cost of agricultural inputs (along with inflation). All of these factors have increased cash requirements in Tanzania (Da Costa and Price, 2009).

‘Development organizations’, governments and NGOs, however, often portray a similar image of rural communities, particularly in Africa, wherein it is assumed that older people will inevitably receive familial support in old age (Barrientos, 2002; Beales, 2000). For example, it is argued that ‘traditional’ family support networks in Tanzania have been put under increased strain recently owing to “widespread poverty and rapid social and economic change” (URT and HelpAge, 2010: 6). Much like perceptions of development, this lack of support for older people belies a widespread focus on individualism which contradicts the “ideological assumptions” of the Tanzanian government, donors and NGOs alike, regarding the importance of ‘traditional’, collectivist values in “rural African communities” (Green, 2000: 81). It might, therefore, be the case that a heightened focus on older people is necessary yet individualist and materialist perceptions of development are not limited to this group as reflected in other, more general research conducted in Tanzania which emphasizes personal material benefits, more than state social provision (Kamat, 2008; Marsland, 2007).
When social provision was brought into the equation, the familiar theme of absence emerged, in spite of the fact that older people are supposed to benefit from free healthcare. This is also reflected in a recent national survey in which older people from across Tanzania were unaware of this entitlement or did not receive free healthcare when visiting government facilities (URT, 2007). Wazee often highlighted their rights as citizens (*raia, wananchi or bindamu*), yet these entitlements are not seen to have been met, and especially not in the more remote southern part of the country. Mamdani (1996) goes a stage further, arguing that postcolonial states continue to draw their legitimacy from the urban society, leaving rural populations “subordinated subjects rather than citizens endowed with democratic rights” (in Maddox and Giblin, 2005: 2). This seems to echo the views of older people herein, especially given that the research took place in a largely rural area.

In both villages there is a palpable sense that *maendeleo* was something that could only really be understood through projection, either spatially, temporally or both. While the “capacity to aspire” remains, as witnessed by significant material desires (farming tools, better houses and infrastructure), many felt that these things served to symbolise development but were largely inaccessible to older people. It may be the case that the perceived absence of significant material changes has removed expectations and the hope that surrounded the colonial train, independence, the tractor in Dihimba, the arrival of NGOs in Mikindani and (to a lesser extent) villagization, has, to varying degrees, brought a fatalism concerning positive changes or ‘development’. Thus, it is appropriate to suggest that some older people no longer aspire to positive changes and are accepting of what they determine to be ‘their fate’. This is particularly significant in light of the
view that nostalgia can be understood as “aspiration without possibility” (Bissell, 2005: 226), marking the failure to meet the expectations generated by various historical and more recent interventions as listed above, amongst many others. There is a keen sense that expectations have never been met and that those few opportunities that do afford themselves to individuals are never available to older people. The ahistoricism of development is not reflected in the way in which it is manifest and understood at local scales and in projects and interventions. Older people (who it is often assumed will be looked after by family members) become largely irrelevant and sidelined from this picture yet their views should be more central to discussions.
CHAPTER NINE

Overall Conclusions and Future Research

This project began as an investigation into the perceptions of development held by older people in South-Eastern Tanzania, the supposed beneficiaries of various interventions over time. It was argued that their views might be significant when it comes to readings of development and this thesis demonstrates the many fascinating insights and astute comments they offer to interpret development, or maendeleo. Moreover, the findings illustrate the nebulous nature of the concept of development which a small minority felt they were unable to describe, principally since it is used to refer to so many distinct phenomena (see 5.1.2). Most, however, worked through the apparent contradiction between the development of the self and the development of the society with failed attempts at the latter here seen to influence the commonplace idea that development is necessarily an individualistic pursuit. The fact that older people are not seen to have advanced materially, and are not seen to have the opportunity to do so, means that they largely understand development through absence rather than through presence. Throughout the thesis I argue that framing development around the dimensions of materiality, space and time offers a framework within which the variety of perspectives offered can be understood, especially given that these areas are often sidelined when it comes to mainstream readings development. A brief synopsis of each dimension is offered below, prior to a discussion of the various contributions made by this thesis – conceptually and empirically – and some ideas of potential future research which could build on this project.
9.1 MATERIALITY, PLACE AND TIME IN DEVELOPMENT

Individual material welfare is clearly seen as a vital constituent of development from the perspective of interviewees in southern Tanzania, especially in terms of houses with brick walls and metal roofs, shop ownership, clothes, farming tools and technological improvements. Such material changes and benefits are, however, deemed unlikely to happen among interviewees who see development as absent, rather than present. *Wazee* live with individual material poverty and are unable to access the goods available today, given that prices are prohibitive, but this was not seen to be the case in ‘the past’. Some positive overall changes were cited in each village, particularly in terms of the services that many associated with a less individualistic, more ‘overall’ or collective view of development. However, many interviewees argue that the low levels of resources invested in schools and health centres mean that services are of a low standard, while improvements to ‘things’ (roads, buildings, bridges and so on) are rarely seen to benefit *wazee*. The dearth of employment opportunities following schooling led some to question the extent to which education is valued, with jobs largely understood in a formalized and ‘modernist’ manner, principally referring to work in factories, for NGOs or for government, and not farming. Place is also crucial when it comes to defining development and whilst the materialist readings of development from each village often overlap, place-specific features cause divergences, emphasized by differing perceptions of NGOs and development projects and by the clear material differences that exist between Mikindani and Dihimba.

Mikindani has numerous resident NGOs which are not seen in a particularly positive light, notwithstanding the fact that they do create a small number of jobs. This stands in
contrast to the predominant views from Dihimba, where it was still argued that NGOs and development projects could ‘bring maendeleo’ if they would come and work in the village. A lack of industry is, however, cited as a principal problem in both villages, the legacy of which is often seen as the long-term and deliberate underdevelopment of southern Tanzania, a regional pariah which many argue was intentionally ostracised until the 1995 election of Mkapa. Indeed, the extent to which improving infrastructure brings ‘development’ to wazee is questioned. Another spatial metaphor commonly used in order to interpret development concerns ideas about people and the places they come from and, by extension, there is an association made between wazungu and development. This highlights a keen awareness of global material inequalities with some informants arguing that I myself symbolize development, owing to the technology at my disposal (without considering the implications I used a dictaphone throughout my research) and given that I wore shoes during some interviews. In spite of the manifold problems with NGOs that were cited by interviewees within Mikindani, it is important to recognize that development remains intimately connected to ‘outside assistance’, thus maendeleo is often related to ‘other places’ in some way. While ‘others’ within Mikindani were seen to ‘have development’, wazee argued that they were only able to access development in ‘the past’.

History, or ‘the past’, and some important historical interventions help to form older people’s perceptions of maendeleo in South-Eastern Tanzania. Development is temporally mapped onto ‘the past’ by many interviewees, opposing a mainstream development discourse that focuses more on the future and on progress. Independence does not seem particularly important to many interviewees and ‘the past’ is therefore
taken as the period traversing independence, prior to the onset of villagization. It is argued that during and since this hugely significant and geographically widespread process, things regressed and have continued to ‘go backwards’ (rudi nyuma). Nostalgia for kipindi cha nyuma (‘the past’/‘past times’) – the time prior to villagization – is widespread and associated with respect, cheap goods, cooperation, stability and an abundance of work. Two examples consistently offered to demonstrate the extent of progress that took place in ‘the past’ are: the train from the colonial era (introduced in the late-1940s as part of the Groundnut Scheme), and the tractor from the Ujamaa era (collectively owned in Dihimba during ‘the past’). These examples support materialist readings of development which highlight the significant potential of agricultural equipment to ‘bring development’. However, such advances are associated with ‘the past’ when agriculture was central to government planning, whether as part of the Groundnut Scheme or through TANU policies during the 1960s and 1970s. While agriculture was highlighted by the state, the enactment of villagization was not desired by most and only seen to be taken up by those ‘with nothing’. Free social services were associated with ‘the past’ but also with Ujamaa and only since liberalization have these been paid for, another clear sign of regression for the interviewees. The compulsory movement of rural peoples as part of villagization processes, and the related fall in incentives, food shortages and the mistrust fomented within the village, was seen as damaging and antithetical to development and was the clearest temporal referent offered.
9.2 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In spite of the fact that Development Studies is conventionally described as both interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, at times it falls short of engaging beyond disciplinary boundaries and reverts to an economistic comfort zone. This is argued in a recent working paper with particular reference to history, wherein Woolcock et al. (2009) demonstrate that even from mainstream development perspectives there is an emerging acknowledgement of the value in drawing on various academic disciplines (see also Harriss, 2002). In order to effectively analyze materiality, place and ‘the past’, as well as the ways in which these three are central to readings of development, it has been important to borrow from anthropology, (development) geography history, politics, and from Development Studies and Post-colonial theories alike, each with separate disciplinary requirements is seen as an important contribution of this research. Bringing this range of perspectives together in order to frame perceptions of such a widely employed, yet differently understood term as *maendeleo* in Tanzania, is seen as one of the principal benefits of this thesis. Indeed, this broadens the range of theories and ideas employed in discussions of development which might impact some of the current theoretical debates, at least in some small way.

Materiality and inequalities are central to local, national and global readings of development, with place and temporality influential in different ways. The fact that many see development as something which happened in ‘the past’ is highly significant and introduces a new dimension to debates beyond a mere consideration of history. While past interventions are undoubtedly important, it seems as though the representing ‘the past’ in certain ways is more significant to constructions of
development. The formation of *Ujamaa* villages structures ‘the past’; development is associated with the period prior to villagization, while the following period is marked by pessimism and general sense that things have regressed or ‘gone backwards’ (*rudi nyuma*). The perceived regression in terms of material welfare – or the absence of improvements at an individual level – was reflected in a widespread ambivalence towards NGOs and development interventions, which were not seen to have had any impact, positive or negative, on the material welfare of older people. While older people referred to the positive role NGOs might play, especially given that some are seen to do so in other places, the involvement of NGOs in Mikindani is largely seen to have exacerbated inequalities. This illustrates that older people in some ways feel scripted out of the discourse of development, which is not only associated with ‘other’ people and ‘other’ places but also by readings of ‘the past’. From mainstream development perspectives, and this is true of the history of ‘Western’ development theories, linear readings of ‘the past’ are widespread and this thesis illustrates that such views are not reflected ‘on the ground’ in South-Eastern Tanzania.

This thesis is an important contribution to the burgeoning studies which highlight alternative perceptions of development and while it does not share the theoretical basis of much development research, it might be sensible to position it within those approaches that highlight the perspectives of the recipients of development. However, owing to the fact that this is a thesis that does not directly consider potential future interventions, it is freed of some of the constraints of participatory projects, for example, which often require tangible outcomes for a funding body or donor. Instead, this thesis represents a more conceptual investigation into *maendeleo* in South-Eastern Tanzania, in
some ways building on the research of Maia Green (2000; 2003) and James Ferguson (2006). While the materialist perceptions of development exposed by both scholars are also present in my findings, I believe that using space and time to frame the thesis, alongside materiality, this research both complements and transcends previous studies. The almost singular focus on older people from the outset (notwithstanding a few focus groups with younger people) is premised on my view that they are consistently undermined and overlooked within and by development, as a material process and an intellectual project (recalling Apter, 1987) and as a series of interventions in certain parts of the (Third) World. However, it might be fruitful to offer more of a comparison with the perspectives of younger people, or with people from other parts of Tanzania, in order to scrutinise maendeleo in further detail and to determine the extent to which age, as well as place, impacts readings of development. For all of the benefits that this research brings, the myopic focus on wazee might be seen as a slight limitation.

9.3 BUILDING ON THIS RESEARCH

During the time I have spent in the South-Eastern Tanzania I have become increasingly interested in the border with Mozambique, particularly given that some interviewees spoke in some detail of time spent there and recalled the colonial war, and the civil war following independence during general discussions of ‘the past’. Lal (2010) points out that migration throughout the Mtwara region has been common for a long time and based on my interviews, it would seem that transnational connections across the Ruvuma River are also particularly strong. While this is not discussed in any great detail in this thesis since the central focus remains on perceptions of development in Tanzania, it would be interesting to conduct a comparative study of development among people on
both sides of the border. This would be particularly interesting given the close connections between the two countries and Nyerere’s support for Mozambican independence, as well as the extent to which the FRELIMO government of Samora Michel followed Tanzania’s lead, even while the problems with some of Nyerere’s policies were starting to materialize in Tanzania.

It would be interesting to discover whether the key finding of this thesis, namely that development is today understood through absence, rather than through presence among older people, is echoed in such a transnational study. Such a project might also reflect my claim that development to some extent creates realities that it only aims to describe, building on the ideas of Castree (2004) and Corbridge (2007) who argue that this is true of Development Studies (in the latter), and Economy and Culture (in the former). This is clearly part of the way in which development is understood by wazee, and further emphasizes widespread views that development inevitably comes from ‘outside’ of the village. This is not only an outcome of the idea of development creating aspirations and realities, but is also a function of the paternalism of various forms of development interventions over time and throughout the sixty unique lives and experiences on which this thesis rests.
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